Cruz vs Secretary of DENR
15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay
Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law;
IPRA; Regalian Doctrine
GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition
and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
(IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The
petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the
ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and
other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution.
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the
ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral
domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral
domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to
the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains
merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which
the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of
these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale
development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of
the lands of the public domain. They are private lands and belong to
the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title
that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However,
the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their
ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not
include the right to alienate the same.
Francisco Chavez vs Public Estates Authority (July 2002)
384 SCRA 152 Civil Law Land Titles and Deeds Lands of the
Public Domain
The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central implementing
agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took
over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR (Department of
Environmental and Natural Resources) insofar as reclaimed or about
to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and Development
Corporation, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34
hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156
hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to Amari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.
HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public
domain to be transferred to Amari as private lands will sanction a
gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed
lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of
title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain.
The 592.
remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain.
The transfer (as embodied in a joint venture agreement) to
AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares
of the Freedom Islands, is void for being contrary to Section
3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also
seeks to transfer to Amari ownership of 290.156 hectares of
still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for
being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural
resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
Chavez v. NHA (2007)
Doctrines:
Secs. 2 and 3, Art. XII of the Constitution declare
that all natural resources are owned by the State
and they cannot be alienated except for alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain.
Facts:
On March 19, 1993, the National Housing Authority
(NHA) and R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) entered into a Joint
Venture Agreement (JVA) for the development of the
Smokey Mountain dumpsite and reclamation area to be
converted into a low cost medium rise housing complex and
industrial/commercial site. The Project will involve 79
hectares of reclaimed land (it was initially 40 hectares but
the JVA was amended). The JVA also provides that as part
of the consideration for the Project, NHA will convey a
portion of the reclaimed lands to RBI.
The reclamation of the area was made; and
subsequently, Special Patents were issued conveying the
reclaimed land to NHA.
On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco
I. Chavez filed this Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus
seeking to declare NULL and VOID the Joint Venture
Agreement (JVA) and the Smokey Mountain Development
and Reclamation Project, and all other agreements in
relation thereto, for being Unconstitutional and Invalid.
Issues:
1. W/N NHA and RBI have been granted the power
and authority to reclaim lands of the public domain
(Chavez claims that the power to reclaim lands of
public domain is vested exclusively with PEA).
2. W/N NHA and RBI were given the power and
authority by DENR to reclaim foreshore and
submerged lands, as required (Chavez claims that
they were not).
3. W/N the reclaimed lands are classified as alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain
(Chavez claims that there was no proclamation
officially classifying the reclaimed lands as
alienable and disposable).
4. W/N the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI is void
since it did not undergo public bidding but by
negotiated contract.
5. W/N RBI, being a private corporation, is barred by
the Constitution to acquire lands of public domain.
Held/Ratio:
1 NAT RES
1. YES. Although PEA was designated under EO 525 as the
agency primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and
coordinating all reclamation projects, its charter does not
mention that it has the exclusive and sole power and
authority to reclaim lands of public domain. In fact, EO 525
provides that reclamation projects may also be undertaken
by a national government agency or entity authorized by its
charter to reclaim land.
There are 3 requisites to a legal and valid reclamation
project:
a. approval by the President;
b. favorable recommendation of PEA; and
c. undertaken by any of the ff:
i. PEA
ii. any person or entity pursuant to a
contract it executed with PEA
iii. the National government agency or
entity authorized under its charter to
reclaim lands subject to consultation
with PEA.
Applying the above requirements, the SC concluded that the
Project has met all 3 requirements:
a. There was ample approval by the President of the
Philippines. Presidents Aquino and Ramos issued
Proclamations approving and implementing the
reclamation of lands.
b. There was an implied grant of a favorable endorsement
of the reclamation phase from PEA. This is shown in the
fact that PEA was a member of the EXECOM which was
in charge of overseeing the implementation of the
Project.
c. The reclamation was undertaken by the NHA, a national
government agency authorized to reclaim lands under
its charter and other laws. While the charter of NHA does
not explicitly mention reclamation in any of its listed
powers, such power is implied since it is vital or
incidental to achieving the objective of an urban land
reform and housing program.
2. YES. The DENR exercises exclusive jurisdiction on the
management and disposition of all lands of the public
domain. As such, it decides whether areas, like foreshore or
submerged lands, should be reclaimed or not and whether
they should be classified as alienable and disposable.
In this case, when the President approved and ordered the
development of a housing project with the corresponding
reclamation work, making DENR a member of the EXECOM
(committee tasked to implement the project), the required
authorization from the DENR to reclaim land can be
deemed satisfied. Also, the issuance of the Environmental
Compliance Certificates by the DENR shows its ratification
of the reclamation project.
3. YES. When Proclamations Nos. 39 (placed the lands under
the administration and disposition of the NHA) and 465
(increased the reclamation area from 40 hectares to 79
hectares) were issued, the inalienable lands covered by
said proclamations were converted to alienable and
disposable lands of public domain. Furthermore, when
the titles to such reclaimed lands were transferred to the
NHA, said alienable and disposable lands of public domain
were automatically classified as lands of the private
domain or patrimonial properties of the State. The reason
is obvious: if the reclaimed land is not converted to
patrimonial land once transferred to NHA, then it
would be useless to transfer it to the NHA since it
will not be able to transfer such lands to qualified
entities and thus, it will not achieve its purpose.
4. VALID. Since the lands reclaimed became
patrimonial properties of the State upon transfer of
their titles to the NHA, the latter can therefore
legally transfer them to RBI or to any other
interested qualified buyer without any bidding.
Unlike the PEA, the NHA is a government agency
not tasked to sell lands of the public domain.
5. NO. RA 6957, as amended (BOT Law), states that
a contractor can be paid a portion as percentage
of the reclaimed land subject to the constitutional
requirement that only Filipino citizens or
corporations with at least 60% Filipino equity can
acquire the same. In this case, RBI is a private
corporation wherein Filipino citizens own at least
60% of its shares.
Republic vs Naguiat
Natural Resources and Environmental Laws
G.R. No. 134209; January 24, 2006
FACTS:
Celestina Naguiat filed an application for
registration of title to four parcels of land located in
Panan, Botolan, Zambales. The applicant alleges
that she is the owner of the said parcels of land
having acquired them by purchase from its
previous owners and their predecessors-in-interest
who have been in possession thereof for more
than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her
knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or
encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any
person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in
possession thereof.
Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that
neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the
lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior
thereto, considering the fact that she has not
established that the lands in question have been
declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable
and disposable property.
ISSUE:
Did the areas in question cease to have the status
of forest or other inalienable lands of the public
domain?
HELD:
No, the said areas are still classified as forest
land.The issue of whether or not respondent and
her predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
exclusive and continuous possession of the
parcels of land in question is of little moment. For,
unclassified land cannot be acquired by adverse
occupation or possession; occupation thereof in
the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen
into private ownership and be registered as title.
2 NAT RES

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain
does not lose such classification simply because loggers or
settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land
classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass
or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers.
"Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of
the way places. The classification is merely descriptive of its
legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of
what the land actually looks like.
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
GR No. 179987
April 29, 2009
en banc
FACTS:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land
registration before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of
land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters.
Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful
possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco
testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two
hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino
had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe
fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons
inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966,
Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the
properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After
the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded
them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which
originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this
property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a
Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community
Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated
that the subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established
under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on
March 15, 1982. On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved the
application for registration.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing
that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC
had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in
the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation
of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals
reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the appliocation of
Malabanan.
ISSUES:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain
may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No.
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree,
should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as
of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification
occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for
registration provided that it is established that the applicant
has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as
alienable and disposable be deemed private land and
therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in
accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in
character either because of its use or because its slope is
below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the
provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject
land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree or both?
HELD:
The Pertition is denied.
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or
through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and
registrable title to, such lands based on the length and
quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12
June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have
been alienable and disposable during the entire period of
possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial
confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared
alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed
by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code,
prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership
of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands
become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration
that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be
an express government manifestation that the property is
already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service
or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of
the Civil Code. And only when the property has become
patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of
property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the
government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial
3 NAT RES
property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure
registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property

may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under
ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a
patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in
good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive
prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse possession of
patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good
faith or just title, ripens into ownership.

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish

that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive
evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property
since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date
back their possession, according to their own evidencethe Tax
Declarations they presented in particularis to the year 1948. Thus,
they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for

registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or
disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer
intended for public use service or for the development of the national
evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The
classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land
of the public domain does not change its status as property of the
public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

4 NAT RES