MABANAG VS.

LOPEZ VITO

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-1123 March 5, 1947

ALEJO MABANAG, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.

JOSE LOPEZ VITO, ET AL., respondents.

Alejo Mabanag, Jose O. Vera, Jesus G. Barrera, Felixberto Serrano, J. Antonio Araneta, Antonio Barredo, and Jose W. Diokno
for petitioners.

Secretary of Justice Ozaeta, Solicitor General Taada, and First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes for respondents.

FACTS: Three senators and eight representatives had been proclaimed by a majority vote of the Commission on Elections as
having been elected senators and representatives in the elections held on 23 April 1946. The three senators were suspended
by the Senate shortly after the opening of the first session of Congress following the elections, on account of alleged
irregularities in their election. The eight representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in the lower House,
except to take part in the election of the Speaker, for the same reason, although they had not been formally suspended. A
resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the House of Representatives, but that resolution had not been acted
upon definitely by the House when the petition for prohibition was filed. As a consequence these three senators and eight
representatives did not take part in the passage of the congressional resolution, designated "Resolution of both houses
proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto," nor was their
membership reckoned within the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote which is required in proposing an
amendment to the Constitution. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the
proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. The petition
for prohibition sought to prevent the enforcement of said congressional resolution, as it is allegedly contrary to the
Constitution. The members of the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor General, and the
Director of the Bureau of Printing are made defendants. Eight senators, 17 representatives, and the presidents of the
Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party.

ISSUE: Whether the Court may inquire upon the irregularities in the approval of the resolution proposing an amendment to
the Constitution.

HELD: It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities that political questions are not within the province of
the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express
constitutional or statutory provision. This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the separation of powers, a principle also
too well known to require elucidation or citation of authorities. The difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the
meaning of political question. The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in
full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of the political
departments of the government. If a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political
departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect. If
ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question. The
two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory
process as provided in section I of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution "consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and
ratification." There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal
to amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and
committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even in dependent of any intervention by the
Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest,
there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal then into that of ratification.

GONZALES VS. COMELEC [21 SCRA 774; G.R. No. L-28196; 9 Nov 1967

G.R. No. L-28196

21 SCRA 774

November 9, 1967

Petitioner: Ramon A. Gonzalez / Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA)

Respondent: Commission on Elections (COMELEC)

FACTS: This case is composed of consolidated cases filed separately by Petitioner Gonzalez and PHILCONSA assailing for the
declaration of nullity of RA. No. 4913 and R.B.H. No. 1 and 3. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of
Representatives passed the following resolutions (Resolution of Both Houses/R.B.H.):

1. R.B.H No. 1: Proposes that Sec 5, Art VI of Constitution be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of
Representatives from a maximum of 120 in accordance with the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be
apportioned among several provinces and that each province shall have at least one (1) member.

2. R.B.H. No. 2: Calls for a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution, which will be composed of two (2) elective
delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of
November 1971.

3. R.B.H. No. 3: Proposes that Sec 16, Art VI of the Constitution be amended so as to authorize Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without the need to forfeit
their respective seats in Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which became RA No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution
proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people at the general elections on
November 14, 1967. This act fixes the date and manner of elevtion for the proposed amendments to be voted upon by the
people, and appropriates funds for said election.

Petitioners assail the validity/constitutionality of RA No. 4913 and for the prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain
COMELEC from implementing or complying with the said law. PHILCONSA also assails R.B.H No. 1 and 3.

ISSUE:

1.) Whether or not RA No. 4913 is unconstitutional.

2.) Whether or not the issue involves a political question.

HELD:

1.) Pursuant to Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, SC held that there is nothing in this provision that states that the election
referred to is special, different from the general election. The Congress deemed it best to submit the amendments for
ratification in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed
amendments for ratification in general elections. Petition is therefore DENIED.

2.) SC also noted that the issue is a political question because it attacks the wisdom of the action taken by Congress and not
the authority to take it. A political question is not subject to review by the Court.

TOLENTINO V. COMELEC

Petitioner: ARTURO M. TOLENTINO

Respondents: Commission on Election, and the Chief Accountant, the Auditor and the Disbursing Officer of the 1971
Constitutional Convention, Raul S. Manglapus, Jesus G. Barrera, Pablo S. Trillana III, Victor dela Serna, Marcelo B. Fernan, Jose
Y. Feria, Leonardo Siguin Reyna, Victor F. Ortega and Juan V. BorraG.R. No. L-34150; October 16, 1971, 41 SCRA 702
Ponente: Barredo, J.

FACTS:
After the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention held on November 10, 1970, the convention held its
inaugural session on June 1, 1971. On the early morning of September 28, 1971, the Convention approved Organic Resolution
No. 1 which seeks to amend Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution, lowering the voting age to 18. On September 30, 1971,
COMELEC resolved to inform the Constitutional Convention that it will hold the plebiscite together with the senatorial
elections on November 8, 1971. Arturo Tolentino filed a petition for prohibition against COMELEC and prayed that Organic
Resolution No. 1 and acts in obedience to the resolution be null and void.

ISSUE:
1. Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?
2. Is the Organic Resolution No. 1 constitutional?

HELD:
1. The case at bar is justiciable. As held in Gonzales vs. Comelec, the issue whether or not a resolution of Congress, acting
as a constituent assembly, violates the constitution is a justiciable one and thus subject to judicial review. The jurisdiction is
not because the Court is superior to the Convention but they are both subject to the Constitution.
2. The act of the Convention calling for a plebiscite on a single amendment in Organic Resolution No. 1 violated Sec. 1 of
Article XV of the Constitution which states that all amendments must be submitted to the people in a single election or
plebiscite. Moreover, the voter must be provided sufficient time and ample basis to assess the amendment in relation to the
other parts of the Constitution, not separately but together.
SANIDAD VS COMELEC

73 SCRA 333; October 12, 1976

Ponente: Martin, J

Facts: On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA
AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law. The Commission on Elections, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987
Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), said R.A. 6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution
No. 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. In a petition
dated November 20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW"
for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the
constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which provides: Section 19. Prohibition on columnists,
commentators or announcers. During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass
media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or
against the plebiscite issues It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional because it violates the
constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the Constitution.

Issue : WON the said Section 19 of resolution No 2167 is unconstitutional

Held: it is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the power to supervise and
regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other
public utilities, media of communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to
reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured
Neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec
has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to
expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are
neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section
19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis. While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner's freedom
of expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the forum where he may express his view. No reason was advanced by
respondent to justify such abridgement. We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's
freedom of expression for no justifiable reason. Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people's
right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an
unabridged discussion of the issues, including the forum. The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should
not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised. Comelec spaces and
Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the
public concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or television times

ALEX ALMARIO VS MANUEL ALBA

[G.R. No. L-66088. January 25, 1984.]

ALEX G. ALMARIO, ISAGANI M. JUNGCO, ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., DORINTINO FLORESTA, FIDELA Y. VARGAS, ET
AL., Petitioners, v. HON. MANUEL ALBA and THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.

FACTS: In January 1984, a plebiscite was to be held to allow the voters to either approve or reject amendments to the
Constitution proposed by the Batasang Pambansa. The proposed amendments are embodied in four (4) separate questions to
be answered by simple YES or NO answers.
Alex Almario and some other concerned groups seek to enjoin the submission in the said plebiscite of Questions No. 3
(grant as an additional mode of acquiring lands belonging to the public domain) and 4 (the undertaking by the government
of a land reform program and a social reform program) to the people for ratification or rejection on the ground that there has
been no fair and proper submission following the doctrine laid down in Tolentino v. COMELEC.

However, unlike in the case of Tolentino vs COMELEC, Almario et al do not seek to prohibit the holding of the plebiscite but
only ask for more time for the people to study the meaning and implications of the said questions/proposals until the nature
and effect of the proposals are fairly and properly submitted to the electorate.

ISSUE: Whether or not Questions 3 and 4 can be presented to the people on a later date.

HELD: No. This is a political question. The necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the proposed amendments are beyond the
power of the courts to adjudicate. Precisely, whether or not grant of public land and urban land reform are unwise or
improvident or whether or not the proposed amendments are unnecessary is a matter which only the people can decide. The
questions are presented for their determination.

Assuming that a member or some members of the Supreme Court may find undesirable any additional mode of disposing of
public land or an urban land reform program, the remedy is to vote NO in the plebiscite but not to substitute his or their
aversion to the proposed amendments by denying to the millions of voters an opportunity to express their own likes or
dislikes.

Further, Almario et al have failed to make out a case that the average voter does not know the meaning of grant of public
land or of urban land reform.