Svatahprmnyavda

Before going to discuss the theory of Svatahprmnyavda let us consider the

nature of knowledge according to Mimms. Prabhkar defines valid knowledge as
apprehension. All apprehension is direct and immediate and valid per se. A cognition,
which apprehends an object, cannot be intrinsically invalid. Memory arises from the
impression of a prior cognition and therefore cannot be treated as valid knowledge.
Kumrila defines valid knowledge as apprehension of an object, which is produced by,
causes free from defects and which is not contradicted by subsequent knowledge.
Prthasrathi defines it as apprehension of anobject, which has not been already
apprehended, which truly represents the object, which is not produced by defective
causes, and which is free from contradiction. A valid cognition therefore must fulfill
theses four conditions. Firstly, it must not arise from defective causes. Secondly, it must
be free from contradiction. It must be self-consistent and should not be set aside by
subsequent knowledge. Thirdly, it must apprehend an object, which has not already been
apprehended. Novelty is the essential feature of knowledge. Fourthly, it must truly
represent the object.
The Mimmsaka upholds the theory of Svatahprmnyavda, which may be
translated as the theory of self-validity or intrinsic validity of knowledge. All
apprehension is intrinsically valid. All knowledge is valid by itself. It is not validated by
any other knowledge. Its validity arises from those very causes from which knowledge
itself arises. Validity of knowledge arises from the essential nature of the causes of
knowledge. It is not due to any extraneous conditions. Prabhkara and Kumrila both
uphold the intrinsic validity of knowledge. Prabhkara says: All cognitions as cognitions
are valid; their invalidity is de to their disagreement with the real nature of the objects.
Kumrila also says, The validity of knowledge consists in its apprehending an object; it
is set aside by such discrepancies as its disagreement with the real nature of the object.
All knowledge, therefore, is presumably valid and our normal life runs smooth on
account of this belief. A need for explanation is felt only when knowledge fails to be
valid. And its invalidity is inferred either from some defect in the instrument of
knowledge or from a subsequent contradicting knowledge. If a person suffering from
jaundice sees a conch yellow, the knowledge of the yellow conch is invalidated on
account of the defect in the organ of vision, i.e., on account of the presence of the bile in
the eye. If a rope is mistaken for a snake, the knowledge of the rope-snake is invalidated
by the subsequent knowledge of the rope. Though the invalidity of knowledge is inferred,
yet knowledge itself is intrinsically presumed to be valid. Its validity is not subject to
inference. Truth is normal; error is abnormal. Belief is natural; disbelief is exception. The
Mimmsaka advocates the self-validity of knowledge both in respect its origin and
ascertainment. The validity of knowledge arises together with that knowledge and it is
also known as soon as that knowledge is known. The very condition which gives rise to
knowledge also gives rise to its validity as well as to the belief in that validity. Validity of
knowledge and knowledge of that validity arise together with that knowledge and from
those very conditions, which give rise to that knowledge. Neither validity nor belief in
that validity is due to any external condition and neither requires any verification by
anything else. The theory of self-validity of knowledge is advocated in these two aspects.
If the necessary conditions which give rise to knowledge, e.g., absence of defects in the
instrument of knowledge arises and it arises with a belief in its validity. The conditions,
which give rise to knowledge also give, rise to its validity. And this validity is known as
soon as the knowledge has arisen.
Mdhavchrya in his Sarvadarshnasangraha has mentioned four theories of the
validity and invalidity of knowledge. According to Snkhya, both the validity and the
invalidity of knowledge are self-evident. According to some school of Buddhism,
knowledge intrinsically invalid and becomes valid through extraneous conditions.
According to Nyya-Vaishesika, both the validity and the invalidity of knowledge are due
to extraneous conditions. According to Mimma, knowledge is intrinsically valid,
though its validity is due to extraneous conditions.
The Mimmsaka criticizes the Sankhya view by pointing out that same
knowledge cannot be both intrinsically valid and invalid. It would be clear self-
contradiction to maintain that. If it is said that the same knowledge is not regarded as
valid and invalid, but what is maintained is only this that validity knowledge reveals its
validity and invalid knowledge reveals ifs invalidity without depending on external
conditions, then it would be difficult to distinguish between valid and invalid knowledge,
because validity cannot be known without external conditions. The Buddhist view is
criticizes by pointing out that if knowledge is not intrinsically valid it can never be
validated afterwards, for second knowledge, which is said to validate the first, brings
itself knowledge is intrinsically invalid and requires another knowledge to validate itself
and so on ad infinitum.
The controversy between the Mimmsaka and the Nyyika regarding the validity
of knowledge has become classic. Nyya advocates the theory of extrinsic validity of
knowledge called Paratah Prmnyavada. The Mimmsaka agrees with the Nyyika so
far as the invalidity of knowledge is concerned, because both regard it is due to
extraneous conditions. But he criticizes Nyyika in regard to the validity of knowledge.
All knowledge is intrinsically valid. If the validity of knowledge also, like its invalidity,
depends on extraneous conditions, no knowledge would ever become valid. The Nyyika
contends that knowledge arises simple as knowledge that it is natural and that question of
its validity or invalidity arises afterwards and depends on external test. The Mimmsaka
points out that the so-called natural knowledge is an impossibility. We always
experience either valid or invalid knowledge. There is no third alternative; we never
experience natural knowledge. To say so is to maintain the absurd position that
knowledge when it arises is devoid of all logical value. Hence natural knowledge is no
knowledge at all. All knowledge must be either valid or invalid. We admit that the
validity of knowledge is due to extraneous condition. Nothing can validate knowledge if
knowledge is not self valid. The presence of excellence (guna) in the causes of
knowledge cannot make it valid, for no such excellence is known. There is no necessity
of assuming any excellence in the causes of knowledge. Freedom from defect and
contradiction is sufficient to account for the rise of valid knowledge. If validity of
knowledge is due to an external condition like some excellence in the causes of
knowledge or correspondence or fruitful activity, then this second knowledge of
excellence or correspondence of fruitful activity would require a third knowledge to
validate itself before it can validate the first knowledge and so on as infinitum.