BS9999 Fire Regulations PDF

The BS 9999 Handbook

Effective fire safety in the design, management
and use of buildings
Michael Green and Jonathan Joinson

First published in the UK in 2010
by
BSI
389 Chiswick High Road
London W4 4AL
British Standards Institution 2010
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About the authors
Michael Green
Michael Green is a chartered engineer, a partner of Buro Happold, and was
responsible for the early development of their fire safety engineering consultancy
team, FEDRA, with an involvement on fire safety since 1979. In addition to
major international sports, cultural, transportation and commercial projects,
he has made many contributions to the fire safety profession. This includes
development of an approach to the appraisal of existing sports grounds,
published by the IStructE in 1991 after the tragic fire at the Bradford North
Stand. Subsequently he chaired the production of two further guides: An
Introduction to the Fire Safety Engineering of Structures (2003) and An
Advanced Guide on the Fire Safety Engineering of Structures (2007). He was
also the author of the smoke and ventilation section of the CIBSE Guide E
(1997). An early involvement with the development of BS 9999 from 1998,
when work first began on this standard, has enabled an ongoing contribution
to the BSI committee.
Michael continues to be a strong advocate of research and its application in the

design and operation of buildings. He has strong links with many universities
internationally and is a director of Vulcan Solutions, a joint venture company
with Sheffield University.
Jonathan Joinson
Jonathan Joinson is a chartered fire engineer, a senior team member within
Buro Happold FEDRA, and has been involved in the fire safety design of
buildings since 1999. He has been involved in many high-profile projects within
the UK and internationally during his professional career, such as the Emirates
Stadium, the London O2 Arena and the redevelopment of the Ascot racecourse
grandstand, delivering efficient and progressive fire-engineering solutions. He
has extensive knowledge covering many aspects of fire engineering, including
international fire codes and best practice, smoke management, occupant
evacuation and the implementation and construction of design solutions, which
provide a sound basis, and in-depth understanding and background, for new
developments such as BS 9999.
The BS 9999 Handbook v

Contents
List of tables xi
List of figures xiii
Foreword xv
Introduction xvii
1. General 1
Principles 1
Spread of fire and smoke 2
The impact of fire on people 3
Historic buildings 4
Property and business continuity protection 5
Means of escape for disabled people 6
The full circle of fire safety 7
2. The concept of a risk profile 10

Key points 10
Background 10
Occupancy characteristics 11
Fire growth rate 12
The value of sprinklers within BS 9999 16
3. Methodology and tactics for use of the standard 17

Key points 17
Background 17
Inclusion of automatic sprinklers 20
Inclusion of automatic fire detection and alarm 20
Taking advantage of high ceilings 21
Example of the application of the allowable variations and the
associated benefits 21
Multi-space buildings with various risk profiles 23
The BS 9999 Handbook vii

Contents
4. Allocation of fire protection measures 24

Key points 24
Background 24
Additional fire protection measures 27
5. Managing fire safety design, occupation and construction 28

Key points 28
Background 28
Management levels 29
Designing so that a building can be managed 30
Fire safety manual 34
6. Design for means of escape 38

Key points 38
Background 38
Additional fire protection measures 43
Effect of automatic fire detection 44
Effect of ceiling heights 45
Maximum acceptable variations 46
Travel distance 46
Door and escape stair widths 47
Floor space factors 48
Alternative escape routes 48
Inner rooms 52
Dead-end corridors 54
Progressive horizontal evacuation 54
Escape for disabled people 55
External protection to escape stairs 58
7. Access and facilities for fire-fighting 59

Key points 59
Background 60
Risk profiles and fire-fighting provisions 60
viii The BS 9999 Handbook

Contents
Smoke control for fire-fighting shafts 66

Smoke venting from basement floors 66
Smoke venting from car parks, loading bays and service roads 67
8. Designing the building structure 68

Key points 68
Background 68
Compartmentation 82
Openings within fire-resisting construction (compartmentation or
escape routes) 83
External fire spread between neighbouring buildings 84
9. Recommendations for atria 90

Key points 90
Background 91
Escape routes 92
Smoke and heat control systems 97
10. Recommendations for theatres, cinemas and similar venues 98

Key points 98
Background 99
Seating and exit layouts 99
Furnishings, fabrics and decorative features 100
Stage areas 101
11. Recommendations for shopping complexes 102

Key points 102
Background 103
Means of escape and motivation to escape 104
Smoke control 104
Fire protection 104
Uncovered shopping complexes 105
Small shopping developments or arcades 105
Covering existing streets 105
The BS 9999 Handbook ix

Contents
12. Process plant and outdoor structures 106

Key points 106
Background 106
13. Worked example two storey retail unit 109
14. Worked example high-rise office building 114
15. Worked example mixed-risk profile building 119
Bibliography 128
x The BS 9999 Handbook

Contents
Tables
Table 1 Occupancy characteristics 11
Table 2 Fire growth rate 12
Table 3 Risk profile (BS 9999: Table 4) 13
Table 4 Examples of risk profiles (BS 9999: Table 5) 14
Table 5 Checklist for the design assessment, refer to Figure 2

(BS 9999: Table 1) 19
Table 6 Summary of the minimum fire protection package for each

risk profile (BS 9999: Tables 6, 8 and 9) 25
Table 7 Key factors used in assessing management levels 31
Table 8 Permissible variation of door, corridor and stair widths and

travel distance with ceiling height (BS 9999: Table 16) 45
Table 9 Travel distance as a function of risk profile

(BS 9999: Tables 12 and 17) 46
Table 10 Door width as a function of risk profile mm per person

(BS 9999: Tables 13 and 18) 47
Table 11 Absolute minimum width of stairs (BS 9999: Table 14) 48
Table 12 Minimum width of escape stairs for simultaneous evacuation

(BS 9999: Table 15) 49
Table 13 Examples of typical floor space factors (BS 9999: Table 10) 50
Table 14 Perimeter access requirements for fire service vehicles

(BS 9999: Table 21) 62
Table 15 Minimum fire resistance performance (BS 9999: Table 24) 73
Table 16 Fire resistance periods for elements of structure (based on

the ventilation conditions) (BS 9999: Table 26) 78
The BS 9999 Handbook xi

Contents
Table 17 Ventilation conditions for application of Table 16

(BS 9999: Table 27) 80
Table 18 Maximum dimensions of compartments (BS 9999: Table 30) 81
Table 19 Provision of fire doors (BS 9999: Table 32) 85
Table 20 Maximum travel distances for weather-housed, weather-

protected or external plant (BS 9999: Table F.1) 107
Table 21 Calculated travel distances 112
Table 22 Calculated horizontal exit width per person 112
Table 23 Calculated vertical exit width per person 112
xii The BS 9999 Handbook

Contents
Figures
Figure 1 Circle of fire safety 8
Figure 2 Process for approach to risk profile and related fire

protection measures 18
Figure 3 Design options 22
Figure 4 Process to design and construct a building that can be

managed 35
Figure 5 Design for means of escape decision chart 41
Figure 6 Pre-movement time as a function of fire growth rate 42
Figure 7 Fire growth, means of escape and travel time (adapted

from Figure 1, BS 9999) 43
Figure 8 Travel distance 45 or more apart (BS 9999: Figure 5) 52
Figure 9 Inner room and access room (BS 9999: Figure 6) 53
Figure 10 Dead-end corridors (BS 9999: Figure 9) 54
Figure 11 Progressive horizontal evacuation (BS 9999: Figure 12) 55
Figure 12 External protection to protected stairways

(BS 9999: Figure 14) 56
Figure 13 Fire resistance of areas adjacent to external stairs

(BS 9999: Figure 15) 56
Figure 14 Summary of recommendations for internal fire-fighting

provisions 63
Figure 15 Principles for the layout and fire resistance of fire-

fighting shafts (BS 9999: Figure 16) 65
Figure 16 Route for determining the applicable fire resistance

periods 72
The BS 9999 Handbook xiii

Contents
Figure 17 Compartment floors (BS 9999: Figure 24) 83
Figure 18 Small unprotected areas allowable without calculation

(BS 9999: Figure 41) 88
Figure 19 Provisions for external surfaces of walls

(BS 9999: Figure 45) 89
Figure 20 Example of smoke plume movement 92
Figure 21 Occupancy characteristic A (awake and

familiar) 18 m or less in height, open or closed, simultaneous
evacuation (BS 9999: Figure C.8 Exemplar 2) 93
Figure 22 Occupancy characteristic B (awake and

unfamiliar) 18 m or less in height, open, simultaneous evacuation
(BS 9999: Figure C.24 Exemplar 12) 94
Figure 23 Occupancy characteristic B (awake and unfamiliar)

18 m or less in height, enclosed, fire-resisting, simultaneous
evacuation (BS 9999: Figure C.25 Exemplar 13) 95
Figure 24 Occupancy characteristic Ciii (asleep and unfamiliar)

Short-term occupancy, protected escape route, any height
(BS 9999: Figure C.35 Exemplar 20) 96
Figure 25 Number of seats in a row (BS 9999: Figure D.1 and

Table D.1) 100
Figure 26 Assumed population of stairs in the example building,

even distribution 124

uneven distribution 125
xiv The BS 9999 Handbook

Foreword
The publication of BS 9999 was a major milestone in the development of British

Standards relating to fire safety in buildings and, in consequence, took a long
time to come to fruition. Following the issue of Part 11 of BS 5588 in 1997, a
review established a need for a full review of the whole BS 5588 series which
had grown over a period of years and which in themselves were developments
from Codes of Practice developed in the late 1940s.
The review identified a number of problems with the existing documentation

and a need for common national guidance which would be used by regulators,
designers, users, and enforcers was identified. Work started in early 1998 and in
June 2001 BS 9999-2 was issued as a Draft for Public Comment. A decision by
regulators to reform existing fire safety legislation in UK necessitated a change
of direction which resulted in the document being issued as a BS DD (Draft for
Development) coupled with a new Part 12 to BS 5588 using the Managing Fire
Safety material from BS 9999-2. Resulting from further changes in legislation
and issued Government Guidance, these stages were not finally completed until
mid 2005.
In late 2006, work to turn the DD into a BS commenced; this included integration
of BS 5588 Parts 5 and 12. Resulting from 2006/7 research on fire-fighter physiology
and fire service practice, amendments were needed to the text from BS 5588-5
on incorporation into BS 9999 and the fully revised text for BS 9999 was issued
as a Draft for Public Comment (DPC) in January 2008 and as a final document in
October 2008.
BS 9999 is one of the most important guidance documents dealing with fire
safety in buildings and, as stated in the document, its principal purpose is to
provide Guidance which gives a more transparent and flexible approach to fire
safety design through the use of a structured approach to risk-based design
where designers can take account of varying physical and human factors.
Although the guidance is based on fire safety engineering principles, it is not a
guide to fire safety engineering.
I believe the document does exactly what was intended when the work started
over 10 years ago and since its publication in 2008, BS 9999 has been used
extensively and there have been numerous seminars and courses covering its
scope and application. The publication of this book provides additional help and
The BS 9999 Handbook xv

Foreword
guidance to those using the Standard and to those who have previously had
doubts about using it. The text of the book has been carefully structured,
covering all aspects of BS 9999 and includes some useful worked examples.
David B Smith CEng, FIFireE, PPBEng, FBEng, FCII.

Chairman of BSI Technical Committee FSH/14
xvi The BS 9999 Handbook

Introduction
BS 9999 and consequently this guide are intended for use by designers, fire
engineers, fire and rescue services and fire safety managers. However, they are
also clearly of value to regulators, enforcers, operators/end users/clients, insurers
and contractors. The standard is designed as a holistic guide to bring together
the key areas of fire safety:
design for means of warning and escape;

fire resistance performance to protect means of escape and provide structural
stability;
the provision of access and facilities for fire fighting;
fire safety management.
BS 9999 contains a number of important changes from the guidance in the

BS 5588 series, particularly in the approach for design of means of escape and
construction. It also introduces the concept of the risk profile. It brings forward
guidance from BS 5588-5 and BS 5588-12 and has taken into account the input
from a major public consultation process. When compared with the various
national guidance documents and other British Standards, some fire protection
measures have been increased and others have been reduced to better reflect
the risks that are more clearly identified by relating to both the characteristics
of occupants and the potential for fire development in a more integrated way.
This applies to means of escape, fire resistance and fire-fighting provisions.
The recommendations specifically relating to fire-fighting have been updated
to take into account the findings of the Building Disaster Assessment group
(www.communities.gov.uk/fire/researchandstatistics/fireresearch/
buildingdisasterassessment/).
In the UK, technical guidance on fire safety is provided at three different levels.
This permits a design approach to be adopted that corresponds to the complexity
of the building and to the degree of flexibility required. The three levels are as
follows.
General approach. This level is applicable to a majority of building work

undertaken within the UK. Fire precautions designed into the building
usually follow the guidance in various national prescriptive documents
(e.g. Approved Document B) published to support legislative requirements.
The BS 9999 Handbook xvii

Introduction
Advanced approach. This is the level for which BS 9999 is provided.

Guidance provided gives a more transparent and flexible approach through
use of a structured process to risk-based design to account for different fire
and human factors. Much of the guidance in BS 9999 is based on fire safety
engineering principles, although it is not intended as a guide to fire safety
engineering.
Fire safety engineering. This is the level for which BS 7974 is provided. This
level provides an alternative approach to fire safety and can be the only
practical way to achieve a satisfactory standard of fire safety in some large
and complex buildings.
An early decision by the client and the design team on the most effective and
efficient approach is recommended so that the needs of the project are best
served. There might be circumstances in which it is necessary to use one
publication to supplement another, but care needs to be taken when using a
pick-and-mix approach as it is essential to ensure that an integrated approach
is used in any one building. Clear justification is necessary if this approach is
adopted.
The method of procurement of a building and the time at which a future

operator/end user can be identified is subject to a number of variables that
cannot easily be prescribed. It is therefore particularly important that fire safety
information, risk assessments and other relevant data throughout the whole
design, procurement and the operation of a building are made available by
those responsible at the different stages.
As per the standard, this guide does not cover the design of individual dwelling
houses, flats or maisonettes. For guidance on the fire safety design of these
types of premises refer to BS 5588-1.1
Use of this handbook

This handbook, like BS 9999, takes the form of guidance and recommendations.
It should not be quoted as if it were a specification, and particular care should
be taken to ensure that claims of compliance are not misleading.
1
BS 5588-1 is due to be replaced by BS 9991 in late 2010.
xviii The BS 9999 Handbook

Introduction
The primary purpose of this handbook is to provide a pocket guide to the use
of BS 9999 that is easy to use and draws together the key areas of fire safety
design that require consideration during the early development of design
concepts. The handbook provides an aid to the understanding and use of
BS 9999 and is not intended to be a substitute for the standard. The most
commonly used data, tables, figures and a Key Points list at the beginning of
each chapter provide a quick and effective overview of the measures that may
be necessary. In addition, a methodology is presented to help the user find the
best approach to deploy the flexible design recommendations introduced by
BS 9999.
Although it is a prescriptive guide, BS 9999 has a relationship with fire safety

engineering, and the opportunity for adopting such an approach has been
identified in a number of places throughout this handbook. The use of the
guidance involves limited calculation and engineering but does require
knowledge of fire safety in order to best judge the most appropriate package
of fire protection measures, management and training. It does allow for the
trade-off of one fire protection measure against another within a limited
framework beyond which a fire safety engineering approach would be required.
The BS 9999 Handbook xix

1. General
Principles
The recommendations given in the British Standard are general, and all fire
protection measures, procedures, etc., need to take into account the particular
circumstances of the individual building or complex concerned. The same
recommendations generally apply to both existing and new buildings, but
existing buildings, especially historic buildings, often pose problems that are
unlikely to arise in new buildings and, therefore, require further consideration by
adopting a flexible approach in the risk assessment process.
Although it is a prescriptive guide, BS 9999 provides a higher level of flexibility

than many prescriptive standards. It supports the concept of achieving the best
balance between an adequate performance and reasonable value. This has been
possible because the original basis of the recommendations gave recognition to
many of the engineering principles embodied in BS 7974. Where relevant and
useful, a brief background is provided in each of the chapters.
The guidance is straightforward to use for routine and typical buildings, but the
inbuilt flexibility will also support a sustainable reuse of our built environment.
The following areas are an essential contribution:
The identification of alternative flexible solutions to support the preservation

and the extended use of historic buildings, balancing the requirements of
modern construction standards and the need to be sensitive with historic
structures and finishes, is required.
The logical approach that is embodied in the code enables a relatively simple
risk assessment to appraise a change of use by addressing the fundamentals
that affect the outcomes: the fire load and the occupancy characteristics.
This will increase the overall ability of the design community to identify
alternative solutions that are good value, sustainable and safe.
The design of a new building to be adaptable for reuse at some future time
is a new challenge, which if successful will significantly enhance the life of
our building stock. The flexibility contained within BS 9999 allows designers
to plan for alternative future uses without the addition of a disproportionate
cost premium. The same flexibility equally allows alternative interpretations
when appraising an existing building for alternative uses.
The BS 9999 Handbook 1

General
No one building or operator/end user/client is exactly the same as another, so

a code of practice, such as BS 9999, can provide only a framework for the
designer and the operator/end user/client to make an informed judgement on
the most appropriate package of fire protection measures to meet both the
requirements of the designer and the objectives of the building operator/end
user/client. Fire precautions in all premises, however old, need to be seen as a
whole, a package aimed at achieving an acceptable standard of fire safety.
BS 9999 applies straightforwardly where premises have a single main use and
are contained in a single, separate building. However, complications might arise
where a building comprises two or more different main uses. In such cases, it is
important to consider the effect of one risk on another. A fire in a shop or
unattended office could have serious consequences on, for example, a residential
or hotel use in the same building. Similarly, a high fire risk in one part of a
building could seriously affect other areas in another part of that building. A
worked example in Chapter 15 provides an illustration of how to approach
different risk profiles within a single building.
Spread of fire and smoke

A common basis for designing fire safety measures lies in the identification of
the possible causes and sources of fire, and the evaluation of the development
and spread through a building.
The fact that outbreak of fire is more likely to occur in furnishings, decorations,
finished goods, raw materials, chemicals, equipment, electrical services, process
plant, or service plant in a building has been taken into account in the development
of the standard. Initially, a fire creates a hazard only in the part of the building
in which it starts, and it is unlikely to involve a large area in the first instance,
although it can subsequently spread to other parts of the building, and vertical
shafts such as lifts and service risers are a particular risk. Fire is less likely to
spread if passages, corridors, lobbies or stairways, intended for access or means
of escape, are kept clear of combustible materials. As the fire grows, flames
increase in height, reach the ceiling and are deflected horizontally, radiating
heat downwards and accelerating fire growth. If the ceiling is combustible, it
can ignite and add to the volume of flame and speed of fire growth. If the
space has insufficient openings to provide a continuing air supply, the burning
rate diminishes as it draws on increasingly vitiated air, but the gases generated
are then extremely toxic.
2 The BS 9999 Handbook

General
The impact of fire on people

A fire occurring anywhere within a compartment of a building has to be regarded
as presenting a hazard to all occupants within that compartment, even though
the hazard may seem small in the initial stages. When a fire occurs in an
enclosed space, hot smoke-laden toxic gases rise to form a layer, which at first
has a tendency to flow under the ceiling and then deepens to fill the whole
space. Smoke is likely to be the first sign that there is a fire. For higher and
larger spaces, it takes longer for the space to fill with smoke, and so there is
more time for escape, and therefore longer travel distances and smaller stairs
are possible. Higher fire growth rates reduce the time available.
When smoke descends down to head height it causes difficulty in breathing and
impairs visibility, which interferes with the efforts of occupants to find their way
towards the exits. Smoke can cause intoxication, disorientation, incapacity,
unconsciousness and, in the worst-case scenario, fatalities.
These considerations are particularly important when dealing with large

numbers of people, who might be unfamiliar with their surroundings, and vary
widely in age and degree of mobility. Also, when people are unfamiliar with
their surroundings they might initially go in the wrong direction or they might
not take the most direct path and, therefore, the average speed of travel to an
exit could be slower than a typical average walking speed.
To facilitate escape it is therefore necessary:
to ensure that protected escape routes are provided and that they are
adequately safeguarded against the ingress of smoke;
to limit the time people have to travel before they reach a protected route or
final exit;
to consider reverse flows that might occur as a result of a particular exit
route being unavailable;
to plan evacuation for disabled people in an integrated manner.
A means of smoke ventilation might be necessary to assist the fire and rescue
service and, if operated automatically, can also assist escape from the building.
After the outbreak of fire there might only be a short time during which the
actions necessary for ensuring the safety of occupants can be carried out. This
time will be sufficient only if all provisions for the safety of people from fire are
planned and managed so as to be effective when the occasion arises.

General
Historic buildings
Many historic buildings are listed, and permitted alterations are limited
without the agreement of the appropriate authorities. The advice of consultative
bodies, such as English Heritage, should be sought in the early stages of design.
The appropriate authorities sometimes agree to limited modifications to
improve life safety where, in turn, there will be added long-term protection
and preservation of the original building fabric. Issues relating to historic
buildings include:
the preservation of the ambience and important features of the building,

such as timber linings to accommodation stairs and slender cast iron
structure, both of which can sometimes conflict with the desired fire safety
but can be accommodated with suitable compensating features;
the existing construction of the building, including hidden features such as
cavities through which fire could spread and the fire performance of walls,
partitions and floors;
the interrelationship between life safety and measures to protect
property/contents;
the fire performance of the building structure. Although modern
construction standards seldom apply to historic buildings, action to improve
the level of fire and life safety might be necessary on the basis of change of
use or due to the need to reduce the fire risk and potential for loss of the
building and its contents.
In assessing the fire safety management needs of an existing building that is

being modified, it is essential to have a full understanding of the existing
structure (Appraisal of Existing Structures, 3rd edition, IStructE) and any fire
safety provisions incorporated. Any change in use of the premises that could
affect the fire risk profile (e.g. increased fire load and process risks, introducing
the public, changes to sleeping risk, seasonal changes) should be considered.
Also the legislation and guidance introduced since the premises were originally
constructed or last altered, or since their fire safety was last assessed, should be
reviewed.
In both new construction and upgrading existing buildings, the fire precautions
are interrelated and weaknesses in some areas can be compensated for by
strengths in others. BS 9999 provides a level of flexibility that allows the fire
protection measures and the risks to be assessed to enable reasonable practical
solutions to be designed.

General
Property and business continuity protection

The guidance and recommendations in BS 9999 are primarily concerned with
the protection of life. The provision of fire safety systems for life safety does not
necessarily give adequate protection to property or to the continuity of the
business carried out in the building.
Smoke and fire spread are major causes of property damage and losses that
include:
property: contents, fabric and building services;

business: loss of trade, loss of operational continuity, loss of records.
The objectives are first to reduce the chance of fire starting and second in the
event of fire starting to reduce the consequences of that fire. Because many
of the features necessary for life safety are common, the risk assessment for
property and business continuity protection could be an extension to other risk
assessments carried out for life safety. The following are the primary means of
achieving the objectives:
the first barrier to property and business loss is the level of fire prevention
management in the building. This is to ensure that ignition hazards are
eliminated or controlled, that operations in the building are carried out
appropriately and that combustible loads are subject to control and good
housekeeping.
smoke management (mechanical, natural, pressurization) to prevent damage
from heat and corrosive chemicals in the smoke;
compartmentation and structural fire protection to reduce spread of fire
between spaces. The complete involvement of the whole fire compartment is
an extreme-event scenario. Adequate detailing of cavity barriers, fire-stopping
doors, shutters, fire resistance, etc. is important to maintain the performance
of the compartment walls and floors.
fire-fighting facilities, including consideration of speed of response and the
tactics for external and internal fire-fighting;
external fire spread and building separation. For most buildings it is expected
that these provisions for life safety will also be adequate for property
protection. However, for some buildings and uses the provision may need to
be more stringent. Consideration should be given to buildings having highly
glazed faades.
automatic suppression systems to reduce fire severity such as sprinklers, etc.

General
The consequences of fire on property and business loss can be highlighted to

the owner, occupier, operator/end user/client, tenant, designers and insurers
and can involve discussions on the acceptable level of risk.
Any changes in the design added for the purpose of property protection should
be discussed with the relevant authorities to ensure that there is no adverse
impact on life safety. If a conflict exists between the provisions for life safety
and property protection that cannot be resolved, then life safety takes priority.
The risk assessment could range from a simple statement outlining the potential
property and business losses that are acceptable to business managers and their
insurers, through to a rigorous quantified analysis of probabilities and
consequences of fire. Whatever method is used, the aims of the risk assessment
should be understood by all concerned.
The insurance industry has produced various guides that are directed at property
protection (including FPA guide Essential Principles and guidance published by
the Arson Control Forum, Arson Prevention Bureau and Zurich Municipal). Arson
and vandalism are addressed by guidance produced by the Arson Control Forum
and the Arson Prevention Bureau.
Many insurers use the LPC Design Guide for the Fire Protection of Buildings as a
basis for providing guidance to the building designer on what they require.
BS 9999 is the first significant design standard that embeds the quality of the
management into the design process. Many fire losses are due wholly or in part
to failures in management so it makes good sense to draw attention to the
management needs. It will also be increasingly important for the insurance
industry to build the quality of the management into their methodology to help
reduce losses. However, trade-off for enhanced management, enabling reductions
in the built provision, is not allowed in the standard.
Reference should be made to Annex A of BS 9999 for additional considerations

for property and business continuity protection.
Means of escape for disabled people

Means of escape for disabled people, and the associated fire safety strategy,
should be considered as an integral part of the design process, and not as a
separate issue. Where a building is designed and managed inclusively to provide

General
access for all users, the facilities provided should, where appropriate, be used to
improve egress arrangements.
Fire safety for disabled people is included within the standard; this includes
consideration of all disabilities and is not restricted to guidance for assisting
wheelchair users. Specific guidance on means of escape for disabled people is
given in BS 9999: Clauses 17.7 and 18.8; general guidance on fire safety
procedures for people at particular risk is given in BS 9999: Clause 44.3; and
measures to aid the evacuation of disabled people are described in BS 9999:
Clause 46.
Disabled people can be at particular risk in the event of a fire and need appropriate
protection facilities. These might include relevant provisions for those requiring
assistance, such as:
appropriate means for giving warning in the event of fire;

management planning;
appropriate fire instructions in alternative formats;
appropriate wayfinding systems;
evacuation lifts or protected refuge areas and devices for taking people down
or up stairs.
Special management procedures might be required when it is reasonably

foreseeable that the proportion of disabled users in a building will be relatively
high or where the use of the premises is likely to result in groups of wheelchair
users being present (e.g. some types of sporting, entertainment, transport or
public assembly building).
The full circle of fire safety

The concept of the full circle of fire safety is inherent within a comprehensive
whole-life approach to fire safety. However BS 9999 is exceptional in that it
incorporates an explicit connection between the use, the design and the operation.
Historically, the management for fire safety has not been a significant part of
the design process, and this is currently still the case in many countries.
The full circle of fire safety requires effective connectivity between the client
brief, design, operational fire strategy and ultimately whether the actual
operational approach meets with the client intentions and the full circle.

8
Client brief
General
and policy
Qualitative design review

Operational certification
Design aspirations Acceptance criteria
Auditing and reporting and objectives
Structural
Fire-fighting Zone models
Maintenance fire design
Evacuation modelling CFD

Staff training Review fire safety plan
Science Fire
Fire risk strategy
management
Procure fire systems
Fire safety plan Risk assessments Fire tests
Design products
Cause and effects
Risk assessment
Define management
standard
Operational
fire safety plan Operational requirements
Commissioning and testing
Building regulations approval
Buro Happold
Figure 1 Circle of fire safety

General
It is likely that simple buildings complying with the recommendations of the

standard will only necessitate consideration of a selection of the sub-components
of the circle of fire safety. However, complex buildings, particularly where a fire
engineering approach is adopted, will probably necessitate the adoption of the
majority of sub-components identified in Figure 1.

2. The concept of a risk profile
Key points
The risk profile associated with a space is a combination of the occupant

characteristics and the fire growth rate and is the principal driver for the
development of the fire safety design and provision of a suitable package
of fire safety measures within BS 9999.
The occupancy characteristic (Table 1) embodies the familiarity of
occupants with their surroundings, their alertness, their response to fire
and warning and hence the time taken to evacuate to a place of safety.
The fire growth rate (Table 2) embodies the growth and scale of a fire
and hence the time available for those occupants to evacuate and the
severity of the fire impacting on the structure. The addition of sprinklers
improves safety and thus reduces the fire growth rate, which alters the
risk profile for the space.
There are certain combinations of occupant characteristics and fire
growth rate that are not allowable and outside the scope of the guidance
within BS 9999. Risk profiles A4, B4 and C4 will require the addition of
fire suppression/sprinklers or the adoption of a fire engineered approach.
Background
There are two fundamental inputs to the design of a building that drive the
specification of the fire protection measures and the approach to fire safety
management. Every other input is a decision made by the designer, an
operator/end user/client, or the approving authorities. The two inputs are
associated with the intended use and are as follows:
1. The occupancy characteristics. The principal variables are whether the

majority of occupants are familiar with the building or whether there is a
sleeping use. Occupant characteristics will also influence the approach to
design for disabled people.
2. The fire growth rate. This is derived from the use and management of the
building, and encompasses:
a. the growth rate of a fire, which is a key factor in the means of escape;

The concept of a risk profile
b. the severity of the fire that affects the performance of the structure,
construction and the compartmentation.
By a combination of the above two inputs the risk profile for the building or
space is defined.
Occupancy characteristics
The occupancy characteristics for a single use are usually fairly clear and can be
determined from Table 1. Complications can arise when there is a mix of uses.
Table 1 Occupancy characteristics
Occupancy Description Examples

characteristic
A Occupants who are awake and Office and industrial premises
familiar with the building
B Occupants who are awake and Shops, exhibitions, museums,
unfamiliar with the building leisure centres, other assembly
buildings etc.
C Occupants who are likely to be
asleep:
Ci Long-term individual Individual flats without
occupancy 24-hour maintenance and
management control on site
Cii Long-term managed Serviced flats, halls of
occupancy residence, sleeping areas or
boarding schools
Ciii Short-term occupancy Hotels
A)
D Occupants receiving medical Hospitals, residential care
care facilitiesB)
EC) Occupants in transit Railway stations, airports
A)
Currently, occupancy characteristic D, medical care, is dealt with in other
documentation and is outside the scope of this British Standard.
B)
Under some circumstances, residential care facilities may be classified as occupancy
characteristic Cii.
C)
This occupancy characteristic is included for completeness within this table but is
not referred to elsewhere in this British Standard.

Unless the uses can be clearly delineated, it is advisable to adopt the higher
requirement. A worked example is provided in Chapter 15 where a number of
different risk profiles are contained within the same building.
Fire growth rate

The fire growth rate as defined by BS 9999 embodies both of the following:
the rate of fire growth, which is of primary concern for means of escape,
travel distance, doors stairs, etc.;
fire load and ventilation and thus the severity of the fire impacting on the
structure.
Table 2 provides a simple summary of the typical fire loads with the associated
fire growth rate.
The selection of the fire growth rate requires some thought and consideration.
For example an office fire growth rate could vary between 1 and 3, although 3
would be unlikely unless there are very significant amounts of open storage
areas. A fire growth rate of 1 is possible as offices become paperless, although it
may be unwise to select 1 for the design of a new facility as this may reduce
future flexibility, unless the client is able to prescribe with some certainty into
the future or in the case of temporary use. Another example for consideration is
that of a shop. Some boutique-style shops with products that are well spaced
and presented for sale in low densities may have a fire growth rate of 1, but
Table 2 Fire growth rate
Fire growth Examples Fire growth

rate parameterA)
kJ/s3
Slow Banking hall, limited combustible materials 0.0029
Medium Stacked cardboard boxes, wooden pallets 0.012
Fast Baled thermoplastic chips, stacked plastic 0.047
products, baled clothing
Ultra-fast Flammable liquids, expanded cellular plastics 0.188
and foam
A)
This is discussed in PD 7974-1.

conversely a shop with head-height shelving may be growth rate 3, or possibly

4, if there are significant volumes of combustible materials. However, a fire
growth rate 3 is considered as typical within the standard as it covers a broad
range of shops, but as highlighted above will not apply to every type of shop.
The designer in consultation with the client does need to make a well-judged
decision that reflects the intended use. Table 2 gives some typical values that are
useful for initial guidance, but each case should be specifically assessed on its
own merits.
Table 3 highlights how risk profiles are defined, and risk profiles for typical areas
within a building are given in Table 4.
As this standard derives from a very simple logic, it enables a more flexible
responsive approach compared with traditional prescriptive guidance. This
handbook includes a description of how this flexibility can best be deployed.
The risk profile provides a simple and very effective basis for handling and
assessing the variations in risk, the related package of fire protection measures
and the need for management.
Table 3 Risk profile (BS 9999: Table 4)
Occupancy characteristic Fire growth rate Risk profile

(from Table 2)
A 1 Slow A1
(Occupants who are awake and familiar 2 Medium A2
with the building)
3 Fast A3
4 Ultra-fast A4
B 1 Slow B1
(Occupants who are awake and 2 Medium B2
unfamiliar with the building)
3 Fast B3
4 Ultra-fast B4
C 1 Slow C1
(Occupants who are likely to be asleep) 2 Medium C2
3 Fast C3
4 Ultra-fast C4

Table 4 Examples of risk profiles (BS 9999: Table 5)
Occupancy Risk Occupancy Risk

profile profile
Administration office A2 Gymnasium/leisure centre B2
Amusement arcade B2 Indoor games/training rooms B2
in schools
Archive/library reading area B3 Kitchen A3
Art gallery B1/B2 Licensed betting office (public B1
area)
Assembly hall B2 Lobbies B1
Banking hall B1 Lounge (other than dwelling) B2
Bar B2 Machine/printing room A3
Bazaar B2/B3 Mechanical plant room A4
Bedroom/study bedroom Cii2 Meeting room B2
Bed-sitting room Cii2 Museum B2
Billiards or snooker room B2 Office (closed-plan or office B2
less than 60 m2)
Bingo hall B2 Office (open-plan exceeding A2
60 m2)
Bowling alley B2 Reading room B2
Business centre B2 Reception area B1
Canteen A2 Restaurant B2
Classroom A2 Shop sales area B3
Club B2 Showrooms B3
Committee room A2 Skating rink B1
Common room A2 Stadia and grandstands B1
Computer room B2 Staffroom A2
Concourse or shopping mall B2 Storage and warehousing A2/A3/
A4
Conference room B2 Studio (radio, television, film, A2
recording), non-public
Crush hall B2 Studio (radio, television, film, B2
recording), public

Table 4 Examples of risk profiles (BS 9999: Table 5)(contd)
Occupancy Risk Occupancy Risk

profile profile
Dance area B2 Teaching laboratories A3
Deposit/strongroom A2/A3 Theatre/cinema/concert hall B2
auditoria
Design studio/drafting office A2 Theatre stages A2/A3
Dining room B1 Trading floor B2
Dormitory Cii2 Trading gallery B2
Exhibition areas B2/B3 Venue for pop concerts B1
Factory production area A2/A3 Waiting area/visitors lounge B1
Filing room/store A3 Waiting room B1
Foyers B1 Workshop A3
The risk profile concept is a common thread throughout BS 9999, although

there are some areas where reference to a purpose group remains to enable
effective cross-reference to other guidance documents. Where guidance within
BS 9999 refers to assembly and recreation, shops and factories, these are
known as purpose groups as defined within Table D1 of Approved Document
B. The designer should reference this document to determine which purpose
group their occupancy falls within. By using responsible judgement, it may be
possible to map a risk profile to a purpose group where they continue to be
referenced, although this is currently beyond the scope of the standard.
Risk profile assessments are carried out on a case-by-case basis, as highlighted in

the examples considered above. Because of the relatively high risks, ultra-fast
fires are deemed to be unacceptable and therefore risk profiles A4, B4 and C4
are not allowable unless an effective localized suppression system or automatic
sprinklers are added to alter the risk profiles to A3, B3 and C3 respectively. In
addition, risk profile C3 may also be unacceptable under many circumstances
unless special precautions are taken. Fire safety engineering can offer an
alternative approach to those risk profiles that are not allowable within BS 9999.

Occupancy characteristic C is divided into the following sub-categories:
Ci long-term individual occupancy, i.e. individual flats without 24-hour

maintenance and management control on site;
Cii Long-term managed occupancy, i.e. serviced flats, halls of residence,
sleeping areas or boarding schools.
Ciii Short-term occupancy, i.e. hotels.
The value of sprinklers within BS 9999

Sprinklers help to improve performance in a variety ways of including the safety
of people, performance of the construction as well as reducing the overall
risks of spread of fire and the consequent protection of property and business
sustainability. In particular, consideration should be given to the following when
considering the value of sprinklers in a particular case.
A person in the space where the fire originates may be safer, as the presence
of sprinklers limits fire growth and reduces temperature as well as smoke
production. At best sprinklers put a fire out, but they may only slow the fire
growth rate if the circumstances for extinguishing the fire are not ideal.
BS 9999 conservatively assumes a reduction in growth rate by allowing a
reduction of one step in the fire growth rate (i.e. 2 to 1, 4 to 3, etc.).
Sprinklers may also reduce the chance of fire spreading from one room to
another.
The chance of a fire seriously affecting the fire performance of a structure
reduces if sprinklers are present, and therefore a lower fire resistance
requirement is reasonable to achieve a given performance.
For the same reasons as for the structure, the chances of fire spread between
buildings is beneficially reduced.
Automatic sprinkler systems should be designed and installed in accordance

with BS EN 12845 (new systems) or BS 5306-2 (existing systems). Where it is
proposed to modify the risk profile by using a fire suppression system other than
a traditional water-fed sprinkler system, it will need to be demonstrated that this
system achieves the equivalent standard of fire protection and reliability.
The list of example risk profiles in Table 4 is not exhaustive and should not be
prescriptively applied without due consideration. As highlighted previously, it is
possible for office spaces to have risk profiles varying from A1 to A3.

3. Methodology and tactics for use of the
standard
Key points
Before beginning the design of a building in accordance with BS 9999, it
is essential that knowledge of any fire protection systems due to client or
insurance requirements is established.
Figure 2 outlines a process for approaching the interaction between risk
profile and the related fire protection measures to ensure that the design
does not fall short of the recommendations within the standard.
The provision of automatic sprinklers within a space will improve safety
and enable a change in the risk profile, which then affects all related
recommendations, so an early decision on this helps the process greatly.
The provision of automatic detection and alarm and/or high ceilings can
allow increased travel distances and reduced escape route widths.
Chapter 15 provides a worked example that highlights how the
recommendations of BS 9999 can be applied to a building containing
multiple-risk profiles.
Background
The guidance provided within BS 9999 is flexible and allows trade-off among the
risk profile, sprinklers and the package of fire protection measures. For example
automatic sprinklers will result in a change to the risk profile (e.g. B3 to B2 when
sprinklers are introduced into a shop), and high ceilings or automatic detection
and alarm can directly allow increased travel distances and reduced escape route
widths. Therefore, use of the standard can provide a high level of flexibility for new
buildings and renewed flexibility for the refurbishment of existing building stock.
Variation in BS 9999 design recommendations, responding to risk profile and

the inclusion of fire protection measures within a room or space, relate primarily
to the following:
design of means of escape (refer to Chapter 6);

fire resistance period(s) of a building (refer to Chapter 8);
compartment limitations.

Methodology and tactics for use of the standard
Determine risk profile
Consider adding
sprinklers to reduce Is minimum package of
the risk profile or an fire protection measures
alternative fire available?
No (See Chapter 5,Table 6)
engineering
approach
Yes
Introduce
additional fire
No Option 2 protection
No Option 1
measures
Design assessment
Does the design conform to the
means of escape, construction,
operational and fire-fighting
requirements of the standard
(see Table 5)?
Yes
Buro Happold OK
Figure 2 Process for approach to risk profile and related fire

protection measures
Design recommendations in other areas of fire safety design within BS 9999 do

not vary in response to the inclusion of additional fire protection measures. Note
that the variation of design recommendations can be applied only within rooms
or spaces that incorporate the associated fire protection measures.
Figure 2 outlines a process for approaching the risk profile and the incorporation
of the related fire protection measures. It also shows how the risk profile can be
changed by the addition of sprinklers compensating for a shortfall of other
recommendations.
A checklist for the design assessment stated in Figure 2 is highlighted in Table 5.

Table 5 Checklist for the design assessment (BS 9999: Table 1)
Factor Comments
Adequacy of means to prevent fire The assessment should identify the
scope for fire prevention measures and
indicate the associated management
systems needed.
Early fire warning by an automatic This provision can also lead to first aid
detection and warning system to or fire and rescue service fire-fighting
enable early evacuation in the early stages of fire development.
Modern systems can be unobtrusive
(aspirating), addressable (by which a
fire location and development can be
identified) and can reduce unwanted
alarms.
The standard of means of escape See Chapter 6 and Chapter 8 (for which
structural enclosure and separation
would be a part).
Provision of smoke control See Chapters 7, 9, 10 and 11.
Control of the rate of fire growth This item particularly includes spread
of flame over surfaces and linings, and
within contents. See Chapter 8.
Adequacy of the structure to resist the See Chapter 8.
effects of fire
Degree of fire containment Includes containment by
compartmentation, cavity barriers,
and fire stopping. See Chapter 8.
Fire separation between buildings or See Chapter 8.
parts of a building
Standard of active measures for fire See Chapters 4 and 8.
extinguishment or control
Facilities to assist the fire and rescue See Chapter 7.
service
Quality of premises management See Chapter 5.
Provisions for staff training and See Chapter 5.
ongoing controls
Occupancy characteristics and risk See Table 3.
profiles

It is essential that any fire protection system that might be included because of
client or insurance requirements or later sections of BS 9999 are identified prior
to beginning the design assessment of the building to minimize abortive work.
The impacts of such systems on design guidance are highlighted in the
remainder of this chapter.
Inclusion of automatic sprinklers

As discussed in Chapter 2, when using BS 9999 the value of installing automatic
sprinklers in a building is recognized by directly altering the risk profile through
reducing the fire growth rate by one level. It is therefore necessary to know
whether the building being designed necessitates automatic sprinklers as a
minimum provision to avoid abortive work.
In addition to client and insurance requirements, this can be due to the following
recommendations within BS 9999: Section 7 Designing the Building Structure
(refer to Chapter 8 of this handbook):
All buildings with a floor greater than 30 m in height should be protected

throughout by automatic sprinklers.
Where there is a need to reduce the risk profile to comply with the
compartmentation guidance, see Chapter 8, Table 18.
Certain basements that are >200 m2 in floor area and >3 m below
adjacent ground level (except for car parks) and are mechanically
ventilated.
The risk profile for unacceptable conditions from Table 3 (A4, B4 and C4)
should be changed.
Note that where sprinklers are necessary to meet the recommendations of

BS 9999: Section 7 Designing the Building Structure, the beneficial reduction of
fire growth associated with sprinklers can still be used to reduce the risk profile
(refer to the worked example in Chapter 14).
Inclusion of automatic fire detection and alarm

The value of installing automatic detection and alarm in a room or space to a
higher standard than the minimum recommended is recognized within BS 9999
by allowing the application of a per cent variation (stated as 15 per cent) to the
following components of the means of escape design:

travel distances (15 per cent increase, refer to Chapter 6);

horizontal escape route widths (15 per cent decrease, refer to Chapter 6);
escape stair widths (15 per cent decrease, refer to Chapter 6).
Note that the per cent variation is allowable only where automatic smoke
detection and alarm within the room or space is not required as a minimum
provision by the standard (refer to Chapter 4 of this handbook) and a clear
benefit can be demonstrated (refer to the worked example in Chapter 15). For
example, the installation of automatic smoke detection within a small reception
area is unlikely to provide a direct benefit to the persons in the reception, but it
may provide a clear early warning of a fire in that area for those persons located
in adjoining spaces. Similarly, a fire warning system that provides information
about a fire incident can greatly reduce the response of the occupants within
the building. However, the installation of a voice alarm system is likely to
provide a greater benefit in a building containing occupant characteristic B. In a
building with occupant characteristic A, where the occupants are familiar with
the building layout and receive regular training, they are likely to respond
relatively quickly to a fire alarm and the installation of a voice alarm is less likely
to provide an increased benefit compared with typical sounders.
Taking advantage of high ceilings

BS 9999 also recognizes the inherent safety associated with high ceilings within
a room or space by allowing the application of a per cent variation (variable
dependent upon the height) to the following components of the means of
escape design:
Travel distances (per cent increase, refer to Chapter 6).

Horizontal escape route widths (per cent decrease, refer to Chapter 6).
Escape stair widths (per cent decrease, refer to Chapter 6).
Example of the application of the allowable variations and

the associated benefits
Figure 3 illustrates the potential flexibility and tangible benefits that can be
achieved with the use of BS 9999. It compares an office with and without
sprinkler protection, risk profiles A1 and A2 respectively. The immediate
difference between the two is likely to be a smaller number of escape routes
within the building. The addition of automatic detection and alarm would result

Office with sprinklers risk profile A1 Office without sprinklers risk profile A2
Scenario A
65 m 65 m 55 m 55 m
Fire resistance periods between 15 min Fire resistance periods between 30 min
and 90 min (Table 16) and 150 min (Table 16)
No limit on building height Building height limited to 30 m unless
No limit on compartment floor area sprinklers are provided
Travel distance limited to 65 m No limit on compartment floor area
Travel distance limited to 55 m
Scenario B
Add automatic detection and alarm Add automatic detection and alarm
74 m 74 m 63 m 63 m
Travel distance limited to 74 m Travel distance limited to 63 m

Total stair width required less than scenario A Total stair width required less than
scenario A
Scenario C
Automatic detection and high ceilings Automatic detection and high ceilings
90 m 90 m 75 m 75 m
Actual allowable travel distance depends Actual allowable travel distance depends
upon the height of the ceiling upon the height of the ceiling
Overall travel distance limited to 90 m Overall travel distance limited to 75 m
Total stair width required less than Total stair width required less than
scenario B scenario B
Escape stair cores
Buro Happold
Figure 3 Design options

in an increased travel distance and a reduction in stair and exit widths.

Combining this with high ceiling heights could further increase the travel
distances and may result in a further reduction in the number of escape routes.
Multi-space buildings with various risk profiles

The guidance within BS 9999 is mapped against the risk profile. It is possible
that a building will contain more than one risk profile, each with different
recommendations, which may affect only the immediate locality of the risk
profile or apply to the entire building.
Where guidance affects the entire building, the most onerous recommendation
relating to the occupying risk profiles should be adopted throughout the
building. The following are examples of such design recommendations within
BS 9999:
minimum level of management;

automatic alarm and detection;
emergency lighting;
fire resistance period;
compartment dimensions.
Where guidance affects the immediate locality of the risk profile, each space
should be assessed independently to determine the recommendations relevant
to the associated risk profile. This assessment should also include any allowable
variations as these are dependent upon both the risk profile and the geometry
of the space. The following are examples of such design recommendations
within BS 9999:
travel distances;
horizontal escape route widths.
Escape stair widths will often link different risk profiles and will require both
local and overall checks to assess the requirements.
Chapter 15 provides a worked example which highlights how the

recommendations of BS 9999 can be applied to a building containing
multiple-risk profiles.

4. Allocation of fire protection measures
Key points
A minimum level of management is expected for each risk profile within
BS 9999, with some necessitating higher levels than others. This minimum
expectation should be communicated to the intended user, to their
representative or to those who will eventually co-ordinate the design with
the building operator/end user/client.
Minimum levels of fire detection, alarm and emergency escape lighting
coverage are expected within BS 9999, with the extent being dependent
upon the risk profile.
Table 6 highlights the minimum fire protection measures that are
necessary for each risk profile.
The addition of sprinklers improves safety, changes the risk profile and
therefore might allow reduced minimum fire protection measures.
Where the minimum fire protection measures cannot be provided, a fire
engineering approach should be adopted (refer to Figure 2).
Refer to Chapters 6, 7 and 8 of this handbook to identify the minimum

recommendations for means of escape, fire-fighting facilities and building
construction.
Background
For every risk profile there is a minimum package of fire protection measures
and a related management level that is necessary to ensure sufficient time for
escape in the event of a fire. It is a basic requirement that will allow the design
parameters for means of escape, construction, etc. to be adopted. The total
package of fire protection measures for each of the risk profiles is summarized
in Table 6 and represents the minimum necessary to allow the use of the
BS 9999 approach.
The type and extent of fire detection and alarm is dependent on the risk profile.
In premises where occupants are awake and the fire growth rate is low then it
may be acceptable to rely on manual detection. Where the fire growth rate is
high, or occupants are asleep, fire and smoke spread may adversely affect

Allocation of fire protection measures

risk profile (BS 9999: Tables 6, 8 and 9)
systems are defined in

Minimum acceptable
detection and alarm
Compartmentation
Management level
emergency escape
Building structure
Type M, L3, L2, L1
Means of escape
Areas needing
Risk profile
BS 5839-1
lighting
A1 M Underground or windowless 3A)
accommodation
A2 M 2
Stairways in a central core
A3 L2 or serving storey(s) more 1
A4 N/A than 18 m above ground N/A
Internal corridors more than
30 m long
Open-plan areas of more
than 60 m2
B1 M All escape routes, including 2
external routes (except in
B2 M 2
shops of three or fewer
B3 L2 storeys with no sales floor 1
See Chapter 6
See Chapter 8
See Chapter 8
more than 280 m2 provided
B4 N/A N/A
that the shop is not a
restaurant or bar)
Ci1 Au/tomatic All common escape routes, 2
fire detection including external routes,
in individual except in two-storey blocks
units of flats
Ci2 Automatic 1
fire detection
in individual
units
Ci3 L3 1
Cii1 L2 2
Cii2 L2 1
Cii3 L1 1
Ciii1 L1 2


risk profile (BS 9999: Tables 6, 8 and 9) (contd)
systems are defined in

Minimum acceptable
detection and alarm
Compartmentation
Management level
emergency escape
Building structure
Type M, L3, L2, L1
Means of escape
Areas needing
Risk profile
BS 5839-1
Ciii2 L1 lighting
All common escape routes, 1
including external routes,
Ciii3 L1 1
except in two-storey blocks
C4 N/A of flats N/A
Generally All sanitary accommodation
See Chapter 6
See Chapter 8
See Chapter 8
for any with a floor area over 8 m2.
use Windowless sanitary
accommodation with a
floor area not more than
8 m2. Electricity and
generator rooms. Switch
room/battery room for
emergency lighting system.
Emergency control room
A)
Level 3 provides a very basic level of management and in some instances may not be
adequate to meet other legislative requirements, i.e. the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety)
Order in England and Wales.
occupants remote from the area of origin of the fire, and automatic detection
and alarm are necessary to ensure sufficient time for escape in the event of a
fire. The provision of voice and/or visual alarms within buildings containing
occupancy characteristic B is not necessarily required as a minimum although it
can help to reduce evacuation time.
The lighting of escape routes should be such that occupants can move safely
along the required escape routes during an emergency. It should be designed to
operate during failure of the normal power supply.

Access and facilities for fire-fighting are not currently aligned to the risk
profiles although this could happen at a future time. However, in carrying out
a fire-fighting risk assessment for a particular building some consideration could
reasonably be given to the risk profile and the associated fire protection measures
as part of the assessment.
The management of fire safety is discussed further in Chapter 5.
Additional fire protection measures

In addition to the variation of risk profile enabled by the addition of sprinklers,
the design can be varied further to account for high ceilings, which increase
the smoke fill time and therefore the time available for means of escape (see
Chapter 1 on spread of fire and smoke). The design can also be altered by
adding automatic fire detection to increase the travel time to escape.
These additional measures affect only the means of escape design and are
therefore described in more detail in Chapter 6.

5. Managing fire safety design,
occupation and construction
Key points
A building should be designed such that it can be managed, and therefore
fire safety management should be a consideration right from the early
stages.
Management levels are dependent upon occupant characteristics and fire
loading and therefore form part of the minimum fire protection measures
associated with a risk profile (refer to Table 6).
There are three management levels in BS 9999, levels 1, 2 and 3; level 1 is
the highest (with expectation of empowerment and resource) and level 3
is the lowest.
There are several key factors that must be taken into account when
deciding upon a management level, and these are outlined in Table 7.
The client should develop a fire safety policy to inform the designers and
contractors of their fire safety requirements.
Designers and/or contractors are responsible (e.g. requirement under
Regulation 16B of the Building Regulations in England and Wales) for
providing all fire safety related design and as-built information on project
completion such that clients can incorporate it within their fire safety
manual.
The client should produce a fire safety manual to integrate the fire safety
policy, the information provided by the designers and/or contractor, and
the proposed operational organization and plan. This will contribute to
any risk assessment required under current UK legislation, e.g. The
Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order in England and Wales.
Background
It is a fundamental assumption that the measures described in BS 9999 will
require management and maintenance throughout the life of the building.
Once the designer and/or contractor have handed over the building then good
management of fire safety becomes the key element to fire safety throughout
the life of the building. It is therefore essential and safer if management

Managing fire safety design, occupation and construction
activities are explicit and are used positively rather than undervaluing what good
management can deliver.
Managing fire safety refers to a whole process throughout the life of a building,
starting with the initial design, which is intended both to minimize the incidence
of fire and to ensure that, when a fire does occur, appropriate fire safety systems
(including active, passive and procedural systems) are in place and are fully
functional. The management of fire safety is thus an essential element in
averting disaster in the event of a fire. Although many buildings will never have
a serious life-threatening fire, it is essential for fire safety procedures to be
planned for every building. It is now widely acknowledged that effective
management of fire safety, system maintenance, staff training, etc. is integral to
the design and engineering for life safety throughout the life of a building.
Effective management of fire safety can contribute to the protection of the

occupants of the building in many ways:
by working to prevent fires occurring;

by monitoring the fire risks on an ongoing basis and taking appropriate
action to eliminate or reduce the risk;
by being aware of the types of people in the building (such as disabled
people, elderly people, children, pregnant women, etc.) and any special risks
or needs;
by ensuring that all of the fire safety measures in the building are kept in
working order and in particular that the means of escape are always
available;
by training staff and organizing the evacuation plan, to ensure that
occupants leave quickly if a fire occurs;
by taking command in the event of a fire until the fire and rescue service
arrives.
Management levels
In BS 9999, the standard or quality of management is referred to as the
management level. There are three management levels: level 1 which provides
the highest level of management; level 2 which provides a normally acceptable
level of management; and level 3 which provides a very basic level of
management.

The minimum acceptable level of management within a space or building is

dependent upon the fire loading and the occupant category, the risk profile.
Table 6 maps the minimum level recommended by BS 9999 to the various risk
profiles within the standard. However, irrespective of the guidance given in
Table 6, it is important to ensure that the management level proposed does
reflect the intended use and operation in the building. A designer should bear in
mind that a level 3 management system may not meet the requirements placed
on the occupiers, owners or other responsible persons under current UK
legislation, i.e. the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order in England and Wales.
When considering the appropriate level of management within a space or

building there are several key factors that should be taken into account. Table 7
highlights these key factors and what is expected for the three management
levels in relation to each of these factors.
In the UK, the management for fire safety has been present for some time now, but
there is still not sufficient confidence to use a management level as an additional
measure as defined by BS 9999 at this point in time. Nevertheless the step taken to
include management levels in BS 9999 is very important in emphasizing the value of
management for delivering improved fire safety. However, looking forward, with
increased experience and the application of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety)
Order in England and Wales, the recognition of fire safety management as an
additional benefit is a goal for the future. With the appropriate risk assessment,
fire safety management can be part of a fire safety engineered approach.
Designing so that a building can be managed

Management, working in combination with the right package of fire protection
measures, is fundamental to fire safety in the built environment. It is important
to emphasize that reliance cannot be placed on active and passive fire protection
measures alone. A design that relies on an unrealistic or unsustainable management
regime cannot be considered to have met the requirements of Part B of the
Building Regulations.
Where the designer is aware of the management systems that will be adopted
in the premises upon occupation, they can be taken into account in the fire
safety design strategy. Where the management systems are not known, the
designer will need to specify the management level that is appropriate for the
design. During the life of a building the management level may need to be
changed to reflect new circumstances or a change of risk profile.

Table 7 Key factors used in assessing management levels
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3

Planning for risk Planning anticipates the impact This level reacts to the impact of This level reviews any changes on
profile change of any proposed changes to the proposed changes to the risk a periodic basis, identifies
risk profile and identifies any profile, identifies alternative alternative protection and
alternative protection and protection and management management measures required
management measures required measures required and ensures and ensures implementation.

as a result and ensures implementation.
implementation.
Resources and Manager(s) are empowered to Responsibility is divided over a Persons responsible for fire safety
authority ensure that legislative fire safety number of different individuals, have limited power or resources
requirements are met; they departments or even companies. and are unlikely to ensure that
initiate testing, initiate Implementation of changes the fire safety systems are kept
maintenance or repair, and have requires approval of those not fully functional without reference
direct control of staff responsible directly responsible for to a third party.
for these tasks. Powers are management of fire safety within
supported by appropriate the premises.
resources and funding. Note that
in companies operating over
several locations some fire safety
management actions may be
controlled from a central point
(head office). Where this is the
case the local and central powers
should be co-ordinated to ensure
that the outcome is to a
sufficient standard to meet the
local needs.
31
32
Table 7 Key factors used in assessing management levels (contd)
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3

Staffing levels Staffing level is specific to the As for Level 1, except that there General training is provided on a
building considering: use of will be no contingency provision. periodic basis.
building, nature of occupants,
management systems in place,
active and passive fire systems,
and includes sufficiently trained
personnel to ensure occupants
are assisted out of the building
effectively in an emergency and
includes contingency for training,
sickness and other unexpected
absences.
Fire training This level ensures sufficient staff As for level 1, except there will be Work control is developed
numbers are trained in all aspects no contingency provision. proactively with clear lines of
of fire prevention, fire protection responsibility, a permit system,
and evacuation procedures, with logging and audit processes, and
contingency for sickness or routine checking and supervision.
holiday.
Work control Work control is developed Work control is developed Work control is reactive to work
proactively with clear lines of reactively with clear lines of required on site.
responsibility, a permit system, responsibility with a permit
logging and audit processes, and system and logging and audit
routine checking and supervision. processes.

Communication Communications ensure that As for level 1, except there will be As for level 2, except that it does
procedures those involved are given no contingency provision. not allow alternative formats.
information, which includes use
of alternative formats and
contingency for systems failure.
Maintenance Dynamic monitoring of fire safety Monitoring of fire safety systems A predetermined regime of
and testing of systems and equipment is and equipment is functional at all maintenance and testing is not in
fire systems functional at all times when the times when the building is in use. place.

building is in use and includes Alternative procedures for times
alternative procedures for times when systems and equipment are
when systems and equipment are unavailable are determined
unavailable or not fully reactively.
functional.
Fire authority Liaison is proactive and includes As for level 1, except there will be Liaison is likely to be either
liaison notification of the fire authority no routine meetings non-existent or sporadic.
to changes in risk profile and
other key factors, and routine
meetings.
Contingency Planning is proactive and takes Planning takes account of a There is no effective pre-planning
planning account of a wide range of narrow range of possible and ongoing business continuity
possible emergency incidents. emergency incidents. is unlikely to be secured.
33
For example, where reductions in management levels from those adopted within
the original design strategy are proposed, there will be a need to re-evaluate the
fire safety strategy for its continued viability. Similarly, changes to the building
layout might require changes to the management procedures. This is a legal
duty for the employer, building owner or occupier under the Regulatory Reform
(Fire Safety) Order.
The primary objective is to design a building that can be managed and

maintained with an adequate level of fire safety that meets the needs for an
effective and efficient building that complies with the client brief. This is
achieved by:
the client developing a fire safety policy to inform the client brief;
providing a level of management that is consistent with the risk profile;
designing and constructing a building that complies with the client brief;
the operator/end user/client procuring and owning an up-to-date fire safety
manual, which reflects the original design intent and any subsequent
changes to the building or use.
The interaction of the above points during the design and construction process
is highlighted in Figure 4 as is the associated legislation that drives them. The
way that buildings are procured and delivered to the eventual user varies
considerably as do the parties that are responsible for delivering the various
components highlighted in Figure 4. Therefore, the leader of the design,
procurement and operational stages needs to be aware of the main requirements
so that they can be passed on effectively throughout the process as different
parties get involved.
Fire safety manual

The design of buildings needs to be documented for the benefit of the
management of the premises. All relevant information should be included in
a fire safety manual. The manual needs to set out the basis on which the fire
safety design was planned, the type of management organization envisaged
for running the building and the consequential staff responsibilities. It needs
to explain the operation of all the mechanical and electrical systems and to give
information on routine testing and maintenance requirements. The assumptions
made at the design stage regarding these aspects should be recorded in the fire
safety manual.

Construction Design Client/operator
Fire safety policy
Fire safety design

Client brief
process
Fire safety plan for Construction Continued update of

construction information fire safety policy to
reflect design
development and
construction
Construction
Operational
As-built fire safety organization and
information plan
Fire
safety
manual
Risk
assessment
Building Regulations
Health and Safety (CDM)
Operator/client/end user responsibility (controlled by the Regulatory

Reform (Fire Safety) Order in England and Wales)
Buro Happold
Figure 4 Process to design and construct a building that can be

managed

The operator/end user/client should at the outset of a construction project,

new-build or refurbishment define a fire safety policy that can inform the brief
from the client to the design (and construction) team. Initially this policy may
simply be a set of strategic statements or objectives, but during the life of the
project it should be continually updated to reflect design progression and
consultations with external stakeholders such as insurers, funders and approving
authorities. The fire safety policy, via the client brief, can be the vehicle for
ensuring that the appropriate information is provided by the designers and/or
contractors to the client at project completion for incorporation into the fire
safety manual.
During the design and construction stages of a project, the fire safety design
strategy should be continually reviewed, and regularly documented, such that
at project completion, up-to-date documentation is available for incorporation
into the fire safety manual by the client. In addition to the fire safety design
strategy, it is the responsibility of the designers and/or contractor (e.g. required
by Regulation 16B of the Building Regulations in England and Wales) to provide
all other necessary as-built fire safety-related information, i.e. systems and equipment
manuals, etc., to the client for incorporation into the fire safety manual.
On large and complex projects a considerable amount of material needs to be

understood and responded to by the client, who either needs to make sure that
there is sufficient in house expertise, or that appropriate experts are appointed.
Wherever possible the opportunity should be created to introduce an overlap
between the design, construction and the development of the fire safety manual
leading to effective operational planning.
The following outlines a potential structure for the development of the fire
safety manual document:
1. Fire safety policy; including

c strategic client fire safety performance objectives;
c aims of proposed management system;
2. Design information; including
c fire safety design strategy;
c details of as-built fire safety systems;
c testing and maintenance requirements;
3. Operational organization and plan; including
c operational records;
c responsibility of management and staff;

c evacuation planning;
c assessment against fire safety policy.
4. Review and maintenance of fire safety manual; including
c building alterations;
c changes in staff duties and training;
c responses to incidents.
The fire safety manual should form part of the information package that contributes
to any fire risk assessment that might need to be carried out, i.e. under the
Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order in England and Wales. The fire safety
manual, its contents, use and upkeep should conform to the recommendations
given in BS 9999: Annex H.

6. Design for means of escape
Key points
The occupancy characteristics, fire growth rate and risk profile are
fundamental to the design for means of escape (refer to Chapter 2).
The recommended travel distances and width per person for escape
routes are only applicable when the minimum fire protection measures
are provided (refer to Tables 9, 10 and 12).
High ceilings and additional fire protection measures, such as automatic
fire detection and alarm, allow variations to the recommended travel
distances and escape width.
The percentage variations should be summed and checked against the
allowable limits for travel distance and escape width.
The addition of sprinklers improves safety, changes the risk profile and
therefore allows increased travel distances and reduced escape widths.
Where the proposed means of escape design will not meet with the
recommendations of the standard, a fire engineering approach should be
adopted (refer to Figure 2).
Background
The package of fire precautions provided for a building should reflect the nature
of the use of the building, the occupants, processes, materials stored and used,
and the fire safety management provided (see also Chapter 5). Risk profiles
provide a basis against which the risk to occupants can be assessed and the
appropriate level of fire precautions determined. See Table 6 for the process
linking risk profile to design for means of escape.
Reasonable facilities for means of escape in fire are necessary to limit the
distance travelled by occupants directly at risk from the fire and the smoke, and
subsequently structural fire precautions are required to safeguard escape routes.
In densely occupied spaces the critical condition will be queuing so the width of
exit doors, corridors and stairs will be the primary concern. In lightly occupied
spaces the critical factor will be the distances to the exits. Escape routes from a
storey should be sited so that a person confronted by fire can go around the
source if distances are short or otherwise turn away from the fire and take a safe
route through an alternative exit.

Design for means of escape
The basic assumption is that no reliance should be placed on fire and rescue
services. Special consideration will be necessary in certain institutional buildings
where assistance from staff may be necessary. Additional consideration will also
be necessary for people with disabilities.
The guidance in Chapter 5 enables the allocation of the risk profile appropriate
for the intended use of a given building, which is in effect the first stage of risk
assessment to align the building design with the intended operation. Associated
with each risk profile is a package of fire protection measures that are consistent
with the risks associated with the particular occupancy characteristic and the fire
growth rate (Table 6). Similarly for each risk profile a set of means of escape
design rules need to be applied as summarized in this chapter.
Planning for means of escape has a major impact on a building design, and so
serious consideration needs to be given to identify the most appropriate strategy
to adopt. The range of options can include the following, which is not exhaustive:
total simultaneous evacuation involving immediate evacuation of all occupants;

total simultaneous evacuation involving two stages with the first being an
investigation period;
total evacuation carried out in a series of phases that reduces the total width
of protected stairways, but require additional active and passive fire
precautions supported by management procedures to ensure the safe
delivery of the phased evacuation plan;
progressive horizontal evacuation from the fire-affected compartment to an
adjacent place of safety in a fire compartment at the same level;
zoned evacuation to places of relative safety within a large space, such as a
shopping complex a possibility that is beyond the scope of this handbook
and is likely to require a fire safety engineering approach.
The development of the building plan and design for means of escape is an
integrated exercise that can be facilitated flexibly by providing additional fire
protection measures as set out by the standard. The choice of internal subdivisions
(compartments, partitions, atria, etc.) within a building align to the spatial/visual
planning and will clearly have an impact on the design for means of escape, so
early consideration will deliver considerable benefit to the design process.
Particular points to note in relation to the design for means of escape include:
identification of any high-risk fire areas that need special consideration see
BS 9999: Clauses 13.6 and 15.2

provision of crches adjacent to escape routes that would be used by the

parents; see BS 9999: Clause 14.1 (b).
provision of additional fire protection measures for disabled people to
improve communications, CCTV extensions, places to rest, additional
handrails plus additional way finding and warning;
progressive horizontal evacuation using fire compartments is an acceptable
means of escape for disabled people in all risk profiles;
simultaneous evacuation to be adopted for all basement storeys and
buildings incorporating openings between floors (excludes those suitably
designed in accordance with BS 9999: Annexes B and C);
exits to be discounted in turn when sizing escape routes to ensure adequate
escape during a fire. It is not necessary to discount an entire escape stair in a
sprinkler-protected building or where that stair is protected by either lobbies
or a pressurization system (note that storey exits are still required to be
discounted in turn);
final exits, not less than the escape routes they serve, to facilitate rapid
dispersal of the occupants, clear of danger from fire and smoke, risks from
basements and with care to ensure space for wheelchair users;
negotiating doors can be critical, so easily operated simple fastenings are
essential. Where security conflicts arise consideration should be given to
appropriately specified powered locks (see BS 9999: Clause 16.5.2 and
BS 7273-4: 2007). In empty non-residential buildings final exit locks may be
acceptable subject to appropriate management procedures.
The means of escape recommendation on distance and door widths are

aligned to an engineered approach while respecting the considerable amount
of knowledge in documents such as Approved Document B and BS 5588.
Minimizing the time taken for the total evacuation to a reasonable level is the
key to a successful outcome. Therefore any engineered approach has to rely on
time as the basic control for making recommendations. Some of the factors that
influenced the outcomes in the standard are listed below.
A fast-growing fire results in less time being available for escape.

The average speed for people who are unfamiliar is less than for those that
are familiar and trained.
Sprinklers reduce the fire growth rate but do not necessarily extinguish the fire.
In large rooms the time taken to commence evacuation can be much greater
than for small rooms where the risks are more quickly apparent.
Management plays an important role in ensuring an early commencement to
evacuation.

Carry out risk assessment to

prescribe Risk Profile accounting
for presence of sprinklers (see
Chapters 3 and 4)
Determine minimum package

of fire protection measures
associated with risk profile
Table 6
Carry out a design appraisal

to assess if compliance with
the minimum package of fire
protection measures is achieved
No Table 5 No
Yes
Option 1 Add Option 2 Add
sprinklers and review additional fire
the risk profile (see Design OK protection measures
Chapter 3) and repeat process
(see Chapter 4)
Buro Happold
Figure 5 Design for means of escape decision chart
Figure 6 illustrates the broad relationship that exists between the pre-movement
time during the available safe escape time (see Figure 7) and influences such as
the size of a room, the fire growth rate and the complexity of a space. Warning
and alarm systems will have relatively little impact on smaller spaces and where
the fire and smoke are clearly apparent. However, warning and alarm clearly
become more important as the size and the complexity of a space increases.
Figure 7, a schematic representation of the assumptions that were made in

the determination of the range of travel distances in BS 9999, highlights the
relationship with time, which clearly has a major impact on the safe means of
escape. Figure 6 presents the critical time periods during the means of escape
process in a building. The assumptions are summarized below.

Base of smoke
layer as fire
develops
Slow growth fire

Height of smoke above floor
Medium
Fast
Pre-movement
Small rooms time
Medium rooms
Complex medium rooms
Large rooms
Complex large rooms
Buro Happold
Figure 6 Pre-movement time as a function of fire growth rate
The time taken for people to start to move and escape (i.e. the pre-movement
time) is likely to be shorter if the fire is growing quickly and smoke or flames
become apparent, or are detected sooner.
If a room is small, the time taken to react to a fire is clearly very short, as the
smoke fill time is very quick, and, so movement is more likely to begin during
the incubation stage of a fire. (See Figure 6.)

Available safe escape time (ASET) Tenability limits

reached
Life safety strategy complete
Pre-movement Allowable
time travel time
Actual
travel time
Time line
Occupants become Incubation period of
aware of fire by alarm fire following ignition
or by observation of fire Fire continues to
and/or smoke grow with time
Figure 7 Fire growth, means of escape and travel time (adapted from
Figure 1, BS 9999)
In medium and large spaces, the time to recognize the risks associated with a
fire will depend on the fire growth rate. Small slow-growing fires will not be
seen or detected as a risk as quickly as fast growing fires.
The more complex a space (in terms of its shape or due to obstructions) the
longer the time will be before a fire is recognized as a risk particularly by the
people who are farthest away from the fire. Those people closest may well
start moving sooner.
Additional fire protection measures

The provision of automatic sprinklers is covered in Chapter 3 and affects the risk
profile, which needs to be determined at an early stage. This should not be
confused with additional fire protection measures.

Every building should incorporate the minimum level of fire protection

measures recommended in Table 6. However, if additional fire protection
measures are provided it is permissible to increase the travel distances and
reduce the door widths and stair widths, subject to the maximum variations
given in the following paragraphs. Any such increase/decrease should, however,
be carefully reviewed and assessed by the designers for applicability during the
risk assessment process.
Effect of automatic fire detection

The provision of automatic smoke detection systems can be of significant
benefit in terms of providing early warning for the occupants. If such systems
are installed, they should be designed and installed in accordance with
BS 5839-1. The speed of response is likely to vary with different types of
occupancy: for example, in an office building where the occupants are familiar
with the building layout and receive regular training, they are likely to respond
relatively quickly to a fire alarm; whereas in a shop where the occupants are
unfamiliar with the layout and focused on their personal business, they will
respond much more slowly and might not begin evacuation until requested to
do so by the staff.
The response of occupants of a building is generally enhanced by the

installation of a fire warning system that provides information about a fire
incident. In circumstances in which the occupants might be unaware of a fire
they will rely upon the level of information given by the warning system in
making the decision to evacuate or not.
Depending on the type of occupancy and level of management within the

building, the provision of an automatic fire detection and alarm system,
primarily utilizing smoke detectors and incorporating an informative warning
system (such as a voice alarm), might allow longer travel distances and narrower
doors. Where automatic fire detection and alarm is necessary as part of the
minimum package of fire protection measures recommended in BS 9999:
Clause 16, a variation of the recommended travel distances, door widths,
corridor widths and stair widths is not permitted. However, where a clear
benefit resulting from additional detection and/or enhanced warning systems is
demonstrated and is appropriate to the circumstances, a 15 per cent increase in
allowable travel distance and a 15 per cent reduction in door width, corridor
width and stair width is allowable.

Effect of ceiling heights

Rooms with high ceilings are safer than rooms with low ceilings, as they have a
greater capacity and therefore increase the time taken to fill with smoke to a
level that affects escape.
For rooms with high ceilings, it is permissible to increase the travel distance and
decrease the door width, corridor width and stair width, provided that the
increase/decrease is no more than the percentages given in Table 8 and that the
entire escape route, with the exception of protected corridors and protected
lobbies, has a high ceiling. This flexibility is appropriate only when a full account
is taken of the risk presented, i.e. position, height and nature of fire load.
The height of the room should be measured to a point below significant

obstructions such as downstand beams.
Table 8 Permissible variation of door, corridor and stair widths and

travel distance with ceiling height (BS 9999: Table 16)
1. Room height Maximum permissible increase in travel distance and

reduction in door width, corridor width and stair width
All risk profiles except A4, Risk profiles A4, B4 and C4A)
B4 and C4A) %
m %
!3 Not allowable Not allowable
>3, !4 5 Not allowable
>10 30 Not allowable
A)
These risk profiles are outside the scope of BS 9999. Addition of an effective
localized suppression system or sprinklers will reduce the fire growth rate and
consequently change the risk profile. Alternatively a fire engineering approach may

Maximum acceptable variations

The per cent variations for ceiling height and fire detection can be aggregated
subject to not exceeding the maximum allowed as defined in Tables 9, 10, 11
and 12.
Travel distance
The travel distance should generally not exceed the values given in Table 9
for the appropriate risk profile. Note that Table 9 has two columns; the first
recommends travel distances where the minimum fire protection measures are
provided and the second places a maximum if additional fire protection
measures have been provided to increase travel distances.
Table 9 Travel distance as a function of risk profile

(BS 9999: Tables 12 and 17)
Risk Maximum travel distance when Maximum permissible travel

profile minimum fire protection distance upper limit with
measures are provided additional measures
Two-way travel One-way travel Two-way travel One-way travel
m m m m
A1 65 26 90 30
A2 55 22 75 24
A3 45 18 60 22
A4 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
B1 60 24 90 28
B2 50 20 75 24
B3 40 16 60 20
B4 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
C1 27 13 37 18
C2 18 9 27 13
C3 14 7 18 9
C4 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable

Table 10 Door width as a function of risk profile mm per person

(BS 9999: Tables 13 and 18)
Risk Minimum door width per person Minimum permissible door

profile with minimum fire protection width lower limit with
measures additional measures
mm per person mm per person
A1 3.3 2.4
A2 3.6 3.0
A3 4.6 4.1
A4 Not applicable Not applicable
B1 3.6 2.4
B2 4.1 3.3
B3 6.0 5.3
B4 Not applicable Not applicable
C1 3.6 2.4
C2 4.1 3.3
C3 6.0 5.3
C4 Not applicable Not applicable
Door and escape stair widths

The width of escape routes should not be less than the values given in Tables
10, 11 and 12 for the appropriate risk profile and route component. Note
that Table 10 has two columns outlining the minimum width per person; the
first recommends minimum door widths where the minimum fire protection
measures are provided, and the second places a lower limit if additional fire
protection measures have been provided to decrease escape widths.
Note that the absolute minimum width of doors and corridors is 800 mm and
1,200 mm, respectively, irrespective of the calculated width.

Table 11 Absolute minimum width of stairs (BS 9999: Table 14)
Occupancy Width of stair for Width of stair for

characteristic downward travel upward travel
mm mm
A 1,000 1,200
B (except assembly) 1,000 1,200
B (assembly only) 1,100 1,200
C 1,000 1,200
The minimum width of an escape stair when additional fire protection measures
have been provided to decrease escape widths should be not less than each of
the following:
the absolute minimum stated in Table 11; and

the available width per person should be not less than 75 per cent of the
appropriate value in Table 12.
Floor space factors

A realistic estimate should be made of the maximum occupancy associated with
the intended use of the room/space. This can be achieved by either using the
maximum number of persons the room/space is designed to hold or dividing
the area of the room/space by an appropriate floor space factor (see Table 13,
although this list is not exhaustive and should not be prescriptively applied
without due consideration). Note that maximum limitation on the occupancy
of any space is ultimately determined by the available exit widths provided.
Alternative escape routes

Where alternative escape routes are provided within a room they should be
sited so as to minimize the possibility of multiple exits being rendered
unavailable simultaneously. Alternative escape routes should therefore meet
the recommendations outlined in Figure 8.

Table 12 Minimum width of escape stairs for simultaneous evacuation (BS 9999: Table 15)
Risk Minimum width of stair per person served over total number of floors served
profile mm
1 floor 2 floors 3 floors 4 floors 5 floors 6 floors 7 floors 8 floors 9 floors 10+ floors
A1 3.90 3.40 2.95 2.45 2.15 2.00 1.80 1.70 1.50 1.40
A2 4.50 3.80 3.25 2.75 2.45 2.20 2.00 1.90 1.70 1.60

A3 5.40 4.60 4.00 3.50 3.10 2.80 2.60 2.30 2.10 2.00
A4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
B1 4.20 3.60 3.10 2.60 2.30 2.10 1.90 1.80 1.60 1.50
B2 4.80 4.00 3.40 2.90 2.60 2.30 2.10 2.00 1.80 1.70
B3 7.00 6.00 5.30 4.60 4.20 3.70 3.40 3.10 2.80 2.60
B4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
C1 4.20 3.60 3.10 2.60 2.30 2.10 1.90 1.80 1.60 1.50
C2 4.80 4.00 3.40 2.90 2.60 2.30 2.10 2.00 1.80 1.70
C3 7.00 6.00 5.30 4.60 4.20 3.70 3.40 3.10 2.80 2.60
C4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
NOTE The widths of stairs have been calculated on the assumption that all floors are evacuating simultaneously. This is
conservative, as the occupants on the fire floor are likely to move more quickly than those on the other floors..
49
Table 13 Examples of typical floor space factors (BS 9999: Table 10)
Occupancy Floor space Occupancy Floor space

factor factor
m2 per person m2 per person
Administration office 5.0 Individual seating 0.4
Amusement arcade 0.5 Indoor games/training 10.0
rooms in schools
Archive/library reading 5.0 Kitchen 7.0
area
Art gallery 5.0 Licensed betting office 1.0
(public area)
Assembly hall 0.5 Lobbies 2.0
Banking hall 3.0 Lounge 1.0
Bar 0.3 Machine/printing 10.0
room
Bazaar 2.0 Mechanical plant 30.0
room
Bench seating 0.4 Meeting room 1.0
Billiards or snooker 10.0 Museum 5.0
room
Bingo hall 0.5 Office (closed-plan or 8.0
less than 60 m2)
Bowling alley 10.0 Office (open-plan or 5.0
exceeding 60 m2)
Business centre 7.0 Queuing area 0.5
Car park (per parking 2.0 Reading or writing 2.0
space) room (seated)
Classroom 2.0 Reading room 1.0
(standing)
Club 0.5 Reception area 2.0
Committee room 1.0 Restaurant 1.0
Common room 1.0 Shop 2.0

Table 13 Examples of typical floor space factors (BS 9999: Table 10)
(contd)
Occupancy Floor space Occupancy Floor space

factor factor
m2 per person m2 per person
Computer room 7.0 Showrooms 7.0
Conference room 1.0 Skating rink 2.0
Crush hall 0.5 Space with loose 0.75
seating
Dance area 0.5 Space with loose 1.0
tables
Deposit/strongroom 30.0 Stadia and 0.6
grandstands
Design studio / 7.0 Staffroom 1.0
Drafting office
Dining room and 1.0 Storage and 30.0
canteens warehousing
Dining rooms with 1.0 Studio (radio, 1.5
loose tables television, film,
recording)
Dormitory 5.0 Teaching laboratories 3.0
Exhibition areas 1.5 Venue for pop 0.5
concerts
Factory production 5.0 Waiting area/visitors 2.0
area lounge
Filing room/store 10.0 Waiting room 2.0
Foyers in theatres and 0.3 Workshop 5.0
cinemas
Gymnasium open 0.6
plan (where fixed
machines are used,
the occupancy is
based on the number
of machines provided)

B
E
45
A
<45 D
Alternative routes are available from C because angle ACB is 45 or more, and therefore
CA or CB (whichever is the less) should be no more than the maximum distance for
travel given for alternative routes.
Alternative routes are not available from D because angle ADB is less than 45. There is
also no alternative route from E.
a) Option 1
D
45
A
Angle ABD should be at least 45. CBA or CBD (whichever is less) should be no more
than the maximum distance of travel given for alternative routes, and CB should be no
more than the maximum distance for travel where there are no alternative routes.
b) Option 2 (travel distance in dead-end condition)
NOTE The use of dashed lines is to aid use of the diagrams and does not have any
other significance.
Figure 8 Travel distance 45 or more apart (BS 9999: Figure 5)
Inner rooms
An inner room is an enclosed space that has only one escape route that passes
through another room (access room) before reaching a corridor or storey/final
exit. Consequently, an inner room can be at risk if a fire starts in the access
room. Therefore, in order to minimize the risk associated with an inner room,

A B 2
1 3
Key
1 Room with alternative exits
2 Access room
3 Inner room
A needs no special provision.
B should conform to the design recommendations above.
Figure 9 Inner room and access room (BS 9999: Figure 6)
such an arrangement is recommended only where all of the following

conditions are met:
the occupant capacity of the inner room does not exceed 60 (30 where the
occupants require assistance to escape);
the inner room is not a bedroom;
the inner room is entered directly from the access room;
the escape route from the inner room does not pass through more than one
access room;
the travel distance from any point in the inner room to the exit(s) from the
access room does not exceed the allowable one-way travel distance;
the access room is not a place of special fire hazard and is in the control of
the same occupier as the inner room;
one of the following arrangements is made:
c the enclosures (walls or partitions) of the inner room are stopped at least
500 mm below the ceiling; or
c a suitably sited vision panel not less than 0.1 m2 is located in the door or
walls of the inner room, to enable occupants of the inner room to see
whether a fire has started in the outer room; or
c the access room is protected by an automatic smoke detector that
operates either an alarm that is audible in the inner room, to a sound
pressure level (typically measured in dB) in accordance with the minimum
recommended in BS 5839-1, or gives a visual indication in the inner room
if the ambient noise levels are so great as to make an alarm inaudible.

1 1
1 1
1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
2 1
1
1 1
a) T junction with main corridor b) Continuation past stairway
Key
1 Self-closing fire door
2 Fire-resisting construction (same fire resistance as protected corridor)
Protected corridor
NOTE Recommendations for fire resistance of fire doors (FD) and protected corridors
are given in BS 9999: Clause 32.1
Figure 10 Dead-end corridors (BS 9999: Figure 9)
Dead-end corridors
All corridors serving a dead-end greater than 2 m should be protected with fire
resisting construction. In addition, all dead-end corridors greater than 4.5 m
that are connected to more than one storey exit should be subdivided from the
remainder of the corridor by fire doors (illustrated in Figure 10). Note that
where the corridor and any adjoining escape stairs are protected with a smoke
control system using pressure differentials, then the latter recommendation for
subdividing fire doors can be omitted.
Progressive horizontal evacuation

The evacuation of occupants through one or more compartment walls within a
storey is an acceptable form of evacuation and often may be the only approach

2 2
3 3
4 4 4
Key
1 Compartment wall
2 Fire door (equivalent to storey exit)
3 Storey exit
4 Compartment
NOTE Travel distance limits apply to storey exits in compartment walls.
Figure 11 Progressive horizontal evacuation (BS 9999: Figure 12)
suitable for non-ambulant persons, i.e. wheelchair users, day-care patients,

etc. The use of progressive horizontal evacuation using fire compartments is
illustrated in Figure 11. For details of specific design recommendations for
progressive horizontal evacuation please refer to the BS 9999: Clause 17.3.13.
Escape for disabled people

Means of escape for disabled people may comprise a combination of structural
provisions (e.g. lifts, refuge areas, ramps) and management procedures (e.g.
assisted escape). A strategy should be designed to enable a flexible response to
different situations.
The ideal methods of evacuation for disabled people are horizontal evacuation
to the outside of the building or to another fire compartment, or vertical
evacuation by lift.
Normal lifts should not typically be used for general evacuation, but in some
situations they may be used for the evacuation of disabled people where a
suitable fire risk assessment is undertaken to evaluate whether the lift meets the
functional recommendations of an evacuation lift. The risk assessment should

1 Dimensions in millimetres
1,800
2
1,800
A
1
1 Key
2 1 Accommodation
2 Stair
1,800
Fire-resisting construction
B
1
Figure 12 External protection to protected stairways

(BS 9999: Figure 14)
take into account all the features of fire protection in a building. For example in
a building with automatic sprinklers and significant compartmentation or smoke
control, a risk assessment might conclude that a non-evacuation lift would be
usable in the initial stages of a fire. Alternatively, specific evacuation lift(s) can
be provided within a building. Refer to BS 9999: Clause 46 and BS 9999: Annex
G for further guidance.
Where suitable lifts are not available then it might be necessary to carry disabled
people up or down the escape stair. The management plan of a building should
identify the procedure to be used and staff should be adequately trained.
BS 9999: Annex G provides guidance on the design of refuges and evacuation

lifts and BS 9999: Clause 46 provides guidance on the management of
evacuation for disabled people.

1 2
3
4
m
5
1.8
6
7
5
a) Example 1
A 1.8 m
1.8 m
B B
A 5
Plan
1
1.8 m
3
m
1.8
6
8
7
Section AA Section BB
b) Example 2
Key
1 No fire resistance needed for door
2 Window with 30 min fire-resisting construction
3 1,100 mm zone above top landing
4 1,800 mm zone of fire-resisting construction at side of stair
5 Self-closing fire door with 30 min fire-resisting construction
6 6 m maximum height of stair without weather protection
7 Ground level or a roof or podium served by an independent stairway
8 9 m zone of fire-resisting construction below stair
Figure 13 Fire resistance of areas adjacent to external stairs


External protection to escape stairs

Where an escape stair projects beyond or forms an angle* of greater than
0 degrees with the adjoining external line of the building, then the distance
between any non-fire-resisting area in the external wall of the building and any
non-fire-resisting area in the external wall of the escape stair should be at least
1,800 mm (illustrated in Figure 12).
Where more than one escape route is available from a storey or part of a
building and at least one of those escape routes is via an internal escape stair,
other escape routes may be by way of an external escape stair providing they
meet the recommendations illustrated in Figure 13.
* Note
The angle is that formed by the external face of the stair and the adjacent accomodation = 0 is
where the external face of the stair and the faade enclosing the accomodation are directly in line.

7. Access and facilities for fire-fighting
Key points
The recommendations for access and facilities for fire-fighting are
independent of the risk profile concept. Where it is proposed to vary the
provisions from those recommended within the standard, it is essential
that early liaison and agreement is obtained from the fire and rescue
service.
Fire-fighting shafts, including lifts, should be provided within all buildings
over 18 m in height.
Additionally, fire-fighting shafts should be provided in shops, factories
and assembly and recreation buildings >7.5 m in height and having floor
areas "900 m2.
Buildings between 11 m and 18 m in height and not meeting the previous
point, should be provided with lobby protected escape stairs and internal
fire mains.
Fire-fighting shafts should be installed in basements of at least two
storeys, each having floor areas "900 m2. Fire-fighting lifts should be
installed in basements deeper than 10 m.
In buildings where internal fire mains are not provided, access to the
perimeter of the building should be provided and be appropriate to the
aggregate floor area of the building.
Fire mains within buildings over 50 m in height should be of the wet type.
All shafts containing fire-fighting lifts should be designed to keep lift wells
free from water; this may include sloped floor/raised thresholds and/or
drainage channels at landing level or within the lift pit.
Fire-fighting shafts serving buildings greater than 30 m above, or 10 m
below, Fire service access level should be protected by a pressurization
system. All other fire fighting shafts should be provided with adequate
natural smoke ventilation (refer to BS 9999: Clause 28.2 for further details).
Smoke and heat ventilation should be provided on all basement storeys
that have a floor area >200 m2 and are >3 m below adjacent grade level.
Smoke clearance for fire-fighting should be provided in all atria not
provided with a smoke control system (see Chapter 9).
Refer to BS 9999: Annex E for additional requirements relating to
shopping complexes.

Access and facilities for fire-fighting
Background
The layout and design of a building should not only consider the escape of
occupants from within, but also the ability of firefighters to enter and undertake
fire-fighting operations in a reasonable period of time. The provisions needed to
provide appropriate access depend upon the size and complexity of the
building.
For low-rise buildings (up to three to four storeys) appropriate access can be
provided via the perimeter. However, as buildings with large floor plates
approach medium to high-rise or contain deep basements then access from
solely the exterior is not practical and internal fire-fighting is necessary.
The method of vertical access for firefighters in medium to high-rise buildings is

driven by the fitness of individuals and their ability to climb several flights of
stairs before undertaking fire-fighting operations. Beyond a reasonable limit, it is
necessary to ensure appropriate vertical transportation, such as lifts, to assist in
access.
In addition to vertical access, it is necessary to provide systems that allow

efficient internal fire-fighting and adequate protection, such as mains to deliver
fire-fighting water and a means of smoke venting.
Risk profiles and fire-fighting provisions

The recommendations for access and facilities for fire-fighting within BS 9999
are independent of the risk profile concept and continue to use the purpose
groups defined in Table D1 of Approved Document B. Where it is proposed to
vary the provisions from those recommended, it is essential that early liaison is
undertaken with the fire service. In varying the provisions, recognition should be
given to additional fire protection measures and factors that are built into the
risk profile. The response of the fire and rescue services to an incident could
vary depending upon whether the occupants are familiar or unfamiliar. The
fire-fighting response will also vary with the quantity of fire load, the fire growth
rate and the presence of sprinklers or other fire suppression systems. The use of
a fire-fighting intervention model could be used as part of such an assessment.
Due consideration should also be given to a good management level where it
can be demonstrated to be beneficial to fire-fighting operations. For heritage
buildings the designers and the approving authorities would benefit by working

with the fire service to achieve the right pragmatic balance between active and
passive fire protection measures while respecting the historic surroundings.
Variation of the recommended provisions is currently beyond the scope of the

standard but could be considered in an alternative fire engineering approach.
External fire-fighting provisions

All buildings should have appropriate external access for fire service vehicles
(appliances). This includes trafficable routes and hardstanding areas within close
proximity to building entrances and connection points to internal fire-fighting
systems.
In low-rise buildings it is possible to undertake fire-fighting operations via the

exterior providing that sufficient access is available to the building perimeter.
Buildings with a total floor area of 2,000 m2 or less and having a top storey not
more than 11 m above access level should be provided with vehicle access to
within 45 m of every point on the projected plan area of the building or to 15
per cent of the perimeter, whichever is the less onerous. All other low-rise
buildings should be provided with fire vehicle access to the perimeter of
building in accordance with Table 14.
All elevations to which vehicle access is necessary should have a door(s) not less
than 750 mm wide allowing entry to the interior of the building. Doors should
be located on the elevation such that there is no more than 60 m between each
door and/or the end of that elevation.
If the access outlined in Table 14 cannot be achieved, internal fire-fighting

provisions would be necessary. Note that where the standard recommends
internal fire-fighting provisions for other reasons, Table 14 does not apply.
However, where a building has internal fire-fighting provisions installed (see
below), access for fire vehicles (pumping appliance) is necessary to within
18 m of either each fire main inlet connection point for dry mains or the inlet
connection point for emergency replenishment of the suction tank for the wet
mains.
The specification of fire vehicle access routes and hardstandings should meet
the recommendations of BS 9999: Clause 22.3.

Table 14 Perimeter access requirements for fire service vehicles

(BS 9999: Table 21)
Total floor area Height to floor of Type of Position of access

of buildingA) top storey of applianceB) % of perimeterC)
m 2 building
m
<2,000 >11 Pump and 15
high-reach
2,000 to 8,000 <11 Pump 15
>11 Pump and 50
high-reach
8,000 to 16,000 <11 Pump 50
>11 Pump and 50
high-reach
16,000 to 24,000 <11 Pump 75
>11 Pump and 75
high-reach
>24,000 <11 Pump 100
>11 Pump and 100
high-reach
NOTE 1 In the case of storage buildings, height should be measured to mean roof
level.
A)
The total floor area is the aggregate of the floor areas of all the storeys in the
building.
B)
Pump = pumping appliance; high-reach = aerial appliance, e.g. turntable ladder
or hydraulic platform.
C)
Perimeter refers to the face of the total length of all exposed perimeter walls.
Internal fire-fighting provisions

As discussed above, buildings above a reasonable height or with deep basements
require an appropriate means of internal fire-fighting provisions and vary with
height and area of the building. Figure 14 summarizes the recommendations for
internal fire-fighting provisions.

>50 m
Sprinklers recommended in buildings >30 m
in height.
Pressurization recommended for fire-fighting shafts

>30 m i b ildi 30 i h i h
Height above
>18 m
11 m
>7.5 m
Fire
service
access
level
Depth
below
> 10 m
Key
Dry rising/falling fire

Fire-fighting stair Fire-fighting lift
and fire-fighting
Wet rising fire main lobby
Shops, factories or Basement

assembly and recreation floor areas
with a floor area 900 m2 900 m2
Figure 14 Summary of recommendations for internal fire-fighting

provisions

NOTES
1. The number of fire-fighting shafts should be provided such that every part of the
floor plate is within the maximum hose distance requirements from the fire main
outlet; 45 m for escape stairs and 60 m for fire-fighting shafts, and at least two
fire-fighting shafts should be provided within buildings with a storey of 900 m or
2
more in area.
2. Buildings not covered within the above figure should be provided with adequate
perimeter access (refer to BS 9999: Clause 22).
3. Existing buildings, in particular historic buildings, may have difficulty incorporating
the above recommended internal fire-fighting measures; therefore, alternative fire
engineering solutions may be adopted. However, early consultation with the local
fire service is recommended if an alternative needs to be adopted.
Where a fire-fighting shaft is recommended within Figure 14, then the layout
and fire resistance of the shaft construction should follow the principles outlined
in Figure 15. There are other recommendations within the standard on the
robustness of the construction, refer to BS 9999: Clause 21.2.5.
The layout of any fire-fighting shaft at access level should be such that firefighters
can either enter directly from the open air or by way of a protected corridor not
exceeding 18 m in length. Firefighters accessing the building should not obstruct
escaping occupants; therefore where an access route is shared with escaping
occupants it should be 500 mm wider than that necessary for means of escape
purposes (to allow room for fire and rescue service personnel to move towards
the fire-fighting shaft).
Lifts designated for the use of firefighters can also serve the general building
population during non-emergency conditions. However, such lifts require
enhancement above a standard lift installation, such as protected power
supplies, protection from water ingress, etc., so that it can continue to operate
during emergency conditions. Therefore all lifts designated for firefighter use
should meet the recommendations of BS EN 81: Part 72, and BS EN 81: Part 1
or BS EN 81: Part 2 as appropriate for the particular type of lift. Further
guidance is provided by BS 9999: Clause 21.3.4.
Within large or complex buildings, a fire control centre should be provided

to enable the fire service to co-ordinate fire-fighting and emergency operations
effectively. This can either be a dedicated room or combined within the
security/management control room. It should be located such that it is directly
accessible from outside or accessible via a fire-protected route, and it should

1 1
500 mm 500 mm
2
3 5
4
4 2
5 6
5m
6
7
8
7
8
a) Example 1 b) Example 2
4 5 4 5
2 2
6 6
5m
5m
5m
7 7 8
8
c) Example 3 d) Example 4
Key
1 Openable areas
2 Fire door with 30 min fire resistance with smoke seal
3 Fire-fighting lobby
4 Fire main
5 Fire door with 30 min fire resistance without smoke seal
6 Fire-fighting lift
7 Accommodation
8 Fire door with 60 min fire resistance with smoke seal
Minimum fire resistance of 1 h from both sides
Minimum fire resistance of 2 h from outside the fire-fighting shaft and 1 h from
inside the fire-fighting shaft
Minimum fire resistance of 2 h from accommodation
Figure 15 Principles for the layout and fire resistance of fire-fighting

shafts (BS 9999: Figure 16)

contain the status and override controls for all key fire protection systems.
Further guidance on the design and content of fire control centres is provided in
BS 9999: Clause 25.
Smoke control for fire-fighting shafts

All fire-fighting shafts serving floors greater than 30 m above, or 10 m below,
Fire service access level should be protected by a pressurization system. All other
fire-fighting shafts should be provided with adequate natural smoke ventilation.
BS 9999: Clause 28.2 has further guidance on the natural smoke ventilation
options allowable.
Smoke venting from basement floors

Fire-fighting operations within basement storeys can be more hazardous
because of the lack of self-venting that would typically occur through the
faade on storeys above ground, leading to the build-up of smoke and heat.
Therefore with the exception of basement storeys not more than 3 m below
the adjacent ground level and with an area of not more than 200 m2, all other
basement storeys should be provided with a system of smoke and heat
ventilation.
Natural smoke vents can be installed, provided that they are sited at high
level, are evenly distributed and are equivalent to not less than 2.5 per cent of
the floor area of each storey. The location of the smoke vents should be such
that they do not prevent the use of escape routes from the building and that
each compartment within a basement is served independently, i.e. doors
between compartments should not serve as part of the route to external air.
An alternative to natural smoke vents is a mechanical smoke ventilation system.

However, an automatic sprinkler system is required within any basement storeys
served by a mechanical smoke ventilation system. The system should be capable
of providing 10 air changes per hour and begin operation automatically on
activation of the sprinkler system or an automatic detection system. BS 9999:
Clause 28.3.3 provides further guidance.

Smoke venting from car parks, loading bays and service

roads
The smoke ventilation for cark parks, covered service roadways and enclosed
loading docks exceeding 200 m2 should be designed in accordance with
BS 7346: Part 7.

8. Designing the building structure
Key points
The occupancy characteristics, fire growth rate and the risk profile, are
fundamental to the fire resistance for the building structure (refer to Chapter 2).
Recommendations for minimum fire resistance periods for the relevant
construction component are contained in Table 15.
The availability of natural ventilation (windows and other non-protected
areas) on the building perimeter affects the recommended fire resistance
period. Where Table 15 refers to Table 16 for the recommended fire
resistance period the room/space must meet the ventilation conditions in
Table 17, otherwise further guidance from BS 9999 is required (see Figure 16).
Maximum dimensions of compartments should meet the
recommendations in Table 18.
The addition of sprinklers improves safety and changes the risk profile,
and therefore allows reduced fire resistance periods and increased
compartment limits.
All buildings with an occupied storey >30 m above access level should
incorporate compartment floors and be protected throughout with
automatic sprinklers.
Where the proposed construction design will not meet with the
recommendations of the standard, a fire engineering approach should be
adopted (refer to Figure 2).
Background
The fire performance of the building construction during a fire, for a reasonable
period of time, is essential to protect the occupants, the firefighters and those
external to the building who may be at risk from falling debris. This provision for
life safety clearly has a favourable impact on property protection, but specific
risk assessments will be required if there are particular needs for additional
protection. As with all fires, there is considerable benefit for life safety, reducing
insurance risk and property protection if whole-life consideration is given to the
management provision to reduce the chances of a fire starting and growing.

Designing the building structure
Where there is a need to protect heritage buildings in a sensible, practical

manner, the flexibility allowed by BS 9999 can reasonably be adopted to create
well-judged holistic solutions.
The arrangement of the load-bearing and non-load-bearing construction/structure

as dictated by the means of escape and the compartmentation provisions is
clearly fundamental and covered by the guidance in those sections in
combination with the recommendations that follow here.
There are a range of factors that have an influence on the fire resistance
requirement depending on the consequences of failure. The fire growth rate
and the occupancy type, which are the two primary factors that drive the choice
of risk profile, plus the height and scale of a building, all have an impact on the
fire resistance requirement. Sprinklers in many cases will have a beneficial
impact and will allow a reduction in the fire resistance performance of the
structure while maintaining the required standard.
The following are used to describe the fire resistance performance of

load-bearing elements of structure in a fire resistance test.
Load-bearing capacity is the ability of a structure to carry the applied loads,

while being acted on by fire. Traditional approaches to the design and
analysis of structures in fire are based on the behaviour of isolated
elements beams, slabs and columns with idealized support conditions
tested in a furnace. This is convenient for proof testing and is consistent
with the approaches traditionally used for normal design at ambient
temperature, with no recognition given to real fire performance.
Integrity is the ability of the structure to prevent the development of
significant-sized holes to limit the transmission of hot gases. Failure is related
to openings forming in a member and defined by ignition of a cotton pad
held close to an opening (testing method in BS 476). This reduces the
chances of spread of fire and increases the chances of adjacent spaces
remaining tenable. Voids in the construction for services or other purposes
need to be carefully detailed, usually by the architect, in accordance with the
appropriate building code to prevent spread of fire around or through the
structure.
Insulation is the ability of a structure to limit the transfer of heat within
defined limits so that fire does not spread and adjacent spaces do not
become untenable. For insulation, the failure criteria are a temperature rise
on the unexposed face of 140 C (average) or 180 C (at any single point).

The performance criteria that may need to be met, depending on the nature of
the structural element, vary according to the circumstances, but the following
are typical of the majority of buildings.
Load-bearing capacity is required for all structural elements including floors,

beams, columns and load-bearing walls.
Floors require insulation and integrity to protect spaces above and below the
fire.
Compartment walls require insulation and integrity to protect the adjacent
space.
Columns require only load-bearing capacity unless they are built into an
element that requires insulation and integrity, such as a compartment wall.
Beams require only load-bearing capacity unless they are built into a floor or
a wall that requires insulation and integrity.
In some large, high or complex structures there will be a need to look beyond
the simplistic approach associated with single elements of structure such as
beams or columns. This is to make sure that there are no particular sensitive
elements of structure that could cause a disproportionate collapse during a fire.
The structural/fire engineer should be able to provide an overview of the stability
and the robustness of the structure during fire to aid this assessment. Conversely
there may be elements of structure that are required during normal day-to-day
use to reduce vibration or deflection that are redundant during a fire and thus
may not need to have fire resistance. The detail of this is beyond the scope of
BS 9999 but it will be important to establish when that boundary has been
reached as part of the design process. For further background reference can be
made to the following documents:
Introduction to the Fire Safety Engineering of Structures IStructE
Guide to the Advanced Fire Safety Engineering of Structures IStructE
Recommended periods of fire resistance have typically been based upon:
the amount of combustibles (fire load density) likely within a building;

the amount of ventilation through windows and other non-fire-resisting
constructions that control the amount of oxygen available for the fire;
linking real fire performance to the standard fire tests that are used to
determine fire resistance periods for construction components (time
equivalent method);
heat loss into compartment surfaces.

BS 9999 has coupled this method with other engineering approaches to

evaluate variables and the risks associated with building height and occupancy
characteristics, thus providing a transparent method for the recommendation of
fire resistance periods (Ref: A new approach to specifying fire resistance
periods, Kirby et al., Structural Engineer, October 2004). The following factors
influenced the recommendations for periods of fire resistance within the
standard.
Buildings with a high potential for ventilation to outside will encounter

shorter fire durations.
Sprinklers reduce the fire severity but do not necessarily extinguish the fire.
A sleeping occupancy within a building represents a greater risk compared
with occupants who are awake.
The perceived risk associated with structural failure increases with the height
of the building.
The above approach has led to the inclusion of two additional height categories,
11 m and 60 m, compared with the typical guidance within Approved Document
B. This has introduced benefit to the following buildings:
three and four storey buildings that typically had to meet the same
recommendations as five and six storey buildings;
9 to 16 storey buildings that typically had to meet the same
recommendations as a building that was substantially higher.
BS 9999 includes two tables that provide recommended fire resistance periods
for buildings; one table is based upon the engineering approach discussed
above, and the second table, which originates from Table A2 of Approved
Document B, is for use where recommended ventilation conditions are not
achieved. Figure 16 illustrates the route necessary for determining the applicable
fire resistance period.
In addition to the overall fire resistance requirements described above, there are
further requirements and guidance on measures to prevent the spread of fire
and smoke through cavities, for the fire properties of internal linings, external
walls and roof surfaces. Also the design of ductwork systems, including
dampers, details for doors, hardware, cavity barriers, recommendations for
engineering services and spread of fire between buildings are also covered in the
standard.

Determine minimum fire resistance

period relevant for construction
component (Table 15)
Use period of minutes No Is Table 16 referenced

provided in Table 15 in Table 15
Yes
Does the design meet the

ventilation conditions
applicable to the selected
risk profile outlined in
Table 17?
Yes No
UseTable 16 to determine Alternative

the fire resistance applicable Refer to BS 9999: Table 25
to the selected risk profile
Buro Happold
Figure 16 Route for determining the applicable fire resistance periods

Table 15 Minimum fire resistance performance (BS 9999: Table 24)
Part of building Minimum provisions when tested to the relevant parts of BS 476 or Method of exposure
the relevant European standard, in minutesA)
Load-bearing capacity Integrity Insulation
Structural frame, * Not applicable Not applicable Exposed faces
beam or column

Load-bearing wall * Not applicable Not applicable Each side separately
element
FloorB)
Between a shop and a 60 or *C) 60 or *C) 60 or *C) From underside
flat above
Any other floor, * * * From underside
including compartment
floors
Roof
Any part forming an 30 30 30
escape route
Any roof that performs * * * From underside
the function of a floor
External wall
Any part less than 1 m * * * Each side separately
away from any point on
the relevant boundary
73
74
Table 15 Minimum fire resistance performance (BS 9999: Table 24) (contd)
Any part 1 m or more * * 15 From inside the
from the relevant building
boundaryD)
Any part adjacent to an 30 30 No provisionE) From inside the
external escape route building
Compartment wall
Walls separating 60 or *F) 60 or *F) 60 or *F) Each side separately

occupancies other than
occupancies in
occupancy
characteristic A (office)
Any other compartment * * * Each side separately
walls
Protected shaft,
excluding any fire
fighting shafts
Glazed screen Not applicable 30 No provisionE), G) Each side separately
separating protected
shaft from lobby or
corridor

Any other part between 30 30 30 Each side separately
the shaft and a
protected
corridor/lobby
Any other part not * * * Each side separately
described above
Fire-fighting shaft

Construction separating 120 120 120 From side remote from
fire-fighting shaft from shaft
rest of building
60 60 60 From shaft side
Construction separating 60 60 60 Each side separately
fire-fighting stair, fire-
fighting lift shaft and
fire-fighting lobby
Enclosure
Not forming part of a 30 30 30E) Each side separately
compartment wall or a
protected shaft, to a
protected lobby or a
protected corridor
In a flat, to a protected 30 30 30E) Each side separately
entrance hall or a
protected landing
75
76
Table 15 Minimum fire resistance performance (BS 9999: Table 24) (contd)
Subdivision of a corridor 30 30 30E) Each side separately
Fire-resisting
construction
Enclosing communal 30 30 30E) Each side separately
areas in sheltered
housing
Enclosing places of 30 30 30 Each side separately

special fire hazard
Between storerooms 30 30 30 Each side separately
and sales area in shops
Cavity barrier Not applicable 30 15 Each side separately
DuctH) Not applicable 30 No provision From outside
Casing around a Not applicable 30 No provision From outside
drainage systemH)
Flue wallsH) Not applicable Half the period stated Half the period stated From outside
for compartment wall/ for compartment wall/
floor floor
Fire door See Table 19 See Table 19 See Table 19
Construction 120 120 120 From the roadway side
enclosing a roadway

A)
Part 21 for load-bearing elements, Part 22 for non-load-bearing elements, Part 23 for fire-protecting suspended ceilings, and
Part 24 for ventilation ducts. BS 476-8 results are acceptable for items tested or assessed before 1 January 1988.
B)
Guidance on increasing the fire resistance of existing timber floors is given in DG 208.
C)
Whichever is greater.
D)
The guidance in BS 9999: Figure 18 and BR 187 allows such walls to contain areas which need not be fire-resisting
(unprotected areas).
E)
Except for any limitations on glazed elements given in 31.3 of BS 9999.

F)
Whichever is less.
G)
See BS 9999: Clause 31.3.2
H)
BS 9999: Clause 33.
* The applicable period from Table 16 where the ventilation conditions of Table 17 are met. Refer to BS 9999: Table 25 where
the ventilation conditions of Table 17 cannot be met.
77
78
Table 16 Fire resistance periods for elements of structure (based on the ventilation conditions)
(BS 9999: Table 26)
Risk profile Minimum periods of fire resistance, in minutesA)
Height of top occupied storey above access level
Not more Not more than Not more than Not more than Not more than More
than 5 m 11 m 18 m 30 m 60 m than 60 m
A1 15 30 30 60 75 90
A2 30B) 30 60 90 120 150
A3 60 60 90 120 300 300
A4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

B1 30 30 30 60 60 75
B2 30 30 60 75 90 120
B3 30 45 75 105 135 180
B4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
CiC) 45D) 60 75 75 90 105
Ci2C) 60D) 90 105 120 N/A N/A
Cii1 or Ciii1 30 30 30 45 60 60
Cii2 or Ciii2 30 45 60 75 90 105
C3 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
C4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

NOTE 1 For occupancy characteristic A covering storage and car parks, and all basements, the fire resistance periods are as
given in BS 9999: Table 25.
NOTE 2 Variation of the risk profile by the addition of sprinklers conforming to BS EN 12845 (new systems) or BS 5306-2
(existing systems) can be used to reduce the fire resistance as described in BS 9999: Subclause 6.5.
A)
Where a product or system is not available to meet the specific classification recommended in this table, then a product or
system should be used that has the next highest available classification category. The classification periods 75, 105 and 135 do
not exist in European classification system BS EN 13501-2.
B)

Reduced to 15 min when ground floor area is less than 1,000 m2.
C)
15 min reduction when compartment size is limited to 10 per cent of the floor area on each floor (cannot be used in
combination with the reduction in footnote D).
D)
Reduced to 30 min for single-owner occupancy (cannot be used in combination with the reduction in footnote C).
79
Table 17 Ventilation conditions for application of Table 16

(BS 9999: Table 27)
Occupancy Use Ventilation parameter

characteristic
Minimum potential Height of openingA)
area as percentage as a percentage of
of floor area the compartment
height (i.e.
from floor to
ceiling)
A Office 5 30 to 90
A Industrial: low 2.5 30 to 80
hazard
A Industrial: high 2.5 30 to 80
hazard
B Shops and 5 50 to 100
commercial
B Assembly: low 2.5 30 to 80
hazard
B Assembly: 2.5 30 to 80
medium hazard
B Assembly: high 2.5 30 to 80
hazard
Ci Individual 10 30 to 90
residential
Cii and Ciii Other residential 10 40 to 90
A)
This is the weighted mean height (by ventilation area) of the potential openings. If
a compartment has openings each with an area of A1, A2, A3,An and heights of h1,
h2, h3, hn, then the total area of the openings A = A1 + A2 + A3 + An, and the
weighted mean height, h, is given by:
A1 h1 " A2 h2 " A3 h3 " # A n hn
h!
A
NOTE In the calculation of the weighted mean height it is also acceptable to
consider selectively only the height(s) of the openings that achieve the minimum
ventilation area.
If h is the weighted mean height of all the openings and H is the height of the
compartment then h/H should be between the values given in the end column.

Table 18 Maximum dimensions of compartments (BS 9999: Table 30)
Risk profile Single storey Multi-storey

Maximum floor Height of top Maximum floor
area floor area
m2 m m2
A1 No limit No limit No limit
A2 No limit <30 No limit
>30 Not applicable
A3A) No limit <18 14,000
18 to 30 4,000
A4 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
B1 No limit <30 No limit
>30 Not applicable
B2 No limit <18 8,000
No limit 4,000
B3 2,000 No limit 2,000
B4 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
C1 No limit No limit No limit
C2 No limit <30 No limit
C3 No limit Not applicable Not applicable
C4 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
A)
Guidance on the maximum dimensions of compartments for risk profile has not
been included with the standard. As the standard recommends that all buildings
with a top floor above 30 m are protected by sprinklers, it is unlikely that an A3 risk
profile will occur in buildings over this height. In the unlikely event that a space with
an A3 risk profile does occur, adopting the guidance for a B3 risk profile would be
appropriate.

a) Example of compartmentation in an b) Compartmentation in tall

unsprinklered shop buildings
1
2
1
30 m
3
4
3
4
None of the floors in this case would need to be In a building over 30 m in height,
compartment floors, but the two storeys exceeding all storeys should be separated
2,000 m2 would need to be divided into by compartment floors. For advice
compartments not more than 2,000 m2 by on the special conditions in atrium
compartment walls. buildings see Chapter 9.
NOTE The compartment walls in this example
do not need to be in one vertical plane.
c) Shallow basements d) Deep basements
Only the floor of the ground storey need All basement storeys should be
be a compartment floor if the lower separated by compartment floors if
basement is at a depth of not more any storey is at a depth of more
than 10 m. than 10 m.
Key
1 Storey not exceeding 2,000 m2
2 Roof
3 Compartment wall
4 Storey exceeding 2,000 m2 divided by compartment wall
Figure 17 Compartment floors (BS 9999: Figure 24)

Compartmentation
It may be necessary to restrict the spread of fire by separating one or more
areas of the building from adjacent areas and creating individual fire-protected
compartments. This may be necessary horizontally and/or vertically and can be
dependent upon several features of the building layout such as:
to support an evacuation strategy based upon either progressive horizontal

escape or escape to an area of relative safety;
to support a phased evacuation strategy;
to separate individual floors within high-rise buildings (>30 m in height);
to separate floors within buildings with occupancy characteristic C (except
floors between one level and another within a single unit having occupancy
characteristic Ci);
to separate basement storeys where there is a basement floor level >10 m
below grade;
to separate basement storeys from above ground storeys3.
to separate different risk profiles where different standards of fire resistance
or means of escape are being applied;
where compartment size on any one storey (see Figure 17) exceeds the
limitation outlined in Table 18.
Openings within fire-resisting construction (compartmentation

or escape routes)
Openings within fire-resisting constructions forming compartmentation or protecting
escape routes should be protected such that they do not represent a weakness
in the fire protection strategy for a building.
The provision of fire doors to protect openings within such construction should
meet the recommendations in Table 19. Note that all doors having a suffix S
should adequately resist the passage of cold smoke (refer to BS 9999: Clause
33.1.7 for further guidance).
3
Except occupancy characteristic Ci where the ground floor and basement storey immediately below is
part of the same unit (i.e. same occupancy), buildings comprising only one basement storey and two
other storeys each having a floor area !280 m2 or the ground floor is penetrated by an atrium that
meets the recommendations of Chapter 9.

All other openings within fire resisting construction should be protected with a
suitable proprietary device tested in accordance with the appropriate British
Standard. Refer to BS 9999: Clause 33 for further guidance.
External fire spread between neighbouring buildings

The guidance given in the standard is concerned with restricting the potential
spread of fire from the building of origin to a neighbouring building. For
buildings within 1 m of the relevant boundary, flame spread is considered the
primary fire spread mechanism. Beyond this distance, the primary fire spread
mechanism is considered to be thermal radiation.
External walls or parts of external walls within 1 m of a boundary should be

constructed to meet the appropriate period of fire resistance as recommended
by Table 15 herein with the exclusion of small unprotected areas meeting the
recommendations of Figure 18.
With the exclusion of small unprotected areas meeting the recommendations

of Figure 18, the unprotected areas of external walls or parts of external walls
1 m or more from a boundary should meet the recommendations of BR 187.
Alternatively a fire engineering approach should be adopted. Refer to BS 9999:
Clause 36.4.4 for specific alternative guidance relating to small occupancy
characteristic C buildings.
The external surfaces of walls should meet the recommendations in Figure 19.

Table 19 Provision of fire doors (BS 9999: Table 32)
Values in minutes
Position of door Minimum fire resistance of door in terms of
integrity
When tested in When tested in
accordance with accordance with
BS 476-22 BS EN 1634-1
1 In a compartment wall As for the wall in which As for the wall in which
separating buildings door is fitted, but not the door is fitted, but
less than 60 min not less than 60 min
2 In a compartment wall:
a if it separates a flatfrom FD 30S E 30 Sa
a space in common use
b enclosing a protected FD 30S E 30 Sa
shaft forming a
stairway situated wholly
or partly above the
adjoining ground in
occupancy characteristic
A (office only), B, Ci, Cii
and Ciii buildings
c enclosing a protected Half the period of fire Half the period of fire
shaft forming a resistance of the wall in resistance of the wall
stairway not described which it is fitted but not in which it is fitted but
in 2b) less than 30 min and not less than 30 min
with suffix SC) minimum and with
suffix SaC)
d enclosing a protected Half the period of fire Half the period of fire
shaft forming a lift or resistance of the wall in resistance of the wall in
service shaft which it is fitted but not which it is fitted but not
less than 30 min less than 30 min
e not described in 2a), As for the wall it is As for the wall it is
2b), 2c) or 2d) fitted in, but with suffix fitted in, but add SaC) if
S if the door is used for the door is used for
progressive horizontal progressive horizontal
evacuation evacuation
3 In a compartment floor As for the floor in which As for the floor in which
it is fitted it is fitted

Table 19 Provision of fire doors (BS 9999: Table 32) (contd)
Values in minutes
integrity
BS 476-22 BS EN 1634-1
4 Forming part of the
enclosure of:
a a protected stairway FD 30S E 30 Sa
(except where described
in item 10)
b the separation between FD 30S E 30 Sa
upward and downward
flights of a basement
stair (see Section 5)
c lift shaft, which does FD 30 E 30
not form a protected
shaft in 2b), 2c) or 2d)
enclosures of:
a a protected lobby FD 30S E 30 Sa
approach (or protected
corridor) to a stairway,
except for a
fire-fighting stair
b any other protected FD 20S E 20 Sa
corridor, or
c a protected lobby FD 30S E 30 Sa
approach to a lift shaft
enclosures of:
a evacuation lifts or FD 30S E 30 Sa
refuges, except for lift
landing doors
b evacuation lifts, where FD 30 E 30
the door is a lift landing
door
7 Affording access to an FD 30 E 30
external escape route

Values in minutes
integrity
BS 476-22 BS EN 1634-1
8 Subdividing:
a corridors connecting FD 20S E 20 Sa
alternative exits
b dead-end portions of FD 20S E 20 Sa
corridors from the
remainder of the corridor
9 Any door:
a within a cavity barrier FD 30 E 30
b forming part of FD 30S E 20 Sa
the enclosure to a
communal area in
sheltered housing
10 Any door:
a forming part of the FD 20 E 20
enclosure to a protected
entrance hall or protected
landing in a flat
b within any other fire- FD 20 E 20
resisting construction in
dwelling accommodation
not described elsewhere
in this table
NOTE 1 For fire-fighting shafts, see BS 9999: Clause 21.2.

NOTE 2 The national classifications do not automatically equate with the equivalent
classifications in the final column; therefore products cannot typically assume a
European class unless they have been tested accordingly.
A)
Fire doors are designated by reference to their recommended performance (in
minutes) for integrity only, and whether they need to retard the passage of smoke at
ambient temperature. The need to include insulation as part of the specification is
dependent on the function of the door. For example, reference FD 60 is to a door
that should achieve not less than 60 min integrity when tested in accordance with
BS 476-22 or BS EN 1634-1.


B)
Or with BS 476-8, in respect of items tested or assessed prior to 1 January 1988.
C)
Fire doors having suffix S should either:
Have a leakage rate not exceeding 3 m3/h per metre, when tested in accordance
with BS 476-31.1 with the threshold taped and subjected to a pressure of 25Pa; or
Meet the classification requirement of Sa when tested in accordance with BS EN 1634-3.
1 2
4m 4m
..........
4m
1.5 m
1.5 m
1 1
Key
1 Unrestricted
2 External wall of shaft that is enclosed by a minimum of 60 min fire resistance from
the accommodation side
3 Compartment boundaries
Represents an unprotected area of not more than 1 m2 which may consist of
two or more smaller areas within an area of 1,000 mm 1,000 mm
Represents an area of not more than 0.1m2
Figure 18 Small unprotected areas allowable without calculation


1 1 3
2
>1 m >1 m
>1 m
<1 m
a) Any building b) Any building other c) Assembly or recreation building

than c) of more than one storey
5
4 4
<1 m 6
<1 m
>1 m >1 m
d) Any building e) Any building

NOTE 1 The national classifications do not automatically equate to the equivalent
European classifications; therefore products cannot typically assume a European class
unless they have been tested accordingly.
NOTE 2 When a classification includes s3, d2, this means that there is no limit set for
smoke production and/or flaming droplets/particles.
Key
1 Building height <18 m
2 Up to 10 m above ground level
3 Up to 10 m above a roof or any part of the building to which the public has access
4 Building height 18 m or more
5 Portion of building more than 18 m above ground level
6 Portion of building up to 18 m above ground level
Relevant boundary
No provision in respect of the boundaries indicated
Class 0 (national class) or class B-S3, d2 or better (European class). Profiled or
flat steel sheet at least 0.5 mm thick with an organic coating of no more than
0.2 mm thickness is also acceptable.
Index (I) not more than 20 (national class) or class C-s3, d2 or better (European
class). Timber cladding at least 9 mm thick is also acceptable. (The index I
relates to tests specified in BS 476-6.)
Figure 19 Provisions for external surfaces of walls


9. Recommendations for atria
Key points
Design solutions are not applicable to the following:
c buildings intended to confine occupants;
c theatres, cinemas and similar venues (see Chapter 10);
c shopping malls (see Chapter 11);
c small premises and buildings with occupancy characteristics A and B
containing an atrium uniting only two storeys and designed for
simultaneous evacuation.
It is not necessary to separate any below-ground and above-ground
sections of an atrium.
Phased evacuation should be used only where occupied floors are
separated from atria by imperforate construction (smoke and/or fire
resisting); simultaneous evacuation should be used in all other cases.
Escape routes should not need to pass within 4.5 m of the atrium edge
unless occupants are protected by either imperforate construction (smoke
and/or fire resisting) or a smoke control system.
Smoke-resisting construction should be used only where smoke
temperatures are controlled by sprinklers and/or smoke control systems.
Control of fire loads on the atrium base, without sprinklers, can be
achieved by limiting fire load areas to !10 m2 and separating them by at
least 4 m from adjacent fire loads.
A smoke control system should be provided in buildings with occupancy
characteristic A where phased evacuation is adopted or the height
exceeds 30 m, and in all buildings with occupancy characteristic B. The
type of smoke control system is dependent upon the method of
separation between the atria and the adjoining floor areas.
Smoke clearance for fire-fighting should be provided in all atria not
provided with a smoke control system and based upon the following:
c natural vents within atria !18 m, equivalent to 10 per cent of the atrium
plan area;
c mechanically ventilated to six air changes per hour in atria of any height
where the building is not sprinkler protected, equivalent to the volume
of the atrium and the largest floor open to the atrium;

Recommendations for atria
c mechanically ventilated to four air changes per hour in atria of any

height where the building is sprinkler protected, equivalent to the
volume of the atrium and the largest floor open to the atrium.
For sprinkler-protected atrium buildings, external fire spread assessments can
assume that the building is equivalent to a fully compartmented non-atrium
building. All other atrium buildings should consider the atrium and any
adjoining floors not fire separated from the atrium as one compartment.
If an atrium design cannot meet the recommendations of BS 9999:
Annexes B and C, then it will be necessary to adopt a fire engineered
alternative approach.
Background
The inclusion of atria within buildings results in the connection of multiple
storeys such that smoke from a fire on any storey, or in the atrium base, could
potentially spread via the atria and present a hazard to occupants that are
remote from the storey of fire origin. The majority of smoke from a fire on a
storey open to an atrium will spread directly into the atrium; the development
of the smoke layer on the storey of fire origin is reduced leading to an increase
in the time available for escape on the storey of fire origin. As the smoke rises
through the atrium, it entrains large quantities of clean ambient air increasing
the volume but also diluting the concentration of smoke particles and reducing
the temperature of the smoke. This can also lead to the build-up of smoke on
upper storeys open to the atrium, and although this smoke will be significantly
more dilute than on the storey of fire origin it may necessitate immediate
evacuation of those upper storeys or partial enclosure to provide additional time
available for escape (this is highlighted in Figure 20). Consequently, the
recommendations within BS 9999 for the fire safety design of atria depend
upon the type of enclosure provided (if any), the height of the atria, the method
of evacuation adopted and the occupancy characteristics.
The standard does not at this time use the risk profile in its entirety but it does
take full advantage of the occupancy characteristics to vary the recommendations.
A wide range of solutions (exemplars) are outlined in BS 9999: Annex C and
their use is informed by a set of decision trees providing a route map through
the selection process. It should be recognized that the solutions documented
are not exhaustive, may not be appropriate to all buildings and that alternative
solutions may exist by which an equivalent level of fire safety can be achieved.

Figure 20 Example of smoke plume movement
Such approaches are beyond the scope of BS 9999 and would require adoption
of a fire engineering approach.
Equally it is not possible to replicate all of the exemplars from the standard in
this handbook. However, exemplars for the most common atria solutions are
reproduced in Figures 21 to 24. Further detailed guidance can be found in
BS 9999: Annexes B and C.
Escape routes
Escapes routes typically coincide with circulation routes, but in a building
containing atria this may not be appropriate if travel close to the edge of an
open atrium is necessary.
The design of the means of escape should follow the principles of the equivalent
non-atrium building (see Chapter 6). However, where accommodation is open
to an atrium or not separated by smoke-retarding construction, storey exits
should be sited away from the atrium so that escape routes do not pass within
4.5 m of the atrium edge. Further guidance on acceptable escape along balconies
is provided within BS 9999: Clause B.4.3, and typically necessitates the protection
of the balcony from the effects of heat and smoke unless an alternative escape
route is available.

1 1
AFD/A SE 2 AFD/A SE
AFD/A SE AFD/A SE
3
AFD/A SE AFD/A SE
18m
AFD/A SE AFD AFD/A SE
AFD/A SE AFD/A SE
AFD/A SE AFD/A SE
AFD/A SE 4 AFD/A SE
5 5
1 1
6
AFD/A SE AFD/A SE
AFD/A SE AFD/A SE
3
AFD/A SE AFD/A SE
AFD
18 m
AFD/A SE AFD/A SE
AFD/A SE AFD/A SE
AFD/A SE AFD/A SE
AFD/A SE 4 AFD/A SE
5 5
Key
1 Smoke clearance system
2 Smoke-retarding enclosure but not fire-resisting
3 Open or enclosed
4 Atrium base: use and contents comparable with that adjoining the atrium
5 Make-up air
6 Smoke reservoir
AFD Automatic fire detection connected to the building fire alarm system
AFD/A Automatic fire detection within the atrium and associated floor areas and alarm
throughout the building
SE Simultaneous evacuation
Figure 21 Occupancy characteristic A (awake and familiar) 18 m or

less in height, open or closed, simultaneous evacuation (BS 9999:
Figure C.8 Exemplar 2)

1 1
AFD/VA SE AFD/VA SE
AFD/VA SE AFD/VA SE
AFD/VA SE AFD/VA SE
18 m
AFD/VA SE AFD AFD/VA SE

AFD/VA SE AFD/VA SE
AFD/VA SE AFD/VA SE
AFD/VA SE 2 AFD/VA SE
3 3
Key
1 Smoke exhaust system
2 Atrium base: controlled fire load
3 Make-up air
AFD/VA L2 automatic fire detection within the atrium and associated floor areas and
voice alarm throughout the building
Automatic sprinkler protection
Figure 22 Occupancy characteristic B (awake and unfamiliar) 18 m

or less in height, open, simultaneous evacuation
(BS 9999: Figure C.24 Exemplar 12)

1 1
AFD/VA SE AFD/VA SE
AFD/VA SE AFD/VA SE
18 m
AFD/VA SE AFD AFD/VA SE
AFD/VA SE AFD/VA SE
AFD/VA SE AFD/VA SE
4 4
Key
2 Enclosed fire-resisting (30 min integrity) and smoke-retarding construction
4 Make-up air
AFD/VA L2 automatic fire detection within the atrium and associated floor areas and
voice alarm throughout the building
Figure 23 Occupancy characteristic B (awake and unfamiliar) 18 m

or less in height, enclosed, fire-resisting, simultaneous evacuation

1 1
2 2
L1AFD/VA 3 L1AFD/VA
L1AFD/VA L1AFD/VA
L1AFD/VA L1AFD/VA
L1AFD/VA 4 AFD L1AFD/VA
L1AFD/VA L1AFD/VA
L1AFD/VA L1AFD/VA
L1AFD/VA 5 L1AFD/VA
6 6
Key
2 Protected escape route directly from accommodation independent of atrium
3 30 min fire-resisting and smoke-retarding construction
4 Unlimited height
6 Make-up air
L1AFD/VA L1 automatic fire detectionA) and voice alarm throughout the building
A)
Automatic fire detection conforming to the L1 standard as specified in
BS 5839-1:2002+A2:2008.
Figure 24 Occupancy characteristic Ciii (asleep and unfamiliar)

Short-term occupancy, protected escape route, any height

Smoke and heat control systems

Smoke control is an integral part of the fire safety design solutions (exemplars)
outlined in BS 9999: Annex C and uses a combination of passive (smoke-
retarding/fire resisting construction) and active measures. Where active smoke
control is necessary and requires engineering calculation, the methodology
should be in accordance with recognized documents, such as PD 7974: Part 2,
BS 7346: Part 4 and BR 368.

10. Recommendations for theatres,
cinemas and similar venues
Key points
Foyers serving several auditoria (theatres, cinemas, etc.) should be enclosed
by fire resisting construction, and the foyer should be approached via
protected lobbies.
Transformer rooms, boiler rooms and other similar perceived risk areas should
not have openings located in close proximity to exits from the building.
Within rowed seating the width between the back of a seat and the most
forward projection of the seat behind (seatway width) should not be less
than 300 mm and should be constant throughout the length of the row
(see Figure 25).
Seating within closely seated layouts should be designed and constructed
such that they are resistant to ignition sources 0, 1 and 5 when tested in
accordance with BS 5852: 2006.
The slope of any tiered seating should not exceed an angle of 35 degrees
to the horizontal.
Travel distances within tiered seating should not exceed 15 m where
escape is available in one direction only and 32 m where escape is
available in more than one direction.
Gangways serving more than 60 persons should have a minimum width
of 1,100 mm. Those serving fewer than 60 persons can be reduced to
900 mm.
Temporary seating for between 50 persons and 250 persons should be
secured together in lengths of at least four seats. Temporary seating for
more than 250 persons should be fixed to the floor, although this fixing
can be at the end of rows where all seats are secured together.
Where a proscenium wall is provided (separated stages) it should be
constructed of non-combustible material achieving a 60 minute fire
resistance period. The associated safety curtain should be of non-combustible
material and should withstand the effects of fire for the duration of the
evacuation.
Protected lobbies should be provided between the stage basement and
the orchestra pit, and between the stage and the following areas:

Recommendations for theatres, cinemas and similar venues
c dressing room corridor(s);

c final exit(s) to open air; and
c the auditorium when a pass door is provided in a proscenium wall.
At least one escape route from the dressing rooms should be independent
of the stage.
Separated stages (stages with a proscenium wall and safety curtain)
should be automatically ventilated at a temperature not exceeding 74 C,
by sprinkler activation when provided, and additionally have a manual
opening facility.
Open stages should be ventilated to keep the auditorium clear of smoke
during means of escape and should be equivalent to a total aerodynamic
area of at least 10 per cent of the stage area.
Background
In venues with auditoria (theatres, cinemas, etc.), escape routes should be
designed so that in the event of a fire occupants are able to evacuate the whole
building. To this end, the design recommendations contained within BS 9999:
Annex D may be more onerous than that required to meet the Building
Regulations.
Additional guidance in the design of such venues can be found within the
Technical Standards for Places of Entertainment produced by the Association of
British Theatre Technicians, the District Surveyors Association and the Institute of
Licensing.
Seating and exit layouts

Limitations on travel distance control the maximum spacing of exits, but the
actual location may be driven by the seating layout and the provision for spaces
for wheelchair users and ambulant disabled people (see also BS 8300).
Where gangways are provided at each end of seating rows and generous seatway
widths are provided, the number of seats in a row is relatively unimportant
provided that travel distances are within acceptable limits. In other instances it is
necessary to limit the number of persons, for example to account for reduced
movement speeds due to narrow seatway widths. Figure 25 outlines the maximum
recommended number of seats within a row.

Seatway width (mm)

1 1 1 1 1
Maximum number of seats in a row

Gangway on one Gangway on two
(1 = Seatway)
side sides
300 to 324 7 14
325 to 349 8 16
350 to 374 9 18
375 to 399 10 20
400 to 424 11 22
425 to 449 12 24
450 to 474 12 26
475 to 499 12 28
500 or more 12 Limited by 32 m
travel distance as
escape is available
in more than one
direction
Figure 25 Number of seats in a row (BS 9999: Figure D.1 and

Table D.1)
Exits located at the rear of a seating tier may reduce overall travel distance,
although this may be one of the first areas to be directly affected by smoke
from a fire in the activity area. Therefore some form of smoke control may be
necessary to prevent early smoke logging of such exit routes. The escape of
occupants towards an activity area is acceptable providing that the occupants
would not be directly affected by a fire during the evacuation period.
Furnishings, fabrics and decorative features

Furnishings, fabrics and decorative features (including drapes and artificial
foliage) should be of materials that do not significantly increase the combustible

materials within the building and be suitably robust that washing is not
detrimental to their performance. Therefore such materials should either be
non-combustible or should be of a type B classification when tested in accordance
with BS 5867 Part 2:2008 (after being subjected to the appropriate wetting or
cleansing procedure described in BS 5651). However, only non-combustible
materials should be provided within enclosed escape routes (excluding foyers).
In addition, drapes should not be provided in front of exit doors or across
escape routes.
Stage areas
The stage area comprises the stage and its ancillary areas, such as prop/scenery
stores and quick-change rooms.
There might be a high fire loading on the stage, particularly because of the
quantities of scenery and curtains involved. The risk of fire can be increased
because of temporary props, furniture and temporary lighting equipment. However,
the stage area is likely to have close supervision whenever the public is present.
A proscenium wall, safety curtain and smoke ventilation above the stage area
can protect occupants from the effects of a fire on the stage for the evacuation
period. However, not all venues can readily separate the stage from spectators, i.e.
open-stage configurations. Where a stage does not have a safety curtain, the
approving authority may limit the amount and type of scenery used. There may be
a need for higher standards of flame retarding, limiting the materials available for
the construction of scenery, and subsequently increasing running costs. The
approving authority should be consulted at an early stage where an open stage
configuration is proposed and a fire engineering approach may be required.
Spaces that are ancillary to the stage are areas of intense activity during a stage
presentation and may be highly loaded with combustibles. Therefore, spaces
such as dressing rooms and scene docks should be enclosed in fire-resisting
construction, and any openings should be suitably protected fire-rated assemblies.
In addition, scene docks should be provided with manually operated smoke
ventilation.
Grid and fly galleries provide additional facilities for scenery and lighting. These
areas can be particularly hazardous in the event of a fire on the stage. Access is
typically via fixed ladders, although in a fire situation access to an alternative
means of escape is recommended.

11. Recommendations for shopping
complexes
Key points
The recommendations are typically appropriate to new shopping complexes,
but guidance appropriate for existing and uncovered malls, and small
arcades, is also provided.
Automatic sprinkler protection should be provided throughout all areas of
buildings that are connected to covered malls unless such buildings are
fully separated and have escape routes that are fully independent of the
mall.
Covered mall complexes should be provided with a smoke control system
designed in accordance with BS 7346 Part 4 and BRE guidance documents
BR 186 and BR 368. Uncovered mall complexes do not necessitate smoke
control.
Other non-public areas may also require some form of smoke control, i.e.
high-risk areas within basements.
Covered malls with units on both sides of the mall should have a minimum
effective width of 6 m to provide adequate escape and minimum
separation between unit demises across the mall.
Uncovered malls with units on both sides of the mall should have a
minimum separation of 5 m between unit demises across the mall.
The minimum exit width provided from all malls with a width up to 8 m
should be based upon an occupant load factor of one person for every
0.75 m2 (or 1.0 m2 for seated areas) of mall area. For malls with a width
greater than 8 m then an occupant load factor of one person for every 2.0 m2
should be used for that part of the mall width over 8 m. This recognizes
that wider malls will be less crowded than similar narrower malls.
Exits from a mall should not discharge into car parks, but exits from a
retail unit may do so where the car park is fire separated from the mall
complex, or the car park is in open air, or is accessed via an open-air
bridge link.
Escape routes through service areas, car parks, unloading docks or similar
areas are acceptable providing such routes are clearly defined (guarded
with protective barriers where necessary) and have a minimum width of 2 m.

Recommendations for shopping complexes
All service corridors serving units within mall complexes should be

subdivided with a self-closing fire door, or be provided with protected
lobbies between the unit(s) and corridor, or be protected by an
appropriate smoke control system.
Service corridors are acceptable to serve as an alternative means of escape
for units having an occupant load of !300 persons providing that the
width provided incorporates an additional 0.5 m to that required by the
largest unit served and the overall width of the corridor is "2.0 m but !3.0 m.
If a service corridor serves a unit as an alternative escape route it should
lead directly to a storey exit, and if it is greater >45 m it should have a
storey exit at each end.
A fire control centre for fire service use should be provided within all
shopping complexes.
A wet fire main system can be used to provide adequate access for fire-
fighting operations within a complex that has a deep plan provided that
the route taken to the fire main outlet point is protected by fire-resisting
construction.
Buildings within uncovered mall complexes do not necessitate the same
level of fire protection measures compared with a covered mall, although
consideration should be given to the future enclosure of the uncovered
mall(s) and the additional measures that may be necessary, i.e. sprinkler
protection, separation between buildings, etc.
Small shopping developments, i.e. small arcades, may not meet the
minimum recommendations for new-build covered shopping malls and
therefore guidance within BS 9999 for a similar uncompartmented retail
unit should be followed or a fire engineering approach should be adopted
where this is not appropriate.
Background
Many early shopping complexes were designed with single-level access and with
the public circulation spaces open to external air. Over time the trend has been
to provide cover, of various degrees, to the public. This has led to a range of
shopping experiences from covering existing small shopping arcades to purpose
built, multi-level, fully enclosed, shopping complexes. The latter typically
incorporates a complex interaction of atria and vertical circulation routes that
connect several levels within a public mall, and escaping occupants are expected
to escape via these malls.

Consequently, modern shopping mall complexes provide a different set of fire

safety issues from those that are common to an individual retail unit. BS 9999:
Annex E provides guidance on how to tackle these issues.
Means of escape and motivation to escape

Motivation to escape is important. Research into several major fatal fires and
evacuations suggests that in large internal spaces people in a crowd have
difficulty in recognizing any immediate threat from a fire elsewhere in the
building. People are also likely to underestimate how quickly a fire can spread.
In a fire disaster, the uncertainty of the situation in its early stages is usually
compounded by a serious delay in warning the public in time for them to start
to evacuate and to reach safety. To overcome these problems it is necessary to
provide a package of related fire precautions measures, complementary staff
training and evacuation management procedures, and to introduce appropriate
means of escape criteria, aimed at achieving an acceptable level of means of
escape conditions in these areas, taking into account the potential risk profile.
Smoke control
In a town centre high street, a fire in a retail unit will probably threaten only the
occupants in that building. However, a covered shopping complex has individual
units opening onto a covered mall, potentially incorporating atria, and smoke
from a fire in any unit could spread rapidly via the mall system. Therefore a fire
in an individual unit may present a hazard to occupants that are remote from
the unit of fire origin. This design issue coupled with the fact that such complexes
can be very densely populated at peak times requires that a greater time is
provided for occupant evacuation through the use of smoke control. Smoke
control is therefore an integral part of design in covered shopping complexes
and should be designed in accordance with BS 7346-4 and BRE Reports BR 186
and BR 368.
Fire protection
In addition to the smoke control highlighted above, other fire protection
measures will be necessary within covered shopping complexes in order to
support the need for the control of smoke and fire spread. Such measures
would include the provision of sprinkler protection and an automatic fire alarm

system throughout a covered shopping complex. These systems also complement

the fire control centre and other facilities necessary for fire-fighting operations
within covered complexes.
Uncovered shopping complexes

With respect to fire safety design, the majority of uncovered complexes may be
similar to a high street shopping district. Therefore some of the fire protection
measures recommended for covered complexes, in particular smoke control and
sprinkler protection, would not be necessary. However, during the design stage
of a project, consideration should be given to the possibility of future proofing
the complex for being covered at a later date.
Small shopping developments or arcades

Small shopping developments, such as small covered arcades, may not readily
meet the recommendations aimed at purpose built covered shopping malls and
therefore guidance within Annex E of the standard may be unduly restrictive.
Therefore such developments, whether new build or formed by the covering of
an existing arcade, should follow the guidance within the standard for a similar
uncompartmented retail building. Where neither this approach nor Annex E is
suitable, then a fire engineering approach will be required.
Covering existing streets

There are occasions when existing large streets are covered, sometimes at a
high or low level. The mix of sprinklered and unsprinklered shops associated
with a wide building represents a more considerable design challenge. Unless
significant changes can be made to achieve compliance with the standard, the
resolution is beyond the scope of BS 9999.

12. Process plant and outdoor structures
Key points
Process plant buildings should generally be designed in accordance with
the section of the standard Designing means of escape, although
departures from this guidance for escape widths and vertical escape
components may be acceptable, i.e. a ladder, where rapid smoke logging
is unlikely.
Escape routes within weather housed, weather protected or external plant
can be designed on the basis of the maximum travel distances
recommended in Table 20.
The horizontal components of alternative escape routes within weather
housed and external plant should be at least 90 apart. Vertical
components of escape routes within weather-housed and external plant
should either be at least 20 m apart or descend at opposite extremities of
the structure.
Background
It is recognized that the general recommendations of the standard for certain
components of means of escape may be unduly restrictive on buildings that are
constructed solely for the housing of process and storage plant, primarily
because of the characteristically low occupancy and familiarity with the premises.
Within process plant buildings there is a potential for both rapid escalation of a
fire and rapid smoke logging, and therefore the general recommendations of
the standard should be followed for means of escape design. A relaxation on
the minimum width of exit routes and the use of ladders for vertical escape are
allowable in buildings that pose a reduced threat of rapid smoke logging
because of the nature of the process or their design. However, travel distances
are not relaxed as the heat radiation associated with a rapid growing fire will
continue to represent the greatest hazard to escaping occupants.
The sole purpose of weather housed buildings is to enclose plant from the
external environment. Such buildings are typically large enclosures with
pedestrian routes provided on the basis of required maintenance access to the

Process plant and outdoor structures
Table 20 Maximum travel distances for weather-housed, weather-

protected or external plant (BS 9999: Table F.1)
Situation Travel distance

m
Two-way travel One-way travel
Weather-housed plant
Risk profile A1 100 20
Risk profile A4 Not applicable Not applicable
External plant/weather-protected plant
Normal fire hazard outdoor zone 200A) 25B)
High fire hazard outdoor zoneC)
Frequently visited 100A) 13
Not frequently visited 200A) 25
A)
Plus an additional 50 m at ground level where the direction of travel is substantially
unrestricted.
B)
100 m from the top of a storage tank or silo, provided that a person is not required
to cross the top of more than one other tank to reach a route leading to ground
level.
C)
Such areas are outside the scope of this British Standard unless a sprinkler system
or another appropriate fire suppression system is installed to reduce the risk profile.
plant inside and they are likely to be at multiple levels. Therefore increased travel
distances and unenclosed vertical escape components are acceptable provided
that adequate escape routes will remain unaffected during the early stages
of a fire. These overall travel distances would include any unenclosed vertical
components. External escape routes with a reduced level of fire resistance may
provide an adequate alternative where an appropriate level of resistance to heat
and smoke is provided.
Weather protected plant is essentially plant that has only partial enclosure, i.e.
incorporates louvers, ridge vents, etc. Therefore smoke logging is less likely
compared with weather-housed plant, and the risk posed to escaping occupants
is similar to those associated with external plant.

Process plant and outdoor structures
External plant has minimal potential for smoke logging, although the heat
radiation associated with a rapidly growing fire will continue to represent a
hazard to escaping occupants. A minimum of two escape routes should be
provided from any part of the external plant area and they should be separated
such that they are unlikely to be simultaneously compromised during the early
stages of a fire. The overall travel distance should be measured from any
accessible point to a point at adjacent ground level outside the confines of the
plant or structure surrounding it.
The principles outlined in Chapter 6 for altering travel distances using additional
fire protection measures can be applied to the distances stated above for
weather-housed plant.

13. Worked example two storey retail unit
The example clothing retail unit is a stand-alone building independent of any

connections to other buildings. It has two floors, the ground floor and first
floor, which are interconnected by a void with escalators used for vertical
transportation. All escape from the first floor is independent of ground floor
escape.
The floor to ceiling height on both levels is approximately 4.5 m (approximately

5 m floor to floor), and the gross floor area of both levels is 2,000 m2.
An automatic alarm system incorporating automatic smoke detection will be

provided throughout the building, including the retail sales floor.
The faade is constructed from floor to ceiling glazing.
Step 1: Establish the risk profiles within the building (refer

to Tables 3 and 4)
The risk profile of the retail unit is determined by a combination of the likely fire
growth within the space and the occupant characteristics. From the risk profile
of a building, the minimum fire protection measures, means of escape layout
(including stair widths, door widths, travel distance, etc.) and construction
recommendations can be determined.
Occupant characteristics
Occupants within the retail unit will be awake but may be unfamiliar with the
space. Therefore the occupant risk category can be defined as B Occupants
who are awake and unfamiliar with the building.
Fire growth
The fire load within the retail unit will be consistent with that expected within a
clothing retail unit, i.e. racks throughout the sales floor comprising clothing,
and can be approximated to a category 3 fast fire growth.

Worked example two storey retail unit
Step 2: Identify the minimum management level

recommended for the building (refer to Table 6)
Having determined the risk profiles for each space within the building it is easy
to identify the minimum recommended management level for each risk profile.
Therefore a level 1 (the highest) management level is expected throughout the
building due to the B3 risk profile.
Step 3: Identify the minimum fire protection features

The means of escape provisions recommended for a space with a particular risk
profile are based upon that space having a minimum package of fire protection.
For the example retail unit, risk profile B3, the minimum package is as follows:
L2 automatic fire detection and alarm system; and

emergency lighting on all escape routes (including external routes).
Step 4: Identify the per cent variations allowable in means

of escape components (refer to Table 8)
After the identification of the minimum fire protection measures, it is possible to
identify whether any per cent variations are allowable within the building. It is
possible to introduce variations to components associated with means of escape,
i.e. travel distances and width of exits and stairs, where;
floor to ceiling heights are greater than 3 m; and/or

automatic fire detection and alarm is not recommended within the room as a
minimum within the standard for the selected risk profile but will be provided
in this case.
As identified within Step 3 above, the example retail unit does necessitate
automatic fire detection and alarm as a minimum to comply with the standard.
However, this is only to an L2 standard, which does not require smoke detection
on the retail sales floor; therefore a 15 per cent variation associated with this
fire protection feature is allowable (BS 9999: Clause 19.2).
In addition, the example retail unit does incorporate floor to ceiling heights of
4.5 m, and therefore a 10 per cent variation associated with this is allowable
(variation for floor to ceiling heights of between 4 m and 5 m).

Consequently, the travel distances can be extended and widths of exits and
stairs can be reduced by up to the sum of the per cent variations identified
above, 25 per cent (subject to overriding maxima and minima identified within
BS 9999). Note that for ease of calculation purposes the per cent variations have
been added; however, aggregation is allowable within the standard (refer to the
example in BS 9999: Clause 19.1 for further details).
Step 5: Determine the dimensions applicable to means of

escape components (refer to Tables 9, 10, 11 and Table 12)
Travel distances
On the basis of the risk profile of B3 identified in Step 1, Table 21 highlights
the calculated travel distance after the 25 per cent variation (identified in Step 4)
has been applied to risk profile B3.
However, these distances must be checked against Table 9, which outlines an

overall limit on travel distances. By referring to Table 9 it can be seen that the
upper limit for risk profile B3 is not exceeded.
Horizontal exit widths

On the basis of the risk profile of B3 identified in Step 1, Table 22 highlights
the calculated width per person after the 25 per cent variation (identified in
Step 4) has been applied to risk profile B3.
However, these widths must be checked against Table 10, which outlines an
overall limit on exit width per person. From referring to Table 10 it can be seen
that the lower limit of 5.3 mm per person for risk profile B3 is exceeded and
therefore the calculated exit width of 4.5 mm per person is not acceptable and
must be increased to the limit of 5.3 mm per person.
Vertical exit widths

On the basis of stairs serving one storey and a risk profile of B3, the calculated
stair width per person is shown in Table 23 (including the 25 per cent variation
where identified as applicable in Step 4).

Table 21 Calculated travel distances
Risk profile Maximum travel distance Calculated travel distance

when minimum fire (with identified 25 per cent
protection measures are variation where applicable)
provided
Two-way One-way Two-way One-way
travel travel travel travel
B3 40 m 16 m 50 m 20 m
Table 22 Calculated horizontal exit width per person

Risk profile Minimum width per person Calculated width per person
with minimum fire (with identified 25 per cent
protection measures variation where applicable)
B3 6.0 mm per person 4.5 mm per person
Table 23 Calculated vertical exit width per person
Variations in stair widths are limited to a maximum of 25 per cent (BS 9999: Clause
19.4.4). As the variation identified in Step 4 is 25 per cent, the calculated stair width
per person stated in Table 23 should be appropriate; however, the minimum width
per person recommended for horizontal exits is 5.3 mm per person and therefore
the calculated exit width of 5.25 mm per person must be increased to 5.3 mm per
person to ensure that the escape stair is not narrower than the storey exit.
Step 6: Determine the minimum fire resistance period for

construction components (refer to Tables 15, 16 and 17)
Table 15 illustrates the minimum fire resistance period recommended for the
various construction components throughout a building. Where the number (of
minutes) is not provided or applicable, it makes reference to Table 16. Table 16

can be used only where the ventilation conditions of Table 17 have been met,
otherwise reference should be made to the British Standard. For the purpose of
this example it is assumed that the ventilation conditions of Table 17 can be met
for risk profile B3.
On the basis of risk profile B3 within a building having a top floor not more
than 5 m above ground, Table 16 would recommend a minimum 30 minute
period of fire resistance.
Step 7: Determine the maximum compartment dimensions

(refer to Table 18)
On the basis of risk profile B3 within a building having a top floor not more
than 5 m above ground, Table 18 recommends a 2,000 m2 limit be placed on
the maximum compartment area of a storey.
As the gross floor area of each storey is not more than 2,000 m2, there is no
compartment floor area limitation that would need to be incorporated within
the example building.
As the example retail unit does not include a basement and does not have a
floor more than 30 m (BS 9999: Clause 32.4.2) above ground, then there are no
additional compartmentation recommendations. Subsequently, as the guidance
in BS 9999 Annex B for atria applies only when compartmentation is breached
(BS 9999: Clause 32.4.1.1) the opening within the first floor for the escalators
does not require any further fire protection measures.

14. Worked example high-rise office
building
The example high-rise office building is a stand-alone building independent of any

connections to other buildings. The topmost occupied floor is 45 m above ground.
The floor to ceiling height on all levels is approximately 2.6 m, and the layout on
each floor will be predominantly open plan.
An automatic alarm system incorporating smoke detection will be provided

throughout the building, including the office floor areas.
As the building is over 30 m, the building will be protected throughout with an

automatic sprinkler system and will adopt a phased evacuation strategy.
The faade is constructed from floor to ceiling glazing.

to Tables 3 and 4)
The risk profile of the office building is determined by a combination of the
likely fire growth within the space and the occupant characteristics. From the
risk profile of a building, the minimum fire protection measures, means of
escape layout (including stair widths, door widths, travel distance, etc.) and
construction recommendations can be determined.
Occupants within the office building will be awake, and will be familiar with the
space. Therefore the occupant risk category can be defined as A Occupants
who are awake and familiar with the building.
Fire growth
The fire load within the office building can be approximated to a category 2
medium fire growth. However, the building is protected throughout with an
automatic sprinkler system and therefore in accordance with BS 9999: Clause

Worked example high-rise office building
6.5 the fire growth rate can be reduced by one level, i.e. from category 2
medium to category 1 slow. Consequently, the risk profile has been
determined as A1.

Having determined the risk profile for the office building, it is easy to identify
the minimum recommended management level for the building. Therefore a
level 3 (the lowest) management level is expected throughout the building due
to the A1 risk profile. It should be borne in mind that a level 3 management
system may not meet the requirements placed on the occupiers, owners or
other responsible persons under current UK legislation, i.e. the Regulatory
Reform (Fire Safety) Order in England and Wales.
Step 3: Identify the minimum fire protection features

The means of escape provisions recommended for a space with a particular
risk profile are based upon that space having a minimum package of fire
protection. For the example office building, risk profile A1, the minimum
package is as follows:
manual detection and alarm system; and

emergency lighting as per Table 6.

After the identification of the minimum fire protection measures, it is possible
to identify whether any per cent variations are allowable within the building. It
is possible to introduce variations to components associated with means of
escape, i.e. travel distances and width of exits and stairs, where:

minimum within the standard for the selected risk profile and will be
provided within the building.

As identified within Step 3 above, the example office building does not
necessitate automatic fire detection and alarm as a minimum to comply with
the standard, therefore a 15 per cent variation associated with this fire
protection feature is allowable (BS 9999: Clause 19.2).
The example office building does not incorporate floor to ceiling heights greater than
3 m and therefore a per cent variation associated with this is not allowable.
Consequently, the travel distances can be extended and widths of exits and
stairs can be reduced by up to 15 per cent (subject to overriding maxima and
minima identified within BS 9999).

escape components (refer to Tables 9, 10, 11 and 12)
Travel distances
On the basis of a risk profile of A1 identified in Step 1, Table 24 illustratesthe
calculated travel distance after the 15 per cent variation (identified in Step 4)
has been applied to risk profile A1.

overall limit on travel distances. From referring to Table 9 it can be seen that the
upper limit is not exceeded for risk profile A1.

On the basis of a risk profile of A1 identified in Step 1, Table 25 illustrates the
calculated width per person after the 15 per cent variation (identified in Step 4)
has been applied to risk profile A1.
overall limit on exit width per person. From referring to Table 10 it can be seen
that the lower limit for risk profile A1 is not exceeded and therefore the
calculated exit width per person is allowable.
Vertical exit widths

The example office building will adopt a phased evacuation strategy and
therefore in accordance with BS 9999: Clause 18.4.3 the vertical exit widths


when minimum fire protection (with identified 15 per cent
measures are provided variation where applicable)
A1 65 m 26 m 74.75 m 29.9 m

A1 3.3 mm per person 2.8 mm per person
should be sized based upon serving the maximum occupancy of any two
contiguous floors.
On the basis of stairs serving two storeys and a risk profile of A1, the
calculated stair width per person is shown in Table 26 (including the 15 per cent
variation where identified as applicable in Step 4).
Variations in stair widths are limited to a maximum of 25 per cent (BS 9999:
Clause 19.4.4). As the variation identified in Step 4 is 15 per cent, the calculated
stair width per person stated in Table 26 is allowable.


Table 15 highlights the minimum fire resistance period recommended for the
this example, it is assumed that the ventilation conditions of Table 17 can be
met for risk profile A1.
On the basis of risk profile A1 within a building having a top floor not more
than 60 m above the ground, Table 16 would recommend a minimum 75
minute period of fire resistance.

(refer to Table 18)
On the basis of a risk profile of A1, Table 18 does not recommend a limit be
placed on the maximum compartment area of a storey.

15. Worked example mixed-risk profile
building
The example building has six storeys (ground floor plus five others) and
comprises the following types of purpose:
retail (clothing) on the ground floor;

restaurants and conference on the first floor;
offices on the second floor;
guest rooms on the third, fourth and fifth floors.
Escape from the ground floor is independent of escape from all other levels.
Escape stairs within the building serve all storeys above the ground floor and have
lobby protection. The building will adopt a simultaneous evacuation strategy.
The floor to ceiling height on all levels is between 2.5 m and 3 m and all storeys
have a gross floor area of less than 2,000 m2.

to Tables 3 and 4)
The risk profiles within the building are determined by a combination of the
likely fire growth and the occupant characteristics within each space. From the
risk profile, the minimum fire protection measures, means of escape layout
(including stair widths, door widths, travel distance, etc.) and construction
recommendations can be determined.
Occupants on the ground floor (retail) and first floor (restaurant and conference)
will be awake, but may be unfamiliar with the space. Therefore the occupant
risk category can be defined as B Occupants who are awake and unfamiliar
with the building.
Occupants on the second floor (office) will be awake and familiar with the
space. Therefore the occupant risk category can be defined as A Occupants
who are awake and familiar with the building.

Worked example mixed-risk profile building
Occupants on the third, fourth and fifth floors (guest rooms) are likely to be
asleep and a short-term occupancy. Therefore the occupant risk category can be
defined as Ciii Occupants who are likely to be asleep, and short-term
occupancy.
Fire growth
The fire load within the ground floor retail will be consistent with that expected
within a clothing retail unit, i.e. racks throughout the sales floor comprising
clothing, and can be approximated to a category 3 fast fire growth.
The fire load within the first floor restaurant and conference can be approximated
to a category 2 medium fire growth.
The fire load within the second floor offices can be approximated to a category
2 medium fire growth.
The fire load within the third, fourth and fifth floor guest rooms can be approximated
to a category 2 medium fire growth.
The risk profiles for each storey in the building can be broken down as follows:
B3 on the ground floor;

B2 on the first floor;
A2 on the second floor;
Ciii2 at third, fourth and fifth floors.

Having determined the risk profiles for each space within the building, it is
easy to identify the minimum recommended management level for each risk
profile.
Where the different risk profiles within the building have different recommended
management levels, the most onerous should be adopted. Therefore a level 1
(the highest) management level is expected throughout the building because of
the C2 risk profile.

Step 3: Identify the automatic fire detection and alarm

(minimum fire protection measures in BS 9999)
The means of escape provisions recommended for a space with a particular risk
profile are based upon that space having a minimum package of fire protection
measures. Where the individual risk profiles have different recommended
minimum packages the most onerous should be adopted throughout the building.
On the basis of the most onerous (C2 for fire detection and alarm and B2 for
emergency light) the minimum package of fire protection is as follows:
L1 automatic fire detection and alarm system; and

emergency lighting on all escape routes excluding those within guest rooms
(including external routes).
Some storeys will therefore have a higher standard of automatic fire detection and
alarm than recommended, which will support variations as described in Step 4.

After the identification of the minimum fire protection measures, it is possible to
identify whether any per cent variations are allowable within the building. It is
possible to introduce variations to components associated with means of escape,
i.e. travel distances and width of exits and stairs, where;

minimum within the standard for the selected risk profile and will be provided
within the building.
As stated at the beginning of the example the building incorporates floor to

ceiling heights between 2.5 to 3 m and therefore a per cent variation is not
allowable in this case.
As identified within Step 3 above, the building as a whole does necessitate

automatic fire detection and alarm to an L1 standard as a minimum to comply
with the standard because of the recommendation associated with the guest
rooms (C2). However, as ground (B3), first (B2) and second floors (A2) do not
require smoke detection as a minimum on the storeys, a 15 per cent variation

associated with this fire protection feature is allowable for means of escape
components on those storeys only (BS 9999: Clause 19.2). Consequently, the
travel distances can be extended and widths of exits and stairs can be reduced
by up to the sum of the per cent variations identified above, 15 per cent
(subject to overriding maxima and minima identified within BS 9999).

escape components (refer to Tables 9, 10, 11 and Table 12)
Travel distances
On the basis of the risk profiles identified in Step 1, Table 27 highlights the
calculated travel distance after the 15 per cent variation (identified in Step 4)
has been applied to the relevant risk profiles.

overall limit on travel distances. From referring to Table 9, it can be seen that
the upper limit is not exceeded for any of the relevant risk profiles.

On the basis of the risk profiles identified in Step 1, Table 28 highlights the
calculated width per person after the 15 per cent variation (identified in Step 4)
has been applied to the relevant risk profiles.

when minimum fire (with identified 15 per cent
protection measures are variation where applicable)
provided
A2 55 m 22 m 63 m 25 m
B2 50 m 20 m 57.5 m 23 m
B3 40 m 16 m 46 m 18 m
C2 18 m 9m 18 m 9m

C2 4.4 mm per person 4.4 mm per person
overall limit on exit width per person. By referring to Table 10, it can be seen
that the lower limit of 5.3 mm per person for risk profile B3 is exceeded and
therefore the calculated exit width of 5.1 mm per person is not acceptable and
must be increased to the limit of 5.3 mm per person. All other risk profiles are
within the overall limits within Table 10.
Vertical exit widths even distribution of occupants entering a stair

Where the occupant load entering an escape stair at each level served is evenly
distributed throughout the height of the stair then the width of the stair should
be based upon the following:
total number of floors served by the stair; and

the most onerous width per person of the risk profiles served.
The example building has escape stairs serving five of the six storeys and the risk
profiles served by the escape stairs are B2 (first floor), A2 (second floor) and C2
(third, fourth and fifth floors). On the basis of stairs serving five storeys, the
calculated stair width per person for each of the risk profiles served by the stairs
is shown in Table 29 (including the 15 per cent variation where identified as
applicable in Step 4).
Variations in stair widths are limited to a maximum of 25 per cent (BS 9999:
Clause 19.4.4). As the variation identified in Step 4 is only 15 per cent the
allowable stair widths per person stated in Table 29 are appropriate.

C2 2.6 mm per person 2.6 mm per person
5th 200 persons (C2)
3rd 200 persons (C2)
2nd 200 persons (A2)
1st 200 persons (B2)
Total = 1,000 persons

even distribution
The most onerous stair width per person for the example building is 2.6 mm per
person (risk profile C2); therefore this should be adopted for calculation of the
stair width for the entire stair occupant load.
On the basis of the total occupant load of 1,000 persons and the width per
person of 2.6 mm per person, the minimum stair width requirement would be
2,600 mm.

3rd 100 persons (C2)
2nd 200 persons (A2)
1st 700 persons (B2)
Total = 1,200 persons

uneven distribution
Vertical exit widths uneven distribution of occupants entering

a stair
In the event that the occupant load entering an escape stair at each level
served is not evenly distributed throughout the height of the stair, i.e. one or
two storeys are discharging a much greater occupant load into the stair than
the other storeys, then additional checks are necessary to ensure an adequate
width for occupants on all storeys. The following outlines the process required.
Calculate the width of stair required using the approach outlined above for
an even distribution (2.6 mm per person for the example building, see
above).
Undertake a width per person check on each storey, based upon the
relevant risk profile for the individual storey assuming only that storey is
served by the stair. Where a single risk profile applies to a number of
contiguous storeys, then the width per person can be based upon that
number of storeys.
The largest width resultant from the local check should then be checked
against the width calculated using the approach for an even distribution and
the greater of the two adopted for the escape stair width.

Risk profile Minimum Calculated Number of Minimum

(No. of floors width per width per persons width
being person with person (with required for
assessed) minimum fire identified 15 risk profile
protection per cent
measures variation
where
applicable)
A2 (1 floor) 4.5 mm per 3.82 mm per 200 ,764 mm
person person
B2 (1 floor) 4.8 mm per 4.08 mm per 700 2,856 mm
person person
C2 (3 floors) 3.4 mm per 3.4 mm per 300 1,020 mm
person person
As highlighted in Table 29, the most onerous stair width per person for the
example building was 2.6 mm per person (risk profile C2). On the basis of the
total occupant load of 1,200 persons, the uniform minimum stair requirement
would be 3,120 mm.
The local check needs to determine whether the calculated width of 3,120 mm
will provide sufficient exit widths for all levels. The example building has escape
stairs serving the risk profiles B2 (first floor), A2 (second floor) and C2 (third,
fourth and fifth floors). On the basis of stairs serving one storey for A2 and B2
and serving three contiguous storeys for C2, the calculated stair width per
person for each of the risk profiles served by the stairs is shown in Table 30
(including the 15 per cent variation where identified as applicable in Step 4).
As the variation identified in Step 4 is only 15 per cent, the allowable stair
widths per person stated in Table 30 are appropriate.
Table 30 highlights that a stair width of at least 2,856 mm is required to ensure

that each individual level has an adequate exit width. As the value of 3,120 mm
calculated for the total occupant load of the stair is larger than this value the
minimum stair width required for the example building is 3,120 mm.


Table 15 highlights the minimum fire resistance period recommended for the
this example it is assumed that the ventilation conditions of Table 17 can be met
for all risk profiles.
Where the different risk profiles have different recommended periods of fire
resistance the most onerous should be adopted throughout the building.
On the basis of risk profiles A2, B2, B3 and Ciii2 within a building having a top
floor not more than 18 m above ground, Table 16 would recommend a
minimum 75 minute period of fire resistance as this is the most onerous (B3) for
the risk profiles within the building.
As risk profile B3 is located at the first floor and is the risk profile requiring the
75 minute period of fire resistance, it would be possible to provide a compartment
floor on the second floor with a 75 minute period of fire resistance and then to
apply a 60 minute period (A2, B2 and Ciii2) of fire resistance to all storeys above.

(refer to Table 18)
On the basis of risk profiles A2, B2, B3 and Ciii2 within a building having a top
floor not more than 18 m above ground, Table 18 recommends a 2,000 m2 limit
be placed on the maximum compartment area of a storey because of the
presence of risk profile B3.
As the gross floor area of each storey is less than 2,000 m2 there is no
compartment floor area limitation that would need to be incorporated within
the example building.
Every floor within a building containing a Ciii risk profile should be designated
as a compartment floor (of BS 9999: Clause 32.4.4). This recommendation is
specific to risk profiles Cii and Ciii only.

Bibliography
Standards
BS 476 (all parts), Fire tests on building materials and structures
BS 1634-1, Fire resistance and smoke control tests for door, shutter and openable
window assemblies and elements of building hardware Fire resistance tests
for doors, shutters and openable windows, 2008
BS 5306-2, Fire extinguishing installations and equipment on premises

Specification for sprinkler systems, 1990
BS 5588 (all parts), Fire precautions in the design, construction and use of
buildings
BS 5651, Method for cleansing and wetting procedures for use in the assessment
of the effect of cleansing and wetting on the flammability of textile fabrics and
fabric assemblies, 1989
BS 5839-1, Fire detection and fire alarm systems for buildings Code of
practice for system design, installation, commissioning and maintenance, 2002
BS 5852, Methods of test for assessment of the ignitability of upholstered

seating by smouldering and flaming ignition sources, 2006
BS 5867-2, Fabrics for curtains, drapes and window blinds. Flammability

requirements, 2008
BS 7273-4, Code of practice for the operation of fire protection measures

Actuation of release mechanisms for doors, 2007
BS 7346-4, Components for smoke and heat control systems Functional

recommendations and calculation methods for smoke and heat exhaust
ventilation systems, employing steady-state design fires Code of practice,
2003
BS 7346-7, Components for smoke and heat control systems Code of practice
on functional recommendations and calculation methods for smoke and heat
control systems for covered car parks, 2006

Bibliography
BS 8300, Design of buildings and their approaches to meet the needs of

disabled people Code of practice, 2009
BS 9999, Code of practice for fire safety in the design, management and use
of buildings, 2008
BS EN 81-1, Safety rules for the construction and installation of lifts Electric
lifts, 1998
BS EN 81-2, Safety rules for the construction and installation of lifts Hydraulic
lifts, 1998
BS EN 81-72, Safety rules for the construction and installation of lifts

Particular applications for passenger and goods passenger lifts Firefighters
lifts, 2003
BS EN 12845, Fixed firefighting systems Automatic sprinkler systems

Design, installation and maintenance, 2004
BS EN 13501 (all parts), Fire classification of construction products and building

Elements
PD 7974-2, Application of fire safety engineering principles to the design of

buildings. Spread of smoke and toxic gases within and beyond the enclosure of
origin (Sub-system 2), 2002
Books/booklets
Appraisal of Existing Structures, 3rd edition, IStructE
Fire Engineering, CIBSE Guide E, 2003
FPA Guide: Essential Principles and Guidance, published by the Arson Control
Forum, Arson Prevention Bureau and Zurich Municipal
Guide to the Advanced Fire Safety Engineering of Structures, IStructE, 2007
Introduction to the Fire Safety Engineering of Structures, IStructE, 2003
Increasing the fire resistance of existing timber floors, Building Research

Establishment, 1988

Bibliography
Kirby et al., A New Approach to Specifying Fire Resistance Periods, Structural

Engineer, October 2004
LPC Design Guide for the Fire Protection of Buildings, 2000
The Technical Standards for Places of Entertainment, produced by The Association

of British Theatre Technicians, the District Surveyors Association, the Institute of
Licensing, 2008
Legislation
BR 187, External fire spread: building separation and boundary distances,
Building Research Establishment, 1991
BR 368, Design methodologies for smoke and heat exhaust ventilation, Building
Research Establishment, 1999
GREAT BRITAIN. Building Regulations 2000 and subsequent amendments, The

Stationery Office
GREAT BRITAIN. Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005, The Stationery
Office
The Building Regulations 2000 Approved Document B Volume 2: Fire

safety Buildings other than dwellinghouses, The Stationery Office, 2000

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The BS 9999 Handbook

The BS 9999 Handbook

Michael Green and Jonathan Joinson

British Standards Institution 2010

Typeset in Frutiger by Helius www.helius.biz

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Michael continues to be a strong advocate of research and its application in the

The BS 9999 Handbook v

List of figures xiii

2. The concept of a risk profile 10

3. Methodology and tactics for use of the standard 17

The BS 9999 Handbook vii

4. Allocation of fire protection measures 24

5. Managing fire safety design, occupation and construction 28

6. Design for means of escape 38

7. Access and facilities for fire-fighting 59

viii The BS 9999 Handbook

Smoke control for fire-fighting shafts 66

8. Designing the building structure 68

9. Recommendations for atria 90

10. Recommendations for theatres, cinemas and similar venues 98

11. Recommendations for shopping complexes 102

The BS 9999 Handbook ix

12. Process plant and outdoor structures 106

13. Worked example two storey retail unit 109

14. Worked example high-rise office building 114

15. Worked example mixed-risk profile building 119

x The BS 9999 Handbook

Table 1 Occupancy characteristics 11

Table 2 Fire growth rate 12

Table 3 Risk profile (BS 9999: Table 4) 13

Table 4 Examples of risk profiles (BS 9999: Table 5) 14

Table 5 Checklist for the design assessment, refer to Figure 2

Table 6 Summary of the minimum fire protection package for each

Table 7 Key factors used in assessing management levels 31

Table 8 Permissible variation of door, corridor and stair widths and

Table 9 Travel distance as a function of risk profile

Table 10 Door width as a function of risk profile mm per person

Table 11 Absolute minimum width of stairs (BS 9999: Table 14) 48

Table 12 Minimum width of escape stairs for simultaneous evacuation

Table 14 Perimeter access requirements for fire service vehicles

Table 15 Minimum fire resistance performance (BS 9999: Table 24) 73

Table 16 Fire resistance periods for elements of structure (based on

The BS 9999 Handbook xi

Table 17 Ventilation conditions for application of Table 16

Table 18 Maximum dimensions of compartments (BS 9999: Table 30) 81

Table 19 Provision of fire doors (BS 9999: Table 32) 85

Table 20 Maximum travel distances for weather-housed, weather-

Table 21 Calculated travel distances 112

Table 22 Calculated horizontal exit width per person 112

Table 23 Calculated vertical exit width per person 112

Table 24 Calculated travel distances 117

Table 25 Calculated horizontal exit width per person 117

Table 26 Calculated vertical exit width per person 117

Table 27 Calculated travel distances 122

Table 28 Calculated horizontal exit width per person 123

Table 29 Calculated vertical exit width per person 124

Table 30 Calculated vertical exit width per person 126

xii The BS 9999 Handbook

Figure 1 Circle of fire safety 8

Figure 2 Process for approach to risk profile and related fire

Figure 3 Design options 22

Figure 4 Process to design and construct a building that can be