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otherwise without prior permission in writing from the publisher.
Whilst every care has been taken in developing and compiling this publication, BSI accepts
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reliance on its contents except to the extent that such liability may not be excluded in law.
The right of Michael Green and Jonathan Joinson to be identified as the authors of this
Work has been asserted by them in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988.
ISBN 978-0-580-67508-9
About the authors
Michael Green
Michael Green is a chartered engineer, a partner of Buro Happold, and was
responsible for the early development of their fire safety engineering consultancy
team, FEDRA, with an involvement on fire safety since 1979. In addition to
major international sports, cultural, transportation and commercial projects,
he has made many contributions to the fire safety profession. This includes
development of an approach to the appraisal of existing sports grounds,
published by the IStructE in 1991 after the tragic fire at the Bradford North
Stand. Subsequently he chaired the production of two further guides: An
Introduction to the Fire Safety Engineering of Structures (2003) and An
Advanced Guide on the Fire Safety Engineering of Structures (2007). He was
also the author of the smoke and ventilation section of the CIBSE Guide E
(1997). An early involvement with the development of BS 9999 from 1998,
when work first began on this standard, has enabled an ongoing contribution
to the BSI committee.
Jonathan Joinson
Jonathan Joinson is a chartered fire engineer, a senior team member within
Buro Happold FEDRA, and has been involved in the fire safety design of
buildings since 1999. He has been involved in many high-profile projects within
the UK and internationally during his professional career, such as the Emirates
Stadium, the London O2 Arena and the redevelopment of the Ascot racecourse
grandstand, delivering efficient and progressive fire-engineering solutions. He
has extensive knowledge covering many aspects of fire engineering, including
international fire codes and best practice, smoke management, occupant
evacuation and the implementation and construction of design solutions, which
provide a sound basis, and in-depth understanding and background, for new
developments such as BS 9999.
List of tables xi
Foreword xv
Introduction xvii
1. General 1
Principles 1
Spread of fire and smoke 2
The impact of fire on people 3
Historic buildings 4
Property and business continuity protection 5
Means of escape for disabled people 6
The full circle of fire safety 7
Bibliography 128
Tables
Table 13 Examples of typical floor space factors (BS 9999: Table 10) 50
Figures
In late 2006, work to turn the DD into a BS commenced; this included integration
of BS 5588 Parts 5 and 12. Resulting from 2006/7 research on fire-fighter physiology
and fire service practice, amendments were needed to the text from BS 5588-5
on incorporation into BS 9999 and the fully revised text for BS 9999 was issued
as a Draft for Public Comment (DPC) in January 2008 and as a final document in
October 2008.
BS 9999 is one of the most important guidance documents dealing with fire
safety in buildings and, as stated in the document, its principal purpose is to
provide Guidance which gives a more transparent and flexible approach to fire
safety design through the use of a structured approach to risk-based design
where designers can take account of varying physical and human factors.
Although the guidance is based on fire safety engineering principles, it is not a
guide to fire safety engineering.
I believe the document does exactly what was intended when the work started
over 10 years ago and since its publication in 2008, BS 9999 has been used
extensively and there have been numerous seminars and courses covering its
scope and application. The publication of this book provides additional help and
guidance to those using the Standard and to those who have previously had
doubts about using it. The text of the book has been carefully structured,
covering all aspects of BS 9999 and includes some useful worked examples.
BS 9999 and consequently this guide are intended for use by designers, fire
engineers, fire and rescue services and fire safety managers. However, they are
also clearly of value to regulators, enforcers, operators/end users/clients, insurers
and contractors. The standard is designed as a holistic guide to bring together
the key areas of fire safety:
In the UK, technical guidance on fire safety is provided at three different levels.
This permits a design approach to be adopted that corresponds to the complexity
of the building and to the degree of flexibility required. The three levels are as
follows.
An early decision by the client and the design team on the most effective and
efficient approach is recommended so that the needs of the project are best
served. There might be circumstances in which it is necessary to use one
publication to supplement another, but care needs to be taken when using a
pick-and-mix approach as it is essential to ensure that an integrated approach
is used in any one building. Clear justification is necessary if this approach is
adopted.
As per the standard, this guide does not cover the design of individual dwelling
houses, flats or maisonettes. For guidance on the fire safety design of these
types of premises refer to BS 5588-1.1
1
BS 5588-1 is due to be replaced by BS 9991 in late 2010.
The primary purpose of this handbook is to provide a pocket guide to the use
of BS 9999 that is easy to use and draws together the key areas of fire safety
design that require consideration during the early development of design
concepts. The handbook provides an aid to the understanding and use of
BS 9999 and is not intended to be a substitute for the standard. The most
commonly used data, tables, figures and a Key Points list at the beginning of
each chapter provide a quick and effective overview of the measures that may
be necessary. In addition, a methodology is presented to help the user find the
best approach to deploy the flexible design recommendations introduced by
BS 9999.
Principles
The recommendations given in the British Standard are general, and all fire
protection measures, procedures, etc., need to take into account the particular
circumstances of the individual building or complex concerned. The same
recommendations generally apply to both existing and new buildings, but
existing buildings, especially historic buildings, often pose problems that are
unlikely to arise in new buildings and, therefore, require further consideration by
adopting a flexible approach in the risk assessment process.
The guidance is straightforward to use for routine and typical buildings, but the
inbuilt flexibility will also support a sustainable reuse of our built environment.
The following areas are an essential contribution:
BS 9999 applies straightforwardly where premises have a single main use and
are contained in a single, separate building. However, complications might arise
where a building comprises two or more different main uses. In such cases, it is
important to consider the effect of one risk on another. A fire in a shop or
unattended office could have serious consequences on, for example, a residential
or hotel use in the same building. Similarly, a high fire risk in one part of a
building could seriously affect other areas in another part of that building. A
worked example in Chapter 15 provides an illustration of how to approach
different risk profiles within a single building.
The fact that outbreak of fire is more likely to occur in furnishings, decorations,
finished goods, raw materials, chemicals, equipment, electrical services, process
plant, or service plant in a building has been taken into account in the development
of the standard. Initially, a fire creates a hazard only in the part of the building
in which it starts, and it is unlikely to involve a large area in the first instance,
although it can subsequently spread to other parts of the building, and vertical
shafts such as lifts and service risers are a particular risk. Fire is less likely to
spread if passages, corridors, lobbies or stairways, intended for access or means
of escape, are kept clear of combustible materials. As the fire grows, flames
increase in height, reach the ceiling and are deflected horizontally, radiating
heat downwards and accelerating fire growth. If the ceiling is combustible, it
can ignite and add to the volume of flame and speed of fire growth. If the
space has insufficient openings to provide a continuing air supply, the burning
rate diminishes as it draws on increasingly vitiated air, but the gases generated
are then extremely toxic.
When smoke descends down to head height it causes difficulty in breathing and
impairs visibility, which interferes with the efforts of occupants to find their way
towards the exits. Smoke can cause intoxication, disorientation, incapacity,
unconsciousness and, in the worst-case scenario, fatalities.
to ensure that protected escape routes are provided and that they are
adequately safeguarded against the ingress of smoke;
to limit the time people have to travel before they reach a protected route or
final exit;
to consider reverse flows that might occur as a result of a particular exit
route being unavailable;
to plan evacuation for disabled people in an integrated manner.
A means of smoke ventilation might be necessary to assist the fire and rescue
service and, if operated automatically, can also assist escape from the building.
After the outbreak of fire there might only be a short time during which the
actions necessary for ensuring the safety of occupants can be carried out. This
time will be sufficient only if all provisions for the safety of people from fire are
planned and managed so as to be effective when the occasion arises.
Historic buildings
Many historic buildings are listed, and permitted alterations are limited
without the agreement of the appropriate authorities. The advice of consultative
bodies, such as English Heritage, should be sought in the early stages of design.
The appropriate authorities sometimes agree to limited modifications to
improve life safety where, in turn, there will be added long-term protection
and preservation of the original building fabric. Issues relating to historic
buildings include:
In both new construction and upgrading existing buildings, the fire precautions
are interrelated and weaknesses in some areas can be compensated for by
strengths in others. BS 9999 provides a level of flexibility that allows the fire
protection measures and the risks to be assessed to enable reasonable practical
solutions to be designed.
Smoke and fire spread are major causes of property damage and losses that
include:
The objectives are first to reduce the chance of fire starting and second in the
event of fire starting to reduce the consequences of that fire. Because many
of the features necessary for life safety are common, the risk assessment for
property and business continuity protection could be an extension to other risk
assessments carried out for life safety. The following are the primary means of
achieving the objectives:
the first barrier to property and business loss is the level of fire prevention
management in the building. This is to ensure that ignition hazards are
eliminated or controlled, that operations in the building are carried out
appropriately and that combustible loads are subject to control and good
housekeeping.
smoke management (mechanical, natural, pressurization) to prevent damage
from heat and corrosive chemicals in the smoke;
compartmentation and structural fire protection to reduce spread of fire
between spaces. The complete involvement of the whole fire compartment is
an extreme-event scenario. Adequate detailing of cavity barriers, fire-stopping
doors, shutters, fire resistance, etc. is important to maintain the performance
of the compartment walls and floors.
fire-fighting facilities, including consideration of speed of response and the
tactics for external and internal fire-fighting;
external fire spread and building separation. For most buildings it is expected
that these provisions for life safety will also be adequate for property
protection. However, for some buildings and uses the provision may need to
be more stringent. Consideration should be given to buildings having highly
glazed faades.
automatic suppression systems to reduce fire severity such as sprinklers, etc.
Any changes in the design added for the purpose of property protection should
be discussed with the relevant authorities to ensure that there is no adverse
impact on life safety. If a conflict exists between the provisions for life safety
and property protection that cannot be resolved, then life safety takes priority.
The risk assessment could range from a simple statement outlining the potential
property and business losses that are acceptable to business managers and their
insurers, through to a rigorous quantified analysis of probabilities and
consequences of fire. Whatever method is used, the aims of the risk assessment
should be understood by all concerned.
The insurance industry has produced various guides that are directed at property
protection (including FPA guide Essential Principles and guidance published by
the Arson Control Forum, Arson Prevention Bureau and Zurich Municipal). Arson
and vandalism are addressed by guidance produced by the Arson Control Forum
and the Arson Prevention Bureau.
Many insurers use the LPC Design Guide for the Fire Protection of Buildings as a
basis for providing guidance to the building designer on what they require.
BS 9999 is the first significant design standard that embeds the quality of the
management into the design process. Many fire losses are due wholly or in part
to failures in management so it makes good sense to draw attention to the
management needs. It will also be increasingly important for the insurance
industry to build the quality of the management into their methodology to help
reduce losses. However, trade-off for enhanced management, enabling reductions
in the built provision, is not allowed in the standard.
access for all users, the facilities provided should, where appropriate, be used to
improve egress arrangements.
Fire safety for disabled people is included within the standard; this includes
consideration of all disabilities and is not restricted to guidance for assisting
wheelchair users. Specific guidance on means of escape for disabled people is
given in BS 9999: Clauses 17.7 and 18.8; general guidance on fire safety
procedures for people at particular risk is given in BS 9999: Clause 44.3; and
measures to aid the evacuation of disabled people are described in BS 9999:
Clause 46.
Disabled people can be at particular risk in the event of a fire and need appropriate
protection facilities. These might include relevant provisions for those requiring
assistance, such as:
The full circle of fire safety requires effective connectivity between the client
brief, design, operational fire strategy and ultimately whether the actual
operational approach meets with the client intentions and the full circle.
and policy
Key points
Background
There are two fundamental inputs to the design of a building that drive the
specification of the fire protection measures and the approach to fire safety
management. Every other input is a decision made by the designer, an
operator/end user/client, or the approving authorities. The two inputs are
associated with the intended use and are as follows:
b. the severity of the fire that affects the performance of the structure,
construction and the compartmentation.
By a combination of the above two inputs the risk profile for the building or
space is defined.
Occupancy characteristics
The occupancy characteristics for a single use are usually fairly clear and can be
determined from Table 1. Complications can arise when there is a mix of uses.
Unless the uses can be clearly delineated, it is advisable to adopt the higher
requirement. A worked example is provided in Chapter 15 where a number of
different risk profiles are contained within the same building.
the rate of fire growth, which is of primary concern for means of escape,
travel distance, doors stairs, etc.;
fire load and ventilation and thus the severity of the fire impacting on the
structure.
Table 2 provides a simple summary of the typical fire loads with the associated
fire growth rate.
The selection of the fire growth rate requires some thought and consideration.
For example an office fire growth rate could vary between 1 and 3, although 3
would be unlikely unless there are very significant amounts of open storage
areas. A fire growth rate of 1 is possible as offices become paperless, although it
may be unwise to select 1 for the design of a new facility as this may reduce
future flexibility, unless the client is able to prescribe with some certainty into
the future or in the case of temporary use. Another example for consideration is
that of a shop. Some boutique-style shops with products that are well spaced
and presented for sale in low densities may have a fire growth rate of 1, but
Table 3 highlights how risk profiles are defined, and risk profiles for typical areas
within a building are given in Table 4.
As this standard derives from a very simple logic, it enables a more flexible
responsive approach compared with traditional prescriptive guidance. This
handbook includes a description of how this flexibility can best be deployed.
The risk profile provides a simple and very effective basis for handling and
assessing the variations in risk, the related package of fire protection measures
and the need for management.
A person in the space where the fire originates may be safer, as the presence
of sprinklers limits fire growth and reduces temperature as well as smoke
production. At best sprinklers put a fire out, but they may only slow the fire
growth rate if the circumstances for extinguishing the fire are not ideal.
BS 9999 conservatively assumes a reduction in growth rate by allowing a
reduction of one step in the fire growth rate (i.e. 2 to 1, 4 to 3, etc.).
Sprinklers may also reduce the chance of fire spreading from one room to
another.
The chance of a fire seriously affecting the fire performance of a structure
reduces if sprinklers are present, and therefore a lower fire resistance
requirement is reasonable to achieve a given performance.
For the same reasons as for the structure, the chances of fire spread between
buildings is beneficially reduced.
The list of example risk profiles in Table 4 is not exhaustive and should not be
prescriptively applied without due consideration. As highlighted previously, it is
possible for office spaces to have risk profiles varying from A1 to A3.
Key points
Before beginning the design of a building in accordance with BS 9999, it
is essential that knowledge of any fire protection systems due to client or
insurance requirements is established.
Figure 2 outlines a process for approaching the interaction between risk
profile and the related fire protection measures to ensure that the design
does not fall short of the recommendations within the standard.
The provision of automatic sprinklers within a space will improve safety
and enable a change in the risk profile, which then affects all related
recommendations, so an early decision on this helps the process greatly.
The provision of automatic detection and alarm and/or high ceilings can
allow increased travel distances and reduced escape route widths.
Chapter 15 provides a worked example that highlights how the
recommendations of BS 9999 can be applied to a building containing
multiple-risk profiles.
Background
The guidance provided within BS 9999 is flexible and allows trade-off among the
risk profile, sprinklers and the package of fire protection measures. For example
automatic sprinklers will result in a change to the risk profile (e.g. B3 to B2 when
sprinklers are introduced into a shop), and high ceilings or automatic detection
and alarm can directly allow increased travel distances and reduced escape route
widths. Therefore, use of the standard can provide a high level of flexibility for new
buildings and renewed flexibility for the refurbishment of existing building stock.
Consider adding
sprinklers to reduce Is minimum package of
the risk profile or an fire protection measures
alternative fire available?
No (See Chapter 5,Table 6)
engineering
approach
Yes
Introduce
additional fire
No Option 2 protection
No Option 1
measures
Design assessment
Does the design conform to the
means of escape, construction,
operational and fire-fighting
requirements of the standard
(see Table 5)?
Yes
Buro Happold OK
Figure 2 outlines a process for approaching the risk profile and the incorporation
of the related fire protection measures. It also shows how the risk profile can be
changed by the addition of sprinklers compensating for a shortfall of other
recommendations.
Factor Comments
Adequacy of means to prevent fire The assessment should identify the
scope for fire prevention measures and
indicate the associated management
systems needed.
Early fire warning by an automatic This provision can also lead to first aid
detection and warning system to or fire and rescue service fire-fighting
enable early evacuation in the early stages of fire development.
Modern systems can be unobtrusive
(aspirating), addressable (by which a
fire location and development can be
identified) and can reduce unwanted
alarms.
The standard of means of escape See Chapter 6 and Chapter 8 (for which
structural enclosure and separation
would be a part).
Provision of smoke control See Chapters 7, 9, 10 and 11.
Control of the rate of fire growth This item particularly includes spread
of flame over surfaces and linings, and
within contents. See Chapter 8.
Adequacy of the structure to resist the See Chapter 8.
effects of fire
Degree of fire containment Includes containment by
compartmentation, cavity barriers,
and fire stopping. See Chapter 8.
Fire separation between buildings or See Chapter 8.
parts of a building
Standard of active measures for fire See Chapters 4 and 8.
extinguishment or control
Facilities to assist the fire and rescue See Chapter 7.
service
Quality of premises management See Chapter 5.
Provisions for staff training and See Chapter 5.
ongoing controls
Occupancy characteristics and risk See Table 3.
profiles
It is essential that any fire protection system that might be included because of
client or insurance requirements or later sections of BS 9999 are identified prior
to beginning the design assessment of the building to minimize abortive work.
The impacts of such systems on design guidance are highlighted in the
remainder of this chapter.
In addition to client and insurance requirements, this can be due to the following
recommendations within BS 9999: Section 7 Designing the Building Structure
(refer to Chapter 8 of this handbook):
Office with sprinklers risk profile A1 Office without sprinklers risk profile A2
Scenario A
65 m 65 m 55 m 55 m
Fire resistance periods between 15 min Fire resistance periods between 30 min
and 90 min (Table 16) and 150 min (Table 16)
No limit on building height Building height limited to 30 m unless
No limit on compartment floor area sprinklers are provided
Travel distance limited to 65 m No limit on compartment floor area
Travel distance limited to 55 m
Scenario B
Add automatic detection and alarm Add automatic detection and alarm
74 m 74 m 63 m 63 m
90 m 90 m 75 m 75 m
Actual allowable travel distance depends Actual allowable travel distance depends
upon the height of the ceiling upon the height of the ceiling
Overall travel distance limited to 90 m Overall travel distance limited to 75 m
Total stair width required less than Total stair width required less than
scenario B scenario B
Buro Happold
Where guidance affects the entire building, the most onerous recommendation
relating to the occupying risk profiles should be adopted throughout the
building. The following are examples of such design recommendations within
BS 9999:
Where guidance affects the immediate locality of the risk profile, each space
should be assessed independently to determine the recommendations relevant
to the associated risk profile. This assessment should also include any allowable
variations as these are dependent upon both the risk profile and the geometry
of the space. The following are examples of such design recommendations
within BS 9999:
travel distances;
horizontal escape route widths.
Escape stair widths will often link different risk profiles and will require both
local and overall checks to assess the requirements.
Key points
A minimum level of management is expected for each risk profile within
BS 9999, with some necessitating higher levels than others. This minimum
expectation should be communicated to the intended user, to their
representative or to those who will eventually co-ordinate the design with
the building operator/end user/client.
Minimum levels of fire detection, alarm and emergency escape lighting
coverage are expected within BS 9999, with the extent being dependent
upon the risk profile.
Table 6 highlights the minimum fire protection measures that are
necessary for each risk profile.
The addition of sprinklers improves safety, changes the risk profile and
therefore might allow reduced minimum fire protection measures.
Where the minimum fire protection measures cannot be provided, a fire
engineering approach should be adopted (refer to Figure 2).
Background
For every risk profile there is a minimum package of fire protection measures
and a related management level that is necessary to ensure sufficient time for
escape in the event of a fire. It is a basic requirement that will allow the design
parameters for means of escape, construction, etc. to be adopted. The total
package of fire protection measures for each of the risk profiles is summarized
in Table 6 and represents the minimum necessary to allow the use of the
BS 9999 approach.
The type and extent of fire detection and alarm is dependent on the risk profile.
In premises where occupants are awake and the fire growth rate is low then it
may be acceptable to rely on manual detection. Where the fire growth rate is
high, or occupants are asleep, fire and smoke spread may adversely affect
Compartmentation
Management level
emergency escape
Building structure
Type M, L3, L2, L1
Means of escape
Areas needing
Risk profile
BS 5839-1
lighting
A1 M Underground or windowless 3A)
accommodation
A2 M 2
Stairways in a central core
A3 L2 or serving storey(s) more 1
A4 N/A than 18 m above ground N/A
Internal corridors more than
30 m long
Open-plan areas of more
than 60 m2
B1 M All escape routes, including 2
external routes (except in
B2 M 2
shops of three or fewer
B3 L2 storeys with no sales floor 1
See Chapter 6
See Chapter 8
See Chapter 8
more than 280 m2 provided
B4 N/A N/A
that the shop is not a
restaurant or bar)
Ci1 Au/tomatic All common escape routes, 2
fire detection including external routes,
in individual except in two-storey blocks
units of flats
Ci2 Automatic 1
fire detection
in individual
units
Ci3 L3 1
Cii1 L2 2
Cii2 L2 1
Cii3 L1 1
Ciii1 L1 2
Compartmentation
Management level
emergency escape
Building structure
Type M, L3, L2, L1
Means of escape
Areas needing
Risk profile
BS 5839-1
Ciii2 L1 lighting
All common escape routes, 1
including external routes,
Ciii3 L1 1
except in two-storey blocks
C4 N/A of flats N/A
Generally All sanitary accommodation
See Chapter 6
See Chapter 8
See Chapter 8
for any with a floor area over 8 m2.
use Windowless sanitary
accommodation with a
floor area not more than
8 m2. Electricity and
generator rooms. Switch
room/battery room for
emergency lighting system.
Emergency control room
A)
Level 3 provides a very basic level of management and in some instances may not be
adequate to meet other legislative requirements, i.e. the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety)
Order in England and Wales.
occupants remote from the area of origin of the fire, and automatic detection
and alarm are necessary to ensure sufficient time for escape in the event of a
fire. The provision of voice and/or visual alarms within buildings containing
occupancy characteristic B is not necessarily required as a minimum although it
can help to reduce evacuation time.
The lighting of escape routes should be such that occupants can move safely
along the required escape routes during an emergency. It should be designed to
operate during failure of the normal power supply.
Access and facilities for fire-fighting are not currently aligned to the risk
profiles although this could happen at a future time. However, in carrying out
a fire-fighting risk assessment for a particular building some consideration could
reasonably be given to the risk profile and the associated fire protection measures
as part of the assessment.
These additional measures affect only the means of escape design and are
therefore described in more detail in Chapter 6.
Key points
A building should be designed such that it can be managed, and therefore
fire safety management should be a consideration right from the early
stages.
Management levels are dependent upon occupant characteristics and fire
loading and therefore form part of the minimum fire protection measures
associated with a risk profile (refer to Table 6).
There are three management levels in BS 9999, levels 1, 2 and 3; level 1 is
the highest (with expectation of empowerment and resource) and level 3
is the lowest.
There are several key factors that must be taken into account when
deciding upon a management level, and these are outlined in Table 7.
The client should develop a fire safety policy to inform the designers and
contractors of their fire safety requirements.
Designers and/or contractors are responsible (e.g. requirement under
Regulation 16B of the Building Regulations in England and Wales) for
providing all fire safety related design and as-built information on project
completion such that clients can incorporate it within their fire safety
manual.
The client should produce a fire safety manual to integrate the fire safety
policy, the information provided by the designers and/or contractor, and
the proposed operational organization and plan. This will contribute to
any risk assessment required under current UK legislation, e.g. The
Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order in England and Wales.
Background
It is a fundamental assumption that the measures described in BS 9999 will
require management and maintenance throughout the life of the building.
Once the designer and/or contractor have handed over the building then good
management of fire safety becomes the key element to fire safety throughout
the life of the building. It is therefore essential and safer if management
activities are explicit and are used positively rather than undervaluing what good
management can deliver.
Managing fire safety refers to a whole process throughout the life of a building,
starting with the initial design, which is intended both to minimize the incidence
of fire and to ensure that, when a fire does occur, appropriate fire safety systems
(including active, passive and procedural systems) are in place and are fully
functional. The management of fire safety is thus an essential element in
averting disaster in the event of a fire. Although many buildings will never have
a serious life-threatening fire, it is essential for fire safety procedures to be
planned for every building. It is now widely acknowledged that effective
management of fire safety, system maintenance, staff training, etc. is integral to
the design and engineering for life safety throughout the life of a building.
Management levels
In BS 9999, the standard or quality of management is referred to as the
management level. There are three management levels: level 1 which provides
the highest level of management; level 2 which provides a normally acceptable
level of management; and level 3 which provides a very basic level of
management.
In the UK, the management for fire safety has been present for some time now, but
there is still not sufficient confidence to use a management level as an additional
measure as defined by BS 9999 at this point in time. Nevertheless the step taken to
include management levels in BS 9999 is very important in emphasizing the value of
management for delivering improved fire safety. However, looking forward, with
increased experience and the application of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety)
Order in England and Wales, the recognition of fire safety management as an
additional benefit is a goal for the future. With the appropriate risk assessment,
fire safety management can be part of a fire safety engineered approach.
Where the designer is aware of the management systems that will be adopted
in the premises upon occupation, they can be taken into account in the fire
safety design strategy. Where the management systems are not known, the
designer will need to specify the management level that is appropriate for the
design. During the life of a building the management level may need to be
changed to reflect new circumstances or a change of risk profile.
31
32
Table 7 Key factors used in assessing management levels (contd)
logging and audit processes, and system and logging and audit
routine checking and supervision. processes.
33
Managing fire safety design, occupation and construction
For example, where reductions in management levels from those adopted within
the original design strategy are proposed, there will be a need to re-evaluate the
fire safety strategy for its continued viability. Similarly, changes to the building
layout might require changes to the management procedures. This is a legal
duty for the employer, building owner or occupier under the Regulatory Reform
(Fire Safety) Order.
the client developing a fire safety policy to inform the client brief;
providing a level of management that is consistent with the risk profile;
designing and constructing a building that complies with the client brief;
the operator/end user/client procuring and owning an up-to-date fire safety
manual, which reflects the original design intent and any subsequent
changes to the building or use.
The interaction of the above points during the design and construction process
is highlighted in Figure 4 as is the associated legislation that drives them. The
way that buildings are procured and delivered to the eventual user varies
considerably as do the parties that are responsible for delivering the various
components highlighted in Figure 4. Therefore, the leader of the design,
procurement and operational stages needs to be aware of the main requirements
so that they can be passed on effectively throughout the process as different
parties get involved.
Operational
As-built fire safety organization and
information plan
Fire
safety
manual
Risk
assessment
Building Regulations
During the design and construction stages of a project, the fire safety design
strategy should be continually reviewed, and regularly documented, such that
at project completion, up-to-date documentation is available for incorporation
into the fire safety manual by the client. In addition to the fire safety design
strategy, it is the responsibility of the designers and/or contractor (e.g. required
by Regulation 16B of the Building Regulations in England and Wales) to provide
all other necessary as-built fire safety-related information, i.e. systems and equipment
manuals, etc., to the client for incorporation into the fire safety manual.
The following outlines a potential structure for the development of the fire
safety manual document:
c evacuation planning;
c assessment against fire safety policy.
4. Review and maintenance of fire safety manual; including
c building alterations;
c changes in staff duties and training;
c responses to incidents.
The fire safety manual should form part of the information package that contributes
to any fire risk assessment that might need to be carried out, i.e. under the
Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order in England and Wales. The fire safety
manual, its contents, use and upkeep should conform to the recommendations
given in BS 9999: Annex H.
Key points
The occupancy characteristics, fire growth rate and risk profile are
fundamental to the design for means of escape (refer to Chapter 2).
The recommended travel distances and width per person for escape
routes are only applicable when the minimum fire protection measures
are provided (refer to Tables 9, 10 and 12).
High ceilings and additional fire protection measures, such as automatic
fire detection and alarm, allow variations to the recommended travel
distances and escape width.
The percentage variations should be summed and checked against the
allowable limits for travel distance and escape width.
The addition of sprinklers improves safety, changes the risk profile and
therefore allows increased travel distances and reduced escape widths.
Where the proposed means of escape design will not meet with the
recommendations of the standard, a fire engineering approach should be
adopted (refer to Figure 2).
Background
The package of fire precautions provided for a building should reflect the nature
of the use of the building, the occupants, processes, materials stored and used,
and the fire safety management provided (see also Chapter 5). Risk profiles
provide a basis against which the risk to occupants can be assessed and the
appropriate level of fire precautions determined. See Table 6 for the process
linking risk profile to design for means of escape.
Reasonable facilities for means of escape in fire are necessary to limit the
distance travelled by occupants directly at risk from the fire and the smoke, and
subsequently structural fire precautions are required to safeguard escape routes.
In densely occupied spaces the critical condition will be queuing so the width of
exit doors, corridors and stairs will be the primary concern. In lightly occupied
spaces the critical factor will be the distances to the exits. Escape routes from a
storey should be sited so that a person confronted by fire can go around the
source if distances are short or otherwise turn away from the fire and take a safe
route through an alternative exit.
The basic assumption is that no reliance should be placed on fire and rescue
services. Special consideration will be necessary in certain institutional buildings
where assistance from staff may be necessary. Additional consideration will also
be necessary for people with disabilities.
The guidance in Chapter 5 enables the allocation of the risk profile appropriate
for the intended use of a given building, which is in effect the first stage of risk
assessment to align the building design with the intended operation. Associated
with each risk profile is a package of fire protection measures that are consistent
with the risks associated with the particular occupancy characteristic and the fire
growth rate (Table 6). Similarly for each risk profile a set of means of escape
design rules need to be applied as summarized in this chapter.
Planning for means of escape has a major impact on a building design, and so
serious consideration needs to be given to identify the most appropriate strategy
to adopt. The range of options can include the following, which is not exhaustive:
The development of the building plan and design for means of escape is an
integrated exercise that can be facilitated flexibly by providing additional fire
protection measures as set out by the standard. The choice of internal subdivisions
(compartments, partitions, atria, etc.) within a building align to the spatial/visual
planning and will clearly have an impact on the design for means of escape, so
early consideration will deliver considerable benefit to the design process.
Particular points to note in relation to the design for means of escape include:
identification of any high-risk fire areas that need special consideration see
BS 9999: Clauses 13.6 and 15.2
Yes
Option 1 Add Option 2 Add
sprinklers and review additional fire
the risk profile (see Design OK protection measures
Chapter 3) and repeat process
(see Chapter 4)
Buro Happold
Figure 6 illustrates the broad relationship that exists between the pre-movement
time during the available safe escape time (see Figure 7) and influences such as
the size of a room, the fire growth rate and the complexity of a space. Warning
and alarm systems will have relatively little impact on smaller spaces and where
the fire and smoke are clearly apparent. However, warning and alarm clearly
become more important as the size and the complexity of a space increases.
Base of smoke
layer as fire
develops
Medium
Fast
Pre-movement
Small rooms time
Medium rooms
Large rooms
Buro Happold
The time taken for people to start to move and escape (i.e. the pre-movement
time) is likely to be shorter if the fire is growing quickly and smoke or flames
become apparent, or are detected sooner.
If a room is small, the time taken to react to a fire is clearly very short, as the
smoke fill time is very quick, and, so movement is more likely to begin during
the incubation stage of a fire. (See Figure 6.)
Pre-movement Allowable
time travel time
Actual
travel time
Time line
Occupants become Incubation period of
aware of fire by alarm fire following ignition
or by observation of fire Fire continues to
and/or smoke grow with time
Figure 7 Fire growth, means of escape and travel time (adapted from
Figure 1, BS 9999)
In medium and large spaces, the time to recognize the risks associated with a
fire will depend on the fire growth rate. Small slow-growing fires will not be
seen or detected as a risk as quickly as fast growing fires.
The more complex a space (in terms of its shape or due to obstructions) the
longer the time will be before a fire is recognized as a risk particularly by the
people who are farthest away from the fire. Those people closest may well
start moving sooner.
For rooms with high ceilings, it is permissible to increase the travel distance and
decrease the door width, corridor width and stair width, provided that the
increase/decrease is no more than the percentages given in Table 8 and that the
entire escape route, with the exception of protected corridors and protected
lobbies, has a high ceiling. This flexibility is appropriate only when a full account
is taken of the risk presented, i.e. position, height and nature of fire load.
Travel distance
The travel distance should generally not exceed the values given in Table 9
for the appropriate risk profile. Note that Table 9 has two columns; the first
recommends travel distances where the minimum fire protection measures are
provided and the second places a maximum if additional fire protection
measures have been provided to increase travel distances.
Note that the absolute minimum width of doors and corridors is 800 mm and
1,200 mm, respectively, irrespective of the calculated width.
The minimum width of an escape stair when additional fire protection measures
have been provided to decrease escape widths should be not less than each of
the following:
Risk Minimum width of stair per person served over total number of floors served
profile mm
1 floor 2 floors 3 floors 4 floors 5 floors 6 floors 7 floors 8 floors 9 floors 10+ floors
A1 3.90 3.40 2.95 2.45 2.15 2.00 1.80 1.70 1.50 1.40
A2 4.50 3.80 3.25 2.75 2.45 2.20 2.00 1.90 1.70 1.60
NOTE The widths of stairs have been calculated on the assumption that all floors are evacuating simultaneously. This is
conservative, as the occupants on the fire floor are likely to move more quickly than those on the other floors..
Design for means of escape
49
Design for means of escape
Table 13 Examples of typical floor space factors (BS 9999: Table 10)
Table 13 Examples of typical floor space factors (BS 9999: Table 10)
(contd)
B
E
45
A
<45 D
Alternative routes are available from C because angle ACB is 45 or more, and therefore
CA or CB (whichever is the less) should be no more than the maximum distance for
travel given for alternative routes.
Alternative routes are not available from D because angle ADB is less than 45. There is
also no alternative route from E.
a) Option 1
D
45
A
Angle ABD should be at least 45. CBA or CBD (whichever is less) should be no more
than the maximum distance of travel given for alternative routes, and CB should be no
more than the maximum distance for travel where there are no alternative routes.
NOTE The use of dashed lines is to aid use of the diagrams and does not have any
other significance.
Inner rooms
An inner room is an enclosed space that has only one escape route that passes
through another room (access room) before reaching a corridor or storey/final
exit. Consequently, an inner room can be at risk if a fire starts in the access
room. Therefore, in order to minimize the risk associated with an inner room,
A B 2
1 3
Key
1 Room with alternative exits
2 Access room
3 Inner room
A needs no special provision.
B should conform to the design recommendations above.
the occupant capacity of the inner room does not exceed 60 (30 where the
occupants require assistance to escape);
the inner room is not a bedroom;
the inner room is entered directly from the access room;
the escape route from the inner room does not pass through more than one
access room;
the travel distance from any point in the inner room to the exit(s) from the
access room does not exceed the allowable one-way travel distance;
the access room is not a place of special fire hazard and is in the control of
the same occupier as the inner room;
one of the following arrangements is made:
c the enclosures (walls or partitions) of the inner room are stopped at least
500 mm below the ceiling; or
c a suitably sited vision panel not less than 0.1 m2 is located in the door or
walls of the inner room, to enable occupants of the inner room to see
whether a fire has started in the outer room; or
c the access room is protected by an automatic smoke detector that
operates either an alarm that is audible in the inner room, to a sound
pressure level (typically measured in dB) in accordance with the minimum
recommended in BS 5839-1, or gives a visual indication in the inner room
if the ambient noise levels are so great as to make an alarm inaudible.
1 1
1 1
1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
2 1
1
1 1
Key
1 Self-closing fire door
2 Fire-resisting construction (same fire resistance as protected corridor)
Protected corridor
NOTE Recommendations for fire resistance of fire doors (FD) and protected corridors
are given in BS 9999: Clause 32.1
Dead-end corridors
All corridors serving a dead-end greater than 2 m should be protected with fire
resisting construction. In addition, all dead-end corridors greater than 4.5 m
that are connected to more than one storey exit should be subdivided from the
remainder of the corridor by fire doors (illustrated in Figure 10). Note that
where the corridor and any adjoining escape stairs are protected with a smoke
control system using pressure differentials, then the latter recommendation for
subdividing fire doors can be omitted.
2 2
3 3
4 4 4
Key
1 Compartment wall
2 Fire door (equivalent to storey exit)
3 Storey exit
4 Compartment
NOTE Travel distance limits apply to storey exits in compartment walls.
The ideal methods of evacuation for disabled people are horizontal evacuation
to the outside of the building or to another fire compartment, or vertical
evacuation by lift.
Normal lifts should not typically be used for general evacuation, but in some
situations they may be used for the evacuation of disabled people where a
suitable fire risk assessment is undertaken to evaluate whether the lift meets the
functional recommendations of an evacuation lift. The risk assessment should
1 Dimensions in millimetres
1,800
2
1,800
A
1
1 Key
2 1 Accommodation
2 Stair
1,800
Fire-resisting construction
B
1
take into account all the features of fire protection in a building. For example in
a building with automatic sprinklers and significant compartmentation or smoke
control, a risk assessment might conclude that a non-evacuation lift would be
usable in the initial stages of a fire. Alternatively, specific evacuation lift(s) can
be provided within a building. Refer to BS 9999: Clause 46 and BS 9999: Annex
G for further guidance.
Where suitable lifts are not available then it might be necessary to carry disabled
people up or down the escape stair. The management plan of a building should
identify the procedure to be used and staff should be adequately trained.
1 2
3
4
m
5
1.8
6
7
5
a) Example 1
A 1.8 m
1.8 m
B B
A 5
Plan
1
1.8 m
3
m
1.8
6
8
7
Section AA Section BB
b) Example 2
Key
1 No fire resistance needed for door
2 Window with 30 min fire-resisting construction
3 1,100 mm zone above top landing
4 1,800 mm zone of fire-resisting construction at side of stair
5 Self-closing fire door with 30 min fire-resisting construction
6 6 m maximum height of stair without weather protection
7 Ground level or a roof or podium served by an independent stairway
8 9 m zone of fire-resisting construction below stair
Where more than one escape route is available from a storey or part of a
building and at least one of those escape routes is via an internal escape stair,
other escape routes may be by way of an external escape stair providing they
meet the recommendations illustrated in Figure 13.
* Note
The angle is that formed by the external face of the stair and the adjacent accomodation = 0 is
where the external face of the stair and the faade enclosing the accomodation are directly in line.
Key points
The recommendations for access and facilities for fire-fighting are
independent of the risk profile concept. Where it is proposed to vary the
provisions from those recommended within the standard, it is essential
that early liaison and agreement is obtained from the fire and rescue
service.
Fire-fighting shafts, including lifts, should be provided within all buildings
over 18 m in height.
Additionally, fire-fighting shafts should be provided in shops, factories
and assembly and recreation buildings >7.5 m in height and having floor
areas "900 m2.
Buildings between 11 m and 18 m in height and not meeting the previous
point, should be provided with lobby protected escape stairs and internal
fire mains.
Fire-fighting shafts should be installed in basements of at least two
storeys, each having floor areas "900 m2. Fire-fighting lifts should be
installed in basements deeper than 10 m.
In buildings where internal fire mains are not provided, access to the
perimeter of the building should be provided and be appropriate to the
aggregate floor area of the building.
Fire mains within buildings over 50 m in height should be of the wet type.
All shafts containing fire-fighting lifts should be designed to keep lift wells
free from water; this may include sloped floor/raised thresholds and/or
drainage channels at landing level or within the lift pit.
Fire-fighting shafts serving buildings greater than 30 m above, or 10 m
below, Fire service access level should be protected by a pressurization
system. All other fire fighting shafts should be provided with adequate
natural smoke ventilation (refer to BS 9999: Clause 28.2 for further details).
Smoke and heat ventilation should be provided on all basement storeys
that have a floor area >200 m2 and are >3 m below adjacent grade level.
Smoke clearance for fire-fighting should be provided in all atria not
provided with a smoke control system (see Chapter 9).
Refer to BS 9999: Annex E for additional requirements relating to
shopping complexes.
Background
The layout and design of a building should not only consider the escape of
occupants from within, but also the ability of firefighters to enter and undertake
fire-fighting operations in a reasonable period of time. The provisions needed to
provide appropriate access depend upon the size and complexity of the
building.
For low-rise buildings (up to three to four storeys) appropriate access can be
provided via the perimeter. However, as buildings with large floor plates
approach medium to high-rise or contain deep basements then access from
solely the exterior is not practical and internal fire-fighting is necessary.
with the fire service to achieve the right pragmatic balance between active and
passive fire protection measures while respecting the historic surroundings.
All elevations to which vehicle access is necessary should have a door(s) not less
than 750 mm wide allowing entry to the interior of the building. Doors should
be located on the elevation such that there is no more than 60 m between each
door and/or the end of that elevation.
The specification of fire vehicle access routes and hardstandings should meet
the recommendations of BS 9999: Clause 22.3.
NOTE 1 In the case of storage buildings, height should be measured to mean roof
level.
A)
The total floor area is the aggregate of the floor areas of all the storeys in the
building.
B)
Pump = pumping appliance; high-reach = aerial appliance, e.g. turntable ladder
or hydraulic platform.
C)
Perimeter refers to the face of the total length of all exposed perimeter walls.
>50 m
Sprinklers recommended in buildings >30 m
in height.
>18 m
11 m
>7.5 m
Fire
service
access
level
Depth
below
> 10 m
Key
NOTES
1. The number of fire-fighting shafts should be provided such that every part of the
floor plate is within the maximum hose distance requirements from the fire main
outlet; 45 m for escape stairs and 60 m for fire-fighting shafts, and at least two
fire-fighting shafts should be provided within buildings with a storey of 900 m or
2
more in area.
2. Buildings not covered within the above figure should be provided with adequate
perimeter access (refer to BS 9999: Clause 22).
3. Existing buildings, in particular historic buildings, may have difficulty incorporating
the above recommended internal fire-fighting measures; therefore, alternative fire
engineering solutions may be adopted. However, early consultation with the local
fire service is recommended if an alternative needs to be adopted.
Where a fire-fighting shaft is recommended within Figure 14, then the layout
and fire resistance of the shaft construction should follow the principles outlined
in Figure 15. There are other recommendations within the standard on the
robustness of the construction, refer to BS 9999: Clause 21.2.5.
The layout of any fire-fighting shaft at access level should be such that firefighters
can either enter directly from the open air or by way of a protected corridor not
exceeding 18 m in length. Firefighters accessing the building should not obstruct
escaping occupants; therefore where an access route is shared with escaping
occupants it should be 500 mm wider than that necessary for means of escape
purposes (to allow room for fire and rescue service personnel to move towards
the fire-fighting shaft).
Lifts designated for the use of firefighters can also serve the general building
population during non-emergency conditions. However, such lifts require
enhancement above a standard lift installation, such as protected power
supplies, protection from water ingress, etc., so that it can continue to operate
during emergency conditions. Therefore all lifts designated for firefighter use
should meet the recommendations of BS EN 81: Part 72, and BS EN 81: Part 1
or BS EN 81: Part 2 as appropriate for the particular type of lift. Further
guidance is provided by BS 9999: Clause 21.3.4.
1 1
500 mm 500 mm
2
3 5
4
4 2
5 6
5m
6
7
8
7
8
a) Example 1 b) Example 2
4 5 4 5
2 2
6 6
5m
5m
5m
7 7 8
8
c) Example 3 d) Example 4
Key
1 Openable areas
2 Fire door with 30 min fire resistance with smoke seal
3 Fire-fighting lobby
4 Fire main
5 Fire door with 30 min fire resistance without smoke seal
6 Fire-fighting lift
7 Accommodation
8 Fire door with 60 min fire resistance with smoke seal
Minimum fire resistance of 1 h from both sides
Minimum fire resistance of 2 h from outside the fire-fighting shaft and 1 h from
inside the fire-fighting shaft
Minimum fire resistance of 2 h from accommodation
contain the status and override controls for all key fire protection systems.
Further guidance on the design and content of fire control centres is provided in
BS 9999: Clause 25.
Natural smoke vents can be installed, provided that they are sited at high
level, are evenly distributed and are equivalent to not less than 2.5 per cent of
the floor area of each storey. The location of the smoke vents should be such
that they do not prevent the use of escape routes from the building and that
each compartment within a basement is served independently, i.e. doors
between compartments should not serve as part of the route to external air.
Key points
The occupancy characteristics, fire growth rate and the risk profile, are
fundamental to the fire resistance for the building structure (refer to Chapter 2).
Recommendations for minimum fire resistance periods for the relevant
construction component are contained in Table 15.
The availability of natural ventilation (windows and other non-protected
areas) on the building perimeter affects the recommended fire resistance
period. Where Table 15 refers to Table 16 for the recommended fire
resistance period the room/space must meet the ventilation conditions in
Table 17, otherwise further guidance from BS 9999 is required (see Figure 16).
Maximum dimensions of compartments should meet the
recommendations in Table 18.
The addition of sprinklers improves safety and changes the risk profile,
and therefore allows reduced fire resistance periods and increased
compartment limits.
All buildings with an occupied storey >30 m above access level should
incorporate compartment floors and be protected throughout with
automatic sprinklers.
Where the proposed construction design will not meet with the
recommendations of the standard, a fire engineering approach should be
adopted (refer to Figure 2).
Background
The fire performance of the building construction during a fire, for a reasonable
period of time, is essential to protect the occupants, the firefighters and those
external to the building who may be at risk from falling debris. This provision for
life safety clearly has a favourable impact on property protection, but specific
risk assessments will be required if there are particular needs for additional
protection. As with all fires, there is considerable benefit for life safety, reducing
insurance risk and property protection if whole-life consideration is given to the
management provision to reduce the chances of a fire starting and growing.
There are a range of factors that have an influence on the fire resistance
requirement depending on the consequences of failure. The fire growth rate
and the occupancy type, which are the two primary factors that drive the choice
of risk profile, plus the height and scale of a building, all have an impact on the
fire resistance requirement. Sprinklers in many cases will have a beneficial
impact and will allow a reduction in the fire resistance performance of the
structure while maintaining the required standard.
The performance criteria that may need to be met, depending on the nature of
the structural element, vary according to the circumstances, but the following
are typical of the majority of buildings.
In some large, high or complex structures there will be a need to look beyond
the simplistic approach associated with single elements of structure such as
beams or columns. This is to make sure that there are no particular sensitive
elements of structure that could cause a disproportionate collapse during a fire.
The structural/fire engineer should be able to provide an overview of the stability
and the robustness of the structure during fire to aid this assessment. Conversely
there may be elements of structure that are required during normal day-to-day
use to reduce vibration or deflection that are redundant during a fire and thus
may not need to have fire resistance. The detail of this is beyond the scope of
BS 9999 but it will be important to establish when that boundary has been
reached as part of the design process. For further background reference can be
made to the following documents:
The above approach has led to the inclusion of two additional height categories,
11 m and 60 m, compared with the typical guidance within Approved Document
B. This has introduced benefit to the following buildings:
three and four storey buildings that typically had to meet the same
recommendations as five and six storey buildings;
9 to 16 storey buildings that typically had to meet the same
recommendations as a building that was substantially higher.
BS 9999 includes two tables that provide recommended fire resistance periods
for buildings; one table is based upon the engineering approach discussed
above, and the second table, which originates from Table A2 of Approved
Document B, is for use where recommended ventilation conditions are not
achieved. Figure 16 illustrates the route necessary for determining the applicable
fire resistance period.
In addition to the overall fire resistance requirements described above, there are
further requirements and guidance on measures to prevent the spread of fire
and smoke through cavities, for the fire properties of internal linings, external
walls and roof surfaces. Also the design of ductwork systems, including
dampers, details for doors, hardware, cavity barriers, recommendations for
engineering services and spread of fire between buildings are also covered in the
standard.
Yes
Yes No
Buro Happold
Part of building Minimum provisions when tested to the relevant parts of BS 476 or Method of exposure
the relevant European standard, in minutesA)
Load-bearing capacity Integrity Insulation
Structural frame, * Not applicable Not applicable Exposed faces
beam or column
73
74
Table 15 Minimum fire resistance performance (BS 9999: Table 24) (contd)
Part of building Minimum provisions when tested to the relevant parts of BS 476 or Method of exposure
the relevant European standard, in minutesA)
Load-bearing capacity Integrity Insulation
Any part 1 m or more * * 15 From inside the
from the relevant building
boundaryD)
Any part adjacent to an 30 30 No provisionE) From inside the
external escape route building
Compartment wall
Designing the building structure
75
76
Table 15 Minimum fire resistance performance (BS 9999: Table 24) (contd)
Part of building Minimum provisions when tested to the relevant parts of BS 476 or Method of exposure
the relevant European standard, in minutesA)
Load-bearing capacity Integrity Insulation
Subdivision of a corridor 30 30 30E) Each side separately
Fire-resisting
construction
Enclosing communal 30 30 30E) Each side separately
areas in sheltered
housing
Designing the building structure
77
78
Table 16 Fire resistance periods for elements of structure (based on the ventilation conditions)
(BS 9999: Table 26)
Risk profile Minimum periods of fire resistance, in minutesA)
Height of top occupied storey above access level
Not more Not more than Not more than Not more than Not more than More
than 5 m 11 m 18 m 30 m 60 m than 60 m
A1 15 30 30 60 75 90
A2 30B) 30 60 90 120 150
A3 60 60 90 120 300 300
Designing the building structure
79
Designing the building structure
1
2
1
30 m
3
4
3
4
None of the floors in this case would need to be In a building over 30 m in height,
compartment floors, but the two storeys exceeding all storeys should be separated
2,000 m2 would need to be divided into by compartment floors. For advice
compartments not more than 2,000 m2 by on the special conditions in atrium
compartment walls. buildings see Chapter 9.
NOTE The compartment walls in this example
do not need to be in one vertical plane.
Only the floor of the ground storey need All basement storeys should be
be a compartment floor if the lower separated by compartment floors if
basement is at a depth of not more any storey is at a depth of more
than 10 m. than 10 m.
Key
1 Storey not exceeding 2,000 m2
2 Roof
3 Compartment wall
4 Storey exceeding 2,000 m2 divided by compartment wall
Compartmentation
It may be necessary to restrict the spread of fire by separating one or more
areas of the building from adjacent areas and creating individual fire-protected
compartments. This may be necessary horizontally and/or vertically and can be
dependent upon several features of the building layout such as:
The provision of fire doors to protect openings within such construction should
meet the recommendations in Table 19. Note that all doors having a suffix S
should adequately resist the passage of cold smoke (refer to BS 9999: Clause
33.1.7 for further guidance).
3
Except occupancy characteristic Ci where the ground floor and basement storey immediately below is
part of the same unit (i.e. same occupancy), buildings comprising only one basement storey and two
other storeys each having a floor area !280 m2 or the ground floor is penetrated by an atrium that
meets the recommendations of Chapter 9.
All other openings within fire resisting construction should be protected with a
suitable proprietary device tested in accordance with the appropriate British
Standard. Refer to BS 9999: Clause 33 for further guidance.
The external surfaces of walls should meet the recommendations in Figure 19.
Values in minutes
Position of door Minimum fire resistance of door in terms of
integrity
When tested in When tested in
accordance with accordance with
BS 476-22 BS EN 1634-1
1 In a compartment wall As for the wall in which As for the wall in which
separating buildings door is fitted, but not the door is fitted, but
less than 60 min not less than 60 min
2 In a compartment wall:
a if it separates a flatfrom FD 30S E 30 Sa
a space in common use
b enclosing a protected FD 30S E 30 Sa
shaft forming a
stairway situated wholly
or partly above the
adjoining ground in
occupancy characteristic
A (office only), B, Ci, Cii
and Ciii buildings
c enclosing a protected Half the period of fire Half the period of fire
shaft forming a resistance of the wall in resistance of the wall
stairway not described which it is fitted but not in which it is fitted but
in 2b) less than 30 min and not less than 30 min
with suffix SC) minimum and with
suffix SaC)
d enclosing a protected Half the period of fire Half the period of fire
shaft forming a lift or resistance of the wall in resistance of the wall in
service shaft which it is fitted but not which it is fitted but not
less than 30 min less than 30 min
e not described in 2a), As for the wall it is As for the wall it is
2b), 2c) or 2d) fitted in, but with suffix fitted in, but add SaC) if
S if the door is used for the door is used for
progressive horizontal progressive horizontal
evacuation evacuation
3 In a compartment floor As for the floor in which As for the floor in which
it is fitted it is fitted
Values in minutes
Position of door Minimum fire resistance of door in terms of
integrity
When tested in When tested in
accordance with accordance with
BS 476-22 BS EN 1634-1
4 Forming part of the
enclosure of:
a a protected stairway FD 30S E 30 Sa
(except where described
in item 10)
b the separation between FD 30S E 30 Sa
upward and downward
flights of a basement
stair (see Section 5)
c lift shaft, which does FD 30 E 30
not form a protected
shaft in 2b), 2c) or 2d)
5 Forming part of the
enclosures of:
a a protected lobby FD 30S E 30 Sa
approach (or protected
corridor) to a stairway,
except for a
fire-fighting stair
b any other protected FD 20S E 20 Sa
corridor, or
c a protected lobby FD 30S E 30 Sa
approach to a lift shaft
6 Forming part of the
enclosures of:
a evacuation lifts or FD 30S E 30 Sa
refuges, except for lift
landing doors
b evacuation lifts, where FD 30 E 30
the door is a lift landing
door
7 Affording access to an FD 30 E 30
external escape route
Values in minutes
Position of door Minimum fire resistance of door in terms of
integrity
When tested in When tested in
accordance with accordance with
BS 476-22 BS EN 1634-1
8 Subdividing:
a corridors connecting FD 20S E 20 Sa
alternative exits
b dead-end portions of FD 20S E 20 Sa
corridors from the
remainder of the corridor
9 Any door:
a within a cavity barrier FD 30 E 30
b forming part of FD 30S E 20 Sa
the enclosure to a
communal area in
sheltered housing
10 Any door:
a forming part of the FD 20 E 20
enclosure to a protected
entrance hall or protected
landing in a flat
b within any other fire- FD 20 E 20
resisting construction in
dwelling accommodation
not described elsewhere
in this table
1 2
4m 4m
..........
4m
1.5 m
1.5 m
1 1
Key
1 Unrestricted
2 External wall of shaft that is enclosed by a minimum of 60 min fire resistance from
the accommodation side
3 Compartment boundaries
Represents an unprotected area of not more than 1 m2 which may consist of
two or more smaller areas within an area of 1,000 mm 1,000 mm
Represents an area of not more than 0.1m2
1 1 3
2
>1 m >1 m
>1 m
<1 m
5
4 4
<1 m 6
<1 m
>1 m >1 m
NOTE 2 When a classification includes s3, d2, this means that there is no limit set for
smoke production and/or flaming droplets/particles.
Key
1 Building height <18 m
2 Up to 10 m above ground level
3 Up to 10 m above a roof or any part of the building to which the public has access
4 Building height 18 m or more
5 Portion of building more than 18 m above ground level
6 Portion of building up to 18 m above ground level
Relevant boundary
No provision in respect of the boundaries indicated
Class 0 (national class) or class B-S3, d2 or better (European class). Profiled or
flat steel sheet at least 0.5 mm thick with an organic coating of no more than
0.2 mm thickness is also acceptable.
Index (I) not more than 20 (national class) or class C-s3, d2 or better (European
class). Timber cladding at least 9 mm thick is also acceptable. (The index I
relates to tests specified in BS 476-6.)
Key points
Design solutions are not applicable to the following:
c buildings intended to confine occupants;
c theatres, cinemas and similar venues (see Chapter 10);
c shopping malls (see Chapter 11);
c small premises and buildings with occupancy characteristics A and B
containing an atrium uniting only two storeys and designed for
simultaneous evacuation.
It is not necessary to separate any below-ground and above-ground
sections of an atrium.
Phased evacuation should be used only where occupied floors are
separated from atria by imperforate construction (smoke and/or fire
resisting); simultaneous evacuation should be used in all other cases.
Escape routes should not need to pass within 4.5 m of the atrium edge
unless occupants are protected by either imperforate construction (smoke
and/or fire resisting) or a smoke control system.
Smoke-resisting construction should be used only where smoke
temperatures are controlled by sprinklers and/or smoke control systems.
Control of fire loads on the atrium base, without sprinklers, can be
achieved by limiting fire load areas to !10 m2 and separating them by at
least 4 m from adjacent fire loads.
A smoke control system should be provided in buildings with occupancy
characteristic A where phased evacuation is adopted or the height
exceeds 30 m, and in all buildings with occupancy characteristic B. The
type of smoke control system is dependent upon the method of
separation between the atria and the adjoining floor areas.
Smoke clearance for fire-fighting should be provided in all atria not
provided with a smoke control system and based upon the following:
c natural vents within atria !18 m, equivalent to 10 per cent of the atrium
plan area;
c mechanically ventilated to six air changes per hour in atria of any height
where the building is not sprinkler protected, equivalent to the volume
of the atrium and the largest floor open to the atrium;
Background
The inclusion of atria within buildings results in the connection of multiple
storeys such that smoke from a fire on any storey, or in the atrium base, could
potentially spread via the atria and present a hazard to occupants that are
remote from the storey of fire origin. The majority of smoke from a fire on a
storey open to an atrium will spread directly into the atrium; the development
of the smoke layer on the storey of fire origin is reduced leading to an increase
in the time available for escape on the storey of fire origin. As the smoke rises
through the atrium, it entrains large quantities of clean ambient air increasing
the volume but also diluting the concentration of smoke particles and reducing
the temperature of the smoke. This can also lead to the build-up of smoke on
upper storeys open to the atrium, and although this smoke will be significantly
more dilute than on the storey of fire origin it may necessitate immediate
evacuation of those upper storeys or partial enclosure to provide additional time
available for escape (this is highlighted in Figure 20). Consequently, the
recommendations within BS 9999 for the fire safety design of atria depend
upon the type of enclosure provided (if any), the height of the atria, the method
of evacuation adopted and the occupancy characteristics.
The standard does not at this time use the risk profile in its entirety but it does
take full advantage of the occupancy characteristics to vary the recommendations.
A wide range of solutions (exemplars) are outlined in BS 9999: Annex C and
their use is informed by a set of decision trees providing a route map through
the selection process. It should be recognized that the solutions documented
are not exhaustive, may not be appropriate to all buildings and that alternative
solutions may exist by which an equivalent level of fire safety can be achieved.
Such approaches are beyond the scope of BS 9999 and would require adoption
of a fire engineering approach.
Equally it is not possible to replicate all of the exemplars from the standard in
this handbook. However, exemplars for the most common atria solutions are
reproduced in Figures 21 to 24. Further detailed guidance can be found in
BS 9999: Annexes B and C.
Escape routes
Escapes routes typically coincide with circulation routes, but in a building
containing atria this may not be appropriate if travel close to the edge of an
open atrium is necessary.
The design of the means of escape should follow the principles of the equivalent
non-atrium building (see Chapter 6). However, where accommodation is open
to an atrium or not separated by smoke-retarding construction, storey exits
should be sited away from the atrium so that escape routes do not pass within
4.5 m of the atrium edge. Further guidance on acceptable escape along balconies
is provided within BS 9999: Clause B.4.3, and typically necessitates the protection
of the balcony from the effects of heat and smoke unless an alternative escape
route is available.
1 1
AFD/A SE 2 AFD/A SE
AFD/A SE AFD/A SE
3
AFD/A SE AFD/A SE
18m
AFD/A SE AFD AFD/A SE
AFD/A SE AFD/A SE
AFD/A SE AFD/A SE
AFD/A SE 4 AFD/A SE
5 5
1 1
6
AFD/A SE AFD/A SE
AFD/A SE AFD/A SE
3
AFD/A SE AFD/A SE
AFD
18 m
AFD/A SE AFD/A SE
AFD/A SE AFD/A SE
AFD/A SE AFD/A SE
AFD/A SE 4 AFD/A SE
5 5
Key
1 Smoke clearance system
2 Smoke-retarding enclosure but not fire-resisting
3 Open or enclosed
4 Atrium base: use and contents comparable with that adjoining the atrium
5 Make-up air
6 Smoke reservoir
AFD Automatic fire detection connected to the building fire alarm system
AFD/A Automatic fire detection within the atrium and associated floor areas and alarm
throughout the building
SE Simultaneous evacuation
1 1
AFD/VA SE AFD/VA SE
AFD/VA SE AFD/VA SE
AFD/VA SE AFD/VA SE
18 m
AFD/VA SE 2 AFD/VA SE
3 3
Key
1 Smoke exhaust system
2 Atrium base: controlled fire load
3 Make-up air
AFD Automatic fire detection connected to the building fire alarm system
AFD/VA L2 automatic fire detection within the atrium and associated floor areas and
voice alarm throughout the building
SE Simultaneous evacuation
Automatic sprinkler protection
1 1
AFD/VA SE 2 AFD/VA SE
AFD/VA SE AFD/VA SE
AFD/VA SE AFD/VA SE
18 m
AFD/VA SE AFD AFD/VA SE
AFD/VA SE AFD/VA SE
AFD/VA SE AFD/VA SE
AFD/VA SE 3 AFD/VA SE
4 4
Key
1 Smoke clearance system
2 Enclosed fire-resisting (30 min integrity) and smoke-retarding construction
3 Atrium base: controlled fire load
4 Make-up air
AFD Automatic fire detection connected to the building fire alarm system
AFD/VA L2 automatic fire detection within the atrium and associated floor areas and
voice alarm throughout the building
SE Simultaneous evacuation
1 1
2 2
L1AFD/VA 3 L1AFD/VA
L1AFD/VA L1AFD/VA
L1AFD/VA L1AFD/VA
L1AFD/VA 4 AFD L1AFD/VA
L1AFD/VA L1AFD/VA
L1AFD/VA L1AFD/VA
L1AFD/VA 5 L1AFD/VA
6 6
Key
1 Smoke clearance system
2 Protected escape route directly from accommodation independent of atrium
3 30 min fire-resisting and smoke-retarding construction
4 Unlimited height
5 Atrium base: controlled fire load
6 Make-up air
AFD Automatic fire detection connected to the building fire alarm system
L1AFD/VA L1 automatic fire detectionA) and voice alarm throughout the building
A)
Automatic fire detection conforming to the L1 standard as specified in
BS 5839-1:2002+A2:2008.
Key points
Foyers serving several auditoria (theatres, cinemas, etc.) should be enclosed
by fire resisting construction, and the foyer should be approached via
protected lobbies.
Transformer rooms, boiler rooms and other similar perceived risk areas should
not have openings located in close proximity to exits from the building.
Within rowed seating the width between the back of a seat and the most
forward projection of the seat behind (seatway width) should not be less
than 300 mm and should be constant throughout the length of the row
(see Figure 25).
Seating within closely seated layouts should be designed and constructed
such that they are resistant to ignition sources 0, 1 and 5 when tested in
accordance with BS 5852: 2006.
The slope of any tiered seating should not exceed an angle of 35 degrees
to the horizontal.
Travel distances within tiered seating should not exceed 15 m where
escape is available in one direction only and 32 m where escape is
available in more than one direction.
Gangways serving more than 60 persons should have a minimum width
of 1,100 mm. Those serving fewer than 60 persons can be reduced to
900 mm.
Temporary seating for between 50 persons and 250 persons should be
secured together in lengths of at least four seats. Temporary seating for
more than 250 persons should be fixed to the floor, although this fixing
can be at the end of rows where all seats are secured together.
Where a proscenium wall is provided (separated stages) it should be
constructed of non-combustible material achieving a 60 minute fire
resistance period. The associated safety curtain should be of non-combustible
material and should withstand the effects of fire for the duration of the
evacuation.
Protected lobbies should be provided between the stage basement and
the orchestra pit, and between the stage and the following areas:
Background
In venues with auditoria (theatres, cinemas, etc.), escape routes should be
designed so that in the event of a fire occupants are able to evacuate the whole
building. To this end, the design recommendations contained within BS 9999:
Annex D may be more onerous than that required to meet the Building
Regulations.
Additional guidance in the design of such venues can be found within the
Technical Standards for Places of Entertainment produced by the Association of
British Theatre Technicians, the District Surveyors Association and the Institute of
Licensing.
Where gangways are provided at each end of seating rows and generous seatway
widths are provided, the number of seats in a row is relatively unimportant
provided that travel distances are within acceptable limits. In other instances it is
necessary to limit the number of persons, for example to account for reduced
movement speeds due to narrow seatway widths. Figure 25 outlines the maximum
recommended number of seats within a row.
Exits located at the rear of a seating tier may reduce overall travel distance,
although this may be one of the first areas to be directly affected by smoke
from a fire in the activity area. Therefore some form of smoke control may be
necessary to prevent early smoke logging of such exit routes. The escape of
occupants towards an activity area is acceptable providing that the occupants
would not be directly affected by a fire during the evacuation period.
materials within the building and be suitably robust that washing is not
detrimental to their performance. Therefore such materials should either be
non-combustible or should be of a type B classification when tested in accordance
with BS 5867 Part 2:2008 (after being subjected to the appropriate wetting or
cleansing procedure described in BS 5651). However, only non-combustible
materials should be provided within enclosed escape routes (excluding foyers).
In addition, drapes should not be provided in front of exit doors or across
escape routes.
Stage areas
The stage area comprises the stage and its ancillary areas, such as prop/scenery
stores and quick-change rooms.
There might be a high fire loading on the stage, particularly because of the
quantities of scenery and curtains involved. The risk of fire can be increased
because of temporary props, furniture and temporary lighting equipment. However,
the stage area is likely to have close supervision whenever the public is present.
A proscenium wall, safety curtain and smoke ventilation above the stage area
can protect occupants from the effects of a fire on the stage for the evacuation
period. However, not all venues can readily separate the stage from spectators, i.e.
open-stage configurations. Where a stage does not have a safety curtain, the
approving authority may limit the amount and type of scenery used. There may be
a need for higher standards of flame retarding, limiting the materials available for
the construction of scenery, and subsequently increasing running costs. The
approving authority should be consulted at an early stage where an open stage
configuration is proposed and a fire engineering approach may be required.
Spaces that are ancillary to the stage are areas of intense activity during a stage
presentation and may be highly loaded with combustibles. Therefore, spaces
such as dressing rooms and scene docks should be enclosed in fire-resisting
construction, and any openings should be suitably protected fire-rated assemblies.
In addition, scene docks should be provided with manually operated smoke
ventilation.
Grid and fly galleries provide additional facilities for scenery and lighting. These
areas can be particularly hazardous in the event of a fire on the stage. Access is
typically via fixed ladders, although in a fire situation access to an alternative
means of escape is recommended.
Key points
The recommendations are typically appropriate to new shopping complexes,
but guidance appropriate for existing and uncovered malls, and small
arcades, is also provided.
Automatic sprinkler protection should be provided throughout all areas of
buildings that are connected to covered malls unless such buildings are
fully separated and have escape routes that are fully independent of the
mall.
Covered mall complexes should be provided with a smoke control system
designed in accordance with BS 7346 Part 4 and BRE guidance documents
BR 186 and BR 368. Uncovered mall complexes do not necessitate smoke
control.
Other non-public areas may also require some form of smoke control, i.e.
high-risk areas within basements.
Covered malls with units on both sides of the mall should have a minimum
effective width of 6 m to provide adequate escape and minimum
separation between unit demises across the mall.
Uncovered malls with units on both sides of the mall should have a
minimum separation of 5 m between unit demises across the mall.
The minimum exit width provided from all malls with a width up to 8 m
should be based upon an occupant load factor of one person for every
0.75 m2 (or 1.0 m2 for seated areas) of mall area. For malls with a width
greater than 8 m then an occupant load factor of one person for every 2.0 m2
should be used for that part of the mall width over 8 m. This recognizes
that wider malls will be less crowded than similar narrower malls.
Exits from a mall should not discharge into car parks, but exits from a
retail unit may do so where the car park is fire separated from the mall
complex, or the car park is in open air, or is accessed via an open-air
bridge link.
Escape routes through service areas, car parks, unloading docks or similar
areas are acceptable providing such routes are clearly defined (guarded
with protective barriers where necessary) and have a minimum width of 2 m.
Background
Many early shopping complexes were designed with single-level access and with
the public circulation spaces open to external air. Over time the trend has been
to provide cover, of various degrees, to the public. This has led to a range of
shopping experiences from covering existing small shopping arcades to purpose
built, multi-level, fully enclosed, shopping complexes. The latter typically
incorporates a complex interaction of atria and vertical circulation routes that
connect several levels within a public mall, and escaping occupants are expected
to escape via these malls.
Smoke control
In a town centre high street, a fire in a retail unit will probably threaten only the
occupants in that building. However, a covered shopping complex has individual
units opening onto a covered mall, potentially incorporating atria, and smoke
from a fire in any unit could spread rapidly via the mall system. Therefore a fire
in an individual unit may present a hazard to occupants that are remote from
the unit of fire origin. This design issue coupled with the fact that such complexes
can be very densely populated at peak times requires that a greater time is
provided for occupant evacuation through the use of smoke control. Smoke
control is therefore an integral part of design in covered shopping complexes
and should be designed in accordance with BS 7346-4 and BRE Reports BR 186
and BR 368.
Fire protection
In addition to the smoke control highlighted above, other fire protection
measures will be necessary within covered shopping complexes in order to
support the need for the control of smoke and fire spread. Such measures
would include the provision of sprinkler protection and an automatic fire alarm
Key points
Process plant buildings should generally be designed in accordance with
the section of the standard Designing means of escape, although
departures from this guidance for escape widths and vertical escape
components may be acceptable, i.e. a ladder, where rapid smoke logging
is unlikely.
Escape routes within weather housed, weather protected or external plant
can be designed on the basis of the maximum travel distances
recommended in Table 20.
The horizontal components of alternative escape routes within weather
housed and external plant should be at least 90 apart. Vertical
components of escape routes within weather-housed and external plant
should either be at least 20 m apart or descend at opposite extremities of
the structure.
Background
It is recognized that the general recommendations of the standard for certain
components of means of escape may be unduly restrictive on buildings that are
constructed solely for the housing of process and storage plant, primarily
because of the characteristically low occupancy and familiarity with the premises.
Within process plant buildings there is a potential for both rapid escalation of a
fire and rapid smoke logging, and therefore the general recommendations of
the standard should be followed for means of escape design. A relaxation on
the minimum width of exit routes and the use of ladders for vertical escape are
allowable in buildings that pose a reduced threat of rapid smoke logging
because of the nature of the process or their design. However, travel distances
are not relaxed as the heat radiation associated with a rapid growing fire will
continue to represent the greatest hazard to escaping occupants.
The sole purpose of weather housed buildings is to enclose plant from the
external environment. Such buildings are typically large enclosures with
pedestrian routes provided on the basis of required maintenance access to the
plant inside and they are likely to be at multiple levels. Therefore increased travel
distances and unenclosed vertical escape components are acceptable provided
that adequate escape routes will remain unaffected during the early stages
of a fire. These overall travel distances would include any unenclosed vertical
components. External escape routes with a reduced level of fire resistance may
provide an adequate alternative where an appropriate level of resistance to heat
and smoke is provided.
Weather protected plant is essentially plant that has only partial enclosure, i.e.
incorporates louvers, ridge vents, etc. Therefore smoke logging is less likely
compared with weather-housed plant, and the risk posed to escaping occupants
is similar to those associated with external plant.
External plant has minimal potential for smoke logging, although the heat
radiation associated with a rapidly growing fire will continue to represent a
hazard to escaping occupants. A minimum of two escape routes should be
provided from any part of the external plant area and they should be separated
such that they are unlikely to be simultaneously compromised during the early
stages of a fire. The overall travel distance should be measured from any
accessible point to a point at adjacent ground level outside the confines of the
plant or structure surrounding it.
The principles outlined in Chapter 6 for altering travel distances using additional
fire protection measures can be applied to the distances stated above for
weather-housed plant.
Occupant characteristics
Occupants within the retail unit will be awake but may be unfamiliar with the
space. Therefore the occupant risk category can be defined as B Occupants
who are awake and unfamiliar with the building.
Fire growth
The fire load within the retail unit will be consistent with that expected within a
clothing retail unit, i.e. racks throughout the sales floor comprising clothing,
and can be approximated to a category 3 fast fire growth.
As identified within Step 3 above, the example retail unit does necessitate
automatic fire detection and alarm as a minimum to comply with the standard.
However, this is only to an L2 standard, which does not require smoke detection
on the retail sales floor; therefore a 15 per cent variation associated with this
fire protection feature is allowable (BS 9999: Clause 19.2).
In addition, the example retail unit does incorporate floor to ceiling heights of
4.5 m, and therefore a 10 per cent variation associated with this is allowable
(variation for floor to ceiling heights of between 4 m and 5 m).
Consequently, the travel distances can be extended and widths of exits and
stairs can be reduced by up to the sum of the per cent variations identified
above, 25 per cent (subject to overriding maxima and minima identified within
BS 9999). Note that for ease of calculation purposes the per cent variations have
been added; however, aggregation is allowable within the standard (refer to the
example in BS 9999: Clause 19.1 for further details).
Travel distances
On the basis of the risk profile of B3 identified in Step 1, Table 21 highlights
the calculated travel distance after the 25 per cent variation (identified in Step 4)
has been applied to risk profile B3.
However, these widths must be checked against Table 10, which outlines an
overall limit on exit width per person. From referring to Table 10 it can be seen
that the lower limit of 5.3 mm per person for risk profile B3 is exceeded and
therefore the calculated exit width of 4.5 mm per person is not acceptable and
must be increased to the limit of 5.3 mm per person.
Risk profile Minimum width per person Calculated width per person
with minimum fire (with identified 25 per cent
protection measures variation where applicable)
B3 7.0 mm per person 5.25 mm per person
Variations in stair widths are limited to a maximum of 25 per cent (BS 9999: Clause
19.4.4). As the variation identified in Step 4 is 25 per cent, the calculated stair width
per person stated in Table 23 should be appropriate; however, the minimum width
per person recommended for horizontal exits is 5.3 mm per person and therefore
the calculated exit width of 5.25 mm per person must be increased to 5.3 mm per
person to ensure that the escape stair is not narrower than the storey exit.
can be used only where the ventilation conditions of Table 17 have been met,
otherwise reference should be made to the British Standard. For the purpose of
this example it is assumed that the ventilation conditions of Table 17 can be met
for risk profile B3.
On the basis of risk profile B3 within a building having a top floor not more
than 5 m above ground, Table 16 would recommend a minimum 30 minute
period of fire resistance.
As the gross floor area of each storey is not more than 2,000 m2, there is no
compartment floor area limitation that would need to be incorporated within
the example building.
As the example retail unit does not include a basement and does not have a
floor more than 30 m (BS 9999: Clause 32.4.2) above ground, then there are no
additional compartmentation recommendations. Subsequently, as the guidance
in BS 9999 Annex B for atria applies only when compartmentation is breached
(BS 9999: Clause 32.4.1.1) the opening within the first floor for the escalators
does not require any further fire protection measures.
The floor to ceiling height on all levels is approximately 2.6 m, and the layout on
each floor will be predominantly open plan.
Occupant characteristics
Occupants within the office building will be awake, and will be familiar with the
space. Therefore the occupant risk category can be defined as A Occupants
who are awake and familiar with the building.
Fire growth
The fire load within the office building can be approximated to a category 2
medium fire growth. However, the building is protected throughout with an
automatic sprinkler system and therefore in accordance with BS 9999: Clause
6.5 the fire growth rate can be reduced by one level, i.e. from category 2
medium to category 1 slow. Consequently, the risk profile has been
determined as A1.
As identified within Step 3 above, the example office building does not
necessitate automatic fire detection and alarm as a minimum to comply with
the standard, therefore a 15 per cent variation associated with this fire
protection feature is allowable (BS 9999: Clause 19.2).
The example office building does not incorporate floor to ceiling heights greater than
3 m and therefore a per cent variation associated with this is not allowable.
Consequently, the travel distances can be extended and widths of exits and
stairs can be reduced by up to 15 per cent (subject to overriding maxima and
minima identified within BS 9999).
However, these widths must be checked against Table 10, which outlines an
overall limit on exit width per person. From referring to Table 10 it can be seen
that the lower limit for risk profile A1 is not exceeded and therefore the
calculated exit width per person is allowable.
Risk profile Minimum width per person Calculated width per person
with minimum fire (with identified 15 per cent
protection measures variation where applicable)
A1 3.4 mm per person 2.89 mm per person
should be sized based upon serving the maximum occupancy of any two
contiguous floors.
On the basis of stairs serving two storeys and a risk profile of A1, the
calculated stair width per person is shown in Table 26 (including the 15 per cent
variation where identified as applicable in Step 4).
Variations in stair widths are limited to a maximum of 25 per cent (BS 9999:
Clause 19.4.4). As the variation identified in Step 4 is 15 per cent, the calculated
stair width per person stated in Table 26 is allowable.
On the basis of risk profile A1 within a building having a top floor not more
than 60 m above the ground, Table 16 would recommend a minimum 75
minute period of fire resistance.
The example building has six storeys (ground floor plus five others) and
comprises the following types of purpose:
Escape from the ground floor is independent of escape from all other levels.
Escape stairs within the building serve all storeys above the ground floor and have
lobby protection. The building will adopt a simultaneous evacuation strategy.
The floor to ceiling height on all levels is between 2.5 m and 3 m and all storeys
have a gross floor area of less than 2,000 m2.
Occupant characteristics
Occupants on the ground floor (retail) and first floor (restaurant and conference)
will be awake, but may be unfamiliar with the space. Therefore the occupant
risk category can be defined as B Occupants who are awake and unfamiliar
with the building.
Occupants on the second floor (office) will be awake and familiar with the
space. Therefore the occupant risk category can be defined as A Occupants
who are awake and familiar with the building.
Occupants on the third, fourth and fifth floors (guest rooms) are likely to be
asleep and a short-term occupancy. Therefore the occupant risk category can be
defined as Ciii Occupants who are likely to be asleep, and short-term
occupancy.
Fire growth
The fire load within the ground floor retail will be consistent with that expected
within a clothing retail unit, i.e. racks throughout the sales floor comprising
clothing, and can be approximated to a category 3 fast fire growth.
The fire load within the first floor restaurant and conference can be approximated
to a category 2 medium fire growth.
The fire load within the second floor offices can be approximated to a category
2 medium fire growth.
The fire load within the third, fourth and fifth floor guest rooms can be approximated
to a category 2 medium fire growth.
The risk profiles for each storey in the building can be broken down as follows:
Where the different risk profiles within the building have different recommended
management levels, the most onerous should be adopted. Therefore a level 1
(the highest) management level is expected throughout the building because of
the C2 risk profile.
On the basis of the most onerous (C2 for fire detection and alarm and B2 for
emergency light) the minimum package of fire protection is as follows:
Some storeys will therefore have a higher standard of automatic fire detection and
alarm than recommended, which will support variations as described in Step 4.
associated with this fire protection feature is allowable for means of escape
components on those storeys only (BS 9999: Clause 19.2). Consequently, the
travel distances can be extended and widths of exits and stairs can be reduced
by up to the sum of the per cent variations identified above, 15 per cent
(subject to overriding maxima and minima identified within BS 9999).
Travel distances
On the basis of the risk profiles identified in Step 1, Table 27 highlights the
calculated travel distance after the 15 per cent variation (identified in Step 4)
has been applied to the relevant risk profiles.
Risk profile Minimum width per person Calculated width per person
with minimum fire (with identified 15 per cent
protection measures variation where applicable)
A2 4.0 mm per person 3.4 mm per person
B2 4.4 mm per person 3.74 mm per person
B3 6.0 mm per person 5.1 mm per person
C2 4.4 mm per person 4.4 mm per person
However, these widths must be checked against Table 10, which outlines an
overall limit on exit width per person. By referring to Table 10, it can be seen
that the lower limit of 5.3 mm per person for risk profile B3 is exceeded and
therefore the calculated exit width of 5.1 mm per person is not acceptable and
must be increased to the limit of 5.3 mm per person. All other risk profiles are
within the overall limits within Table 10.
The example building has escape stairs serving five of the six storeys and the risk
profiles served by the escape stairs are B2 (first floor), A2 (second floor) and C2
(third, fourth and fifth floors). On the basis of stairs serving five storeys, the
calculated stair width per person for each of the risk profiles served by the stairs
is shown in Table 29 (including the 15 per cent variation where identified as
applicable in Step 4).
Variations in stair widths are limited to a maximum of 25 per cent (BS 9999:
Clause 19.4.4). As the variation identified in Step 4 is only 15 per cent the
allowable stair widths per person stated in Table 29 are appropriate.
Risk profile Minimum width per person Calculated width per person
with minimum fire (with identified 15 per cent
protection measures variation where applicable)
A2 2.45 mm per person 2.08 mm per person
B2 2.6 mm per person 2.21 mm per person
C2 2.6 mm per person 2.6 mm per person
The most onerous stair width per person for the example building is 2.6 mm per
person (risk profile C2); therefore this should be adopted for calculation of the
stair width for the entire stair occupant load.
On the basis of the total occupant load of 1,000 persons and the width per
person of 2.6 mm per person, the minimum stair width requirement would be
2,600 mm.
Calculate the width of stair required using the approach outlined above for
an even distribution (2.6 mm per person for the example building, see
above).
Undertake a width per person check on each storey, based upon the
relevant risk profile for the individual storey assuming only that storey is
served by the stair. Where a single risk profile applies to a number of
contiguous storeys, then the width per person can be based upon that
number of storeys.
The largest width resultant from the local check should then be checked
against the width calculated using the approach for an even distribution and
the greater of the two adopted for the escape stair width.
As highlighted in Table 29, the most onerous stair width per person for the
example building was 2.6 mm per person (risk profile C2). On the basis of the
total occupant load of 1,200 persons, the uniform minimum stair requirement
would be 3,120 mm.
The local check needs to determine whether the calculated width of 3,120 mm
will provide sufficient exit widths for all levels. The example building has escape
stairs serving the risk profiles B2 (first floor), A2 (second floor) and C2 (third,
fourth and fifth floors). On the basis of stairs serving one storey for A2 and B2
and serving three contiguous storeys for C2, the calculated stair width per
person for each of the risk profiles served by the stairs is shown in Table 30
(including the 15 per cent variation where identified as applicable in Step 4).
As the variation identified in Step 4 is only 15 per cent, the allowable stair
widths per person stated in Table 30 are appropriate.
Where the different risk profiles have different recommended periods of fire
resistance the most onerous should be adopted throughout the building.
On the basis of risk profiles A2, B2, B3 and Ciii2 within a building having a top
floor not more than 18 m above ground, Table 16 would recommend a
minimum 75 minute period of fire resistance as this is the most onerous (B3) for
the risk profiles within the building.
As risk profile B3 is located at the first floor and is the risk profile requiring the
75 minute period of fire resistance, it would be possible to provide a compartment
floor on the second floor with a 75 minute period of fire resistance and then to
apply a 60 minute period (A2, B2 and Ciii2) of fire resistance to all storeys above.
As the gross floor area of each storey is less than 2,000 m2 there is no
compartment floor area limitation that would need to be incorporated within
the example building.
Every floor within a building containing a Ciii risk profile should be designated
as a compartment floor (of BS 9999: Clause 32.4.4). This recommendation is
specific to risk profiles Cii and Ciii only.
Standards
BS 476 (all parts), Fire tests on building materials and structures
BS 1634-1, Fire resistance and smoke control tests for door, shutter and openable
window assemblies and elements of building hardware Fire resistance tests
for doors, shutters and openable windows, 2008
BS 5588 (all parts), Fire precautions in the design, construction and use of
buildings
BS 5651, Method for cleansing and wetting procedures for use in the assessment
of the effect of cleansing and wetting on the flammability of textile fabrics and
fabric assemblies, 1989
BS 5839-1, Fire detection and fire alarm systems for buildings Code of
practice for system design, installation, commissioning and maintenance, 2002
BS 7346-7, Components for smoke and heat control systems Code of practice
on functional recommendations and calculation methods for smoke and heat
control systems for covered car parks, 2006
BS 9999, Code of practice for fire safety in the design, management and use
of buildings, 2008
BS EN 81-1, Safety rules for the construction and installation of lifts Electric
lifts, 1998
BS EN 81-2, Safety rules for the construction and installation of lifts Hydraulic
lifts, 1998
Books/booklets
Appraisal of Existing Structures, 3rd edition, IStructE
FPA Guide: Essential Principles and Guidance, published by the Arson Control
Forum, Arson Prevention Bureau and Zurich Municipal
Legislation
BR 187, External fire spread: building separation and boundary distances,
Building Research Establishment, 1991
BR 368, Design methodologies for smoke and heat exhaust ventilation, Building
Research Establishment, 1999
GREAT BRITAIN. Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005, The Stationery
Office