Llaban vs.
CA, 204 SCRA 887 (1991) decision dated September 13, 1916 were affected
Author: Delgado
Facts:
i. In a decision rendered in September 1916, CFI Cebu
awarded Lot No. 6017 to the petitioners.
ii. Upon motions of the spouses Filemon Sotto and Carmen
Rallos, who claimed to have purchased the shares of some of
the adjudicatees of the lot or their heirs, the cadastral court, on
1 March 1932, issued an Auto.
iii. No party appealed from the September 1916 decision as
modified by the above Auto of March 1932. Neither was any
decree issued pursuant to it.
iv. After 42 years, claimants (respondents) filed a petition for
the issuance of a decree of registration over the lot.
v. Acting on the petition, CFI Cebu issued an Order directing
the Commissioner of Land Registration to issue a decree in
favor of the adjudicatees based on the dispositive portions of
the decision of 13 September 1916 and the Auto of 1 March
1932.
vi. Commissioner submitted a report which quoted the
dispositive portions adverted to and contained the following
pertinent observations:
a) civil status of the adjudicatees was inadvertently
omitted which is necessary in the preparation of
the final decree of registration of Lot No. 6017 as
provided for under Section 40 of Act 496
b) The Commission entertains a doubt which portions
said lot were adjudicated to spouses Carmen
Rallos de Sotto and Filemon Sotto and which
share of the adjudicatees mentioned in the
thereof.
c) That it is imperative that the tracing cloth or print
copy be submitted to this Commission prior to the
issuance of the decree of registration
d) The said plan and its technical descriptions should
be approved by the Court and the same should be
in conformity with the decision dated September
13, 1916 and Order dated March 1, 1932.
vii. Various claimants soon began to lay their claim on the said
lot. Private respondents claim that the predecessors-in-interest
of the petitioners had sold the lot in question to the spouses
Filemon Sotto and Carmen Rallos, now both deceased;
petitioners have nothing then to inherit; and that they cannot
now re-open the cadastral proceeding because the Order of
March 1932 constitutes res judicata.
viii. CFI Cebu ruled that the order of March 1932 superseded
and/or amended the decision of September 1916 as reinstated
in the order of March, 1925. As a decree of registration has not
been issued registration proceedings is still pending for the
purposes of pre-Commonwealth Act 3110, and, when lost or
destroyed, must be reconstituted in conformity with said act.
vix. They now allege that the Order of March 1932 was
isosued without any notice to them; they were never given a
chance to be heard and that they did not receive a copy of
said order; they came to know about it only in the middle part
of 1980; and granting that it was in fact issued, such was done
in excess of and/or without jurisdiction.
Issue: Lack of jurisdiction of the lower court, sitting as a
cadastral court, to rule and decide on the controversy, or to
pass upon the validity of the claim, sale or transfer in favor of
the private respondents, alleging that such matters could only
be ventilated in an ordinary civil action.
Held: Petition granted. Lower court has no jurisdiction to grant
such relief and Judge Ramolete of CFI Cebu clearly acted
without any jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
giving due course to the petition by approving the Subdivision
Plan Psd-17733, the technical descriptions of Lots Nos. 6017-
A to 6017-H, inclusive, and directing the Land Registration
Commissioner to issue the final decree of registration of the
subdivision lots in favor of each of the claimants named in the
14 May 1979 petition. Aggravating such action is his obvious
disregard for due process.
Ratio:
i. The lower court, sitting as a cadastral court, had no
jurisdiction to amend or modify the September 1916 decision
and that Judge Ramolete of CFI Cebu acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
Order of 16 February 1981.
ii. The September 1916 decision, as amended by the Auto of
March 1932, had long become final as there is no showing at
all that any affected party appealed therefrom within the
reglementary period of 30 days prescribed by the then
governing law on procedure, Act No. 190. Section 11 of the
Cadastral Act expressly provides that trials in cadastral cases
shall be conducted in the same manner as ordinary trial, and
proceedings in the Court of First Instance shall be governed by
the same rules and that all provisions of the Land Registration
Act as amended, except as otherwise provided in the former,
shall be applicable to proceedings in cadastral cases.
ii. Sections 38 and 41 of the Land Registration Act tell us when
decisions become final. Even if they are erroneous, but such
errors are not jurisdictional, correction could only be done by a
regular appeal within the reglementary period, the failure of
which could lead to the decisions' becoming final. Decisions,
erroneous or not, become final after the period fixed by law;
litigations would be endless; no questions would be finally
settled; and titles to property would become precarious if the
losing party were allowed to reopen them at any time in the
future.
iii. The failure to issue a final decree does not prevent the
decision from attaining finality. Precisely, the final decree can
only issue after the decision shall have become final. The final
decree must state the name of the party adjudged in the
decision to be owner of a cadastral lot.
iv. In the instant case, in view of the finality of the decision of
13 September 1916, as amended by the Auto of March 1932,
the final decree which can be validly issued is one which must
be in full conformity with said decision, as amended.
v. Except for the spouses Filemon Sotto and Carmen Rallos,
the alleged claimants in whose favor the subdivided lots are to
be adjudicated are not the adjudicatees in the September
1916 decision, as amended by the March 1932 Auto. And
there is no indication whatsoever of the relationships of the
claimants with the original adjudicatees that could serve as
basis for their claims. In reality then, the petition is not just for
the issuance of a final decree, but for the amendment or
modification of the final decision.
vi. In the absence of proof that they received a copy of the
Order, no conclusion may be drawn that it has become final as
against them. Besides, the order has no valid basis. It failed to
consider the Auto of March 1932 which amended the original
decision of September 1916. Hence, no valid decree can be
issued exclusively on the basis of the latter.
Melgar vs. Pagayon, 21 SCRA 841 (1967)
Author: MONZON
Respondents (Pagayons) predecessors in interest, Salvador
Pagayon, acquired the land by purchase from Basilia Paccial, the
registered owner. Petitioner emanated from Eladio Palomillo, who
claims to have acquired the land by virtue of Basilia's failure to
repurchase the same within the stipulated period of three years.
The subject land was owned by Paccial who sold it to one
Palomillo subject to a right of repurchase within a period of three
years.The period expired without such a right being exercised.
Petitioner acquired whatever rights, interests and participation in
the aforesaid. However, CFI Iloilo rendered judgment in Cadastral
Case No. 31 decreeing the registration of the lot in favor of
vendor Basilia Paccial, it being noted that it was encumbered to
Palomillo. OCT was issued in the name of Paccial.
AThe situation in this case is that of a vendee relying on a Torrens
title as against another vendee allegedly having in his favor a sale
with pacto de retro executed before the registration of the
property.
According to the brief, the sale pacto de retro to Palomino does
not appear in the Original Certificate of Title of the land in
question because, Basilia Paccial had concealed this fact in her
Answer in the Cadastral Case or in the hearing thereof when she
obtained judgment. But this did not destroy the fact that Eladio
Palomillo was already the owner of the disputed land
CA: ruled in favor of Pagayons and sustained the right of the
vendee who did purchase registered land, thereafter securing the
issuance of the corresponding title in his name.
Issue: Who has the better right over the property? Pagayons
Ruling:
Neither the vendee a retro nor his transferee, petitioner, could still
compel vendor Paccial to execute an absolute deed of sale, the
action being barred by Section 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Cited Cabanos v. Register of Deeds, a 1920 decision: "the
consolidation of title could not take place, because the vendor
has obtained a certificate of title which has become indefeasible
and absolutely binding against the whole world and could no
longer be reviewed by reason of the expiration of the period for
review, nevertheless, the decree of registration has not annulled
the contract of pacto de retro sale which still subsists without any
alteration and still remains valid and binding against the vendor,
the latter's certificate of title not having rescinded nor destroyed
the validity of the sale a retro." "the incontestable and absolute
character of the Torrens title."
Land registration proceedings under Act 496 are in rem and that
such proceedings, as well as the title issued , are binding and
conclusive upon the whole world. Upon the expiration of one year,
said decree and the title issuedbecome incontrovertible (Section
38, Act 496), and the same may no longer be changed, altered or
modified, much less set aside.This has to be the rule, for if even
after the ownership of a property has been decreed by a land
registration court in favor of a particular person and title issued
may still be annulled, alleged, changed, altered or modified after
the lapse of the one year period fixed by the legal provision
mentioned above, the object of the Torrens system, namely, to
guarantee the indefeasibility of the title to the property, would be
defeated. In this case the above doctrine should apply with more
reason, considering the fact that the property has passed from
the hands of the original registered owner into those of clearly
innocent third parties."
Chief Justice Bengzon in another case: He alleged ownership
thru failure of the vendor a retro to repurchase in time. He had to
prove such allegation. The defendants had a right to reply on the
Torrens title issued in their name. If such repurchase was an
essential step for the registration and confirmation of their
ownership, the issuance of the certificate of title in their names
gives rise to the presumption that it has been duly taken. . . . The
result of the foregoing observations is that the precedents
claimed by petitioner as practically foursquare with this, do not
control the situation. Therefore he failed to establish any right
superior to the conclusive title of defendants under the Torrens
system."
Gomez vs. CA, 168 SCRA 503 (1988)
Author: GOJAR
Atty. Gomez et al applied for registration of several lots (Lots
1-12) before RTC
Prior to the application for registration, said lots were involved
in Government vs Abran case where SC declared Consolacion
Gomez as the owner. Teodoro and Luis (Consolacions father
and son) inherited the lots. When Teodoro died, Luis executed
a Quitclaim in favor of the Gomezes.
Aug 5 1981 - After notice and publication and there being no
opposition, the trial court adjudicated the lots in favour of
petitioner
Oct 6 1981 - Trial court issued an order stating the Aug 5
decision became final and excretory and directed the Chief of
General Land Registration Office to issue the corresponding
decrees of registration over the lots
July 11 1984 - Respondent Silverio G. Perez, Chief of Division
of Original Registration Land Registration Commission (now
known as the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration), submitted a report to the trial court stating that
lots 15, 16, 34 and 41 of Ipd-92 were already covered by
homestead patents issued in 1928 and 1929 and are
registered under the Land Registration Act, he then
recommended that the Aug 5 and Oct 6 decision be set aside
March 25 1985 - trial court rendered a decision setting aside
its Aug 5 and Oct 6 decision, hence petitioner filed MR which
was denied
CA: Dismissed the petition stating that when the respondent
Judge amended his decision after the report of the respondent
officials of the Land Registration office had shown that
homestead patents had already been issued on some of the
lots, respondents cannot be faulted because land already
granted by homestead patent can no longer be the subject of
another registration

ISSUE: Would finality of the decision adjudicating the land to
the Gomezes bar the RTC from setting it aside? NO.
HELD:
Petitioners contentions:
1. The judgment became final and executory, hence the
decree of registration be issued in a matter of course and
when the judge set aside the Aug and Oct decision, he acted
without jurisdiction.
This contention is NOT CORRECT. Unlike ordinary civil
actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land
registration proceeding does not become final, in the
sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of
one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of
registration. As long as a final decree has not been
entered by the Land Registration Commission (now
NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not
elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the title is
not finally adjudicated and the decision in the
registration proceeding continues to be under the
control and sound discretion of the court rendering it
2. Respondent Perez should have submitted the report before
the decision of the trial court became final and executory
The duty of respondent land registration officials to
render reports is not limited to the period before the
courts decision becomes final, but may extend even
after its finality but not beyond the lapse of one (1) year
from the entry of the decree.
If the SC would sustain petitioners contention, it would
be pressuring respondent land registration officials to
submit a report or study even if haphazardly prepared
just to beat the reglementary deadline for the finality of
the court decision.
Decrees of registration must be stated in convenient
form for transcription upon the certificate of title and
must contain an accurate technical description of the
land. This requires technical men. Moreover, it
frequently occurs that only portions of a parcel of land
included in an application are ordered registered and
that the limits of such portions can only be roughly
indicated in the decision of the court. In such cases
amendments of the plans and sometimes additional
surveys become necessary before the final decree can
be entered. That can hardly be done by the court itself;
the law very wisely charges the Chief Surveyor of the
General Land Registration Office with such duties
3. Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land
registration officials to issue the decree is purely ministerial
It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the
orders of the court and the decree must be in
conformity with the decision of the court and with the
data found in the record, and they have no discretion in
the matter.
HOWEVER, if they are in doubt upon any point in
relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree,
 it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act,
in this respect, as officials of the court and not as
administrative officials, and their act is the act of the
court. They are specifically called upon to extend
assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land
registration proceedings.
4. The law of the case is found in the Gov. of the Phil. vs.
Abran where the SC decided that the lands of Consolacion
Gomez were not public lands
It is now the law of the case. The report of respondent
land registration officials states that the holders of the
homestead patents registered the lots in question in
the years 1928 and 1929. The decision in Government
of the Philippine Islands vs. Abran was promulgated on
31 December 1931. Hence, the subject lots are
specifically excluded from those adjudicated by the
aforesaid decision to Consolacion M. Gomez.
It is a settled rule that a homestead patent, once
registered under the Land Registration Act, becomes
indefeasible and incontrovertible as a Torrens title, and
may no longer be the subject of an investigation for
determination or judgment in cadastral proceeding.
5.Petitioners claim that the homestead title holders may still
vindicate their rights by filing separate civil action
BUT the same recourse may be resorted by petitioners
themselves. The petitioners may file a separate civil
action for cancellation of titles and reconveyance in a
court of ordinary civil jurisdiction.
The true owner may bring an action to have the
ownership or title to land judicially settled, and if the
allegations of the plaintiff that he is the true owner of
the parcel of land granted as free patent and described
in the Torrens title and that the defendant and his
predecessor-in-interest were never in possession of
the parcel of land and knew that the plaintiff and his
predecessor-in-interest have been in possession
thereof be established, then the court in the exercise of
its equity jurisdiction, without ordering the cancellation
of the Torrens title issued upon the patent, may direct
the defendant, the registered owner, to reconvey the
parcel of land to the plaintiff who has been found to be
the true owner thereof.
Ramos vs. Rodriguez, 244 SCRA 418 (1995)
Author: Monje
Facts:
Feliciano Ramos applied for the registration of a parcel of land
in San Jose, Rodriguez, Montalban, Rizal, identified as Lot
125-B of subdivision plan Psd-760 with a total area of 156,485
square meters. Upon his death on April 6, 1982 and during the
pendency of said application, Feliciano was substituted by his
heirs, petitioners herein.
Trial Court:
In 1988, the court a quo issued an Order for
Administrator of National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration (NLTDRA) to prepare the
 decree and certificate of registration in compliance with
Section 39 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 .
Instead of issuing the said decree, NLTDRA
Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio submitted a report
which was earlier required by the court, recommending
that the July 28, 1988 decision be set aside after due
hearing because the subject lot was part of Lot 125,
Psu-32606 which is already covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 8816 issued on in 1924 in
the name of the Payatas Estate Improvement
Company which was also assigned Decree No. 1131
on January 31, 1905.
Petitioners later claimed that TCT No. 8816 was
fraudulent but they failed to present any evidence in
support of such allegation.
Court opined "that it cannot set aside its (July 28,
1988) decision on the basis of the report dated
September 26, 1988, which was received by this Court
on October 10, 1988, after the finality of its decision."
Court added that the proper remedy of the
government was an action for annulment of judgment.
Bonifacio filed on March 9, 1990, through the Chief
Legal Officer of the Land Registration Authority (LRA),
a motion for reconsideration of the February 2, 1990,
order.
Court- granted MR and set aside its former
decision
Issues/Held:
1. W/n the first judgment of the Court could be nullified- YES
2. W/n the issuance of the decree of registration and the
certificate of title by the LRA is a ministerial duty which follows
as a matter of course the order of the court directing it to issue
said decree.- As a general rule YES but there is an exceptional
circumstance that we can answer NO
3. W/N respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion in setting aside the July 28, 1988, decision and the
order for issuance of decree dated September 12, 1988, upon
the mere motion for reconsideration filed by the LRA, not by
the Solicitor General- NO
Ratio:
1. This is because unlike ordinary civil actions, the
adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration
proceeding does not become final, in the sense of
incontrovertibility(,) until after the expiration of one (1) year
after (sic) the entry of the final decree of registration. As long
as a final decree has not been entered by the Land
Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of
one (1) year has not elapsed from the date of entry of such
decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in
the registration proceeding continues to be under the control
and sound discretion of the court rendering it.
2. It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders
of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the
decision of the court and with the data found in the record, and
they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they are in
doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and
issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the
court. They act, in this respect as officials of the court and not
as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court.
They are specifically called upon to "extend assistance to
courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings."
 - Administrator Bonifacio filed his report as an
officer of the court precisely to inform the latter that the
NLTDRA cannot comply with the order to issue a
decree because the subject lot sought to be registered
was discovered to have been already decreed and
titled in the name of the Payatas Estate. Under these
circumstances, the LRA is not legally obligated to
follow the court's order.
- The court's Order for Issuance of Decree is
NOT the reckoning point in determining the timeliness
of a petition to re-open or review the decree of
registration in view of the ministerial nature of the
LRA's duty.
- Also, the one-year period stated in section 32 of
P.D. 1529 within which a petition to re-open and review
the decree of registration clearly refers to the decree of
registration described in Section 31 of the said P.D.,
which decree is prepared and issued by the
Commissioner of Land Registration.
3. The court a quo could not have committed grave abuse of
discretion because it was merely following the earlier
recommendation of the LRA which was then acting as an
agent of the court. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the
Solicitor General is bound to "[r]epresent the Government in all
land registration and related proceedings." Add to this the fact
that P.D. 1529 itself, specifically Section 6 thereof which
enumerates the functions of the Commissioner of Land
Registration, is bereft of any grant of power to the LRA or to
the Commissioner to make the same representation as the
Office of the Solicitor General in behalf of the government in
land registration proceedings.
- Nevertheless, even granting that procedural
lapses have been committed in the proceedings below,
these may be ignored by the Court in the interest of
substantive justice. This is especially true when, as in
this case, a strict adherence to the rules would result in
a situation where the LRA would be compelled to issue
a decree of registration over land which has already
been decreed to and titled in the name of another.
TCT No. 8816, however, having been issued under the
Torrens system, enjoys the conclusive presumption of
validity.
MOREOVER, COURT NOTES THAT THE CONTROVERSIES
IN THE CASE MIGHT HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF:
1. If the proper procedure in land registration cases been
observed by both the trial court, acting as a land registration
court and by the LRA, acting as an agent of the court.
- The court should have rendered its decision
only "after considering the evidence and the reports of
the commissioner of Land Registration and the Director
of Lands," as mandated by Section 29 of P.D. 1529,
instead of precipitately adjudicating the land in question
to the applicant and directing the Commissioner to
issue a decree of registration and certificate of title
when the report of the LRA was still forthcoming.
2. If the Solicitor General is more vigilant in handling cases
which his office should, under the law, properly represent.
 Phil. Trust Co. vs. CA, G.R. No. 150318, November 22,
2010
Author: CD
Facts:
Property was owned by Forfom Development Corp (Forfom)
under TCT 10896 and 64884. Sometime in 1989, plaintiff
discovered that the subject properties had already been
transferred in the names of said Ma. Teresa Limcauco and
Ellenora Limcauco who were never known to plaintiff or its
employees. Forfom sought help from the NBI and it was
discovered to transfer the lots, the signature of former
President Felix Limcauco was forged in the Deed of Sale and
a certification to the effect that plaintiffs Board of Directors had
duly approved the sale.
A petition for issuance of owners duplicate copy was filed with
the RTC of Angeles City by Ellenora Limcauco who allegedly
lost said owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 64884 docketed as
Cad. Case No. A-124-160. Court granted but Judge Guinto
denied before the NBI authorities having signed such order or
having conducted hearing on said case. The copy submitted to
the Register of Deeds was merely stamped Original Signed.
Another document certifying that the Order granting the
petition in Cad. Case No. A-124-160 had become final and
executory was also submitted to the Register of Deeds in
connection with the cancellation of TCT No. 64884. However,
then Branch Clerk of Court Benedicto A. Pineda testified that
he did not sign said certification and neither had he been
aware of the proceedings in Cad. Case No. A-124-160. Atty.
Pinedas signature on said certification appears to have been
falsified by one Lorenzo San Andres.
A separate petition for issuance of owners duplicate copy was
also filed by Ma. Teresa in Cad. Case No. A-124-280 and as
a result, TCT No. 10896 was cancelled and TCT No. 82760/T-
414 was issued in the name of Ma. Teresa Limcauco
On September 23, 1987, a Deed of Absolute Sale was
executed by Ellenora Vda. De Limcauco in favor of defendant
Raul P. Claveria whereby the property covered by TCT No.
64884 was supposedly sold to said defendant for the sum of
P5,139,126.00. On September 24, 1987, TCT No. 75436/T-
378 was cancelled and a new certificate of title, TCT No.
75533 was issued in the name of defendant Raul P. Claveria.
On October 21, 1987, defendant spouses Raul and Elea
Claveria mortgaged the property with the defendant Philippine
Trust Company to guarantee a loan in the amount of
P8,000,000.00, which mortgage was duly registered and
annotated as Entry No. 2858 in TCT No. 75533.
Issue:
1. Whether a bank, as a mortgagee, is required to look beyond
the certificate of title
2. Whether Philtrust is a mortgagee in good or bad faith.
Held:
1. As a general rule, no but in granting a mortgage contract (ie
documents that support the contract and following SOP of
Banks in determining credit) they must exercise extraordinary
diligence
2. Philtrust is in bad faith
Ratio:
1. A bank is not required, before accepting a mortgage, to
make an investigation of the title of the property being
given as security. This is a consequence of the rule that a
person dealing with registered land has a right to rely
upon the face of the Torrens certificate of title and to
dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when
the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious
man to make such inquiry.
The protection that a party may rely solely on the title is
applicable for those in good faith. But it is settled that
banks, their business being impressed with public interest,
are expected to exercise more care and prudence than
private individuals in their dealings, even those involving
registered lands. The rule that persons dealing with
registered lands can rely solely on the certificate of title
does not apply to banks. Consequently, Philtrust should
prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence required of
it in approving the mortgage contract in favor of the
spouses Claveria.

A forged deed may be the root of a valid title when an

innocent purchaser for value intervenes. A purchaser in
good faith and for value is one who buys the property of
another without notice that some other person has a right
to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price
for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he
has notice of the claims or interest of some other person
in the property. It has been held that where a mortgagee
bank accepted the mortgage in good faith, the land
involved being registered land, it is not bound to go
[beyond] the certificate of title to look for flaws in the
mortgagors title, the doctrine of innocent purchaser for we find that the Court of Appeals did not even err in finding
value being applicable to an innocent mortgagee for that Philtrust was in bad faith in the execution of the mortgage
value. A mortgagee in good faith and for value is entitled contract with the spouses Claveria.
to protection. 2. Evidence which show that Philtrust knew of the scheme
They did not investigate the collateral being offered by the
spouses (they have a property in Ayala Alabang but a newly
bought property outside Metro Manila was offered and
accepted). They did not visit the property.
When asked why they granted the loan without security, they
mere answered that the spouses passed the standards of the
bank.
SC: The mere fact that Philtrust accepted the subject property
as security most certainly does not prove that it followed the
standard operating procedure in doing so.
Evid (not important)
Philtrust adds that it stated in the Answer to Interrogatories
that it followed the standard operating procedures in accepting
the property as security. Since said Answer to Interrogatories
is a notarized document, Philtrust claims that it is a public
document which is conclusive as to the truthfulness of its
contents.
SC: it is not a public document that is conclusive to the
truthfulness of the content. It falls under (b) Documents
acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and
testaments; The presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed therefore applies only to the Jurat,
wherein the notary public (public officer authorized to take
oath) merely attests that the affidavit was subscribed and
sworn to before him or her, on the date mentioned thereon
Camper Realty Corp. vs. Maria Nena Pajo-Reyes, G.R. No.
179543 October 6, 2010
Author: Adrian
FACTS:
1. Rodolfo pajo caused the notarization on March 27,
1974 by Atty. Naraval of a SPA executed by him and
purportedly by his 4 siblings: Nena, Godofredo, Tito
and Isaias. The SPA authorized Rodolfo to sell a parcel
of land with an area of 8,060 sq m, situated in Davao
City.
2. The day after, Rodolfo sold the property to Ligaya
Bajado who thereafter caused the cancellation of the
title and issuance of a new title in her name.
3. 2 days after he notarized the SPA, Atty. Naraval
observed that all the signatures, except that of Rodolfo,
were forged. He then wrote a letter to Rodolfos co-
owners, cancelling the SPA from his notarial register.
4. After Ligaya passed away, the property was
bequeathed to her son, Augusto. Ligayas title was
cancelled and a new title was issued in the name of
Augusto.
5. Augusto divided the property into two: one containing
7,420 sq m, which was sold to Camper Realty Corp
(title was still in Augustos name), and the other, 640 sq
m he retained.
6. After 19 years, Nena filed a complaint against Augusto
and Rodolfo and Godofredo for declaration of nullity
and cancellation of title before the RTC of Davao City.
Upon learning of Augustos sale to Camper Realty
Corp, Nena impleaded the latter as necessary party.
7. Nena contended that no right could have been
transmitted to Ligaya and the subsequent transferees,
the SPA being a forged document.
8. RTC: Dismissed the case. Nena is guilty of laches.
Titles to the property were already under the name of
the transferors at the time of transfer. The court cannot
declare the nullity of the succeeding contracts.
 9. CA: Reversed the RTC ruling. There was no valid
transfer to Ligaya and, accordingly, to her son Augusto.
He did not acquire any right over the subject lot since
an heir merely steps into the shoes of the decedent
and is merely the continuation of the personality of his
predecessor-in-interest. Contract of sale entered with
Camper was invalid.
ISSUE:
WON Camper Realty Corp is entitled to the subject lot
HELD:
YES, Camper is a purchaser in good faith
RATIO:
1. Augusto acquired the property as his share in his
mother Ligayas estate. As compulsory heir, he merely
stepped into the shoes of Ligaya. Since Ligayas title
was derived from Rodolfos sale to her on the basis of
a forged SPA, Augustos title must be cancelled. Nemo
dat quod non habet.
2. Notwithstanding the nullity of Augustos title, Camper
Realty Corp is a purchaser in good faith.
3. A forged deed can legally be the root of a valid title
when an innocent purchaser for value intervenes. For a
prospective buyer of a property registered under the
Torrens system need not go beyond the title, especially
when he has no notice of any badge of fraud or defect
that would place him on guard. His rights are entitled to
full protection, for the law considers him an innocent
purchaser.
4. There was no duty on petitioners part to go beyond the
face of Augustos title and conduct inquiries on its
veracity. Nena did not present any proof of any
circumstance that could serve as caveat for petitioner
to undertake a searching investigation respecting the
title. Moreover, the property was registered in Ligayas
name in 1974 yet, Augustos in 1986, and no
encumbrance or lien was annotated either on Ligayas
or Augustos title. For 18 years, there was no
controversy or dispute hounding the property to caution
petitioner about Augustos title.
Heirs of Saves vs. Saves, G.R. No. 152866, October 6,
2010
Author: LIN
FACTS:
1. Sometime on January 1921, several persons filed their respective
claims before the then, CFI of of Oriental Negros for the titling of the
respective lots they occupy, among them were Severo Chaves and
Benedicta Chaves, who filed their claim for Lot No. 382, to be titled
in their names, together with 5 OTHER Saves, in Cadastral Case
No. 15.
2. On April 22, 1921, a Decision was rendered by the court,
adjudicating several parcels of land to different claimants, among
the lots adjudicated, also Decree No. 177831 was issued by the
USA for CFI of the Province of Negros ordering the registration of
Lot No. 382 in the names of Benedicta Saves, Escolastica Saves,
the sons of Romana Saves, deceased, Rafaela Saves, Januaria
Saves, and the sons of Maximo Saves, deceased. Thereafter,
Severo Saves died intestate, leaving his wife, Teresa Ramirez, his 4
surviving children, and the heirs of his two children who
predeceased him.
3. On June 21, 1941, Adelaida S. Martinez and Felicidad S. Martinez, 9. The parties failed to arrive to an amicable settlement during the pre-
who were the heirs of Januaria Saves, who predeceased them, sold trial stage, but have agreed to exclude Lot 386 in the litigation and
their 1/6 share in Lot No. 382 to a certain Gaudencia Valencia limited the issues as to the ownership of lots 382 and 383.
evidenced by a public instrument, per allegation in a Motion for the 10. RTC rendered decision in favor of petitioners, declaring deed of sale
Issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title, filed by Valencia. as null and void, and ordering defendant Abella to convey and
4. On June 30, 1941, a Deed of Sale was executed by the 5 heirs of deliver unto the plaintiffs their shares of Lot No. 382. CA reversed
Romana Saves, with last names of Alimayda; the sole heir of RTC ruling, and held that Abellas TCT was valid.
Rafaela Saves, Pablo Saves Dizon; and the sole heir of Escolastico
Saves, Teodoro Saves, their respective 1/6 share in Lot No. 382, or ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals can consider evidence
3/6 of the property, to Valencia. not formally offered in the trial court as basis for the herein
5. On June 6, 1947, Benedicta Saves and Marcela Saves, the sole heir assailed Court of Appeals ruling?
of Maximo Saves, sold their respective 1/6 share in Lot No. 382,
also to Valencia, or 2/6 of the property, as embodied in a Deed of HELD: Yes, since exception requirements were followed.
Absolute Sale. Considering that all the 1/6 share, rights, and PETITION DENIED.
participation of each co-owner in Lot No. 382 were already sold to1. GR: It is a basic procedural rule that the court shall consider no
Valencia, she initiated the titling of the said property under her name evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for
in a Motion for Issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title before CFI, which the evidence is offered must be specified. A formal offer is
TCT No. 148 was issued by the Register of Deeds for Negros necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of
Oriental in the name of Valencia. facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence
6. Sometime in 1961, Valencia sold the entire property to her grandchild offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the trial
Enriqueta Chavez Abella, and TCT No. 110 was issued in the name judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is
of Enriqueta Chavez, who was married to Abella. presenting the evidence. This allows opposing parties to examine
7. In 1979, Meleriana Saves, who was then residing in Cebu, wrote her
the evidence and object to its admissibility. It facilitates review as
relatives in Negros Oriental, the herein appellees, asking them to
the appellate court will not be required to review documents not
verify from the Register of Deeds information pertaining to Lot 382,
previously scrutinized by the trial court.
as they were among the heirs entitled to said property. 2. XPN: However, in People v. Napat-a, citing People v. Mate,
8. On March 17, 1981, a case for Reconveyance, Partition, and relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence not formally
Damages was filed before the RTC of Negros Oriental by plaintiffs- offered to be admitted and considered by the trial court provided
appellees, alleging, inter alia, that Lot No. 382 was fraudulently the following requirements are present, viz: first, the same must
acquired by Valencia, and that she fictitiously sold the lot to her have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and,
grandchild Abella. The complaint was amended twice by plaintiffs second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of
considering that the original plaintiffs and defendants were all the case. In the case at bar, the records would show that the
deceased.
 above requisites have been satisfactorily complied with respect to
Exhibit 7 which is a document entitled Motion for the Issuance of
TCT filed by Valencia in the same trial court that led to the
issuance of TCT No. 148, the records would show that it is the
same document that petitioners witness Fruto Rosario identified
in his March 5, 1984 testimony and marked as petitioners Exhibit
I, he testified that Maximo had 2 children, Maximo died ahead of
Severa, Severa died ahead of Marcela.
3. It is a well-settled doctrine that one who deals with property
registered under the Torrens system need not go beyond the
same, but only has to rely on the certificates of title. He is
charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are
annotated on the certificates. In the case at bar, TCT No. 110,
which represented proof of respondent Abellas ownership of Lot
No. 382, did not contain any encumbrance or annotation that was
transferred from its title of origin - TCT No. 148. To be sure, the
burden to prove that Abella had notice of any defect in the title of
her predecessor lies with the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs failed to
substantiate their contention.
4. There is no cogent reason or legal compulsion for respondent
Abella to inquire beyond Valencias title over the property at issue
since the latter had been in possession of Lot No. 382 prior to the
sale. Settled is the rule that a buyer of real property in possession
of persons other than the seller must be wary and should
investigate the rights of those in possession, for without such
inquiry the buyer can hardly be regarded as a buyer in good faith
and cannot have any right over the property. Valencia had been
occupying the property prior to its sale to respondent Abella.
Petitioners were never in possession of the property from the
very start, nor did they have any idea that they were entitled to
the fruits of the property not until co-petitioner Meleriana Saves
wrote her relatives, co-petitioners, about the possibility of having
a claim to the property.
5. Neither does the plaintiffs insistence that the deeds of sale
executed in favor of Valencia were void support their theory that
Abella is a purchaser in bad faith, as it hardly suffice to deem the
said contracts as null and void. Abella had no participation in its
execution which were signed by the parties thereto when she
was very young. Like any stranger to the said transactions, it was
reasonable for Abella to assume that these public documents
were what they purport to be on their face in the absence of any
circumstance to lead her to believe otherwise. Petitioners and
predecessors never interposed any challenge to Valencias
continued possession under title of ownership over Lot No. 382
ever since the entire property was sold to her in 1947 it was not
only until 1981, or 34 years from Valencias acquisition of the
entire lot and 20 years from the transfer of ownership over the
same to respondent Abella, that petitioners decided to assert
their alleged rights over the property in a proper action in court.
Court of Appeals vs. Veloso, G.R. No. 102737, August 21, 1996,
260 SCRA 593
Author: Isabel
Facts:
Veloso was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in
Tondo, Manila. It had an area of 177 sqm and it was covered
by TCT 49138. He acquired it from the Philippine Building
Corporation in 1957. He found out his copy was missing
when his wife (Irma) left for abroad.
He filed an action for annulment of documents, reconveyance
of property w/ damages and preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order against Escario, who obtained another TCT
 for the same land. The said transfer was supported by a
General Power of Attorney (GPA) and Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by Escario and Irma, who acted as his atty-in-fact.
He alleged that: He never authorized anyone to sell the
property; He never executed the GPA; His signature was
falsified; Hes never seen the two witnesses to the GPA; Hes
never met Escario; He married Irma only in 1962 so the
property wasnt part of their conjugal partnership; He likewise
presented Allied Bank checks to show his genuine signature.
The notary Public, Atty. Tubig, likewise denied having
notarized the documents.
Escario contends that she relied on the general power of atty
of Irma and so, she was a buyer in good faith. Velosos real
cause of action is against his wife.
TC adjudged Escario as the lawful owner as she was an
innocent purchaser for value. The general power of atty was
valid and theres no need for a special power of atty (SPA)
since the former already included the authority to sell. Veloso
also failed to substantiate his claim of fraud. Considering his
admission that he was the only person with access to the
title, Irmas possession was deemed conclusive authority.
Under equitable estoppel, he must bear the loss.
CA affirmed.
Issue: W/N there was a valid sale - YES
Held:
The assailed GPA was valid and regular on its face. It was
notarized and it carried the presumption of due execution.
Hence, Irma had authority.
SPA to sell the subject property was already included in the
GPA which states to buy or sell, hire or lease, mortgage or
otherwise hypothecate lands more specifically TCT No.
49138 What matters is the extent of the powers
contemplated. If the power to sell is specific and not merely
implied or couched in general terms, the atty in fact may
execute a valid sale.
Mere variance of signatures is not conclusive proof as to
forgery. It must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
Whoever alleges it has the burden of proving the same. It
was necessary to determine the cause of the variation
(whether it be due to a different personality or an expected
variation by the same writer) and the resemblance (imitation
or habitual natural resemblance from writing.)
Even assuming there was forgery and the docs were void,
Escarios TCT cannot be revoked. She had no participation in
the execution of GPA and was an innocent purchaser for
value. It was reasonable to believe in Irmas authority as
Velosos wife and having with her the TCT.
Purchaser in good faith is one who buys and pays for
property without notice or knowledge that another person has
a right/interest in the same at the time of such purchase.
Equitable Estoppel:Where innocent persons must suffer a
loss, he who by his conduct made the loss possible must
bear it. Veloso was the only person who had access to the
TCT. As such, Irmas possession of the TCT was deemed
conclusive authority from Veloso.
Spouses Aggabao vs. Sps. Dionisio, G.R. No. 165803,
Sept. 1, 2010.
Author: Garcia
Doctrine:
Alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property during the
effectivity of the FC is void if without authority of the court or
the written consent of the other spouse. (Art. 124, FC)
To be considered buyers in good faith, the buyer must show
that he has inquired into 1) the sellers title and 2) the sellers
capacity to sell.
Facts:
Spouses Elena and Dionisio Parulan were under de facto
separation. Their conjugal property consisted of, among
others, 2 parcels of land located at No. 49 Miguel Cuaderno
Street, Executive Village, BF Homes, Paraaque City and
registered under TCT No. 63376 and TCT No. 63377 in the
name of Spouses Maria Elena A. Parulan (Elena) and
Dionisio Z. Parulan, Jr. (Dionisio).
On March 18, 1991, Elena sold the lands to Spouses Aggabao
(BUYERS) and showed them a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) purportedly executed by her husband to authorize her to
sell them. But the SPA was a forgery, the husband being out of
the country at the time of its execution, as evidenced by the
entries in his passport.
Elena and the BUYERS agreed that the BUYERS would pay
the existing mortgage on the land covered by TCT 63377.
When the BUYERS were paying the mortgage annotated on
TCT 63377, the bank (Los Banos Rural Bank) related
(chinismis lang) to them that the bank had asked for a court
order authorizing Elena to mortgage the lot covered by TCT
63377. When the mortgage was satisfied, the bank then
released TCT 633777, which was later cancelled, and a new
one was issued in the name of the BUYERS.
As for TCT 63376, Elena could not deliver it to the BUYERS
because it was then in the possession of the Dionisios
brother, Atty. Jeremy Parulan, who was in possession of an
authentic SPA executed by Dionisio authorizing him to sell
herein lands.
Despite what they heard from the bank, the BUYERS did not
ask Elena for a court order authorizing her to sell the lands,
nor did they confirm the authority of the Notary Public (NP)
who notarized the SPA. It turned out that in 1991, the NP was
not authorized to act as NP in Manila.
As a result, the Husband sought the nullification of the
absolute sale and the cancellation of the new TCT issued to
the BUYERS. The BUYERS claimed to be buyers in good
faith.
RTC declared the Deed of Absolute Sale as void. CA affirmed
RTC.
Issues:
Can a spouse sell a conjugal property without the consent of
the other spouse?No, by express provision of the Family
Code, i.e., Art. 124.
Can herein buyers be considered buyers in good faith?No
Held:
With respect to the first issue:
Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
Article 124. The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court
by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of
within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include disposition or encumbrance without authority of
the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In
the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on
the part of the consenting spouse and the third person,
and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the
court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors.
In short, alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property during
the effectivity of the FC is void if without authority of the court
or the written consent of the other spouse. In this case, the
sale happened on March 18, 1991, or after the effectivity of the
FCAugust 3, 1988and without the consent of the other
spouse or court order authorizing the sale. Thus, the Deed of
Absolute Sale was declared void.
Note: In the absence of the other spouses consent, the
transaction should be construed as a continuing offer on the
part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may
be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
other spouse or upon authorization by the court before the
offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
With respect to the second issue: (For summary, see last
paragraph)
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of
another, without notice that some other person has a right to,
or interest in, such property, and pays the full and fair price for
it at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the
claim or interest of some other persons in the property. He
buys the property with the belief that the person from whom he
receives the thing was the owner and could convey title to the
property. He cannot close his eyes to facts that should put a
reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good
faith. The status of a buyer in good faith is never presumed but
must be proven by the person invoking it.
Article 124 of the Family Code categorically requires the
consent of both spouses before the conjugal property may be
disposed of by sale, mortgage, or other modes of disposition.
In Bautista v. Silva, the Court erected a standard to determine
the good faith of the buyers dealing with a seller who had title
to and possession of the land but whose capacity to sell was
restricted, in that the consent of the other spouse was required
before the conveyance, declaring that in order to prove good
faith in such a situation, the buyers must show that they
inquired not only into the title of the seller but also into the
sellers capacity to sell. Thus, the buyers of conjugal property
must observe two kinds of requisite diligence, namely: (a) the
diligence in verifying the validity of the title covering the
property; and (b) the diligence in inquiring into the authority of
the transacting spouse to sell conjugal property in behalf of the
other spouse.
It is true that a buyer of registered land needs only to show
that he has relied on the face of the certificate of title to the
property, for he is not required to explore beyond what the
certificate indicates on its face. In this respect, the petitioners
sufficiently proved that they had checked on the authenticity of
TCT No. 63376 and TCT No. 63377 with the Office of the
Register of Deeds in Pasay City as the custodian of the land
records; and that they had also gone to the bank to inquire
about the mortgage annotated on TCT No. 63377. Thereby,
the petitioners observed the requisite diligence in examining
the validity of the TCTs concerned.
However, issue was whether or not the BUYERS had diligently
inquired into the authority of Elena to convey the property. In
this case, they did not. An unquestioning reliance by the
BUYERS on Elenas SPA without first taking precautions to
verify its authenticity was not a prudent buyers move. They
should have done everything within their means and power to
ascertain whether the SPA had been genuine and authentic. If
they did not investigate on the relations of the respondents
Elena and Dionisio vis--vis each other, they could have done
other things towards the same end, like attempting to locate
the notary public who had notarized the SPA, or checked with
the RTC in Manila to confirm the authority of Notary Public
Atty. Datingaling. It turned out that Atty. Datingaling was not
authorized to act as a Notary Public for Manila during the
period 1990-1991, which was a fact that they could easily
discover with a modicum of zeal. In fact, they fully paid the
price even without the owners duplicate copy of the TCT No.
63376 being handed to them by Elena, which indicated a
revealing lack of precaution on the part of the petitioners.
In sum, to be considered buyers in good faith, the buyer must
show that he has inquired into 1) the sellers title and 2) the
sellers capacity to sell. In this case, although the BUYERS
checked the authenticity of the TCTs with the Office of the
Register of Deeds, they failed to inquire the sellers capacity to
sell. They just accepted the SPA for what it represented on its
face.
Ponce de Leon vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corp., 36 SCRA
289 (1976)
Author: LARS
Facts:
1. On August 14, 1945, plaintiff Jose L. Ponce de Leon
and Francisco Soriano, father of third-party plaintiffs
obtained a loan for P10k from the PNB Manila,
mortgaging a parcel of land situated at Barrio Ibayo,
Municipality of Paraaque, Rizal, covered by OCT No.
8094 of the land records of Rizal Province in the name
of Francisco Soriano, married to Tomasa Rodriguez,
as security for the loan.
2. Jose L. Ponce de Leon filed with the Rehabilitation
Finance Corporation (RFC for short) Manila, his loan
application for an industrial loan, for putting up a
sawmill, in the amount of P800k offering as security
 certain parcels of land, among which, was the parcel
which Ponce de Leon and Soriano mortgaged to the
PNB. Jose Ponce De Leon, his wife Carmela and,
Francisco Soriano(father of third party plaintiff) filed for
a loan from the RFC for P495k. A deed of mortgage
was then executed in view of the loan, secured by a
parcel of land owned by Soriano. At the time that
Francisco Soriano signed the mortgage deed his
spouse Tomasa Rodriguez was already dead
leaving as her heirs, her children none of whom
signed the said mortgage deed or the promissory
note.
3. It was stipulated that part of the proceeds of the
mortgage loan shall be used to pay off obligations. In
view of these conditions, the RFC paid Ponce de
Leon's obligations to PNB, Cu Unjieng Bros and Arturo
Colmenares. Various amounts were released to Ponce
de Leon from December 1951 to July 1952. The
checks covering these releases were issued to Jose L.
Ponce de Leon in view of the authority given to him in
writing by Francisco Soriano and Carmelina Russell.
4. Allegedly, the loan was not paid. Because of this, RFC
sought for extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgaged
properties (real estate+sawmill in Samar and
equipment). RFC was the purchaser of all the
mortgaged properties in the ensuing sheriff's sales,
with the exception of two parcels of land situated in
Bacolod City which were purchased by private
individuals.
5. The Sheriff sold the land covered by OCT No. 8094
in the name of Francisco Soriano, married to
Tomasa Rodriguez, and the deed of sale was
executed by the sheriff in favor of the purchaser
the RFC, including all the other properties sold.
6. Prior to the expiration of the one year period
redemption period. Francisco Soriano(through his
heirs) offered to repurchase the Paranaque lot for 14k
but the bank(RFC) rejected the offer. RFC scheduled
the public sale of the lot.
7. In 1956, Ponce filed the present action questioning the
validity of the sherriffs foreclose sale, and requiring a
writ of preliminary injunction to restrain RFC from
carrying out its scheduled sale.
8. The Sorianos filed a 3rd party complaint contending that
the mortgage in favor of the RFC and promissory note
signed by Francisco Soriano lacked the latter's consent
and was w/o consideration and hence void as to him
and his children; that the lot covered by OCT No. 8094
in the name of Francisco Soriano belonged to the
conjugal partnership of the latter and his wife, Tomasa
Rodriguez, now deceased, and since the latter was
already dead when the mortgage was executed and
her children who inherited her share have not signed
the mortgage contract and promissory note, at least,
the share of the lot belonging now to the Soriano
sisters and brothers, the third-party plaintiffs, have not
been legally included in the mortgage to the RFC so
the latter had not acquired said one-half share in the
sheriff's sale.
9. TC dismissed Ponces complaint and held that being
registered in the name of "Francisco Soriano, married
to Tomasa Rodriguez," the property covered by OCT
No. 8094(the Paraaque property) is presumed belong
to the conjugal partnership of said spouses, and the
 RFC having failed to offset this presumption, the
mortgage on and the sale of the property by the sheriff
are null and void as to one-half () thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether the TC erred erred in holding that the Paraaque
property is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership of Mr. and Mrs. Francisco Soriano? YES
HELD:
1. It appears that the property was registered in the name
of "Francisco Soriano, married to Tomasa Rodriguez,"
and based upon this fact alone without any proof
establishing satisfactorily that the property had been
acquired during coverture, the lower court presumed
that it belongs to the conjugal partnership of said
spouses.
2. We should not overlook the fact that the title to said
property was not a transfer certificate of title, but
an original one, issued in accordance with a decree
which, pursuant to law, merely confirms a pre-
existing title. Said original certificate of title does
not establish, therefore, the time of acquisition of
the Paraaque property by the registered owner
thereof.
3. Lower Court applied said presumption in Article 160 of
our Civil Code, which reads:
... All property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife.
4. This provision must be construed in relation to Articles
153 to 159 of the same Code, enumerating the
properties "acquired ... during the marriage" that
constitute the conjugal partnership. We have held that
"the party who invokes this presumption must first
prove that the property in controversy was
acquired during the marriage. In other words, proof
of acquisition during coverture is a condition sine
qua non for the operation of the presumption in
favor of conjugal partnership.
5. The Sorianos have not succeeded in proving that the
Paraaque property was acquired "during the
marriage" of their parents. What is more, there is
substantial evidence to the contrary.
6. Gregorio Soriano testified that his first cousin,
Francisco Soriano, had acquired said property from
his parents, long before he got married. Said
prosecution does not necessarily warrant the
conclusion that Gregorio Soriano was impelled by an
"improper motive" in testifying as he did. After all, the
Sorianos are, likewise, nieces of Gregorio Soriano and
he was not the party allegedly accused by them.
7. This witness testified in a straightforward manner, and
disclosed a good number of details bearing the ear-
marks of veracity. His testimony was corroborated, not
only by Felipe Cuaderno, Jr. and OCT No. 8094, but,
also, by the testimony of 3rd plaintiff Rosalina Soriano.
Felipe Cuaderno, Jr., an assistant attorney and notary
public of the RFC, before whom the deed of mortgage
was acknowledged, testified that Francisco Soriano
assured him that the Paraaque property was "his own
separate property, having acquired it from his
 deceased father by inheritance and that his children
have nothing to do with the property." This was, in
effect, confirmed by Rosalina Soriano, stated on cross-
examination, that her father "was born and ... raised" in
said property, so that contrary to her testimony in chief
he could not have told her that he and his wife had
bought it.
8. Needless to say, had the property been acquired by
them during coverture, it would have been registered,
in the name not of "Francisco Soriano, married to
Tomasa Rodriguez," but of the spouses "Francisco
Soriano and Tomasa Rodriguez." In Litam vs. Espiritu,
the words 'married to Rafael Litam' written after the
name of Marcosa Rivera, in each of the above
mentioned titles are merely descriptive of the civil
status of Marcosa Rivera, the registered owner of the
properties covered by said titles.
9. It is difficult to believe also that Sorianos did not know
then of the mortgage constituted by Francisco Soriano,
on October 8, 1951, in favor of the RFC. In fact,
Rosalina Soriano testified that month, Francisco
Soriano and she conferred with the plaintiff, he stated
that the Paraaque property was mortgaged to the
RFC, her father got angry at the plaintiff and said that
he had fooled him (Francisco Soriano). Being aware of
said mortgage since October 1951, the Sorianos did
not question its validity until January 12, 1957, when
they filed in this cage their 3rd -party complaint in
intervention as regards, at least, 1/2 of the Paraaque
property, which they now claim to be their mother's
share in the conjugal partnership. Worse still, after the
foreclosure sale in favor of the RFC, they tried to
redeem the property for P14,000, and, when the RFC
did not agree thereto, they even sought the help of the
Office of the President to effect said redemption.
10. Their failure to contest the legality of the mortgage for
over five (5) years and these attempts to redeem the
property constitute further indicia that the same
belonged exclusively to Francisco Soriano, not to the
conjugal partnership with his deceased wife, Tomasa
Rodriguez. Apart from the fact that said attempts to
redeem the property constitute an implied admission of
the validity of its sale and, hence, of its mortgage to the
RFC ,there are authorities to the effect that they bar the
Sorianos from assailing the same.
PNB vs. CA, 153 SCRA 435 (1987)
Author: Jackie
FACTS:
1. Clodualdo Vitug first marriage was with Gervacia
Flores with whom he had 3 children. His second wife is
Donata Montemayor with whom he had 8 children.
2. Clodualdo Vitug died intestate on May 20,1929 so his
estate was settled and distributed in Special
Proceeding wherein Donata Montemayor was the
Administratrix.
3. On November 28, 1952, Donata Montemayor, through
her son, Salvador M. Vitug, mortgaged to the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) several parcels of land covered
 by TCT No. 2289 (in the name of Montemayor) located
in Pampanga to guarantee the loan granted by the
PNB to Salvador Jaramiila and Pedro Bacani in the
amount of P40,900.00 which was duly registered in the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga.
4. On December 1, 1963, Donata Montemayor also
mortgaged in favor of PNB certain properties covered
by TCT Nos. 2887 and 2888 (in the name of
Montemayor), Pampanga to guarantee the payment of
the loan account of her son Salvador Vitug in the
amount of P35,200.00, which mortgage was duly
registered in the Register of Deeds of Pampanga.
Salvador Vitug failed to pay his account so the
bank foreclosed the mortgaged properties
covered by TCT Nos. 2887 and 2888. At the
public auction, PNB was the highest bidder. The
titles thereto were thereafter consolidated in the
name of PNB.
Likewise, Salvador Jaramilla and Pedro Bacani
failed to settle their accounts with the PNB so
the latter foreclosed the properties covered by
TCT No. 2889 which were sold at public auction
and likewise PNB was the buyer thereof. On
August 30, 1968, a certificate of sale was
issued by the Register of Deeds covering said
properties in favor of the PNB.
When the title of the PNB was consolidated a
new title was issued in its name
On September 2,1969, the PNB sold the
properties covered by TCT Nos. 2887 and
2888, Pampanga to Jesus M. Vitug,
Anunciacion V. de Guzman, Prudencia V.
Fajardo, Salvador Vitug and Aurora V. Gutierrez
in those names the corresponding titles were
issued.
5. Meanwhile, on May 12, 1958, Donata Montemayor
executed a contract of lease of Lot No. 24, which is
covered by TCT No. 2887-R in favor of her children
Pragmacio and Maximo both surnamed Vitug. This
lease was extended on August 31, 1963. By virtue of a
general power of attorney executed by Donata
Montemayor on Sept. 19, 1966 in favor of Pragmacio
Vitug, the latter executed a contract of lease on Sept.
19, 1967 of the said lot in favor of Maximo Vitug.
6. On March 21, 1970 Pragmacio Vitug and Maximo Vitug
filed an action for partition and reconveyance with
damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
against Marcelo Mendiola, special administrator of the
intestate estate of Donata Montemayor et al, and PNB
The subject of the action is 30 parcels of land
which they claim to be the conjugal property of
the spouses Donata Montemayor and
Clodualdo Vitug of which they claim a share of
2/11 of 1/2 thereof. They assailed the mortgage
to the PNB and the public auction of the
properties as null and void. They invoked the
case of Vitug vs. Montemayor, L5297 decided
by this Court on Oct. 20, 1953 which is an
action for partition and liquidation of the said 30
parcels of land wherein the properties were
found to be conjugal in nature.
DISMISSED. APPEAL TO THE CA. CA
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE LC.
7. Hence this petition
ISSUE: Does the presumption of conjugality of properties
acquired by the spouses during coverture provided for in
Article 160 of the Civil Code apply to property covered by a
Torrens certificate of title in the name of the widow?
HELD: NO. When the subject properties were mortgaged to
the PNB they were registered in the name of Donata
Montemayor, widow. Relying on the torrens certificate of title
covering said properties the mortgage loan applications of
Donata were granted by the PNB and the mortgages were
duly constituted and registered in the office of the Register of
Deeds.
The PNB had a reason to rely on what appears on the
certificates of title of the properties mortgaged. For all legal
purposes, the PNB is a mortgagee in good faith for at the time
the mortgages covering said properties were constituted the
PNB was not aware to any flaw of the title of the mortgagor.
RATIO:
a. In processing the loan applications of Donata
Montemayor, the PNB had the right to rely on what
appears in the certificates of title and no more. On its
face the properties are owned by Donata Montemayor,
a widow. The PNB had no reason to doubt nor question
the status of said registered owner and her ownership
thereof. Indeed, there are no liens and encumbrances
covering the same.
b. The well-known rule in this jurisdiction is that a person
dealing with a registered land has a right to rely upon
the face of the torrens certificate of title and to
dispense with the need of inquiring further, except
when the party concerned has actual knowledge of
facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably
cautious man to make such inquiry.
c. A torrens title concludes all controversy over ownership
of the land covered by a final degree of registration.
Once the title is registered the owner may rest assured
without the necessity of stepping into the portals of the
court or sitting in the mirador de su casa to avoid the
possibility of losing his land.
d. "Art. 160, NCC. All property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless
it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife."
The presumption applies to property acquired
during the lifetime of the husband and wife. In
this case, it appears on the face of the title that
the properties were acquired by Donata
Montemayor when she was already a widow.
When the property is registered in the name of
a spouse only and there is no showing as to
when the property was acquired by said
spouse, this is an indication that the property
belongs exclusively to said spouse. And this
presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code
cannot prevail when the title is in the name of
only one spouse and the rights of innocent third
parties are involved.
e. At any rate, although actions for recovery of real
property and for partition are real actions, however,
they are actions in personam that bind only the
particular individuals who are parties thereto. The PNB
not being a party in said cases is not bound by the said
 decisions, Nor does it appear that the PNB was aware
of the said decisions when it extended the above
described mortgage loans. Indeed, if the PNB knew of
the conjugal nature of said properties it would not have
approved the mortgage applications covering said
properties of Donata Montemayor without requiring the
consent of all the other heirs or coowners thereof.
Moreover, when said properties were sold at public
auction, the PNB was a purchaser for value in good
faith so its right thereto is beyond question.
Solid State Multi-Products Corp. vs. CA, 196 SCRA 630
(1991)
Author:
Facts:
1982 pet, a domestic corporation, filed an action for
quieting of title against the resp estate of Virata alleging
that it is the registered owner of a parcel of land located
at Imus, Cavite, with an area of 48,182 sq. meters,
covered by a Certificate of Title No. which was issued in
1976; that Virata, during his lifetime thru the use of fraud,
caused the issuance of a Certificate of Title in 1959 thru
an administrative reconstitution of a nonexistent original
title covering the same parcel of land; that by reason of
the said reconstitution and subsequent issuance of TCT
in favor of Virata, there now exists a cloud on the title of
pet
According to the pets evidence
Pursuant to Act No. 32 [law on sale of Friar
Lands], Pearanda [predecessor-in-
interest] submitted with the Bureau of
Lands an application to purchase a friar
land. The application covers Lot No. 7449
containing an area of a little over 4
hectares. Said application was
accompanied by a "SALAYSAY" signed and
sworn to by one Mabini Legaspi purporting
to transfer to, and to waive in favor of,
Pearanda, all the rights of executor to Lot
No. 7449
Chief of Land Management Division
forwarded to the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, the application of
Pearanda, recommending that Lot No.
7449 be sold to said applicant w/o public
auction for a sum of P1,198.00. The
application of Pearanda was returned by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, to the Director of Lands,
approving that sale without auction, to
Pearanda, of lot No. 7449. Pursuant to this
approval, the Director of Lands and Julian
Pearanda executed, therefore, Sales
Contract in 1969, for a consideration of
P1,198.00, to be paid in 10 monthly
installments, w/c was fully paid in Aug.,
1969
 The Undersecretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources issued the final deed of
conveyance of lot No. 7449 in favor of
Pearanda
On the basis of said Deed of Conveyance,
the Register of Deeds of Cavite issued in
Nov., 1969 in favor of Pearanda a TCT,
and in 1976, the pet, by way of a Deed of
Absolute Sale bought said Lot No. 7449 as
a consequence of which, TCT was issued
to the pet
Pet enrolled Lot No. 7449 with the issuance
of Tax Declaration and continued to
religiously pay the realty taxes and the
subject property is in its actual possession
since its acquisition from Pearanda up to
the present.
Accdg. to resps evidence
In 1943, the Director of Lands gave
authority to sell at public auction Lot No.
7449 at the price of not less than P290.00.
In the same year, the Bureau of Friar Lands
Agent issued a Notice fixing the public
auction of Lot No. 7449, among others, on
May 5, 1943. On said date, Mabini Legaspi
[resps predecessor-in-interest] submitted a
winning bid of P290.00. The subsequent
installments were paid respectively
evidenced by Official Receipts
The Register of Deeds of Cavite issued a
TCT to Mabini Legaspi who held ownership
of the property up to 1957 when he
executed a Deed of Sale transferring it to
resp Virata. The deed was registered with
the Registry of Deeds in the same year and
on that same day, the Register of Deeds
issued TCT to resp Virata
However, in 1959, the Provincial Capitol
building of Cavite which housed the
Registry of Deeds was burned, destroying
land records and titles in the registry among
which were the records relating to Lot No.
7449
In September, 1959, the Registry of Deeds
administratively reconstituted the original of
resps TCT
The TCT issued in the name of pet in 1976
came to the knowledge of resp in 1978
when he received a subpoena from the NBI
in connection with its investigation of the
conflicting land titles on Lot No. 7449. Resp
presented Mabini Legaspi as his witness.
Mabini Legaspi in her sworn testimony
declared, among others, that she did not
sell the land to Pearanda, nor waived her
right over the land in his favor
Trial Court ruled in favor of resp; CA affirmed; hence, this
pet
Issue: who is the rightful/lawful owner of the parcel of
land in question
Held: Pet Solid State Multi-Products Corp.; TC & CA
rulings reversed
Ratio:
It is undisputed that the land involved in this case is a
friar land and that the laws which are applicable are Act
No. 1120, [Friar Lands Act] providing for the
administration and temporary leasing and sale of certain
haciendas and parcels of land, commonly known as friar
lands, and Commonwealth Act No. 32 as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 316, which provided for the
subdivision and sale of all the portions of the friar lands
estate remaining undisposed of
From the pertinent provisions of the said laws, the
Bureau of Lands shall first issue a certificate stating
therein that the govt has agreed to sell the land to such
settler or occupant. The latter then shall accept the
certificate and agree to pay the purchase price and in the
installments and at the interest specified in the certificate.
The purchaser becomes the owner upon the issuance of
the certificate of sale in his favor subject only to the
cancellation thereof in case the price agreed upon is not
paid
Upon the payment of the final installment, the govt shall
then issue a final deed of conveyance in favor of the
purchaser. However, the sale of such friar lands shall be
valid only if approved by the Secretary of Interior as
provided in Act No. 1120. Later laws, however, required
that the sale shall be approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce. In short, the approval by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is indispensable
for the validity of the sale.
Pets predecessor, Pearanda was the actual occupant of
Lot 7449 when he filed his application to purchase the
said lot in 1968; the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources approved the sale of the lot w/o auction to
Pearanda; that a sales contract was executed between
the Director of Lands and Pearanda for a consideration
of P 1,198.00 payable in 10 monthly installments; that
upon the full payment of the price, the Undersecretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources issued the final deed
of conveyance in favor of Pearanda. Subsequently, the
Register of Deeds of Cavite issued a TCT in the name of
Pearanda, and when the latter sold the land to pet,
formers TCT was cancelled and TCT was issued in favor
of the latter. Clearly, the purchase of the friar land made
by Pearanda was in compliance with law
On the other hand, nowhere in the evidence for the resp
would show that a certificate of sale was ever issued by
the Bureau of Lands, which would vest ownership and
title over the land in favor of Mabini Legaspi. The
acquisition of the lot by Legaspi was highly irregular and
void, and not in compliance with the procedure mandated
by law for the sale of friar lands. For one thing, Mabini
Legaspi allegedly purchased the land in a sale at public
auction, which procedure is nowhere provided in the
applicable laws. The laws expressly state that an actual
occupant of the land shall purchase the lot occupied by
him at a private sale and not in a sale at public auction
[Sec. 2, C.A. 32 as amended]. Further, neither was there
any deed of conveyance issued to Legaspi by the govt
after the full payment of the installments on the disputed
lot.
There was neither allegation nor proof that the sale was
with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce. The absence of such approval made the
supposed sale null and void ab initio.
The issuance of a certificate of title in favor of Mabini
Legaspi did not vest ownership upon her over the land
nor did it validate the alleged purchase of the lot, which is
null and void.
Although a period of 1 year has already expired from the
time the certificate of title was issued to Mabini Legaspi
pursuant to the alleged sale from the govt, said title does
not become incontrovertible but is null and void since the
acquisition of the property was in violation of law. Further,
the petitioner herein is in possession of the land in
dispute. Hence, its action to quiet title is imprescriptible.
Being null and void, the sale made to Mabini Legaspi and
the subsequent titles issued pursuant thereto produced
no legal effects whatsoever.
Even assuming that resp was a purchaser in good faith
and for value, the law is, as b/w 2 persons both of whom
are in good faith and both innocent of any negligence, the
law must protect and prefer the lawful holder of
registered title over the transferee of a vendor bereft of
any transmissible rights. Further if a person happened to
obtain property by mistake or to the prejudice of another
with or without bad faith, the certificate of title w/c may
have been issued to him under the circumstances may
and should be cancelled or corrected.
Villanueva vs. CA, 198 SCRA 472 (1991)
Author: Banico
Facts:
The present case assails the decision of the CA in
reversing the decision of the RTC, which the latter court
dismissed the complaint for the annulment of the deed of sale.
The CA found that the signature of the vendor in the deed of
sale was forged.
Catalina Sanchez (private respondent) claimed to be
the widow of Roberto Sanchez (vendor). Catalina then claimed
that her husband is the owner of a 275 sq. meter parcel of land
in Rosario Cavite, which was registered in the names of Sps.
Villanueva (petitioners) without her knowledge and an alleged
deed of sale. On a report by the Philippine Constabulary (PC)
it was showed that the signature of Roberto was forged. She
now prays for the annulment of the deed of sale. On the part of
the petitioners, Sps. Villanueva questions the personality of
the Catalina, contending that Roberto was never married, but
had a common-law wife, which he had 2 illegitimate children.
They also claim the Roberto signed over the deed to them in
1968 for the sum of P500 as partial payment of a judgment
they obtained against him.
During the trial, the RTC then required that the
document be investigated by the NBI, as requested by
petitioners. The NBI had the same findings, claiming that the
signature was not done by the same person. The RTC ruled in
favor of the petitioner, rejecting the findings of both the PC and
the NBI. It was reasoned that the difference in the signature
may be caused by Roberto being "under serious emotional
stress and intensely angry" when he reluctantly signed the
document after he had lost the case to them". It was also
stated that Roberto did not do anything to annul the deed of
sale, thus the action has already prescribed. However, the CA
reversed the decision of the RTC and ruled in favor of the
respondent.
Issue: WoN the CA erred in reversing the decision of the RTC
and annulling the deed of sale?
Ruling: No, the CA did not commit reversible error. The SC
affirms the decision of the CA.
Catalina Sanchez has proved that she is the widow of
Roberto by submitting her marriage contract. It was rendered
unnecessary the presumption that "a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage" and may also explain why Roberto
Sanchez could not marry the woman by whom he supposedly
had two illegitimate children. It was error on the part of the
RTC to reject the evidence of a marriage contract and held the
validity of the Transfer Certificate Title describing Roberto to
be single, disregarding the principle that the best evidence of
a marriage is the marriage contract.
Going to the expert testimonies of both the PC and the
NBI, it was significant that even though it was petitioners who
requested the examination of the NBI, it was respondent who
presented it as her own witness. It is clear that petitioners
thought that that the NBIs findings would refute the PCs
examination, however, the findings coincide with one another.
They did not conjure this conclusion out of thin air but
supported it with knowledgeable testimony extensively given
on direct and cross-examination on the various characteristics
and differences of the signatures they had examined and
compared. The Court itself examined the signatures of
Roberto in different instruments, and is also inclined to accept
the findings of the experts. For the reason that the difference
was because Roberto was "under serious emotional stress
and intensely angry", petitioners were not able to establish for
such reason, and it was only conjecture on the part of the
RTC.
Petitioners also were not able to properly explain why it
took them 13 years before they could have filed for the
registration of the deed of sale. They explain that they were
mere peasants and did not appreciate the significance of the
immediate transfer of the property in their names. However,
the evidence support that the petitioners understood the
importance of the immediate registration since it was for the
purpose of using it as collateral in case they wanted to borrow
money.
Also, for the claim of prescription, petitioner invoke that
the CA erred in not declaring the action to have prescribed.
The SC ruled that the applicable rule is not Art. 1391 but Art.
1410 of the Civil Code. Art. 1410 provides that "the action or
defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract
does not prescribe.
 Finally, petitioners invoke that Art. 1431 of the Civil
Code, contending that the respondent is estopped from
questioning the deed of sale. The conclusion of petitioner that
private respondent had knowledge of the transaction, is not
supported by evidence on record. Also, the Court does not see
the connection of Art. 1431, which provides that "through
estoppel an admission or representation is rendered
conclusive upon the person making it and cannot be denied or
disproved as against the person relying thereon at the present
case.
Avila vs. Tapucar, 201 SCRA 148 (1991)
Author: TANG
SUMMARY & READ KAHIT ETO LNG BASAHIN NIYO
PORTION FOR EASY UNDERSTANDING
Bahan applied for a free patent registration on a certain
property
In the free patent application included another persons
property - hence enlarging their own property through
such erroneous inclusion.
As such obviously (petitioner) Avilas got angry why
was their said property subject to another persons
land registration (Bahans free patent application)
Bahans free patent application was granted - hence
they are invoking indefeasibility of title because they
already had a valid registration, as evidence of
ownership
Avila questions such whether or not registration is valid
, because their title was erroneously included in
Bahans free patent registration
Court ruled in favor of Avila -The evidence shows that
Free Patent No. 552571 issued to the Bahans is
erroneous as it embraced and comprised in portions
thereof lands which belong to the Avilas.
Facts:
Acquisition
In 1918, spouses Pedro Bahan and Dominga Exsaure
acquired a parcel of land situated at Tabangao, Victory,
Tubay, Agusan del Norte, which is more particularly
described as follows:
A parcel of coconut land containing an area of 1.8340
has. (now reduced to 1.3485 due to road) covered by
Tax Dec. No. 270, bounded on the North by Anastacio
Luyahan, on the East and South by Tabangao Creek
and on the West by Tomas Colon, assessed in the
amount of P330.00
Inheritance
In 1965, said property was inherited by private
respondents Julito Bahan, Cristina Bahan-Panis, Lucita
Carters, Boy Cartera and Candelaria Bahan-Mendoza
as successors-in-interest.
Avilas purchase of Property
On October 11, 1960, petitioner Magdalena Avila (then
Mrs. Magdalena R. Vda. de Leon) bought a parcel of
land situated at Tabangao, Victory, Tubay, Agusan del
Norte, containing an area of 4,371 square meters more
or less from Luis Cabalan and his wife under a Deed of
Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land and under Tax
Declaration No. 3055.
Filing of free patent (Bahan Heirs)
 On November 3, 1971, the heirs of Pedro Bahan,
represented by Julito Bahan filed Free Patent
Application No. (IX-2) 10144 for an area of 2.2400
hectares of Lot No. 2383, Pls-736 which lot has a total
area of 6.9027 hectares in its entirety. Deputy Public
Land Inspector Francisco C. Baylen in his report, dated
November 28, 1971 stated that the heirs of Pedro
Bahan represented by Julito Bahan, have cultivated
only 2.2500 hectares of land applied for and
consequently, he did not recommend the issuance of
the patent. Said report was erroneously forwarded to
the Bureau of Lands by then Acting Assistant District
Land Officer of Butuan City dated December 23, 1971,
recommending the issuance of patent therefor.
Alleged farming of Bahan in Avilas said property
In May 1973, private respondent Julito Bahan together
with ten persons who were alleged to be members of
the Free Farmers Federation, gathered coconuts from
the land purchased by petitioner Magdalena Avila but
was intercepted by the Chief of Police of Tubay,
Agusan del Norte.
Bahans act of quieting the title
On June 27, 1973, private respondents Bahans filed an
action for quieting of title and damages with the Court
of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City,
Branch I docketed as Civil Case No. 1585 entitled
"Julito Bahan, Cristina Bahan-Panis, Lucita Carters,
Boy Carters, Candelaria Bahan-Mendoza, Alfreda Pol,
in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children:
Carmencita, Oscar, Julia, Julita and Gervacio, Jr., all
surnamed Bahan versus Ludovico Avila (Mariano Avila)
and Magdalena Avila" alleging that they were the
successors-in-interest of "a parcel of coconut land
containing an area of 1.8340 has. (now reduced to
1.3485 due to the road)" and that sometime in 1968, he
discovered that the northwestern portion of said land
containing an area of about 1/3 of a hectare was
already in the possession of the Avilas; and the latter
were harvesting the fruits of about 40 coconut trees
found therein. The Bahans prayed that the petitioners
Avilas be ordered to pay the Bahans the sum of not
less than P1,800.00 a year from the time they took
possession of the aforesaid property until the
possession thereof is restored to them.
Avilas defense of purchase of title and adverse
possession
In their answer, the petitioners Avilas raised the
defense that on October 11, 1960, Magdalena Avila
purchased a parcel of land situated at Tabangao,
Victory, Tubay, Agusan del Norte, containing an area of
4,371 square meters more or less from Luis Cabalan
and from then on has been in open, continuous, public,
peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the same.
Bahans application of a free patent was granted
In the meantime, private respondents Bahans'
application for free patent was approved for 6.9027
hectares and Free Patent No. 552571 was issued on
December 6, 1973. Original certificate of title No. P-
8424 was issued in the name of the Heirs of Pedro
Bahan, represented by Julito Bahan on the same date.
KAHIT ETO LNG BASAHIN NIYO
On October 17, 1974, the Avilas filed an administrative
protest against the Bahans before the Bureau of Lands
docketed as B.L. Claim No. 872 (N) DLO Lot No. 2383
 Tabangao, Doa Rosario, Tubay, Agusan del Norte,
entitled "Mariano P. Avila and Magdalena R. Avila,
Claimants-Protestants versus F.P.A. No. (IX-2) 10144
(Patent No. 552571) Heirs of Pedro Bahan,
represented by Julito Bahan, Applicant-Respondent"
for having erroneously included their land under the
issued free patent and Original Certificate of Title,
which protest was filed 11 months after the issuance of
the patent and 7 months and 3 days after the
registration of the Certificate of Title in the Registration
Book of the Register of Deeds, Agusan del Norte.
Judge Tapucar ruled in favor of Bahan - citing
indefeasibility of title as a valid defense
Issue: W/N Bahans defense of having a valid decree of
registration over the said free patent was valid (the one having
an erroneous inclusion of Avilas property , hence enlarging
Bahans own property)
Held:NO- Bahans erroneous inclusion of Avilas title in
the formers successful free patent application does not
make the former the owner of the latters property
Registration does not vest title. It is not a mode of acquiring
ownership but is merely evidence of such title over a particular
property. It does not give the holder any better right than what
he actually has, especially if the registration was done in bad
faith. The effect is that it is as if no registration was made at all
Ratio:
Sa usapin sa lupa , kunin lng ang nararapat sayo,
wag kunin ang nakatakda sa ibang tao, kahit anong
gawin mo , hindi mo yan makukuha.
It is axiomatic in this jurisdiction that "while land
registration is a proceeding in rem and binds the whole
world, the simple possession of a certificate of title
under the Torrens Systems does not necessarily make
the holder a true owner of all the property described
therein. If a person obtains a title under the Torrens
system, which includes by mistake or oversight land
which can no longer be registered under the system,
he does not, by virtue of the said certificate alone,
become the owner of the lands illegally included
Foja Vs. Court of Appeals, 75 SCRA 441 (1977)
Author: John Briones
Facts:
1. Levin Frial filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz
Branch 3, situated in Mambusao, Capiz, a complaint for
Recovery of Possession and damages, for a parcel of land
located in Barrio San Agustin, Dumalag, Capiz, w/ area of 235,
854 square meters more or less, ( OCT No. RO-1496), named
under Indalecio Frial, father of Levine Frial;
2. Levine Frial came to know that Felipa Faja was
occupying the property, Frial demanded its return, however,
Faja declined;
3. Thus, Frial filed a complaint for recovery of possession
of the land in question, and the unearned income from the land
for a period of not less than 30 years, at around P150, 000.00;
4. Faja, in her answer, denied under oath the allegations
in the complaint as to the ownership of Frial, in her defense,
Faja claimed she is the lawful owner and in actual possession
of the property, which is identical to Lot No. 4010 of the
Cadastral Survey of Dumalag, Capiz, which she inherited from
her father, Marcelino Faja; and argues the ff:

Faja argues that she and her predecessors in-interest
have been in possession of the property publicly,
peacefully, continuously and adversely, in the concept
of owners, for more than 60 years, with tax
declarations in the name of her father, Marcelino Faja
and taxes have been paid ever since then; Faja further
explains that she herself lives on the land in question,
and that the same is planted with coconut trees,
mangoes, bananas, santol, buri, while around 8
hectares are for rice and corn;
Faja also argues that Levin Frial and his father,
Indalecio Frial, NEVER LIVED nor possessed the
said property, EVEN FOR A SINGLE MOMENT. Faja
also argues that any Certificate of Title secured by
Indalicio Frial was obtained through FRAUD, DECEIT,
and MISREPRESENTATION.
6. Frial, denied the fraud claim against his father; and
alleged that Fajas right to question the validity of the Title had
PRESCRIBED;
7. Responsive pleadings filed, pre-trial conference
ensued, Judge Leonidas order parties to submit a
memoranda, whether or not SUMMARY JUDGMENT may be
issued on the basis of the pleadings, since there were only 2
issues to be resolved;
a. can a registered owner who has acquired title thereto
for almost 35 years still recover possession from actual
occupants who claim long and continuous possession of same
property but w/out title;
b. is reconveyance of titled property still legally possible
considering that a period of more than 10 years had elapsed
since the issuance of the decree of registration;
8. Subsequently, Felipa Faja in her memorandum argued
that summary judgment should be DENIED, as there was
genuine controversy between the partieswhich required a trial
on the merits, and that the alleged prescription of her
counterclaim for reconveyance cannot be subject of a
summary judgment, notwithstanding the fact that her cause of
action for reconveyance to her of the property only arose from
the moment she was served the copy of the compliant which
was 1975;
9. However, TRIAL COURT: Trial Judge ruled in favor of
Levin Frial, and against Faja. Trial Court ruled that there was
NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO MATERIAL FACT, except to
amount of damages, SUMMARY JUDGMENT was declared in
favor of Frial.
10. MR was filed by Faja, denied, subsequently, Faja died,
her children now herein, all surnamed Gardose, substituted
her, and filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for Certiorari;
11. Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the summary judgment,
NO GENUINE ISSUE as to any material fact, CA reasoned
that the disputed property was covered by an OCT, and that
any action to annul that title on the ground of fraud prescribes
after the lapse of 10 years;
ISSUE: W/N the trial court and the Court of Appeals was
correct in their summary judgments
HELD: NO, summary judgments set aside, the presiding
judge of CFI Capiz, is directed to proceed with the trial on
the merits.
RATIO:
1. Counterclaim of Felipe Faja for reconveyance of the litigated
property has NOT PRESCRIBED. It is an established rule that
an action to quiet title to property in the possession of plaintiff
is IMPRESCRIPTIBLE. Here, Faja was in possession of the
property since 1945-present, basically 30 years, her cause of
action for reconveyance, which seeks to quiet title to the
property in dispute, FALLS WITHIN THE RULE. More
importantly, the period of prescription began to run
against Felipa Faja, only from the time she was served
with the copy of the complaint in 1975 giving her notice
that property she was occupying was titled in the name of
Indalecio Frial;
2. Settled jurisprudence provides that, one who is actual
possession of a land claiming to be owner, may wait until his
possession or his title be attacked, before taking steps to
vindicate his right, his undisturbed possession gives him a
continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity, this
can only be claimed by one who is in possession.
Here, THIS RULE OF EQUITY strongly applies to Felipa Faja ,
who was in possession of the litigated property for no less than
30 years and was suddenly confronted with a claim that her
land which she was occupying and cultivating was titled to
someone else;
3. This Court rules that the right to seek reconveyance and
annul the certificate of title to the property, ACCRUED ONLY
from the time the one in possession was made aware of the
adverse claim, the time of knowledge will be the reckoning
point that the statutory period of prescription will run against
the possessor;
4. The existence of Certificate of Title in the name of Frials
father is NOT CONCLUSIVE, because there are allegations of
fraud;
5. This Court regrets the summary dismissal, because there
exists MATERIAL FACTS, to be inquired, into and resolved on
the basis of evidence adduced by the parties:
a) circumstances which led to the issuance of OCT in 1950 in
favor of Frial
b) explanation, if any, of Frials INACTION, and his heirs, for a
period of 30 years to take possession of land in question
c) claim of ownership of Faja
Ergo, all these matters cannot simply be summarily
disposed of in favor Frial.
5. This Court, desires to the encourage trial courts to take
advantage of and apply provisions of Rules of Court on
Summary Judgments for expeditious disposition of cases,
however, as stated in the case of Constantino vs. Hon.
Estenzo,
the rule on summary judgment can only be entertained where
there are no questions of fact in issue or where material
allegations of the pleadings, Are not disputed. xxx the
demands of a fair, impartial and wise administration of justice
call for a faithful adherence to legal precepts on procedure
which ensure litigants the opportunity to present their evidence
and secure a ruling on all issues presented in the respective
pleadings. SHORTCUTS IN JUDICIAL PROCESS ARE TO BE
AVOIDED, where they impede, rather than promote a
judicious dispensation of justice.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring.
Respondent court failed to appreciate that these are vital
genuine issues of fact which would materially affect the
outcome of the case and therefore gravely erred in ruling that
summary judgment is proper as there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact.
Register of Deeds vs. PNB, 13 SCRA 46 (1965)
Author:
Facts:
This appeal originated from a petition filed by the Register of
Deeds of Cotabato in Cadastral Case. He prayed that original
certificates of title in the name of Datu Sinarimbo Binasing, be
ordered cancelled on the ground that they had been issued
erroneously; that Datu Binasing had secured the said titles
upon false representations in an affidavit wherein he alleged
that he had never, to his knowledge, secured titles for said
lands.
The Philippine National Bank opposed the petition because it
was the mortgagee of said lots which were later extrajudicially
foreclosed, with the PNB itself as the highest bidder at the
foreclosure sale.
The facts are not disputed. Datu Binasing was the owner of
the said four lots pursuant to which four original certificates of
titles were issued in his name. On July 23, 1938, he sold said
lots to Soledad C. de Teruel. The deed of sale was registered
in the office of the Register of Deeds and the corresponding
Transfer Certificates of Title were accordingly issued in her
name.
The Office of the said Register of Deeds was burned during
the Pacific War and the records, among them, the original
certificates of title in the name of Datu Binasing covering said
four lots were destroyed.
In 1947, Datu Binasing secured certified copies of the
aforesaid decrees from the General Land Registration Office.
And on the strength of these copies and an affidavit stating
that he had not at anytime secured certificates of title for said
fours lots, the said Register of Deeds on August 8, 1947,
issued in the name of Datu Binasing, original certificates of
title. Thereafter, said Datu obtained from the Philippine
National Bank, a loan of P10,000.00, and he gave as security
the said lots and some other properties. On March 20, 1954, Held: No
the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed.
Ratio: Datu has other properties that the bank can use to
Soledad C. de Teruel, on the other hand, procured a enforce its loan against Datu. On the other hand, the Supreme
reconstitution of her transfer certificates of title, in lieu thereof, Court ruled that the Torrens issued to Datu in 1947 could not
Transfer Certificates of Title were issued in her name. prevail over the Torrens issued to de Teruel in 1938. The
theory of indefeasibility of titles under the Torrens System,
Having discovered this state of affair (two different certificates
states that the indefeasibility of title thereunder could be
of title for each of said four lots, and in the name of two
claimed only if a previous valid title to the same parcel of land
different persons), the Register of Deeds filed the petition that
does not exist. Where issuance of the title was attended by
gave rise to this appeal.
fraud, the same cannot vest in the titled owner any valid legal
Lower court: directed the said Register of Deeds to cancel
title to the land covered by it; and the person in whose name
original certificates of title issued in the name of Datu, and
the title was issued cannot transmit the same, for he (Datu)
declared valid and subsisting the Transfer Certificates of Title
has no true title thereto. This ruling is a mere affirmation of the
issued in the name of Soledad C. de Teruel.
recognized principle that a certificate is not conclusive
The Philippine National Bank appealed contending that being evidence of title if it is shown that the same land had already
an innocent mortgagee for value, it is entitled to protection been registered and that an earlier certificate for the same
under Sec. 55, Act 496 as amended; that in the case of land is in existence.
Blondeau vs. Nano and Vallejo, a mortgagee (relying upon a
Torrens title in good faith and unaware that fraud had been
committed by forgery) was protected. He cites other cases Martinez vs. CA, 56 SCRA 647 (1974)
Author: Corpuz
holding that the innocent purchaser for value may take good
title, notwithstanding defects of the mortgagors title deeds. FACTS:
Issue: Whether or not to give due weight to the mortgage
executed by Datu in favor of PNB.
1. Spouses Martinez are the registered owners of Lot Nos. 1
and 2 located in Lubao, Pampanga. Both parcels of land
are fishponds. The subject property is Lot No. 2.
2. It was originally owned by Paulino Montemayor. When he
died, he passed it to his successors-in-interest, who in
turn, sold both properties to a certain Potenciano Garcia.
3. Garcia was prevented by then municipal president of
Lubao from restoring the dikes constructed on the
contested property, so he filed a civil case with the CFI.
4. CFI declared a permanent preliminary injunction, which
was affirmed by SC. So since 1914, the dikes around the
property remained closed until a portion thereof was again
opened just before the outbreak of the Pacific War.
5. In 1925, Garcia applied for the registration of both parcels
of land in his name, which was granted by CFI Pampanga.
Hence, an OCT was issued to Garcia and his wife.
6. These parcels of land were eventually acquired by herein
spouses Martinez (7th purchaser).
7. They referred the issue on dikes to the Committee on
Rivers and Streams who appointed a Sub-Committee to
investigate the case and to conduct an ocular inspection
of the contested property. The Sub-Committee submitted
its report stating that Parcel No. 2 was not a public river
but a private fishpond owned by spouses Martinez.
Thereafter, the Committee on Rivers and Streams then
rendered its decision in favor of spouses Martinez.
8. The municipal officials of Lubao refused to recognize the
aforementioned decision because spouses Martinez also
instituted a civil case, before the CFI of Pampanga,
against Mayor Zagad who prevented them from
constructing dikes. Mayor Zagad appealed the injunction
suit to SC. SC dismissed the petition so spouses Martinez
proceeded to construct the dikes in the disputed parcel of
land.
9. 4 years later, while the civil case against Mayor Zagad was
still pending, then Secretary of Public Works and
Communications ordered another investigation of the said
parcel of land, directing the spouses to remove the dikes
they had constructed pursuant to the authority granted to
him by RA 2056. Otherwise, the dikes would be
demolished within thirty (30) days.
10. Spouses Martinez filed the present case, which was
decided in their favor by the lower Court.
11. CA, on appeal, reversed CFIs decision stating that Lot
No. 2 is a public stream so the title should be cancelled
and the river covered reverted to public domain. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in declaring Lot No. 2 as a public
river and ordering the cancellation of its registration
because this constitutes a collateral attack on a Torrens
Title in violation of the law.
HELD: NO. The incontestable and indefeasible character of
a Torrens certificate of title does not operate when the land
covered thereby is not capable of registration. CA affirmed.
RATIO:
1. The technical description of both Lots Nos. 1 and 2
confirms the fact that Lot No. 2 is practically bounded by
rivers on all sides. Lot No. 2 is a branch of the main river
that has been covered with water since time immemorial
and, therefore, part of the public domain that is NOT
 capable of private appropriation or acquisition by
prescription.
2. A person does not, by virtue of a certificate of title alone,
become the owner of the land illegally included, such as
those that cannot be registered under the Torrens system.
(Ledesma v. Municipality of Iloilo)
3. The right of reversion or reconveyance to the State of
such public properties does not prescribe.
4. Moreover, the Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction
over non-registerable properties and cannot validly
adjudge the registration of title in favor of a private
applicant.
5. When it comes to registered properties, the Secretary of
Public Works & Communications has jurisdiction to order
the removal or obstruction to navigation along a public and
navigable creek or river included therein (R.A. 2056)
6. Furthermore, appellants cannot be deemed purchasers for
value and in good faith. They knew the condition of the
land that they were buying and the restrictions that may be
imposed by the government in connection with their
project of converting Lot No. 2 into a fishpond.
Nevertheless, they willfully and voluntarily assumed the
risks attendant to the sale of said lot. One who buys
something with knowledge of defect or lack of title in his
vendor cannot claim that he acquired it in good faith.
7. As a general rule, a purchaser of a registered property
cannot go beyond the record to make inquiries as to the
legality of the title of the registered owner, but may rely on
the registry to determine if there is no lien or
encumbrances over the same. However, it cannot be
availed of as against the law and the accepted principle
that rivers are parts of the public domain for public use
and not capable of private appropriation or acquisition by
prescription.
Bornales vs. IAC, 166 SCRA 519 (1988)
Author: Sarah Rosales
Facts:
1. A parcel of land in Barrio Indayagan Pontevedra, Capiz, with
an area of 774, 397 square maters was awarded to Sixto
Dumulong who is married to Isabel Marquez. An original
certificate of title was issued in his name.
2. Sixto and Isabel did not have a child. Subsequently, Sixto
had an extramarital affair cohabited with Placida and they
begot children.
3. In March 1978 (by this time Sixto is already dead), a "Deed
of Extrajudicial Adjudication and Sale of Real Property",
which was purportedly a settlement of the conjugal estate of
Sixto Dumolong and Isabel Marquez Dumolong and the sale
of said lot for P6,000.00 to spouses Carlito Patanao and
Minda Dumolong and to spouses Bernardo Decrepito and
Loreta Dumolong, was executed by Renito Dumolong (Son
of Sixto and Placida) and by Isabel Marquez Dumolong
whose supposed thumbmark appeared in the document.
4. The deed was registered and a transfer certificate of title
was issued in favor of the spouses. 3 months later, the
spouses sold the lot to Antonio and Florenda Bornales for
40,000 and they eventually secured a transfer certificate of
title in their names.
5. Isabel Marquez filed an action for reconveyance and
damages against Placida Dumolong, Renito Dumolong,
spouses Carlito Patanao and Minda Dumolong, spouses
Bernardo Decrepito and Loreto Dumolong, and spouses
Antonio Bornales and Florenda Diaz for the alleged forgery
 of the "Deed of Extrajudicial Adjudication and Sale of Real private respondent sometime in 1980 to secure her signature and
Property. conformity to the Extra-Judicial Adjudication and Sale of Real
6. Bornales countered he was not aware of the fraudulent Property.
nature of the prior transactions, but since a Torrens was
issued he should be considered as a buyer in good faith,
hence entitled to some right.

Issue: Whether or not Bornales may invoke the indefeasibility

of the torrens title
Held: No.
Ratio:
Having bought the land registered under the Torrens system from
Placida who procured title thereto by means of fraud, Bornales
cannot invoke the indefeasibility of a certificate of title against Isabel
to the extent of her interest therein. The Torrens system of land Arguelles vs. Timbancaya, 72 SCRA 193 (1976)
registration should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud Author: Bianca Dador
against the rightful owner of real property. Registration, to be
effective, must be made in good faith. It is a settled rule that the The rule on the incontrovertible nature of a certificate of title
defense of indefeasibility of a certificate of title does not extend to a
applies when what is involved is the validity of the OCT, not
transferee (Bornales) who takes it with notice of the flaws in his
when it concerns that of the TCT. Also, public policy demands
transferors (Placidas) title. Thus, it is a settled rule that the defense
of indefeasibility of a certificate of title does not extend to a
that a person guilty of fraud or at least, of breach of trust,
transferee who takes it with notice of the flaws in his transferor's title. should not be allowed to use a Torrens title as a shield against
If at all, the petitioners only acquire the right which their vendors then the consequences of his own wrong doing.
had.
Facts:
The fact that petitioners have been the tenants/lessees of the land
even during Sixto Dumolong's lifetime belies any alleged lack of Defendant Guillermo Timbancaya appeals directly and on
knowledge. Having been the cultivators of the land, it is purely questions of law the decision of Palawan CFI. The trial
unimaginable that the petitioners would have been unaware of the court ruled that the property, subject of plaintiffs action for
transactions affecting the land. It appears that petitioners were aware
reconveyance and by virtue of a compromise agreement and
that the private respondent was the legal wife of Sixto Dumolong and
judgment in Special Proceedings No. 211, was owned jointly
was a rightful heir to the properties of the latter. In fact, the trial court
conclusively found that the petitioners themselves went to see the one-half thereof by Caridad Arguelles and the other half by
Guillermo and Alberto Timbancaya.
During the special proceedings for Intestate Estate of Jose
Arguelles, the court rendered a decision, in conformity with a
compromise agreement, adjudicating one half of the land to
Arguelles and the other half to the Timbancayas. It also
ordered both parties to pay for the coconut trees planted in
their respective portions of the land, which they relinquish in
favor of the other.
Contrary to the agreement and judgment in the special
proceedings however, Timbancaya was able to have the
original certificate of title cancelled and have a new CT issued
in his favor covering the whole land (June 5, 1961), despite
Arguelles actual open and continuous possession of one half
of the property even before the filing of the special
proceedings.
Upon knowing the issuance of the TCT, Arguelles filed the
instant case for reconveyance (April 30, 1965). Timbancaya,
for his part, alleges that Arguelles has no right to the property
in question because she is not an heir of the estate of the late
Jose Arguelles despite the decision in the special proceedings.
Issue:
W/N TCT had already become indefeasible, since almost four
years have lapsed before action was filed
Held:
No. The rule that a decree of registration once issued
becomes final and incontrovertible 1 year after its issuance is
not relevant to the case at bar.
Ratio:
Arguelles does not question the validity of the OCT but instead
seeks the annulment of the TCT, which was issued to
Timbancaya after the judgment by compromise and based on
his misrepresentation in the Register of Deeds. Timbancaya
had claimed that he and his brother are the exclusive owners
of the property as the only legitimate children and surviving
heirs of (their) parents Jose Arguelles and Rufina de los
Reyesa representation contrary to his previous admissions
that they are not the legitimate children of the deceased
Spouses Jose Arguelles and Rufina de los Reyes, but the
sons of Rufina de los Reyes with her first husband, Joaquin
Timbancaya.
In this case, the action to annul the title or action for
reconveyance has its basis in Section 55 of Act 496, which
provides that in all cases of registration procured by fraud the
owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against
the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the
rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title.
This remedy is distinct from that authorized by Section 38,
which has for its purpose the reopening of the decree of title,
on the ground of fraud, within 1 year from its issuance.
Judgment appealed from affirmed.
Umbay vs. Alecha, 135 SCRA 427 (1985); but see Jimenez
vs. Fernandez, 184 SCRA 190 (1990)
Author: PANGANIBAN

FACTS:
This case is about the right of the heirs of the registered owner
of a parcel of land with an area of 2,265 square meters to
recover a portion thereof with an area of 500 square meters
allegedly usurped by the adjoining owner.
1. Natalio Enanoria was the owner of Lot No. 5280
located in the mountain of Barrio Valencia, Carcar,
Cebu. His title is an OCT issued in 1922. He dided in
1924.
2. His heirs asked a surveyor to relocate the lot. They
discovered that its 500-square-meter portion was
occupied by Placido Alecha, the owner of the adjoining
Lot No. 5281 which is its southeastern boundary.
3. TC: ordered Alecha and his wife to vacate the said
500-square-meter portion.
4. Appellate Court: reversed that decision and dismissed
the complaint of the Enanoria heirs.
ISSUE: WON the Heirs of Enanoria has the right to recover
the 500sqm portion of their lot?
HELD: Yes. No prescription and laches. Neither can the
Alecha acquire the land through prescription because it is
covered by Torrens Title.
RATIO:
Sec 47 (P.S. 1529): no title to registered land in derogation to
that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription
or adverse possession
Prescription is unavailing not only against the
registered owner but also against his hereditary
successors because the latter merely step into the
shoes of the decedent by operation of law and are
merely the continuation of the personality of their
predecessor-in-interest
the real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title
to land and to stop forever any question as to its
legality. "Once a title is registered, the owner may rest
secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of
the court, or sitting in the mirador de su casa, to avoid
the possibility of losing his land."
Adverse, notorious and continuous possession under a
claim of ownership for the period fixed by law is
ineffective against a Torrens title. Title to land can no
longer be acquired by prescription after a Torrens title
has been issued for it.
The right to recover possession of registered land is
imprescriptible because possession is a mere
consequence of ownership
In this case, the petitioners action to recover the 500 square
meters cannot be barred by the equitable defense of laches or
delay because they because aware of the encroachment only
after they hired a surveyor in 1963 to ascertain the true area
and boundaries of Lot No. 5280.
Laches presupposes waiver of ones right. There was no
waiver in this case. The petitioners, poor, ignorant rustics,
never intended to renounce their right to the 500 square
meters.
SEE ALSO:
JIMENEZ v FERNANDEZ
Author: PANGANIBAN
FACTS:
The land in question is the Eastern portion with an area of
Four Hundred Thirty Six (436) square meters of that parcel of
residential land situated in Barrio Dulig (now Magsaysay),
Municipality of Labrador, Pangasinan actually covered by TCT
issued in the name of Jimenez.
1. Fermin Jimenez (formerly owns the parcel of land w/
an area of 2, 932 sqm) has 2 sons Fortunato and
Carlos.
2. Fortunato has one child Suplicia Jimenez (petitioner).
After death of Fermin, entire parcel of land was
registered under Act 496 in the name of Carlos and
Suplicia in equal shares pro-indiviso.
3. OCT was issued in their name.
4. Carlos died. His illegitimate daughter Melecia
Jimenez took possession of the eastern portion of the
property consisting of 436 sqm.
5. Melecia sold the 436 sqm to Edilberto Cagampan and
Teodora Grado (resp) w/ a contract (Exchange of Real
Properties).
6. Petitioner Sulpicia executed an affidavit adjudicating
unto herself the other half of the property appertaining
to Carlos Jimenez, upon manifestation that she is the
only heir of her deceased uncle. TCT was issued in
Sulpicias name alone covering 2,932sqm.
7. Sulpicia then instituted this action to recover the
eastern portion of the property (436sqm).
8. TC: Grado (resp) is the absolute owner. Sulpicia
appealed to CA, which affiremed the decision of TC;
MR denied.
ISSUE: WON Sulipicia is entitled to recover the eastern
portion of the parcel of land?
HELD: Yes. Sulpicia is not barred by laches.
RATIO:
[PRESCRIPTION and LACHES]
CA relied on Arcuino case, concluded that respondents
had acquired the property under litigation by
prescription UNTENABLE.
since 1933 petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez was a title
holder, the property then being registered in her and
her uncle Carlos Jimenez' name.
Melecia Cayabyab's possession or of her
predecessors-in-interest would be unavailing against
the petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez who was the holder pro-
indiviso with Carlos Jimenez of the Torrens Certificate
of Title covering a tract of land which includes the
portion now in question
No possession by any person of any portion of the land
covered by said original certificate of titles, could defeat
the title of the registered owner of the land covered by
the certificate of title
Sulpicia's ownership over her one-half of the land and
which is the land in dispute was always covered by a
Torrens title, and therefore, no amount of possession
thereof by the respondents, could ever defeat her
 proprietary rights thereon. It is apparent, that the right
of plaintiff (now petitioner) to institute this action to
recover possession of the portion of the land in
question based on the Torrens Title of Sulpicia
Jimenez, is imprescriptible and not barred under the
doctrine of laches.
There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches
or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined
according to its particular circumstances. The question
of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court and since laches is an equitable doctrine, its
application is controlled by equitable considerations. It
cannot be worked to defeat justice or to perpetrate
fraud and injustice. It would be rank injustice and
patently inequitous to deprive the lawful heirs of their
rightful inheritance.
and which should be the governing law in so far as the
right to inherit from his estate was concerned), a child
must be either a child legitimate, legitimated, or
adopted, or else an acknowledged natural child for
illegitimate not natural are disqualified to inherit.
Even assuming that Melecia Cayabyab was born out of
the common-law-relationship between her mother
(Maria Cayabyab) and Carlos Jimenez, she could not
even be considered an acknowledged natural child
because Carlos Jimenez was then legally married to
Susana Abalos and therefore not qualified to marry
Maria Cayabyab and consequently Melecia Cayabyab
was an illegitimate spurious child and not entitled to
any successional rights in so far as the estate of Carlos
Jimenez was concerned.

[MELECIA AS ILLEGITIMATE CHILD]

From the start the respondent court erred in not
declaring that Melecia Jimenez Cayabyab also known
as Melecia Jimenez, is not the daughter of Carlos
Jimenez and therefore, had no right over the property
in question. Nonetheless, assuming for the sake of
argument that Melecia Cayabyab was the illegitimate
daughter of Carlos Jimenez there can be no question
that Melecia Cayabyab had no right to succeed to the
estate of Carlos Jimenez and could not have validly
acquired, nor legally transferred to Edilberto
Cagampan that portion of the property subject of this
petition.
To be an heir under the rules of Civil Code of 1889
(which was the law in force when Carlos Jimenez died

Sotto vs. Teves, 86 SCRA 154 (1978)
Author: Mark
(Please try to see the original. Ang labo ng case. Baka
mas maintindihan niyo sa original. Sana. Ewan. Basta,
ang labo.)
Facts:
(This suit involves the heirs of Concepcion Rallos and the
estate of Atty. Filemon Sotto.)
This involves 5 parcels of land in Cebu City.
It originally belonged to the conjugal partnership of
Florentino and Maria Rallos
They had 2 children, Carmen and Concepcion
When Florentino died, his properties were bequeathed
to Maria, Carmen and Concepcion
Maria, Carmen and Concepcion entrusted the
settlement of the estate to Atty. Sotto.
The probate proceedings closed in 1913.
It was agreed that the property would be preserved for
the family, through a co-ownership
Afterward, Atty. Sotto married Carmen
Maria then passed away
Carmen died in 1945 without having any children
However, Atty. Sotto has children out of wedlock.
Concepcion died, leaving behind many children.
When Atty. Sotto was already old and under
guardianship, the heirs of Concepcion found out that
the 5 parcels in Cebu were in the name of Carmen
only, then passed to Atty. Sotto
All along, Concepcions heirs believed that the
properties would be passed to them.
Since the properties were now in the name of Atty.
Sotto, it was in danger of being passed to his
illegitimate children.
CFI
Hence, Concepcions heirs went to the CFI, suing
Marcelo Sotto (administrator of Atty. Sottos estate) for
recovery of possession and ownership of the 5 parcels
in Cebu.
Concepcions heirs claim that there was a trust
relationship between Atty. Sotto and Maria, Carmen
and Concepcion
Thus, Atty. Sotto violated the trust by placing the
properties solely in his wifes Carmens name, and
ultimately, to him.
Concepcions heirs say that the decree is null and void
because it should have been issued not just in
Carmens name, but also in Maria and Concepcions
names as well.
Marcelo says that the decree adjudicating the lots in
the name of Carmen was pursuant to an express
agreement between Carmen and the other heirs that
such parcel be given to her
CFI dismissed the complaint of Concepcions heirs.
No trust was established over the lots
The transfer of the lots was done through actual and
legitimate partition, wherein Carmen got the 5 lots.
Thus, Carmen was entitled to register them in her
name.
th
CA 8 Division
Concepcions heirs appeal to the CA
CA 8th Division affirms the CFI Decision
Concepcions heirs file a MR
CA Special Division
 CA Special Division reverses the CA 8th Division
CA Special Division held that Atty. Sottos special
relations with the family made him a constructive
trustee of his wife Carmen and Maria and Concepcion.
Hence, as a trustee, he should not have put his
interests above those of the family.
Also, Carmen did not acquire the lots, but was rather
entitled only to the usufruct thereof, as administratrix of
the trust between her, Maria and Concepcion.
Thus, Carmen could not have passed the property to
her husband Atty. Sotto.
CA Special Division thus declares Concepcions heirs
as the rightful owners of the properties.
Issue:
Can a trustee who registered the property in her/his name rely
on the registration as against the beneficiaries?
the trust by relying on the registration, which is one of
the well-known limitations upon the finality of a decree
of title.
Because of the very nature of a trust relation which
existed between Carmen Rallos and her co-owners,
she cannot obtain and secure a torrens title to the
properties in her name much less dispose of them by
testament to her husband, a constructive trustee, to the
prejudice and deprivation of the rights and interests of
said co-heirs.
A fiduciary relationship may exist even if the title to the
property subject to the trust appears in the name of the
trustee alone, because in cases of trusteeship, the
legal title usually appears in the name of the trustee,
while the equitable title remains with the cestui que
trust.

Held:
No. The SC affirms the decision of the CA Special Division.

Ratio:
Marcelo Sotto claims that Carmen already had the
property registered in her name, so she was well within
her right to transfer it to Atty. Sotto.
However, the SC says that Carmen could not have
done that because she held the property in trust for
Maria and Concepcion, and as such she could not
dispose of the property to the prejudice of the others.
The trust over the properties was present since 1913
It is true that Torrens titles were issued in the name of
Carmen Rallos, but the principle holds that a trustee
who takes a Torrens title in his name cannot repudiate

Toyota Motor Philippines Corp. vs. CA, G.R. No. 102881,
Dec. 7, 1992
Author: Delgado
Facts:
i. This case is a boundary dispute between Toyota Motor Phil.
Corporation and Sun Valley Manufacturing and Development
Corporation. Both are the registered owners of two adjoining
parcels of land situated in La Huerta, Paraaque, Metro Manila
which they purchased from the Asset Privatization Trust (APT).
ii. The properties in question formerly belonged to Delta
Motors Corporation (DMC). They were foreclosed by the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) and later transferred to the
national government through the APT for disposition.
iii. APT then proceeded to classify the DMC properties
according to the existing improvements, i.e., buildings,
driveways, parking areas, perimeter fence, walls and gates
and the land on which the improvements stood. The entire
DMC property is called GC III-Delta Motors Corporation,
divided into Delta I, Delta II, and Delta III. Further subdivisions
for the separate catalogues were made for each division e.g.
Delta I into Lots 1, 2 and 3. After this classification, APT
parcelled out and catalogued the properties for bidding and
sale.
iv. Part of the duly parcelled Delta I property (Lot 2) was sold
to Toyota through public bidding on May 12, 1988 for the
amount of P95,385,000.00. After its purchase, Toyota
constructed a concrete hollow block (CHB) perimeter fence
around its alleged property.
v. On October 5, 1990, another part of the parcelled Delta I
(Lot 1) covering an area of 55,236 square meters was
purchased by Sun Valley from APT for the bid price of
P124,349,767.00. Relying upon the title description of its
property and the surveys it had commissioned, Sun Valley
claimed that Toyota's perimeter fence overlaps Sun Valley's
property along corners 11 to 15 by 322 square meters and
corners 19 to 1 by 401 square meters for a total of 723 square
meters.
vi. Negotiations between the corporations for a possible
settlement of the dispute bogged down. Court battles ensued,
grounded on purely procedural issues. In pursuing the
resolution of the dispute, both Toyota and Sun Valley opted to
file separate actions. Much of the complications that arose and
are now before us can be traced to the two separate cases
pursued by both parties.
vii. Toyota Case: Toyota filed an action for reformation before
Judge Tensuan on September 11, 1991, before Judge
Tensuan alleging that the true intentions of the parties were
not expressed in the instrument (Art. 1359 Civil Code). The
instrument sought to be reformed is the deed of sale executed
by APT in favor of Toyota. Toyota alleges that there was a
mistake in the designation of the real properties subject matter
of the contract. Sun Valley was impleaded in order to obtain
complete relief since it was the owner of the adjacent lot.
viii. Sun Valley Case: Sun Valley filed an action for recovery of
possession before Judge Gorospe of the disputed 723 square
meters boundary with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Makati.
On the same day, Judge Gorospe issued a TRO enjoining
Toyota from committing further acts of dispossession against
Sun Valley. It argues that Toyotas complaint for reformation
states no cause of action against it since an action for
reformation is basically one strictly between the parties to the
contract itself. Third persons who are not parties to the
contract cannot and should not be involved. Thus, Sun Valley
contends that it should not have been impleaded as a
defendant.
Issue:
i. Who as between Judge Tensuan or Judge Gorospe has
jurisdiction of the case.
ii. Who as between the parties has the rightful possession of
the land.
Held:
i. Sun Valley's action for recovery of possession filed before
Judge Gorospe now stands to be the proper forum where the
following dispute may be tried or heard.
ii. Sun Valley has a better right.
Ratio:
i. General rule: All persons to be affected by the proposed
reformation must be made parties. However, these principles
are not applicable under the particular circumstances of
this case. Under the facts of the present case, Toyota's
action for reformation is dismissible as against Sun
Valley.
ii. The contention that the arbitration clause has become
disfunctional because of the presence of third parties is
untenable. The contract of sale executed between APT and
Toyota provides an arbitration clause which states that:
In case of disagreement or conflict arising out of this Contract, the
parties hereby undertake to submit the matter for determination by
a committee of experts, acting as arbitrators, the composition of
which shall be as follows:
a) One member to be appointed by the VENDOR;
b) One member to be appointed by the VENDEE;
c) One member, who shall be a lawyer, to be appointed by
both of the aforesaid parties;
The members of the Arbitration Committee shall be appointed not
later than three (3) working days from receipt of a written notice
from either or both parties. The Arbitration Committee shall
convene not later than three (3) weeks after all its members have
been appointed and proceed with the arbitration of the dispute
within three (3) calendar months counted therefrom. By written
mutual agreement by the parties hereto, such time limit for the
arbitration may be extended for another calendar month. The
decision of the Arbitration Committee by majority vote of at least
two (2) members shall be final and binding upon both the VENDOR
and the VENDEE.
iii. Contracts are respected as the law between the contracting
parties. As such, the parties are thereby expected to abide
with good faith in their contractual commitments. Toyota is
therefore bound to respect the provisions of the contract it
entered into with APT.
iv. The arbitration committee is therefore the proper and
convenient forum to settle the matter as clearly provided in the
deed of sale. Having been apprised of the presence of the
arbitration clause in the motion to dismiss filed by APT, Judge
Tensuan should have at least suspended the proceedings and
directed the parties to settle their dispute by arbitration. Judge
Tensuan should have not taken cognizance of the case.
v. The more apparent reason which warrants the dismissal of
the action as against Sun Valley is the fact that the complaint
for reformation amounts to a collateral attack on Sun Valley's
title, contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals' 11th
Division. Sun Valley has a Torrens title registered in its
name by virtue of its purchase of the land from APT. Well-
settled is the rule that a certificate of title can not be
altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law, thus an action for
reformation is improper. Reformation may often be had to
correct mistakes in defining the boundary of lands conveyed
so as to identify the lands, it may not be used to pass other
lands from those intended to be bought and sold,
notwithstanding a mistake in pointing out the lines, since
reformation under these circumstances would be inequitable
and unjust.
vi. Existence of a "clear positive right" especially calling for
judicial protection has been shown by Sun Valley. Sun Valley
has TCT No. 49019 of the Registry of Deeds of Paraaque
embracing the aforesaid property in its name, having been
validly acquired also from APT by virtue of a Deed of Sale
executed in its favor on December 5, 1990. There is therefore
sufficient and convincing proof that Sun Valley has a clear
legal right to possession in its favor to warrant the issuance of
a writ of preliminary/mandatory injunction. Sun Valley's TCT
gives it that right to possession. On the other hand, Toyota has
not established its right over the said property except for the
assertion that there was a mistake in an instrument which
purportedly should have included the questioned strip of land.
Realty Sales Enterprises, Inc. vs. IAC, 154 SCRA 328
(1987)
Author: Monzon
Facts:
Two adjacent parcels of land located in Almanza, Las Pias,
Metro Manila situated in the vicinity of the Ayala Alabang Project
and BF Homes Paraaque are covered by three distinct sets of
Torrens titles
Morris Carpo filed a complaint with the CFI of Rizal referred to as
Vera Court for "declaration of nullity of Decree No. N-63394 and
TCT No. 20408." Named defendants were Realty Sales
Enterprise, Inc., Macondray Farms, Inc. and the Commissioner of
Land Registration. The complaint alleged is a nullity as the CFI of
Rizal referred to as the Reyes Court which issued the order
directing the issuance of a decree of registration, was not sitting
as a land registration court, but as a court of ordinary jurisdiction.
It was further alleged that the original records the basis for the
issuance of said order of were lost and/or destroyed during World
War II and were still pending reconstitution; hence, the Reyes
Court had no authority to order the issuance of a certificate of
title.
Realty and Macondray alleged in their answer that the Reyes
Court was acting as a court of land registration and in issuing the
order, was actually performing a purely ministerial duty for the
registration court which had rendered a decision adjudicating the
two (2) lots in question to Estanislao Mayuga. It was alleged that
it is the title of Carpo which is null and void, having been issued
over a parcel of land previously registered under the Torrens
System in favor of another.
With leave of court, Realty and Macondray filed a third-party
complaint against the Quezon City Development and Financing
Corporation. QCDFC asserted the validity of its own title alleging
that it is the title in the name of Realty which is null and void.
QCDFC also filed a fourth-party complaint alleging that it bought
said parcels of land from them. Fourth-party complaint was
dismissed for lack of interest.
Vera Court rendered judgment sustaining the title of Morris G.
Carpo to the two (2) lots in question and declaring the titles of
Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. and QCDFC null and void.
Carpo filed a motion for reconsideration with the appellate court.
In the meantime, the Court of Appeals was reorganized into the
Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC). As a consequence, there was
a re-raffling of cases and the case was assigned to the Second
Special Cases Division which returned the records of the case for
another re-raffling to the Civil Cases Divisions as it deemed itself
without authority to act on a civil case in view of the allocation of
cases to the different divisions of the IAC under Section 8 of BP
129. The case was then assigned to the Third Civil Cases
Division.
On, December 29, 1982, the Court of Appeals set aside the
decision of the trial court and rendered a new one upholding the
validity of the title in the name of Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. and
declaring null and void the titles in the name of Carpo and
QCDFC.
The IAC, through its Special Third Civil Cases Division granted
Carpo's motion for reconsideration, reversing and setting aside
the decision of December 29, 1982, and affirming the decision of
the trial court.
Issue: W/N declaring the title in the name of Carpo was valid
- No
Ruling:
The Dec 29, 1982 decision of CA was affirmed.
Re issue of jurisdiction: Under Act No. 496, Land Registration
Act, (1902) as amended by Act No. 2347 (1914), jurisdiction over
all applications for registration of title to and was conferred upon
the Courts of First Instance of the respective provinces in which
the land sought to be registered is situated.
Jurisdiction over land registration cases, as in ordinary actions, is
acquired upon the filing in court of the application for registration,
and is retained up to the end of the litigation. The issuance of a
decree of registration is but a step in the entire land registration
process; and as such, does not constitute a separate proceeding.
In the case at bar, it appears that it was Estanislao Mayuga,
father of Dominador Mayuga, predecessor-in-interest of Realty,
who originally filed in the CFI of Rizal to confirm his title over
parcels of land described (Lots 2 and 3 the subject of the instant
litigation among Carpo, RRealty and QCDFC.)
On May 13, 1958 Dominador Mayuga, son of Estanislao, filed a
petition with the Reyes Court alleging that he was the only heir of
the deceased Mayuga and praying for the issuance of a decree of
registration over the property adjudicated in favor of Estanislao. It
cannot be overemphasized that the petition filed by
Dominador is NOT a distinct and separate proceeding from,
but a continuation of, the original land registration
proceedings initiated by Estanislao Mayuga, Florentino
Baltazar and Eduardo Guico. In the same vein, the Reyes
Court, as Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
was continuing in the exercise of jurisdiction over the case,
which jurisdiction was vested in the CFI-Rizal upon filing of the
original applications.
Re records destroyed by fire/calamities: Section 29 of Act
No. 3110 should be applied only where the records in the CFI as
well as in the appellate court were destroyed or lost and were not
reconstituted, but not where the records of the Court of First
Instance are intact and complete, and only the records in the
appellate court were lost or destroyed, and were not
reconstituted.
The whole theory of reconstitution is to reproduce or replace
records lost or destroyed so that said records may be complete
and court proceedings may continue from the point or stage
where said proceedings stopped due to the loss of the records.
If the records up to a certain point or stage are lost and they are
not reconstituted, the parties and the court should go back to the
next preceding age where records are available, but not beyond
that; otherwise to ignore and go beyond the stage next preceding
would be voiding and unnecessarily ignoring proceedings which
are duly recorded and documented, to the great prejudice not
only of the parties and their witnesses, but also of the court which
must again perforce admit pleadings, rule upon them and then try
the case and decide it anew,-all of these, when the records up to
said point or stage are intact and complete, and uncontroverted.
The parties thereto did not have to commence a new action
but only had to go back to the preceding stage where
records are available. The land registration case itself re.
mained pending and the Court of First Instance of Rizal
continued to have jurisdiction over it.
Re innocent purchaser: Whether or not Carpo is an innocent
purchaser for value was never raised as an issue in the trial court.
A perusal of the records of the case reveals that no factual basis
exists to support such a conclusion. Even Carpo himself cites no
factual proof of his being an innocent purchaser for value. He
merely relies on the presumption of good faith under Article 527
of the Civil Code.
It is settled that one is considered an innocent purchaser for value
only if, relying on the certificate of title, he bought the property
from the registered owner, "without notice that some other person
has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair
price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has
notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the
property."
Also, Since Realty is claiming under TCT No. 1609 which was
issued earlier than OCT No. 8931 from which QCDFC's title was
derived, Realty's title must prevail over that of QCDFC.
It must be emphasized that the action filed by Carpo against
Realty is in the nature of an action to remove clouds from title to
real property. By asserting its own title to the property in question
and asking that Carpo's title be declared null and void instead,
and by filing the third-party complaint against QCDFC, Realty was
similarly asking the court to remove clouds from its own title.
Actions of such nature are governed by Articles 476 to 481.
Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they,
strictly speaking, in personam, but being against the person in
respect of the res, these proceedings are characterized as quasi
in rem.The judgment in such proceedings is conclusive only
between the parties.
Albienda vs. CA, 135 SCRA 402 (1985)
Author: GOJAR
Private respondents Supposes Sumampao were applicants for
a free patent over a land known as lot 1548 situated in San
Francisco Agusan del Sur.
They claimed that an 8-hectare portion was
erroneously included in the technical description of the
certificate of title covering Lot 1550 which is the adjoing
lot belonging to petitioner Felda Albienda. They based
such claim from the technical description in the survey
return by the Bureau of Lands surveyors. Hence, the
respondents instituted an action against petitioner
Albienda for correction of the latters certificate of title
and recovery of possession/reconveyance of said
portion of the land, with damages.
Petitioner averred that Lot 1550 with an area of 196,848 sq.m
originally belonged to Enesaria Goma in whose name the
same was registered under the Torrens System on July 23.
1958 then Goma sold it to Senerpida who possessed it
continuously & peacefully until Nov 21, 1972 when petitioner
Albienda acquired the lot for value in good faith and when the
deed of sale in favour of Albienda was registered, she was
issued a TCT covering Lot 1550 with an area of 196, 848
sq.m. which is the same area stated in the certificates of title of
petitioners predecessors-in-interest
ALSO, petitioner alleged that assuming the technical
description was wrong, the action for correction and
reconveyance is unavailable because more than 1 year
had elapsed since the issuance of the original
certificate of title in 1958 to petitioners predecessor-in-
interest, Enesaria Goma.
Issue having been joined, respondents filed a motion for
summary judgment and the documents and affidavits attached
disclosed that:
On August 22, 1958 - Loida Beterbonia, respondents
predecessor in-interest, wrote the Director of Lands requesting
for a recomputation of the respective areas of the adjoining
properties (Lot 1548 and Lot 1550),
Dec 2, 1958 - the chief of survey party stationed in San
Francisco Agusan, to whom the letter was referred, issued an
indorsement stating that it is believed that there has been a
mistake in the computation of the technical description of Lot
1550 because when the computation was done in Manila, the
plan was not yet available as it was still in Agusan office BUT
no further action was taken from that letter
Trial court: granted the summary judgment and ordered the
gov. officials to make necessary corrections and conform to
the survey by Bureau of Lands Cagayan and ordered Albiendo
to vacate the overlapped area and turn over to spouses
Sumamapo
CA: affirmed trial court decision
ISSUE: Whether or not the description of a parcel of land in
the petitioners certificate of title may be corrected to conform
with the technical description appearing in the survey return
on file in the Bureau of Lands, notwithstanding the lapse of
more than one (1) year since the issuance of said certificate of
title? NO.
HELD:
Section 38 of the Land Registration Act: Every decree of
registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto x x x it
shall be conclusive upon and against all persons x x x x
whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or
citations, or included in the general description To All Whom It
May Concern/ It is a settled doctrine that even when the
decree of registration has been obtained by fraud, the party
defrauded has only one year from entry of the decree to file a
petition for review before a competent court, and such petition
can prosper only if no innocent purchaser for value has
acquired an interest in the land.
Said Section 38 categorically declares that upon the
expiration of the said term of one [1] year every decree or
certificate of title issued in accordance with this section shall
be incontrovertible. Hence, A Torrens Title can no longer be
corrected as to area description after the lapse of one year
from issuance of decree of registration and the land has
already been sold to a purchaser in good faith even if area in
the title does not correspond to survey return or file with the
Bureau of Lands.
In this case, the original certificate of title covering Lot 1550
was issued on July 23, 1958 in favor of Enesaria Goma, the
petitioners predecessor-ininterest. The fact that sometime in
October 1958 Loida Baterbonia had written the Director of
Lands for a recomputation of the area set forth in the
certificate of the said land is of no moment, for up until the sale
of Lot 1550 to petitioner in 1972, no action had been brought
before a court of competent jurisdiction to correct the error, if
indeed there was such error.
The instant action to correct the certificate of title in question
was filed on July 13, 1977 or
about 19 years after the issuance of said certificate of title.
Since the period allowed by law for setting aside the decree of
registration of a certificate of title had long elapsed, the original
certificate of title issued in the name of petitioners
predecessor-in-interest had become indefeasible.
The Transfer Certificate of Title derived therefrom is likewise
unassailable, for under Section 39 of Act 496, every person
receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of
registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered
land who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith shall
hold the same be free of all encumbrance except those noted
on said certificate.
Hence, every person dealing with registered land may rely on
the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the
law will in no way oblige them to go behind the certificate to
determine the condition of the property.
Republic vs. CA, G.R. No. 84966, Nov. 21, 1991
Author: Kat
Facts:
1. The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor
General, filed on August 22, 1979, a complaint for
declaration of nullity of Decreto No. 6146, the owner's
duplicate copy of TCT No. 2337 and all titles derived from
said decree; and the declaration of the parcel of land
 covered by the decree as belonging to the state, except so
much thereof as had been validly disposed of to third
persons.
2. The complaint was amended on October 12, 1979. The
complaint alleged that: " The alleged Decree No. 6146 issued on
September 10, 1911 and the alleged owner's copy of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 23377 issued on May 12, 1933, both in the
name of Francisco and Hermogenes Guido, and which supposed
owner's duplicate was made the basis of the administrative
reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. (23377) on March
29, 1976, or about 43 years later, are false, spurious and fabricated
and were never issued by virtue of judicial proceedings for
registration of land, either under Act No. 496, as amended,
otherwise known as the Land Registration Act
3. Named defendants were:
1) Antonina, Margarita, Feliza, Crisanta and Candida, nee
Guido, who claim to be the heirs of Francisco Guido and
whose spouses were joined as defendants; 2) Esperanza,
Alfredo (who died during the pendency of this case and who
was substituted by his heirs), Eufronia, Gliceria, Priscilla,
Profetiza, Buenaventura, Buensuceso and Carlos, all
surnamed Guido, who claimed to be the heirs of
Hermogenes Guido and whose respective spouses were
joined as defendants; 3) Spouses Jose and Emiliana Rojas;
4) Pacil Development Corporation; and 5) Interport
Resources Corporation.
4. The defendants, herein private respondents, denied that
Decreto No. 6145 and TCT No. 23377 were false and
spurious. They consistently claimed (from the trial court up to
this Court) that the parcel of land covered by the questioned
document is a portion of the vast Hacienda de Angono
owned by their predecessor-in-interest, Don Buenaventura
Guido y Sta. Ana; that Don Buenaventura Guido left a
portion of the hacienda to his heirs, Francisco and
Hermogenes Guido; that the subject matter of the petition is
only a portion of plano 11-827, consisting of an area of
3,181.74 hectares and covered by Decreto No. 6145, issued
on September 1, 1911 in the name of the heirs of
Buenaventura Guido y Sta. Ana (Francisco and Hermogenes
Guido); that on June 12, 1912, an Original Certificate of Title
(OCT No. 633) was issued on the basis of Decreto No. 6145;
that the original title was subsequently cancelled and in lieu
thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23377 was issued on
May 12, 1933; that the heirs of Francisco and Hermogenes
Guido adjudicated among themselves the estate left by their
predecessors and transferred one-half portion thereof to
Jose Rojas sometime in 1942, as contained in an Extra-
judicial Settlement of Estate with Quitclaim dated December
17, 1973.
5. The parties admit that on August 20, 1974, the heirs of
Buenaventura Guido, represented by their lawyer, requested
LRA to issue the corresponding original certificate of title
based on Decreto 6145. The request was denied on January
8, 1976.
6. On March 29, 1976, Alfredo Guido, representing the other
heirs, filed a petition for reconstitution of TCT No. 23377 with
the Registry of Deeds of Morong. The petition alleged that
the original of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23377 could
not be located in the files of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal
after he and his co-heirs sought the registration of their
Extra- judicial Settlement with Quitclaim dated December 17,
1973. The petition was supported by the owner's duplicate
copy of the title. The petition for administrative reconstitution
of TCT No. 23377 was granted and a reconstituted certificate
of title was issued dated March 29, 1976.
7. After the reconstitution, the heirs presented before the
Registry of Deeds of Morong the Extra-judicial Settlement of
Estate with Quitclaim which they executed on December 17,
1973 in favor of Jose Rojas and which they had earlier
presented for registration. 21 lots subdivided into 21
separate titles
 8. The named heirs and now spouses Jose and Emilia Rojas of ownership or with lengths of possession which had ripened to
sold the property to Pacil Management Corporation and new ownership. Having been found valid and genuine, Decreto No. 6145
titles were issued in favor of the buyer on June 25, 1976. therefore, possessed all the attributes of a decree of registration.
However, on August 26, 1976, Pacil Management having been found true and authentic also possessed all the
Corporation reconveyed all the twenty one lots to the former attributes of a torrens certificate of title. By express provision of
owners. Section 47 of P.D. 1529, no title to registered land in derogation to
9. On August 25, 1978, fourteen (14) of these twenty-one (21) that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
lots were exchanged with shares of stocks of Interport adverse possession. To declare that the decree and its derivative
Resources Corporation. On April 21, 1980, all the named titles is valid but only with respect to the extent of the area described
heirs renounced their rights over the property in favor of their in the decree not possessed by occupants with indefeasible
co-heir Alfredo Guido, Sr. in exchange for monetary registered titles or to possessors with such lengths of possession
considerations. It appears that the only parties with existing which had ripened to ownership is to undermine the people's faith in
interests in the property subject of this case are Interport the torrens title being conclusive as to all matters contained therein.
Resources Corporation, the Heirs of Alfredo Guido, Sr. and The certificate serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the
spouses Jose Rojas and Emilia Rojas. property in favor of the person whose names appear therein. After
10. After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment dismissing the the expiration of the one year period from the issuance of the decree
complaint and declaring Decree No. 6145 and TCT No. of registration upon which it is based, it becomes incontrovertible
23377, genuine and authentic.
11. The decision of the trial court was appealed by the Solicitor
General to the Court of Appeals which affirmed said decision
on July 12, 1988. On July 16, 1988, the Solicitor General
filed a MR of the decision of the CA. In the same motion, he
prayed for an alternative judgment declaring the decree and
its derivative titles authentic except with respect to such
portions of the property which were either: 1) possessed and
owned by bona fide occupants who had already acquired
indefeasible titles thereto; or 2) possessed and owned by
bona fide occupants and their families with lengths of
possession which amounted to ownership. MR denied
Issue: w/n it possessed all the attributes of a decree of registration
Held/Ratio: YES. IT POSSESSED ALL THE ATTRIBUTES OF
DECREE OF REGISTRATION.
No legal basis for the declaration of the questioned documents as
valid only with respect to such portions of the property not possessed
and owned by bonafide occupants with indefeasible registered titles