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A Realist Conception of Truth

William P. Alston

1.Introduction

InthisessayIwillsetoutwhatIcallarealistconceptionoftruthanddefendit,
insofarasthatisrequired.Thebasicideaisasimpleandfamiliarone.Astatement,
forexample,istrueifandonlyif(iff)whatthestatementisaboutisasthestatement
saysittobe(moresoberly,astheonemakingthestatementsaysittobe).The
statementthatthisroomislitistrueiffwhatthestatementisabout,thisroom,isas
itissaidtobeinmakingthatstatement,namely,lit.Moresuccinctly,thestatement
thatthisroomislitistrueiffthisroomislit.Thecontentofthestatement,whatit
states to be the case, gives us everything we need to specify what it is for the
statementtobetrue.That,inessence,istheconceptionof(propositional)truthI
wishtodefend. Ithasmanydistinguishedantecedents,reachingbackatleastasfar
asAristotle,whosaidinafamouspassageoftheMetaphysics,Tosayofwhatis
thatitisandofwhatisnotthatitisnotistrue(IV,6,1001b,28).Butthoughthe
basicideaisverysimple,itisnotsoeasytoknowhowbesttoformulateit.

Iwillsaysomethingaboutthattaskinamoment,thoughnotasmuchasinmy
recent book (Alston 1996), but first I want to explain why I call this a realist
conception. Though realism is more commonly used for one or another
metaphysicalposition,Ifinditappropriatetocallthisconceptionoftruthrealist.
Thereasonisthis.Whatittakestorenderastatementtrueissomethingthatis
objectivevisvisthatstatement,namely,afactinvolvingwhatthestatementis
about. The truth value of the statement depends on how it is with the world
beyond the statement rather than on some feature of the statement itself. In
particular,andlookingforwardtothemaincompetitoroftherealistconception,
truthvaluedoesnotdependontheepistemicstatusofthestatement,whetheritis
justified,warranted,countsasanexpressionofknowledge,orcohereswithsome
systemorother.Iwilluse thetermalethicrealismfortheviewthattherealist
conceptionoftruthistheonethatisordinarilyusedinapplicationtostatements,
beliefs,andpropositions.

Nowformoreelaboratedformulations.Therearetwothingstodetermine.(1)What
totakeastruthvalue(Tvalue)bearers;whatsortofthingistrueorfalse.(2)How
dowesay,ingeneral,what,onthisconception,itisforaTvaluebearertobetrue?
Iwilltaketheminthatorder.

2.TheChoiceofTruthBearers

Mybriefintroductoryremarkswereintermsofstatements.Butsincebyfarthemost
popular choice for Tvalue bearers in recent Englishspeaking philosophy is
sentences,ImustsayawordastowhyIdonotgoalongwiththis.First,wemust
distinguishbetweensentencetypesandtokens.Asentencetypeisthesortofentity
thatcanbeutteredandheardonmanydifferentoccasions.YouandIbothutterthe
sentence I'm hungry. I utter it, the same sentence, many times. Here we are
speakingofasentencetype.Eachoftheutterancesofthesentenceisadifferent
sentencetoken.Mostdiscussionsofthetruthofsentencesdealwithtypes.When
someonebringsouttheoldchestnut,Snowiswhite''istrueiffsnowisWhite,she
isnotspeakingofsomeparticularutteranceofthatsentencebutratherofwhatis
commontoallthoseutterances.ButtherearedecisivereasonsagainstattributingT

values to sentence types. The most serious one concerns the radical
underdeterminationofreferencebymeaninginnaturallanguages.YouandIboth
sayTheindicatoronthedialisat7,butitmaybethatwhatIsayistrueandwhat
yousayisfalse.ThedialI'mlookingatreads7,butyouhavemisreadthedialyou
arelookingat.WhatarewetosayofthesentencetypeTheindicatoronthedialis
at7?IfweregarditasabearerofTvalues,wewillhavetosaythatitissometimes
trueandsometimesfalse.Andit'sworsethanthat.Sincemanypeopleutterthis
sentenceatvarioustimes,thesentencetypeisconstantlychangingitsTvalue.But
therearestrongreasonsagainstthinkingofTvaluebearersassounstable.IfIwant
toknowwhetheritistruethatthedialIwaslookingatreads7,itissothatIcanuse
thatreadinginthetestingofsomehypothesis.IftheTvalueofaTvaluebearer
with which I am concerned were constantly changing, or even occasionally
changing,Icouldnoteitherincludeitorrejectitasabitofevidence.Andthesame
istrueofmorepracticalmatters.Iamconcernedwithwhetheritistruethatyouare
hungry.IfitisthesentencetypeI'mhungrythatisinquestion,thatmaywellnot
retain the same Tvalue long enough for me to prepare food for you. These
elementary points have been ignored by many philosophers in this century,
primarily, I speculate, because of their preoccupation with artificial, formalized
languages,inwhich,sinceitisjuststipulatedwhatthereferentofeachsingular
termis,thekindofproblemjustmentioneddoesnotarise.

Recently such considerations have led many philosophers to switch to sentence

tokens as Tvalue bearers. A particular token can be assigned a stable Tvalue
providedthespeakerhassatisfiedtherequirements,referentialandotherwise,for
makingadefinitestatement.AnalternativeistocontinuetoascribeTvaluesto
sentencetypes,butrelativetovariouscontextualfeaturesthatservetopindown
singularreferenceandotherrespectsinwhichonetokencandifferinTvaluefrom
othertokensofthesametype.SotheythinkofthetypeI'mhungryashavingone
TvaluerelativetoonespeakerandtimeandanotherTvaluerelativetoadifferent
speakerandtime.Onbothofthesealternatives,thingsbecomemuchlessclearcut
thantheywerewhensentencetypeswerestraighforwardlytakentobetrueorfalse.
InbothcasesmattersotherthanpurelylinguisticonesarebroughtintotheTvalue
bearer:thespeaker,timeofutterance,contextualfactorsthatdeterminethereference
ofanexpressionlikethechair,andsoon.

However,thesententialchoicefacesanmuchmorefundamentalproblem,onethat
pointsthewaytoasuperioralternative.SofarasIcansee,thereisnoordinary,
nontechnicalpracticeofapplyingtrueandfalseeithertosentencetypesorto
sentencetokens.AsksomeoneinnocentofAngloAmericanphilosophywhetherthe
sentencetypeThechairisbroken(notwhatsomeoneisassertingbyaparticular
utteranceofthatsentence)istrueorfalse,andseeifhecanunderstandthequestion.

Asfortokens,anutterancelikeIsthatsequenceofsoundsyoujustmadewithyour
vocal organs true or false? has no natural interpretation available to eachuent
speakerofthelanguagebyvirtueofherlinguisticcompetence.Butthereisawayof
introducingsuchapractice,atleastforsentencetokens,aswellasforsentencetypes
thatdon'tvaryinwaysIhavebeenillustrating.Forthetoken,weconsiderwhat
statementwasmadeinissuingthattokenandtakethetokentoenjoytheTvalueof
thatstatement.Forstabletypes,likeSnowisWhite,weconsiderwhatstatement
wouldnormallybemadebyastandarduseofthatsentence.Andthat,ineffect,is
what people do who assign truth values to sentences. This was implicit in the
accountIgaveaboveofhowsentencetypescanbeassignedTvaluesrelativeto
certainotherfactors.Wepickfactorsthatwillaffectwhatstatementwouldbemade
byaparticularutteranceofthesentence.

Butnotewherethishasbroughtus.Tounderstandwhatitisforasentencetobe
true,wehavetousethenotionofthetruthofastatement.Asentencetokenistrue
iffthestatementmadebyutteringthatsentenceistrue.AndsoevenifattributingT
valuestosentencesisaviableproject,itisconceptuallydependentonthinkingof
statements as Tbearers. Hence statements are more fundamental bearers of T
values.

Butinwhatsenseofstatement?Statementisambiguousbetweentheactof
statingandwhatisstated,thecontentofthestatement.Similarlybelief,theterm
foranotherprominentTvaluebearer,isambiguousbetweenthepsychologicalstate
ofbelievingsomethingandwhatisbelieved,thecontentofthebelief.Itseemsclear
thatinbothcasesitisinthecontentsensethattrueorfalseapplies.WhenI
wonderwhetherSmith'sstatementthatClintonwilladdressthenationthisevening
istrue,myinterestisinwhetheritistruethatClintonwilladdressthenationthis
evening,ratherthaninsomefeaturepeculiartoSmith'sspeechact.Andthesame
holdsofbeliefs.YousaythatyoubelievethatClintonisinnocentofthecharges
broughtbyPaulaJones,andIsayDoyoureallythinkthat'strue?Whatisthe
referentofthathere?Notyourpsychologicalstateofbelief,butthatClintonis
innocentofthecharges.

Now for the final step. The content of a belief or statement can be termed a
proposition.Thethatclausesweusetospecifythosecontentscanalsobeusedto
individuatepropositions.Justaswecanspeakofthestatementthatgoldismalleable
andthebeliefthatgoldismalleable,sowecanrefertothepropositionthatgoldis
malleableby,sotosay,detachingthepropositionfromitsstatusasthecontentofa
statementorbelief(orhope,fear,doubt,wondering,orwhatever)andholditupfor
examinationonitsown.Andjustasstatementsorbeliefscanbetermedtrueorfalse,
socanpropositionsnaturally,sincewhenweengageintheformertalk,itiswhatis
statedorwhatisbelievedtowhichweattributeaTvalue;thatis,weattributetheT
valuetothepropositionthatisthecontentoftheactofstatingorbelieving.Hence
wecantakepropositionsasthemostfundamentalbearersoftruthvalues.Statements
andbeliefshavethatstatusbyvirtueofthepropositionsthataretheircontents,and
sentenceshavethatstatus,ifatall,byderivationfromstatements.

Talkofpropositionsoftenraisesphilosophicalhackles,andifIwereseriouslyto
addressissuesconcerningtheontologicalstatusofpropositions,Iwouldnevergetto
mymain concerns here. Propositions are variously construed as abstractentities
with an independent (Platonic) mode of timeless existence, as sets of possible
worlds, as states of affairs that might or might not obtain, as complexes with
structuresthatmirrorthoseofsentences,andsoon.InsofarasIhaveaviewonsuch
matters, it is Aristotelian rather than Platonist in that I think that the basic
ontological locus of propositions is the acts of stating and the propositional
attitudesinwhichtheyfigureascontents.ButforpresentpurposesIsidestepall
suchquestions. Itake itthatifoneknowshow tousethatclausestospecify
statements,propositionalpsychologicalattitudes,andpropositions,onehasallthe
workinggraspofthenotionofpropositionsoneneedstotalkandthinkintelligibly
ofpropositionsasthebasicbearersofTvalues.Theontologicalchipsmaybeleftto
fallwheretheymay.

3.HowtoFormulatetheRealistConceptionofTruth

Thenextissueconcernshowtogiveageneralformulationoftherealistconception
ofwhatitisforapropositiontobetrue.Theinitialroughformulationofthetruthof
astatementasdependentonwhatthestatamentisaboutseemslessfelicitouswhen
appliedtopropositionsassuch.Butthegutinsightisthesame.Thepropositionthat
thisroomislitistrueifftheroomislit.Underlyingthis,andanyotherformulation
concerningaparticularproposition,isageneralschema,whichIwillcalltheT
schema.

(1)Thepropositionthatpistrueiffp.ThesimilaritytoTarski'sfamousequivalence
oftheform(T)willnothaveescapedyournotice.

(2)Xistrueiffp.

Butthedifferencesareequallysignificant.

Schema(2)isaboutsentences,whileschema(1)isaboutpropositions.
Schema (2), unlike schema (1), is designed for use with artificial, formalized
languages.

Schema(2)istobereadintermsofmaterialequivalence.Schema(1)istobeso
understoodthatanysubstitutioninstanceoftheschemaisanecessary,conceptual,
analytictruth.

Now(1),beingaschemaratherthanadefiniteproposition,doesnotamounttoa
thesisaboutwhatitisforapropositiontobetrue.Nevertheless,itcontainstheseed
ofsuchathesis.Thesimplestwaytodeveloptheseedintoafullblownplantisto
usesubstitutionalquantificationtogiveitauniversalgeneralization.

(3)Itisanecessary,conceptual,analytictruththat(p)thepropositionthatpistrue
iffp.

Thisisnotobjectualquantification,butnotbecausepropositionsarenotobjects.
Even if they are, it still doesn't count as objectual quantification, because the
variablescannotbereplacedbysingularreferringexpressionsthatpickoutobjects.
Theymustbereplacedbydeclarativesentences.(Somephilosopherstrytotreat
declarativesentencesasreferringexpressions,butsomuchtheworseforthem.)And
substitutional quantification makes many philosophers nervous. Since I am not
among them, I have no objection to treating (3) as a general statement of the
position.Butforthosewhodofinditobjectionable,therearealternatives.Wecan
conveythesame conceptionofpropositionaltruthbygoingmetalinguisticasin
schema(4):

(4)Anysubstitutioninstanceof(1)isanecessary,conceptual,analytictruth.
Anyonewhorealizesthenecessary,conceptual,analytictruthofanysubstitution
instanceoftheTschemahasgraspedtherealistconceptionoftruth.

Notethatnoneofthiscanclaimtobeadefinitionoftruth,inthesenseofasynonym
oftruethatcanbesubstitutedfortruewheneveritoccursasapredicateof
propositions. Even the most explicit formulation, (3), is not even a contextual
definition.Foreventhough,asItakeit,itistruejustbyvirtueofthemeaningof
truethatforanyp,p'sbeingthecaseisanecessaryandsufficientconditionforthe
truthofp,Iamnotwillingtoadmit,asdeationistsclaim,thatItistruethatgold
ismalleableissynonymouswithGoldismaleable.Fortheformercontainsa
conceptlackinginthelatter,namely,theconceptoftruth.Anditseemscleartome
that one could understand Gold is maleable(or at least simpler proposition
expressing sentences like The dog is scratching itself) without possessing the
conceptoftruth.WhatIclaimfor(3)and(4)isthattheyareeffectivewaysof
bringingouttheconceptofpropositionaltruth,inthatanyonewhoacceptsthemis
therebyinpossessionofthatconcept.

4.ADefenseoftheRealistConceptionofTruth

WhenItrytoreectonthequestionofwhyIacceptthiswayofbringingoutwhatit
isforapropositiontobetrue,Ifinditdifficulttoknowhowtoanswer.For(3)and
(4)seemtometobemiserabletruisms,whichnoonewhofullyrealizedwhathe
wassayingwoulddeny.Ifsomeoneshouldsay,Thereisnodoubtthatoilisthicker
thanwater,butitisnotatallcleartomethatitistruethatoilisthickerthanwater,
howshouldwerespond?Iwouldrespondbysayingthatifthespeakerhadhismind
onwhathewassayingandhadnodifficultywiththeothertermsoftheutterance
likedoubtandclear,thenwemustjudgethatheisdeficientinhisgraspof
true,thathesimplydoesnothavetheordinaryconceptofpropositionaltruth.It
simplydoesn'tmakesensetosayOilisthickerthanwater,butitisnottruethatoil
isthickerthanwater.

Butifthisissotruistic,whyshouldIhavedevotedasizablebooktolayingitout
anddefendingit?Asforlayingitout,thedifficultyofidentifyingthebestwayof
formulatingitmaybeasufficientreason.Butasordefendingit,thereasonisthat
manycontemporarythinkersdenyit,oratleasttakepositionsthatappeartobe
inconsistentwithit.AsCicerooncewrote,thereisnothingsoabsurdthatitmaynot
be found in the books of the philosophers. And if it weren't for the fact that
philosophers, especially the cleverest among them, are given to espousing and
defendingwhatseemtobeobviouslyfalsepositions,themoresensibleamongus
mightbeatalossastohowtospendourtime.(Orperhapswewouldfindmore
usefulpursuits!)AgainstthatbackgroundIfeelitisnotawasteoftimetoexhibit
clearlyanddefendtheordinarywayofunderstandingpropositionaltruth.
A word is in order concerning the relation of the realist conception of truth to
variousformsofmetaphysicalrealismandantirealism.Sincemetaphysicalrealism
isalargeandsprawlingterritory,Icannotproperlyenterintoitinthisessay.ButI
willjuststickmytoein.Myaccountoftruthisneutralbetweenthehistorically
prominent metaphysical debates between realists and their opponents. The basic
pointcanbeputthisway.Themetaphysicalrealistandthemetaphysicalantirealist
differastowhatpropositionsaretrueorfalse,buttheyneednotdifferastowhatit
isforapropositiontobetrueorfalse.Thisisobviouswithrespecttowhatwemight
callparochialrealismsandantirealisms,realismwithrespecttoacertainputative
domainofreality:properties,propositions,andotherabstractobjects;physical
objects;theoreticalentities;moralproperties;aestheticvalues;God.Therealist
andthephenomenalistaboutphysicalobjectscanagreethattheirclaimsaretrueor
false,dependingonwhetherwhattheyaretalkingaboutisastheysayittobe.The
samepointcanbemadeconcerningrealistsandinstrumentalistsabouttheoretical
entities, and concerning theists and atheists. I would even say that the more
objectiveformsofidealism,typifiedbyBerkeley,canacceptarealistaccountof
truth.OnaBerkeleyanidealism,acertainphysicalfact,e.g.,thatthereisaspruce
treeinmyfrontyard,turnsouttobeafactaboutthemindofGod.Butwhetheritis
truethatthereisasprucetreeinmyfrontyarddependsonwhetherthemindofGod
isorganizedasthatproposition(interpretedinaBerkeleyanway)wouldhaveit
organized.

Iampreparedtogofurtherandholdthatevenanontologicalrelativismlikethat
espousedbyPutnamorGoodmaniscompatiblewithrealismabouttruth.Onthese
views,whatseemstobeapurelyobjectivefact(sayaboutmysprucetree)obtains
only relative to a certain conceptual scheme, one to which there are viable
alternatives.Butifweputtherelativityintothecontentofpropositionsratherthan
intheconceptoftruth(somethingthatPutnamsometimesdenies),thenwecansay,
inthespiritoftheTschema,thatitistruethat,relativetoschemeC,thereisa
sprucetreeinmyfrontyardiffrelativetoschemeCthereisasprucetreeinmy
frontyard.

Tobesure,whatagivenphilosophercallsmetaphysicalrealismmayincludea
commitmenttoarealistconceptionoftruth,andwhenthatphilosopheropposes
metaphysicalrealism,thatoppositioncanbeexpectedtoincludearejectionofthe
realistconceptionoftruth.Wefindthisexemplifedin,forexample,Putnam1981.
Butfrommypointofview,inthatbookPutnamhaslinkedtogetherwhatIwould
regardasadistinctivelymetaphysicalrealism(Theworldconsistsofsomefixed
totalityofmindindependentobjects)andarealistviewoftruth(Truthinvolves
somesortofcorrespondencerelationbetweenwordsorthoughtsignsandexternal
thingsandsetsofthings)(1981,49). Ifweseparateoutthestrictlymetaphysical
claim,wefindthatonecandenythatwithoutdenyingtherealistconceptionoftruth.

5DoestheAccountGoFarEnough?

Evenifonewerepreparedtoadmitthatmyaccountisaccurate,asfarasitgoes,one
might maintain that it does not go far enough. To bring out the basis for this
reaction,Ineedtoidentifyhowmyaccountisminimal.Itsminimalityconsistsinits
undertaking the fewest commitments compatible with identifying the concept of
truth.Itisrestrictedtobringingouthowthetruthofapropositiondepends,tovary
the expression a bit, on whether its content is actualized or realized in the
world.InthetermsIusedabove,itisconfinedtoaffirmingtheconceptualtruthof
allinstantiationsoftheTschema,andanythingequivalenttothat.Buttraditionally
accountsoftruththatareofagenerallyrealistcasthavebeenmoreambitious.They
havetakentruthtoconsistinsomekindofcorrespondencebetweenaproposition
and a fact. This is typically spelled out by specifying a kind of structural
isomorphismthatmustholdbetweenapropositionandafactifthepropositionisto
betrue.Andmyaccountissilentaboutallthat.Itakethistobeavirtue,butthe
presentobjectiondeemsitavice.Sowhichisit?

Myansweristhatitisboth,andtosustainthatanswerIneedtomakeadistinction.
ThedistinctionIneedisonethat,inothercases,hasbeenprominentinphilosophy
lately:thatbetweentheconceptofPandthepropertyofP.Totakeanfamiliar
example,theordinaryconceptofwaterissomethinglikeastuffthatisliquid(in
certaintemperatureranges),tastelessandcolorlesswhenpure,whatfallsinrain,
what is in oceans, lakes, and streams, etc. The ordinary, pretheoretic concept
contains no specification of chemical composition, much less finer physical
structure.Butempiricalinvestigationhasrevealedthatthepropertyofbeing(pure)
water, the property of belonging to that natural kind, is having the chemical
constitution H2O. This is a feature of the kind that, while compatible with the
featuresrepresentedintheconcept,goesbeyondthemtoasignificantextent.The
same distinction can be made here. Even if the ordinary concept of truth is
adequately picked out by my Tschema based account, it may be that further
investigationwillrevealadditionalfeaturesofwhattruthis,whatthepropertyis
whosepossessionmakesapropositiontrue.Tobesure,thiscasediffersfromthe
watercaseinthattheinvestigationwillnotbeempiricalinthesameway.Itwill
consist,rather,ofreectiononaproposition'sbeingtrueandofanattempttospecify
what is necessarily involved in that. I have just hinted at a direction such an
investigation might take: exploring the structures of propositions and facts and
spellingoutwhatittakesfortherightkindofmatch.InthesetermsIdenythatmy
accountdoesnotgofarenoughtoidentifytheconcept,butIagreethatitdoesnot
gosofarastospelloutfeaturesofthepropertythatgobeyondthat.Mypositionon
theconceptisnotcommittedtothesuccessofanysuchfurthercharacterization,but
itisnotcommittedtoitsfailureeither.

Moreover,myrealistconceptionoftruthisbynomeansneutralbetweendifferent
ideasastowhatfurtherfeaturesthepropertymighthave.AsIwillarguebelow,it
sortsillwithaccountsofthepropertyoftruthintermsofepistemicfeaturesofT
valuebearers.Onamorepositivenote,itseemsclearthattheTschemasuggestsa
correspondencetheoryoftheproperty;indeed,suchatheoryseemstobeimplicitin
theschema.TheTschemanaturallygivesrisetotheideathatapropositionismade
truebyafact.Thedictumthatthepropositionthatlemonsaresouristrueifflemons
aresourisnaturallyreadassayingthatthepropositionismadetruebythefactthat
lemons are sour (rather than that lemons are made sour by the truth of the
proposition).Wecouldembodythatideainwhatmightbecalledaminimalistform
ofacorrespondencetheory.

(5)(p)thepropositionthatpistrueiffitisafactthatp.

Thisis,atmost,aninchoateformofcorrespondencetheorybecauseitdoesnothing
tospellouthowafacthastoberelatedtoapropositiontomakeittrue.ButtheT
schema does exhibit what it is about a particular fact that makes a particular
propositiontrue;itdoessobyusingthesamethatclausetospecifyboth.We
mightputthisbysayingthatitisanidentityofcontentthatmakesthatfact,rather
thansomeother,thetruthmakerforthatproposition.Andthistalkofidentityof
contenthasbroughtustothevergeofafullblowncorrespondencetheory,which
wouldgointowhatthecontentofpropositionsandoffactsconsistsinanattempt
that would presumably lead to a specification of something like a structural
isomorphismbetweenapropositionandthetruthmakingfact.

6EpistemologicalObjectionstotheRealistConception

NowIwanttoconsiderawidespreadkindofobjectiontoarealistconceptionof
truth,whatIcallanepistemologicalobjection.BythisImeannotanargument
thatanepistemicaccountoftheconceptissuperiortoarealistone,butratheran
argumentthatisconcernedwiththeepistemologyoftruth,withwhatittakestotell
whetheragivenpropositionistrue.Theargumentisthatthisisimpossibleona
realistconceptionoftruth.

Theargumentexistsinmanyversions.Aprominentonedependsontheassumption
that determining that a proposition is true, on the realist conception, requires
comparingapropositionwithafact,anditisargued(ormorefrequently,just
assumed)thatthisisimpossible.

Herearesomedictatothateffect(intermsofstatementsorbeliefs,ratherthan
propositions,butwehaveseentohowtotranslatebackandforth):

Eachstatementmaybecombinedorcomparedwithotherstatements,e.g.,inordertodraw
conclusionsfromthecombinedstatements,ortoseeiftheyarecompatiblewitheachother
ornot.Butstatementsarenevercomparedwithareality,withfacts.Noneofthosewho
supportacleavagebetweenstatementsandrealityisabletogiveapreciseaccountofhowa
comparisonbetweenstatementsandfactsmaypossiblybeaccomplished,andhowwemay
possiblyascertainthestructureoffacts.(Hempel1935,5051)

Ifmeaningsaregivenbyobjectivetruthconditionsthereisaquestionhowwecanknow
thattheconditionsaresatisfied,forthiswouldappeartorequireaconfrontationbetween
whatwebelieveandreality;andtheideaofsuchaconfrontationisabsurd.(Davidson
1986,307)

Justificationisamatterofaccommodatingbeliefsthatarebeingquestionedtoabodyof
accepted beliefs. Justification always terminates with other beliefs and not with our
confrontingrawchunksofreality,forthatideaisincoherent.(Williams1977,112)

Neithertheclaimthattotellthatapropositionistrue,onarealistaccount,requires
comparing a proposition and a fact, nor the claim that this is impossible, is
supportedbyanyargumenthere.AndwhyshouldwesupposethatIhavetomake
anysuchcomparisontodiscoverthatapropositionisrealisticallytrue?Inreecting
on this question, we discover an important distinction between ways of
understandingtherequirement.Itissusceptibleofaninnocuousinterpretationin
whichwheneverIrecognizethatit'struethatthisroomislitjustbyrecognizingthat
thisroomislit,Ihavecarriedoutacomparisonofpropositionandfact.Ifthat'sallit
amounts to, it is unsurprising thatphilosophers like those justquoted mount no
argumentforitsimpossibility.Butpresumablytheyhaveinmindsomethingmore
ambitiousand(allegedly)moredifficult.Thus,itissometimesmadeexplicitthatit
isamaximallydirectawarenessoffactsandtheirrelationtopropositions,along
withtheepistemicstatusesofinfallibilityandindubitabilitycustomarilyassociated
withdirectawareness,thatissaidtobebothrequiredbytherealistconceptionand
to be impossible. This is suggested by Davidson's and Williams's use of the
metaphorofconfrontation.ItismoreexplicitinRorty's1979attackonarealist
understandingoftruthaspresupposinganindefensibleaccountofthemindasa
mirrorofnature,ascapableofunmediated,foolproofawarenessesofextramental
fact.

Butwhysupposethatevenanexplicit,consciouscomparisonoffactandproposition
requiresthatonebeimmediatelyawareofthefactinquestion?Whywouldn'titbe
enough to have any sort of knowledge of fact, whether immediate, inductively
derived,basedoninferencetothebestexplanation,orwhatever?Solongaswe
knowthatthefactobtains,whyshoulditmatterhowwegetthatknowledge?
Inanyevent,ifwethinkofakindofawarenessthatisproperlytermed`direct',even
ifnotinfallibleandindubitable,suchasperceptionoftheimmediateenvironmentas
viewedbydirectrealistsaboutperception,whyisn'tthatpossibleandwhycan'tthat
beabasisfordeterminingwhetherfactsandpropositionsmatch?Hereisaspirited
defenseofthatpossibilitybyMoritz Schlick,inresponsetothe1935articleby
Hempel,fromwhichIquotedabove.

Ihavebeenaccusedofmaintainingthatstatementscanbecomparedwithfacts.Iplead
guilty.Ihavemaintainedthis.ButIprotestagainstmypunishment.Ihaveoftencompared
propositionstofacts;soIhadnoreasontosaythatitcouldn'tbedone.Ifound,forinstance,
inmyBaedekerthestatement:Thiscathedralhastwospires,Iwasabletocompareit
with reality by looking at the cathedral, and this comparison convinced me that
Baedeker'sassertionwastrue....

Perhapsyousay:ButifweanalyzetheprocessofverificationofBaedeker'sassertionwe
shallfindthatitamountstoacomparisonofpropositions.Ianswer:whatevertheresultof
youranalysismaybe,atanyratewecandistinguishbetweencasesinwhichawritten,
printed or spoken sentence is compared with some other written, printed or spoken
sentence,andcaseslikeourexample,whereasentenceiscomparedwiththethingofwhich
itspeaks.AnditisthislattercasewhichItookthelibertyofdescribingasacomparisonof
apropositionwithafact....

Youinsistthatastatementcannotormustnotbecomparedtoanythingbutstatements.But
why?Itismyhumbleopinionthatwecancompareanythingtoanythingifwechoose.Do
youbelievethatpropositionsandfactsaretoofarremovedfromeachother?Toodifferent?
Isitamysteriouspropertyofpropositionsthattheycannotbecomparedwithanythingelse?
Thatwouldseemtobearathermysticalview.(Schlick,inMacdonald1954,232235)

Against this eminently commonsensical protest by Schlick there is a serious

argumentfromthenatureofperceptualcognition,anargumentthatwasprominent
inabsoluteidealismandthathasenjoyedarecentrevivalofinuence.Thisargument
picks up on Schlick's surmise that his opponent will claim that his perceptual
verificationamountstoacomparisonbetweenpropositions.Wefindit,topickone
source outof acrowd, in Blanshard1939. There, inrespondingtoa claimlike
Schlick's,hewritesasfollows:

It[thepositionBlanshardopposes]assumesthat,correspondingtoourjudgment,thereis
somesolidchunkoffact,directlypresentedtosenseandbeyondallquestion,towhich
thoughtmustadjustitself.Andthissolidfactisafiction.Whatthetheorytakesasfact
andactuallyusesassuchisanotherjudgementorsetofjudgements,andwhatprovidesthe
verificationisthecoherencebetweentheinitialjudgementandthese.(Blanshard1939,vol.
2,p.228)

Thisisaformofthecurrentlypopularviewthatperceptualawarenessofobjectsis
conceptually structured and, in stronger forms like that of Blanshard's,
propositionally structured in such a way as to involve judgments with the
propositional content in question. Hence Blansard takes it that one can't see a
cardinalwithoutjudgingittobesuchandsuch(notnecessarilytobeacardinal).
And from that he draws the conclusion that the supposed external fact of the
cardinalsittingonabranchisreallyitselfajudgment(statement,proposition),rather
thanafactcorrespondencewithwhichcouldrenderthejudgementtrue.

But,ofcourse,evenifallperceptualawarenessispropositionallystructured,and
evenifitallinvolvesjudgement(whichIdonotadmitforamoment),itwouldnot
follow that there is nothing to the perceptual awareness of a cardinal but a
judgement. Seeing a cardinal is obviously different from merely judging that a
cardinalisthere.Andthatdifferencereectssomethingintheperceptionthatisin
additiontojudgement,somekindofdistinctivelyperceptualawarenessofwhatany
judgementthatmaybeinvolvedisabout.Andsothethesisthatperceptionhasa
pervasivelypropositionalstructureleavesopenthepossibilitythatthisdistinctively
perceptual awareness of objects might constitute a presentation, even a direct
presentation,ofextrajudgmentalfact.ButthoughIdon'tthinkthattheproponentsof
thisobjectiontoarealistconceptionoftruthhaveclosedoffthepossibilityofa
directawarenessofextramentalfacts,Idon'twanttorestmycaseonthathighly
controversialclaim.InsteadwhatItaketobemystrongestpointistheearlierone:
thatevenifnosuchdirectawarenessispossible,onecancomparepropositionand
fact,providedonehasknowledgeofeach,whetherthatknowledgeisdirectornot.

Finally,Iwanttolookatamoregeneralepistemologicalargumentagainstarealist
conception of truth. This one is based on the supposition that it is essential to
realismtoconstruetruthvalueasdeterminedbyarealitythatisexternaltoour
knowledge,notjustinthesenseofbeingotherthanourknowledge,butalsointhe
senseofbeinginaccessibletoit.Thereisaforthrightstatementofthispositionis
Horwich1982.Therehecharacterizesmetaphysicalrealismasthedoctrinethat
the concept of truth involves a primitive nonepistemic ideafor example,
correspondencewithreality....Truthisheldtobeagenuinepropertyofcertain
propositions...and...thegoalthatmotivatesourstandardsofjustificationandour
verificationprocedures''(1982, 182). This is along the same lines as myalethic
realism.Horwichgoesontosay,

Therespectinwhichmetaphysicalrealismiscommittedtoautonomousfactsis...radical.
Itconcernstheadequacyofthecanonsofjustificationimplicitinscientifcandordinary
linguisticpracticewhatreasonistheretosupposethattheyguideustowardsthetruth?This
question,givenmetaphysicalrealism,issubstantialand,Ithink,impossibletoanswer;and
itisthisgulfbetweentruthandourwaysofattemptingtorecognizeitwhichconstitutesthe
respectinwhichfactsareradicallyautonomous.Assumingagraspofpropositions,and
knowledgeofwhatitisforthemtohavethepropertyofmetaphysicaltruth,itisfarfrom
clearhowwecouldderivetheabilitytorecognizewhenthispropertyapplies.Indeed,itis
ourtotalinabilitytoseehowthisproblemmightbesolvedwhichshouldleadustoreject
metaphysical realism.... Thus metaphysical realism involves to an unacceptable, indeed
fatal,degreetheautonomyoffacts:thereisfromthatperspectivenoreasontosupposethat
scientificpracticeprovideseventheslightestcluetowhatistrue.(1982,185186)

Needlesstosay,Horwichisfreetodefinemetaphysicalrealisminanywayhe
pleases. What he is not free to do is first to define the view in terms of a
nonepistemicconceptoftruththattakesittobesomethinglikecorrespondencewith
fact,andthentoattributetotheviewsodefinedarepresentationoffactswhereby
wehavenowayofdeterminingwhatthefactsare,withoutgivinganyreasonsfor
supposingthatthisviewoftruthiscommittedtothelatter. Andhegivesnoreason
forsupposingthatmetaphysicalrealism,ashedefinesit,iscommittedtotaking
thetruthmakingfactstobecognitivelyinaccessible.Itissheerlyarbitrarytoburden
theviewwithsuchcripplingconsequences.

Another attempt to saddle realism about truth with the doctrine that facts are
inaccessibleisfoundinRorty'sessay,TheWorldWellLostinRorty1982,in
whichhepresentsthisextremeconceptionastheonlyalternativetoregardingthe
worldasconsistingofthebeliefswetaketobefirmlyestablishedandimmune
fromdoubt.ReferringtotheDavidsonianpositionthatitisnecessarythatmostof
ourbeliefsaretrue,hewrites,

IfoneacceptstheDavidsonStroudposition,thentheworldwilljustbethestars,the
people, the tables, and the grassall those things which nobody except the occasional
scientificrealistphilosopherthinksmightnotexist.Soinonesenseofworldthesense
inwhich(exceptforafewfringecaseslikegods,neutrinos,andnaturalrights)wenow
knowperfectlywellwhattheworldislikeandcouldnotpossiblybewrongaboutitthereis
noargumentaboutthepointthatitistheworldthatdeterminestruth....Butthisis,of
course,notenoughfortherealist.WhathewantsispreciselywhattheDavidsonStroud
argument prevents him from havingthe notion of a world so independent of our
knowledgethatitmight,forallweknow,provetocontainnoneofthethingswehave
alwaysthoughtweweretalkingabout.Thisnotionoftheworldmustbethenotionof
somethingcompletelyunspecifiedandunspecifiablethethinginitself,infact.Tosumup
the point, I want to claim that the world is either the purely vacuous notion of the
ineffablecauseofsenseandgoalofintellect,orelseanamefortheobjectsthatinquiryat
themomentisleavingalone:thoseplanksintheboatwhichareatthemomentnotbeing
movedabout.(1982,1415)

HereRorty,themasterofcaricature,isexercisinghisart.Ifyouarenotcontentto
construe the world, reality, as consisting of beliefs that are taken as firmly
established(orasneedingnoestablishment),thentheonlyalternativeisaworldof
whichwecanknownothing.Butassoonasthisdisjunctionisformulated,itcanbe
seentobeobviouslynotexhaustive.Whycouldn'ttheworldbemadeupoffacts
thatarewhattheyare,independentofourcognitivesuccessesandfailures,without
thesefactsbeingalloftheminaccessibletoourknowledge?Whyfoistontothe
realist,whotakesthetruthofptodependsolelyonwhetheritisthecasethatp,the
commitmenttop'sbeingunknowable?Isn'tthereroomforthecategoryofmightor
mightnotbeknown,aswellasthecategoriesofknownandunknowable?

YouwillnotethatRorty'sargumentattacksaformofmetaphysicalrealismproperly
socalledthattakesthefactsonwhich(many)propositionsdependfortheirtruth
valuetobewhattheyareindependentofourcognitivedealingswiththem.Rorty,
like many philosophers, makes no sharp distinction between such metaphysical
realismandrealismabouttruth.(Indeed,RortyassociatestheTschemawithhis
alternative to realism about truth!) By contrast, I have already dissociated my
realismabouttruthfromanycommitmenttosuchametaphysicalposition,though
thetwopositionsdohaveanaffinityforeachother.Nevertheless,Rorty'slineof
argument can be turned against a realist construal of truth, and that is why I
introducedithere.ThisisbecauseRortypresentstheviewofrealityascognitively
inaccessiblebyusastheonlyalternativetoacoherencetheoryoftruth,andthis
leaves no room for a realist account of truth on which the facts that make
propositionstrueareoftenaccessible.Henceitisnotirrelevanttothedefenseofmy
viewtopointoutthedefectsinargumentsthatpurporttoshowthatanyalternative
toacoherenceaccountoftruthmakestruthundiscoverable.

7EpistemicConceptionsofTruth

The main alternatives to a realistconceptionof truth are epistemic conceptions,

whichidentifytruthwithsomepositiveepistemicstatusofTvaluebearers.This
positive epistemic status is variously identifed with membership in a maximally
comprehensiveandcoherentsystem(aswiththeabsoluteidealistviewsoftruthas
coherencethatwereprominentinthelate1800sandearly1900s),withwhat,in
Peirce'swellknownformulation,isfatedtobeultimatelyagreedtobyallwho
investigate, with what, in Dewey's phrase, is instrumental to an active
reorganization of the given environment, a removal of some specific trouble or
perplexity,andmorerecentlyinPutnam1981,withbeingsuchthatitwouldbe
justifiedinepistemicallyidealconditions.Togivefocustothisbriefdiscussion,I
willconcentrateonPutnam'sview,abbreviatinghiscandidatefortruthasideal
justifiability(IJ)andhisviewastheidealjustifiabilityconception(IJC).

Thoughepistemicconceptionsoftruthhavebeenattractivetomany,Ibelievethat
theyareamongthefewwidelyheldphilosophicalpositionsthatcanbedefinitively
refuted.Iwillgivebriefpresentationsoffourargumentsagainstthem.
i

The first is an extensional argument to the effect that truth and IJ are not
completelycoextensive.Thatisthecaseiftherearepropositionsthataretruebutnot
IJ,orIJbutnottrue.Iwillconcentratehereontheformerpossibility.IfIweretotry
togiveparticularexamples,itcouldbeobjectedthatIcanhardlybeconfidentthata
beliefistruewithoutsupposingmyselftobejustifiedinacceptingitandsupposing
thatthisjustificationwouldholdupnomatterhowimprovedmyepistemicsituation.
Evenifthatisso,itwouldnotfollowthatabeliefcouldnotbetruewithoutbeingIJ.
Butratherthancontinuingthatargument,Iprefertoproceedmoreindirectly.Iwill
considerhowplausibleitistoholdthattherearetruepropositionsthatwouldnotbe
justifiableinanidealepistemicsituation.

Themostextremecandidateswouldbepropositionssuchthatnothingthattellsfor
oragainsttheirtruthiscognitivelyaccessibletohumanbeings,eveninprinciple.I
neednotrestrictmyselfheretopropositionsweareabletoenvisage.Maytherenot
be states of affairs, or even entire realms or aspects of reality, that are totally
inaccessibletohumancognition?Ifso,propositionstotheeffectthatsuchstatesof
affairs obtain will be true, even though no beliefs or statements bearing those
propositionsastheircontentwouldbejustifiableinanepistemicallyidealsituation.

Buthowplausibleisitthattherearerealmsoraspectsofrealitythatareinprinciple
inaccessible to human cognition? There are considerations that render it quite
plausible.Thinkofthelimitationsofourcognitivepowerslimitationsonourstorage
andretrievalcapacity,ontheamountofdatawecanprocesssimultaneously,onthe
considerationswecanholdtogetherinourmindsatonemoment,onthecomplexity
ofpropositionswearecapableofgrasping.Isn'tithighlylikelythattherearefacts
thatwillforeverliebeyondusjustbecauseoftheselimitations?Anditisnotjust
our finitude; there is also what we might call our particularity. The cognitive
designofhumanbeingsrepresentsonlyoneoutofalargemultitudeofpossible
designsforcognitivesubjects,evenforembodiedcognitivesubjectsasfiniteaswe
are, leaving out of account angels and God. It seems clear that there could be
corporealcognitivesubjectswithformsofsensoryreceptivitydifferentfromours,
withsensitivitytodifferentformsofphysicalenergy.Therecouldbesubjectswith
different innate cognitive tendencies, propensities, and hardwired beliefs and
concepts.Therecouldbesubjectswhoreasoninpatternsdifferentfromthosewe
employ.Allthisstronglysuggeststhattherearemanyfactsaccessibletocognizers
withradicallydifferenthardwareandsoftwarebuttotallyinaccessibletous.

One possible response to this objection would be to make the IJC range over
cognitivesubjectsgenerally.Truthwouldthenbeidentifiedwithjustifiabilityfor
some cognitive subjects or other in situations that are the most ideal for those
subjects. And if there are still true propositions unenvisageable by any actual
subjects,wecouldmaketheconceptionrangeoverpossiblesubjectsaswell.These
modifications would certainly take the sting out of the present objection. But it
wouldalsotakemuchofthestingoutoftheIJC.Ifwesurveythereasonsthathave
beengivenforanepistemicdefinitionoftruth,wewillseethattheyareheavily
anthropocentric.Dummett'sargumentsforaverificationistconceptionoftruth,for
example,dependonconsideringwhatsortsoftruthconditionswecouldlearnto
attachtosentences.JamesandDeweyarepreoccupiedwithhowwejudgebeliefsto
betrueorfalseandwiththefunctionsbeliefswecalltrueplayforusinourlives.
AndPutnamwrites,Atruestatementisastatementthatarationalbeingwould
acceptonsufficientexperienceofthekindthatisactuallypossibleforbeingswith
our nature to have (1981, 64). And in any event, we would have to restrict
considerationtofinitecognitivesubjects.Ifanomniscientdeitywerebroughtinto
thepicture,thepositionwouldlacktheantirealistbiteitisdesignedtohave. Realism
shouldhavenohesitationinrecognizingthatanecessaryconditionofthetruthofa
propositionisthatitwouldbeknown(accepted,believed,etc.)byanomniscient
cognitivesubject.Andwiththerestrictiontofinitesubjectsinplace,westillhaveto
takeseriouslytheideathatsomeaspectsofrealityareinaccessibleinprincipleto
anysubjectsactualorpossible.

ii

Anotherobjectionisthatwecan'tspelloutidealjustifiabilitywithoutmakinguseof
the concept of truth. Hence the explication cannot go the other way without
circularity.Herearetwowaysofseeingthis.

First,whatis meantbyone's being(epistemically)justifiedinholdingacertain

belief? Most epistemologists who address this issue take a truth conducivity
position,accordingtowhichabeliefisjustifiediffitisformedand/orheldsoasto
makethebelieflikelytobetrue.Thereisavarietyofsuggestionsastowhatconfers
this likelihood: being based on adequate evidence, grounds, or reasons; being
formedbytheoperationofareliablebeliefformingmechanism;coheringinthe
rightsortofsystem;etc.Butintakingthesetobejustificationconferringconditions,
onesupposesthemtorenderthebelieflikelytobetrue.Andthebasicreasonforthis
isthatotherwisejustificationwouldnothavethevalueforourcognitiveendeavors
thatwetakeittohave.LaurenceBonJourputsthematterstrongly:

Whyshouldwe,ascognitivebeings,carewhetherourbeliefsareepistemicallyjustified?
Why is suchjustification something tobe sought andvalued?... The following answer
seemsobviouslycorrect....Whatmakesuscognitivebeingsatallisourcapacityfor
belief,andthegoalofourdistinctivelycognitiveendeavorsistruth:wewantourbeliefsto
correctlyandaccuratelydepicttheworld....Thebasicroleofjustificationisthatofa
meanstotruth,amoredirectlyattainablemediatinglinkbetweenoursubjectivestarting
pointandourobjectivegoal....Ifourstandardsofepistemicjustificationareappropriately
chosen,bringingitaboutthatourbeliefsareepistemicallyjustifiedwillalsotendtobringit
about...thattheyaretrue.Ifepistemicjustificationwerenotconducivetotruthinthis
way,iffindingepistemicallyjustifiedbeliefsdidnotsubstantiallyincreasethelikelihoodof
findingtrueones,thenepistemicjustificationwouldbeirrelevanttoourmaincognitive
goalandofdubiousworth.(BonJour1985,78)

Butifthatisthecase,ifepistemicjustificationisessentiallytruthconducive,then
unless justification is being used in some different sense that would need
explanation,beingjustifiedinanidealepistemicsituationwoulddifferfrombeing
justified by ordinary, everyday standards only in that it is even more strongly
indicativeoftruththanthelatter.Hencewecan'texplainwhatismeantbyanideal
epistemicsituationwithoutemployingtheconceptoftruth.

This point can be driven home by considering some alternatives to a truth

conducivity conception of justification. Foley (1987) holds that a belief is
epistemicallyrationaliffthebelieverwould,onsufficientreection,takethereto
beaconclusiveargumentforit(whereinlimitingcasestheargumentcanbefrom
itself to itself). This makes justification independent of truth by carrying out a
considerablesubjectivizationoftheconceptofjustification.Andthisveryfeature
makes justification, so construed, of doubtful cognitive value. If we allow an
unrestrained variation in what a given individual would take, on considerable
reection, to be a conclusive argument for p, we may well wonder why anyone
shouldbeconcernedtoseetoitthattheirbeliefsareepistemicallyrational.

Asomewhatmore widespreadapproachistotie justificationtothe lackofany

violationofintellectualobligationsorduties.JustIamjustifiedinanaction,e.g.,
resigning from my job with only two weeks notice, provided I violate no rule,
regulation,orcommitmentindoingso,onthisview,Iamjustifiedinbelievingthat
thereisintelligentlifeelsewhereintheuniverse,providedmybelievingthisisnot
theresultoffailurestoconductmyintellectualoperationsasIshould.Tobesure,
whether this way of thinking of justification is opposed to a truthconducivity
conceptiondepends onwhatintellectualobligations we have. Iftheyinclude an
obligationtodowhatwecantobelievewhatistrueandtoavoidbelievingwhatis
false,thisisnotsharplyopposedtoatruthconducivityview.Butifwethinkof
these obligations in some other way, e.g., as looking carefully for pro and con
considerationsontheissue,thenthismayormaynotbecloselyconnectedwitha
likelihoodoftruthforthebeliefinquestion.Andifitisn't,thequestionagainarises
astowhyweshouldtakejustificationinthissensetobeanimportantvalueforour
cognitivelives.
Sotruthalreadyentersintotheveryconceptionofepistemicjustification.Another
wayinwhichtruthispresupposedintheunderstandingofIJChastodowithwhat
makesanepistemicsituationideal.Anaturalunderstandingofthisisintermsofthe
readyavailabilityofallrelevantevidence(reasons,considerations).Nowtosaythat
evidenceisavailableistosaythatonecouldcomeintopossessionofit.Sothe
crucialnotionisthatofpossessionofevidence.Theevidenceitselfwillpresumably
consistoffacts.Whatisitforthesubjecttopossessthosefactssoastomakeuseof
theminjustifyingabelief?Themostobviousansweristhatthesubjectcomesto
knowthem.Butthenotionofknowledgeinvolvesthenotionoftruth.(Knowledgeis
truebeliefthatsatisfiescertainfurtherconditions.)Toavoidthisconclusion,we
wouldhavetoconstruepossessionofthefactsintermsofbeliefwithoutmentioning
knowledge.Butthenwewillhavetorequirethebeliefstobetrue.Otherwise,oneis
notinpossessionofgenuineevidencebutonlymistakenlysupposeshimselftobe
so.Atthispointthesuggestionmightbethatpossessionofevidenceconsistsin
havingjustifiedbeliefs.Butwehavealreadyseenthatthenotionofjustification
involves the notion of truth. Moreover, this involves a different circle. The
justificationinvolvedhereobviouslycan'tbejustificationbyeverydaystandards.
Forbythosestandards,abeliefcanbejustifiedinonesituationandnotinanother,
whichmeansthatthereisnouniqueanswertowhattherelevantevidenceisfora
giventargetbelief.Hencethesewillhavetobeliefsthatwouldbejustifiedinideal
epistemiccircumstances.Butthenweareinanevensmallercircle.Wedefineideal
justifiabilityintermsofanidealepistemicsituation,butthenwehavetodefine
suchasituationintermsofwhatbeliefswouldbejustifiedinanidealepistemic
situation!

Ibelievethereareotherpointsatwhichtheconceptofanidealepistemicsituation
restsontheconceptoftruth,butsufficientuntothedayisthedifficultythereof.

iii

NextIwouldliketopresentanargumentagainsttheIJCthatisbasedontheT
schema, the heart of alethic realism. According to the Tschema, or a suitable
generalizationthereof,thefactthatsugarissweetisconceptuallybothnecessaryand
sufficientforitsbeingtruethatsugarissweet.Andthatwouldseemtoleaveno
room for any epistemic necessary or sufficient conditions. Nothing more than
sugar'sbeingsweetisneededtomakethepropositiontrue,andnothinglesswould
suffice.How,then,cansomeepistemicconditionbeconceptuallynecessaryand/or
sufficient?

MyopponentcancomplainthatIambeggingthequestionbybasingtheargument
onwhatmypositiontakestobeconceptuallynecessaryandsufficientfortruth.But
toseethattheargumentisfreeofspecialpleading,weonlyhavetonotethattheT
schemaisalmostuniversallyendorsedbyepistemictheorists(thoughmanyofthem,
thinking in terms of sentences as Tvalue bearers, endorse the Tarskian version
instead). Thus Putnam writes, We could ... keep formal semantics (including
Tarskitype truthdefinitions) . . . and yet shift our notion of truth over to
something approximating warranted assertibility (Putnam 1978, 29). Thus
epistemictheoristsareanxioustosquaretheirpositionwiththeTschemaorits
brethren.AndthatisnotsurprisingiftheTschemaisasobviouslytrueasIhave
been claiming. And so in arguing from that schema against epistemic theorists'
construaloftheconceptoftruth,Irelyonwhatiscommongroundbetweenus.

But,ofcourse,thereisapossibleanswertomycharge.Anepistemicconceptof
truthliketheIJCmaynotbeincompatiblewiththeTschema.Itwouldn'tbeifIJC
wereconceptuallyequivalentwiththerealistnecessaryandsufficientconditionfor
truth,namely,thecorrespondingfact.Ifthebeliefthatsugarissweetbeingideally
justifiable is itself conceptually equivalent to sugar's being sweet, then, by the
transitivity of conceptual equivalence, the former is likewise conceptually
equivalenttoitsbeingtruethatsugarissweet.Isaythisisapossibleanswer,but,so
farasIcansee,itisonlyabstractlyconceivable.Inparticular,itisnoepistemic
possibility.Whatbasiscouldtherebeforholdingthattheidealjustifiabilityofthe
beliefthatsugarissweetisconceptuallybothnecessaryandsufficientforsugar's
beingsweet.Eveniftheywereextensionallyequivalent,whichIdonotadmit,why
suppose that the concepts involved guarantee the equivalence. On the basis of
linguisticintuition,itseemsclearthatwecanconsistentlyconceiveofafact(ifnot
sugar's being sweet, then some more recondite fact like the big bang's being
precededbyacollapseofapreviousuniverseintoapoint)withoutitsbeingideally
justifiablethatthefactobtains.ThemostIcanseetobeevenminimallyplausible
alongthislineisthefollowing.Ononetypeofabsoluteidealism,anythingIcan
thinkofthatisexternaltomycurrentthoughtissomefullyrealizeddevelopmentof
my thought, an ``all comprehensive and fully realized whole'' of which Anglo
Americanabsoluteidealismspoke,or,inmoreHegelianterms,theculminationof
theAbsoluteSpirit'sprocessofattainingfullselfdevelopment.Onsuchaviewit
would,ifyoulike,bemetaphysicallyimpossiblethatsugarwouldbesweetwithout
that judgment's figuring inan all comprehensive and ideally coherent system of
thought.Butthatwouldstillnotmakethatcombinationconceptuallyimpossible.It
wouldstillnotpreventusfromconsistentlyandintelligiblyenvisagingthatsugaris
sweetalthoughitisnotideallyjustifiablethatitis.Andsothissuggestedoutforthe
epistemictheoristturnsouttobeablindalley.Andevenifitweren't,Idoubtvery
muchthatanycontemporaryadvocateofanepistemicconceptionoftruthwouldbe
willing topurchase acceptability for the view atthe price of accepting absolute
idealism.
iv

OnefinalshotagainstIJC.Wehaveseenthatacommonobjectionagainstarealist
conceptionoftruthisthatitmakesitimpossibletodeterminetruthvalues.And
correspondingly,amainattractionofepistemicconceptionsisthattheyavoidthis
disabilityoftheirrival.Butironicallyenough,thetablesareturnedagainstepistemic
accountsonjustthispoint.Assoonaswemaketheepistemicconceptionstrong
enough to be at all plausible as an account of truth, it turns out that on that
conception,itismuchmoredifficulttodeterminetruthvaluesthanitisontherealist
conception.Ifwecouldidentifytruthwith,say,justificationbyordinarystandards,
thenitwouldbeeasiertodeterminetruthvaluesthanontherealistconception.But
anysuchaccountwouldbepalpablyinadequate.Clearly,somebeliefsjustifiedby
ordinary standards are false. For an epistemic account of truth to have any
plausibilityatall,wehavetoidentifytruthwithsomehighlyidealizedepistemic
status:membershipina maximallycomprehensive andcoherent systemorwhat
wouldbejustifiedinidealepistemicconditions.Andhavinginatedtheconception
to that extent, it becomes extremely problematic whether a belief satisfies the
condition.Whocansaywhichofourpresentbeliefswouldstillbejustifiableifwe
had ready access to all relevant evidence? Whenever the topic is difficult or
controversial,aswithmanyissuesinsceince,history,andphilosophy,weareinno
positiontosaywithanyassurancewhatpositionwouldbejustifiedinthemostideal
ofcircumstances.Andwheresimplermattersareconcerned,aswithgardenvariety
perceptualjudgments,weareinamuchbetterpositionwitharealistconception.
Becauseofthesevereproblemsofworkingoutadeterminateconceptionofideal
epistemiccircumstances,itismucheasiertodeterminethatmycomputerisonnow
than it is to determine whether that belief would be justified in ideal epistemic
circumstances. So the IJC doesn't deliver the goods for the sake of which it is
sought.Itmakestruthvalueslessaccessible,notmore.