Malabang vs Benito

FACTS:

Municipality of Balabagan was once part of the Municipality of Malabang before it was created into a separate municipality
thru an executive order.

The Municipality Malabang filed a suit against the Municipality of Balabagan for having been created under an invalid EO
386 and to restrain the respondent municipal officials from performing the functions of their respective offices.

Petitioner relied on the ruling of the Pelaez case that Sec. 68 of the Administrative Code is unconstitutional (a) because it
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and (b) because it offends against Section 10 (1) of Article VII of the
Constitution, which limits the President's power over local governments to mere supervision.

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the
subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory
enactment.

The Respondents on the other hand argue that the Mun. of Balabagan is at least a de facto corporation for having been
organized under color of a statute before this was declared unconstitutional, its officers having been either elected or
appointed, and the municipality itself having discharged its corporate functions for the past five years preceding the
institution of this action. It is contended that as a de facto corporation, its existence cannot be collaterally attacked,
although it may be inquired into directly in an action for quo warranto at the instance of the State and not of an individual
like the petitioner Balindong.

The method of challenging the existence of a municipal corporation is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo
warranto or other direct proceeding. But the rule disallowing collateral attacks applies only where the municipal
corporation is at least a de facto corporation. For where it is neither a corporation de jure nor de facto, but a nullity, the
rule is that its existence may be questioned collaterally or directly in any action or proceeding by any one whose rights or
interests are affected thereby, including the citizens of the territory incorporated unless they are estopped by their conduct
from doing so.

ISSUE: W/O the municipality of Balabagan is a de facto corporation.

RULING:

No, because there is no other valid statute to give color of authority to its creation when EO 386 was subsequently
declared as unconstitutional.

The color of authority requisite to the organization of a de facto municipal corporation may be:

1. A valid law enacted by the legislature.

2. An unconstitutional law, valid on its face, which has either (a) been upheld for a time by the courts or (b) not yet been
declared void; provided that a warrant for its creation can be found in some other valid law or in the recognition of its
potential existence by the general laws or constitution of the state.

In the case at bar, there is no other law that could give color of authority to the validity of the existence of the municpality
of Balabagan when EO 386 was later on invalidated. Hence, such municipality is not a de factor corporation.

Padilla v COMELEC

FACTS: COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2312 pursuant to RA No. 7155 which created the Municipality of Tulay-
Na-Lupa. 15 Dec 1991: A plebiscite was held in the barangays comprising the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa
and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. Only 2,890 favored the creation of the new
municipality while 3,439 voted against it.

The Governor of Camarines Norte sought to set aside the plebiscite on the ground that it should not have been conducted
since the approval and ratification of the 1987 Constitution reverted to the ruling in Paredes v Executive Secretary and
that Tan v COMELEC is no longer controlling.

ISSUE: WON the term political units directly affected only comprises those areas in the proposed LGU and not those
from the mother LGU. NO.

RATIO: The deletion of the phrase unit or in Sec. 10 Art. XI of the 1973 Constitution has not affected the ruling of the SC
in Tan v COMELEC.

During the 1986 Con Com:

Mr. Davide: I precisely asked for the deletion of the words unit or because in the plebiscite to be conducted, it
must involve all the units affected. If it is the creation of a barangay, the municipality itself must participate in the plebiscite
because it is affected. It would mean a loss of a territory.

It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted in the political units directly
affected, it means that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation have a
right to vote. The phrase political units directly affected contemplates the plurality of political units which would
participate in the exercise.

Miranda v Aguirre (1999)

FACTS: 5 May 1994: RA 7720 converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into an independent component city. 14
Feb 1998: RA 8528 was enacted, amending RA 7720. It changed the status of Santiago from an independent component
city to a component city. Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of this RA since it lacked a provision submitting the law
for ratification by the people of Santiago City in a plebiscite. The respondents raised the defense of standing and the
political question doctrine. The Sol Gen argued that the RA merely reclassified Santiago City from an independent
component city to a component city. It allegedly did not involve any creation, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units.

ISSUE: WON a reclassification of a city from an independent component city to a component city requires a plebiscite.
YES.

RATIO: The wording of the constitution has a common denominator: the material change in the political and economic
rights of the LGU directly affected. The consent of the people is required to serve as a checking mechanism to any
exercise of legislative power. The changes are substantial. The city mayor will be placed under the administrative
supervision of the provincial governor. The resolutions and ordinances of the city council will have to be reviewed by the
Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city will have to be shared with the province. There would
be a reduction in their IRA.

When RA 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago City from a municipality to an independent component city, it
required the approval of its people thru a plebiscite called for that purpose. There is no reason why the same should not
be done when RA 8528 downgrades the status of their city. The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward
so long as they result in a material change in the LGU directly affect

Grio vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 105120 September 2, 1992

FACTS:

Grio and his LDP political party filed a certiorari case against COMELEC in relation to the May 11, 1992 election. Grio is
a candidate for Governor of Iloilo where the sub-province of Guimaras is located. LGC of 1991 took effect requiring the
conversion of existing sub-provinces into regular provinces, and Guimaras is one such sub-provinces, upon approval by
majority of votes cast in a plebiscite. The plebiscite favored the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province but
petitioner questioned the COMELEC that ballots should have contained spaces to allow voting for Gov, Vice Gov and
members of the Sanggunian of Iloilo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a complete failure of election in Guimaras.

HELD:

The court held that COMELEC was under mistaken presumption that under the LGC of 1991, whether or not the
conversion of Guimaras into a regular province is ratified by the people in plebiscite, the President will appoint provincial
officials. However, the voters favored for the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province so there was need to undo
what COMELEC has done in plebiscite. There, ballots in Guimaras should have contained spaces for Gov and Vice Gov.
etc. but SC has now considered the case moot and academic since majority voted in the affirmative for the conversion of
Guimaras.

Alvarez v Guingona (1996)

FACTS:

- HB 8817 entitled An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be
known as the City of Santiago was filed in the lower house.
- A counterpart of the bill was filed in the Senate, SB 1243.
- The Senate conducted public hearings after HB No. 8817 was transmitted to the Senate.
- Petitioners contend that RA 7720 is unconstitutional since:
o The Act did not originate exclusively from in the House as mandated by Sec. 24, Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution.
o Santiago has not met the minimum average annual income required under Sec. 450 of the LGC for it to
be converted into a component city.
- The petitioners argued that the income of an LGU does not include the IRA. The average annual income of
Santiago was more than P20M. It is reduced to only P13M, however, if the IRA is excluded from the computation.

ISSUE: WON RA 7720 should be declared unconstitutional for the two reasons cited.

HELD: NO. RA 7720 is constitutional.

The acquisition of resources necessary to discharge its powers and effectively carry out its functions is effected
through the vesting in every LGU of:

1. The right to create and broaden its own source of revenue;

2. The right to be allocated a just share in national taxes, such share being in the form of Internal Revenue
Allotments (IRAs); and
3. the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth, if
any, within its territorial boundaries.

- The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and National wealth utilization proceeds accrue to the general fund of the
LGU and are used to finance its operations subject to specified modes of spending the same as provided for in the LGC
and its implementing rules and regulations.
Income- all revenues and receipts collected or received forming the gross accretions of funds of the LGU.

- DOF certified that the municipality had an average annual income of at least 20M for the last 2 consecutive years
based on 1991 constant prices.

Sec. 450 (c) of the LGC provides that the average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general
fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income.

________________________________________________________________________________________________

League of Cities vs COMELEC

During the 11th Congress, 57 bills seeking the conversion of municipalities into component cities were filed before
the House of Representatives. However, Congress acted only on 33 bills. It did not act on bills converting 24 other
municipalities into cities. During the 12thCongress, R.A. No. 9009 became effective revising Section 450 of the Local
Government Code. It increased the income requirement to qualify for conversion into a city from P20 million annual
income to P100 million locally-generated income. In the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities filed, through their
respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. Each of the cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting the
particular municipality from the 100 million income requirement imposed by R.A. No. 9009.

Are the cityhood laws converting 16 municipalities into cities constitutional?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

November 18, 2008 Ruling

No. The SC (voting 6-5) ruled that the exemptions in the City Laws is unconstitutional because sec. 10, Art. X of
the Constitution requires that such exemption must be written into the LGC and not into any other laws. The Cityhood
Laws violate sec. 6, Art. X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local
government units. The criteria, as prescribed in sec. 450 of the LGC, must be strictly followed because such criteria
prescribed by law, are material in determining the just share of local government units (LGUs) in national taxes.
(League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec GR No. 176951, November 18, 2008)

March 31, 2009 Ruling

No. The SC denied the first Motion for Reconsideration. 7-5 vote.

April 28, 2009 Ruling

No. The SC En Banc, by a split vote (6-6), denied a second motion for reconsideration.

December 21, 2009 Ruling

Yes. The SC (voting 6-4) reversed its November 18, 2008 decision and declared as constitutional the Cityhood
Laws or Republic Acts (RAs) converting 16 municipalities into cities. It said that based on Congress deliberations and
clear legislative intent was that the then pending cityhood bills would be outside the pale of the minimum income
requirement of PhP100 million that Senate Bill No. 2159 proposes; and RA 9009 would not have any retroactive effect
insofar as the cityhood bills are concerned. The conversion of a municipality into a city will only affect its status as a
political unit, but not its property as such, it added. The Court held that the favorable treatment accorded the sixteen
municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on substantial distinction.
The Court stressed that respondent LGUs were qualified cityhood applicants before the enactment of RA 9009. To
impose on them the much higher income requirement after what they have gone through would appear to be indeed
unfair. Thus, the imperatives of fairness dictate that they should be given a legal remedy by which they should be allowed
to prove that they have all the necessary qualifications for city status using the criteria set forth under the LGC of 1991
prior to its amendment by RA 9009. (GR No. 176951, League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC; GR No. 177499,
League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC; GR No. 178056, League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC,
December 21, 2009) NOTE: The November 18, 2008 ruling already became final and executory and was recorded in the
SCs Book of Entries of Judgments on May 21, 2009.)
August 24, 2010 Ruling

No. The SC (voting 7-6) granted the motions for reconsideration of the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), et al. and
reinstated its November 18, 2008 decision declaring unconstitutional the Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts (RAs)
converting 16 municipalities into cities. Undeniably, the 6-6 vote did not overrule the prior majority en banc Decision of 18
November 2008, as well as the prior majority en banc Resolution of 31 March 2009 denying reconsideration. The tie-vote
on the second motion for reconsideration is not the same as a tie-vote on the main decision where there is no prior
decision, the Court said. In the latest resolution, the Court reiterated its November 18, 2008 ruling that the Cityhood Laws
violate sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution which expressly provides that no cityshall be createdexcept in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code. It stressed that while all the criteria for the creation of cities
must be embodied exclusively in the Local Government Code, the assailed Cityhood Laws provided an exemption from
the increased income requirement for the creation of cities under sec. 450 of the LGC. The unconstitutionality of the
Cityhood Laws lies in the fact that Congress provided an exemption contrary to the express language of the
Constitution.Congress exceeded and abused its law-making power, rendering the challenged Cityhood Laws void for
being violative of the Constitution, the Court held.

The Court further held that limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the
classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities
cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in
the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for
violation of the equal protection clause. (GR No. 176951,League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec; GR No.
177499, League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec; GR No. 178056, League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec,
August 24, 2010)

February 15, 2011 Ruling

Yes, the laws are constitutional. The February 15, 2011 resolution is the fourth ruling since the High Court first resolved
the Cityhood case in 2008.

April 12, 2011Ruling

Yes! Its final. The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. We should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities
covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, but have also complied
with the requirements of the [Local Government Code] LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by RA No. 9009. Congress
undeniably gave these cities all the considerations that justice and fair play demanded. Hence, this Court should do no
less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative intent and by duly recognizing the certain
collective wisdom of Congress, the SC said.

The Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be
exempted from the coverage of RA 9009, which imposes a higher income requirement of PhP100 million for the creation
of cities.

The Court reiterated that while RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, the Congress was well aware of the
pendency of conversion bills of several municipalities, including those covered by the Cityhood Laws. It pointed out that
RA 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, when the 12th Congress was incipient. By reason of the clear legislative intent to
exempt the municipalities covered by the conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, the House of
Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in
Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 from the coverage of Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to
act on the said Joint Resolution. Even so, the House readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 during
the 12th Congress, and forwarded the same for approval to the Senate, which again failed to prove it. Eventually, the
conversion bills of respondents were individually filed in the Lower House and fellesters.blogspot.com were all
unanimously and favorably voted upon. When forwarded to the Senate, the bills were also unanimously approved. The
acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but
the express articulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception, from the coverage of
RA No. 9009. Thereby, RA 9009, and, by necessity, the LCG, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the express
exemptions being embodied in the exemption
clauses.(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/news/courtnews%20flash/2011/04/04141101.php)

The Court held that the imposition of the income requirement of P100 million from local sources under RA 9009 was
arbitrary. While the Constitution mandates that the creation of local government units must comply with the criteria laid
down in the LGC, it cannot be justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the LGC
despite such amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to promote autonomy,
decentralization, countryside development, and the concomitant national growth.(GR No. 176951, League of City of the
Philippines v. COMELEC; GR No. 177499, League of City of the Philippines v. COMELEC: GR No. 178056, League of
City of the Philippines v. COMELEC, April 12, 2011)

NAVARRO v ERMITA

Facts: Republic Act No. 9355 created a province of Dinagat Islands, formerly part of Surigao Del Norte. It was questioned
for constitutionality for not being in compliance with the population or the land area requirements of the Local Government
Code under Sec. 461. Previous decisions relating to this case declared the creation of the province as unconstitutional.

Issue: Is the creation of Dinagat Islands as a separate province constitutional?

Held: YES. SC now looked at the central policy considerations in the creation of provinces. They compared the LGC
provisions on the creation of municipalities and cities and how they allow an exception to the land area requirement in
cases of non-contiguity as provided for under Sections 442 and 450 of the LGC.SC concluded that it must have been the
intent of the legislators to extend such exception to provinces especially considering the physical configuration of the
Philippine archipelago. In fact, while such exemption was absent under Section 461 of the LGC (provision relating to
creation of provinces), such was incorporated under the LGC-IRR thus correcting the congressional oversight in said
provision and reflecting the true legislative intent. Moreover, the earlier decisions show a very restrictive construction
which could trench on the equal protection clause, as it actually defeats the purpose of local autonomy and
decentralization as enshrined in the Constitution. Hence, the land area requirement should be read together with
territorial contiguity.