SUPREME COURT DECIDED CASES

MMDA vs. JANCOM

G.R. No. 147465
January 30, 2002

Reporter: Jose Luis P. Pacquiao

FACTS: An Executive Committee was created by President Ramos issuance of Presidential Memorandum Order No. 202. It will oversee
the build-operate-transfer (BOT) implementation of solid waste management projects of waste disposal sites in San Mateo, Rizal and
Cavite. Proponents to the project should have the capability to establish municipal solid waste thermal plants using incineration
technology. Several bid conferences took place, and eventually the EXECOM, headed by the MMDA chairman, had approved to award to
JANCOM the San Mateo Waste Disposal site.

A draft BOT contract was prepared and was signed between JANCOM and the Philippine Government. It was submitted to
President Ramos for approval but this was too close to the end of his term which expired without him signing the contract. President
Ramos, however, endorsed the contract to incoming President Joseph E. Estrada.

With the change of administration, the composition of the EXECOM also changed. Subsequently, Republic Act No. 8749 was
passed by Congress. Due to changes in policy and economic environment, the implementation of the BOT contract executed and signed
between JANCOM and the Philippine Government would no longer be pursued. The reasons cited by MMDA for not pushing through with
the subject contract were: 1) the passage of the Clean Air Act (RA No. 8749), which allegedly bans incineration; 2) the closure of the San
Mateo landfill site; and 3) the costly tipping fee.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contract will still push through even if there is a subsequent passage of RA No. 8749

HELD: Yes. Sec. 20 of the Clean Air Act pertinently reads:

SECTION 20. Ban on Incineration. Incineration, hereby defined as the burning of municipal, bio-chemical and hazardous
wastes, which process emits poisonous and toxic fumes, is hereby prohibited: x x x.

Section 20 does not absolutely prohibit incineration as a mode of waste disposal; rather only those burning processes which emit
poisonous and toxic fumes are banned.

Mead vs. Argel

GR No. L-41958
July 20, 1982

Reporter: Jose Luis P. Pacquiao

FACTS: Petitioner Donald Mead and a certain Isaac Arivas were charged by the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal with violation of Section 9, in
relation to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3931, for unlawfully and feloniously drain or otherwise dispose into the highway canal and/or
cause, permit, suffer to be drained or allow to seep into such waterway the industrial and other waste matters discharged due to the
operation of the said Insular Oil Refinery Co

Petitioner Donald Mead, one of the accused in the criminal case, filed a motion to quash on the ground that the trial court has no
jurisdiction and that the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal has no legal personality to file the above-quoted information.

Principal contention of the petitioner states that the National Water and Air Pollution Control Commission (hereinafter referred to
as the "Commission") as created under Republic Act No. 3931 has the exclusive authority to determine the existence of "pollution" before
a criminal case can be filed for a violation of the said law; and that it has the exclusive authority to prosecute violations of the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not a Provincial Fiscal has the authority to file an information for a violation of Republic Act No. 3931

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HELD: No. The Provincial Fiscal of Rizal lacked the authority to file the information charging the petitioner with a violation of the provisions
of Republic Act No. 3931, there being no prior finding or determination by the Commission that the act of the petitioner had caused
pollution in any water or atmospheric air of the Philippines. It is not to be understood, however, that a fiscal or public prosecutor may not
file an information for a violation of the said law at all. He may do so if the Commission had made a finding or determination that the law or
any of its orders had been violated.

In the criminal case presently considered, there had been no prior determination by the Commission that the supposed acts of
the petitioner had caused pollution to any water of the Philippines. The filing of the information for the violation of Section 9 of the law is,
therefore, premature and unauthorized. Concomitantly, the respondent Judge is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense
charged therein.

Pollution Adjudication Board vs. CA

GR No. 93891
March 11,1991

Reporter: Jose Luis P. Pacquiao

FACTS: Respondent Solar Textile Finishing Corporation is involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with wastewater of about 30
gpm. Inspections were conducted and results showed that the volume of untreated wastewater discharged in the final out fall outside of
the plant's compound was even greater. Wastewater was being directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to the
Tullahan-Tinejeros River by means of a by-pass and the remaining 20% was channelled into the plant's existing Wastewater Treatment
Plant (WTP). An order was subsequently given, ordering respondent to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source
installation. A writ of execution was also received by the respondent.

Solar filed a motion for reconsideration/appeal but was denied. Dissatisfied, Solar went on appeal to the Court of Appeals which
reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. Petitioner Board moved for
reconsideration, without success.

Petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the
operations of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents or wastewater, the
pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the NPCC (now, the Board).

Respondent Solar contends that under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex parte order may issue only if the effluents
discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life." In the instant case, according to
Solar, the inspection reports before the Board made no finding that Solar's wastewater discharged posed such a threat.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Pollution Adjudication Board has the authority to issue Order and Writ of execution against respondent Solar

HELD: Yes. Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner Board to issue ex parte cease and desist orders.

Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here presented precisely because
stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be
made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple
and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years. The relevant pollution control
statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the
safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as
the police power.

The Court is not here saying that the correctness of the ex parte Order and Writ of Execution may not be contested by Solar in a
hearing before the Board itself. Where the establishment affected by an ex parte cease and desist order contests the correctness of
the prima facie findings of the Board, the Board must hold a public hearing where such establishment would have an opportunity to

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controvert the basis of such ex parte order. That such an opportunity is subsequently available is really all that is required by the due
process clause of the Constitution in situations like that we have here.

The Board's decision rendered after the public hearing may then be tested judicially by an appeal to the Court of Appeals in
accordance with Section 7(c) of P.D. No. 984 and Section 42 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations. A subsequent public hearing is
precisely what Solar should have sought instead of going to court to seek nullification of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution and
instead of appealing to the Court of Appeals.

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 Henares vs. LTFRB
G.R. No. 158290 October 23, 2006

Reporter: Vienna Mae J. Miranda

Facts: Hilarion Henares Jr., seeks for the issuance of a writ of mandamus, a judicial action, commanding LTFRB and DOTC to require
public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas(CNG) as alternative fuel since the compositions emitted by various engine
combustions have caused air pollution which has detrimental effects on health and endanger the environment and causes retardation and
leaf bleaching in plants. Petitioners propose the use of CNG to PUVs to counter the detrimental effects of its emissions. Asserting their
right to Clean Air, they petitioned for a writ of mandamus to order LTFRB and DOTC to require PUVs to use CNG as they have no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. They contends that the writ of mandamus shall be issued against the
LTFRB and DOTC, since they are the government agencies clothed with power to regulate and control vehicles and that it would
tantamount to neglect in the performance of a duty if LTFRB and DOTC will not recognize CNG and compel its use as alternative fuel. The
respondent, represented by the Solicitor General, contends that nothing in RA 8749 prohibits the use of gasoline and diesel by motor
vehicles and it is the DENR that is tasked to implement and DOE to set the specifications for all types of fuel provided by RA 8749 and
not the LTFRB. Nor the DOTC who is limited to implementing the emission standards and cannot alter emission standards. The SolGen
also argued that RA 8749 only goes as far as setting maximum limit for the emission of vehicles but does not recognize CNG as alternative
fuel and cited Sec 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court that writ of mandamus is not the correct remedy.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners can compel the respondents, through a writ of mandamus, to order the use of Compressed Natural
Gas as alternative fuel to PUVs.

Held: No. The remedy sought by petitioners, the writ of mandamus is unavailing in this case.

Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates
the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG.

At most the LTFRBs task in E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 is only to grant preferential and exclusive Certificates of
Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs based on the results of the DOTC surveys.

Petitioners were unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant of the writ of
mandamus. Under the Clean Air Act, it is the DENR that is tasked to set the emission standards for fuel use and the task of developing an
action plan. As far as motor vehicles are concerned, it devolves upon the DOTC and the line agency whose mandate is to oversee that
motor vehicles prepare an action plan and implement the emission standards for motor vehicles, namely the LTFRB.
In addition, the petition had been mooted by the issuance of Executive Order No. 290, which implemented a program on the use of
CNG by public vehicles. The court was assured that the implementation for a cleaner environment is being addressed. Though the court
said that the legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by herein
petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.

Technology Developers Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 94759 January 21, 1991

Reporter: Vienna Mae J. Miranda

Facts: Petitioner, TDI is a corporation engaged in charcoal briquette. Private respondent, the acting Mayor, ordered the full cessation of
TDIs operation without previous and reasonable notice. Residents near the company was complaining about the smoke coming out from
the plant and later it was found out in an investigation conducted that due to the manufacturing process and nature of raw materials used,
the fumes coming from the factory may contain particulate matters which are hazardous to the health of the people and that the company
should cease operating until such a time that the proper air pollution device is installed and operational. TDI filed an action for mandamus
with preliminary injunction against the acting Mayor, alleging that the closure order was issued in grave abuse of discretion.

Issue: Whether or not the acting Mayor had a legal ground to order the closure of the plant.

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Held: Yes. While it is true that the mtter of determining whether there is a pollution of the environment that requires control if not
prohibition of the operation of a business is essentially addressed to the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants
from pollution, and by virtue of his police power, he may deny the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the
same unless appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community from the
emissions in the operation of the business.
The action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents and the closure order was issued only after an
investigation was made that the fumes emitted by the plant goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air pollution device
has been installed.

The Court stressed that concomitant with the need to promote investment and contribute to the growth of the economy is the
equally essential imperative of protecting the health, nay the very lives of the people, from the deleterious effect of the pollution of the
environment.

Rodriguez vs. IAC

G.R. No. 74816 March 17, 1987

Reporter: Vienna Mae J. Miranda

Facts:

An action for abatement of a public nuisance with damages was filed against private respondent, Daytona Construction &
Development Company who manufactures road and concrete building materials and cement, by the petitioners who reside nearby the
plant because of its effluence(cement dust) that causes property damage and illness like skin problems and bronchial asthma. The trial
court declared Daytona Construction in default for not filing an answer and ruled to close the cement plant and pay damages to
petitioners. Respondent filed a petition for injunction against the execution of the closure of the plant but was denied by IAC and Supreme
Court. They again appealed to the IAC contending that the trial court should not have executed the judgment pending appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court may execute the judgement pending appeal.
Held:
Yes. The trial court had good reasons to issue the order of execution pending appeal. There was a need to stop and close the
cement plant because it was injurious to the health and property of the neighborhood where the plant is located and that its operation
causes serious discomfort to them, violates their rights and causes them damage. The evidence presented by the petitioners clearly
establishes the need for the trial court to execute the judgment.

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