36. PEOPLE vs LACSON, G.R. 149453 April 1,
the offended party is notified of the motion for
2003
FACTS: Before the court is the petitioners motion of
reconsideration of the resolution dated May 23, 2002,
for the determination of several factual issues relative
to the application of Sec. 8 Rule 117 of RRCP on the
dismissal of the cases Q-99- 81679 and Q-99-81689
against the respondent. The respondent was charged
with the shooting and killing of eleven male persons.
The court confirmed the express consent of the
respondent in the provisional dismissal of the
aforementioned cases when he filed for judicial
determination. The court also ruled the need to
determine whether the other facts for its application
are attendant.
ISSUES: 1) Whether or not Section 8, Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is applicable to
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689?
2) Should time-bar in said rule be applied
prospectively or retroactively?
RULING: 1) No. Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure reads: A case shall not
be provisionally dismissed except with the express
consent of the accused and with notice to the
offended party. The provisional dismissal of offenses
punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 years or
a fine of any amount, or both, shall become
permanent 1 year after issuance of the order without
the case having been revived. With respect to
offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than (6)
years, their provisional dismissal shall become
permanent 2 years after issuance of the order without
the case having been revived.
Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel
of prosecutors and before the Court of Appeals, the
respondent is burdened to establish the essential
requisites of the first paragraph thereof, namely: 1).
the prosecution with the express conformity of the
accused or the accused moves for a provisional
dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the
accused move for a provisional dismissal of the
case;2.
a provisional dismissal of the case; 3. the court issues
an order granting the motion and dismissing the case
provisionally; 4. the public prosecutor is served with a
copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.
In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that
the first and second requisites of the first paragraph of
the new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689. Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any
motion for the provisional dismissal of the said
criminal cases. For his part, the respondent merely
filed a motion for judicial determination of probable
cause and for examination of prosecution witnesses
alleging that under Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution and the decision of this Court in Allado v.
Diokno, among other cases, there was a need for the
trial court to conduct a personal determination of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against respondent and to have the prosecutions
witnesses summoned before the court for its
examination. The respondents admissions made in
the course of the proceedings in the Court of Appeals
are binding and conclusive on him. The respondent is
barred from repudiating his admissions absent
evidence of palpable mistake in making such
admissions. To apply the new rule in Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 would be to add to
or make exceptions from the new rule which are not
expressly or impliedly included therein. Therefore, the
State is not barred by the time limit set forth in the
second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State can
thus revive or refile Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679
to Q-99-81689 or file new Informations for multiple
murder against the respondent.
2) Time-bar should not be applied retroactively.
Though procedural rules may be applied retroactively,
it should not be if to do so would work injustice or
would involve intricate problems of due process.
Statutes should be construed in light of the purposes
to be achieved and the evils to be remedied. This is
because to do so would be prejudicial to the State
since, given that the Judge dismissed the case on
March 29,1999, and the New rule took effect on Dec
1,2000, it would only in effect give them 1 year and
three months to work instead of 2 years. At that time,
they had no knowledge of the said rule and therefore
they should not be penalized for that. Indeed for
justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is
not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The two-
year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of
both the State and the accused. It should not be
emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive
application of the time-bar therein provided merely to
benefit the accused. To do so would cause an
injustice of hardship to the state and adversely affect
the administration of justice. To require the State to
give a valid justification as a condition sine qua non to
the revival of a case provisionally dismissed with the
express consent of the accused before the effective
date of the new rule is to assume that the State is
obliged to comply with the time-bar under the new
rule before it took effect. This would be a rank denial
of justice. The State must be given a period of one
year or two years as the case may be from December
1, 2000 to revive the criminal case without requiring
the State to make a valid justification for not reviving
the case before the effective date of the new rule.
Although in criminal cases, the accused is entitled to
justice and fairness, so is the State.