G.R. No.

173791 The Information, dated February 21, 1997, was filed with the court on February 28,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, 1997.
- versus -
PABLO AMODIA, Accused-Appellant. Pablo was arrested on June 5, 1998 and was thereafter prosecuted. The other
Present: accused remained at large.[4] Pablo moved to quash the Information on the ground
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, of mistaken identity and the staleness of the warrant of arrest issued on March 4,
CARPIO MORALES, 1997. The RTC denied his motion.[5]
TINGA,
Pablo entered a plea of not guilty to the charge when arraigned on August 3, 1998.[6]
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ. The Prosecutions Version

Promulgated: The prosecution presented evidence, both documentary [7] and

April 7, 2009
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals [1] (CA) affirming with
modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38, Makati Cityin
Criminal Case No. 97-289. The RTC found the accused-appellant Pablo Amodia
(Pablo) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the corresponding civil liabilities
to the heirs of the victim.
Pablo was indicted, together with three other accused, under the
Information:[2]
That on or about the 26th day of November 1996, in the City of Makati, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another,
while armed with a piece of wood and bladed weapon, taking advantage of their
superior strength [sic] and employing means to weaken the defense, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal
violence upon one FELIX OLANDRIA y BERGAO, by beating him on the head with a
piece of wood and stabbing him repeatedly on the different parts of his body,
thereby inflicting upon him mortal/fatal stab wounds which directly caused his
death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
[8]
testimonial, to establish that Pablo was one of the four assailants who, by their
concerted efforts, killed Felix Olandria y Bergao (victim).[9] Acting together, they hit
him on the head and stabbed him.
The records show that Romildo Ceno (Romildo) was a resident of Zone 17, Pembo,
Makati City and lived in the house of Freda Elnar (Freda).[10] At around 12:05 a.m. of
November 26, 1996, he, Mario Bitco (Mario),[11] and Freda were talking and watching
television at their house[12] when he heard a noise coming somewhere below the C-5
bridge, located some forty (40) to fifty (50) meters away from their house; he also
heard somebody shout may away doon.[13] Curious, he and Mario went to the
bridge[14] and saw five persons whom he identified as the victim, Pablo, Arnold
Partosa (Arnold), George Palacio (George),[15] and Damaso Amodia (Damaso). He
knew these men; the victim was his neighbor, while Pablo, Arnold, George and
following Damaso were residents of Scorpion Street, Zone 17 Pembo, Makati City.[16]
When Romildo was about three arms-length away from the place of the commotion,
then illuminated by light coming from a Meralco post located some five (5) to six (6)
meters from the scene, he saw the victim being held on his right hand by Pablo,
while the other hand was held by Arnold. [17] George was positioned at the victims
back and clubbed the victim on the head; Damaso was in front of the victim and
stabbed him three times.[18]
Luther Caberte (Luther), who happened to be passing by the C-5 Bridge at the time,
also saw what happened. He testified that he saw men fighting under the C-5 Bridge
which was illuminated by a light coming from a lamppost located some ten (10)
meters away.[19] From his vantage point (about 15 meters away from the fight), he
saw Pablo, Damaso, George and Arnold ganging up (pinagtulung-tulungan) on the
victim.[20] He saw Pablo holding the victims hand while Damaso was stabbing him. He
also confirmed that George was positioned behind the victim. [21] He personally knew
both Pablo and the victim; they have been neighbors since 1986.[22]
1
 Both eyewitnesses left the scene after the stabbing; Romildo was chased away by
George and Damaso, while Luther went home immediately. Both were shaken and
shocked with what they had seen.[23]
At 3:00 a.m. of the same day, the CID Homicide received a report of an unidentified
body found in a road along Comembo Bridge, Barangay Pembo.[24] SPO2 Romeo
Ubana (SPO2 Ubana), a police investigator assigned to the CID Homicide, and a
police photographer went to the place and saw the body of a dead male person with
three stab wounds whom they subsequently identified as the victim. [25] He prepared
a Final Investigation Report of the incident.[26]
After the spot investigation, the victims body was taken to the Veronica Memorial
Chapel where Dr. Antonio Bertido (Dr. Bertido), a National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) Medico Legal Officer, subjected it to a post-mortem examination.[27] The
autopsy yielded the following findings:
Pallor, intergument and nailbeds.
Stab wounds.
1. Elongated 4.5. cms. Edges are clean cut, medial border is sharp, lateral border is
blunt. Located at the chest, anterior, left side, 6.0 cms. From the anterior median
line. Directed backwards, upwards and medially involving the skin and underlying
soft tissues, into the thoracic cavity, perforating the pericardial sac, into the
pericardial cavity, penetrating the heart with an approximate depth of 10.0 cms.
2. Elongated, 3.5 cms edges are clean cut, medial border is blunt, lateral border is
sharp. Located at the anterior abdominal wall, left side, 6.5 cms. From the anterior
median line. Directed backwards, upwards and medially involving the skin and
underlying soft tissues, perforating the stomach with an approximate depth of 14.0
cms.
3. Elongated, 3.0 cms, edges are clean-cut, medial border is blunt, lateral border is
sharp. Located at the anterior abdominal wall, right side. 2.0 cms. From the anterior
median line. Directed backwards, upwards and laterally involving the skin and
underlying soft tissues, penetrating the head of the pancreas with an approximate
depth of 12.0 cms.[28]
Dr. Bertido stated that the victim was stabbed three times on the body by a single-
bladed sharp-pointed instrument.[29] Through the use of an anatomic diagram, Dr.
Bertido showed that the victim was stabbed on his left chest and over his right and
left abdominals.[30] He also stated that of the three stab wounds, the wound on the
victims chest was the most fatal because it was near his heart, while the other
2
wounds involved the victims stomach and pancreas.[31] Dr. Bertido declared that no
other wound, aside from the three stab wounds, was found on the victims
body.[32] He later on executed a Certificate of Post-Mortem Examination showing the
cause of death as hemorrhage, secondary to stab wounds.[33]
Dr. Bertido admitted that while he could not specifically determine the position of
the victim at the time he was stabbed, he was certain that the stab wounds were
inflicted when the victim and his assailant were facing each other.[34] He also
disclosed that the sizes of the wounds were different from each other. [35]
The prosecution also presented Claudio Olandria, [36] the victims father, who took the
witness stand and testified on the expenses that he and his family incurred by reason
of his sons death.
The Defenses Version
The defense relied on the defense of alibi, submitting testimonial and documentary
evidence[37] to support Pablos claim that he was in another place at the time of the
stabbing.
Pablo averred that his name is Pablito Amodia and stated that at the time of the
incident, he lived in the house of Elma Amodia Romero (Elma), his sister, located at
Zone 13, Ilocos Street, Barangay Rizal, Makati City.[38] He has lived there since
1994. He claimed that he was at home in the evening of November 25, 1996, until
the early morning of the next day.[39] At around 10:00 of that evening, his brother
Elias Amodia (Elias) who lived next door, awakened him[40] and told him that his
(Elias) wife, then pregnant, had started having labor pains.[41] He went back to sleep
only to be awakened by Elias at past 12:00 midnight. Elias then requested him to
take care of his house.[42]
Pablo related that it was at this time that Damaso (another brother), George,
Arnold, and another person he did not know, came to Elmas house. [43] He noticed
that Damaso was in a hurry and was packing his clothes; the latter told him that they
(Damaso and his companions) encountered trouble.[44] Damaso and his companions
left past midnight; on the other hand, he went to Elias house to take care of the
latters children, while Elias and his wife went to a lying-in clinic.[45] While at Elias
house, Elma visited him to check on him and the children. [46] He stayed there
until 9:00 a.m. of November 26, 1996 when he went back to Elmas house; he went to
school later in the day.[47]
Pablo also alleged that it was only after returning from school that he came to know
of the victims death; he only knew the victim by name and even went to the victims
wake the first night.[48]
He further alleged that he stopped schooling for lack of funds and went to
Zamboanga del Norte in January 1997.[49] He went back to Manila on May 22,
1998 to continue his education, but was arrested on June 5, 1998.[50]
Elma and Elias corroborated Pablos story.[51] Elma stated that Pablo lived with her in
their brothers house together with her husband, their children, and Damaso. [52] She
added that Damaso told her that they were in trouble (atraso) because of a fight,
and that he and his companions were on their way to Cebu.[53] Elma declared that
Pablo was with her when Damaso came to the house to pack his clothes. [54] Pablo
and Damaso left at 12:30, but for different destinations.[55] She knew that Pablo went
to Elias house because she went to check on him and the children around 1 a.m. and
then again at 2 a.m.[56] Elias wife gave birth to a baby girl at 2:50 p.m. of November
26, 1996.[57]
After some prodding, Elma admitted that she knew that cases have been filed
against Pablo and Damaso as early as December 1996.[58] The defense thereafter
rested its case.
Prosecutions Rebuttal Evidence
The prosecution presented Amelita Sagarino, a resident of Scorpion Street, Zone 17
since 1989, as a rebuttal witness.[59] She testified that she knew the victim and the
accused who were all her neighbors.[60] She stated that she served food at the
victims wake from seven in the evening up to six in the morning and that she never
saw Pablo there.[61] She also heard from her neighbors that the people responsible
for the victims death were George, Arnold, Damaso, Pabling and Pablito
Amodia.[62] She clarified that Pabling and Pablito Amodia are one and the same
person.[63]
Subsequently, she stated that Pablito Amodia also attended the wake of the
victim.[64]
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC convicted Pablo of murder after finding sufficient evidence of his identity,
role in the crime as principal by direct participation, and conspiracy between him and
the other accused who used their superior strength to weaken the victim. The RTC
relied on the testimonies of eyewitnesses Romildo and Luther, the autopsy results
conducted on the body of the victim, and the lack of physical impossibility on the
part of Pablo to be at the crime scene. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision
reads:
3
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Pablo guilty of having committed the crime of
murder as principal by conspiracy. Considering that there are no aggravating or
mitigating circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime, pursuant to
Article 64 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, accused is sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. He is further sentence to pay the heirs of the
deceased Felix Olandria the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and to
reimburse said heirs of the amount of P23,568.00 for expenses incurred for the
funeral service, burial and incidental expenses.
SO ORDERED.[65]
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the CA agreed with the RTCs findings and affirmed Pablos
conviction.[66] The CA, however, corrected the RTCs ruling on the applicable provision
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended (Code), and modified the award of actual
damages, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed
Decision dated July 19, 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in accordance with Rule
63(2) of the Revised Penal Code. He is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim, P23,268.00, as actual damages, P50,000 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00, as
exemplary damages, in addition to the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
The Issues
In his Brief before this Court,[67] Pablo assigns the following errors committed by
both the RTC and CA:
(1) In finding that his guilt for the crime charged has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
(2) In finding the existence of conspiracy.
Pablo argues that the lower courts erred in failing to give evidentiary weight to
his alibi, thus disregarding the constitutional presumption of innocence in his
favor.[68] He emphasizes that his alibi was corroborated by defense witness Elma who
confirmed that he was at Eliass house at the time of the stabbing. [69]
He alternatively argues that granting that he was a part of Damasos group and that
this group killed the victim, the prosecution failed to prove the conspiracy among
them; there was no evidence adduced to establish how the incident that led to the
stabbing began. Any doubt that he acted as a principal should have been resolved in
his favor.[70]
In their Brief,[71] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) representing the People,
maintain that no reversible error was committed by the lower courts. The OSG avers
that the prosecutions evidence has satisfactorily proven all the elements of the
crime. Similarly, the conspiracy between Pablo and the three accused was proven by
the autopsy report which corroborated the categorical testimonies of Romildo and
Luther on how the accused and the others acted, clearly showing a unity of purpose
in the accomplishment of their criminal objective.[72] The testimonies of these two
eyewitnesses also reveal that the killing was attended by the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength, and the employment of means to
weaken the defense of the victim. These circumstances qualify the killing to murder.
The Courts Ruling
We affirm Pablos conviction.
The appeal essentially attacks the soundness of the factual findings of the RTC and
CA that, according to Pablo, are not in accord with the totality of the evidence in the
case. He emphasizes that the RTC and CA disregarded his alibi and the lack of
evidence establishing a conspiracy to kill the victim.
A review of the records fails to persuade us to overturn Pablos judgment of
conviction. We have emphasized often enough that the factual findings of the trial
court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of their
probative weight are given high respect, if not conclusive effect, unless cogent facts
and circumstances of substance were ignored, misconstrued or misinterpreted,
which, if considered, would alter the outcome of the case.[73] Under the
circumstances, we find no exceptional reason to warrant a deviation from this rule.
The records show that both the RTC and CA convicted Pablo of murder based on the
positive identification by Romildo and Luther and their eyewitness accounts of the
actual killing, showing the existence of a conspiracy among Pablos group to kill the
victim. The CA decision clearly reflects these findings and reasoning:
The evidence on record gives the picture of the incident at the time when Felix
Olandria was already being held on both hands by accused Pablo Amodia and Arnold
Pantosa. It was while in this position that accused Damaso Amodia delivered three
(3) stab blows which proved to be fatal . . .[74]
4
Both courts gathered, too, from these testimonies that the killing was qualified by
the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, demonstrated by the
concerted efforts of Pablos group to overpower the victims strength with their own
in carrying out their criminal plan:
the nature of the evidence presented, there are sufficient reasons to conclude and
consider as having been established beyond reasonable doubt, the existence of
conspiracy and the qualifying aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior
strength and employment of means to weaken the defense. These are: first, the
convergence of four (4) accused; x x x second, the time when the four (4) accused
were seen together which is about 12:05 in the early morning of November 26, 1997;
x x x third, the place where they were seen together which is below the bridge of C-
5; fourth, possession by accused Damaso Amodia of a knife his occupation being that
of a painter; fifth, absence of any other injuries in other parts of the body of the
victim Felix Olandria x x x; sixth, the location of the three stab wounds all of which
were directed against delicate parts of the body indicating intent to kill The foregoing
circumstances clearly proven by the prosecution evidence, when taken together with
the fact that death ensued indicate that there was conspiracy on the part of the
accused that they abused their superior strength and employed means to weaken
the defense. The act of one is to be considered therefore the act of the other. [75]
The Eyewitnesses Testimonies.
The RTC and CA found the identification made by Romildo and Luther to
be clear, categorical, and consistent.[76] We observed that in accepting the truth of
the identification and the account of how the stabbing took place, the RTC and CA
considered the witnesses proximity to the victim and his assailants at the time of the
stabbing they were about three arms length away and 15 meters away, respectively;
the well-lighted condition of the crime scene; and the familiarity of these
eyewitnesses with the victim and his assailants they were all residents of the same
area. Similarly, we also note that no evidence was presented to establish that these
eyewitnesses harbored any ill-will against Pablo and had no reason to fabricate their
testimonies. The weight of jurisprudence is to accept these kinds of testimonies as
true for being consistent with the natural order of events, human nature and the
presumption of good faith.[77]
Aside from these, we additionally note that Romildo and Luther never wavered,
despite the contrary efforts of the defense, in their positive identification of Pablo as
one of the assailants of the victim. The records glaringly show the defense counsels
vain efforts to prove that these eyewitnesses committed a mistake in identifying
Pablo as one of the assailants since his name was allegedly Pablito Amadio, and not
Pablo.
 We state in this regard that positive identification pertains essentially to proof of
identity and not necessarily to the name of the assailant. A mistake in the name of
the accused is not equivalent, and does not necessarily amount to, a mistake in the
identity of the accused especially when sufficient evidence is adduced to show that
the accused is pointed to as one of the perpetrators of the crime. In this case, the
defenses line of argument is negated by the undisputed fact that the accuseds
identity was known to both the eyewitnesses. On the one hand, we have Romildos
testimony stating that Pablo lived across Scorpion Street from where he lived.[78] He
also stated that he had known Pablo for more than a year. [79] On the other hand,
Luther testified that he had known Pablo since 1986 because they were neighbors
and that he even played basketball with him.[80] We stress that Pablo never denied
these allegations.
In People v. Ducabo, we took notice of the human trait that once a person knows
another through association, identification becomes an easy task even from a
considerable distance; most often, the face and body movements of the person
identified has created a lasting impression on the identifiers mind that cannot easily
be erased.[81]
The association the eyewitnesses cited specifically, being neighbors and even
basketball game mates rendered them familiar with Pablo, making it highly unlikely
that they could have committed a mistake in identifying him as one of the assailants.
Their identification came at the first opportunity (i.e., when they revealed) what they
knew of the killing, and culminated with their courtroom identification of Pablo as
among those who assaulted the victim.[82]
Two reasons settle the argument about Pablos name against his favor. It strikes us
that this argument is a line of defense that came only as the defenses turn to present
evidence neared. We have on record that prior to the defenses presentation of
evidence, Pablo referred to himself as Pablo Amodia when the court asked him his
name.[83] We likewise find no competent evidence, other than his assertion and
those of his siblings, showing that his true name is really Pablito Amodia. We
therefore conclude that any uncertainty on the name by which the accused is or
should be known is an extraneous matter that in no way renders his identification as
a participant in the stabbing uncertain.
We find nothing irregular, unusual, or inherently unbelievable, in the eyewitnesses
testimonies that would affect their credibility. Their narratives are remarkably
compatible with the physical evidence on hand; likewise, their accounts are also
consistent with each other. More importantly, the narration of these eyewitnesses
are in full accord with the human experience of individuals who are exposed to a
startling event and their initial reluctance to involve themselves in the criminal
5
matters especially those involving violent crimes committed by individuals known to
them.
The Defense of Alibi
Pablo argues that his alibi should have been given greater evidentiary weight
because it was corroborated by his sister, Elma. As reproduced by Pablo in his Brief,
the substance of Elmas testimony is as follows:
Q: Mrs. Witness while you were sleeping which you said you start sleeping at 10:00
oclock in the evening of November 25, 1996, while you were sleeping, what
transpired, if any, was there any unusual incident that transpired? [sic]
A: Pumunta po ang isang kapatid ko, si Elias Amodia dahil naglalabor daw and hipag
ko at manganganak at dadalhin niya sa lying-in, eh malayo po at siya ang
pinagbabantay sa mga pamangking kong maliliit, sir.
Q: Could you tell the Honorable Court what time did your brother Elias Amodia wake
up Pablo Amodia?
A: 12:00 midnight, sir.
xxx
Q: When Pablo woke up, what if any did Pablo Amodia do?
A: Pumunta po siya sa bahay ng kapatid ko, sir?
Q: And where was that house of your brother Elias located?
A: Malapit lang po sa amin.
Q: How far is your house to his house?
A: Tatlong (3) dipa po ang layo, sir.[84]
Alibi is a defense that comes with various jurisprudentially-established limitations. A
first limitation fully applicable to this case is that alibi cannot overcome positive
identification.[85] For the defense of alibi to prosper, evidence other than the
testimony of the accused must be adduced. Evidence referred to in this respect does
not merely relate to any piece of evidence that would support the alibi; rather, there
must be sufficient evidence to show the physical impossibility (as to time and place)
that the accused could have committed or participated in the commission of the
crime. For alibi to be given evidentiary value, there must be clear and convincing
evidence showing that at the time of the commission of the crime, it was physically
impossible for the accused to have been at the situs criminis.[86]
As we have discussed at length, Pablo was positively identified by Romildo and
Luther as one of the victims assailants. We find no reason to doubt the accuracy of
the identification made.
Pablos alibi does not also meet the requirements of physical impossibility of time
and place. A scrutiny of the entire testimony of Elma failed to show that it was
physically impossible for Pablo to be at the crime scene when the stabbing took
place. We note that although Elma testified that Pablo was at Elias house at the time
of the stabbing, she nonetheless admitted that her house (which was located beside
Elias house) and the bridge where the crime was committed is a 10-minute walking
distance away from each other.[87] She further testified that after Pablo left for Elias
house, she only saw him again at around 1:00 a.m. and at 2:00 a.m at their brothers
house. [88] Hence, it was possible that Pablo could have gone out of Elias house to join
Damaso, George, and Arnold in assaulting the victim, and afterwards returned to his
brothers house without Elma knowing that he was ever gone.
We scrutinize Elmas version of the events with utmost care considering that she is
Pablos sister. This is not the first time that this Court has encountered a case
where alibiis provided by a close kin; we have recognized that in these situations, it
may come naturally to some to give more weight to blood ties and close relationship
than to the objective truth;[89] thus, our strict scrutiny.
We find that the time frame in Elmas version of events shows a pattern of
inconsistency that renders its truthfulness suspect. The testimony is inconsistent on
the time Pablo slept and was awakened by Elias details that, to our mind, are
material to show his whereabouts on that fateful night.[90]
Elma initially stated that Pablo slept at 9:00 p.m. and was awakened by Elias
at 12:00 midnight.[91] Thereafter, she claimed that Pablo was also awakened by Elias
at 9:00 p.m. (the same time that Pablo slept) that evening, and that Pablo went to
Eliass house around 12:30 p.m.[92] Subsequently, she averred that Pablo was
awakened at 10:00 p.m.but went back to sleep then awakened again at 12:00 p.m.[93]
These conflicting statements are not rendered any more believable by their conflict
with the time frames claimed in Pablos version of events. [94] Similarly, Elmas version
of what occurred when is likewise inconsistent with Elias version of events.[95]
6
Finally, even granting that a semblance of truth exists in the defenses narration of
events, the inconsistencies and contradictions in its witnesses testimonies render
their evidence uncertain. In the final analysis, even their version does not preclude
Pablo from being physically present at the crime scene when the killing took
place. Thus, the defense and prosecutions evidence taken together, render Pablo
guilty of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
Conspiracy
As an alternative argument, Pablo puts into issue the failure of the prosecutions
evidence to establish the conspiracy between him and his other co-accused to make
him liable for murder. He emphasizes that the evidence, as testified to by the
eyewitnesses, only relate to events during, and not prior to, the assault and the
stabbing of the victim. He argues that no evidence was adduced to show that the
accused all agreed to kill the victim.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. [96] It arises on the very instant the
plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to
pursue it.[97] It may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence.[98]
Direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found; circumstantial evidence is often resorted
to in order to prove its existence.[99] Absent of any direct proof, as in the present
case, conspiracy may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner the offense
was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves, when such
acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of
interest.[100] An accused participates as a conspirator if he or she has performed
some overt act as a direct or indirect contribution in the execution of the crime
planned to be committed.[101] The overt act may consist of active participation in the
actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-
conspirators by being present at the commission of the crime, or by exerting moral
ascendancy over the other co-conspirators.[102] Stated otherwise, it is not essential
that there be proof of the previous agreement and decision to commit the crime; it is
sufficient that the malefactors acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.[103]
Although there was no evidence in the present case showing a prior agreement
among Pablo, Arnold, George, and Damaso, the following chain of events however
show their commonality of purpose in killing the victim: first, the accused
surrounded the victim on all sides: Damaso at the front, George at the victims rear,
while Pablo and Arnold flanked the victim on each side; second, Pablo then wrested
the right arm of the victim and restrained his movement, while Arnold did the same
to the left arm of the victim; third, George then hit the victims head with a piece of
wood; and fourth, Damaso stabbed the victim three times.
In People v. Elijorde,[104] we said: Me-sm
The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally
rendered which cannot exist without previous cognizance of the criminal act
intended to be executed. It is therefore required in order to be liable either as a
principal by indispensable cooperation or as an accomplice that the accused must
unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct participation. S
In People v. Manalo,[105] we declared that the act of the appellant in holding the
victims right hand while the latter was being stabbed constituted sufficient proof of
conspiracy:
Indeed, the act of the appellant of holding the victims right hand while the victim
was being stabbed by Dennis shows that he concurred in the criminal design of the
actual killer. If such act were separate from the stabbing, appellants natural reaction
should have been to immediately let go of the victim and flee as soon as the first
stab was inflicted. But appellant continued to restrain the deceased until Dennis
completed his attack.
Tested against these, the existence of conspiracy among the four accused is clear;
their acts were aimed at the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each
doing their respective parts in the series of acts that, although appearing
independent from one another, indicated a concurrence of sentiment and intent to
kill the victim. Following the reasoning in Manalo, if there was in fact no unity of
purpose among Pablo and the three other accused, Pablos reaction would have been
to let go of the victim and flee after the first stabbing by Damaso. The evidence
reveals, however, that after the first stabbing, Pablo still continued to hold the right
arm of the victim, rendering him immobile and exposed to further attack.
Where there is conspiracy, a person may be convicted for the criminal act of
another.[106] Where there is conspiracy, the act of one is deemed the act of all. [107]
The Crime
Murder is committed by killing a person under any of the qualifying circumstances
enumerated by Article 248 of the Code not falling within the provisions of Article 246
(on parricide), Article 249 (on homicide), and Article 255 (on infanticide) of the said
Code.
With Pablos participation in the killing duly established beyond reasonable doubt,
what is left to examine is whether or not the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
7
superior strength, which qualifies the crime to murder, is present under the
circumstances.
To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out
of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. [108] Taking
advantage of superior strength does not mean that the victim was completely
defenseless.[109]
In People v. Ventura, we opined that there are no fixed and invariable rules in
considering abuse of superior strength or employing means to weaken the defense
of the victim.[110] Superiority does not always mean numerical superiority. Abuse of
superiority depends upon the relative strength of the aggressor vis--vis the
victim.[111] Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of the aggressors natural
strength over that of the victim, considering the position of both, and
the employment of the means to weaken the defense, although not annulling
it.[112] The aggressor must have advantage of his natural strength to ensure the
commission of the crime.[113]
In the present case, we find that there was abuse of superior strength employed by
Pablo, Arnold, George and Damaso in committing the killing. The evidence shows
that the victim was unarmed when he was attacked. In the attack, two assailants
held his arms on either side, while the other two, on the victims front and back, each
armed with a knife and a piece of wood that they later used on the victim. Against
this onslaught, the victims reaction was graphically described by the prosecution
eyewitness, Luther, when he testified:
Q: Which came first, by the way, was the victim or what was the victim doing then
when the fight took place?
A: Wala siyang nagawa kase hinawakan siya, gusto niyang makawala pero wala
siyang magawa hinawakan siya sa leeg, sir.[114] [Emphasis supplied]
Under these circumstances, no doubt exists that there was gross inequality of forces
between the victim and the four accused and that the victim was overwhelmed by
forces he could not match. The RTC and CA therefore correctly appreciated the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength which qualified the killing to
the crime of murder.
The Penalty
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Code is reclusion perpetua to
death. Article 63 (2) of the same Code states that when the law prescribes a penalty
consisting of two indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime, the lesser penalty shall be
imposed. Since the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength already
qualified the killing to murder, it can no longer be used to increase the imposable
penalty. We note that while another aggravating circumstance, i.e., employing
means to weaken the defense of the victim, was alleged in the Information, the
prosecution failed to adduce evidence to support the presence of this circumstance.
Hence, the RTC and CA correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Likewise, the CA correctly awarded P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000 as

exemplary to the heirs of the victim consistent with prevailing
jurisprudence.[115]However, in line with recent jurisprudence, the award of civil
indemnity shall be increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.[116]

Further, the CA erred in awarding actual damages in the amount

of P23,268.00. In People v. Villanueva, we held that when actual damages proven by
receipts during the trial amount to less than P25,000.00, the award of temperate
damages for P25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual damages of a lesser
amount.[117] We reiterated this ruling in the recent cases of People v.
Casta[118] and People v. Ballesteros[119] where we awarded temperate damages,
in lieu of actual damages, in the amount of P25,000.00.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals

decision dated May 4, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01764 finding accused-appellant
Pablo Amodia GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, with
the MODIFICATION that:

(1) The award of civil indemnity shall be increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00;

(2) The award of actual damages in the amount of P23,268.00 is hereby DELETED;
and

(3) In lieu thereof, accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay P25,000.00 as temperate

damages.

The other portions of the appealed decision are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

8
G.R. No. 187044 September 14, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RENATO LAGAT Y GAWAN A.K.A. RENAT GAWAN AND JAMES PALALAY Y
VILLAROSA, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This appeal was filed by accused-appellants Renato Lagat y Gawan (Lagat), also
known as Renat Gawan, and James Palalay y Villarosa (Palalay) to challenge the
Court of Appeals October 8, 2008 Decision1 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02869, for
affirming with modification the March 19, 2007 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 21, Santiago City, wherein they were found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Qualified Carnapping in Criminal Case No. 21-4949.
Accused-appellants Lagat and Palalay were charged with the crime of Carnapping as
defined under Section 2 and penalized under Section 14 3 of Republic Act No. 6539.
The accusatory portion of the Information,4 reads:
That on or about the 12th day of April 2005, at Santiago City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
conniving with each other, and mutually helping one another and with intent to gain
and without the consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away one (1) unit YASUKI tricycle
bearing Engine No. 161FMJ41535420 and Motor No. LX8PCK0034D002243 then
driven and owned by JOSE BIAG, valued at 70,000.00, to the damage and prejudice
of the owner thereof.
That in the course of the commission of carnapping, or on occasion thereof, the
above-named accused, conspiring, conniving confederating and helping each other,
and with intent to kill, did then and there assault, attack and wound the said JOSE
BIAG with sharp and pointed instrument directing blows against the vital parts of the
body of the latter thereby inflicting upon him multiple stab and hacking wounds
which directly caused the death of the said JOSE BIAG.
Lagat pleaded not guilty upon arraignment on June 16, 2005. 5 Palalay, on the other
hand, did not enter any plea; hence, a plea of not guilty was entered by the RTC for
him.6
On August 1, 2005, both accused proposed to plead guilty to a lesser offense. 7 In
their plea-bargaining proposal,8they asked that they be allowed to plead guilty to the
crime of Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and that the
mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and/or no intention to commit so grave a
9
wrong be considered in their favor. They also asked that damages be fixed at
120,000.00. This proposal was rejected9 by the prosecution; thus, the pre-trial
conference proceeded. The pre-trial Order contained the following facts as admitted
by the parties:
1. That the cadaver of Jose Biag was recovered along Angadanan and Sn. Guillermo
road by members of the police together with Barangay Captain Heherson Dulay and
Chief Tanod Rumbaoa, Sr.
2. That the two accused were arrested in possession of palay allegedly stolen in
Alicia, Isabela.
3. That the cause of death of Jose Biag was multiple stab and hack wounds as
described in the Autopsy Report and death certificate which shall be submitted
during trial.10
After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution first presented Florida Biag (Florida), the wife of the victim Jose Biag
(Biag), to testify on the circumstances leading to Biags disappearance and the
discovery of his body, the recovery of Biags tricycle, and the expenses she incurred
and the income she had lost as a result of her husbands death. Florida testified that
her husband was a farmer, a barangay tanod, and a tricycle driver. 11 On April 12,
2005, at around two oclock in the morning, her husband left to operate his tricycle
for public use. It was around 11:00 a.m. of April 13, 2005, when news reached her
that their tricycle was with the Philippine National Police (PNP) of the Municipality of
Alicia and that her husband had figured in an accident. After learning of the incident,
Florida sought the help of their Barangay (Brgy.) Captain, Heherson Dulay, who
immediately left for Angadanan without her. At around 2:00 p.m., Brgy. Captain
Dulay informed12 Florida of what had happened to her husband. 13 Florida then
presented in court the receipts14 evidencing the expenses she had incurred for her
husbands wake and funeral and for the repair of their tricycle, which was recovered
with missing parts. She also testified as to the income Biag was earning as a farmer, a
tanod, and a tricycle driver, and claimed that his death had caused her sleepless
nights.15
The second witness for the prosecution was the Chief Tanod of Barangay Rizal, Poe
Rumbaoa, Sr. (Rumbaoa). He testified that on April 13, 2005, after he and Brgy.
Captain Dulay received Floridas report, they immediately went to the Alicia Police
Station, wherein they found Biags tricycle. The PNP of Alicia showed them the
identification card recovered in the tricycle and told them that the tricycle was used
in stealing palay from a store in Angadanan, Isabela that belonged to a certain Jimmy
Esteban (Esteban). Rumbaoa and Brgy. Captain Dulay were also told that the owner
of the tricycle was killed and dumped along the Angadanan and San Guillermo Road.
They were thereafter shown the two suspects and the place where Biags body was
dumped. Rumbaoa said that he was able to identify the body as Biags, which was
almost unrecognizable because it was bloated all over, only because Biag had a mark
on his right shoulder, which Rumbaoa knew of.16
Police Officer 2 (PO2) Arthur Salvador, a member of the PNP in Alicia, took the
witness stand next. He testified that on April 13, 2005, he was on duty along with
other colleagues at the Alicia PNP Station, when they received a report from Esteban
that the cavans of palay stolen from him were seen at Alice Palay Buying Station in
Alicia, Isabela, in a tricycle commandeered by two unidentified male persons. PO2
Salvador said that upon receipt of this report, their Chief of Police composed a team,
which included him, PO2 Bernard Ignacio, and PO2 Nathan Abuan, to verify the
veracity of the report. At Alice Palay Buying Station, they saw the tricycle described
to them by their chief, with the cavans of palay, and the two accused, Lagat and
Palalay. PO2 Salvador averred that he and his team were about to approach the
tricycle when the two accused "scampered"17 to different directions. After
"collaring" the two accused, they brought them to the Alicia PNP Station together
with the tricycle and its contents. PO2 Salvador asseverated that when they reached
the station, they asked the two accused if they had any papers to show for both the
tricycle and the palay, to which the two accused did not answer. They allegedly kept
silent even after they were informed of their rights not only to remain as such, but
also to have counsel, either of their own choosing, or to be assigned to them if they
cannot afford one. PO2 Salvador then continued that when they unloaded the
tricycle, they discovered bloodstains inside and outside the sidecar. He also
personally found a wallet containing the tricycles Certificate of Registration and
Official Receipt18 issued by the Land Transportation Office in the name of Jose Biag.
When they asked the two accused about their discoveries, Lagat and Palalay
voluntarily answered that the name in the papers is that of the owner of the tricycle,
whom they killed and dumped along Angadanan and San Guillermo Road, when they
carnapped his tricyle. PO2 Salvador alleged that upon hearing this revelation, they
again informed Lagat and Palalay that anything they say would be used against them,
and that they had a right to counsel. Thereafter, they coordinated with the PNP of
Angadanan Police Station, and together with the two accused, they proceeded to
Angadanan-San Guillermo Road, where they found Biags body in a ravine just after
the bridge near the road.19
The prosecutions last witness, PO2 Ignacio corroborated PO2 Salvadors testimony
on the events that led them to the tricycle, the palay, the two accused, and the body
of Biag. He also confirmed PO2 Salvadors claim that they had informed the two
accused of their rights but the latter just ignored them; hence, they continued with
10
their investigation.20 PO2 Ignacio added that the two accused also told them how
they killed Biag, to wit:
A- They rented a tricycle from Santiago to Alicia but they proceeded to Angadanan.
And upon arrival at the site, they poked a knife to the driver and the driver ran away.
They chased him and stabbed him, sir.21
Upon cross-examination, PO2 Ignacio averred that they were not able to recover the
murder weapon despite diligent efforts to look for it and that they had questioned
the people at Alice Palay Buying Station and were told that the two accused had no
other companion. PO2 Ignacio also admitted that while they informed Lagat and
Palalay of their constitutional rights, the two were never assisted by counsel at any
time during the custodial investigation.22
The prosecution also submitted the Post-Mortem Autopsy Report23 on Biag of Dr.
Edgar Romanchito P. Bayang, the Assistant City Health and Medico-Legal Officer of
Santiago City. The Report showed that Biag was likely killed between 12:00 noon and
2:00 p.m. of April 12, 2004, and that he had sustained three stab wounds, an incise
wound, two hack wounds and an "avulsion of the skin extending towards the
abdomen."24
After the prosecution rested its case, the accused filed a Motion to Dismiss on
Demurrer to Evidence25 without leave of court26 on the ground that the prosecution
failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Lagat and Palalay averred that
their constitutional rights on custodial investigation were grossly violated as they
were interrogated for hours without counsel, relatives, or any disinterested third
person to assist them. Moreover, the admissions they allegedly made were not
supported by documentary evidence. Palalay further claimed that Rumbaoas
testimony showed that he had a "swelling above his right eye" and "a knife wound in
his left arm," which suggests that he was maltreated while under police custody. 27
The accused also claimed that the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution was not sufficient to convict them. They averred that aside from the
alleged admissions they had made, the prosecution had nothing else: they had no
object evidence for the bloodstains allegedly found in the tricycle; the murder
weapon was never found; and no eyewitness aside from the police officers was
presented to show that they were in possession of the tricycle at the time they were
arrested. Lagat and Palalay argued that the prosecution failed to establish an
unbroken chain of events that showed their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, thus,
they were entitled to enjoy the constitutional presumption of innocence absent
proof that they were guilty beyond reasonable doubt.28
As the accused filed their Demurrer to Evidence without leave of court, they in effect
waived their right to present evidence, and submitted the case for judgment on the
basis of the evidence for the prosecution.29
On March 19, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE in the light of the foregoing considerations the Court finds the accused
Renato Lagat y Gawan and James Palalay y Villarosa GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of qualified carnapping and hereby sentences each of them to the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. They are also ORDERED TO PAY Florida Biag the sum of Twelve
thousand three hundred pesos ( 12,300.00) as actual damages plus Fifty thousand
pesos ( 50,000.00) for death indemnity and another Fifty thousand pesos (
50,000.00) for moral damages.30
After evaluating the evidence the prosecution presented, the RTC agreed with the
accused that their rights were violated during their custodial investigation as they
had no counsel to assist them. Thus, whatever admissions they had made, whether
voluntarily or not, could not be used against them and were inadmissible in
evidence.31
However, the RTC held that despite the absence of an eyewitness, the prosecution
was able to establish enough circumstantial evidence to prove that Lagat and Palalay
committed the crime, to wit:
1. The accused were caught by the Alicia PNP in possession of Biags tricycle, loaded
with stolen palay;
2. The accused ran immediately when they saw the Alicia PNP approaching them;
3. The Alicia PNP found bloodstains on the tricycle and Biags wallet with documents
to prove that Biag owned the tricycle;
4. The Alicia PNP contacted the PNP of Santiago City to inquire about a Jose Biag, and
this was how the barangay officials of Santiago City and Florida found out that Biags
tricycle was with the Alicia PNP;
5. Biag left early morning on April 12, 2005 and never returned home;
6. The accused themselves led the Alicia PNP and Barangay Captain Dulay and
Rumbaoa to where they dumped Biags body.32
11
The RTC convicted Lagat and Palalay of the crime of carnapping, qualified by the
killing of Biag, which, according to the RTC, appeared to have been done in the
course of the carnapping.33
Lagat and Palalay asked the RTC to reconsider its Decision on the grounds that it
erred in giving full credence to the testimonies of the prosecutions witnesses and in
relying on the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution.34
On May 29, 2007, the RTC denied35 this motion, holding that the testimonies of the
witnesses were credible and supported by the attending facts and circumstances,
and that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict the accused.
Lagat and Palalay went36 to the Court of Appeals, asserting that their guilt was not
established beyond reasonable doubt.37 They averred that circumstantial evidence,
to be sufficient for a judgment of conviction, "must exclude each and every
hypothesis consistent with innocence,"38 which was allegedly not the case in their
situation. They elaborated on why the circumstantial evidence the RTC enumerated
could not be taken against them:
1. The accuseds possession of the tricycle cannot prove that they killed its owner;
2. Their act of fleeing may be due to the stolen palay (which is not the subject of this
case), and not the tricycle;
3. No evidence was given that would link the bloodstains found in the tricycle to Biag
himself. They could have easily been Palalays, who was shown to have a knife
wound; and
4. The accuseds act of pointing to the police and the barangay officials the ravine
where Biags body was dumped was part of their interrogation without counsel,
which the RTC itself declared as inadmissible in evidence.39
On October 8, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision with the following
dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March 19, 2007 of the RTC, Branch 21, Santiago
City, in Criminal Case No. 21-4949, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
accused-appellants Renato Lagat y Gawan and James Palalay y Villarosa are ordered
to pay to private complainant the increased amount of 14,900.00 as actual
damages.40
In affirming the conviction of the accused, the Court of Appeals held that the
elements of carnapping were all present in this case. The Court of Appeals pointed
out that Lagat and Palalay were in possession of the missing tricycle when they were
apprehended by the Alicia PNP. Moreover, they failed to offer any explanation as to
how they came to be in possession of the tricycle. The Court of Appeals also agreed
with the RTC that whatever confession or admission the Alicia PNP extracted out of
the accused could not be used in evidence for having been done without the
assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals nonetheless affirmed the RTCs judgment
as it was "convinced" that the following circumstantial evidence supported the
conviction of the accused for qualified carnapping:
1. Biag and his tricycle went missing on April 12, 2005;
2. Lagat and Palalay were found in unauthorized possession of the tricycle on April
13, 2005;
3. The Alicia PNP, upon inspection of the tricycle, found traces of blood inside it,
together with the original receipt and certificate of registration of the vehicle in the
name of Jose Biag;
4. Palalay had a stab wound on his left arm when the Alicia PNP presented him and
Lagat to Brgy. Capt. Dulay and prosecution witness Rumbaoa;
5. Biag bore five (5) hack wounds on his body when the Alicia PNP recovered his
corpse in a ravine; and
6. Lagat and Palalay failed to account for their possession of the bloodstained tricycle
immediately after their arrest.41
The accused are now before us with the same lone assignment of error they posited
before the Court of Appeals, to wit:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY
OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH HIS
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.42
Ruling of the Court
Lagat and Palalay have been charged and convicted of the crime of qualified
carnapping under Republic Act. No. 653943 or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972.
Section 2 of the Act defines "carnapping" and "motor vehicle" as follows:
"Carnapping" is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to
another without the latters consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation
of persons, or by using force upon things.
12
"Motor vehicle" is any vehicle propelled by any power other than muscular power
using the public highways, but excepting road rollers, trolley cars, street-sweepers,
sprinklers, lawn mowers, bulldozers, graders, fork-lifts, amphibian trucks, and cranes
if not used on public highways, vehicles, which run only on rails or tracks, and
tractors, trailers and traction engines of all kinds used exclusively for agricultural
purposes. Trailers having any number of wheels, when propelled or intended to be
propelled by attachment to a motor vehicle, shall be classified as separate motor
vehicle with no power rating.44
The elements of carnapping as defined and penalized under the Anti-Carnapping Act
of 1972 are the following:
1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;
2. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;
3. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the taking was
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force
upon things; and
4. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle. 45
The records of this case show that all the elements of carnapping are present and
were proven during trial.
The tricycle, which was definitively ascertained to belong to Biag, as evidenced by
the registration papers, was found in Lagat and Palalays possession. Aside from this,
the prosecution was also able to establish that Lagat and Palalay fled the scene when
the Alicia PNP tried to approach them at the palay buying station. To top it all, Lagat
and Palalay failed to give any reason why they had Biags tricycle. Their unexplained
possession raises the presumption that they were responsible for the unlawful taking
of the tricycle. Section 3(j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states that:
[A] person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act
is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that thing which a person
possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him.
In Litton Mills, Inc. v. Sales,46 we said that for such presumption to arise, it must be
proven that: (a) the property was stolen; (b) it was committed recently; (c) that the
stolen property was found in the possession of the accused; and (d) the accused is
unable to explain his possession satisfactorily. 47 As mentioned above, all these were
proven by the prosecution during trial. Thus, it is presumed that Lagat and Palalay
had unlawfully taken Biags tricycle. In People v. Bustinera, 48 this Court defined
"unlawful taking," as follows:
Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the motor vehicle without the
consent of the owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or
by using force upon things; it is deemed complete from the moment the offender
gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. 49
Lagat and Palalays intent to gain from the carnapped tricycle was also proven as
they were caught in a palay buying station, on board the stolen tricycle, which they
obviously used to transport the cavans of palay they had stolen and were going to
sell at the station. In Bustinera, we elucidated on the concept of "intent to gain" and
said:
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful
taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is
the intent to gain. The term "gain" is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also
includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the
act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the
owners consent constitutes gain.50
Having established that the elements of carnapping are present in this case, we now
go to the argument of the two accused that they cannot be convicted based on the
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution.
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient
for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the crime.
In People v. Mansueto,51 we said:
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from
which the facts in issue may be established by inference. Such evidence is founded
on experience and observed facts and coincidences establishing a connection
between the known and proven facts and the facts sought to be proved. 52
13
Hence, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of
circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as
to the guilt of the accused.53
A careful and exhaustive examination of the evidence presented, excluding those
that are inadmissible, show that the circumstantial evidence, when viewed as a
whole, effectively establishes the guilt of Lagat and Palalay beyond reasonable
doubt. We considered the following pieces of evidence as convincing:
First, Lagat and Palalay were found in possession of the tricycle the same day that it,
together with its owner Biag, was reported missing.
Second, Lagat and Palalay were found at a palay buying station, with the stolen
tricycle packed with cavans of palay allegedly stolen in Alicia, Isabela.
Third, Lagat and Palalay who were then on board the tricycle, jumped and ran the
moment they saw the Alicia PNP approaching them.
Fourth, Lagat and Palalay could not explain to the Alicia PNP why they were in
possession of Biags tricycle.
Fifth, Biags wallet and his tricycles registration papers were found in the tricycle
upon its inspection by the Alicia PNP.
Sixth, Biags body bore hack wounds as evidenced by the post-mortem autopsy done
on him, while his tricycle had traces of blood in it.
The foregoing circumstantial evidence only leads to the conclusion that Lagat and
Palalay conspired to kill Biag in order to steal his tricycle. Direct proof that the two
accused conspired is not essential as it may be inferred from their conduct before,
during, and after their commission of the crime that they acted with a common
purpose and design.54 The pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution are
consistent with one another and the only rational proposition that can be drawn
therefrom is that the accused are guilty of killing Biag to carnap his tricycle.
When a person is killed or raped in the course of or on the occasion of the
carnapping, the crime of carnapping is qualified and the penalty is increased
pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended:
Section 14. Penalty for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as
this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of
motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years
and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the
carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon
things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and appointment as a tanod, or that he actually worked as a farmer, we shall consider
not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence only his earnings as a tricycle driver. According to the death certificate 59 submitted
against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of by the prosecution, Biag was 56 years old at the time of his death.1wphi1
reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of
the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the The amount of damages recoverable for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased
carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (As amended by R.A. No. 7659.) (Emphasis is based on two factors: 1) the number of years on the basis of which the damages
ours) shall be computed; and 2) the rate at which the losses sustained by the heirs of the
deceased should be fixed. The first factor is based on the formula (2/3 x 80 age of
As there was no aggravating circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime, the deceased at the time of his death = life expectancy) which is adopted from the
the RTC properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. American Expectancy Table of Mortality.60 Net income is computed by deducting
from the amount of the victims gross income the amount of his living expenses. As
In conformity with prevailing jurisprudence, we affirm the award of 50,000.00 as there is no proof of Biags living expenses, the net income is estimated to be 50% of
civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of Jose Biag and 50,000.00 as moral the gross annual income.61 Thus, the loss of earning capacity of the deceased is
damages for the proven mental suffering of his wife as a result of his untimely death. computed as follows:
However, when actual damages proven by receipts during trial amount to less than
25,000.00, as in this case, the award of temperate damages for 25,000.00 is Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x [gross annual income living expenses]62
justified in lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount. 55 Thus, an award of
25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of the amount of 14,900.00 that the Court = 2/3 [80-age at time of death] x [gross annual income - 50% of gross annual income]
of Appeals awarded as actual damages is proper in this case.
= 2/3 [80-56] x [ 109,500.00 - 54,750.00]
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals failed to consider that under Article 2206 of
the Civil Code, the accused are also jointly and severally liable for the loss of the = 16 x 54,750.00
earning capacity of Biag and such indemnity should be paid to his heirs. 56 In People v.
= 876,000.00
Jadap,57 this Court said:
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the October 8, 2008 decision of the
As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02869. Accused-appellants Renato Lagat y
damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages for loss of
Gawan and James Palalay y Villarosa are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence
the crime of QUALIFIED CARNAPPING and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of
when (1) the deceased is self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage
reclusion perpetua. They are hereby ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim Jose
under current labor laws, in which case judicial notice may be taken of the fact that
Biag the following: (a) 50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) 50,000.00 as moral
in the deceased's line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the
damages; (c) 25,000.00 as temperate damages; (d) 876,000.00 as loss of earning
deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage
capacity; and (e) interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from
under current labor laws. In this case, no documentary evidence was presented to
the date of finality of this judgment.
prove the claim of the victims heirs for damages by reason of loss of earning
capacity. However, the victims father testified that at the time of his sons death, he SO ORDERED.
was only 20 years old and was working as a mason with a monthly income of
3,000.00. We find the fathers testimony sufficient to justify the award of damages
for loss of earning capacity.58

Biags widow, Florida, testified that Biag worked as a farmer, tanod, and tricycle
driver, and that his income amounted to 40,000.00 per cropping season as a
farmer, 2,000.00 per month as a tanod, and 300.00 per day as a tricycle driver.
However, since the prosecution failed to present any document pertaining to Biags
14
G.R. No. 181043 October 8, 2008
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
MILLANO MUIT, SERGIO PANCHO, JR., EDUARDO HERMANO ALIAS "BOBBY REYES,"
ROLANDO DEQUILLO, ROMEO PANCHO, and JOSEPH FERRAER, appellants.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Millano Muit y Munoz (Muit), Sergio Pancho y Cagumoc, Jr. (Pancho, Jr.), Rolando
Dequillo y Tampos (Dequillo), Romeo Pancho (Romeo), Eduardo "Eddie" Hermano
alias "Bobby Reyes" alias "Eddie Reyes" (Hermano), and Joseph Ferraer (Ferraer)
were charged with
kidnapping for ransom with homicide1 and carnapping2 in two separate informations.
Only Muit, Pancho Jr., Dequillo, Romeo, and Ferraer were arrested and stood trial.
However, Ferraer was discharged from the criminal cases by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) and was utilized as a state witness. 3 All appellants pleaded not guilty during
their arraignments.
The facts as culled from the records are as follows:
In the afternoon of 11 November 1997, Orestes Julaton, (Julaton), a relative of
Ferraer, arrived at the latters house in Kaylaway, Nasugbu, Batangas with Sergio
Pancho, Sr. (Pancho, Sr.), Pancho, Jr., Dequillo and four other men on board a gray
Mitsubishi car with plate number PSV-818. Julaton introduced them to Ferraer and
told the latter that Pancho, Sr. is also their relative. Pancho, Sr. told Ferraer that they
wanted to use his house as a safehouse for their "visitor." Ferraer was hesitant at
first as he thought it was risky for him and his family. Hermano told Ferraer not to
worry because they are not killers; their line of work is kidnap for ransom. Ferraer
was assured that the money they will get would be shared equally among them.
Ferraer and Pancho, Sr. would guard their victim. Later, five other men came and
they were introduced to Ferraer as Muit, Morales, alias Tony, alias David and alias
Puri. They had dinner and chatted until midnight. That evening, Morales handed to
Ferraer for safekeeping a folded carton wrapped with masking tape contained in a
big paper bag, and a green backpack. Hermano told Ferraer that the package
contained guns. Ferraer brought the package inside his room; he inspected the
contents before placing them under the bed, and saw that the carton contained a
shotgun and the green backpack, an Ingram folding. Morales and Udon also showed
him their .45 caliber guns tucked at their waists.4
At one oclock in the afternoon of 24 November 1997, Ferraer saw Pancho, Jr., and
Hermano with a companion, seated under the tree in front of his house. Pancho, Jr.
introduced their companion as Romeo. They informed Ferraer that the following
15
day, they would proceed with their plan. Romeo would be the informant since he is
an insider and a trusted general foreman of the victim. The next day, at nine oclock
in the morning, Pancho, Sr. arrived at Ferraers house alone and asked Ferraer if he
was already informed of the plan. Ferraer replied in the affirmative. Pancho, Sr. told
him to wait for the groups return. However, the group returned without the
intended victim because the latter did not show up at the construction site. 5 On 2
December 1997, the group received a call from Romeo informing them that the
victim was already at the construction site. Hermano, Morales, Udon, Manuel,
Bokbok, and Muit commuted to the construction site at Barangay Darasa, Tanauan,
Batangas. Pancho, Jr. was on board the Mitsubishi car as back-up.
At around two oclock in the afternoon of the same date, 2 December 1997, Roger
Seraspe (Seraspe), the personal driver of the victim, drove a blue Pajero with plate
number UDL-746 carrying Engr. Ruth Roldan and the victim to visit the Flexopac
project site at Barangay Darasa, Tanauan, Batangas. At the site, Engr. Roldan and the
victim alighted from the Pajero and, along with Engr. Ed dela Cruz, toured the
construction site. Seraspe talked with Armand Chavez (Chavez), the warehouseman
of ILO Construction, while waiting for his boss. 6
After the site inspection, the three engineers walked towards the direction of
the Pajero. Seraspe was surprised to see that the three engineers who stood
together suddenly lay prostrate on the ground. Seraspe and Chavez saw an
unidentified man standing near the three engineers. Three more armed men
surrounded the Pajero. Two of them approached Seraspe and Chavez. One of the
armed men, Muit, poked a gun at Seraspe and ordered him and Chavez to lay
prostrate on the ground.7 The assailants dragged the victim towards the Pajero. They
forced the victim to order Seraspe to give them the keys to the Pajero. When the
victim was already on board the Pajero, Seraspe heard one of them say, "Sarge,
nandito na ang ating pakay."8
They then started the Pajero and drove away, passing through the Pag-asa Road
gate. Two more persons who were waiting at the Pag-asa road boarded the Pajero.9
At 2:30 that same afternoon, Lipa City Deputy Chief of Police, Supt. Arcadio Mission
(Supt. Mission) received a radio message from the Tanauan Police Station that a
kidnapping was ongoing and the kidnappers on board a Pajero with plate number
UDL-746 were heading towards Lipa City. Supt. Mission immediately ordered the
police posted near the Lipa City bus stop to put up a barricade. In the meantime, two
teams were organized to intercept the Pajero. They proceeded to the barricade.10
Right after Supt. Mission and the teams arrived at the barricade, the Pajero was
spotted. When policemen flagged down the Pajero, the driver stopped the vehicle.
While two policemen approached the Pajero, the driver and front passenger opened
their car doors and started firing at the policemen. At this point, all the policemen
present at the scene fired back. The cross-fire lasted for around four minutes. All the
occupants of the Pajero, except the driver and the front passenger who managed to
escape, died. SPO1 Rolando Cariaga apprehended one of the escapees who turned
out to be Muit, the driver of the Pajero, at Barangay San Carlos, Batangas, about 200
meters from the place of the shootout.11
On the other hand, after the assailants carried their plan into action, Pancho, Jr.
proceeded to their agreed meeting place but did not find Hermanos group there.
Pancho, Jr. waited along the highway in front of the construction site. He thought
that he had been left behind when he did not see the group, so he left. When
Pancho, Jr. returned to Ferraers house, he told Ferraer what happened to their
operation. Worried that something bad might have happened to the group, Pancho,
Jr. went back and looked for the rest of his group. Pancho, Jr. came back alone.
At around 5:30 in the morning of 3 December 1997, Ferraer saw Pancho, Sr. and
Pancho, Jr. watching the TV program "Alas Singko y Medya." He joined them and saw
on the news the Pajero riddled with bullets. Pancho, Sr. and Pancho, Jr. left Ferraers
house at around 9:00 in the morning and they also left behind the Mitsubishi car
they used. That night, Ferraer saw on the news program TV Patrol a footage showing
the cadavers of Udon, Morales, Manuel, Bokbok and the victim, and
the Pajero riddled with bullets. Ferraer also saw Muit in handcuffs.
The prosecution presented Ignacio Ong, Sr., the father of the victim Engr. Ignacio
Ong, Jr.; Seraspe; Chavez; Dr. Anthony Llamas, the PNP Medico-Legal Officer who
conducted the autopsy; Supt. Mission, Ferraer, as the state witness; and Atty. Narzal
Mallare12 (Atty. Mallare), the lawyer who assisted appellants Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo
in executing their respective sworn statements as witnesses. Their accounts were
corroborated by the prosecutions documentary evidence such as the extra judicial
confessions of Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo, which were executed with the assistance of
Atty. Mallare. Muit executed two extra judicial confessions: the first statement was
dated 4 December 1997, in which he was assisted by Atty. Ernesto Vergara, and the
second statement was dated 7 December 1997 in which he was assisted by Atty.
Solomon De Jesus and witnessed by his uncle, Bonifacio Muit (Bonifacio), and his
brother, Dominador Muit (Dominador). On the other hand, the defense presented
appellants Dequillo, Pancho, Jr., and Muit.
Dequillo, for his part, claimed that for the period of November to December 1997 he
was working as a mason at Villanueva Construction in BF Homes. His work starts at
8:00 in the morning and ends at 5:00 in the afternoon. He stated that on 8 December
1997, he was arrested by the CIDG at his house in Purok Sto. Domingo, Barangay
Holy Spirit, Quezon City. At the CIDG Detention Center, he was questioned about the
16
guns used in the kidnapping of the victim. He was allegedly tortured when he denied
any knowledge about the kidnapping and was forced to sign a statement without
being allowed to read it. Atty. Mallare only came in after he had already signed the
statement. He denied any participation in the crimes charged against him. 13
Pancho, Jr. claimed that he was arrested on 7 December 1997 in Calbayog, Samar. He
was first brought to the Calbayog City Police Station, and then transferred to Camp
Crame. He alleged that the police tortured him and forced him to sign the written
confession of his participation in the crimes. He denied having participated in the
commission of the offenses charged against him.14
On the other hand, Muit claimed that on 2 December 1997 he was in Lipa City, near
the place of the shootout. He had just attended a gathering of the Rizalistas and was
waiting for his uncle Bonifacio when the police arrested him. He denied having any
knowledge of the crime. He denied knowing the people whose name appeared in his
two extra judicial confessions. He claimed that the names were supplied by the
police and that he was not assisted by counsel during the custodial investigation. 15
In a decision16 dated 22 November 2002, the RTC, Branch 83 of Tanauan City,
Batangas found Muit, Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Romeo guilty.17 Only the cases
involving the charges of carnapping and kidnapping for ransom which resulted in the
death of the victim were automatically appealed to this Court.
The RTC held that mere denials and alibis of appellants cannot prevail over the
positive declarations of the prosecutions witnesses. It found the prosecutions
witnesses more credible than appellants, whose self-serving statements were
obviously intended to exculpate themselves from criminal liability. The RTC did not
give credence to the claims of appellants that their extra judicial confessions were
procured through torture as these were belied by the testimony of Atty. Mallare and
appellants medical certificates which were issued during their incarceration and
after the execution of their statements. And the RTC noted that even without
appellants extra judicial confessions, there was still sufficient evidence on record to
hold them guilty.
In a resolution dated 17 January 2006, the Court referred the case to the Court of
Appeals for intermediate review.18
The Court of Appeals in a decision19 dated 31 August 2007 affirmed the decision of
the RTC.20 The appellate court held that the RTC was correct in convicting appellants
for kidnapping and carnapping. The prosecution was able to prove through Ferraer
that appellants conspired with one another in the planning and execution of their
plan to kidnap the victim. Moreover, appellants executed extra judicial confessions,
duly assisted by their counsels, detailing their participation in the kidnapping. As for
Muit, other than his extra judicial confession, he was also positively identified during
the kidnapping by eyewitnesses Seraspe and Chavez. Appellants filed their notices of
appeal with the Court of Appeals.
Before this Court, appellants opted not to file supplemental briefs, and instead
adopted the assignment of errors in their respective original briefs. 21 Taken together,
appellants claim that: (i) the RTC erred in finding them guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the charges against them; (ii) the RTC erred in its finding that they acted in
conspiracy in the commission of the crimes charged against them; and (iii) the RTC
erred in giving credence to the extra-judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo,
and to the sworn statement and testimony of Ferraer in convicting them.22
The appeals are bereft of merit.
The elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention 23 are the
following: (a) the accused is a private individual; (b) the accused kidnaps or detains
another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or
kidnapping is illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense, any of the four
circumstances mentioned in Article 267 is present. The essence of the crime of
kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty, coupled with indubitable
proof of intent of the accused to effect the same.24 The totality of the prosecutions
evidence in this case established the commission of kidnapping for ransom with
homicide.
On the other hand, Republic Act No. 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act, as amended,
defines "carnapping" as the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging
to another without the latters consent, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.25 The crime was committed in
this case when the victims Pajero was forcibly taken away from him
contemporaneously with his kidnapping at the construction site.
The kidnapping for ransom with homicide and the carnapping were established by
the direct testimony of Ferraer, Seraspe and Chavez. Ferraer testified on how the
group approached and convinced him to let them use his house to keep the victim
they planned to kidnap. They planned the crime in Ferraers house and waited for
the call from Romeo to inform them when the victim would be at the construction
site. The group received a call from Romeo on 2 December 1997 informing them that
the victim was already at the construction site, and so they went there to carry out
their plan. At the construction site, as testified to by Seraspe and Chavez, Muit and
the other members of the group pointed their guns at the victim and his companion
and ordered them to lie prostrate on the ground. After getting the keys to
the Pajero from Seraspe, they forced the victim to board the vehicle with Muit
driving it. They immediately reported the kidnapping of the victim to the police and
17
the kidnappers were intercepted by the group led by Supt. Mission. Supt. Mission
testified that the kidnappers refused to surrender and engaged the police in a shoot
out in which the victim was among the casualties. Muit was one of the two persons
who survived the shoot out, but was apprehended by the police. Pancho, Jr.
returned to the house of Ferraer alone when the group did not arrive at their
meeting place. Ferraer, Pancho, Jr., and Pancho, Sr. learned from the news that the
group engaged the police in a shoot out and most of them were killed, and that Muit
was arrested by the police.
After investigation, the police were able to apprehend appellants Pancho, Jr.,
Romeo, and Dequillo who all took part in the botched criminal conspiracy to kidnap
the victim. During the investigation, Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit, with the
assistance of their counsels and family members, executed extra judical confessions
divulging their respective roles in the planning and execution of the crimes.
Even though Pancho, Jr., Dequillo and Romeo did not participate in the actual
abduction of the victim, they should still be held liable, as the courts below did,
because of the existence of conspiracy. Conspiracy is a unity of purpose and
intention in the commission of a crime.26 Where conspiracy is established, the
precise modality or extent of participation of each individual conspirator becomes
secondary since the act of one is the act of all. 27 The degree of actual participation in
the commission of the crime is immaterial.
The conspiracy to kidnap the victim was proven through circumstantial evidence. The
group thoroughly planned the kidnapping in Ferraers house and patiently waited for
the day when the victim would be at the construction site. Then on 2 December
1997, the group received a call from Romeo so they proceeded to the construction
site and carried out their plan.
All the appellants took active part in the criminal conspiracy and performed different
roles to consummate their common plan. The roles which Muit and his other
companions played in the actual abduction were described earlier. As for Dequillo,
he was the one who procured the guns used by the group. Pancho, Jr. served as the
driver of the back-up vehicle, and Romeo was the groups informant.
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence states that circumstantial
evidence is sufficient if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit strengthened the
case against them. There is nothing on record to support appellants claim that they
were coerced and tortured into executing their extra judicial confessions. One of the
indicia of voluntariness in the execution of appellants extra judicial statements is
that each contains many details and facts which the investigating officers could not
have known and could not have supplied, without the knowledge and information
given by appellants. Moreover, the appellants were assisted by their lawyers when
they executed their statements. Atty. Mallare testified that Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo
executed their statements voluntarily and affixed their signatures after he talked
with them alone and informed them of their constitutional rights.28 Muit, on the
other hand, was assisted by counsels in each instance when he executed his two
extra judicial confessions; his second statement was even witnessed by his uncle,
Bonifacio, and his brother, Dominador. Muit cannot just conveniently disclaim any
knowledge of the contents of his extra judicial confession. Nevertheless, in Muits
case, he was also positively identified by Seraspe and Chavez as the one who pointed
a gun at them during the kidnapping and ordered them to lay prostrate on the
ground.29
Appellants claims of torture are not supported by medical certificates from the
physical examinations done on them. 30 These claims of torture were mere
afterthoughts as they were raised for the first time during trial; appellants did not
even inform their family members who visited them while they were imprisoned
about the alleged tortures.31Dequillo, for his part, also had the opportunity to
complain of the alleged torture done to him to the Department of Justice when he
was brought there.32 Claims of torture are easily concocted, and cannot be given
credence unless substantiated by competent and independent corroborating
evidence.33
The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit also strengthened
the prosecutions case against Romeo. The rule that an extra judicial confession is
evidence only against the person making it recognizes various exceptions. One such
exception is where several extra judicial statements had been made by several
persons charged with an offense and there could have been no collusion with
reference to said several confessions, the fact that the statements are in all material
respects identical is confirmatory of the confession of the co-defendants and is
admissible against other persons implicated therein. They are also admissible as
circumstantial evidence against the person implicated therein to show the
probability of the latters actual participation in the commission of the crime and
may likewise serve as corroborative evidence if it is clear from other facts and
circumstances that other
persons had participated in the perpetration of the crime charged and proved. These
are known as "interlocking confessions."34 Nonetheless, the RTC, in convicting
Romeo, relied not only on the aforesaid extra judicial statements but also on
18
Ferraers testimony that Romeo was introduced to him in his house as the informant
when they were planning the kidnapping.
As for the penalty, the RTC did not err in imposing the penalty of death since the
kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or
any other person. Neither actual demand for nor payment of ransom is necessary for
the consummation of the felony. It is sufficient that the deprivation of liberty was for
the purpose of extorting ransom even if none of the four circumstances mentioned
in Article 267 were present in its perpetration.35The death of the victim as a result of
the kidnapping only serves as a generic aggravating circumstance for the rule is that
when more than one qualifying circumstances are proven, the others must be
considered as generic aggravating circumstances. 36
The imposition of death penalty is also proper in the carnapping of the
victims Pajero because it was committed by a band, which serves as a generic
aggravating circumstance, without any mitigating
circumstance.37 There is band whenever more than three armed malefactors shall
have acted together in the commission of the offense. 38 As planned, Muit and three
other armed men kidnapped the victim and drove away with the latters Pajero while
two more persons waiting near the Pag-asa road boarded the Pajero.
However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346 which prohibits the imposition of the
death penalty, the penalties imposed are commuted to reclusion perpetua with all its
accessory penalties and without eligibility for parole under Act No. 4103. 39
As to damages, the RTC erred in awarding compensation for loss of earning capacity.
Pursuant to jurisprudence, the Court precludes an award for loss of earning capacity
without adequate proof as it partakes of the nature of actual damages. 40 The bare
testimony of the father of the deceased that, at the time of his death, the victim was
earning
5,000.00 per month as an engineer is not sufficient proof.41 But pursuant to the
Courts ruling in People v. Abrazaldo42 wherein we deemed it proper to award
temperate damages in the amount of 25,000.00 in cases where evidence confirms
the heirs entitlement to actual damages but the amount of actual damages cannot
be determined because of the absence of supporting and duly presented receipts,
the Court awards 25,000.00 temperate damages to the heirs of the victim in the
present case.
The civil indemnity should be increased to 75,000.00. 43 The award of civil indemnity
may be granted without any need of proof other than the death of the victim. 44 In
line with jurisprudence, the moral damages should also be increased
to P 500,000.00.45

Moreover, exemplary damages in the amount of 100,000.00 for the crime of

kidnapping for ransom with homicide46 and 25,000.00 for the crime of carnapping
should be awarded. The law allows exemplary damages in criminal cases as part of
the civil liability of the malefactors when the crime is attended by one or more
aggravating circumstances.47

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02044 which
commuted the death penalties imposed in Criminal Case Nos. P-521 and P-607
to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS that the compensation for loss of earning capacity be deleted while
the civil indemnity be increased to 75,000.00 and the moral damages to
500,000.00, and that appellants shall also pay the heirs of Ignacio Earl Ong, Jr.
temperate damages of 25,000.00 and exemplary damages of 100,000.00 for the
crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide and 25,000.00 for the crime of
carnapping. Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.

19
G.R. No. 177751 December 14, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
FLORENCIO AGACER, EDDIE AGACER, ELYNOR AGACER, FRANKLIN AGACER and
ERIC* AGACER,Appellants.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This case involves a man who was killed by his own relatives. Convicted for the crime
of murder by the lower courts, the indicted relatives are now before us assailing
their guilty verdict.
Factual Antecedents
This is an appeal from the November 17, 2006 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01543, affirming with modification the August 7, 2001
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Aparri, Cagayan which found
appellants Florencio Agacer (Florencio), Franklin Agacer (Franklin), Elynor Agacer
(Elynor), Eric Agacer (Eric) and Eddie Agacer (Eddie), guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder for the killing of Cesario Agacer (Cesario).
As mentioned, all the appellants were related to Cesario. Florencio was Cesarios
nephew and is the father of Franklin while the brothers Elynor, Eric and Eddie are his
nephews.
On March 2, 1999, an Information3 for Murder was filed against the five appellants,
the accusatory portion of which reads as follows:
That on or about April 2, 1998, in the municipality of Sta. Ana, Province of Cagayan,
and within the jurisdiction [of] this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed with a long firearm, a bow and arrow, a bolo and stones, with intent to kill,
with evident premeditation and with treachery, conspiring together and helping one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, stone
and shoot one Cesario Agacer, inflicting upon the latter [bruises] and multiple
gunshot wounds in his body which caused his death.
That the killing was aggravated by the use of an unlicensed firearm.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On October 14, 1999, Florencio, Elynor, Franklin and Eric entered separate pleas of
"not guilty" during their arraignment.5 On January 11, 2000, Eddie likewise pleaded
"not guilty".6 Thereafter, trial ensued.
20
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecutions version of the events is as follows:
Cesario was a 55-year old farmer and owner of a ricefield situated in Dungeg, Santa
Ana, Cagayan. On April 2, 1998, at around 9:00 a.m., he was clearing a section of his
farm and preparing the beddings for the rice seedlings intended for the coming
planting season. Farm laborers Genesis Delantar (Genesis), his brother Andy, Rafael
Morgado and brothers Roden (Roden) and Ric (Ric) Vallejo were nearby in a separate
section of the same ricefield harvesting Cesarios palay.
According to prosecution witnesses Genesis and Roden, it was at that moment while
Cesario was tending to his farm when appellants suddenly emerged from a nearby
banana plantation and surrounded Cesario. Visibly intimidated, Cesario moved
backwards and retreated to where the other farm laborers were working. However,
Franklin set afire the rice straws that covered Cesarios rice seedlings. This prompted
Cesario to return to put out the fire and save his rice seedlings. At this point, Franklin
and Eric started throwing stones at Cesario which forced the latter to retreat again.
Thereafter, Florencio, while standing side by side with Eric, signaled Cesario to come
closer. Cesario obliged but when he was just around five meters away from the
group, Eddie suddenly pulled out a gun concealed inside a sack and, without
warning, shot Cesario hitting him in the left portion of his chest. Almost
simultaneously, Elynor took aim at Cesario with his bow and arrow but missed his
mark. As Cesario fell, appellants fled towards the irrigation canal, where another
gunshot rang. Thereafter, a short firearm was thrown from where the appellants ran
towards the direction of Cesarios fallen body. Appellants then immediately left the
scene of the crime onboard a hand tractor and a tricycle.
After these events unfolded, Genesis and the other farm laborers scampered away in
different directions. Genesis then reached Barangay Capanikian and informed
Cesarios son, Neldison Agacer (Neldison), of the death of his father. At around 3:00
p.m., Cesarios friends in said barangay went to the scene of the crime and retrieved
his corpse. During the autopsy, a total of eight entrance wounds were found, mostly
on the chest of Cesarios cadaver. According to the Medico-Legal Officer, the fatal
gunshot wounds were inflicted by the use of a firearm capable of discharging several
slugs simultaneously.
Version of the Defense
The appellants denied the accusations against them and claimed that Florencio only
acted in self-defense and in defense of relatives. As proof, appellants presented
Florencio who testified that on April 2, 1998, he proceeded to Dungeg, Sta. Ana,
Cagayan, from his residence in Merde, also in Sta. Ana, Cagayan, to prepare seed
beddings in the ricefield over which he and his uncle Cesario had an existing dispute.
At around 8:00 a.m., he claimed that Cesario attempted to prevent him from
preparing the seed beds. When Florencio persisted and argued that he inherited the
land from his father, Cesario departed through a cogonal area. Moments later,
Cesario returned and shouted at him not to continue working on the land. At that
time, Florencio noticed that Cesario was holding an object. Suspecting that Cesario
may be armed, he shouted to Eric, Franklin, Eddie and Elynor, who had just arrived,
to run away. The four heeded his warning and scampered in different directions.
Cesario then chased Florencio who ran and jumped into the irrigation canal to hide
in the tall cogon grasses. However, Cesario was not deterred and continued to
search for him. When Florencio saw that Cesario was already close, he suddenly
grabbed Cesarios buckshot gun and successfully disarmed him. Thereupon, Cesario
drew another firearm and shot Florencio several times. As Cesario was shooting him,
Florencio also fired the gun he earlier grabbed from Cesario and hit the latter.
Finding out that he too was hit in the arm, he shouted to his nephews for help. They
responded by taking him to a hospital for treatment. On April 16, 1998, he went to
the police to surrender.
Elynor and Eddie corroborated this version in their respective testimonies. 7
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court found the prosecutions evidence sufficient to prove
appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It held that appellants acted in conspiracy
in inflicting upon Cesario, in a treacherous manner, multiple gunshot wounds.
However, the trial court did not appreciate evident premeditation as a qualifying
aggravating circumstance for failure to establish its elements as clearly as the
criminal act itself. It also did not consider as aggravating circumstance the use of an
unlicensed firearm since the firearm used in the killing was not presented in
evidence.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision8 of August 7, 2001, reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds all the accused FLORENCIO AGACER, EDDIE AGACER,
ELYNOR AGACER, FRANKLIN AGACER and ERIC AGACER GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of MURDER qualified [by] treachery and hereby sentence[s] them
to:
1. suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties;
21
2. indemnify the heirs of the victim, the amount of 75,000.00 as death indemnity;
the amount of 40,000.00 as actual damages and the amount of 30,000.00 as and
by way of Attorneys fees.
3. pay the costs of litigation.
SO ORDERED.9
Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal,10 which was approved by the trial court in its
Order11 of August 17, 2001. Pursuant thereto, the records of the case were elevated
to this Court. However, in view of the Courts ruling in People v. Mateo 12 allowing an
intermediate review by the CA where the penalty involved is death, reclusion
perpetua as in this case, or life imprisonment, the case was transferred to said court
for appropriate action and disposition.13
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court in all respects. It also awarded moral
damages pursuant to the rule laid down in People v. Dela Cruz 14 and People v.
Panela.15 The dispositive portion of the November 17, 2006 Decision 16 of the CA
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the
instant appeal, and accordingly AFFIRMING in toto the herein impugned August 7,
2001 Decision of the RTC, Branch 08, of Aparri, Cagayan. Additionally, the amount of
P50,000.00 is hereby awarded in favor of Cesario Agacers surviving heirs as and by
way of moral damages pursuant to the doctrine in the cases of Dela Cruz and Panela,
as heretofore stated.
SO ORDERED.17
Hence, the present appeal.
Assignment of Errors
In their Brief,18 appellants assigned the following errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED [AMONG] THE
HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANTS IN THE KILLING OF CESARIO AGACER.
II
THE LOWER COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN FINDING THAT
TREACHERY AS A QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE
CRIME.
III
THE LOWER COURT FINALLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
GUILT HAS BEEN PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.19
Appellants contend that both lower courts erred in finding that they conspired to kill
Cesario. They argue that there was no evidence sufficient to establish their
intentional participation in the crime to achieve a common purpose. Thus, they claim
that the criminal culpability arising from their acts, even if the same were all directed
solely against one victim, is individual and not collective. Put differently, each of
them is liable only for his own acts.
Appellants also contend that treachery did not attend the commission of the crime.
They assert that treachery cannot be appreciated when an altercation precedes the
killing. Here, Cesario already had a previous heated altercation with Florencio.
Appellants aver that Cesario had only himself to blame for obliging when Florencio
summoned him to come near considering that they just had a heated argument.
According to them, Cesario literally courted danger by approaching Florencio instead
of running away from him.
Lastly, appellants posit that they cannot be held guilty of murder since the qualifying
circumstance of treachery was not alleged with clarity nor specified in the
Information as required by Sections 8 and 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
In its Brief,20 the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) maintains that there was conspiracy among the appellants as shown by their
collective acts before, during, and after the perpetration of the crime. Their specific
acts are in fact indicative of a common design and intent to ensure the commission
of the crime.21 The OSG also belies the assertion of the appellants that treachery
does not exist in this case. It insists that their attack on Cesario was sudden and
unexpected, thereby depriving him of a chance to defend himself and ensuring its
commission without risk to the appellants and without the slightest provocation on
the part of the victim.22
Our Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Conspiracy was sufficiently established
22
"Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it." 23 In conspiracy, it is not necessary
to adduce direct evidence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. 24 It "may be
shown through circumstantial evidence, deduced from the mode and manner in
which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused
themselves when such lead to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and
community of interest."25 Proof of a previous agreement and decision to commit the
crime is not essential but the fact that the malefactors acted in unison pursuant to
the same objective suffices.26
Here, while there is no proof of any previous agreement among appellants to
commit the crime and while it was established during trial that Eddie alone shot
Cesario, the acts of all appellants before, during and after the incident establish the
existence of conspiracy to kill Cesario beyond reasonable doubt. First, all of them
emerged at the same time from a banana plantation beside the ricefield. Second,
they surprised Cesario by immediately surrounding him. Third, all of them were
armed at the time of the incident. Eddie had a shotgun concealed in a sack, Florencio
was armed with a bolo, Elynor had a bow and arrow, while Eric and Franklin had
stones in their hands. Fourth, Eric and Franklin struck Cesario with stones moments
before the shooting. Fifth, Eddie immediately shot Cesario at close range while the
latter was approaching the group of appellants upon being summoned by Florencio.
Sixth, Florencio, Franklin, Eric and Elynor stood just a meter away from Eddie when
he shot Cesario, but did not do anything to stop or dissuade Eddie from the assault.
Seventh, after Cesario was shot, all appellants departed from the scene of the crime
together.
Undoubtedly, the acts of the assailants constitute proof of their unanimity in design,
intent and execution.27 They "performed specific acts with closeness and
coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose and design" 28 to ensure
the death of Cesario. We thus uphold the lower courts finding that appellants
conspired to commit the crime of murder against Cesario.
Having established conspiracy, appellants assertion that each of them can only be
made liable for his own acts deserves no merit. Evidence as to who among the
appellants delivered the fatal blow is therefore no longer indispensable since in
conspiracy, a person may be convicted for the criminal act of another.29 In a
conspiracy, the act of one is deemed the act of all.30
Essence of Treachery; Elements
We are also unimpressed with appellants contention that both the trial and
appellate courts erred in ruling that treachery qualified the killing of Cesario to
murder. They maintain that since the attack on Cesario was frontal, there was
therefore no element of surprise on the victim or suddenness of the assault that
characterizes treachery.
"There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense
which the offended party might make." 31 Two conditions must concur for treachery
to be appreciated. First, is the employment of means of execution that gives the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate. Second, the means
of execution was deliberate or consciously adopted.32 "The essence of treachery is
the sudden attack by an aggressor without the slightest provocation on the part of
the victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby
ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor." 33
In this case, treachery is evident from the same circumstances we have already
discussed above. From the facts, Cesario could not have been aware that he would
be surrounded, attacked and killed by the appellants who were all related to him. He
could not have also been aware that Eddie had a shotgun concealed in a sack
because if he was, he would not have casually approached Florencio when the latter
summoned him. Unfortunately, while Cesario was advancing towards Florencio,
Eddie shot him at close range without any warning whatsoever. Evidently, the crime
was committed in a manner that there was no opportunity for Cesario to defend
himself. Also, the mode of attack did not spring from the unexpected turn of events
but was clearly thought of by the appellants. Hence, it no longer matters that the
assault was frontal since its swiftness and unexpectedness deprived Cesario of a
chance to repel it or offer any resistance in defense of his person. 34
Appellants contention that treachery was not alleged with certainty in the
Information is also devoid of merit. In People v. Villacorta 35 the Court appreciated
treachery as an aggravating circumstance, it having been alleged in the Information
and proved during trial that the "x x x accused, armed with a sharpened bamboo
stick, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said weapon one DANILO
SALVADOR CRUZ x x x."
Similarly, we hold that treachery was sufficiently alleged in the Information when it
reads, viz:
x x x the above-name[d] accused, armed with a long firearm, a bow and arrow, a
bolo and stones, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery,
conspiring together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously assault, attack, stone and shoot one Cesario Agacer, inflicting upon
23
the latter [bruises] and multiple gunshot wounds in his body which caused his
death.36 (Emphasis supplied.)
"Well-settled is the rule that when x x x treachery x x x is present and alleged in the
Information, it qualifies the killing and raises it to the category of murder." 37
Appellants failed to discharge their burden to prove Florencios claim that he acted
in self-defense and in defense of relatives.
Florencio admits that he shot Cesario but invokes defense of himself and of his
relatives to escape criminal liability.
The Court is not convinced.
While it is the burden of the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, this burden shifts when the accused admits the killing and pleads
self-defense by way of justification. It therefore becomes vital for the accused to
show clear and convincing evidence that he acted in self-defense. In so doing, he
must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecutions evidence.38
The accused must also prove the following elements of self-defense: (1) there was
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) there was reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) the lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. 39 In the justifying
circumstance of self-defense, unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non.40 Self-
defense, complete or incomplete, cannot be considered a justification, unless the
victim commits an unlawful aggression against the person defending himself.41
Here, Florencio failed to prove that he defended himself against the unlawful
aggression of Cesario. He failed to present any evidence to substantiate his claim
that there was an actual or imminent peril to his life or limb. Aside from his
unreliable and self-serving claim, there is no proof that Cesario assaulted and shot
him with a firearm during their struggle or, if at all, that there was indeed a struggle
between them. On the other hand, the separate testimonies of prosecution
witnesses Genesis and Roden negate Florencios claim of unlawful aggression. The
testimonies of these witnesses established that it was the appellants who emerged
from a nearby banana plantation; that they surrounded Cesario and set to fire the
rice straws covering his rice seedlings; that appellants were armed with different
kinds of weapons, while Cesario was not; that Franklin and Elynor cast stones upon
Cesario; and, that the one who pulled a gun from a sack and shot Cesario was Eddie,
not Florencio. We thus hold that if there was unlawful aggression here, it came from
appellants end and not from Cesario. Hence, there being no unlawful aggression on
the part of Cesario, Florencios claim of self-defense must fail.
Another basis for appellants conviction is the finding of the medico-legal expert that
the cause of Cesarios death was multiple gunshot wounds found mostly at the
"infero-lateral portion of the anterior chest, right side." This corroborates the
testimonies of Genesis and Roden that Cesario was shot in his chest. These
dovetailing findings of the medico-legal expert and the eyewitness accounts of
Genesis and Roden also deserve more credence than the unsubstantiated claim of
self-defense of Florencio, who, interestingly, gave contradictory testimony. Florencio
claimed that he could not see the gun used by Cesario in shooting him as tall cogonal
grass obstructed his view, yet he could clearly recall that he saw the bullet-riddled
Cesario fall.42 These contradictory statements of Florencio all the more convince us
to believe the testimonies of prosecution witnesses that no exchange of gunfire
actually transpired between Cesario and Florencio. Rather, it was only Eddie who
wielded a gun and shot Cesario.1avvphi1
Florencio also invokes the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives, which has
three elements, to wit, (1) there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
(2) there was reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and
(3) in case of provocation given by the person being attacked, the person making
defense had no part therein.43 Like in the case of self-defense, unlawful aggression is
also an indispensable element in defense of relative. As discussed, there is no
unlawful aggression on the part of Cesario. Hence, Florencios reliance on this
justifying circumstance is likewise unavailing.
Similarly, Florencios subsequent presentation of himself at the police station cannot
be considered as a "voluntary surrender" which would mitigate the penalty imposed.
"A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the
accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because (a) he
acknowledges his guilt or (b) he wishes to save them the trouble and expense
necessarily incurred in his search and capture."44 Here, Florencio cannot be
considered to have surrendered voluntarily since his act did not emanate from a
natural impulse to admit the killing of Cesario or to save the police officers the effort
and expense that would be incurred in his search and incarceration. Although he
submitted a medico-legal certificate purportedly to show that his injuries prevented
him from immediately surrendering to the authorities, same, however, does not
certify as to the period of his incapacity or the period during which he required
medical attendance. Thus, there can be no explanation why he surrendered only on
April 16, 1998 or 14 days after the commission of the crime. To us, Florencios
surrender was a mere afterthought undeserving of any consideration. Indeed, the
failure of Florencio to immediately surrender militates against his claim that he killed
24
Cesario in self-defense and in defense of relatives since an innocent person will not
hesitate to take the prompt and necessary action to exonerate himself of the crime
imputed to him.
All told, we find no reason to disturb the conclusion of the trial court, as affirmed by
the CA. The testimonies of the eyewitnesses presented by the prosecution were
given in a clear, natural and spontaneous manner. Their positive identification of the
appellants as the persons responsible for the death of Cesario has been clearly,
categorically and consistently established on record. Moreover, we note that no
evidence was presented to establish that these eyewitnesses harbored any ill-will
against the appellants or that they have reasons to fabricate their
testimonies.45These kinds of testimonies are accepted as true for being consistent
with the natural order of events, human nature and the presumption of good faith. 46
The Proper Penalty
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of murder is
reclusion perpetua to death. As correctly imposed by the trial court and as affirmed
by the CA, appellants must suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua, the lower of
the said two indivisible penalties, due to the absence of an aggravating circumstance
attending the commission of the crime.
The Civil Liability
For the victims death resulting from the crime, the heirs are entitled to the following
awards: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or
compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5)
temperate damages.47
Civil indemnity in the amount of 75,000.00 is mandatory and is granted without
need of evidence other than the commission of the crime. 48 Moral damages in the
sum of 50,000.00 shall be awarded despite the absence of proof of mental and
emotional suffering of the victims heirs.49 "As borne out by human nature and
experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain
and anguish on the part of the victims family."50 Also under Article 2230 of the Civil
Code, exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime was committed with one
or more aggravating circumstances, like treachery,51 as in this case. Thus, the award
of 30,000.00 for exemplary damages is in order.52
As regards actual damages, the son of Cesario, Neldison, testified that the sum of
40,000.00 was spent for the coffin of his father but was unable to present receipts
to substantiate such claim. Where the amount of actual damages for funeral
expenses cannot be ascertained due to the absence of receipts to prove them,
temperate damages in the sum of 25,000.00 may be granted, as it is hereby
granted, in lieu thereof.53 "Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages
may be recovered as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victim suffered
pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved." 54

The heirs of Cesario are also entitled to an interest on all the amounts of damages
we have awarded at the legal rate of 6% from the date of finality of this Decision
until fully paid.55

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the November 17, 2006 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01543 which affirmed the August 7, 2001 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Aparri, Cagayan, finding appellants Florencio,
Franklin, Elynor, Eddie and Eric, all surnamed Agacer, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder, with the following modifications:

(1) actual damages is DELETED;

(2) the appellants are ORDERED to pay the heirs of Cesario Agacer 25,000.00 as
temperate damages; and

(3) the appellants are ORDERED to pay the heirs of Cesario Agacer interest at the
legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all the amounts of damages awarded,
commencing from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

Costs against the appellants.

SO ORDERED.

25
G.R. No. 178300 March 17, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DOMINGO REYES y PAJE, ALVIN ARNALDO y AVENA and JOSELITO FLORES y
VICTORIO, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For review is the Decision,1 dated 14 August 2006, and Resolution,2 dated 18 October
2006, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02301 affirming with
modifications the Decision,3 dated 26 February 2002, of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 12, Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 1611-M-99 finding herein
accused-appellants Domingo Reyes y Paje (Reyes), Alvin Arnaldo y Avena (Arnaldo)
and Joselito Flores y Victorio (Flores) guilty of the special complex crime of
kidnapping for ransom with homicide and imposing upon each of them the capital
punishment of death.
The facts culled from the records are as follows:
On 11 August 1999, an Information4 was filed before the RTC charging appellants
with the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide. The
accusatory portion of the information reads:
The undersigned State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice hereby accuses
Domingo Reyes y Paje, Alvin Arnaldo y Avena and Joselito Flores y Victorio of the
crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide defined and penalized under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed as follows:
That on or about 11:00 p.m. on July 16, 1999, at Sitio Lambakin, barangay Sto. Cristo,
San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another and grouping themselves together with Juanito Pataray y Cayaban, Federico
Pataray y Cabayan and Rommel Libarnes y Acejo, who are still at large, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force and intimidation and
with use of firearms, carry away and deprive Robert Yao, Yao San, Chua Ong Ping
Sim, Raymond Yao, Ronald Matthew Yao, Lennie Yao, Charlene Yao, Jona Abagatnan
ang Josephine Ortea against their will and consent on board their Mazda MVP van
for the purpose of extorting money in the amount of Five Million Pesos
(5,000,000.00), that during the detention of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymong Yao,
said accused with intent to kill, willfully and unlawfully strangled Chua Ong Ping Sim
and Raymond Yao to death to the damage and prejudice of their heirs in such
amount as may be awarded to them by this Honorable Court.
26
During their arraignment,5 appellants, assisted by a counsel de oficio, pleaded "Not
guilty" to the charge. Trial on the merits thereafter followed.
The prosecution presented as witnesses Jona Abagatnan (Abagatnan), Robert Yao
(Robert), Yao San, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Alex Alberto, PO3 Roberto Jabien, Atty.
Florimond Rous (Atty. Rous) and Atty. Carlo Uminga (Atty. Uminga). Their
testimonies, taken together, attest to the following:
The Yao family is composed of Yao San (father), Chua Ong Ping Sim (mother), Robert
and Raymond (children), Lenny (daughter-in-law, wife of Robert), Matthew and
Charlene (grandchildren), and Jona Abagatnan and Josephine Ortea (housemaids).
The Yao family owns and operates a poultry farm in Barangay Santo Cristo, San Jose
del Monte, Bulacan.
On 16 July 1999, at about 11:00 p.m., the Yao family, on board a Mazda MVP van,
arrived at the their poultry farm in Barangay Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.
Yao San alighted from the van to open the gate of the farm. At this juncture,
appellant Reyes and a certain Juanito Pataray (Pataray) approached, poked their
guns at Yao San, and dragged him inside the van. Appellant Reyes and Pataray also
boarded the van. Thereupon, appellants Arnaldo and Flores, with two male
companions, all armed with guns, arrived and immediately boarded the van.
Appellant Flores took the drivers seat and drove the van. Appellants Reyes and
Arnaldo and their cohorts then blindfolded each member of the Yao family inside the
van with packaging tape.6
After about 30 minutes of traveling on the road, the van stopped. Per order of
appellants and their cohorts, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Jona
Abagatnan (Abagatnan) stepped out of the van with appellants Reyes and Arnaldo,
Pataray and one of their male companions.7 Appellant Flores, with the other male
companion, drove the van with the remaining members of the Yao family inside the
vehicle.8
Later, the van stopped again. Appellant Flores and his male companion told Yao San
to produce the amount of five million pesos (5,000,000.00) as ransom in exchange
for the release of Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan. Thereafter,
appellant Flores and his male companion left the van and fled; while Yao San, Lenny,
Matthew, Charlene and Josephine remained inside the van. Upon sensing that the
kidnappers had already left, Yao San drove the van towards the poultry farm and
sought the help of relatives.9
Meanwhile, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan were taken on foot
by appellants Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and one male companion to a safe-house
situated in the mountainous part of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan where they spent
the whole night.10
On the morning of the following day, at around 4:00 a.m., appellants and their
cohorts tried to contact Yao San regarding the ransom demanded, but the latter
could not be reached. Thus, appellants instructed Abagatnan to look for Yao San in
the poultry farm. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and one male companion escorted
Abagatnan in proceeding to the poultry farm. Upon arriving therein, Abagatnan
searched for Yao San, but the latter could not be found. Appellants Reyes and
Arnaldo told Abagatnan to remind Yao San about the ransom demanded. Thereafter,
appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and their male companion left Abagatnan in the
poultry farm and went back to the safe-house.11
In the safe-house, appellants told Robert that they would release him so he could
help Abagatnan in locating Yao San. Robert and appellants left the safe-house, and
after 30 minutes of trekking, appellants abandoned Robert. Robert then ran towards
the poultry farm. Upon arriving at the poultry farm, Robert found Yao San and
informed him about the ransom demanded by the appellants. Robert also told Yao
San that Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were still held by appellants and their
cohorts.12
On 18 July 1999, appellants called Yao San through a cellular phone and demanded
the ransom of 5 million for Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond. Yao San acceded to
appellants demand. Appellants allowed Yao San to talk with Chua Ong Ping Sim. 13
On the morning of 19 July 1999, appellants again called Yao San via a cellular phone
and threatened to kill Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond because of newspaper and
radio reports regarding the incident. Yao San clarified to appellants that he did not
report the incident to the police and also pleaded with them to spare the life of Chua
Ong Ping Sim and Raymond. Appellants then instructed Yao San to appear and bring
with him the ransom of 5 million at 3:00 p.m. in the Usan dumpsite, Litex Road,
Fairview, Quezon City. Yao San arrived at the designated place of the pay-off at 4:00
p.m., but none of the appellants or their cohorts showed up. Yao San waited for
appellants call, but none came. Thus, Yao San left.14
On 23 July 1999, the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were found at the
La Mesa Dam, Novaliches, Quezon City.15 Both died of asphyxia by strangulation.16
On 26 July 1999, appellant Arnaldo surrendered to the Presidential Anti-Organized
Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) at Camp Crame, Quezon City. Thereupon, appellant
Arnaldo, with the assistance of Atty. Uminga, executed a written extra-judicial
confession narrating his participation in the incident. Appellant Arnaldo identified
appellants Reyes and Flores, Pataray and a certain Tata and Akey as his co-
27
participants in the incident. Appellant Arnaldo also described the physical features of
his cohorts and revealed their whereabouts. 17
Subsequently, appellant Reyes was arrested in Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan. Thereafter, appellants Arnaldo and Reyes were identified in a police line-up
by Yao San, Robert and Abagatnan as their kidnappers.18
On 10 August 1999, agents of the PAOCTF arrested appellant Flores in Balayan,
Batangas. Afterwards, appellant Flores, with the assistance of Atty. Rous, executed a
written extra-judicial confession detailing his participation in the incident. Appellant
Flores identified appellants Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and a certain Tata and Akey
as his co-participants in the incident. Appellant Flores was subsequently identified in
a police line-up by Yao San, Robert and Abagatnan as one of their kidnappers. 19
The prosecution adduced documentary evidence to bolster the aforesaid allegations,
to wit: (1) Sinumpaang Salaysay of Abagatnan (Exhibit A);20 (2) Karagdagang
Sinumpaang Salaysay of Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San (Exhibit B); 21 (3) sketch
made by Abagatnan (Exhibit C);22 (4) death certificates of Chua Ong Ping Sim and
Raymond (Exhibits D & E);23 (5) Sinumpaang Salaysay of Robert (Exhibit F);24 (6)
Sinumpaang Salaysay of Yao San (Exhibit H);25 (7) joint affidavit of Police Senior
Inspector Loreto P. Delelis and PO3 Roberto Jabien (Exhibit I);26 (8) joint affidavit of
PO3 Alex Alberto and PO3 Leonito Fermin (Exhibit J); 27 (9) written extra-judicial
confession of appellant Flores (Exhibit K);28 (10) written extra-judicial confession of
appellant Arnaldo (Exhibit L);29 and (11) sketch made by appellant Arnaldo (Exhibit
M).30
For its part, the defense presented the testimonies of appellants, Marina Reyes,
Irene Flores Celestino, Wilfredo Celestino, Jr., Rachel C. Ramos, and Isidro Arnaldo.
Appellants denied any liability and interposed alibis and the defense of frame-up.
Their testimonies, as corroborated by their witnesses, are as follows:
Appellant Arnaldo testified that he was an "asset" of the PAOCTF. He narrated that
on 25 July 1999, while he was at the tricycle terminal of Brgy. Sto. Cristo, San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan, a police officer named Liwanag of the PAOCTF approached and
invited him to go to Camp Crame to shed light on a kidnapping case allegedly
committed by a certain Brgy. Captain Ramos and by members of the Aguirre and
Bautista families. He accepted the invitation. Subsequently, he proceeded to Camp
Crame and met therein Colonel Cesar Mancao III (Colonel Mancao) of the PAOCTF.
Colonel Mancao told him that the PAOCTF would arrest Brgy. Capt. Ramos and
certain persons named Gerry Bautista and Dadie Bautista. Colonel Mancao
instructed him to identify said persons as responsible for the kidnapping of the Yao
family. He refused to do so because he feared Brgy. Capt. Ramos. The day after,
Colonel Mancao called appellant Arnaldo to his office. Upon arriving thereat, the
latter saw Yao San. Yao San promised him that if their kidnappers would be
apprehended through his cooperation, he would give him 500,000.00. He accepted
Yao Sans offer under the condition that he would identify a different set of suspects.
Later, Colonel Mancao gave him 30,000.00.31
Subsequently, he pointed to appellants Reyes and Flores as his cohorts in kidnapping
the Yao family. He implicated appellants Reyes and Flores to get even with them,
since the two had previously mauled him after he sold their fighting cocks and failed
to give them the proceeds of the sale.32
He denied having met with Atty. Uminga. He was not assisted by the latter when he
was forced by the PAOCTF to make a written extra-judicial confession on the
kidnapping of the Yao family. Further, he claimed that while he was under the
custody of PAOCTF, a certain Major Paulino utilized him as a drug pusher. Upon
failing to remit the proceeds of the drug sale, he was beaten up by PAOCTF agents
and thereafter included as accused with appellants Reyes and Flores for the
kidnapping of the Yao family.33
On the other hand, appellant Reyes testified that he slept in his house with his family
from 6:00 p.m. of 16 July 1999 until the morning of the next day; that on the early
morning of 26 July 1999, five policemen barged into his house and arrested him; that
the policemen told him that he was a suspect in the kidnapping of the Yao family;
that he was mauled by the policemen outside his house; that the policemen forcibly
brought him to Camp Crame, where he was subsequently tortured; that he knew the
Yao family because he worked as a carpenter in the familys poultry farm at Brgy.
Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan; that he had no involvement in the
kidnapping of the family; and that appellant Arnaldo implicated him in the
kidnapping of the family because appellant Arnaldo held a grudge against him. 34
For his part, appellant Flores testified that he stayed in his sisters house at Antipolo
City from 12 July 1999 up to 30 July 1999; that he went to her house on 12 July 1999
because it was the birthday of her child; that he worked as a construction worker
during his stay in his sisters house; that he was arrested in Batangas and thereafter
brought to Camp Crame, where he was beaten up by policemen for refusing to admit
involvement in the kidnapping of the Yao family; that after three days of beating, he
was forced to sign a document which he later found out to be a written extra-judicial
confession; that he never met nor did he know Atty. Rous; that he knew the Yao
family because he lived near the familys poultry farm, and he used to work therein
as a welder; that he had no participation in the kidnapping of the family; and that
appellant Arnaldo implicated him in the kidnapping of the family because he and
appellant Reyes had mauled appellant Arnaldo several years ago. 35
28
The defense proffered documentary and object evidence to buttress their foregoing
claims, to wit: (1) prayer booklet of appellant Arnaldo (Exhibit 1 for appellant
Arnaldo);36 (2) calling card of Colonel Mancao (Exhibit 2 for appellant Arnaldo); 37 and
(3) pictures allegedly showing appellant Flores working as a carpenter in Antipolo
City (Exhibits 1 & 2 for appellant Flores).38
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision dated 26 February 2002 convicting
appellants of the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide and
sentencing each of them to suffer the supreme penalty of death. Appellants were
also ordered to pay jointly and severally the Yao family 150,000.00 as civil
indemnity, 500,000.00 as moral damages and the costs of the proceedings. The
dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding herein three (3) accused DOMINGO REYES y PAJE, ALVIN
ARNALDO y AVENA, and JOSELITO FLORES y VICTORIO guilty as principals beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH (DOUBLE)
HOMICIDE as charged, they are hereby sentenced each to suffer the supreme
penalty of DEATH as mandated by law, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of
deceased Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond Yao in the amount of One Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (150,000.00), and all the private offended parties or victims,
including the heirs of the deceased, in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(500,000.00) as moral damages, subject to the corresponding filing fee as a first
lien, and to pay the costs of the proceedings.39
By reason of the death penalty imposed on each of the appellants, the instant case
was elevated to us for automatic review. However, pursuant to our ruling in People
v. Mateo,40 we remanded the instant case to the Court of Appeals for proper
disposition.
On 14 August 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming with
modifications the RTC Decision. The appellate court reduced the penalty imposed by
the RTC on each of the appellants from death penalty to reclusion perpetua without
the possibility of parole. It also decreased the amount of civil indemnity from
150,000.00 to 100,000.00. Further, it directed appellants to pay jointly and
severally the Yao family 100,000.00 as exemplary damages. The fallo of the Court of
Appeals decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 12, dated February 26, 2002, in Criminal Case No. 1611-M-
99 convicting accused-appellants of the crime of Kidnapping For Ransom with
(Double) Homicide, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that:
1) accused-appellants are instead sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua;
2) the award of civil indemnity ex delicto is hereby reduced to 100,000; and
3) accused-appellants are further ordered to pay private complainants the amount of
100,000.00 as exemplary damages.41
Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision but
this was denied. Hence, appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on 25 August 2006.
In their separate briefs,42 appellants assigned the following errors:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES
OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES;
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING A CONSPIRACY BETWEEN APPELLANTS;
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL
CONFESSIONS OF APPELLANT ARNALDO AND APPELLANT FLORES;
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TOTALLY IGNORING THE CORROBORATED EVIDENCE OF
THE DEFENSE;
V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAD PROVEN
APPELLANTS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.43
Anent the first assigned error, appellants assail the credibility of prosecution
witnesses Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San.
In resolving issues pertaining to the credibility of the witnesses, this Court is guided
by the following well-settled principles: (1) the reviewing court will not disturb the
findings of the lower court, unless there is a showing that the latter overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance
that may affect the result of the case; (2) the findings of the trial court on the
29
credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and even finality, as it had the
opportunity to examine their demeanor when they testified on the witness stand;
and (3) a witness who testifies in a clear, positive and convincing manner is a credible
witness.44
After carefully reviewing the evidence on record and applying the foregoing
guidelines to this case, we found no cogent reason to overturn the RTCs ruling
finding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible. Prosecution witnesses
Abagatnan, Robert, and Yao San positively identified appellants and their cohorts as
their kidnappers during a police line-up and also during trial. Abagatnan specifically
testified during the trial that after appellants and their cohorts forcibly entered the
van where she and the Yao family were, appellant Flores drove the van away from
the poultry farm; that appellants Reyes and Arnaldo were among the kidnappers
who guarded her, Robert, Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond in the safe-house; and
that appellants Reyes and Arnaldo accompanied her in going to the poultry farm to
search for Yao San and remind him about the ransom demanded. 45 Robert confirmed
that appellants and their cohorts blindfolded them inside the van during the
incident. He also recounted that appellants and their cohorts detained him and Chua
Ong Ping Sim, Raymond and Abagatnan in a safe-house. He was later instructed by
appellants to find Yao San and remind him about the ransom. 46 Yao San declared
that during the incident, appellant Reyes and Pataray approached him, poked their
guns at him, and dragged him into the van. Appellant Flores took the drivers seat
and drove the van. Appellant Flores and his male companion told him to produce 5
million as ransom money in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert,
Raymond and Abagatnan.47
Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San testified in a clear and candid manner during the
trial. Their respective testimonies were consistent with one another. They were
steadfast in recounting their ordeal despite the grueling cross examination of the
defense. Moreover, their testimonies were in harmony with the documentary
evidence adduced by the prosecution. The RTC and the Court of Appeals found their
testimonies credible and trustworthy. Both courts also found no ill motive for
Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San to testify against appellants.
Appellants, nonetheless, maintain that Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San could not
have identified their kidnappers, because (1) the incident occurred in the darkness of
the night; (2) they were blindfolded then; and (3) the heads of the kidnappers were
covered by T-shirts.
It appears that the crime scene was well-lighted during the incident. At that time,
there was a light from a fluorescent bulb hanging above the gate of the poultry farm
wherein Yao San was held at gunpoint by appellant Reyes and Pataray. 48 The
headlights of the van were also turned on, making it possible for Abagatnan and
Robert to see the faces of appellant Reyes and Pataray as the two approached and
poked their guns at Yao San.49 Further, there was a bulb inside the van, which turned
on when the doors van was opened. This bulb lighted up when appellants and their
cohorts forcibly boarded the van, thus, allowing Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San to
glance at the faces of appellants and their cohorts.50
Although the Yao family was blindfolded during the incident, it was, nevertheless,
shown that it took appellants and their cohorts about 10 minutes before all
members of the Yao family were blindfolded.51 During this considerable length of
time, Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San were able to take a good look at the faces of
appellants and their cohorts. In addition, Abagatnan and Robert narrated that their
respective blindfolds loosened several times, giving them the opportunity to have a
glimpse at the faces of appellants and their cohorts.52
Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San testified that even though the heads of appellants
and their cohorts were covered by T-shirts, their faces were, nonetheless, exposed
and uncovered, allowing them to see their faces.53 Robert and Yao San also declared
that they recognized the faces of appellants during the incident because the latter
resided near the poultry farm of the Yao family, which used to hire them several
times in the farm as carpenters/welders.54
Appellants, however, insist that the testimonies of Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San
that they were able to recognize the kidnappers -- because although the kidnappers
heads were covered with T-shirts, their faces were nevertheless exposed or
uncovered -- are incredible. Appellants argue that it is against human nature and
experience that kidnappers would cover only their heads and not their faces in
concealing their identities.
It is not illogical or against human nature for appellants and their cohorts to cover
their heads with T-shirts, while leaving their faces exposed and uncovered when they
kidnapped the Yao family. Perhaps, appellants and their cohorts thought that putting
T-shirts on their heads without covering their faces was sufficient to conceal their
identities. Regardless of their reason, the fact remains that Abagatnan, Robert and
Yao San positively identified appellants as their kidnappers, and their said
identification and testimonies were found by the RTC, the Court of Appeals and by
this Court to be credible. In People v. Barredo,55 the victim testified that he was able
to identify the accused as his assailants because the latter took off their masks
during the assault. The accused argued that the victims testimony was incredible
because persons who wore masks would not take them off so casually in the
presence of their victims, as doing so would reveal their identities. The trial court,
30
nonetheless, ruled that the victims testimony was credible and truthful. We
sustained such ruling of the trial court and ratiocinated:
Appellants dispute the plausibility of Enrico Cebuhanos claim that he was able to
identify the assailants because they took off their masks. Persons who wear masks
would not take them off so casually in the presence of their victims, as doing so
would thereby reveal their identities. x x x.
The above arguments are untenable. In his testimony, Enrico Cebuhano clearly
stated that the men who entered his home removed their masks when he was
brought downstairs. Why they did so was known only to them. It is possible that they
thought that there was no one in the vicinity who could identify them, or that they
wanted Enrico to see who they were so as to intimidate him. It is also possible that
they felt secure because there were 14 of them who were all armed. In any event,
what is important is that the trial court found Enrico Cebuhanos testimony to be
both credible and believable, and that he was able to positively identify appellants
herein, because the men who entered his home removed their masks, x x x.
It is significant to note that Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were brutally killed as a
result of the kidnapping. It is difficult to believe that Robert and Yao San would point
to appellants and their cohorts as their kidnappers if such were not true. A witness
relationship to the victim of a crime makes his testimony more credible as it would
be unnatural for a relative interested in vindicating a crime done to their family to
accuse somebody other than the real culprit.56 Relationship with a victim of a crime
would deter a witness from indiscriminately implicating anybody in the crime. His
natural and usual interest would be to identify the real malefactor and secure his
conviction to obtain true justice for the death of a relative. 57
Appellants put in issue the failure of Robert and Yao San to immediately report the
incident and identify appellants to authorities despite their common claim that they
recognized appellants, as the latter used to work in the poultry farm.
Robert and Yao San cannot be blamed for not immediately reporting the incident to
the authorities. Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were still held by appellants and
their cohorts when the ransom was demanded for their release. Appellants and their
cohorts were armed and dangerous. Appellants and their cohorts also threatened to
kill Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond if Yao San and Robert would report the incident
to the authorities.58 Understandably, Yao San and Robert were extremely fearful for
the safety of their loved ones, and this caused them to refrain from reporting the
incident. Robert and Yao San cannot also be blamed for not reporting the incident to
the police even after the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond had already
been found, and appellants and their cohorts had cut their communication with
them. Certainly, the killings of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond had a
chilling/paralyzing effect on Robert and Yao San. Also, appellants and their cohorts
were still at large then, and the possibility that they would harm the remaining
members of the Yao family was not remote, considering that appellants and their
cohorts were familiar with the whereabouts of the Yao family. At any rate, we have
held that failure to immediately report the kidnapping incident does not diminish the
credibility of the witnesses.59 The lapse of a considerable length of time before a
witness comes forward to reveal the identities of the perpetrators of the crime does
not taint the credibility of the witness and his testimony where such delay is
satisfactorily explained.60
Apropos the second assigned error, appellants contend that the prosecution failed to
prove that they conspired in kidnapping the Yao family.
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more
persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy presupposes
unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective among the
accused.61 When the accused by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing
one part and the other performing another part as to complete the crime, with a
view to the attainment of the same object, conspiracy exists.62
As can be gleaned from the credible testimonies and sworn statements of
Abagatnan, Robert and Yao, appellant Reyes and Pataray 63 approached and poked
their guns at Yao San, and thereafter dragged the latter into the van. Appellant
Flores then took the drivers seat and drove the van, while each member of the Yao
family was blindfolded by appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and their cohorts inside the
van. Thereafter, appellant Flores instructed Yao San to produce the amount of 5
million as ransom money in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert,
Raymond and Abagatnan. Appellant Reyes and appellant Arnaldo were among the
kidnappers who guarded Abagatnan, Robert, Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond in the
safe-house. They also accompanied Abagatnan and Robert in going to the poultry
farm to search for and remind Yao San about the ransom demanded. Further,
appellants Arnaldo and Flores narrated in their respective extra-judicial
confessions64 how they planned and executed the kidnapping of the Yao family. Their
extra-judicial confessions also detailed the particular role/participation played by
each of appellants and their cohorts in the kidnapping of the family. Clearly, the
foregoing individual acts of appellants and their cohorts demonstrated their unity of
purpose and design in kidnapping the Yao family for the purpose of extorting
ransom.
Appellants, however, challenge the legality and admissibility of the written extra-
judicial confessions.
31
Appellant Reyes claims that his alleged participation in the kidnapping of the Yao
family was based solely on the written extra-judicial confessions of appellants
Arnaldo and Flores. He maintains, however, that said extra-judicial confessions are
inadmissible in evidence, because they were obtained in violation of his co-
appellants constitutional right to have an independent counsel of their own choice
during custodial investigation. Appellant Reyes alleges that the agents of the PAOCTF
did not ask his co-appellants during the custodial investigation whether they had a
lawyer of their own choice, and whether they could afford to hire a lawyer; that the
agents of the PAOCTF suggested the availability of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous to his
co-appellants; and that Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous were associates of the PAOCTF.
Appellant Reyes also asseverates that the extra-judicial confessions of appellants
Arnaldo and Flores cannot be utilized against him.
Appellant Flores argues that his written extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in
evidence, because it was obtained in violation of his constitutional right to have an
independent counsel of his own choice during custodial investigation. He insists that
his written extra-judicial confession was elicited through force, torture and without
the assistance of a lawyer. He avers that he was not assisted by any lawyer from the
time he was arrested until he was coerced to sign the purported confession; that he
was forced to sign it because he could not anymore endure the beatings he suffered
at the hands of the PAOCTF agents; and that he never met or knew Atty. Rous who,
according to the PAOCTF, had assisted him during the custodial investigation.
Appellant Arnaldo contends that his written extra-judicial confession should be
excluded as evidence, as it was procured in violation of his constitutional right to
have an independent counsel of his own choice during custodial investigation. He
claims that he was not given freedom to choose his counsel; that the agents of the
PAOCTF did not ask him during the custodial investigation whether he had a lawyer
of his own choice, and whether he could afford to hire a lawyer; and that the agents
of the PAOCTF suggested the availability of Atty. Uminga to him.
An extra-judicial confession is a declaration made voluntarily and without
compulsion or inducement by a person under custodial investigation, stating or
acknowledging that he had committed or participated in the commission of a
crime.65 In order that an extra-judicial confession may be admitted in evidence,
Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that the following
safeguards be observed66:
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.1awphi.zw+
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate
the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
Thus, we have held that an extra-judicial confession is admissible in evidence if the
following requisites have been satisfied: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made
with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express;
and (4) it must be in writing.67
The mantle of protection afforded by the above-quoted constitutional provision
covers the period from the time a person is taken into custody for the investigation
of his possible participation in the commission of a crime or from the time he is
singled out as a suspect in the commission of the offense although not yet in
custody.68
The right of an accused to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel
contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. 69 Such
right contemplates effective communication which results in the subject
understanding what is conveyed.70
The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to preclude the slightest
coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false.71 The right to counsel
attaches upon the start of the investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts
to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the
accused.72 The lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be, as far
as reasonably possible, the choice of the accused. If the lawyer is one furnished in
behalf of accused, he should be competent and independent; that is, he must be
willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused. 73 A competent and
independent counsel is logically required to be present and able to advice and assist
his client from the time the latter answers the first question asked by the
investigator until the signing of the confession. Moreover, the lawyer should
ascertain that the confession was made voluntarily, and that the person under
investigation fully understood the nature and the consequence of his extra-judicial
confession vis-a-vis his constitutional rights. 74
32
However, the foregoing rule is not intended to deter to the accused from confessing
guilt if he voluntarily and intelligently so desires, but to protect him from admitting
what he is being coerced to admit although untrue. To be an effective counsel, a
lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client. The
presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything which
might incriminate him; but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude
the slightest coercion on the accused to admit something false. The counsel should
never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. 75
We have gone over the records and found that the PAOCTF investigators have duly
apprised appellants Arnaldo and Flores of their constitutional rights to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel of their own choice during their
respective custodial investigations.
The Pasubali76 of appellants Arnaldo and Floress written extra-judicial confessions
clearly shows that before they made their respective confessions, the PAOCTF
investigators had informed them that the interrogation about to be conducted on
them referred to the kidnapping of the Yao family. Thereafter, the PAOCTF agents
explained to them that they had a constitutional right to remain silent, and that
anything they would say may be used against them in a court of law. They were also
told that they were entitled to a counsel of their own choice, and that they would be
provided with one if they had none. When asked if they had a lawyer of their own,
appellant Arnaldo replied that he would be assisted by Atty. Uminga, while appellant
Flores agreed to be represented by Atty. Rous. Thereafter, when asked if they
understood their said rights, they replied in the affirmative. The appraisal of their
constitutional rights was done in the presence of their respective lawyers and in the
Tagalog dialect, the language spoken and understood by them. Appellants Arnaldo
and Flores and their respective counsels, Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous, also signed
and thumbmarked the extra-judicial confessions. Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous
attested to the veracity of the afore-cited facts in their respective court
testimonies.77 Indeed, the appraisal of appellants constitutional rights was not
merely perfunctory, because it appeared certain that appellants had understood
and, in fact, exercised their fundamental rights after being informed thereof.
Records reflect that appellants Arnaldo and Reyes were likewise accorded their right
to competent and independent counsel during their respective custodial
investigations.
As regards appellant Arnaldo, Atty. Uminga testified that prior to the questioning of
appellant Arnaldo about the incident, Atty. Uminga told the PAOCTF investigators
and agents to give him and appellant Arnaldo space and privacy, so that they could
freely converse. After the PAOCTF investigators and agents left them, he and
appellant Arnaldo went to a cubicle where only the two of them were present. He
interviewed appellant Arnaldo in the Tagalog language regarding the latters
personal circumstances and asked him why he was in the PAOCTF office and why he
wanted a lawyer. Appellant Arnaldo replied that he wanted to make a confession
about his participation in the kidnapping of the Yao family. Thereupon, he asked
appellant Arnaldo if the latter would accept his assistance as his lawyer for purposes
of his confession. Appellant Arnaldo agreed. He warned appellant Arnaldo that he
might be sentenced to death if he confessed involvement in the incident. Appellant
Arnaldo answered that he would face the consequences because he was bothered by
his conscience. He inquired from appellant Arnaldo if he was harmed or intimidated
into giving self-incriminating statements to the PAOCTF investigators. Appellant
Arnaldo answered in the negative. He requested appellant Arnaldo to remove his
shirt for him to check if there were torture marks on his body, but he found none. He
also observed that appellant Arnaldos appearance and movements were normal. His
conference with appellant Arnaldo lasted for 15 minutes or more. Thereafter, he
allowed the PAOCTF investigators to question appellant Arnaldo.78
Further, Atty. Uminga sat beside appellant Arnaldo during the inquiry and listened to
the latters entire confession. After the taking of appellant Arnaldos confession,
Atty. Uminga requested the PAOCTF investigators to give him a copy of appellant
Arnaldos confession. Upon obtaining such copy, he read it entirely and thereafter
gave it to appellant Arnaldo. He instructed appellant Arnaldo to read and
comprehend the same carefully. He told appellant Arnaldo to ask him for clarification
and comment if he did not agree or understand any part of his written confession.
Appellant Arnaldo read his entire written confession and handed it to him. Atty.
Uminga asked him if he had objections to it. Appellant Arnaldo replied in the
negative. He then reminded appellant Arnaldo that the latter could still change his
mind, and that he was not being forced to sign. Appellant Arnaldo manifested that
he would sign his written confession. Later, he and appellant Arnaldo affixed their
signatures to the written confession.79
With respect to appellant Flores, Atty. Rous declared that before the PAOCTF
investigators began questioning appellant, Atty. Rous interviewed him in Tagalog
inside a room, where only the two of them were present. He asked appellant Flores
about his personal circumstances. Appellant Flores replied that he was a suspect in
the kidnapping of the Yao family, and he wanted to give a confession regarding his
involvement in the said incident. He asked appellant Flores whether he would accept
his assistance as his lawyer. Appellant Flores affirmed that he would. He asked
appellant Flores why he wanted to give such confession. Appellant Flores answered
that he was bothered by his conscience. Atty. Rous warned appellant Flores that his
confession would be used against him in a court of law, and that the death penalty
might be imposed on him. Appellant Flores told him that he wanted to tell the truth
33
and unload the burden on his mind. He requested appellant Flores to lift his shirt for
the former to verify if there were torture marks or bruises on his body, but found
none. Again, he cautioned appellant Flores about the serious consequences of his
confession, but the latter maintained that he wanted to tell the truth. Thereafter, he
permitted the PAOCTF investigators to question appellant Flores.80
Additionally, Atty. Rous stayed with appellant Flores while the latter was giving
statements to the PAOCTF investigators. After the taking of appellant Flores
statements, he instructed appellant Flores to read and check his written confession.
Appellant Flores read the same and made some minor corrections. He also read
appellant Flores written confession. Afterwards, he and appellant Flores signed the
latters written confession.81
It is true that it was the PAOCTF which contacted and suggested the availability of
Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous to appellants Arnaldo and Flores, respectively.
Nonetheless, this does not automatically imply that their right to counsel was
violated. What the Constitution requires is the presence of competent and
independent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his clients defense without
any intervening conflict of interest.82 There was no conflict of interest with regard to
the legal assistance rendered by Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous. Both counsels had no
interest adverse to appellants Arnaldo and Flores. Although Atty. Uminga testified
that he was a former National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agent, he, nevertheless,
clarified that he had been separated therefrom since 199483 when he went into
private practice. Atty. Uminga declared under oath that he was a private practitioner
when he assisted appellant Arnaldo during the custodial investigation.84 It appears
that Atty. Uminga was called by the PAOCTF to assist appellant Arnaldo, because
Atty. Umingas telephone number was listed on the directory of his former NBI
officemates detailed at the PAOCTF. Atty. Rous, on the other hand, was a member of
the Free Legal Aid Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City at
the time he rendered legal assistance to appellant Flores.85Part of Atty. Rous duty as
member of the said group was to render legal assistance to the indigents including
suspects under custodial investigation. There was no evidence showing that Atty.
Rous had organizational or personal links to the PAOCTF. In fact, he proceeded to the
PAOCTF office to assist appellant Flores, because he happened to be the lawyer
manning the office when the PAOCTF called.86 In People v. Fabro,87 we stated:
The Constitution further requires that the counsel be independent; thus, he cannot
be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a
municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to that of the accused. Atty.
Jungco does not fall under any of said enumeration. Nor is there any evidence that
he had any interest adverse to that of the accused. The indelible fact is that he was
president of the Zambales Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and not a
lackey of the lawmen.
Further, as earlier stated, under Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, an
accused is entitled to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. The phrase "preferably of his own choice" does not convey the message
that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude
other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense.
Otherwise, the tempo of custodial investigation would be solely in the hands of the
accused who can impede, nay, obstruct, the progress of the interrogation by simply
selecting a lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to protect his
interest.88While the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person under custodial
interrogation cannot afford the services of counsel or where the preferred lawyer
is not available is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the suspect has the
final choice, as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A
lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he
does not raise any objection to the counsels appointment during the course of the
investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement
before the swearing officer.89 Appellants Arnaldo and Flores did not object to the
appointment of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous as their lawyers, respectively, during
their custodial investigation. Prior to their questioning, appellants Arnaldo and Flores
conferred with Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous. Appellant Arnaldo manifested that he
would be assisted by Atty. Uminga, while appellant Flores agreed to be counseled by
Atty. Rous. Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous countersigned the written extra-judicial
confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores, respectively. Hence, appellants Arnaldo
and Flores are deemed to have engaged the services of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous,
respectively.
Since the prosecution has sufficiently established that the respective extra-judicial
confessions of appellant Arnaldo and appellant Flores were obtained in accordance
with the constitutional guarantees, these confessions are admissible. They are
evidence of a high order because of the strong presumption that no person of
normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime, unless prompted
by truth and conscience.90 Consequently, the burden of proving that undue pressure
or duress was used to procure the confessions rests on appellants Arnaldo and
Flores.91
In the case at bar, appellants Arnaldo and Flores failed to discharge their burden of
proving that they were forced or coerced to make their respective confessions.
Other than their self-serving statements that they were maltreated by the PAOCTF
officers/agents, they did not present any plausible proof to substantiate their
claims.lawphil.net They did not submit any medical report showing that their bodies
34
were subjected to violence or torture. Neither did they file complaints against the
persons who had allegedly beaten or forced them to execute their respective
confessions despite several opportunities to do so. Appellants Arnaldo and Flores
averred that they informed their family members/relatives of the alleged
maltreatment, but the latter did not report such allegations to proper authorities. On
the contrary, appellants Arnaldo and Flores declared in their respective confessions
that they were not forced or harmed in giving their sworn statements, and that they
were not promised or given any award in consideration of the same. Records also
bear out that they were physically examined by doctors before they made their
confessions.92Their physical examination reports certify that no external signs of
physical injury or any form of trauma were noted during their examination. 93 In
People v. Pia,94 we held that the following factors indicate voluntariness of an extra-
judicial confession: (1) where the accused failed to present credible evidence of
compulsion or duress or violence on their persons; (2) where they failed to complain
to the officers who administered the oaths; (3) where they did not institute any
criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment;
(4) where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies; and (5) where
they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their
claim.
It should also be noted that the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and
Flores are replete with details on the manner in which the kidnapping was
committed, thereby ruling out the possibility that these were involuntarily made.
Their extra-judicial confessions clearly state how appellants and their cohorts
planned the kidnapping as well as the sequence of events before, during and after its
occurrence. The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language if,
upon its face, the confession exhibits no suspicious circumstances tending to cast
doubt upon its integrity, it being replete with details which could only be supplied by
the accused.95
With respect to appellant Reyess claim that the extra-judicial confessions of
appellants Arnaldo and Flores cannot be used in evidence against him, we have ruled
that although an extra-judicial confession is admissible only against the confessant,
jurisprudence makes it admissible as corroborative evidence of other facts that tend
to establish the guilt of his co-accused.96 In People v. Alvarez,97 we ruled that where
the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of
participation by the co-conspirator, that confession is receivable as evidence against
a co-accused. In People v. Encipido98 we elucidated as follows:
It is also to be noted that APPELLANTS extrajudicial confessions were independently
made without collusion, are identical with each other in their material respects and
confirmatory of the other. They are, therefore, also admissible as circumstantial
evidence against their co-accused implicated therein to show the probability of the
latters actual participation in the commission of the crime. They are also admissible
as corroborative evidence against the others, it being clear from other facts and
circumstances presented that persons other than the declarants themselves
participated in the commission of the crime charged and proved. They are what is
commonly known as interlocking confession and constitute an exception to the
general rule that extrajudicial confessions/admissions are admissible in evidence
only against the declarants thereof.
Appellants Arnaldo and Flores stated in their respective confessions that appellant
Reyes participated in their kidnapping of the Yao family. These statements are,
therefore, admissible as corroborative and circumstantial evidence to prove
appellant Reyes guilt.
Nevertheless, even without the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and
Flores, evidence on record is sufficient to sustain a finding of culpability of appellant
Reyes. As earlier found, Abagatnan, Robert and Yao positively identified appellant
Reyes as one of their kidnappers. They specifically testified that during the incident,
appellant Reyes (1) approached and pointed a gun at Yao San and dragged the latter
inside the van; and (2) accompanied Abagatnan and Robert in going to the poultry
farm to search for and remind Yao San about the ransom demanded. The RTC, Court
of Appeals and this Court found such testimonies credible.
Appellants argue that their alibis cast reasonable doubt on their alleged guilt.
Appellant Reyes avers that he could not have been one of those who kidnapped the
Yao family on the night of 16 July 1999 at around 11:00 p.m., because he was
sleeping with his family in their residence during such time and date. Likewise,
appellant Flores asseverates that he could not have been present at the crime scene
on such date and time, as he was already sleeping in his sisters house at Antipolo
City. For his part, appellant Arnaldo asserts that he is a victim of a police frame-up.
He alleges that he was an asset of the PAOCTF, but was later utilized as a drug
pusher by the said agency. Upon failing to remit the proceeds of a shabu sale to the
PAOCTF officers, he was beaten up and included as accused in the kidnapping of the
Yao family.
Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to prove.
Alibi must be proved by the accused with clear and convincing evidence; otherwise it
cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove
that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed. He must likewise prove
that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. 99
35
The defense of frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by this Court with
disfavor, for it can easily be concocted but is difficult to prove. In order to prosper,
the defense of frame-up must be proved by the accused with clear and convincing
evidence.100
It should be observed that the family residence/house of appellant Reyes where he
claimed to have slept when the incident occurred is located within Brgy. Sto. Cristo,
San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.101 This is the same barangay where the Yao familys
poultry farm is situated. Appellant Reyes, in fact, admitted that the poultry farm is
near his residence.102 There is a huge possibility that appellant Reyes slept for a
while, woke up before 11:00 p.m., and thereafter proceeded to the Yao familys
poultry farm to participate in the kidnapping of the family. The same is true with
appellant Flores. Wilfredo, appellant Flores nephew, testified that he and appellant
went to bed and slept together in the house of appellants sister in Antipolo City at
about 8:00 p.m. of 16 July 1999.103 It is greatly possible that Wifredo did not notice
when appellant Flores woke up later at 9:00 p.m. and immediately proceeded to the
Yao familys poultry farm to participate in the kidnapping of the family, arriving
therein at about 11:00 p.m. It is a fact that a person coming from Antipolo City may
reach San Jose del Monte, Bulacan in two hours via a motor vehicle, considering that
there was no more heavy traffic at that late evening. Obviously, appellants Reyes and
Flores failed to prove convincingly that it was physically impossible for them to be at
the crime scene during the incident.
Appellant Flores submitted two pictures which, according to him, show that he
worked as a construction worker from 12 July 1999 up to 30 July 1999 while staying
in his sisters house at Antipolo City. These pictures, however, do not clearly and
convincingly support such claim, because (1) the pictures were undated; (2) the shots
were taken from a far distance; and (3) the face of the man in the pictures which
appellant Flores claims as his is blurred, unrecognizable and almost hidden, as such
person is wearing a cap and is in a position where only the right and back portions of
his head and body are visible.
Appellant Arnaldo also failed to prove with convincing evidence his defense of
frame-up. Aside from his self-serving testimony that he was a former PAOCTF agent
and that he was beaten and included as accused in the kidnapping of the Yao family
by the PAOCTF agents because he failed to remit to the PAOCTF officers the
proceeds of his sale of shabu, he did not present convincing proof to support said
allegations. He submitted the calling card of Colonel Mancao, which appears to have
been signed by the latter at the back portion, but there is nothing on it which
indicates or verifies that appellant Arnaldo was indeed a former PAOCTF agent. He
also submitted a prayer book containing his handwritten narration of torture he
allegedly experienced at the hands of the PAOCTF agents, but this does not
conclusively show that he was beaten by the PAOCTF agents. As we earlier found,
appellant Arnaldo did not produce any medical records/certificates or file any
complaint against the PAOCTF agents to bolster his claim of maltreatment.
It is true that the alibis of appellants Reyes and Flores and the defense of frame-up of
appellant Arnaldo were corroborated on some points by the testimonies of some of
their relatives/friends. We have, however, held that alibi and the defense of frame-
up become less plausible when they are corroborated only by relatives and friends
because of perceived partiality.104
Indeed, the positive and credible testimonies of Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San
prevail over the alibis and defense of frame-up of appellants.105
We shall now determine the propriety of appellants conviction for the special
complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide and the corresponding
penalties imposed.
Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of kidnapping is committed
with the concurrence of the following elements: (1) the offender is a private
individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of
his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (4) in the commission
of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or
detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public
authority; (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a
minor, female, or a public officer. 106 All of the foregoing elements were duly
establish by the testimonial and documentary evidences for the prosecution in the
case at bar. First, appellants and their cohorts are private individuals. Second,
appellants and their cohorts kidnapped the Yao family by taking control of their van
and detaining them in a secluded place. Third, the Yao family was taken against their
will. And fourth, threats to kill were made and the kidnap victims include females.
Republic Act No. 7659 provides that the death penalty shall be imposed if any of the
two qualifying circumstances is present in the commission of the kidnapping: (1) the
motive of the kidnappers is to extort ransom for the release of the kidnap victims,
although none of the circumstances mentioned under paragraph four of the
elements of kidnapping were present. Ransom means money, price or consideration
paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured person that would release him
from captivity.107 Whether or not the ransom is actually paid to or received by the
perpetrators is of no moment.108 It is sufficient that the kidnapping was committed
for the purpose of exacting ransom;109 and (2) the kidnap victims were killed or died
as a consequence of the kidnapping or was raped, or subjected to torture or
36
dehumanizing acts. Both of these qualifying circumstances are alleged in the
information and proven during trial.
As testified to by Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San, appellants and their cohorts
demanded the amount of 5 million for the release of Chua Ong Pong Sim and
Raymond. In fact, Yao San went to the Usan dumpsite, Litex Road, Fairview, Quezon
City, to hand over the ransom money to appellants and their cohorts, but the latter
did not show up. It was also apparent that Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were
killed or died during their captivity. Yao San declared that appellants and their
cohorts called up and told him that they would kill Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond
who were still under their custody, because they heard the radio report that the
incident was already known to the police. True to their threats, the corpses of Chua
Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were later found dumped in La Mesa Dam. Their
respective death certificates show that they died of asphyxia by strangulation.
Withal, the death penalty cannot be imposed on the appellants in view of the
passage of Republic Act No. 9346 on 24 June 2006 prohibiting the imposition of
death penalty in the Philippines. In accordance with Sections 2 and 3 thereof, the
penalty that should be meted out to the appellants is reclusion perpetua without the
possibility of parole. The Court of Appeals, therefore, acted accordingly in imposing
the penalty of reclusion perpetua without the possibility of parole on each of the
appellants.
The Court of Appeals was also correct in ordering appellants to jointly and severally
pay civil indemnity and exemplary damages to the Yao family. Nonetheless, their
corresponding amounts should be modified. In People v. Quiachon, 110 we explained
that even if the death penalty was not to be imposed on accused because of the
prohibition in Republic Act No. 9346, the civil indemnity of 75,000.00 was still
proper, as the said award was not dependent on the actual imposition of the death
penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of
the death penalty attended the commission of the offense. As earlier stated, both
the qualifying circumstances of demand for ransom and the double killing or death
of two of the kidnap victims were alleged in the information and proven during trial.
Thus, for the twin deaths of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond, their heirs (Yao San,
Robert, Lenny, Matthew and Charlene) are entitled to a total amount of 150,000.00
as civil indemnity. Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction
for the public good.111 In criminal offenses, exemplary damages may be recovered
when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances,
whether ordinary or qualifying.112 Since both the qualifying circumstances of demand
for ransom and the killing or death of two of the kidnap victims (Chua Ong Ping Sim
and Raymond) while in captivity were alleged in the information and proven during
trial, and in order to deter others from committing the same despicable acts, the
award of exemplary damages is proper. The total amount of 100,000.00 as
exemplary damages should be modified. In several cases, 113 we awarded an amount
of 100,000.00 to each of the kidnap victims. As in this case, the amount of
100,000.00 as exemplary damages should be awarded each to Yao San, Robert,
Lenny, Matthew, Charlene, Abagatnan and Ortea. This makes the total amount of
exemplary damages add up to 700,000.00.

The appellate court aptly held that the award of moral damages is warranted. Under
Article 2217 of the New Civil Code, moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock and similar injury.
Article 2219 of the same Code provides that moral damages may be recovered in
cases of illegal detention. There is no doubt that each member of the Yao family
suffered physical and/or psychological trauma because of the ordeal, especially
because two of the family members were ruthlessly killed during their captivity.
Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence,114 Yao San, Robert, Lenny, Matthew, Charlene,
Abagatnan and Ortea should each receive the amount of 100,000.00 as moral
damages. Per computation, the total amount of moral damages is 700,000.00 and
not 500,000.00 as fixed by the RTC and the Court of Appeals.

Finally, we observed that the RTC and the Court of Appeals denominated the crime
committed by appellants in the present case as the special complex crime of
kidnapping for ransom with double homicide since two of the kidnap victims were
killed or died during the kidnapping. The word "double" should be deleted therein.
Regardless of the number of killings or deaths that occurred as a consequence of the
kidnapping, the appropriate denomination of the crime should be the special
complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide.

WHEREFORE, the Decision, dated 14 August 2006, and Resolution, dated 18 October
2006, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02301 is hereby AFFIRMED with
the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the total amount of civil indemnity is
150,000.00; (2) the total amount of exemplary damages is 700,000.00; (3) the
total amount of moral damages is 700,000.00; and (4) the appropriate
denomination of the crime committed by appellants is the special complex crime of
kidnapping for ransom with homicide.

SO ORDERED.

37
G.R. No. 178301 April 24, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
ROLANDO "Botong" MALIBIRAN Accused,
and BEVERLY TIBO-TAN, Accused/Appellant.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ J.:
For review is the November 13, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
02167 which affirmed the Joint Decision2 dated September 23, 2003 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Special Court for Heinous Crimes, Branch 156, of Pasig City, Metro Manila, finding
Rolando "Botong" Malibiran (Rolando) and Beverly Tibo-Tan (appellant) guilty of Murder and
Parricide, respectively, and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The conviction arose from the death of Reynaldo Tan (Reynaldo) on February 5, 1995. The
antecedents that led to Reynaldo's death, however, go way back in the 70's when Reynaldo
left his common-law wife, Rosalinda Fuerzas (Rosalinda), and their two (2) children, Jessie and
Reynalin, in Davao, and went to Manila to seek greener pastures. While in Manila, Reynaldo
met and had a relationship with appellant. They eventually married in 1981. Reynaldo and
appellant begot three (3) children Renevie, Jag-Carlo and Jay R.
In 1984, Reynaldo's and Rosalinda's paths crossed again and they resumed their relationship.
This led to the "souring" of Reynaldo's relationship with appellant; and in 1991, Reynaldo
moved out of the conjugal house and started living again with Rosalinda, although Reynaldo
maintained support of and paternal ties with his children.
On that fateful day of February 5, 1995, Reynaldo and appellant were in Greenhills with their
children for their usual Sunday gallivant. After finishing lunch at the Kimpura restaurant, the
family separated at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to do some shopping. Later, they
regrouped and purchased groceries at Unimart. At around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the
family stepped out of the shopping mall and Reynaldo proceeded to the parking lot to get his
red Honda Accord, while the rest of his family stayed behind and waited. Immediately
thereafter, the family heard an explosion coming from the direction where Reynaldo parked
his car. Appellant and Renevie got curious and proceeded to the parking lot. There, they saw
the Honda Accord burning, with Reynaldo lying beside the driver's seat, burning, charred and
bleeding profusely. A taxi driver named Elmer Paug (Elmer) appeared and pulled Reynaldo out
of the car. Reynaldo was then rushed to the Cardinal Santos Medical Hospital where he
eventually died because of the severe injuries he sustained.3 The underlying cause of his death
was Multiple Fracture & Multiple Vascular Injuries Secondary to Blast Injury.4
An investigation was conducted by the police after which two separate Informations for
Murder and Parricide, dated September 10, 1997, were filed against appellant, Rolando and
one Oswaldo Banaag (Oswaldo).
The Information in Criminal Case No. 113065-H accused Rolando and Oswaldo of the crime of
Murder, to wit:
38
On February 5, 1995, in San Juan, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, conspiring and confederating with Beverly Tibo-Tan, and three other
individuals whose identities are still unknown, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, with intent to kill, treachery, evidence (sic) premeditation and with the use of
explosion, plan, plant the explosive, and kill the person of Reynaldo C. Tan, by placing said
grenades on the drivers side of his car, and when said victim opened his car, an explosion
happened, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wound which was the direct and
immediate cause of his death.
The accused Oswaldo, without having participated in said crime of murder as principal, did
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take part, as an accomplice, in its commission,
by cooperating in the execution of the offense by previous and simultaneous acts.
Contrary to law.5
The Information in Criminal Case No. 113066-H accused appellant of the crime of Parricide, to
wit:
On February 5, 1995, in San Juan Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, while still married to Reynaldo C. Tan, and such marriage not having been
annulled and dissolved by competent authority, conspiring and confederating with Rolando V.
Malibiran, and three other individuals whose identities are still unknown, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, treachery, evidence (sic) premeditation
and with the use of explosion, plan, plant the explosive, and kill the person Reynado C. Tan, by
placing said grenades on the drivers side of his car, and when said victim opened his car, an
explosion happened, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wound which was the direct and
immediate cause of his death.
Contrary to law.6
Rolando and appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment. 7 Their co-accused, Oswaldo, was
later discharged and utilized as one of the prosecution witnesses.
The prosecution presented Jessie Tan, Inspector Silverio Dollesin, Elmer Paug, Police Inspector
Wilson Lachica, Supervising Investigating Agent Reynaldo Olasco, Rosalinda Fuerzas, Janet
Pascual (Janet), and Oswaldo, as its witnesses.
For its part, the defense presented the following witnesses, namely: Renevie Tan, Romulo
Bruzo (Romulo), Tessie Luba, Emily Cuevas, Jose Ong Santos, Victorino Feliz, Virgilio Dacalanio
and accused Rolando. Appellant did not testify in her behalf.
The RTC summed up the testimonies, as follows:
THE EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
1. Jessie Tan, a son of Reynaldo with Rosalinda Fuerzas, testified that he moved to Manila
from Davao in 1985 to study at the instance of his father Reynaldo and to enable then to bring
back time that had been lost since his father left his mother Rosalinda and the latters children
in Davao (TSN, Jan. 27, p.14); In 1991 Reynaldo moved to their house because his relationship
with Beverly was worsening, and to exacerbate matters, Beverly had then a lover named Rudy
Pascua or Pascual, a contractor for the resthouse of Reynaldo. Reynaldo and Beverly were
then constantly quarreling over money (TSN, February 10, 1999, pp. 28-29); Jessie had heard
the name of Rolando Malibiran sometime in 1994 because one day, Reynaldo came home
before dinner feeling mad since he found Rolando Malibiran inside the bedroom of Beverly at
their White Plains residence; Reynaldo had his gun with him at the time but Malibiran ran
away (TSN, January 27, 1999, pp. 19-21). He eventually came to learn about more details on
Rolando Malibiran from Oswaldo Banaag, the family driver of Beverly who was in the house at
White Plains at the time of the incident (Ibid, p. 22). One night in December of the same year
(1994) Jessie overheard Reynaldo talking to Beverly over the phone, with the latter fuming
mad. After the phone conversation he asked his father what happened because the latter was
already having an attack of hypertension and his father told him that Beverly threatened him
and that "he, (Reynaldo) will not benetit from his money if he will continue his move for
separation" (p. 40 ibid). This threat was taped by Reynaldo in his conversation with Beverly
(Exh. "B") Jessie himself has received threat of his life over the phone in 1989 (p. 30 ibid).
At the lounge at Cardinal Santos Hospital, on the day of the mishap, Jessie testified on the
emotional state of his mother Rosalinda while in said Hospital; that she was continuously
crying while she was talking to Jessies uncle. When asked where Beverly was and her
emotional state, he said that Beverly was also at the lounge of the said hospital, sometimes
she is seated and then she would stand up and then sit again and then stand up again. He did
not see her cry "hindi ko po syang nakitang umiyak" (pp. 52-23 ibid). When asked if his father
had enemies when he was alive, he said he knows of no one (p.54 ibid). Jessie was informed
by his mother (Rosalinda) few months after the death of Reynaldo that there was a letter by
Rosalinda addressed to his uncle which stated that "if something happened to him, Beverly
has a hand in it" (p. 56 ibid, Exh. "D" Letter dated March 24, 1999)
On cross examination, he admitted having gone to Mandaluyong City Jail and talked with
Oswaldo Banaag about latters claim that both accused have planned to kill his father. When
asked if he knows the consequences if Beverly is convicted, on the matter of Conjugal Partition
of Property, Jessie knows that Beverlys share would be forfeited. Counsel confirmed Jessies
request of whatever property of his father remaining shall shared equally by the legitimate
and illegitimate children. Thus, Jessie confirmed as the agreement between them (p. 28,
March 24, 1999 TSN).
2. Mr. Salonga, a locksmith in Greenhills Supermarket whose work area is at the entrance door
of the grocery of Unimart testified that he can duplicate any key of any car in five (5) minutes.
And that he is accessible to any one passing to Greenhills Shopping Complex (p. 45, March 24,
1999 TSN). The Honda Car representative on the other hand testified that the Honda Accord of
the deceased has no alarm, that the Honda Accord key can be duplicated without difficulty.
And the keyless entry device of the said vehicle can be duplicated (pp. 46-47 ibid, Stipulation.
Order p. 335 record Vol. 1).
3. Insperctor Selverio Dollesin, the Chief of the Bomb Disposal Unit of the Eastern Police
District, and the Police Officer who conducted the post aftermath report of the incident whose
39
skills as an expert was uncontroverted, testified that the perpetrator knew who the intended
vicitim was and has reliable information as to his position when opening the vehicle. If the
intended victim does not usually drive and usually sits on the rear portion of the vehicle (p. 49,
April 14, 1999 TSN) Inspector Dollesins conclusion states that the device (bomb) was placed in
front of the vehicle in between the drivers seat and the front door because the perpetrator
had information about the victims movements, otherwise he could have placed the device
underneath the vehicle, in the rear portion of the vehicle or in any part thereof (p. 53 ibid). He
testified that persons who have minimal knowledge can set up the explosive in the car in five
(5) minutes (p. 65 ibid). The explosion will commence at about 4-7 seconds (p. 66 ibid).
4. Elmer Paug, the taxi driver, testified that on February 5, 1995 he was just dropping a
passenger to Greenhills Shopping Complex when he heard a loud explosion at the parking
level. Being curious of the incident he hurriedly went out to look for a parking, then proceeded
to the area where the explosion occurred. He saw a man wearing a shirt and short who is
about to give assistance to a man who was a down on the ground bloodied. Finding that the
man could not do it on his own, Elmer rushed through to give aid. He held both arms of the
victim, grabbed him in the wrists and dragged him out and brought him farther to the burning
car. (pp. 7 July 7, 1999 TSN). The man lying on the pavement has burnt fingers and hair, chest
bloodied and skin already sticking to Elmers clothes (p. 8 Ibid). He noticed two women at
about two armlength from the car where he was. The younger woman shouted "Daddy,
Daddy, kaya mo iyan". She was crying had wailing (p. 10 ibid). He said that the older woman
gestured her left hand exclaimed in a not so loud voice "wala bang tutulong sa amin?" while
her right hand clutched her shoulder bag (p. 11 ibid). When asked if the older woman appears
to be alarmed, Elmer testified that he cannot say, and said she looked normal; he did not
notice her crying. Neither of the two female rendered assistance to drag the victim, they just
followed him when he pulled him out. The older woman never touched the victim. (p. 12 ibid).
Considering that his Taxi is quite far where the victim was lying, he flagged a taxi, and the
victim was brought to Cardinal Santos Hospital (pp. 15-16 ibid).
On cross examination, he was asked what the meaning of normal is, and he said "natural
Parang walang nangyari" It looks like nothing happened (p. 42 ibid). Her was uncertain as to
whether the two females joined the deceased in the taxi cab (p. 43) as he left.
5. Police Inspector Wilson Lachica testified that he was the police officer who investigated the
case. In the Cardinal Santos Hospital he was able to interview Beverly Tan. He asked her name,
address, name of the victim, how the incident happened and who their companions were. She
answered those questions in a calm manner (p. 13, Sept. 21, 1999 TSN). As per his observation
which was told to his superiors, he has not seen remorse on the part of the victim, (meaning
the wife) for an investigator that is unusual. Based on his more than six years of experience as
an investigator, whenever a violent crime happened, usually those relatives and love ones
appears hysterical, upset and restless. Her reaction at the time according to him is not normal,
considering that the victim is her husband. He interviewed persons close to the victim even at
the wake at Paz Funeral in Quezon City. He was able to interview the daughter of the lady-
accused; the other lady and family or relatives of the victim, the same with the driver of the
lady accused. He came to know the identity of the policeman linked with the lady accused,
named Rolando Malibiran. He testified that he obtained the information that he desired from
the widow nonchalantly and marked with blithe unconcern, which in his observation is
unusual since she is supposed to be the one who would diligently push through in the
investigation. When asked the level of interest as regards accused Malibiran, witness testified
that because of the manner of the commission of the crime through the use of explosives,
only a trained person can do that job (pp. 15-16 ibid).
6. Supervising Investigating Agent Reynaldo Olasco testified that his only observation on the
demeanor of Beverly Tan is that she did not give her statement readily without the assistance
of her counsel which for the investigator is quite irregular. Considering that she is the legal
wife, he could not see the reason why Beverly would bring a counsel when she is supposed to
be the complainant in the case (p. 11, April 5, 2000 TSN). He testified that after having
interviewed a representative from Honda, they had set aside the possibility that it was a third
party who used pick lock in order to have access to the Honda Accord and the presumption is
that the duplicate key or the main key was used in opening the car. The assessment was
connected with the statement of Renevie that she heard the clicking of all the locks of the
Honda Accord, which she was sure of when they left the car in the parking lot (p. 12 ibid) In
1998 they arrested Rolando Malibiran in Candelaria Quezon, he was fixing his owner type jeep
at that time. The arresting officers waited for Beverly Tan, and after thirty minutes they were
able to arrest Beverly Tan on the same place (p 8, May 31, 2000 TSN). They searched the
premises of the place where they reside and found a white paper which he presumed to be
"kulam" because theres some oracle words inscribe in that white piece of paper and at the
bottom is written the same of Jessie (pp. 8-9 ibid). On cross examination, he admitted that
70% of the information on the case was given by Oswaldo Banaag through the persistence of
the NBI which convinced him to help solve the case. It was disclosed to the investigating
officer after he was released, thats the only time he gave in to the request (p. 14, may 31,
2000 TSN). As to how the NBI operatives effected the arrest, it was through an information
from the Lucena Sub-Office (p. 17, Ibid).
7. Rosalinda Fuerzas testified that her life in Makati was "medyo magulo lnag kase nanggugulo
sya sa amin." When asked who this "siya" was, she said Beverly. That one day Beverly called
on her and harassed her, and one day she received a murder letter threatening that she
(Rosalinda) would be around the newspaper saying that she would be killed, like what they did
in the news papers, puputu-putulin iyong mga dodo o anuman dahil mang-aagaw daw ako
(Rosalinda) ng asawa (p. 11 ibid, June 27, 2000 TSN). She stated that her husband wanted to
separate with Beverly because he found out that the latter has paramour named Rudy Pascua
contractor of Jollibee (pp. 13-14 ibid). She had never seen Beverly appeared to be lonely when
her husband was then kidnapped. A telephone conversation with Beverly was recorded by
Reynaldo which was a quarrel regarding money. In the Cardinal Santos Hospital, she did not
see Beverlys appearance to be lonely but appeared to be a criminal, and Beverly did not cry
(pp. 13-17 ibid). She mentioned the letter of Reynaldo that if something happened to him,
Beverly is the one who killed him (p. 26 Ibid; pp. 24-25, Exh. "D, Vol. 1-A Record).
8. Janet Pascual testified that she was able to know Rolando Malibiran, because on March
1993 when she was in White Plains, Beverly showed her a picture of him (Malibiran) and said
to her that he is her boy friend. Witness told her that he was handsome. She was close to
Beverly that she frequently stayed in White Plains when Beverly and Reynaldo is no longer
living in the same roof. They played mahjong, chat and has heard Beverlys hurtful emotions
by reason of her philandering husband Reynaldo. Beverly told her of how she felt bad against
40
underwear not intented for her (p. 9, Oct. 11, 2000 TSN); that on August 1994, Malibiran told
Beverly that he has a "kumapre" who knows how to make "kulam" for an amount of
10,000.00. That Reynaldo would just sleep and never wake up. Witness testified that they
went to Quiapo to buy the needed ingredients but nothing happened (p. 14 Ibid). The accused
wanted to kill Reynaldo in a way that they would not be suspected of having planned it, and
for him just to die of "bangungot". She testified that they wanted to separate their properties
but it did not push through, referring to Beverly and Reynaldo. That Beverly heard of the
house being built in Corinthian intended for Rosalinda and family. In July 1994 Malibiran told
witness testified that she heard this on their way to Batangas, it was Beverlys birthday (p. 16
ibid). On October 1994 she asked by Malibiran to convince Beverly to marry him, this was
asked at the time when Beverly was in Germany (p. 17 ibid).
When asked whether Beverly and Rolando ever got married the witness testified that the two
got married on November 8, 1994. (p. 155 Vol. 1-A records Exh. "JJ" Certificate of Marriage).
That she executed an affidavit of corroborating witnesses for Beverly and Malibiran to
facilitate the processing of their exemption in obtaining marriage license requirement (p. 128
Ibid; Exh. "BB"). She is an employee of the Municipality of San Juan. After getting married they
discussed how Malibiran would get inside the car of Reynaldo. On December of 1994, Beverly
was able to duplicate Reynaldos key at the time when they have shopped for many things,
Reynaldo asked her to bring the goods to the car in the compartment as the kids would still
shop (p. 17 ibid). After having done so, she proceeded to a key duplicator in Virra Mall and had
the key duplicated. Thereafter on the succeeding days or weeks, she was able to give the
duplicate to Malibiran. That they would use the grenade since Malibiran has one in his house
but his only problem is how to get inside the car and place the grenade (p. 18, Oct. 11, 2000
TSN; Vide p. 35 ibid)
As to when the killing would take place, the witness heard that they will do it during the
baptism of the child of Gloria, Rolando Malibirans sister. They chose that date so that they
would not be suspected of anything and that pictures would be taken in the baptism to reflect
that Malibiran took part in the same (pp. 17-18 ibid). During Reynaldos internment when
asked whether Beverly looked sad, witness said that she did not see her sad (p. 20 ibid). On
February 8, 1995, during the wake, witness met Malibiran in a canteen in White Plains and
they rode a Canter owned by Beverly, on the road while the vehicle was cruising along
Katipunan avenue near Labor Hospital, Malibiran told her among others that on the day he
placed a grenade on Reynaldos car he saw a security guard roving and so what he did was to
hurriedly tie the wire in the grenade (p. 21 ibid) not connected with the wire unlike the one
intended for Reynaldo which has a connection (p. 21 ibid). As far as she knows, there were
four or five grenades placed. She told this secret to another friend so that in case something
happened to her, it was the doing of Malibiran and Beverly.
On Cross examination, she was asked whether Malibiran did it alone, she said that he has a
look out as what Malibiran told him (p. 26 ibid). When confronted why she was testifying only
now, she said she was bothered by her conscience. As to how did she get the information of
key duplication, she said that it was told to her by Beverly (p. 35 ibid). It was also disclosed
that she did ask Atty. Morales for a sum of P5,000.00 for he to buy medicine.
9. Oswaldo Banaag (or Banaag) testified that Beverly told him that she and Malibiran had a
relationship (p. 39, April 1994 TSN). He testified that on April 10, 1994 Beverly asked him to
look for a hired gunman, if he could not find one, he just look for a poison that would kill
Reynaldo, ten thousand (10,000.00) pesos was given him for this (p. 14 Ibid). In his sworn
statement he said that Beverly asked him to seek means for Reynaldo to die. That she will pay
any amount just for him to get out of her life. He has driven for her in going to Hilltop Police
Station, Taytay Rizal to see Rolando Malibiran. That Malibiran blames Beverly of the reason
why Reynaldo is still alive and then volunteered himself to remedy the situation, that he
would seek a man that would kill Reynaldo he made an example of a man they killed and
threw in Antipolo "Bangin" with Beverly, Malibiran and two other persons who appear to be
policeman because they have something budging in their waste [sic] which is assumed to be a
gun, they went to Paombong Bulacan via Malabon. He heard that they would fetch a man in
Bulacan that knows how to place a bomb in a vehicle. Near the sea they talked to a person
thereat. From Paombong they rode a banca and went to an islet where the planning was
discussed as to how much is the fee and how the killing will be had. They ordered him to
return back to the vehicle and just fetched them in Binangonan.
He swore that on February 5, 1995 around 10:30 a.m. Beverly asked one of her siblings to call
Reynaldo for them to be picked up because every Sunday, the family would go out for
recreation. Around 12:00 pm he was asked by Beverly to follow where they will go and when
they are already parked, he was instructed to fetch Malibiran in Caltex, Katipunan near
Shakeys and bring them to the place where Reynaldo was parked. In the Caltex station he saw
Malibiran with two persons who looked like policemen and another person he previously saw
in Bulacan. He drove the L300 Van, and brought them to the parking lot where Reynaldos
Honda Car was parked and Malibiran told him just drove [sic] in the area and come back. At
around 3:00 p.m. after half an hour he saw Malibiran and company and I picked them up. He
heard from the person in Bulacan "Ayos na, siguradong malinis ito." Then he was asked to
drive them to Hilltop Police Station. He discovered the death of Reynaldo when he saw and
read newspaper, he called Beverly to confirm this incident and he was asked to be hired again
and drove for her. When he was in White Plains already, he was asked by Beverly and
Malibiran not to squeal what he knows of, otherwise, his life will just be endangered. That
Beverly and Malibiran were lovers since March 1993, when they met each other in a piggery in
Marikina. There was an incident that Reynaldo saw Malibiran in their own bedroom, and there
was almost a gunshot incident, he was there because he was asked to drive the vehicle.
Beverly Tans source of money was from Reynaldo Tan, that he (Banaag) was asked frequently
by Beverly who in turn would give it to Malibiran (Exh. "y", pp. 122-125 Vol. 1-A, Sworn
Statement November 29, 1996).
On March 29, 1996 he was no longer driving for Beverly because he was arrested by the
Presidential Anti-Crime Commission for his alleged involvement in the kidnapping of the father
of the classmate of Renevie Tan. He was later on acquitted (p. 16, Feb. 20, 2001 TSN) and
released from incarceration on May 7, 1997. When asked whether Jessie Tan helped him to be
acquitted in the kidnapping case, he said no (p. 16 ibid).
On Cross examination, he was asked how many times did Jessie Tan visit him in prison, he said
that it was Atty. Olanzo who visited him for about six times and that he saw Jessie when he
was already out of jail (pp. 24-25 ibid). He testified that there was one incident when Reynaldo
41
and Mabiliran almost had a shootout in the bedroom downstairs because Malibiran was inside
the bedroom where Beverly was, Reynaldo have a gun at that time bulging in his waste [sic]
(p. 40 ibid).
Further on Cross, he testified that sometime in June 1994, he with Beverly went to Hilltop
Police Station and fetched Malibiran and company to go to Paombong Bulacan, they passed by
Malabon before going to Bulacan. When they reached the bridge near the sea, they rode a
banca, about six of them plus the one rowing the boar towards an Island. In the Island, there
was one person waiting (p. 44-45 ibid). he stayed there for just for about ten (10) minutes, and
during that period, at about one arms length he overheard their conversation concerning a
man to bring the bomb in the car. When asked who was in the banca then, he said it was
Beverly, Botong (Malibiran), Janet and the man they picked up at Hilltop. He was told to return
the L300 and just wait for them in Binangonan, hence he rode a banca to return to the bridge
and then drove the L300 Van towards Binangonan (p. 50 ibid). When asked if he knows that
Malibiran is engaged in the fishing business of bangus, he had no idea (p. 45 ibid).
DEFENSE EVIDENCE
For the defense, in opposition to the testimony of Elmer Paug, it called to the witness stand
Renevie Tan. She testified that she believe that her mother (Beverly) did not kill her dad
because she was with them at the time of the incident (p. 6 Feb. 5, 2002 TSN). That it is not
true that they did nothing when his dad was lying on the ground at the time of the incident.
That her mom screamed at that time and did tried to pull her dad who was under the car that
she kept going around to find a safer place to pull him out because the car was burning and so
they could not pick her dad without burning. Her mother tried crawling underneath the car so
she can reach him but he pulled her mom aside and pulled dad risking himself from burning
(p. 11 ibid) She found out that the person who helped them was the taxi driver, Elmer Paug.
That a driver of a Ford Fiera or Toyota Tamaraw of some kind of delivery van boarded her dad
with her mom and headed for Cardinal Santos Hospital. She said that if is not true that her
mom appeared unaffected or acting normal as if nothing happened. That it is likewise not true
when Elmer Paug said that he alone carried her dads body, and said that there was another
man who helped put her dad on the car (p. 14 ibid). She swore that her mom was shocked and
was crying at that time (pp. 112-115, Exh. "U" Sworn Statement of Renevie Tan). She admitted
that it was only the taxi driver who pulled out his dad from the danger area to a safer place at
about four (4) meters, while Elmer Paug was dragging her dad, they where there following him
(p. 43 February 5, 2002, TSN). That she touched her father when they where (p. 45 ibid). It was
confirmed in her testimony that it was the taxi drivers who looked for a taxi cab ( p. 46 ibid).
She asked if she observed whether her mom carried a portion of her dads body or arms,
hands, legs or buttocks of her father, she said she could not remember (p. 7-8, February 12,
2002 TSN). When asked whether her mom has a shoulder bag at that time, she could not
remember.
She testified that her parents keep quarreling to each other may be in 1988-89 and stopped in
1991. it was a once a month quarrel (pp. 23-24 ibid). A certain Janet Pascual frequently stayed
in their house in the months of October 1994 until February of 1995, and her moms
relationship with Janet was cordial (pp. 27-28, ibid). As regards to Malibiran, she knows him at
the month of August or September of 1994 but no knowledge of a marriage that took place
between her mom and Malibiran on November of the same year (p. 30 ibid).
Romulo Bruzo, the security guard of Tan Family at White Plains testified that there was an
offer of half a million to him by an unknown person and a demand for him to leave the employ
of Beverly Tan and a threat to his life should he testify before the Court. He testified that
Banaag was a family driver of the Tan in White Plains from March 1993 until August 1994,
after said date, he was taken by Reynaldo Tan as driver at Winreach. He testifies that the
statement of Oswaldo Banaag that he came over to White Plains on February 5, 1995, drove
the L300 Van and followed the family to Greenhills Shopping Complex is false. Because at that
time, the L300 was still parked inside White Plains, it was just a concocted statement of
Banaag because he has a grudge on Mrs. Tan as she did not help him when he was
incarcerated in Camp Crame (p.47-48 ibid).
He was told by Banaag that they were supposed to kidnap the three siblings of Beverly Tan but
he took pity on them because Beverly is a nice person to him. He stated that Jessie Tan helped
him to be acquitted (p. 49 ibid) and promised good job and house to live in.
As regards Janet Pascual, he testified that he had an altercation with her (Janet) because there
was an instruction for him by Renevie for Janet not to let inside the house. That Janet got mad
at them because she is not been [sic] treated the way Renevies mom did not to her. Likewise,
Renevie has refused to give her 5,000.00 allowance as her mom did before to Janet for the
latters medicine (pp. 50-51).
On account of said incident, she made a threatening remark that if she will not be treated
fairly and the 5,000.00 allowance be not given to her, she will go to the Tan Brother and she
will testify Mrs. Tan. When asked whom she was angry of Bruzo said it was against Renevie
and Atty. Morales. She was angry with the latter because she thought that Atty. Morales was
telling Renevie not to give her allowance anymore and refuse access inside the white plains (p.
51 ibid).
When asked if he knows Malibiran, he said that he was able to join him twice when there was
a delivery of rejected bread for fish feeds in Bulacan. That he saw him eight (8) times in a
month in 1994 and just twice a week in the month of August, September and October of said
year. (p. 52 ibid). He also saw him on July of 1994 on the occasion of Beverlys Birthday.
That on February 5, 1994, Beverly called on him to relay to Roger to fetch the three kids in
Green Hills. When asked the tone of Beverly at the time of the phone call, he said the tone
was that she was scared and confused (p. 63 ibid)
Tessie Luba, the caretaker of Manila Memorial Park testified that she was paid by Beverly to
take care of the tomb of Reynaldo and that in some points in time Jessie took over and later
her services were not availed of anymore (p. 23, April 30, 2002 TSN) That she saw Beverly with
Banaag on November 1996 (p. 8 ibid) and Jessie with Banaag in one occasion in going to the
tomb on November 1997 (p. 47 ibid) and in April 2001 (p. 20 ibid).
42
Emily Cuevas, one of the friends of Beverly testified that Janet Pascual is a back fighter and a
traitor, that Janet tried to convince her to testify against Beverly and if witness will be
convinced, Janet will receive a big amount of money about three (3) million from another
source. Testified that it is not true that Beverly and Malibiran orchestrated or masterminded
the death of Reynaldo, and that Janet testified because she needed money because she is sick
and diabetic (p. 7, May 21, 2002 TSN). She knows such fact by heart that they are innocent and
that they are good people (p. 20 ibid).
Victorino Felix, a police officer testified that Malibiran is a member of the Aquarius Multi-
Purpose Cooperative, a cooperative that is engaged in the culture of fish particularly "Bangus"
at Laguna De Bay particularly Bagumbong, Binangonan, Laguna.
He testified that sometime in 1994, he together with Malibiran waited at Tropical Hut, Cainta
for them to be picked up for Bulacan to purchase fingerlings. They were fetched by an L300
Van driven by Oswaldo Banaag and they were around six or seven at that time that headed
first to Dampalit, Malabon, Metro Manila to meet the owner of the fish pond, finding that the
owner thereof was already in Bulacan they proceeded thereat, at Taliptip, Bulacan. In said
place, they left the L300 Van along the bridge, near the sea and from there they rode a motor
banca in going to the fingerlings ponds. He testified that Oswaldo was not with them in going
to the pond from Taliptip (pp. 11-13, Sept. 3, 2002 TSN). When asked where he was, he said
he drove the L300 back (p. 14 ibid). The pond was about three kilometers from Talilip, and
they were able to buy fingerlings, loaded it in another water transport going to Laguna Lake
from Bulacan traversing Pasig River and thereafter they returned back to Binangonan (p. 15
ibid).
On Cross, he testified that has met Banaag many times because he used to deliver rejected for
bangus feeds, but said that it was only once when Banaag drove with him, that is sometimes in
1994 (p. 20 ibid). he testified that Malibiran together with him went to Talilip, Bulacan to
procure some fingerlings sometime in June 1995 to mid 1996 (Joint Order, Sept. 3, 2002, p.
366 Vol. III record).
Virgilio Dacanilao testified that on February 5, 1995 at about 12:00 noon he was at the
residence of one Gloria Malibiran Santos and from there, he saw accused Rolando Malibiran
together with his wife and children, witness parents-in-law and sisters-in-law. When asked
who his parents-in-law is, he said Fernando Malibiran and Jovita Malibiran, the parents of
Rolando Malibiran (p. 5, Sept. 17, 2002 TSN). He said that they left the occasion at around
5:00pm and at that time, accused Malibiran, with Boy Santos and Eduardo was still playing
"pusoy". When asked if there was such a time that Malibiran left the house of Gloria Santos,
he said, he did not go out of the house sir (pp. 5-7 ibid).
On Cross examination, it was disclosed that he knows Malibiran at the time witness was still
his wife, the sister of Malibiran, that was sometime in 1988. when asked if he considered
Malibiran to be close to him as the brother of his wife, he said yes sir (p. 10 ibid). Asked if his
relationship with him is such that he would place Malibiran in a difficult situation, he
answered, it depends on the situation (p. 11 ibid). Witness was asked how long it would take
to reach Unimart Supermarket from his residence in Malanday, he estimate it to be more or
less half an hour (p. 13 ibid). He testified that no game was ever stop [sic] on the reason that
they have to wait for Malibiran.
Said witness testimony was corroborated by Jose Ong Santos, the father of the child who was
baptized on said occasion. He testified that he played "pusoy" with Malibiran at around
2:00pm, until 6:30 to 7:00 pm and there was never a time that Malibiran left the table where
they were playing except when he feels like peeing (p. 10 July 16, 2002 TSN). It was estimated
at abut five times, and it took him about three to five minutes everytime he would rise to pee
and return to the table. That Malibiran may have left their house at around 6:30 or 7:00 in the
evening on February 5, 1995 (p. 11, ibid)
On Cross examination, he testified that the idea of baptism was rushly scheduled, because he
won in a cockfight three to four days before the baptism of his child at about February 1 or 2
of 1995. That amount was about 50,000.00 (pp. 20-21 ibid). Malibiran did not take any
participation in the baptism nor was he present at the church, but was already at the
reception with his family, for lunch. He testified that Malibiran left by call of nature, to pee,
about four to five times and a span of five minutes (p. 31 ibid).
Accused Rolando Malibiran in his Counter-Affidavit said that he does intelligence work for
seven years. He doesnt know Banaag as to reckless discuss a supposed plot to kill somebody
within his hearing. That would be inconsistent with the entire training and experience as a
police officer. Especially when the expertise is intelligence work. Banaag drove for them in
June or July 1995 not in June of 1994 (for months after the death of Reynaldo) [pp. 147-152,
Exh. "HH" Vol. 1-a record].
He testified that he met Banaag sometime in the last quarter of 1993 at the piggery of Beverly
Tan (pp. 12-13, Oct. 8, 2002 TSN). He admitted that he was with Banaag using the L300 Van of
Beverly in one occasion, in 1994 when they purchased fingerlings from Bulacan. They procured
the same because their cooperative was culturing "bangus" in Barangay Bombon, Binangonan,
Rizal (pp. 14-15). He testified that in Bulacan, Banaag was left at the foot of the bridge where
the L300 was parked (p. 19 ibid) and heard that Beverly told Banaag to go back, in White Plains
(p. 21, ibid). After procuring the fingerlings, they rode a big banca called "pituya" then they
went back to Pritil, Binangonan. In Pritil, they waited for Banaag (P. 26 ibid).
He denied having met Janet Pascual on Wednesday at about February 8, 1995 because since
Tuesday (February 7, 1995) he was already confined in the Camp by Order of his Unit
Commander, Chief Inspector Florentin Sipin (p. 5, January 21, 2003 TSN) because he was
under investigation by the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission. He admitted that he met
Beverly in the last quarter of 1993 (p. 8, October 22, 2002) but denied having intimate
relations with her (p. 21 ibid).
He testified that he met Janet Pascual only once, on November 1994, but said that they never
talked (p. 12, November 12, 2002 TSN). He denied having married Beverly Tan nor did he ever
requested Janet Pascual to secure a license for them to get married. He denied having had a
trip with Janet in Bulacan and admitted that he went to Zamables once, with Beverly, kids and
yaya as well as his father (p. 25, ibid), that was sometime in 1994, before Reynaldo died. He
testified that he used his own vehicle with his father in going to Zamables. He denied seeing
43
Reynaldo; he said he just heard him based on his conversation with Beverly Tan which took
place in the piggery in Marikina. In sum, the place of incidents where he managed to meet and
talk with Beverly Tan was in the piggery in Marikina; at Camp station in Taytay Rizal; in Bulacan
when they procured fingerlings in Binangonan; Malabon; Zambales; White Plains and Cainta.
(pp. 30; 32; 35 ibid).
He testified that he was arrested in Candelaria Quezon on December 1998 (p. 11 January 21,
2003) but denied living with Beverly Tan at the time of the arrest. He said he just saw Beverly
thirty (30) minutes after his arrest in the town proper of Candelaria, Quezon (P. 21, ibid). He
denied that he uttered the remark "its better to kill Rene since you are not benefiting from
him" (p. 38 ibid); never have access to grenades; never asked Beverly Tan how he could get
inside Reynaldos Car never claimed to be a sharp shooter and had never went to Batangas
uttering the remarks mentioned by Janet Pascual nor went to Batangas at the time of
Beverlys birthday.
On Cross examination, he said that he never talk to Janet at the time of his restriction and
thereafter. He had no commercial dealing with Janet nor have any romantic relations with her
(p. 8, ibid). It was only when the case was filed he was able to talk to her (p. 5, February 4,
2003 TSN). He testified that he evaded arrest because there was a pending petition for review
filed by his lawyer before the Department of Justice despite the fact that there is an existing
warrant of arrest which he found out at the end of 1997 (p. 15 ibid).
On September 23, 2003, the RTC found Rolando guilty of Murder and appellant, of Parricide.
The dispositive portion of the Joint Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as charged.
Accused Rolando Malibiran for the crime of Murder in Criminal Case No. 113065-H and
accused Beverly Tibo-Tan for Parricide in Criminal Case No. 113066-H defined and penalized
under Article 248 and Article 246, respectively, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in
relation to Republic Act No. 7659 with the attendant circumstances of treachery, evident
premeditation and use of explosion and sentencing both accused the supreme penalty of
DEATH, and ordering them to pay jointly and severally to the heirs of Reynaldo Tan the
amount of Fifty Thousand (50,000.00) Pesos as indemnity for death, Eighty Thousand
(80,000.00) Pesos as actual damages; Fifty Thousand (50,000.00) as moral damages; and to
pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.8
Appellant then appealed to this Court; the appeal was, however, referred to the CA pursuant
to People v. Mateo.9
In its Decision dated November 13, 2006, the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC. The CA,
however, took judicial notice of Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition of the death
penalty and thus reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the said
Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the joint decision dated September 23, 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court, Special Court for Heinous Crimes, Branch 156, Pasig City in Criminal Case
No. 113065-H for Murder and Criminal Case No. 113066-H for Parricide is hereby AFFIRMED
with Modification in that the supreme penalty of death imposed on both accused-appellants is
hereby reduced to RECLUSION PERPETUA.
SO ORDERED.10
As manifested by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), Rolando did not file a Motion for
Reconsideration or a Notice of Appeal from the CA Decision. 11 For all intents and purposes, the
judgment of conviction as to Rolando became final and executory on December 14, 2006. This
was confirmed by CA Resolution dated January 29, 2007, which noted that "pursuant to the
report dated January 23, 2007 of the Judicial Records Division that no motion for
reconsideration or notice of appeal had been filed by counsel for appellant Rolando Malibiran,
entry of judgment is issued against said appellant x x x."12
This review shall therefore pertain only to appellant Beverly Tibo-Tan's conviction.
Appellant and the OSG were required by the Court in its Resolution dated October 3, 2007 to
file supplemental briefs, if they so desired. The OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion that it
would no longer file any supplemental brief. As regards appellant, records show that, as of
even date, she had not filed any supplemental brief, despite due notice.13
In the Brief she filed with the Court prior to the endorsement of the case to the CA, appellant
raised the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT BEVERLY TIBO
TAN GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF PARRICIDE BASED MERELY ON CIRCUMSTANCIAL EVIDENCE,
THE REQUISITES THEREOF NOT HAVING BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY ESTABLISHED;
II.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE NOT APPRECIATED THE TESTIMONY OF
PROSECUTION WITNESS OSWALDO BANAAG AS ITS BASIS FOR ESTABLISHING CONSPIRACY
BETWEEN ACCUSED-APPELLANT MALIBIRAN AND ACCUSED-APPELLANT BEVERLY TAN, SUCH
TESTIMONY BEING HEARSAY ON SOME PARTS AND REPLETE WITH INCONSISTENCIES; 14
Before proceeding to the merits of appellant's arguments, the Court takes note of the RTC's
observation regarding appellant's stoic stance during and after the incident and her non-
presentation as witness. The RTC took this negatively against appellant. The Court differs
therefrom.
Appellant's seeming indifference or lack of emotions cannot be categorically quantified as
an indicium of her guilt. There is no hard and fast gauge for measuring a person's reaction or
behavior when confronted with a startling, not to mention horrifying, occurrence. It has
44
already been stated that witnesses of startling occurrences react differently depending upon
their situation and state of mind, and there is no standard form of human behavioral response
when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience. The workings of the
human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable, and people react differently
some may shout, some may faint and others may be shocked into insensibility.15
Also, appellant's failure to testify in her defense should not be taken against her. The Court
preserves the rule that an accused has the right to decline to testify at the trial without any
inference of guilt drawn from his failure to be on the witness stand.16 The constitutional right
to be presumed innocent still prevails.
This notwithstanding, the totality of the circumstantial evidence presented against appellant
justifies her conviction of the crime of Parricide.
Appellant claims that the circumstantial evidence proven during trial only shows that there
was a possibility that appellant may have conspired with Rolando, but nevertheless claims that
it came short of proving her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 17
Appellant further argues that the testimony of Oswaldo was in some parts hearsay and replete
with inconsistencies.18 Specifically, appellant contends that the testimony of Oswaldo that "he
overheard a conversation between Malibiran (Rolando) and Beverly (appellant) that they will
fetch a man in Bulacan that knows how to place a bomb in a vehicle" is hearsay. 19 Likewise, in
her Reply Brief,20 appellant claims that the testimony of Janet is hearsay.
Contrary to the claim of appellant, the testimonies of Oswaldo and Janet are not covered by
the hearsay rule.
The hearsay rule states that a witness may not testify as to what he merely learned from
others either because he was told, or he read or heard the same. This is derived from Section
36, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court, which requires that a witness can testify only to those
facts that he knows of or comes from his personal knowledge, that is, that are derived from
his perception. Hearsay testimony may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has
learned.21
The law, however, provides for specific exceptions to the hearsay rule. One is the doctrine of
independently relevant statements, where only the fact that such statements were made is
relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule does not apply; hence,
the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not
secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.22 The witness who testifies thereto
is competent because he heard the same, as this is a matter of fact derived from his own
perception, and the purpose is to prove either that the statement was made or the tenor
thereof.23
In this case, Oswaldo's testimony that he overhead a conversation between Rolando and
appellant that they would fetch a man in Bulacan who knew how to place a bomb in a vehicle
is admissible, if only to establish the fact that such statement was made and the tenor thereof.
Likewise, Janet may testify on matters not only uttered in her presence, since these may be
considered as independently relevant statements, but also personally conveyed to her by
appellant and Rolando.
Appellant further argues that Oswaldo's testimony to the effect that he drove the L300 van of
the Tan family and brought Rolando to the parking lot where Reynaldos Honda Accord was
parked, was refuted by defense witness Romulo, the security guard of the Tan family. Romulo
testified that the L300 van never left White Plains on the day of the incident.24
A. And after Beverly placed the things inside the compartment, she had with her the key,
she proceeded to a key duplicator in Virra Mall and had the key duplicated.
Q. When did she give the key to Malibiran, if you know?
A. That was already December, I cannot recall the exact date, sir.
Q. Why did Mr. Malibiran need the key?

While the defense may have presented Security Guard Romulo to refute the testimony of A. Because they planned, since they cannot use the gun Butch said that they would use
Oswaldo, it is settled that when credibility is in issue, the Supreme Court generally defers to grenade instead because he had a grenade in his house. But their only problem is how to get
the findings of the trial court, considering that it was in a better position to decide the inside the car.
question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment during
trial.25 Thus, in the absence of any palpable error, this Court defers to the trials court's COURT:
impression and conclusion that, as between Oswaldo and Romulo, the former's testimony
deserved more weight and credence.1awphi1 Who is Butch?

There is nothing on record to convince the Court to depart from the findings of the RTC. On A. Mr. Malibiran, your Honor.
the contrary, the testimony of Janet as corroborated by Oswaldo, though circumstantial,
COURT
leaves no doubt that appellant had in fact conspired with Rolando in bringing about the death
of her husband Reynaldo. As a rule of ancient respectability now molded into tradition,
Butch and Botong are one and the same person?
circumstantial evidence suffices to convict, only if the following requisites concur: (a) there is
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; A. Yes, your Honor.
and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.26 Q. Did they discuss how, where and when they would planted the grenade in the car of Rene?
The case of the prosecution was primarily built around the strength of the testimonies of Janet A. I heard from them that they would do it during the baptismal of the child of Gloria who is
and Oswaldo. The salient portions of Janet's testimony are extensively quoted hereunder: the sister of Butch.
Q. Anything else significant that happened in the remaining of 1994, Ms. Pascual? Q. And Butch is Botong?
A. After they were married, they talked about what they're gonna do for Rene. A. Botong, sir.
Q. Where did they discuss it? Q. Do you know when that binyag when supposed to be held?
A. Inside the car, Botong was asking Beverly how would he be able to get inside the car since A. The baptismal be held on February 5, 1995, sir.
he has no key and Beverly said that she can do something about it and so it was in the last
week of November 1994 of first week of December 1994 when they shopped for so many Q. Why did they choose that date of the binyag?
things.
A. So that if a picture was taken during the baptism, there would be witnesses that they were
Q. Who is (sic) with him? in the baptism, they would not be suspected that they have something to do with that.27

A. Rene, Beverly and her three kids. Rene asked her since Rene and kids would still shop, Rene xxxx
asked her to brings the goods to the car in the compartment.
Q. What day of the week was this?
Q. And then?
A. Sunday, Ma'm.

45
Q. What kind of kind [sic] was duplicated? Q. Upon whose instruction?

A. The key in the new car of Rene the Honda Accord. A. Ate Beverly, sir.

Court: Q. Did you in fact follow her?

But in the first place, you were not there when it was duplicated? How you were [sic] able to A. Yes, sir.
know that it was indeed duplicated?
Q. What time did they reach. the[W]hiteplains?
A. Because after Beverly had duplicated the key, she told me that she was able to have the
key duplicated and she told me how she did it and she told me that she will give the key to A. Almost 1 o'clock, sir.
Butch.
Q. Incidentally, who was with Beverly?
Q. Did she show you the duplicated key?
A. Kuya Rene Tan, Beverly Tan, Renebie, Jag and JR.
A. Ginanoon niya lang.
Q. What car did they use?
Q. What does it looked [sic] like?
A. Honda Accord.
A. Iyong mahaba na malaki. Hindi ko na inano basta susi, nag-iisa.
Q. Color?
Q. On what occasion did she tell you about this?
A. Red, sir.
A. None, I was just in White Plains.
Q. Who drived [sic]?
Q. When was this?
A. Kuya Rene, sir.
A. That was December, 1994.
Q. What part of Greenhills did they go?
Q. What was their decision when they will execute the plan?
A. The parking lot infront [sic] of Unimart, sir.
A. It will be during the baptismal of the child of Gloria because Butch is one of the
sponsors.28 (Emphasis Supplied) Q. What did you do when they come [sic] to Greenhills?

In addition, Oswaldo testified on the occurrences on the day of the incident, in this wise: A. When I found out they already parked and Kuya Rene got in I went straight to Katipunan.

Q: Why did you go to Greenhills? Q. Why?

A. I was told by Ate Beverly to follow them wherever they go. A. Because I was told by Ate to fetch Botong.

Q. What time did she tell you to go there? Q. Where in Katipunan?

A. After lunch, sir. A. In Caltex near Shakeys.

Q. What vehicle did you use to follow her? COURT

A. L300, sir. Who is Botong?

A. Rolando Malibiran, Your Honor.

46
Q. The accused in this case? A. L300 that I was driving, sir.

A. Yes, your Honor.29 Q. Where if any did you go after picking them up?

xxxx A. From Caltex we proceeded to Greenhills.

Q. You picked up Malibiran at Caltex on February 5, 1995? Q. Why?

A. Yes, sir. A. Because that is the instruction of Ate Beverly. Where they were, I will drop them there.

Q. What time was that? Q. Did you do that?

A. Around 2 o'clock, sir. A. Yes, sir.

Q. Who if any was with him? Q. Where exactly did you drop them on?

A. Two guys. One whom I saw in [sic] Bulacan and the one whom we sinakay at Hilltop. A. In the place where Kuya Rene was parked.31

Q. When did you go in [sic] Bulacan? xxxx

A. In June 1994, sir. COURT: x x x What happened while they were inside the vehicle while you were going back to
the place as instructed by Beverly?
Q. With whom?
A. After that I brought them where the car of Kuya Rene was parked, Your Honor. Before they
A. Botong, Beverly, Janet, I and two guys in Hilltop because that is the instruction of Beverly. alighted, Botong asked, dito na ba?32

Q. Do you know the name of the two guys from Hilltop? Atty. Rondain:

A. If given the chance I can recognize them but I do not know them by name. So you replied Opo, dyan po pumasok si Kuya Rene?

Q. What did you do in Bulacan? A. After I alighted they just go [sic] around.

A. We went to the Island near the sea. Q. Where?

Q. What did you do at that Island? A. In Greenhills, sir.

A. They talked to a person. Q. Then, what happened?

Q. What if you know the date [sic] all about? A. After half an hour I saw Kuya Botong, the three of them. Then they stopped me and the
three of them boarded the vehicle.
A. As far as I remember they talked about the plans about the killing of Kuya Rene.30
Q. What happened?
xxxx
A. After they boarded, the man from Bulacan said, ano pare, malinis na paggawa nito. Then,
Q. Where did they ride on Feb. 5, 1995? I was told by Botong to bring them to Hilltop.33

A. In Katipunan, sir. Based on the foregoing, the testimonies of Janet and Oswaldo clearly link appellant to the
planning of the crime. True, as intimated by appellant, she may not have been at the scene of
Q. What did they ride?
47
the crime at the time of the explosion;34 but then again, if she was, then she would have
suffered the same fate as Reynaldo. Moreover, the nature of the crime and the manner of its
execution, i.e., via a booby trap, does not demand the physical presence of the perpetrator at
the very time of its commission. In fact, the very manner in which it was carried out
necessitated prior scheming and execution for it to succeed. Thus, appellant's absence from
the actual scene of the crime does not negate conspiracy with Rolando in plotting the death of
her husband. A conspiracy exists even if not all the parties committed the same act, but the
participants performed specific acts that indicated unity of purpose in accomplishing a
criminal design.35 Moreover, direct proof of previous agreement to commit an offense is not
necessary to prove conspiracy -- conspiracy may be proven by circumstantial evidence.36
The testimonies of Janet and Oswaldo established the following set of circumstances which, if
taken collectively, show the guilt of appellant: that appellant and Rolando conspired, planned
and agreed to kill Reynaldo using a grenade; that appellant duplicated the key to the red
Honda Accord of Reynaldo so that Rolando could gain access to the car; that appellant
thereafter gave the duplicate key to Rolando; that on February 5, 1995, appellant told
Oswaldo to follow the red Honda Accord of Reynaldo until the latter parked the car; that
appellant told Oswaldo to thereafter pick up Rolando at Katipunan and bring the latter to
where Reynaldo parked his red Honda Accord. Reynaldo died soon after due to injuries he
sustained from an explosion caused by grenades planted in his car.
Another notable fact is that according to the expert opinion of Inspector Selverio Dollesin,
Chief of the Bomb Disposal Unit of the Eastern Police District, the perpetrator had information
about the victim's movements. Dollesin also observed that the perpetrator knew his intended
victim, since the grenade was specifically placed in between the driver's seat and the front
door. That the perpetrator knew the victim's movements was further corroborated by the
affidavits executed by the Tan children, Renevie37 and Jag Carlo38 , attesting that while they
spent their Sundays with their father, this was the only time that they spent a Sunday in
Greenhills. Only someone who had close personal contact with Reynaldo would know his
movements, where the car would be parked, and that he was the one who usually drove the
red Honda Accord, such that it was precisely positioned to ensure damage to the intended
victim.
There is no doubt that, based on the testimony of Janet, it was Rolando who planted the
grenades inside the car of Reynaldo, to wit:
Q. Where did you go?
A. When I was inside the Canter, Botong (Rolando) was asking me while the vehicle was
moving slowly. He asked me what happened in the funeral parlor.
Q. And what did you say?
A. I told him that Major Penalosa called me for an interview but I did not say anything.
Then were already in front of the V. Luna Hospital.
48
COURT
What Hospital?
A. V. Luna, your Honor, along Katipunan.
COURT
Luna in Katipunan?
A. V. Luna is going to Katipunan, your Honor. It was Labor Hospital, your Honor and not V.
Luna. Then Botong told me that on the day he placed the grenade, he was seeing a guard
roving and so what he did since he was already perspiring at that time he hurriedly tied the
wire in the grenade.
Atty. Rondain:
Iqoute na lang natin.
COURT
Dinali-dali niyang ibinuhol ang alambre. That's her term.39 (Emphasis Supplied)
What sealed appellant's fate was that, as observed by the RTC, there were already
outstanding warrants of arrest against appellant and Rolando as early as September 11, 1997;
yet they evaded arrest and were only arrested on December 4, 1998.40 It is well settled that
flight, when unexplained, is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn.
"The wicked flee, even when no man pursueth; but the righteous are as bold as a
lion."41Appellant did not even proffer the slightest explanation for her flight.
All told, this Court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of the crime
as charged. Moreover, considering the manner in which appellant and Rolando planned and
executed the crime, the RTC was correct in appreciating the aggravating circumstances of
treachery, evident premeditation, and use of explosives. Thus, appellant is guilty of the crime
of Parricide as provided in the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Article 246. Parricide- Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate
or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of
parricide and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. (Emphasis Supplied)
Moreover, the Revised Penal Code provides for death as the proper penalty:
Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.
xxxx
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the
following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the
greater penalty shall be applied.
However, as observed by the CA, with the effectivity of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346 entitled
"An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines" on June 24, 2006, the
imposition of the penalty of death has been prohibited. Thus, the proper penalty to be
imposed on appellant as provided in Section 2, paragraph (a) of said law is reclusion
perpetua.42 The applicability of R.A. No. 9346 is undeniable in view of the principle in criminal
law that favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws that are favorable to the
accused are given retroactive effect.43
In addition, appellant is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346, which
states:
SECTION 3. Persons convicted with reclusion perpetua, or those whose sentences will be
reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act
No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
Lastly, as to the award of damages, the RTC awarded the following amounts: (1) 50,000.00 as
civil indemnity for death, (2) 80,000.00 as actual damages, and (3) 50,000.00 as moral
damages.1avvphi1
In the recent case of People v. Regalario,44 the Court stated:
While the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty provided for by
law for a heinous offense is still death and the offense is still heinous. Consequently, the civil
indemnity for the victim is still 75,000.00. x x x the said award is not dependent on the actual
imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the
imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the offense.
As to the award of moral and exemplary damages x x x. Moral damages are awarded despite
the absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering of the victim's heirs. As borne out by
human experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and
anguish on the part of the victim's family. If a crime is committed with an aggravating
circumstance, either qualifying or generic, an award of exemplary damages is justified under
Article 2230 of the New Civil Code. This kind of damage is intended to serve as deterrent to
serious wrongdoings and as vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights
of an injured, or as a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. However, consistent
with recent jurisprudence on heinous crimes where the imposable penalty is death but
reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, the award of moral
damages should be increased from 50,000.00 to 75,000.00 while the award of exemplary
damages should be increased from 25,000.00 to 30,000.00.
Consistent therewith, the RTC's award should be modified: the civil indemnity should be
increased to 75,000.00, and moral damages to 75,000.00.
49
Moreover, although not awarded by the RTC and pursuant to Regalario, exemplary damages
in the amount of 30,000.00 is likewise warranted because of the presence of the aggravating
circumstances of intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation and the use of explosives. The
imposition of exemplary damages is also justified under Art. 2229 of the Civil Code in order to
set an example for the public good.45
However, the award of 80,000.00 by the RTC as actual damages is deleted for lack of
competent evidence to support it. Only substantiated and proven expenses, or those that
appear to have been genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the
victim will be recognized by the court.46 In lieu thereof, appellant should pay temperate
damages in the amount of 25,000.00, said amount being awarded in homicide or murder
cases when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court, 47 and in
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.48 Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate
damages "may be awarded when the Court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered
but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty."
Finally, Section 11, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that:
An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal,
except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
Since Rolando did not appeal the decision of the CA, only portions of this judgment that are
favorable to Rolando may affect him. On the other hand, portions of this judgment that are
unfavorable to Rolando cannot apply to him. Thus, he cannot be made liable to pay for
exemplary damages, as the same were not awarded by the RTC.49However, he benefits from
this Court's finding that, instead of actual damages, only temperate damages should be
awarded to the heirs of the victim.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision dated November 13, 2006 and Resolution dated
September 23, 2003, finding appellant Beverly Tibo-Tan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Parricide and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA are
hereby AFFIRMED. Appellant is ineligible for parole and is further ordered to pay, jointly and
severally with Rolando Malibiran, the heirs of Reynaldo Tan the amounts of 75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, 75,000.00 as moral damages and 25,000.00 as temperate damages. In addition,
appellant is solely liable to pay the heirs of Reynaldo Tan the amount of 30,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 181902 August 31, 2011 (b) CCC:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. * One tri-colored gold necklace (choker) valued at 50,000.00;
EDGAR EVANGELIO y GALLO, JOSEPH EVANGELIO, ATILANO AGATON y OBICO, and
NOEL MALPAS y GARCIA, Accused. * One yellow-gold necklace (choker) valued at 5,000.00;
JOSEPH EVANGELIO, Accused-Appellant.
* One gold necklace with Jesus Christ head pendant valued at 12,000.00;
DECISION
PERALTA, J.: * One gold necklace with star diamond pendant valued at 8,000.00;

This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC * One gold necklace, tri-colored cross diamond valued at 13,000.00;
No. 00109, affirming the trial court's judgment finding appellant Joseph Evangelio
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape in Criminal Case * Three tri-colored bracelet (gold) with diamond valued at 18,000.00;
No. 2001-12-773.
Appellant Joseph Evangelio (Joseph), accused Edgar Evangelio y Gallo (Edgar), Atilano * Three tri-colored bracelet (twisted) valued at 15,000.00;
Agaton y Obico (Atilano) and Noel Malpas y Garcia (Noel) are charged with the crime
* One gold bracelet with diamonds valued at 6,000.00;
of Robbery with Rape in an Information, which reads:
* One gold bracelet (dangling) valued at 4,000.00;
The undersigned City Prosecutor of the City of Tacloban accuses EDGAR EVANGELIO
y GALLO, JOSEPH EVANGELIO, ATILANO AGATON y OBICO, and NOEL MALPAS y * One gold bracelet (chain) valued at 7,000.00;
GARCIA of the crime of Robbery with Rape, committed as follows:
* Five sets earrings and rings valued at 45,000.00;
That on or about the 3rd day of October 2001, in the City of Tacloban, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, * One set earrings and rings (diamond Solitaire) valued at 45,000.00;
conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each other, with intent to
gain and armed with a handgun and deadly/bladed weapons forcibly enter the * Two black-colored wristwatch (Pierre Cardin) valued at 25,000.00; and
inhabited house/residence of BBB and while inside, by means of violence and
intimidation using said arms on the latter and the other occupants therein, and * Two gold-plated wristwatch (Pierre Cardin) valued at 25,000.00; and -
without the consent of their owners did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, take, and carry away from said residence the following personal * One gold bracelet (chain) valued at 4,000; and -
properties belonging to:
(c) Josefina Manlolo:
(a) BBB:
* Instamatic Camera, Olympus brand.
*Two Saudi-gold necklace with pendant with a combined value of 25,000 more or
to the damage and prejudice of said owners to the extent of the value of their
less;
respective properties above indicated.
* Saudi-gold bracelet valued at 25,000.00;
That on the occasion of the said robbery and in the same house/residence, accused,
* Leather wallet containing 1,500.00 cash; by means of force and intimidation and using the said handgun and deadly/bladed
weapons, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
and - knowledge of AAA,2 a 17-year-old minor, against her will and consent and at the time
when the latter lost consciousness after her head was banged on the bathroom
* Two shoulder bags with a combined value of 2,000.00. floor.3
50
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On December 18, 2001, a Warrant of Arrest was issued against the four accused. On
February 8, 2002, appellant Joseph, accused Edgar and Atilano were arrested, while
accused Noel remained at-large.
On May 21, 2002, appellant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. Accused Edgar and Atilano, who at that time were detained at the Bacolod
City Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), were ordered to be brought
to Tacloban City for trial. However, they were not brought to Tacloban City by the
Bacolod City BJMP for the reason that they were criminally charged in the courts of
Bacolod City.
The evidence of the prosecution follows:
On October 3, 2001, at 6:30 in the evening, while AAA, a 17-year-old househelper,
was cooking in the kitchen of the house of BBB situated in Tacloban City, four
persons, one of whom was armed with a handgun while the other three with knives,
suddenly barged inside the house through the open kitchen door. The four men
accosted her, warned her to keep quiet, and brought her to the living room. There,
they herded all the other members of the household whom they caught and bound
their hands and feet, and thereafter, placed masking tapes over their captives eyes.
With her eyes partially covered by the tape, AAA was brought by the appellant inside
the comfort room and thereat, appellant and one of the robbers stripped off AAA's
clothes and removed her panty. AAA resisted and fought back but they slammed her
head twice against the concrete wall, causing her to lose consciousness. When she
regained her senses, appellant and the other robbers were already gone, and she
found herself lying on the side on the floor of the comfort room with her feet untied
and her hands still tied behind her back. She saw her shorts and panty strewn at her
side. She suffered pain in her knees, head, stomach, and her vagina, which was
bleeding. Later on, AAA was freed from the comfort room by the other occupants of
the house, who were earlier freed.
Prosecution witness Evelyn4 was in the living room when the incident happened. She
was tutoring her nieces when the four men barged inside the house. She testified
that she could not be mistaken as to the identity of the accused Edgar, who was
armed with a handgun, because he is a friend of her husband and who used to work
for him. Appellant and accused Noel are also familiar to her because they previously
stayed in Sampaguita, Tacloban City, where she lives. Upon the instruction of
accused Edgar, Edelyn was divested of her earrings, bracelet, watch, and ring.
Thereafter, appellant tied her hands and feet, and blindfolded her with masking
tape. She was hit on the head with a firearm, causing a cut and her losing
consciousness. When she regained her senses, she found herself in the maids' room.
51
She heard accused Edgar ask her nieces where their father kept their pieces of
jewelry and firearm. When her nieces told him that the valuables were kept upstairs,
accused Edgar brought one of them there.
BBB came home around 7:00 in the evening and when he entered the sliding door
facing the garage, he saw the four accused inside, three of them armed with knives
and the other one with a gun. When he entered, he was immediately accosted and
warned to keep quiet. He recognized their faces, particularly the leader of the group,
whom he identified as accused Edgar, who previously worked for him as a laborer in
the construction of the extension of his house. Upon accused Edgar's command, the
other three accused, one of whom he identified in open court as appellant, tied him
up. Accused Edgar, then struck him with the gun on his head, causing him to fall face
down on the floor with blood oozing from his left eyebrow. After a while, appellant
and the three accused went out of the house, through the kitchen door, carrying two
traveling bags and the jewelry box of his wife.
CCC, the wife of BBB, came home from the office in the early evening of October 3,
2001. Upon arriving thereat, she tried to open the door but was not able to do so.
She then called out the names of her children, but nobody responded. She peeped
through the window screen and saw people inside the house with whom she did not
recognize. One of the accused then poked a gun at her head and told her to come
inside, otherwise, he would kill her children. She ran away from their house, and
cried out for help from the neighbors. They called the police. Shortly thereafter, the
policemen arrived. They found the house in complete disarray, the cabinets were
forcibly opened, CCC's jewelry box and her pieces of jewelry stolen, and the
members of the household traumatized. An inventory was taken of the stolen
valuables which amounted to PhP336,000.00, more or less. Some of the stolen items
were later recovered from the house of accused Edgar.
The following day, AAA was examined by Dr. Angel Cordero, a medico-legal officer of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory at Camp Ruperto Kangleon,
Palo, Leyte. Dr. Cordero found that AAA sustained "deep healing lacerations at the 6
o'clock, 9 o'clock, and 3 o'clock positions and shallow healed lacerations at the 1
o'clock and 11 o'clock positions." He concluded that AAA was in a "non-virgin state
physically" and that "findings are compatible with recent loss of virginity" and
with "recent sexual intercourse."
In his defense, appellant denied having committed the crimes charged and
interposed alibi as a defense. He claims that at the time of the incident on October 3,
2001, at about 6:30 in the evening, he was sleeping in his house at Diit, Tacloban City
with his mother and sisters. No other witness was presented by the appellant.
On August 23, 2004, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City, Branch 7,
rendered its Decision5 dated May 16, 2003, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, pursuant to Article 293 in relation to 294, par. 1
of the Revised Penal Code as amended, and the amendatory provisions of R.A. No.
8353, (the Anti-Rape Law of 1997) and R.A. No. 7659 (Death Penalty Law), the Court
found accused, JOSEPH EVANGELIO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of ROBBERY WITH RAPE charged under the information and
sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH, and pay actual damages in the
amount of Three Hundred Thirty-Six Thousand (336,000.00) Pesos to spouses BBB
and CCC and moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand (50,000.00) Pesos;
pay civil indemnity to AAA, the amount of Seventy Five Thousand (75,000.00)
Pesos, and moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand (50,000.00) Pesos; pay
Edelyn the amount of Three Thousand (3,000.00) Pesos as actual damages and
moral damages in the amount of Twenty Thousand (20,000.00) Pesos; and pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED.6
An appeal was made and the records of the case were forwarded to this Court.
However, pursuant to this Courts ruling in People v. Mateo, 7 the case was
transferred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition. The CA rendered a
Decision dated August 10, 2007 affirming with modification the decision of the trial
court. In view of the abolition of the death penalty, pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9346, which was approved on June 24, 2006, the appellant was sentenced
to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. The CA did not consider the
aggravating circumstances of nighttime and unlawful entry in the commission of the
crime. The CA deleted the awards of PhP3,000.00, as actual damages, and
PhP20,000.00, as moral damages, in favor of Edelyn, because they were not charged
in the Information.
On August 28, 2007, appellant, through the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), appealed
the decision of the CA to this Court. Appellant had assigned the following error in his
appeal initially passed upon by the CA, to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF
NIGHTTIME, COMMITTED BY A BAND, DWELLING AND UNLAWFUL ENTRY IN THE
IMPOSITION OF THE PENALTY AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT. 8
In his Brief, appellant denied having committed the crime charged and interposed
alibi as a defense. He claims that at the time of the incident on October 3, 2001, at
52
about 6:30 in the evening, he was sleeping in his house at Diit, Tacloban City,
together with his mother and sisters. On the other hand, the appellant was positively
identified by the prosecution witnesses as one of the perpetrators of the crime of
robbery with rape. Both the trial court and the CA found the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses credible. The Court gives great weight to the trial courts
evaluation of the testimony of a witness because it had the opportunity to observe
the facial expression, gesture, and tone of voice of a witness while testifying, thus
making it in a better position to determine whether a witness is lying or telling the
truth.9
Between the categorical statements of the prosecution witness, on one hand, and
the bare denial of the appellant, on the other, the former must perforce prevail. An
affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony especially when it
comes from the mouth of a credible witness. Alibi and denial, if not substantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of
weight in law. They are considered with suspicion and always received with caution,
not only because they are inherently weak and unreliable but also because they are
easily fabricated and concocted. 10 Denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony
of prosecution witnesses who were not shown to have any ill-motive to testify
against the appellant.11
As to the defense of alibi. Aside from the testimony of appellant that he was in Diit,
Tacloban City at the time of the incident, the defense was unable to show that it was
physically impossible for appellant to be at the scene of the crime. Basic is the rule
that for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was somewhere else when
the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to have been
at the scene of the crime. Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the
place where the appellant was when the crime transpired and the place where it was
committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places. 12 Where there is
the least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of
alibi must fail.13 The appellant testified during trial that Diit is only a one-hour ride
away from Tacloban City.14 Thus, it was not physically impossible for the appellant to
be at the locus criminis at the time of the incident. In addition, positive identification
destroys the defense of alibi and renders it impotent, especially where such
identification is credible and categorical.15
Further, appellant insists that he was at home at the time of the incident with his
mother and sisters. The defense, however, failed to put them on the witness stand.
Neither did they execute any statement under oath to substantiate appellant's alibi.
To be convicted of robbery with rape, the following elements must concur: (1) the
taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against
persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is characterized by
intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (4) the robbery is accompanied by rape. 16
In this case, the prosecution established that appellant and his three co-accused took
the pieces of jewelry and valuables of the spouses BBB and CCC by means of violence
and intimidation. Appellant and his co-accused barged into the house of the victims
armed with a handgun and knives and tied the hands and feet of the members of the
household. The perpetrators then asked for the location of the pieces of jewelry and
valuables. BBB was also tied and was struck in the head with a gun causing him to fall
face down on the floor with blood oozing from his left eyebrow. He was able to see
the perpetrators going out of the house carrying bags and the jewelry box of his
wife. Intent to gain, or animus lucrandi, as an element of the crime of robbery, is an
internal act; hence, presumed from the unlawful taking of things.17 Having
established that the personal properties of the victims were unlawfully taken by the
appellant, intent to gain was sufficiently proven. Thus, the first three elements of the
crime were clearly established.
As regard the last requirement. Although the victim AAA did not exactly witness the
actual rape because she was unconscious at that time, circumstantial evidence
shows that the victim was raped by the appellant and the other accused.
Circumstantial evidence, also known as indirect or presumptive evidence, refers to
proof of collateral facts and circumstances whence the existence of the main fact
may be inferred according to reason and common experience.18 Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if (a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; (c) the combination
of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 19 A
judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the
circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the
perpetrator.20
The following circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution, when analyzed
and taken together, lead to the inescapable conclusion that the appellant raped AAA:
first, while two of the robbers were stealing, appellant and one of the robbers
brought AAA inside the comfort room; second, inside the comfort room, AAA was
stripped off her clothes and her panty; third, when AAA resisted and struggled,
appellant and the other robber banged her head against the wall, causing her to lose
consciousness; fourth, when she regained consciousness, the culprits were already
gone and she saw her shorts and panty strewn at her side; and fifth, she suffered
pain in her knees, head, stomach and, most of all, in her vagina which was then
bleeding.
53
In the following decided cases, the victim was unconscious and was not aware of the
sexual intercourse that transpired, yet the accused was found guilty on the basis of
circumstantial evidence.
In People v. Gaufo,21 the victim was hit on her head by the accused but she fought
back and asked for help. The accused then punched her abdomen causing her to lose
consciousness. Upon regaining her bearings, she noticed that she had no more
underwear, her vagina was bleeding and her body was painful. The combination of
these circumstances, among others, led the Court to adjudge the accused guilty of
rape.
In People v. Pabol,22 the accused hit the victim on her face causing her to fall.
Accused then hugging the victim from behind, sat the victim on his lap, and stroke
her breast with a piece of stone. When she shouted for help, accused covered her
mouth and later she fell unconscious. When she had woken up some two hours later,
she discovered that her ears had been sliced, her blouse opened and her underwear
stained with her own blood. She also experienced pain in her private part after the
incident. Given the foregoing circumstances, the Court found that the accused raped
the victim.
The Court notes that AAA was examined by Dr. Angel Cordero, a medico-legal officer
of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, Camp Ruperto Kangleon,
Leyte the following day23 and found that she sustained deep healing
lacerations and shallow healed lacerations. He concluded that AAA was in a "non-
virgin state physically" and that "findings are compatible with recent loss of
virginity" and with "recent sexual intercourse."24Prosecution witness Dr. Cordero on
direct examination stated that:
Q. Now in your examination were you able to conduct a personal examination on the
person of the victim?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. And what was your finding?
A. I had my findings in my report and it is all reflected in this particular report that I
have made.
Q. Now in your report in the second page of your report there is here a conclusion
and remarks, No. 3 of which states that finding compatible with recent sexual
intercourse. What do you mean by that Doctor Cordero?
A. That there was a sexual connection between the victim and that of the offender
and it was manifested on the findings that I have made and reflected in my report. 25
Although Dr. Cordero's report stated that AAA's lacerations were deep healing and
healed lacerations, this finding does not negate the commission of rape on October
3, 2001. The Court held that the absence of fresh lacerations does not prove that the
victim was not raped.26 A freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of rape
and healed lacerations do not negate rape.27 Hence, the presence of healed hymenal
lacerations the day after the victim was raped does not negate the commission of
rape by the appellant when the crime was proven by the combination of highly
convincing pieces of circumstantial evidence. In addition, a medical examination and
a medical certificate are merely corroborative and are not indispensable to the
prosecution of a rape case.28
For a conviction of the crime of robbery with rape to stand, it must be shown that
the rape was committed by reason or on the occasion of a robbery and not the
other way around. This special complex crime under Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code contemplates a situation where the original intent of the accused was to take,
with intent to gain, personal property belonging to another and rape is committed
on the occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime.29 In the case at bar, the
original intent of the appellant and his co-accused was to rob the victims and AAA
was raped on the occasion of the robbery.
The trial court also found the presence of conspiracy between the perpetrators.
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it. It may
be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during or after the commission of
the crime which, when taken together, would be enough to reveal a community of
criminal design, as the proof of conspiracy is frequently made by evidence of a chain
of circumstances.30 To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of
the execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the
exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Each
conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks which may appear
unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a whole collective effort to achieve
their common criminal objective. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act
of all the conspirators. The precise extent or modality of participation of each of
them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals. 31
In the instant case, conspiracy was shown by the coordinated acts of the four
persons. From the time they gained entry into the victims residence, they tied and
blindfolded the members of the household; inflicted physical injuries on some of the
victims; some went upstairs and proceeded to ransack the house; the others brought
54
AAA in the comfort room and sexually abused her; they then left the house together
carrying the loot. With the foregoing circumstances, there can be no other
conclusion than that the successful perpetration of the crime was done through the
concerted efforts of the four armed men.
In People v. Suyu, we ruled that once conspiracy is established between several
accused in the commission of the crime of robbery, they would all be equally
culpable for the rape committed by anyone of them on the occasion of the robbery,
unless anyone of them proves that he endeavored to prevent the others from
committing rape.32 There is no showing that the other accused prevented appellant
from sexually abusing AAA. In view, however, that the accused Edgar, Atilano and
Noel were not brought for arraignment and trial, judgment cannot be rendered
against them.
THE PENALTY
We now come to the imposition of the proper penalty. The crime of robbery with
rape is a special complex crime punishable under Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended by R.A. 7659.33 Article 294 provides for the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death, when the robbery was accompanied by rape. The provision reads
as follows:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons; Penalties. - Any
person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any
person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death when by reason or on occasion of the
robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed; or when the robbery
shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson; x x x
The CA correctly ruled in not considering the aggravating circumstances of nighttime
and unlawful entry.
As correctly pointed out by the CA:
x x x [T]he aggravating circumstances of nighttime and unlawful entry cannot be
considered. Under the law, specifically Sections 8 and 9, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, as well as jurisprudence, it is required that qualifying as
well as aggravating circumstances must be expressly and specifically alleged in the
Complaint or Information; otherwise, the same will not be considered by the court
against the appellant, even if proved during the trial. And, this principle is applicable
to all criminal cases.
The information merely stated that the crime took place "on or about the 3rd day of
October 2001," without specifying the time of its commission. Also nighttime is
considered an aggravating circumstance only when it is deliberately sought to
prevent the accused from being recognized or to ensure escape. There must be
proof that this was intentionally sought to ensure the commission of the crime, and
that the accused took advantage of it to insure his immunity from captivity. Here,
there is a paucity of evidence that nighttime was purposely, deliberately, and
especially sought by the accused. The mere fact that the offense was committed at
night will not suffice to sustain a finding of nocturnity.
Further, the phrase, "forcibly enter the inhabited house" does not comprise the
aggravating circumstance of "unlawful entry." Verily, evidence showed that all the
accused freely entered the [victims'] residence through the open kitchen door, which
is clearly intended for ingress and or egress.34
The trial court and the CA correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of the
commission of a crime by a band.35 In the crime of robbery with rape, band is
considered as an aggravating circumstance. 36 The prosecution established that one
of the accused was armed with a handgun, while the other three had knives when
they committed the crime.37
The aggravating circumstance of dwelling38 was also attendant in the present case.
Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of the
offended party provided that the latter has not given provocation therefor. 39 In this
case, robbery with violence was committed in the house of the victims without
provocation on their part. In robbery with violence and intimidation against persons,
dwelling is aggravating because in this class of robbery, the crime may be committed
without the necessity of trespassing the sanctity of the offended party's house.40 It is
considered an aggravating circumstance primarily because of the sanctity of privacy
that the law accords to the human abode.41 He who goes to anothers house to hurt
him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere. 42
Since the aggravating circumstances of band and dwelling were alleged in the
Information and proven, the imposable penalty upon the appellant is death,
pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
x x x In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating
circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied. x x x
55
In view, however, of the passage of R.A. No. 9346, 43 prohibiting the imposition of the
death penalty, the CA correctly reduced the penalty of death to reclusion
perpetua,44 without eligibility for parole.45
THE DAMAGES
The trial court did not order the appellant to return the items taken from the victims
but, instead, directed the payment of actual damages amounting to PhP336,000.00.
The said amount is the value of the items taken from the spouses BBB and CCC.
Under Article 10546 of the Revised Penal Code, the appellant is obliged to return the
items he took from the spouses BBB and CCC. If appellant can no longer return the
articles taken, he is obliged to make reparation for their value, taking into
consideration their price and their special sentimental value to the offended
parties.47 Hence, the Court modifies the decision of the trial court, as affirmed by the
CA, and directs the appellant to return the pieces of jewelry and valuables taken
from the spouses BBB and CCC as enumerated in the Information48 dated December
3, 2001 and proven during trial. Should restitution be no longer possible, appellant
shall pay the spouses BBB and CCC the value of the stolen pieces of jewelry and
valuables as determined by the trial court in the amount of PhP336,000.00.
The trial court's award of moral damages in the amount of PhP50,000.00 to the
spouses BBB and CCC is not proper. In order that a claim for moral damages can be
aptly justified, it must be anchored on proof showing that the claimant experienced
moral suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation or similar injury. 49 The victim spouses BBB
and CCC, however, did not present any evidence of their moral sufferings as a result
of the robbery. Thus, there is no basis for the grant of moral damages in connection
with the robbery.
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, AAA is entitled to civil indemnification. Upon
the finding of rape, the victim is entitled to civil indemnity. 50 Thus, AAA is entitled to
PhP75,000.00 as civil indemnity.51
In addition, AAA is entitled to moral damages pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil
Code,52 without the necessity of additional pleadings or proof other than the fact of
rape.53 Moral damages is granted in recognition of the victim's injury necessarily
resulting from the odious crime of rape.54 Such award is separate and distinct from
the civil indemnity.55 However, the amount of PhP50,000.00 awarded as moral
damages, is increased to PhP75,000.00 in line with current jurisprudence.56
The award of exemplary damages in the amount of PhP30,000.00 should also be
imposed. Exemplary damages are awarded when the crime is attended by an
aggravating circumstance, or as a public example, in order to protect hapless
individuals from molestation.57 Furthermore, interest at the rate of six percent (6%)
per annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded from the date of finality of this
judgment, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.58
The CA was also correct in deleting the award of actual damages amounting to
PhP3,000.00 and moral damages amounting to PhP20,000.00 in favor of Edelyn.
Verily, it is a rule that the accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him.59 The information for robbery with rape filed against
the accused shows that Edelyn is not one of the complainants therein and there is no
description of the pieces of jewelry and valuables allegedly taken from her. Simply
put, the appellant was not informed that he was being charged of robbery in so far
as Edelyn is concerned. Hence, the CA correctly deleted the award.
The Office of the Court Administrator is hereby DIRECTED to determine the status of
the case against the accused Edgar Evangelio and Atilano Agaton who, despite being
under the custody of the BJMP Bacolod City, were not brought for trial at the RTC,
Tacloban City for the crime of robbery with rape. The said office is further directed to
investigate and ascertain the possible liability of the person(s) concerned who
caused the delay in the prosecution of accused Edgar Evangelio and Atilano Agaton
for the said offense.
SO ORDERED.

On a final note, records reveal that accused Edgar and Atilano, who were charged
with the appellant, were not brought for arraignment and trial, despite the fact that
they are detained in Bacolod City.

Records show that the RTC of Tacloban City directed the BJMP of Bacolod City to
transfer the accused Atilano and Edgar to the BJMP of Tacloban City in order for
them to stand trial for the crime of robbery with rape. 60 In a letter61dated June 26,
2002, the Jail Warden of Bacolod City informed the trial court that Edgar and Atilano
are being charged with several offenses in the courts of Bacolod City. 62 Thus, the Jail
Warden of Bacolod City requested that Edgar and Atilano be transferred from the
BJMP Bacolod City to the BJMP Tacloban City only after their pending criminal cases
in Bacolod City shall have been terminated. However, the records are bereft of any
information as to the status of this case, i.e., Criminal Case No. 2001-12-773, insofar
as accused Atilano and Edgar are concerned.1avvphil1

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 00109 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant Joseph
Evangelio is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Rape and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility of parole
pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346. He is ordered to return the pieces of jewelry and
valuables taken from the spouses BBB and CCC as enumerated in the
Information63 dated December 3, 2001. Should restitution be no longer possible,
appellant shall pay the spouses BBB and CCC the value of the stolen pieces of jewelry
and valuables in the amount of PhP336,000.00. He is further directed to pay AAA the
amounts of PhP75,000.00 as civil indemnity, PhP75,000.00 as moral damages and
PhP30,000.00 as exemplary damages. Interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum is imposed on all the damages awarded in this case from date of finality of
this judgment until fully paid.

56
G.R. No. 170289 April 8, 2010
ROSIE QUIDET, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Conspiracy must be proved as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the
offense itself for it is a facile device by which an accused may be ensnared and kept
within the penal fold. In case of reasonable doubt as to its existence, the balance tips
in favor of the milder form of criminal liability as what is at stake is the accuseds
liberty. We apply these principles in this case.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the Court of
Appeals (CA) July 22, 2005 Decision1 in CA-G.R. CR No. 23351 which affirmed with
modifications the March 11, 1999 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 20 in Criminal Case Nos. 92-079 and 92-080.
Factual Antecedents
On January 13, 1992, petitioner Rosie Quidet (petitioner), Feliciano Taban, Jr.
(Taban), and Aurelio Tubo (Tubo) were charged with homicide in Criminal Case No.
92-079 for the death of Jimmy Tagarda (Jimmy) allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of October 1991 at 8:00 oclock in the evening, more
or less, at Barangay Looc, Salay, Misamis Oriental, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Feliciano Taban, Jr.,
Rosie Quidet and Aurelio Tubo, with intent to kill, conspiring, confederating, x x x and
[sic] helping one another, taking advantage of the darkness of the night, in order to
facilitate the commission of the offense with the use of sharp pointed x x x
instruments which the accused conveniently provided themselves did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab one Jimmy Tagarda
thus the victim sustained several wounds in different parts of his body and as a
consequence of which the victim died immediately thereafter.
CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.3
On even date, the aforesaid accused were charged with frustrated homicide in
Criminal Case No. 92-080 for the stab wounds sustained by Jimmys cousin, Andrew
Tagarda (Andrew), arising from the same incident, viz:
That on or about the 19th day of October 1991 at 8:00 oclock in the evening, more
or less, at Barangay Looc, Salay, Misamis Oriental, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill,
57
and with the use of sharp pointed x x x instrument, and x x x conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, and taking advantage of the night [in] order
to facilitate the commission of the offense, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault, and stab one Andrew Tagarda thereby hitting his left
chest and nose, the accused having performed all the acts of execution which would
produce the crime of Homicide as a consequence except for reason or cause
independent of the will of the accused that is, the stab was deflected by the victim.
CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 249 in relation to Article 6 of the Revised
Penal Code.4
Upon arraignment, all the accused entered a plea of not guilty in Criminal Case No.
92-080 (frustrated homicide). Meanwhile, in Criminal Case No. 92-079 (homicide),
Taban entered a voluntary plea of guilt while petitioner and Tubo maintained their
innocence. Accordingly, on June 24, 1992, the trial court rendered a partial
judgment5sentencing Taban to imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, two (2) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordering him to pay the heirs of Jimmy
50,000.00 as civil indemnity.6 Thereafter, joint trial ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
On October 19, 1991, at around 8:00 oclock in the evening, Jimmy, Andrew, Edwin
Balani7 (Balani), and Rolando Mabayo (Mabayo) visited a friend in Sitio Punta, Looc,
Salay, Misamis Oriental. Along the way, they saw Taban, together with petitioner and
Tubo, come out of the house of one Tomas Osep (Osep). Taban suddenly stabbed
Andrew on the chest with a knife. Andrew retaliated by boxing Taban. Jimmy tried to
pacify Andrew and Taban but the latter stabbed him in the abdomen. Taban then
immediately fled.
Meanwhile, after Jimmy fell down, Tubo threw a drinking glass at Andrews face
while petitioner boxed Andrews jaw. Tubo stabbed Jimmy who was then lying face
down on the ground twice on the back with an ice pick after which he fled. Petitioner
then boxed Jimmys mouth. At this juncture, Balani rushed to Jimmys aid and boxed
petitioner who retaliated by punching Balani. Thereafter, petitioner left the scene.
Mabayo was unable to help Jimmy or
Andrew because he was shocked by the incident.
After the incident, Jimmy was brought to the clinic of Dr. Precioso Tacandang (Dr.
Tacandang). Jimmy was then in critical condition, thus, Dr. Tacandang advised the
relatives of Jimmy to bring him to the Northern Mindanao Regional Training Hospital.
Upon arrival at the aforesaid hospital, Jimmy was declared dead by the attending
physician, Dr. Cedric Dael (Dr. Dael). Jimmy sustained a vital or mortal stab wound at
the epigastric area four centimeters below the cyphoid process and another stab
wound on the left lumbar. Andrew, who sustained minor injuries, was treated by Dr.
Dael.
Version of the Defense
On the night of the stabbing incident, Taban, Tubo and petitioner were drinking
liquor in the house of Osep. Taban left the group to urinate on a nearby coconut
tree. Outside Oseps house, he was suddenly boxed by Andrew and kicked by Jimmy
causing him to fall near a fishing boat. There Taban found a fishing knife with which
he stabbed Jimmy and Andrew in order to defend himself. After which, he fled for
fear for his life. Meanwhile, petitioner went out to look for Taban. As he was
stepping out of Oseps house, he was boxed by Balani. Petitioner fought back.
Andrew tried to help Balani but petitioner was able to evade Andrews attacks.
Instead, petitioner was able to box Andrew. Petitioner then called out to Tubo to
come out and run. When Tubo stepped out of the house, neither Taban nor
petitioner was present but he saw a person being lifted by several people. Upon
seeing this, Tubo, likewise, fled for fear for his life.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On May 16, 1995, the RTC rendered a judgment finding petitioner and Tubo guilty of
homicide8 and all three accused (petitioner, Tubo and Taban) guilty of frustrated
homicide, viz:
1) In Criminal Case No. 92-079, accused Rosie Quidet and Aurelio Tubo are hereby
sentenced, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances present, to the
penalty of EIGHT (8) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY OF PRISION MAYOR with its medium
period as minimum under the Indeterminate Sentence Law to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS,
EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL in its medium
period [as maximum] under the same law.
2) In Criminal Case No. 92-080 for Frustrated Homicide, there being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances present, this court hereby sentences all the accused
[Feliciano Taban, Jr., Rosie Quidet and Aurelio Tubo] in this case to an Indeterminate
Sentence [Law] of FOUR (4) YEARS OF PRISION CORRECCIONAL in its medium period
as the minimum under the Indeterminate Sentence Law to TEN (10) YEARS OF
PRISION MAYOR in its medium period as the maximum under the same law. With
costs.
3) To pay jointly and severally the heirs of Jimmy Tagarda in the sum of 50,000.00
for Criminal Case No. 92-079;
58
4) And likewise to pay solidarily the heirs of the victim Andrew Tagarda the sum of
10,000.00 for committing the crime of Frustrated Homicide.9
The period of preventive imprisonment during which the accused were detained
pending the trial of these cases shall be credited in full in favor of all the accused.
SO ORDERED.10
The trial court found that the stabbing of Jimmy and Andrew was previously planned
by the accused. The active participation of all three accused proved conspiracy in the
commission of the crimes. Furthermore, the positive identification of the accused by
the prosecution witnesses cannot be offset by the defense of plain denial.
From this judgment, only petitioner appealed to the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On July 22, 2005, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision, affirming with
modifications, the judgment of the RTC, viz:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed
decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the following modifications: (a) That in Criminal
Case No. 92-080 the crime is only Attempted Homicide; and (b) the civil indemnity in
the amount of ten thousand (10,000.00) pesos which was awarded to the heirs of
Andrew Tagarda be deleted as the same has not been fully substantiated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.11
In upholding the conviction of the accused for homicide, the CA held that conspiracy
was duly established as shown by the concerted acts of the accused in inflicting
mortal wounds on Jimmy. Hence, all of the accused are guilty of homicide for the
death of Jimmy.
The CA, however, disagreed with the trial courts finding that the accused are liable
for frustrated homicide with respect to the injuries sustained by Andrew. According
to the CA, the accused failed to inflict mortal wounds on Andrew because the latter
successfully deflected the attack. Andrew suffered only minor injuries which could
have healed within five to seven days even without medical treatment. The crime
committed, therefore, is merely attempted homicide.
The CA also deleted the award of civil indemnity to the heirs of Andrew because the
same was not fully substantiated.
Issue
Whether the Decision of the CA finding petitioner to have acted in conspiracy with
the other accused (Taban and Tubo) in the commission of the offenses charged is in
accordance with law and/or jurisprudence.12
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioner claims that the evidence merely established that: (1) Taban went out of
Oseps store while petitioner and Tubo remained inside; (2) a commotion took place
between Taban and Andrew; (3) after this altercation, petitioner and Tubo stepped
out of Oseps store; and (4) petitioners participation in the incident is limited to
boxing Andrew after the latter had already been stabbed by Taban, and boxing
Jimmys mouth after the latter had been stabbed by Taban and Tubo in succession.
Petitioner insists that it cannot be said that he had the same criminal purpose and
design as Taban and Tubo. His participation was not necessary to the completion of
the criminal acts because by the time he boxed Andrew and Jimmy, the stabbing had
already taken place. The evidence further established that the stabbing incident was
purely accidental and that the accused had no grudge against the victims. Also,
petitioner was unarmed negating his intent to kill.
Petitioner also cites People v. Vistido13 where it was ruled that conspiracy was not
established under facts similar to the present case. In Vistido, the accused was
merely convicted of slight physical injuries.
Respondents Arguments
Respondent contends that conspiracy was duly established. Petitioner was not
merely present during the commission of the crime but he aided Taban and Tubo by
inflicting blows on Andrew and Jimmy after the latter were stabbed. The
simultaneous movement of the accused towards the victims and their successive
escape from the crime scene clearly evince conspiracy. Respondent also stresses that
the factual findings of the trial court should be accorded respect for it is in a better
position to evaluate testimonial evidence.
Our Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
The existence of conspiracy was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus,
petitioner is criminally liable only for his individual acts.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.14 The essence of conspiracy is the
unity of action and purpose.15 Its elements, like the physical acts constituting the
59
crime itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. When there is conspiracy, the
act of one is the act of all.
Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by the acts of the accused
themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interests.16 However, in determining whether conspiracy exists, it is
not sufficient that the attack be joint and simultaneous for simultaneousness does
not of itself demonstrate the concurrence of will or unity of action and purpose
which are the bases of the responsibility of the assailants. 17 What is determinative is
proof establishing that the accused were animated by one and the same purpose.18
As a general rule, factual findings of the trial court, which is in a better position to
evaluate the testimonial evidence, are accorded respect by this Court. But where the
trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance which can affect the result of the case, this Court is duty-
bound to correct this palpable error for the right to liberty, which stands second only
to life in the hierarchy of constitutional rights, cannot be lightly taken away. In the
instant case, we find that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that petitioner conspired with Taban and Tubo in committing the crimes of homicide
and attempted homicide.
Both the trial court and the CA ruled that the evidence duly established conspiracy.
In particular, the CA noted:
[T]his Court HOLDS that there was conspiracy. x x x
With respect to Criminal Case No. 92-080 (for frustrated homicide), it was revealed
that after Andrews chest was stabbed by Taban, Tubo also threw a drinking glass at
Andrews face while [petitioner] boxed Andrews jaws.
From the foregoing facts, it can be inferred that all the accused acted in solidum in
trying to inflict injuries to Andrew. Had it been otherwise, Tubo and [petitioner]
would have just left the scene of the crime.
With respect to Criminal Case No. 92-079 (for homicide), it was revealed that after
Andrew was stabbed by Taban using a double-bladed knife, Taban subsequently
stabbed Jimmy before fleeing from the crime scene. Moments later, while Andrew
was recovering from fist and glass blows from [petitioner] and Tubo, Tubo
[straddled] Jimmy and stabbed him twice with an icepick before [he] left.
[Petitioner], on the other hand, delivered a fist blow to Jimmys mouth
notwithstanding the fact that Jimmy was already stabbed by Taban and Tubo.
From the foregoing facts, it can be inferred that all the accused in Criminal Case No.
92-079 confederated and mutually helped each other to insure the killing of Jimmy
Tagarda. Hence, conspiracy was present in the cases at bar.19
We disagree. To determine if petitioner conspired with Taban and Tubo, the focus of
the inquiry should necessarily be the overt acts of petitioner before, during and after
the stabbing incident. From this viewpoint, we find several facts of substance which
militate against the finding that petitioner conspired with Taban and Tubo.
First, there is no evidence that petitioner, Taban or Tubo had any grudge or enmity
against Jimmy or Andrew. The prosecution eyewitnesses (Andrew and Balani) as well
as the three accused were one in testifying that there was no misunderstanding
between the two groups prior to the stabbing incident. During the testimony of
prosecution witness Balani, the trial court itself grappled with the issue of motive:
COURT: (to the witness)
Q- [W]hen you saw Feliciano Taban and Tubo stabbing Jimmy Tagarda, you mean to
tell this court that they were enemies?
A- No sir.
xxxx
Q- Now, was there any information that you received that the reason why the
accused Taban and Tubo stabbed Jimmy Tagarda and Andrew Tagarda was x x x of
some previous misunderstanding?
A- No, I did not know.
Q- Until now, you cannot tell this court the reason why the stabbing took place
except the fact that the group of the accused were having [a] drinking session and
your group also had a [prior] drinking session somewhere?
A- Yes, sir.20
Second, the stabbing incident appears to have arisen from a purely accidental
encounter between Tabans and Andrews groups with both having had a drinking
session. On direct examination, prosecution witness Andrew testified that Taban,
Tubo and petitioner successively went out of Oseps house to engage their group.
This version of the events made it appear that the three accused laid in wait to carry
out the crimes. However, on cross-examination, Andrew contradicted himself when
he stated that it was only Taban who their group initially saw with a knife outside
Oseps house and who suddenly stabbed Andrew.1avvphi1 After he was stabbed,
60
Andrew stated that he retaliated by boxing Taban and it was only then when he
(Andrew) saw Tubo and petitioner come out of Oseps house. 21 The records of the
preliminary investigation of this case confirm this latter version of the events when
Andrew stated that it was only after the commotion between him and Taban that
Tubo and petitioner stepped out of Oseps store to help Taban defend himself in the
ensuing fight.22 Significantly, when the defense on cross-examination confronted
Andrew with this inconsistency between his statements on direct examination and
the preliminary investigation, Andrew answered that at the time of the incident it
was only Taban that he saw.23 The same observation can be made on the testimony
of the prosecutions second eyewitness, Balani. While on direct examination Balani
claimed that the three accused successively came out of Oseps house, on cross-
examination, he modified his stance by stating that it was only Taban who initially
accosted their group and that petitioner and Tubo were inside Oseps house prior to
the commotion.24 This material inconsistency in the testimonies of the prosecutions
eyewitnesses belies the prosecutions theory that the three accused had a pre-
conceived plan to kill Jimmy and Andrew.
Third, unlike Taban and Tubo, petitioner was unarmed during the incident, thus,
negating his intent to kill the victims. By the prosecution witnesses account,
petitioners participation was limited to boxing Andrew and Jimmy after Taban and
Tubo had stabbed the victims. His acts were neither necessary nor indispensable to
the commission of the crimes as they were done after the stabbing. Thus,
petitioners act of boxing the victims can be interpreted as a mere show of sympathy
to or camaraderie with his two co-accused.
Taken together, the evidence of the prosecution does not meet the test of moral
certainty in order to establish that petitioner conspired with Taban and Tubo to
commit the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide. We agree with petitioner
that this case is similar to People v. Vistido25 and the ruling there applies with equal
force here. In Vistido, we held thus
There is no question that "a person may be convicted for the criminal act of another
where, between them, there has been conspiracy or unity of purpose and intention
in the commission of the crime charged." It is, likewise, settled that "to establish
conspiracy, it is not necessary to prove previous agreement to commit a crime, if
there is proof that the malefactors have acted in consort and in pursuance of the
same objective." Nevertheless, "the evidence to prove the same must be positive
and convincing. As a facile device by which an accused may be ensnared and kept
within the penal fold, conspiracy requires conclusive proof if we are to maintain in
full strength the substance of the time-honored principle in criminal law requiring
proof beyond reasonable doubt before conviction."
In the case at bar, the evidence for the prosecution does not comply with this basic
requirement. To begin with, there is no evidence that appellant and his co-accused
had any enmity or grudge against the deceased. On the contrary, the cousin of the
deceased, Reynaldo Pagtakhan, testified that prior to the stabbing incident, they did
not have any quarrel with them. In the absence of strong motives on their part to kill
the deceased, it can not safely be concluded that they conspired to commit the
crime involved herein.
Neither could it be assumed that when the appellant and his co-accused were
together drinking wine, at the time and place of the incident, they were there
purposely to wait for and to kill the deceased. For, they could not have surmised
beforehand that between 3:00 and 4:00 o'clock in the morning of November 1, 1969,
the deceased and his cousin after coming home from their work at the cemetery
would go to the Marzan Restaurant, and thereafter, would take a taxi for home,
and then, alight at M. Francisco Street. The meeting between the appellant's group
and the deceased appears to be purely accidental which negates the existence of
conspiracy between the appellant and his co-accused.
Besides, the appellant was unarmed; only his two companions (Pepito Montao and
one John Doe) were armed with daggers. If he (appellant) had really conspired with
his co-accused to kill the deceased, he could have provided himself with a weapon.
But he did not. Again, this fact belies the prosecution's theory that the appellant had
entered into a conspiracy with his co-accused to kill the deceased.
Moreover, although the appellant and his co-accused acted with some degree of
simultaneity in attacking the deceased, nevertheless, the same is insufficient to
prove conspiracy. The rule is well-settled that "simultaneousness does not of itself
demonstrate the concurrence of will nor the unity of action and purpose which are
the basis of the responsibility of two or more individuals." To establish common
responsibility it is not sufficient that the attack be joint and simultaneous; it is
necessary that the assailants be animated by one and the same purpose. In the case
at bar, the appellant Raymundo Vistido and the accused Pepito Montao, did not act
pursuant to the same objective. Thus, the purpose of the latter was to kill as shown
by the fact that he inflicted a mortal wound below the abdomen of the deceased
which caused his death. On the other hand, the act of the appellant in giving the
deceased one fist blow after the latter was stabbed by the accused Pepito Montao
an act which is certainly unnecessary and not indispensable for the consummation
of the criminal assault does not indicate a purpose to kill the deceased, but merely
to "show off" or express his sympathy or feeling of camaraderie with the accused
Pepito Montao. Thus, in People vs. Portugueza, this Court held that:
61
"Although the appellants are relatives and had acted with some degree of
simultaneity in attacking their victim, nevertheless, this fact alone does not prove
conspiracy. (People vs. Caayao, 48 Off. Gaz. 637). On the contrary, from the nature
and gravity of the wounds inflicted on the deceased, it can be said that the appellant
and the other defendant did not act pursuant to the same objective. Florentino
Gapole's purpose was to kill the deceased, as shown by the fact that he inflicted a
mortal wound which almost severed the left arm. The injury inflicted by the
appellant, merely scratching the subcutaneous tissues, does not indicate a purpose
to kill the victim. It is not enough that appellant had participated in the assault made
by his co-defendant in order to consider him a co-principal in the crime charged. He
must have also made the criminal resolution of his co-accused his own. x x x." and,
in People vs. Vicente, this Court likewise held:
"In regard to appellant Ernesto Escorpizo, there seems to be no dispute that he
stabbed Soriano several times with a small knife only after the latter had fallen to the
ground seriously wounded, if not already dead. There is no showing that this accused
had knowledge of the criminal intent of Jose Vicente against the deceased. In all
likelihood, Escorpizo's act in stabbing the fallen Soriano with a small knife was not in
furtherance of Vicente's aim, which is to kill, but merely to 'show off' or express his
sympathy or feeling of camaraderie with Vicente. x x x."
By and large, the evidence for the prosecution failed to show the existence of
conspiracy which, according to the settled rule, must be shown to exist as clearly and
convincingly as the crime itself. In the absence of conspiracy, the liability of the
defendants is separate and individual, each is liable for his own acts, the damage
caused thereby, and the consequences thereof. While the evidence shows that the
appellant boxed the deceased, it is, however, silent as to the extent of the injuries, in
which case, the appellant should be held liable only for slight physical injuries.26
We reach the same conclusion here. For failure of the prosecution to prove
conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt, petitioners liability is separate and individual.
Considering that it was duly established that petitioner boxed Jimmy and Andrew
and absent proof of the extent of the injuries sustained by the latter from these acts,
petitioner should only be made liable for two counts of slight physical injuries. In
addition, he should pay 5,000.00 as moral damages to the heirs of Jimmy and
another 5,000.00 as moral damages to Andrew.27 Actual damages arising from said
acts cannot, however, be awarded for failure to prove the same.
Anent the penalty imposed on Taban and Tubo, in Criminal Case No. 92-080, the CA
correctly modified the same. The crime committed was attempted homicide and not
frustrated homicide because the stab wounds that Andrew sustained were not life-
threatening.28 Although Taban and Tubo did not appeal their conviction, this part of
the appellate courts judgment is favorable to them, thus, they are entitled to a
reduction of their prison terms. 29 The rule is that an appeal taken by one or more of
several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal except insofar as the
judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter. 30
Anent the award of damages for which Taban and Tubo should be made solidarily
liable, in Criminal Case No. 92-079, the trial court properly awarded civil indemnity in
the amount of 50,000.00 to the heirs of Jimmy. Civil indemnity is automatically
granted to the heirs of the deceased victim without need of further evidence other
than the fact of the commission of the crime.31 In addition, the trial court should
have awarded moral damages in the sum of 50,000.00 in consonance with current
jurisprudence.32 As to actual damages, the prosecution was able to prove burial-
related expenses with supporting receipt 33 only to the extent of 5,000.00. In People
v. Villanueva,34 we held that when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial
amount to less than 25,000.00, the award of temperate damages for 25,000.00 is
justified in lieu of actual damages for a lesser amount. We explained that it was
anomalous and unfair that
the heirs of the victim who tried but succeeded in proving actual damages
amounting to less than 25,000.00 would be in a worse situation than those who
might have presented no receipts at all but would be entitled to 25,000.00
temperate damages.35 Accordingly, an award of 25,000.00 as temperate damages
in lieu of actual damages is proper under the premises. As to loss of earning capacity,
the same cannot be awarded due to lack of proof other than the self-serving
testimony of Jimmys mother. In Criminal Case No. 92-080, the CA correctly ruled
that Andrew is not entitled to an award of actual damages for failure to substantiate
the same. However, he is entitled to moral damages in the amount of 30,000.00 for
the pain, trauma and suffering arising from the stabbing incident. 36 It may be noted
that the afore-discussed higher indemnities are not favorable to Taban and Tubo
who did not appeal, but in line with our ruling in People v. Pacaa,37 they shall be
held solidarily liable therefor since these amounts are not in the form of a penalty. 38
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The July 22, 2005 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23351 is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
1) In Criminal Case No. 92-079, Rosie Quidet is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of slight physical injuries and is meted the sentence of fifteen (15) days of arresto
menor. He is ordered to pay the heirs of Jimmy Tagarda 5,0000.00 as moral
damages. Feliciano Taban, Jr. and Aurelio Tubo are ordered to solidarily pay the heirs
of Jimmy Tagarda 50,0000 as civil indemnity, 50,000.00 as moral damages and
25,000.00 as temperate damages.
2) In Criminal Case No. 92-080, Feliciano Taban, Jr. and Aurelio Tubo are found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of attempted homicide and are meted the sentence of
four (4) months of arresto mayor in its medium period as minimum to four (4) years
of prision correccional in its medium period as maximum. They are ordered to
solidarily pay Andrew Tagarda 30,000.00 as moral damages. Rosie Quidet is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of slight physical injuries and is meted the sentence
of fifteen (15) days of arresto menor. He is ordered to pay Andrew Tagrda 5,000.00
as moral damages
3) The period of preventive imprisonment of Feliciano Taban, Jr., Aurelio Tubo and
Rosie Quidet shall be credited in their favor in accordance with Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code.
4) The bail bond of Rosie Quidet is cancelled.
SO ORDERED.

Finally, the records indicate that the three accused were placed under preventive
imprisonment prior to and during the trial of this case. This can be surmised from the
motion to grant bail filed by petitioner which was subsequently granted39 by the trial
court. It is not clear, however, for how long and under what conditions they were put
in preventive imprisonment. The trial court should, thus, determine the length and
conditions of the preventive imprisonment so this may be credited, if proper, in
favor of the accused as provided in Article 2940 of the Revised Penal Code.

62
G.R. No. 187536 August 10, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MICHAEL BOKINGO alias "MICHAEL BOKINGCO" and REYNANTE COL, Accused-
Appellants.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For review is the Amended Decision1 dated 14 November 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00658, finding appellants Michael
Bokingco2 (Bokingco) and Reynante Col (Col) guilty as conspirators beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
On 31 July 2000, an Information3 was filed against appellants charging them of the
crime of murder committed as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of February, 2000 in the City of Angeles, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, armed with
a claw hammer and with intent to kill by means of treachery, evident premeditation,
abuse of confidence, and nighttime, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and maul NOLI PASION, by hitting and beating his head
and other parts of his body with said hammer, thereby inflicting upon said NOLI
PASION fatal wounds on his head and body which caused his death.4
On arraignment, Bokingco entered a guilty plea while Col pleaded not guilty. During
the pre-trial, Bokingco confessed to the crime charged. 5
The victim, Noli Pasion (Pasion) and his wife, Elsa, were residing in a house along
Mac Arthur Highway in Balibago, Angeles City. Pasion owned a pawnshop, which
formed part of his house. He also maintained two (2) rows of apartment units at the
back of his house. The first row had six (6) units, one of which is Apartment No. 5 and
was being leased to Dante Vitalicio (Vitalicio), Pasions brother-in-law, while the
other row was still under construction at the time of his death. Appellants, who were
staying in Apartment No. 3, were among the 13 construction workers employed by
Pasion.6
The prosecutions evidence show that at around 1:00 a.m. on 29 February 2000,
Vitalicio was spin-drying his clothes inside his apartment when Pasion came from the
front door, passed by him and went out of the back door. 7A few minutes later, he
heard a commotion from Apartment No. 3. He headed to said unit to check. He
peeped through a screen door and saw Bokingco hitting something on the floor.
63
Upon seeing Vitalicio, Bokingco allegedly pushed open the screen door and attacked
him with a hammer in his hand. A struggle ensued and Vitalicio was hit several times.
Vitalicio bit Bokingcos neck and managed to push him away. Bokingco tried to chase
Vitalicio but was eventually subdued by a co-worker. Vitalicio proceeded to his house
and was told by his wife that Pasion was found dead in the kitchen of Apartment No.
3. Vitalicio went back to Apartment No. 3 and saw Pasions body lying flat on the
kitchen floor. Pasion and Vitalicio were brought to the hospital. Pasion expired a few
hours later while Vitalicio was treated for his injuries.8
Elsa testified that she was in the masters bedroom on the second floor of the house
when she heard banging sounds and her husbands moans. She immediately got off
the bed and went down. Before reaching the kitchen, Col blocked her way. Elsa
asked him why he was inside their house but Col suddenly ran towards her, sprayed
tear gas on her eyes and poked a sharp object under her chin. Elsa was wounded
when she bowed her head to avoid the tear gas. 9 Col then instructed her to open the
vault of the pawnshop but Elsa informed him that she does not know the
combination lock. Elsa tried offering him money but Col dragged her towards the
back door by holding her neck and pulling her backward. Before they reached the
door, Elsa saw Bokingco open the screen door and heard him tell Col: "tara, patay na
siya."10 Col immediately let her go and ran away with Bokingco. Elsa proceeded to
Apartment No. 3. Thereat, she saw her husband lying on the floor, bathed in his own
blood.11
PO3 Quirino Dayrit (PO3 Dayrit) was stationed at Police Station No. 4 in Barangay
Salakot, Balibago, Angeles City. At 1:20 a.m. of 29 February 2000, he received a
phone call regarding the incident. He, together with a certain P/Insp. Maniago,
proceeded to Apartment No. 3 and conducted an investigation. He noticed a pool of
blood on the cemented floor of the kitchen. He also saw a claw hammer with a green
lead pipe handle approximately 13 inches long near the kitchen sink. A lead pipe
measuring 40 inches and a chisel were also found in the nearby construction site.
The police went to Angeles University Medical Center afterwards. PO3 Dayrit saw
Pasion lying in one of the beds while Vitalicio was still loitering around the
emergency room. He approached Vitalicio and Elsa who both informed him of the
incident.12 He prepared a police report on the same day narrating the result of his
investigation.13
Evelyn Gan, the stenographic reporter of Prosecutor Lucina Dayaon, jotted down
notes during the preliminary investigation. She attests that Bokingco admitted that
he conspired with Col to kill Pasion and that they planned the killing several days
before because they got "fed up" with Pasion.14
The necropsy report prepared by Dr. Joven G. Esguerra (Dr. Esguerra), contained the
following findings:
1. Marked pallor of lips and nailbeds
2. Body in rigor mortis
3. Contusion with hematoma, right medial infraorbital region extending to the right
of the root of the nose.
4. Contusion with hematoma, left post-auricular region.
5. Contusion with hematoma, right angle of mandible.
6. Contusion with hematoma, right mandibular region.
7. Contusion with hematoma, left occipital region.
8. Contusion with hematoma, right fronto-parietal region.
9. Contusion with hematoma, right supraorbital region.
10. Abrasions, linear, confluent, proximal third, right leg anterior 2 x 6 cm.
11. Contusion with hematoma, left shoulder, level of head of left humerus.
12. Stab wound, anterior chest along the anterior median line, 7 cm above the nipple
line, 0.8cm length, 0.5 cm wide and 1 cm deep, hitting and puncturing the
manubrium sterni, not entering the thoracic cavity. Both extremities round.
13. 2 stab wounds, non-penetrating, anterior chest, 13 cm to the left of the anterior
median line, 3 cm below injury (12) 14 cm the right of the anterior median line 4
on below injury (12). Wound 0.8 cm in length, both extremities round.
14. Lacerated wound, semi-lunar shape, 3 cm length, left shoulder.
15. Lacerated wound, right eyebrow area, C-shaped 2 cm length.
16. Lacerated wound, lateral angle, right eye, 0.8 cm length.
17. Lacerated wound, right supraorbital region, medial aspect, 2 cm length.
18. Lacerated wound, semi-lunar, 5 cm length, occipital region 5 cm length involving
all layers of the scalp with brain tissue seen on the gaping wound.
64
19. Lacerated wound, 4 cm length, C-shaped 2 cm to the right of injury (18) 1 cm
below, wound involving the whole scalp.
20. Lacerated wound, left post-auricular region, C-shaped 4 cm length, 3 cm length.
21. Lacerated wound left post-auricular region, region of the squamous part of the
left temporal bone, C-shaped (2) 3.5 cm and 4 cm lengths.
22. Lacerated wound, right mandibular region 4 cm length, 1 cm wide.
23. Lacerated wound, stellate, 5.5 x 5 x 5 cm, right fronto-parietal region with brain
tissue out of the gaping wound.
24. Lacerated wound, right submandibular region 0.3 x 3.5 cm.
25. Lacerated wound, right cheek 0.8 cm length.
26. Depressed, complete fracture, occipital bone right with stellate linear extensions,
with gaping, with brain tissue maseration.
27. Skull fracture, right fronto-parietal region, depressed, complete, C-shaped with
linear extensions, with gaping of bone with brain tissue maceration and expulsion.
28. Hemorrhage, massive, subdural and epidural.
29. Brain tissue damage.15
Dr. Esguerra concluded that the injuries sustained by Pasion on his skull proved
fatal.16
Appellants testified on their own behalf. Bokingco recalled that he was sleeping in
Apartment No. 3 at around 1:20 a.m. on 29 February 2000 when he was awakened
by Pasion who appeared to be intoxicated. The latter wanted to know why he did not
see Bokingco at the construction site on 28 February 2000. When Bokingco replied
that he just stayed at the apartment the whole day, Pasion suddenly hit him in the
head. This prompted Bokingco to take a hammer and hit Pasion. They both struggled
and Bokingco repeatedly hit Pasion. Bokingco escaped to Manila right after the
incident. He was subsequently arrested in Mindanao on 11 June 2000. 17 During the
cross-examination, Bokingco admitted that he harbored ill feelings towards Pasion. 18
Col confirmed that he was one of the construction workers employed by Pasion. He
however resigned on 26 February 2000 because of the deductions from his salary. He
went home to Cainta, Rizal, where he was apprehended and brought to Camp Olivas.
Upon reaching the camp, he saw Bokingco who pointed to him as the person who
killed Pasion. He insisted that he doesnt know Bokingco very well. 19
On 16 December 2004, the trial court rendered judgment 20 finding appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder, viz:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused MICHAEL BOKINGO alias MICHAEL BOKINGCO
and REYNANTE COL guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER,
defined and penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being the two
aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of confidence to be considered
against both accused and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty in
favor of accused Bokingo only, hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty
of DEATH. Each accused is ordered to indemnify the heirs of victim Noli Pasion in the
amount of Seventy five thousand pesos (P75,000.00) to pay the heirs of the victim
Seventeen thousand six hundred pesos (P17,600.00) as actual damages, Fifteen
thousand pesos (P15,000.00) as attorneys fees, Twenty five thousand pesos
(P25,000.00) as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs. 21
In its Decision dated 24 July 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the
trial court but reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua in view of Republic Act No.
7659, thus:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-
appellant REYNANTE COL is found GUILTY as conspirator beyond reasonable doubt of
MURDER as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, qualified by treachery and evident premeditation and with
the attendant aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of confidence, with
no mitigating circumstances. The proper imposable penalty would have been death.
However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, appellant is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Accused-appellant is further ordered to indemnify the
heirs of victim Noli Pasion in the amount of Seventy five thousand pesos
(75,000.00); Fifty thousand pesos (50,000.00) as moral damages; Twenty five
thousand pesos (25,000.00) as exemplary damages; Twenty five thousand pesos
(25,000.00) as temperate damages; Fifteen thousand pesos (15,000.00) as
attorneys fees; and to pay the costs.22
Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration23 and called the appellate courts
attention on the omission to rule on Bokingcos fate when it rendered the challenged
decision. Appellants also noted the absence of other evidence, aside from Bokingcos
admission, to prove that conspiracy existed in the instant case. Appellants
maintained that the admission made by Bokingco cannot be used as evidence
against his alleged co-conspirator. Appellants also took exception to the findings of
the lower courts that the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident
65
premeditation, nighttime and abuse of confidence attended the commission of the
crime.24
The Court of Appeals merely modified its Decision by including the criminal liability
of Bokingco in its dispositive portion of its Amended Decision, which reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-
appellants MICHAEL BOKINGCO and REYNANTE COL are found GUILTY as
conspirators beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER as defined in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, qualified by treachery
and evident premeditation and with the attendant aggravating circumstances of
nighttime and abuse of confidence, with no mitigating circumstances. The proper
imposable penalty would have been death. However, pursuant to Republic Act No.
9346, the accused-appellant are sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua without the possibility of parole (in accordance with Section 3 of the said
law). Each of the accused-appellants is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of
victim Noli Pasion in the amount of Seventy five thousand pesos (75,000.00); Fifty
thousand pesos (50,000.00) as moral damages; Twenty five thousand pesos
(25,000.00) as exemplary damages; Twenty five thousand pesos (25,000.00) as
temperate damages; Fifteen thousand pesos (15,000.00) as attorneys fees; and to
pay the costs.25
Appellants filed a notice of appeal. In its Resolution dated 26 October 2009, this
Court required the parties to submit their Supplemental Briefs within 30 days from
notice thereof if they so desire.26 Appellants manifested that they are no longer filing
a Supplemental Brief and are adopting their arguments in the Appellants Brief
submitted before the Court of Appeals. 27 The appellee likewise manifested that it is
dispensing with the filing of a Supplemental Brief. 28The instant case was thus
submitted for deliberation.
In seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals Amended Decision, two issues were
raised: 1) whether the qualifying circumstances were properly appreciated to convict
appellant Bokingco of murder and 2) whether appellant Col is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as a co-conspirator.
There is no question that Bokingco attacked and killed Pasion. Bokingco made two
(2) separate and dissimilar admissions: first, in his extrajudicial confession taken
during the preliminary investigation where he admitted that he and Col planned the
killing of Pasion; and second, when he testified in open court that he was only
provoked in hitting Pasion back when the latter hit him in the head. On the basis of
his extrajudicial confession, Bokingco was charged for murder qualified by evident
premeditation and treachery.
Appellants maintain that they could not be convicted of murder. They question the
presence of treachery in the commission of the crime considering that no one from
the prosecution witnesses testified on how Pasion was attacked by Bokingco. They
also submit that evident premeditation was not proven in the case. They belittle
Bokingcos extrajudicial admission that he and Col planned the killing. The
attendance of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of confidence
was likewise assailed by appellants. They aver that nighttime was not purposely
sought but it was merely co-incidental that the crime took place at that time. Neither
has trust and confidence been reposed on appellants by the victim to aggravate the
crime by abuse of confidence. Appellants claim that they were living in an apartment
owned by Pasion, not because the latter trusted them but because they worked in
the construction of the victims apartment.
On the other hand, the OSG emphasizes that the prosecution has established that
Pasion was defenseless when fatally attacked by Bokingco and there was no
opportunity for him to defend himself from the unexpected assaults of Bokingco.
The OSG agrees as well with the trial courts findings that evident premeditation,
nighttime, and abuse of confidence attended the commission of the crime.
We agree with appellants that treachery cannot be appreciated to qualify the crime
to murder in the absence of any proof of the manner in which the aggression was
commenced. For treachery to be appreciated, the prosecution must prove that at
the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and that
the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack
employed by him.29 Nobody witnessed the commencement and the manner of the
attack. While the witness Vitalicio managed to see Bokingco hitting something on the
floor, he failed to see the victim at that time.30
Bokingco admitted in open court that he killed Pasion. 31 But the admitted manner of
killing is inconsistent with evident premeditation. To warrant a finding of evident
premeditation, the prosecution must establish the confluence of the following
requisites: (a) the time when the offender was determined to commit the crime; (b)
an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (c) a
sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime
to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 32 It is indispensable to show
how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it
was carried out. 33 In the instant case, no proof was shown as to how and when the
plan to kill was devised. Bokingco admitted in court that he only retaliated when
Pasion allegedly hit him in the head.34 Despite the fact that Bokingco admitted that
he was treated poorly by Pasion, the prosecution failed to establish that Bokingco
planned the attack.
66
It was during the preliminary investigation that Bokingco mentioned his and Cols
plan to kill Pasion.35 Bokingcos confession was admittedly taken without the
assistance of counsel in violation of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides:
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
In People v. Sunga,36 we held that "the right to counsel applies in certain pretrial
proceedings that can be deemed critical stages in the criminal process. The
preliminary investigation can be no different from the in-custody interrogations by
the police, for a suspect who takes part in a preliminary investigation will be
subjected to no less than the State's processes, oftentimes intimidating and
relentless, of pursuing those who might be liable for criminal prosecution."37 In said
case, Sunga made an uncounselled admission before the police. He later
acknowledged the same admission before the judge in a preliminary investigation.
Sunga was thrust into the preliminary investigation and while he did have a counsel,
for the latters lack of vigilance and commitment to Sungas rights, he was virtually
denied his right to counsel. Thus, the uncounselled admission was held
inadmissible.38 In the instant case, the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against
Bokingco because he was not assisted at all by counsel during the time his confession
was taken before a judge.
The finding that nighttime attended the commission of the crime is anchored on the
presumption that there was evident premeditation. Having ruled however that
evident premeditation has not been proved, the aggravating circumstance of
nighttime cannot be properly appreciated. There was no evidence to show that
Bokingco purposely sought nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense.
Abuse of confidence could not also be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in
this case. Taking into account that fact that Bokingco works for Pasion, it may be
conceded that he enjoyed the trust and confidence of Pasion. However, there was
no showing that he took advantage of said trust to facilitate the commission of the
crime.
A downgrade of conviction from murder to homicide is proper for Bokingco for
failure of the prosecution to prove the presence of the qualifying circumstances.
Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the applicable penalty for homicide is
reclusion temporal. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance alleged
and proven in the instant case, the penalty should be applied in its medium period
pursuant to Article 64(1) of the Revised Penal Code, which ranges from a minimum
of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to a maximum of 17 years and 4 months. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty shall be within the range of
prision mayor in any of its periods as minimum to reclusion temporal in its medium
period as the maximum. The range of prision mayor is from 6 years and 1 day to 12
years, while reclusion temporal in its medium period, ranges from 14 years, 8
months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months. Therefore, the indeterminate penalty of
six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years, eight months and
one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum is appropriate under the
circumstances.39 The award of exemplary damages should be deleted as no
aggravating circumstance was proven.
Col, on the other hand, was charged as a co-conspirator. He contends that to hold
him guilty as co-conspirator, it must be established that he performed an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy. Applying Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
Col asserts that Bokingcos uncounselled testimony that appellants planned to kill
Pasion bears no relevance considering the fact that there was no other evidence
which will prove the conspiracy. Col also claims that Elsas statements during trial,
such as the presence of Col inside her house and his forcing her to open the vault of
the pawnshop, as well as the alleged statement she heard from Bokingco "Tara,
patay na siya," are not adequate to support the finding of conspiracy.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) justifies Cols conviction of murder by
conspiracy by mentioning that starting from the declaration of Bokingco, the victims
wife, Elsa, also positively declared that Col blocked and attacked her with a knife
when she tried to check on her husband. She was left alone by Col when he was told
by Bokingco that the victim was already dead. For the OSG, appellants acts are
indicative of conspiracy. The OSG contends that the prosecution witnesses had no ill-
motive to lie and falsely accuse appellants of the crime of murder.
The lower courts concluded that there was conspiracy between appellants.
We disagree.
This Court is well aware of the policy to accord proper deference to the factual
findings of the trial court, owing to their unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling
67
examination.40 However, this rule admits of exceptions, namely: 1) when the trial
courts findings of facts and conclusions are not supported by the evidence on
record, or 2) when certain facts of substance and value likely to change the outcome
of the case have been overlooked by the lower court, or 3) when the assailed
decision is based on a misapprehension of facts. 41 The second exception obtains in
this case.
Indeed, in order to convict Col as a principal by direct participation in the case before
us, it is necessary that conspiracy between him and Bokingco be proved. Conspiracy
exists when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit an unlawful act.
It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the
commission of the crime. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in
which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused evincing
a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action, and community of
interest.42 Unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective are
essential to establish the existence of conspiracy.43
As a rule, conspiracy must be established with the same quantum of proof as the
crime itself and must be shown as clearly as the commission of the crime.44
The finding of conspiracy was premised on Elsas testimony that appellants fled
together after killing her husband and the extrajudicial confession of Bokingco.
Nobody witnessed the commencement of the attack. Col was not seen at the
apartment where Pasion was being attacked by Bokingco. In fact, he was at Elsas
house and allegedly ordering her to open the pawnshop vault, thus:
Q: Do you remember any unusual incident that happened on that time and date
when you were in your masters bedroom?
A: I heard a bumping sound (kalabog) at the back portion of our building where we
reside.
xxxx
Q: What did you do when you heard those sounds in the wee hours of the morning
on that day when you were in your masters bedroom?
A: I wondered why and I immediately went down to the kitchen since the door of the
kitchen was directly leading to the back door or back portion of the building where
the apartments were situated.
Q: Why, on what floor is this masters bedroom located?
A: Second floor. Q: What did you feel when your eyes was (sic) sprayed with tear gas?

Q: Were you actually able to go down and see what was happening? A: It was "mahapdi" (painful).

A: Yes, sir, but I was only able to reach the stairs leading to the kitchen. I was not Q: When you felt pain in your eyes, how were you able to see something or a sharp
able to go out of the kitchen because I was blocked. weapon under your chin?

Q: You were blocked by whom? A: Before he sprayed the tear gas to my eyes, I was able to see him poke the sharp
object under my chin and I bowed my head a little to avoid the tear gas. I was
A: By Reynante Col. wounded under my chin and I felt the sharpness of the object.45

Q: Are you referring to the same Reynante Col, the accused in this case? xxxx

A: Yes, sir. Q: What else happened while he was doing that to you?

xxxx A: He sprayed tear gas in my eyes and told me to be silent.

Q: You said you were blocked by Reynante Col. How did he block you? Q: What else, if any, did he tell you?
A: As soon as I reached the stairs, I was blocked by Reynante Col and he was situated A: To open the combination of the vault.
near the back door of the pawnshop. There is a pawnshop in the front portion of our
residence. Q: Did you comply to his order that you open the combination of the vault?

Q: When you saw him near the door of your pawnshop, did you confront him? A: No, sir. I do not know the combination.

A: Yes, sir. Q: What vault are you referring to?

Q: How did you confront him? A: Vault of the pawnshop.

A: I asked him, Reynante, what are you doing here? Q: Where is that pawnshop located with reference to your residence?

Q: What was the reaction of Reynante Col? A: At the first floor is the pawnshop and at the back is our kitchen.

A: He ran towards me and sprayed something into my eyes and he put a sharp object Q: When you refused to open the vault of the pawnshop, what did Reynante Col do
under my chin. (Witness demonstrating by putting her hand under her chin) about it?

Q: How far was he before he attacked you? A: He did not say anything.

A: Probably, from the witness stand up to the chair of Fiscal Hilario. Maybe two steps Q: How about you, was there anything else you did?
away from him. (Around 3 meters)
A: I offered him money so he will not kill me.
Q: Were you able to identify what this spray is and what part of your body was hit?
Q: When you offered him money so he will not kill you, did he agree?
A: My eyes were sprayed with tear gas.
A: No, sir.

68
Q: What else happened next when he did not agree to your offer of money?
A: He dragged me going towards the back door.46
Based on these acts alone, it cannot be logically inferred that Col conspired with
Bokingco in killing Pasion. At the most, Cols actuations can be equated to attempted
robbery, which was actually the initial information filed against appellants before it
was amended, on motion of the prosecution, for murder. 47
Elsa testified that she heard Bokingco call out to Col that Pasion had been killed and
that they had to leave the place. This does not prove that they acted in concert
towards the consummation of the crime. It only proves, at best, that there were two
crimes committed simultaneously and they were united in their efforts to escape
from the crimes they separately committed.
Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill Pasion. Bokingco had
already killed Pasion even before he sought Col. Their moves were not coordinated
because while Bokingco was killing Pasion because of his pent-up anger, Col was
attempting to rob the pawnshop.1avvphi1
All told, an acquittal for Col is in order because no sufficient evidence was adduced
to implicate him.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 00658 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Reynante Col is ACQUITTED
on ground of reasonable doubt. The Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause the
immediate release of accused-appellant, unless he is being lawfully held for another
cause, and to inform this Court of action taken within ten (10) days from notice.
Appellant Michael Bokingco is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Homicide. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six years (6) and one (1)
day of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum Appellant is further ordered to indemnify the heirs
of Noli Pasion in the amount of Seventy five thousand pesos (75,000.00); Fifty
thousand pesos (50,000.00) as moral damages; Twenty five thousand pesos
(25,000.00) as temperate damages; Fifteen thousand pesos (15,000.00) as
attorneys fees; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.

In as much as Bokingcos extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against him, it is

likewise inadmissible against Col, specifically where he implicated the latter as a
cohort. Under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rights of a party cannot
be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another. Res inter alios acta alteri
nocere non debet. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the
confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused, and is considered as
hearsay against them.48 An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission
made by a conspirator. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the
act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator provided that the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than by such act or declaration. 49 In order
that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-
conspirators, it is necessary that first, the conspiracy be first proved by evidence
other than the admission itself; second, the admission relates to the common object;
and third, it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy.50 As we have previously discussed, we did not find any sufficient
evidence to establish the existence of conspiracy. Therefore, the extrajudicial
confession has no probative value and is inadmissible in evidence against Col.

Bokingcos judicial admission exculpated Col because Bokingco admitted that he only
attacked Pasion after the latter hit him in the head.

69