IBP V Zamora

8/12/2015 Integrated Bar of the Phil vs Zamora : 141284 : August 15, 2000 : J.
Kapunan : En Banc
ENBANC
[G.R.No.141284.August15,2000]
INTEGRATEDBAROFTHEPHILIPPINES,petitioner,vs.HON.RONALDOB.
ZAMORA,GEN.PANFILOM.LACSON,GEN.EDGARB.AGLIPAY,and
GEN.ANGELOREYES,respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN,J.:
At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President
JosephEjercitoEstradacommandingthedeploymentofthePhilippineMarines(theMarines)to
jointhePhilippineNationalPolice(thePNP)invisibilitypatrolsaroundthemetropolis.
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies,
kidnappings and carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the
Marinestoconductjointvisibilitypatrolsforthepurposeofcrimepreventionandsuppression.
The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(theAFP),theChiefofthePNPandtheSecretaryoftheInteriorandLocalGovernmentwere
taskedtoexecuteandimplementthesaidorder.Incompliancewiththe presidentialmandate,
the PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of
Instruction 02/2000[1] (the LOI) which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols,
called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted.[2] Task Force Tulungan was placed under
theleadershipofthePoliceChiefofMetroManila.
Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the
MarinesinaMemorandum,dated24January2000,addressedtotheChiefofStaffoftheAFP
andthePNPChief.[3]IntheMemorandum,thePresidentexpressedhisdesiretoimprovethe
peace and order situation in Metro Manila through a more effective crime prevention program
includingincreasedpolicepatrols.[4]ThePresidentfurtherstatedthattoheightenpolicevisibility
in the metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is necessary.[5] Invoking his powers as
CommanderinChiefunderSection18,ArticleVIIoftheConstitution,thePresidentdirectedthe
AFPChiefofStaffandPNPChieftocoordinatewitheachotherfortheproperdeploymentand
utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless
violence.[6] Finally, the President declared that the services of the Marines in the anticrime
campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time
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8/12/2015 Integrated Bar of the Phil vs Zamora : 141284 : August 15, 2000 : J. Kapunan : En Banc
whenthesituationshallhaveimproved.[7]
TheLOIexplainstheconceptofthePNPPhilippineMarinesjointvisibilitypatrolsasfollows:
xxx
2.PURPOSE:
TheJointImplementingPoliceVisibilityPatrolsbetweenthePNPNCRPOandthePhilippine
MarinespartnershipintheconductofvisibilitypatrolsinMetroManilaforthesuppressionof
crimepreventionandotherseriousthreatstonationalsecurity.
3.SITUATION:
CriminalincidentsinMetroManilahavebeenperpetratednotonlybyordinarycriminalsbutalso
byorganizedsyndicateswhosemembersincludeactiveandformerpolice/militarypersonnel
whosetraining,skill,disciplineandfirepowerprovewellabovethepresentcapabilityofthelocal
policealonetohandle.ThedeploymentofajointPNPNCRPOPhilippineMarinesinthe
conductofpolicevisibilitypatrolinurbanareaswillreducetheincidenceofcrimesspecially
thoseperpetratedbyactiveorformerpolice/militarypersonnel.
4.MISSION:
ThePNPNCRPOwillorganizeaprovisionalTaskForcetoconductjointNCRPOPMvisibility
patrolstokeepMetroManilastreetscrimefree,throughasustainedstreetpatrollingtominimize
oreradicateallformsofhighprofilecrimesespeciallythoseperpetratedbyorganizedcrime
syndicateswhosemembersincludethosethatarewelltrained,disciplinedandwellarmed
activeorformerPNP/Militarypersonnel.
5.CONCEPTINJOINTVISIBILITYPATROLOPERATIONS:
a.ThevisibilitypatrolsshallbeconductedjointlybytheNCRPO[NationalCapitalRegional
PoliceOffice]andthePhilippineMarinestocurbcriminalityinMetroManilaandtopreservethe
internalsecurityofthestateagainstinsurgentsandotherseriousthreattonationalsecurity,
althoughtheprimaryresponsibilityoverInternalSecurityOperationsstillrestsupontheAFP.
b.Theprincipleofintegrationofeffortsshallbeappliedtoeradicateallformsofhighprofile
crimesperpetratedbyorganizedcrimesyndicatesoperatinginMetroManila.Thisconcept
requiresthemilitaryandpolicetoworkcohesivelyandunifyeffortstoensureafocused,
effectiveandholisticapproachinaddressingcrimeprevention.Alongthisline,theroleofthe
militaryandpoliceasidefromneutralizingcrimesyndicatesistobringawholesomeatmosphere
whereindeliveryofbasicservicestothepeopleanddevelopmentisachieved.Handinhand
withthisjointNCRPOPhilippineMarinesvisibilitypatrols,localPoliceUnitsareresponsiblefor
themaintenanceofpeaceandorderintheirlocality.
c.Toensuretheeffectiveimplementationofthisproject,aprovisionalTaskForceTULUNGAN
shallbeorganizedtoprovidethemechanism,structure,andproceduresfortheintegrated
planning,coordinating,monitoringandassessingthesecuritysituation.
xxx.[8]
TheselectedareasofdeploymentundertheLOIare:MonumentoCircle,NorthEdsa(SM
City), Araneta Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM Megamall, Makati Commercial Center,
LRT/MRTStationsandtheNAIAandDomesticAirport.[9]
On17January2000,theIntegratedBarofthePhilippines(theIBP)filedtheinstantpetition
toannulLOI02/2000andtodeclarethedeploymentofthePhilippineMarines,nullandvoidand
unconstitutional,arguingthat:
I
THEDEPLOYMENTOFTHEPHILIPPINEMARINESINMETROMANILAISVIOLATIVEOF
THECONSTITUTION,INTHAT:
A)NOEMERGENCYSITUATIONOBTAINSINMETROMANILAASWOULDJUSTIFY,EVEN
ONLYREMOTELY,THEDEPLOYMENTOFSOLDIERSFORLAWENFORCEMENTWORK
HENCE,SAIDDEPLOYMENTISINDEROGATIONOFARTICLEII,SECTION3OFTHE
CONSTITUTION
B)SAIDDEPLOYMENTCONSTITUTESANINSIDIOUSINCURSIONBYTHEMILITARYINA
CIVILIANFUNCTIONOFGOVERNMENT(LAWENFORCEMENT)INDEROGATIONOF
ARTICLEXVI,SECTION5(4),OFTHECONSTITUTION
C)SAIDDEPLOYMENTCREATESADANGEROUSTENDENCYTORELYONTHE
MILITARYTOPERFORMTHECIVILIANFUNCTIONSOFTHEGOVERNMENT.
II
INMILITARIZINGLAWENFORCEMENTINMETROMANILA,THEADMINISTRATIONIS
UNWITTINGLYMAKINGTHEMILITARYMOREPOWERFULTHANWHATITSHOULD
REALLYBEUNDERTHECONSTITUTION.[10]
AssertingitselfastheofficialorganizationofFilipinolawyerstaskedwiththeboundenduty
toupholdtheruleoflawandtheConstitution,theIBPquestionsthevalidityofthedeployment
andutilizationoftheMarinestoassistthePNPinlawenforcement.
Withoutgrantingduecoursetothepetition,theCourtinaResolution,[11]dated25January
2000,requiredtheSolicitorGeneraltofilehisCommentonthepetition.On 8 February 2000,
theSolicitorGeneralsubmittedhisComment.
TheSolicitorGeneralvigorouslydefendstheconstitutionalityoftheactofthePresidentin
deployingtheMarines,contending,amongothers,thatpetitionerhasnolegalstandingthatthe
questionofdeploymentoftheMarinesisnotproperforjudicialscrutinysincethesameinvolves
apoliticalquestionthat the organization and conduct of police visibility patrols, which feature
theteamupofonepoliceofficerandonePhilippineMarinesoldier,doesnotviolatethecivilian
supremacyclauseintheConstitution.
The issues raised in the present petition are: (1) Whether or not petitioner has legal
standing(2)WhetherornotthePresidentsfactualdeterminationofthenecessityofcallingthe
armedforcesissubjecttojudicialreviewand,(3)Whetherornotthecallingofthearmedforces
to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian
supremacyoverthemilitaryandtheciviliancharacterofthePNP.
Thepetitionhasnomerit.
First,petitionerfailedtosufficientlyshowthatitisinpossessionoftherequisitesofstanding
to raise the issues in the petition. Second, the President did not commit grave abuse of
discretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictionnordidhecommitaviolationofthecivilian
supremacyclauseoftheConstitution.
ThepowerofjudicialreviewissetforthinSection1,ArticleVIIIoftheConstitution,towit:
Section1.ThejudicialpowershallbevestedinoneSupremeCourtandinsuchlowercourtsas
maybeestablishedbylaw.
Judicialpowerincludesthedutyofthecourtsofjusticetosettleactualcontroversiesinvolving
rightswhicharelegallydemandableandenforceable,andtodeterminewhetherornotthere
hasbeengraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofany
branchorinstrumentalityoftheGovernment.
Whenquestionsofconstitutionalsignificanceareraised,theCourtcanexerciseitspowerof
judicialreviewonlyifthefollowingrequisitesarecompliedwith,namely:(1)theexistenceofan
actual and appropriate case (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutionalquestion(3)theexerciseofjudicialreviewispleadedattheearliestopportunity
and(4)theconstitutionalquestionisthelismotaofthecase.[12]
TheIBPhasnotsufficientlycompliedwiththerequisitesofstandinginthiscase.
Legal standing or locusstandihas been defined as a personal and substantial interest in

the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmentalactthatisbeing challenged.[13] The term interest means a material interest, an
interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved,oramereincidentalinterest.[14]Thegistofthequestionofstandingiswhetheraparty
alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illuminationofdifficultconstitutionalquestions.[15]
In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to
uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP
assertsnootherbasisinsupportofitslocusstandi.ThemereinvocationbytheIBPofitsduty
topreservetheruleoflawandnothingmore,whileundoubtedlytrue,isnotsufficienttoclotheit
withstandinginthiscase.Thisistoogeneralaninterestwhichissharedbyothergroupsand
the whole citizenry. Based on the standards abovestated, the IBP has failed to present a
specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. Its fundamental purpose which,
under Section 2, Rule 139A of the Rules of Court, is to elevate the standards of the law
professionandtoimprovetheadministrationofjusticeisaliento,andcannotbeaffectedbythe
deploymentoftheMarines.ItshouldalsobenotedthattheinterestoftheNationalPresidentof
theIBPwhosignedthepetition,ishisalone,absentaformalboardresolutionauthorizinghimto
filethepresentaction.Tobesure,membersoftheBAR,thoseinthejudiciaryincluded,have
varying opinions on the issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly authorized the
NationalPresidenttofilethepetition,hasnotshownanyspecificinjurywhichithassufferedor
may suffer by virtue of the questioned governmental act.Indeed,noneofitsmembers,whom
theIBPpurportedlyrepresents,hassustainedanyformofinjuryasaresultoftheoperationof
thejointvisibilitypatrols.Neitherisitallegedthatanyofitsmembershasbeenarrestedorthat
theircivillibertieshavebeenviolatedbythedeploymentoftheMarines.WhattheIBPprojects
as injurious is the supposed militarization of law enforcement which might threaten Philippine
democratic institutions and may cause more harm than good in the long run. Not only is the
presumed injury not personal in character, it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and
uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing. Since petitioner has not successfully
established a direct and personal injury as a consequence of the questioned act, it does not
possess the personality to assail the validity of the deployment of the Marines. This Court,
however, does not categorically rule that the IBP has absolutely no standing to raise
constitutionalissuesnoworinthefuture.TheIBPmust,bywayofallegationsandproof,satisfy
thisCourtthatithassufficientstaketoobtainjudicialresolutionofthecontroversy.
Havingstatedtheforegoing,itmustbeemphasizedthatthisCourthasthediscretiontotake
cognizanceofasuitwhichdoesnotsatisfytherequirementoflegalstandingwhenparamount
interestisinvolved.[16]Innotafewcases,theCourthasadoptedaliberalattitudeonthelocus
standiofapetitionerwherethepetitionerisabletocraftanissueoftranscendentalsignificance
tothepeople.[17]Thus,whentheissuesraisedareofparamountimportancetothepublic,the
Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure.[18] In this case, a reading of the petition
showsthattheIBPhasadvancedconstitutionalissueswhichdeservetheattentionofthisCourt
inviewoftheirseriousness,noveltyandweightasprecedents.Moreover,becausepeaceand
orderareunderconstantthreatandlawlessviolenceoccursinincreasingtempo,undoubtedly
aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition
almostcertainlywillnotgoaway.It will stare us in the face again.It, therefore, behooves the
Courttorelaxtherulesonstandingandtoresolvetheissuenow,ratherthanlater.
ThePresidentdidnotcommitgraveabuseofdiscretionincallingouttheMarines.
In the case at bar, the bone of contention concerns the factual determination of the
Presidentofthenecessityofcallingthearmedforces,particularlytheMarines,toaidthePNPin
visibilitypatrols.Inthisregard,theIBPadmitsthatthedeploymentofthemilitarypersonnelfalls
under the CommanderinChief powers of the President as stated in Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution, specifically, the power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. What the IBP questions, however, is the basis for the
calling of the Marines under the aforestated provision. According to the IBP, no emergency
exists that would justify the need for the calling of the military to assist the police force. It
contends that no lawless violence, invasion or rebellion exist to warrant the calling of the
Marines.Thus,theIBPpraysthatthisCourtreviewthesufficiencyofthefactualbasisforsaid
troop[Marine]deployment.[19]
TheSolicitorGeneral,ontheotherhand,contendsthattheissuepertainingtothenecessity
ofcallingthearmedforcesisnotproperforjudicialscrutinysinceitinvolvesapoliticalquestion
andtheresolutionoffactualissueswhicharebeyondthereviewpowersofthisCourt.
As framed by the parties, the underlying issues are the scope of presidential powers and
limits, and the extent of judicial review.But, while this Court gives considerable weight to the
parties formulation of the issues, the resolution of the controversy may warrant a creative
approachthatgoesbeyondthenarrowconfinesoftheissuesraised.Thus,whilethepartiesare
in agreement that the power exercised by the President is the power to call out the armed
forces,theCourtisoftheviewthatthepowerinvolvedmaybenomorethanthemaintenance
ofpeaceandorderandpromotionofthegeneralwelfare.[20]Forone,therealitiesontheground
do not show that there exist a state of warfare, widespread civil unrest or anarchy. Secondly,
thefullbruntofthemilitaryisnotbroughtuponthecitizenry,apointdiscussedinthelatterpart
ofthisdecision.InthewordsofthelateJusticeIreneCortesinMarcosv.Manglapus:
Moreparticularly,thiscasecallsfortheexerciseofthePresidentspowersasprotectorofthe
peace.[Rossiter,TheAmericanPresidency].ThepowerofthePresidenttokeepthepeaceis
notlimitedmerelytoexercisingthecommanderinchiefpowersintimesofemergencyorto
leadingtheStateagainstexternalandinternalthreatstoitsexistence.ThePresidentisnotonly
clothedwithextraordinarypowersintimesofemergency,butisalsotaskedwithattendingtothe
daytodayproblemsofmaintainingpeaceandorderandensuringdomestictranquilityintimes
whennoforeignfoeappearsonthehorizon.Widediscretion,withintheboundsoflaw,in
fulfillingpresidentialdutiesintimesofpeaceisnotinanywaydiminishedbytherelativewantof
anemergencyspecifiedinthecommanderinchiefprovision.ForinmakingthePresident
commanderinchieftheenumerationofpowersthatfollowcannotbesaidtoexcludethe
PresidentsexercisingasCommanderinChiefpowersshortofthecallingofthearmedforces,
orsuspendingtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusordeclaringmartiallaw,inorderto
keepthepeace,andmaintainpublicorderandsecurity.
xxx[21]
Nonetheless,evenifitisconcededthatthepowerinvolvedisthePresidentspowertocall
out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, the
resolutionofthecontroversywillreachasimilarresult.
WenowaddresstheSolicitorGeneralsargumentthattheissueinvolvedisnotsusceptible
toreviewbythejudiciarybecauseitinvolvesapoliticalquestion,andthus,notjusticiable.
As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it refers to a matter which is
appropriate for court review.[22] It pertains to issues which are inherently susceptible of being
decidedongroundsrecognizedbylaw.Nevertheless,theCourtdoesnotautomaticallyassume
jurisdictionoveractualconstitutionalcasesbroughtbeforeitevenininstancesthatareripefor
resolution.OneclassofcaseswhereintheCourthesitatestoruleonarepoliticalquestions.The
reasonisthatpoliticalquestionsareconcernedwithissuesdependentuponthewisdom,notthe
legality,ofaparticularactormeasurebeingassailed.Moreover,thepoliticalquestionbeinga
functionoftheseparationofpowers,thecourtswillnotnormallyinterferewiththeworkingsof
anothercoequalbranchunlessthecaseshowsaclearneedforthecourtstostepintouphold
thelawandtheConstitution.
AsTaadav.Cuenco[23]putsit,politicalquestionsrefertothosequestionswhich,underthe
Constitution,aretobedecidedbythepeopleintheirsovereigncapacity,orinregardtowhich
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
government.Thus,ifanissueisclearlyidentifiedbythetextoftheConstitutionasmattersfor
discretionaryactionbyaparticularbranchofgovernmentortothepeoplethemselvesthenitis
heldtobeapoliticalquestion.IntheclassicformulationofJusticeBrennaninBakerv.Carr,[24]
[p]rominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrableconstitutionalcommitmentoftheissuetoacoordinatepoliticaldepartmentora
lackofjudiciallydiscoverableandmanageablestandardsforresolvingitortheimpossibilityof
decidingwithoutaninitialpolicydeterminationofakindclearlyfornonjudicialdiscretionorthe
impossibility of a courts undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made or the potentiality of embarassment from
multifariouspronouncementsbyvariousdepartmentsontheonequestion.
The 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial review by providing that (T)he
Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversiesinvolvingrightswhicharelegallydemandableandenforceable,andtodetermine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.[25] Under this
definition,theCourtcannotagreewiththeSolicitorGeneralthattheissueinvolvedisapolitical
question beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to review. When the grant of power is qualified,
conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed qualifications or
conditionshavebeenmetorthelimitationsrespected,isjusticiabletheproblembeingoneof
legality or validity, not its wisdom.[26] Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional
boundaries has been given to this Court.[27] When political questions are involved, the
Constitution limits the determination as to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartoftheofficialwhoseactionis
beingquestioned.[28]
Bygraveabuseofdiscretionismeantsimplycapriciousorwhimsicalexerciseofjudgment
that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to
performadutyenjoinedbylaw,ortoactatallincontemplationoflaw,aswherethepoweris
exercisedinanarbitraryanddespoticmannerbyreasonofpassionorhostility.[29]Underthis
definition, a court is without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary
authorityhasbeendelegated.ButwhilethisCourthasnopowertosubstituteitsjudgmentfor
thatofCongressorofthePresident,itmaylookintothequestionofwhethersuchexercisehas
been made in grave abuse of discretion.[30] A showing that plenary power is granted either
department of government, may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident
exerciseorabusethereofmaygiverisetojusticiablecontroversy.[31]
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his
wisdom.ThisisclearfromtheintentoftheframersandfromthetextoftheConstitutionitself.
TheCourt,thus,cannotbecalledupontooverrulethePresidentswisdomorsubstituteitsown.
However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave
abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary
power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present
petitionfailstodischargesuchheavyburdenasthereisnoevidencetosupporttheassertion
thatthereexistnojustificationforcallingoutthearmedforces.Thereis,likewise,noevidenceto
support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was
exercisedinsuchamannerastoviolatetheconstitutionalprovisiononciviliansupremacyover
themilitary.IntheperformanceofthisCourtsdutyofpurposefulhesitation[32]beforedeclaring
an act of another branch as unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion is
clearlyshownshalltheCourtinterferewiththePresidentsjudgment.Todoubtistosustain.
ThereisacleartextualcommitmentundertheConstitutiontobestowonthePresidentfull
discretionarypowertocalloutthearmedforcesandtodeterminethenecessityfortheexercise
of such power. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which embodies the powers of the
PresidentasCommanderinChief,providesinpart:
ThePresidentshallbetheCommanderinChiefofallarmedforcesofthePhilippinesand
wheneveritbecomesnecessary,hemaycalloutsucharmedforcestopreventorsuppress
lawlessviolence,invasionorrebellion.Incaseofinvasionorrebellion,whenthepublicsafety
requiresit,hemay,foraperiodnotexceedingsixtydays,suspendtheprivilegeofthewritof
habeascorpus,orplacethePhilippinesoranypartthereofundermartiallaw.
xxx
ThefulldiscretionarypowerofthePresidenttodeterminethefactualbasisfortheexercise
ofthecallingoutpowerisalsoimpliedandfurtherreinforcedintherestofSection18,ArticleVII
whichreads,thus:
xxx
Withinfortyeighthoursfromtheproclamationofmartiallaworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeof
thewritofhabeascorpus,thePresidentshallsubmitareportinpersonorinwritingtothe
Congress.TheCongress,votingjointly,byavoteofatleastamajorityofallitsMembersin
regularorspecialsession,mayrevokesuchproclamationorsuspension,whichrevocationshall
notbesetasidebythePresident.UpontheinitiativeofthePresident,theCongressmay,inthe
samemanner,extendsuchproclamationorsuspensionforaperiodtobedeterminedbythe
Congress,iftheinvasionorrebellionshallpersistandpublicsafetyrequiresit.
TheCongress,ifnotinsession,shallwithintwentyfourhoursfollowingsuchproclamationor
suspension,conveneinaccordancewithitsruleswithoutneedofacall.
TheSupremeCourtmayreview,inanappropriateproceedingfiledbyanycitizen,the
sufficiencyofthefactualbasisoftheproclamationofmartiallaworthesuspensionofthe
privilegeofthewritortheextensionthereof,andmustpromulgateitsdecisionthereonwithin
thirtydaysfromitsfiling.
AstateofmartiallawdoesnotsuspendtheoperationoftheConstitution,norsupplantthe
functioningofthecivilcourtsorlegislativeassemblies,norauthorizetheconfermentof
jurisdictiononmilitarycourtsandagenciesovercivilianswherecivilcourtsareabletofunction,
norautomaticallysuspendtheprivilegeofthewrit.
Thesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritshallapplyonlytopersonsjudiciallychargedfor
rebellionoroffensesinherentinordirectlyconnectedwithinvasion.
Duringthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewrit,anypersonthusarrestedordetainedshallbe
judiciallychargedwithinthreedays,otherwiseheshallbereleased.
Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension
andtheCourtmayreviewthesufficiencyofthefactualbasisthereof.However,thereisnosuch
equivalentprovisiondealingwiththerevocationorreviewofthePresidentsactiontocalloutthe
armedforces.Thedistinctionplacesthecallingoutpowerinadifferentcategoryfromthepower
to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
otherwise,theframersoftheConstitutionwouldhavesimplylumpedtogetherthethreepowers
and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification. Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.[33] That the intent of the
Constitutionisexactlywhatitslettersays,i.e.,thatthepowertocallisfullydiscretionarytothe
President,isextantinthedeliberationoftheConstitutionalCommission,towit:
FR.BERNAS.Itwillnotmakeanydifference.Imayaddthatthereisagraduatedpowerofthe
PresidentasCommanderinChief.First,hecancalloutsuchArmedForcesasmaybe
necessarytosuppresslawlessviolencethenhecansuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeas
corpus,thenhecanimposemartiallaw.Thisisagraduatedsequence.
Whenhejudgesthatitisnecessarytoimposemartiallaworsuspendtheprivilegeofthewritof
habeascorpus,hisjudgmentissubjecttoreview.Wearemakingitsubjecttoreviewbythe
SupremeCourtandsubjecttoconcurrencebytheNationalAssembly.Butwhenheexercises
thislesserpowerofcallingontheArmedForces,whenhesaysitisnecessary,itismyopinion
thathisjudgmentcannotbereviewedbyanybody.
xxx
FR.BERNAS.Letmejustaddthatwhenweonlyhaveimminentdanger,themattercanbe
handledbythefirstsentence:ThePresidentmaycalloutsucharmedforcestopreventor
suppresslawlessviolence,invasionorrebellion.Sowefeelthatthatissufficientforhandling
imminentdanger.
MR.DELOSREYES.Soactually,ifaPresidentfeelsthatthereisimminentdanger,thematter
canbehandledbytheFirstSentence:ThePresident....maycalloutsuchArmedForcesto
preventorsuppresslawlessviolence,invasionorrebellion.Sowefeelthatthatissufficientfor
handlingimminentdanger,ofinvasionorrebellion,insteadofimposingmartiallawor
suspendingthewritofhabeascorpus,hemustnecessarilyhavetocalltheArmedForcesofthe
PhilippinesastheirCommanderinChief.Isthattheidea?
MR.REGALADO.Thatdoesnotrequireanyconcurrencebythelegislaturenorisitsubjectto
judicialreview.[34]
Thereasonforthedifferenceinthetreatmentoftheaforementionedpowershighlightsthe
intenttograntthePresidentthewidestleewayandbroadestdiscretioninusingthepowertocall
out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to
suspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusandthepowertoimposemartiallaw,bothof
which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual
freedoms,andthusnecessitatingsafeguardsbyCongressandreviewbythisCourt.
Moreover,underSection18,ArticleVIIoftheConstitution,intheexerciseofthepowerto
suspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusortoimposemartiallaw,twoconditionsmust
concur:(1)theremustbeanactualinvasionorrebellionand,(2)publicsafetymustrequireit.
These conditions are not required in the case of the power to call out the armed forces. The
onlycriterionisthatwheneveritbecomesnecessary,thePresidentmaycallthearmedforcesto
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." The implication is that the
President is given full discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of the power to call as
comparedtothetwootherpowers.
If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted
withoutfactualbasis,thenthisCourtcannotundertakeanindependentinvestigationbeyondthe
pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and
cannot be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a
combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the
absenceoftextualstandardsthatthecourtmayusetojudgenecessity,informationnecessary
to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent
informationmightbedifficulttoverify,orwhollyunavailabletothecourts.Inmanyinstances,the
evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed
forcesmaybeofanaturenotconstitutingtechnicalproof.
Ontheotherhand,thePresidentasCommanderinChiefhasavastintelligencenetworkto
gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the
security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, onthespot decisions may be
imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass
destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress
lawlessviolencemustbedoneswiftlyanddecisivelyifitweretohaveanyeffectatall.Sucha
scenario is not farfetched when we consider the present situation in Mindanao, where the
insurgency problem could spill over the other parts of the country. The determination of the
necessityforthecallingoutpowerifsubjectedtounfetteredjudicialscrutinycouldbeaveritable
prescription for disaster, as such power may be unduly straitjacketed by an injunction or a
temporaryrestrainingordereverytimeitisexercised.
Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as
CommanderinChief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in his
judgmentitisnecessarytodosoinordertopreventorsuppresslawlessviolence,invasionor
rebellion. Unless the petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion was gravely
abused,thePresidentsexerciseofjudgmentdeservestobeaccordedrespectfromthisCourt.
ThePresidenthasalreadydeterminedthenecessityandfactualbasisforcallingthearmed
forces. In his Memorandum, he categorically asserted that, [V]iolent crimes like bank/store
robberies,holdups,kidnappingsandcarnappingscontinuetooccurinMetroManila...[35]Wedo
not doubt the veracity of the Presidents assessment of the situation, especially in the light of
present developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the recent bombings perpetrated by
lawless elements in the shopping malls, public utilities, and other public places. These are
amongtheareasofdeploymentdescribedintheLOI2000.Consideringallthesefacts,wehold
that the President has sufficient factual basis to call for military aid in law enforcement and in
theexerciseofthisconstitutionalpower.
ThedeploymentoftheMarinesdoesnotviolatetheciviliansupremacyclausenordoesit
infringetheciviliancharacterofthepoliceforce.
Prescindingfromitsargumentthatnoemergencysituationexiststojustifythecallingofthe
Marines, the IBP asserts that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law
enforcementismilitarizedinviolationofSection3,ArticleII[36]oftheConstitution.
We disagree. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian
supremacyclause.ThecallingoftheMarinesinthiscaseconstitutespermissibleuseofmilitary
assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint
visibilitypatrolsisappropriatelycircumscribed.ThelimitedparticipationoftheMarinesisevident
in the provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the
Marines authority. It is noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in charge of the
visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP.In fact, the Metro Manila
PoliceChiefistheoverallleaderofthePNPPhilippineMarinesjointvisibilitypatrols.[37]Under
theLOI,thepoliceforcesaretaskedtobriefororientthesoldiersonpolicepatrolprocedures.
[38] It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines.[39] It is,
likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical
supporttothesesoldiers.[40]Inviewoftheforegoing,itcannotbeproperlyarguedthatmilitary
authorityissupremeovercivilianauthority.Moreover,thedeploymentoftheMarinestoassist
thePNPdoesnotunmaketheciviliancharacterofthepoliceforce.Neitherdoesitamounttoan
insidious incursion of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4),
ArticleXVIoftheConstitution.[41]
Inthisregard,itisnotcorrecttosaythatGeneralAngeloReyes,ChiefofStaffoftheAFP,
byhisallegedinvolvementincivilianlawenforcement,hasbeenvirtuallyappointedtoacivilian
postinderogationoftheaforecitedprovision.Therealauthorityintheseoperations,asstatedin
theLOI,islodgedwiththeheadofacivilianinstitution,thePNP,andnotwiththemilitary.Such
beingthecase,itdoesnotmatterwhethertheAFPChiefactuallyparticipatesintheTaskForce
Tulungansincehedoesnotexerciseanyauthorityorcontroloverthesame.Sincenoneofthe
MarineswasincorporatedorenlistedasmembersofthePNP,therecanbenoappointmentto
civilianpositiontospeakof.Hence,thedeploymentoftheMarinesinthejointvisibilitypatrols
doesnotdestroytheciviliancharacterofthePNP.
Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than assistance
requiredinconductingthepatrols.Assuch,therecanbenoinsidiousincursionofthemilitaryin
civilianaffairsnorcantherebeaviolationoftheciviliansupremacyclauseintheConstitution.
Itisworthmentioningthatmilitaryassistancetocivilianauthoritiesinvariousformspersists
inPhilippinejurisdiction.ThePhilippineexperiencerevealsthatitisnotaversetorequestingthe
assistance of the military in the implementation and execution of certain traditionally civil
functions.As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, some of the multifarious activities
wherein military aid has been rendered, exemplifying the activities that bring both the civilian
andthemilitarytogetherinarelationshipofcooperation,are:
1.Elections[42]
2.AdministrationofthePhilippineNationalRedCross[43]
3.Reliefandrescueoperationsduringcalamitiesanddisasters[44]
4.Amateursportspromotionanddevelopment[45]
5.Developmentofthecultureandthearts[46]
6.Conservationofnaturalresources[47]
7.Implementationoftheagrarianreformprogram[48]
8.Enforcementofcustomslaws[49]
9.Compositecivilianmilitarylawenforcementactivities[50]
10.Conductoflicensureexaminations[51]
11.Conductofnationwidetestsforelementaryandhighschoolstudents[52]
12.Antidrugenforcementactivities[53]
13.Sanitaryinspections[54]
14.Conductofcensuswork[55]
15.AdministrationoftheCivilAeronauticsBoard[56]
16.Assistanceininstallationofweatherforecastingdevices[57]
17.Peaceandorderpolicyformulationinlocalgovernmentunits.[58]
This unquestionably constitutes a gloss on executive power resulting from a systematic,
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of Congress and, yet, never
before questioned.[59] What we have here is mutual support and cooperation between the
militaryandcivilianauthorities,notderogationofciviliansupremacy.
In the United States, where a long tradition of suspicion and hostility towards the use of
militaryforcefordomesticpurposeshaspersisted,[60]andwhoseConstitution,unlikeours,does
not expressly provide for the power to call, the use of military personnel by civilian law
enforcement officers is allowed under circumstances similar to those surrounding the present
deploymentofthePhilippineMarines.UnderthePosseComitatusAct[61]oftheUS,theuseof
the military in civilian law enforcement is generally prohibited, except in certain allowable
circumstances.AprovisionoftheActstates:
1385.UseofArmyandAirForceaspossecomitatus
Whoever,exceptincasesandundercircumstancesexpresslyauthorizedbytheConstitutionor
ActofCongress,willfullyusesanypartoftheArmyortheAirForceaspossecomitatusor
otherwisetoexecutethelawsshallbefinednotmorethan$10,000orimprisonednotmorethan
twoyears,orboth.[62]
TodeterminewhetherthereisaviolationofthePosseComitatusActintheuseofmilitary
personnel,theUScourts[63]applythefollowingstandards,towit:
WereArmyorAirForcepersonnelusedbythecivilianlawenforcementofficersatWounded
Kneeinsuchamannerthatthemilitarypersonnelsubjectedthecitizenstotheexerciseof
militarypowerwhichwasregulatory,proscriptive,orcompulsory[64]GeorgeWashingtonLawReview,
pp.404433(1986),whichdiscussesthefourdivergentstandardsforassessingacceptableinvolvementofmilitary
personnelincivillawenforcement.SeelikewiseHONOREDINTHEBREECH:PRESIDENTIALAUTHORITYTO
EXECUTETHELAWSWITHMILITARYFORCE,83YaleLawJournal,pp.130152,1973.64innature,either
presentlyorprospectively?
xxx
Whenthisconceptistransplantedintothepresentlegalcontext,wetakeittomeanthatmilitary
involvement,evenwhennotexpresslyauthorizedbytheConstitutionorastatute,doesnot
violatethePosseComitatusActunlessitactuallyregulates,forbidsorcompelssomeconduct
onthepartofthoseclaimingrelief.Amerethreatofsomefutureinjurywouldbeinsufficient.
(emphasissupplied)
EveniftheCourtweretoapplytheaboverigidstandardstothepresentcasetodetermine
whether there is permissible use of the military in civilian law enforcement, the conclusion is
inevitablethatnoviolationoftheciviliansupremacyclauseintheConstitutioniscommitted.On
thispoint,theCourtagreeswiththeobservationoftheSolicitorGeneral:
3.ThedesignationoftasksinAnnexA[65]doesnotconstitutetheexerciseofregulatory,proscriptive,
orcompulsorymilitarypower.First,thesoldiersdonotcontrolordirecttheoperation.Thisisevidentfrom
Nos.6,[66]8(k)[67]and9(a)[68]ofAnnexA.Thesesoldiers,second,alsohavenopowertoprohibitor
condemn.InNo.9(d)[69]ofAnnexA,allarrestedpersonsarebroughttothenearestpolicestationsforproper
disposition.Andlast,thesesoldiersapplynocoerciveforce.Thematerialsorequipmentissuedtothem,as
showninNo.8(c)[70]ofAnnexA,arealllowimpactanddefensiveincharacter.Theconclusionisthatthere
beingnoexerciseofregulatory,proscriptiveorcompulsorymilitarypower,thedeploymentofahandfulof
PhilippineMarinesconstitutesnoimpermissibleuseofmilitarypowerforcivilianlawenforcement.[71]
It appears that the present petition is anchored on fear that once the armed forces are
deployed,themilitarywillgainascendancy,andthusplaceinperilourcherishedliberties.Such
apprehensions,however,areunfounded.Thepowertocallthearmedforcesisjustthatcalling
outthearmedforces.Unless,petitionerIBPcanshow,whichithasnot,thatinthedeployment
of the Marines, the President has violated the fundamental law, exceeded his authority or
jeopardizedthecivillibertiesofthepeople,thisCourtisnotinclinedtooverrulethePresidents
determinationofthefactualbasisforthecallingoftheMarinestopreventorsuppresslawless
violence.
Onelastpoint.SincetheinstitutionofthejointvisibilitypatrolinJanuary,2000,notasingle
citizen has complained that his political or civil rights have been violated as a result of the
deploymentoftheMarines.Itwaspreciselytosafeguardpeace,tranquilityandthecivilliberties
ofthepeoplethatthejointvisibilitypatrolwasconceived.Freedomanddemocracywillbeinfull
bloomonlywhenpeoplefeelsecureintheirhomesandinthestreets,notwhentheshadowsof
violenceandanarchyconstantlylurkintheirmidst.
WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,thepetitionisherebyDISMISSED.
SOORDERED.
Davide,Jr.,C.J.,Melo,Purisima,Pardo,Buena,GonzagaReyes,YnaresSantiago,andDe
Leon,Jr.,JJ.,concur.
Bellosillo,J.,onofficialleave.
Puno,J.,seeseparateopinion.
Vitug,J.,seeseparateopinion.
Mendoza,J.,seeconcurringanddissentingopinion.
Panganiban,J.,intheresult.
Quisumbing,J.,joinstheopinionofJ.Mendoza.
SEPARATEOPINION
PUNO,J.:
Ifthecaseatbarissignificant,itisbecauseofthegovernmentattempttofoistthepolitical
questiondoctrine to shield an executive act done in the exercise of the commanderinchief
powersfromjudicialscrutiny.Iftheattemptsucceeded,itwouldhavediminishedthepower
of judicial review and weakened the checking authority of this Court over the Chief
Executive when he exercises his commanderinchief powers. The attempt should
remind us of the tragedy that befell the country when this Court sought refuge in the
political question doctrine and forfeited its most important role as protector of the civil
andpoliticalrightsofourpeople.TheongoingconflictinMindanaomayworsenandcan
forcetheChiefExecutivetoresorttotheuseofhisgreatercommanderinchiefpowers,
hence, this Court should be extra cautious in assaying similar attempts. A laid back
posture may not sit well with our people considering that the 1987 Constitution
strengthenedthecheckingpowersofthisCourtandexpandeditsjurisdictionprecisely
tostopanyactconstitutingxxxgraveabuseofjurisdictionxxxonthepartofanybranch
orinstrumentalityoftheGovernment.1
The importance of the issue at bar includes this humble separate opinion. We can best
perceivethedifferentintersectingdimensionsofthepoliticalquestiondoctrinebyviewingthem
from the broader canvass of history.Political questions are defined as those questions which
undertheConstitution,aretobedecidedbythepeopleintheirsovereigncapacity,orinregard
towhichfulldiscretionaryauthorityhasbeendelegatedtothelegislativeorexecutivebranchof
government.2Theyhavetwoaspects:(1)thosemattersthataretobeexercisedbythepeople
in their primary political capacity and (2) matters which have been specifically delegated to
someotherdepartmentorparticularofficeofthegovernment,withdiscretionarypowertoact.3
The exercise of the discretionary power of the legislative or executive branch of government
wasoftentheareawheretheCourthadtowrestlewiththepoliticalquestiondoctrine.4
Abriefreviewofsomeofourcaselawwillthusgiveusasharperperspectiveofthepolitical
questiondoctrine.ThisquestionconfrontedtheCourtasearlyas1905inthecaseofBarcelon
v. Baker.5 The GovernorGeneral of the Philippine Islands, pursuant to a resolution of the
Philippine Commission, suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Cavite and
Batangas based on a finding of open insurrection in said provinces. Felix Barcelon, who was
detained by constabulary officers in Batangas, filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeascorpusallegingthattherewasnoopeninsurrectioninBatangas.The issue to resolve
waswhetherornotthejudicialdepartmentmayinvestigatethefactsuponwhichthelegislative
(the Philippine Commission) and executive (the GovernorGeneral) branches of government
actedinsuspendingtheprivilegeofthewrit.
The Court ruled that under our form of government, one department has no authority to
inquire into the acts of another, which acts are performed within the discretion of the other
department.6SurveyingAmericanlawandjurisprudence,itheldthatwheneverastatutegives
discretionarypowertoanyperson,tobeexercisedbyhimuponhisownopinionofcertainfacts,
thestatuteconstituteshimthesolejudgeoftheexistenceofthosefacts.7SincethePhilippine
Billof1902empoweredthePhilippineCommissionandtheGovernorGeneraltosuspendthe
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, this power is exclusively within the discretion of the
legislative and executive branches of government. The exercise of this discretion is
conclusiveuponthecourts.8
The Court further held that once a determination is made by the executive and legislative
departments that the conditions justifying the assailed acts exists, it will presume that the
conditions continue until the same authority decide that they no longer exist.9 It adopted the
rationalethattheexecutivebranch,thruitscivilandmilitarybranches,arebettersituated to
obtaininformationaboutpeaceandorderfromeverycornerofthenation,incontrastwiththe
judicial department, with its very limited machinery.10 The seed of the political question
doctrinewasthusplantedinPhilippinesoil.
The doctrine barring judicial review because of the political question doctrine was
next applied to the internal affairs of the legislature. The Court refused to interfere in the
legislative exercise of disciplinary power over its own members. In the 1924 case of
Alejandrinov.Quezon,11Alejandrino,whowasappointedSenatorbytheGovernorGeneral,
was declared by Senate Resolution as guilty of disorderly conduct for assaulting another
Senator in the course of a debate, and was suspended from office for one year. Senator
AlejandrinofiledapetitionformandamusandinjunctiontocompeltheSenatetoreinstatehim.
TheCourtheldthatundertheJonesLaw,thepoweroftheSenatetopunishitsmembersfor
disorderlybehaviordoesnotauthorizeittosuspendanappointivememberfromtheexerciseof
hisoffice.WhiletheCourtfoundthatthesuspensionwasillegal,itrefusedtoissuethewritof
mandamusonthegroundthat"theSupremeCourtdoesnotpossessthepowerofcoercionto
make the Philippine Senate take any particular action. [T]he Philippine Legislature or any
branch thereof cannot be directly controlled in the exercise of their legislative powers by any
judicialprocess."12
The issue revisited the Court twentytwo (22) years later. In 1946, in Vera v. Avelino,13
three senatorselect who had been prevented from taking their oaths of office by a Senate
resolutionrepairedtothisCourttocompeltheircolleaguestoallowthemtooccupytheirseats
contending that only the Electoral Tribunal had jurisdiction over contests relating to their
election,returnsandqualifications.Again,theCourtrefusedtointervenecitingAlejandrinoand
affirmed the inherent right of the legislature to determine who shall be admitted to its
membership.
In the 1947 case of Mabanag v. LopezVito,14 three Senators and eight representatives
who were proclaimed elected by Comelec were not allowed by Congress to take part in the
voting for the passage of the Parity amendment to the Constitution. If their votes had been
counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of
the necessary threefourths vote in either House of Congress to pass the amendment. The
amendment was eventually submitted to the people for ratification. The Court declined to
intervene and held that a proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function
performedbyCongressinitssovereignlegislativecapacity.15
Inthe1955caseofArnaultv.Balagtas,16petitioner,aprivatecitizen,assailedthelegality
of his detention ordered by the Senate for his refusal to answer questions put to him by
membersofoneofitsinvestigatingcommittees.ThisCourtrefusedtoorderhisreleaseholding
thattheprocessbywhichacontumaciouswitnessisdealtwithbythelegislatureisanecessary
concomitantofthelegislativeprocessandthelegislature'sexerciseofitsdiscretionaryauthority
isnotsubjecttojudicialinterference.
In the 1960 case of Osmena v. Pendatun,17 the Court followed the traditional line.
CongressmanSergioOsmena,Jr.wassuspendedbytheHouseofRepresentativesforserious
disorderly behavior for making a privilege speech imputing "malicious charges" against the
President of the Philippines. Osmena, Jr. invoked the power of review of this Court but the
CourtoncemoredidnotinterferewithCongress'powertodisciplineitsmembers.
The contours of the political question doctrine have always been tricky. To be sure, the
Court did not always stay its hand whenever the doctrine is invoked. In the 1949 case of
Avelino v. Cuenco,18 Senate President Jose Avelino, who was deposed and replaced,
questionedhissuccessor'stitleclaimingthatthelatterhadbeenelectedwithoutaquorum.The
petition was initially dismissed on the ground that the selection of Senate President was an
internal matter and not subject to judicial review.19 On reconsideration, however, the Court
ruled that it could assume jurisdiction over the controversy in light of subsequent events
justifyinginterventionamongwhichwastheexistenceofaquorum.20Thoughthepetitionwas
ultimately dismissed, the Court declared respondent Cuenco as the legally elected Senate
President.
In the 1957 case of Tanada v. Cuenco,21 the Court assumed jurisdiction over a dispute
involvingtheformationandcompositionoftheSenateElectoralTribunal.ItrejectedtheSolicitor
General'sclaimthatthedisputeinvolvedapoliticalquestion.Instead,itdeclaredthattheSenate
isnotclothedwith"fulldiscretionaryauthority"inthechoiceofmembersoftheSenateElectoral
Tribunalandtheexerciseofitspowerthereonissubjecttoconstitutionallimitationswhichare
mandatory in nature.22 It held that under the Constitution, the membership of the Senate
ElectoralTribunalwasdesignedtoinsuretheexerciseofjudicialimpartialityinthedispositionof
election contests affecting members of the lawmaking body.23 The Court then nullified the
election to the Senate Electoral Tribunal made by Senators belonging to the party having the
largest number of votes of two of their party members but purporting to act on behalf of the
partyhavingthesecondhighestnumberofvotes.
In the 1962 case of Cunanan v. Tan, Jr.,24 the Court passed judgment on whether
Congress had formed the Commission on Appointments in accordance with the Constitution
andfoundthatitdidnot.ItdeclaredthattheCommissiononAppointmentsisacreatureofthe
ConstitutionanditspowerdoesnotcomefromCongressbutfromtheConstitution.
The1967caseofGonzalesv.Comelec25 andthe1971caseofTolentinov.Comelec26
abandoned Mabanag v. LopezVito. The question of whether or not Congress, acting as a
constituentassemblyinproposingamendmentstotheConstitutionviolatestheConstitutionwas
heldtobeajusticiableandnotapoliticalissue.InGonzales,theCourtruled:
"ItistruethatinMabanagv.LopezVito,thisCourtcharacterizingtheissuesubmittedtheretoas
apoliticalone,declinedtopassuponthequestionwhetherornotagivennumberofvotescast
inCongressinfavorofaproposedamendmenttotheConstitutionwhichwasbeingsubmitted
tothepeopleforratificationsatisfiedthethreefourthsvoterequirementofthefundamentallaw.
Theforceofthisprecedenthasbeenweakened,however,bySuanesv.ChiefAccountantofthe
Senate,Avelinov.Cuenco,Tanadav.Cuenco,andMaciasv.CommissiononElections.Inthe
first,weheldthattheofficersandemployeesoftheSenateElectoralTribunalareunderits
supervisionandcontrol,notofthatoftheSenatePresident,asclaimedbythelatterinthe
second,thisCourtproceededtodeterminethenumberofSenatorsnecessaryforaquorumin
theSenateinthethird,wenullifiedtheelection,bySenatorsbelongingtothepartyhavingthe
largestnumberofvotesinsaidchamber,purportingtoactonbehalfofthepartyhavingthe
secondlargestnumberofvotestherein,oftwo(2)Senatorsbelongingtothefirstparty,as
members,forthesecondparty,oftheSenateElectoralTribunalandinthefourth,wedeclared
unconstitutionalanactofCongresspurportingtoapportiontherepresentativedistrictsforthe
HouseofRepresentativesuponthegroundthattheapportionmenthadnotbeenmadeasmay
bepossibleaccordingtothenumberofinhabitantsofeachprovince.Thus,werejectedthe
theory,advancedinthesefourcases,thattheissuesthereinraisedwerepoliticalquestionsthe
determinationofwhichisbeyondjudicialreview.27
TheCourtexplainedthatthepowertoamendtheConstitutionortoproposeamendments
theretoisnotincludedinthegeneralgrantoflegislativepowerstoCongress.Asaconstituent
assembly,themembersofCongressderivetheirauthorityfromthefundamentallawandthey
donothavethefinalsayonwhethertheiractsarewithinorbeyondconstitutionallimits.28This
rulingwasreiteratedinTolentinowhichheldthatactsofaconstitutionalconventioncalledfor
the purpose of proposing amendments to the Constitution are at par with acts of Congress
actingasaconstituentassembly.29
In sum, this Court brushed aside the political question doctrine and assumed
jurisdictionwheneveritfoundconstitutionallyimposedlimitsontheexerciseofpowers
conferredupontheLegislature.30
TheCourthewedtothesamelineasregardstheexerciseofExecutivepower.Thus,
therespectaccordedexecutivediscretionwasobservedinSeverinov.GovernorGeneral,31
whereitwasheldthattheGovernorGeneral,asheadoftheexecutivedepartment,couldnotbe
compelledbymandamustocallaspecialelectioninthetownofSilayforthepurposeofelecting
amunicipalpresident.Mandamusandinjunctioncouldnotlietoenforceorrestrainadutywhich
is discretionary. It was held that when the Legislature conferred upon the GovernorGeneral
powersandduties,itdidsoforthereasonthathewasinabetterpositiontoknowtheneedsof
thecountrythananyothermemberoftheexecutivedepartment,andwithfullconfidencethathe
willperformsuchdutiesashisbestjudgmentdictates.32
Similarly, in Abueva v. Wood,33 the Court held that the GovernorGeneral could not be
compelledbymandamustoproducecertainvouchersshowingthevariousexpendituresofthe
IndependenceCommission.Undertheprincipleofseparationofpowers,itruledthatitwasnot
intended by the Constitution that one branch of government could encroach upon the field of
duty of the other. Each department has an exclusive field within which it can perform its part
withincertaindiscretionarylimits.34Itobservedthat"theexecutiveandlegislativedepartments
of government are frequently called upon to deal with what are known as political questions,
withwhichthejudicialdepartmentofgovernmenthasnointervention.Inallsuchquestions,the
courtsuniformlyrefusedtointerveneforthepurposeofdirectingorcontrollingtheactionsofthe
other department such questions being many times reserved to those departments in the
organiclawofthestate."35
In Forties v. Tiaco,36 the Court also refused to take cognizance of a case enjoining the
ChiefExecutivefromdeportinganobnoxiousalienwhosecontinuedpresenceinthePhilippines
was found by him to be injurious to the public interest. It noted that sudden and unexpected
conditions may arise, growing out of the presence of untrustworthy aliens, which demand
immediate action. The President's inherent power to deport undesirable aliens is universally
denominatedaspolitical,andthispowercontinuestoexistforthepreservationofthepeaceand
domestictranquilityofthenation.37
In Manalang v. Quitoriano,38 the Court also declined to interfere in the exercise of the
President'sappointingpower.It held that the appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of
thePresident,uponwhichnolimitationsmaybeimposedbyCongress,exceptthoseresulting
from the need of securing concurrence of the Commission on Appointments and from the
exerciseofthelimitedlegislativepowertoprescribequalificationstoagivenappointiveoffice.
WenowcometotheexercisebythePresidentofhispowersasCommanderinChief
visavisthepoliticalquestiondoctrine.Inthe1940's,thisCourthasheldthatasCommanderin
ChiefoftheArmedForces,thePresidenthasthepowertodeterminewhetherwar,inthelegal
sense, still continues or has terminated. It ruled that it is within the province of the political
departmentandnotofthejudicialdepartmentofgovernmenttodeterminewhenwarisatend.39
In1952,theCourtdecidedthelandmarkcaseofMontenegrov.Castaneda.40 President
Quirino suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for persons detained or to be
detained for crimes of sedition, insurrection or rebellion.The Court, citing Barcelon, declared
that the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring the suspension of the
privilegebelongstothePresidentandhisdecisionisfinalandconclusiveonthecourts.41
Barcelon was the ruling case law until the 1971 case of Lansang v. Garcia came.42
Lansangreversed thepreviouscasesandheldthatthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritof
habeascorpuswasnotapoliticalquestion.AccordingtotheCourt,theweightofBarcelonwas
dilutedbytwofactors:(1)itreliedheavilyonMartinv.Mott,whichinvolvedtheU.S.President's
powertocalloutthemilitiawhichisamuchbroaderpowerthansuspensionoftheprivilegeof
thewritand(2)theprivilegewassuspendedbytheAmericanGovernorGeneralwhoseact,as
representativeofthesovereignaffectingthefreedomofitssubjects,couldnotbeequatedwith
thatofthePresidentofthePhilippinesdealingwiththefreedomofthesovereignFilipinopeople.
The Court declared that the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is neither absolute nor unqualified because the Constitution sets limits on the
exerciseofexecutivediscretiononthematter.Theselimitsare:(1)thattheprivilegemust
notbesuspendedexceptonlyincasesofinvasion,insurrectionorrebellionorimminentdanger
thereof and (2) when the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be
suspendedwhereverduringsuchperiodthenecessityforthesuspensionshallexist.Theextent
ofthepowerwhichmaybeinquiredintobycourtsisdefinedbytheselimitations.43
Onthevitalissue of how the Court may inquire into the President's exercise of power, it
ruled that the function of the Court is not to supplant but merely to check the Executive to
ascertainwhetherthePresidenthasgonebeyondtheconstitutionallimitsofhisjurisdiction,not
to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. Judicial inquiry is
confinedtothequestionofwhetherthePresidentdidnotactarbitrarily.44Usingthisyardstick,
theCourtfoundthatthePresidentdidnot.
Theemergencyperiodofthe1970'sfloodedtheCourtwithcaseswhichraisedthepolitical
question defense. The issue divided the Court down the middle. Javellana v. Executive
Secretary45showedthatwhileamajorityoftheCourtheldthattheissueofwhetherornotthe
1973Constitutionhadbeenratifiedinaccordancewiththe1935Constitutionwasjusticiable,a
majorityalsoruledthatthedecisiveissueofwhetherthe1973Constitutionhadcomeintoforce
andeffect,withorwithoutconstitutionalratification,wasapoliticalquestion.46
The validity of the declaration of martial law by then President Marcos was next litigated
beforetheCourt.InAquino,Jr.v.Enrile,47itupheldthePresident'sdeclarationofmartiallaw.
Onwhetherthevalidityoftheimpositionofmartiallawwasapoliticalorjusticiablequestion,the
Court was almost evenly divided. Onehalf embraced the political question position and the
other half subscribed to the justiciable position in Lansang. Those adhering to the political
questiondoctrineuseddifferentmethodsofapproachtoit.48
In1983,theLansangrulingwasweakenedbytheCourtinGarciaPadillav.Enrile.49The
petitioners therein were arrested and detained by the Philippine Constabulary by virtue of a
Presidential Commitment Order (PCO). Petitioners sought the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus.TheCourtfoundthatthePCOhadthefunctionofvalidatingaperson'sdetentionforany
of the offenses covered in Proclamation No. 2045 which continued in force the suspension of
theprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus.ItheldthattheissuanceofthePCObythePresident
was not subject to judicial inquiry.50 It went further by declaring that there was a need to re
examineLansangwithaviewtorevertingtoBarcelonandMontenegro.Itobservedthatintimes
ofwarornationalemergency,thePresidentmustbegivenabsolutecontrolfortheverylifeof
thenationandgovernmentisingreatperil.ThePresident,itintoned,isanswerableonlytohis
conscience,thepeople,andGod.51
Butbarelysix(6)daysafterGarciaPadilla,theCourtpromulgatedMorales,Jr.v.Enrile52
reiterating Lansang. It held that by the power of judicial review, the Court must inquire into
everyphaseandaspectofaperson'sdetentionfromthemomenthewastakenintocustodyup
tothemomentthecourtpassesuponthemeritsofthepetition.Onlyaftersuchascrutinycan
thecourtsatisfyitselfthatthedueprocessclauseoftheConstitutionhasbeenmet.53
It is now history that the improper reliance by the Court on the political question
doctrineerodedthepeople'sfaithinitscapacitytocheckabusescommittedbythethen
Executive in the exercise of his commanderinchief powers, particularly violations
against human rights. The refusal of courts to be proactive in the exercise of its
checking power drove the people to the streets to resort to extralegal remedies. They
gavebirthtoEDSA.
TwolessonswerenotlosttothemembersoftheConstitutionalCommissionthatdrafted
the1987Constitution.ThefirstwastheneedtograntthisCourttheexpresspowertoreview
the exercise of the powers as commanderinchief by the President and deny it of any
discretiontodeclineitsexercise.ThesecondwastheneedtocompeltheCourttobepro
activebyexpandingitsjurisdictionand,thus,rejectitslaidbackstanceagainstactsconstituting
grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Then
ChiefJusticeRobertoConcepcion,amemberoftheConstitutionalCommission,workedforthe
insertion of the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII in the draft Constitution,54 which
reads:
"Sec.1.xxx.
Judicialpowerincludesthedutyofthecourtsofjusticetosettleactualcontroversiesinvolving
rightswhicharelegallydemandableandenforceable,andtodeterminewhetherornotthere
hasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthe
partofanybranchorinstrumentalityoftheGovernment."
ThelanguageoftheprovisionclearlygivestheCourtthepowertostrikedownactsamounting
tograveabuseofdiscretionofboththelegislativeandexecutivebranchesofgovernment.
We should interpret Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in light of our
constitutionalhistory.Theprovisionstates:
"Sec.18.ThePresidentshallbetheCommanderinChiefofallarmedforcesofthe
Philippinesandwheneveritbecomesnecessary,hemaycalloutsucharmedforcesto
preventorsuppresslawlessviolence,invasionorrebellion.Incaseofinvasionor
rebellion,whenthepublicsafetyrequiresit,hemay,foraperiodnotexceedingsixty
days,suspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusorplacethePhilippinesorany
partthereofundermartiallaw.Withinfortyeighthoursfromtheproclamationofmartiallawor
thesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus,thePresidentshallsubmitareport
inpersonorinwritingtoCongress.TheCongress,votingjointly,byavoteofatleastamajority
ofallitsMembersinregularorspecialsession,mayrevokesuchproclamationorsuspension,
whichrevocationshallnotbesetasidebythePresident.UpontheinitiativeofthePresident,the
Congressmay,inthesamemanner,extendsuchproclamationorsuspensionforaperiodtobe
determinedbyCongress,iftheinvasionorrebellionshallpersistandpublicsafetyrequiresit.
TheCongress,ifnotinsession,shall,withintwentyfourhoursfollowingsuchproclamationor
suspension,conveneinaccordancewithitsruleswithoutneedofacall.
TheSupremeCourtmayreview,inanappropriateproceedingfiledbyanycitizen,the
sufficiencyofthefactualbasisoftheproclamationofmartiallaworthesuspensionof
theprivilegeofthewritortheextensionthereof,andmustpromulgateitsdecision
thereonwithinthirtydaysfromitsfiling.
xxx."
It is clear from the foregoing that the President, as CommanderinChief of the armed
forces of the Philippines, may call out the armed forces subject to two conditions: (1)
whenever it becomes necessary and (2) to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasionorrebellion.Undeniably,theseconditionslaydownthesinequarequirementfor
theexerciseofthepowerandtheobjectivesoughttobeattainedbytheexerciseofthe
power. They define the constitutional parameters of the calling out power. Whether or
notthereiscompliancewiththeseparametersisajusticiableissueandisnotapolitical
question.
IamnotunawarethatinthedeliberationsoftheConstitutionalCommission,Commissioner
BernasopinedthatthePresident'sexerciseofthe"callingoutpower,"unlikethesuspensionof
theprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusandthedeclarationofmartiallaw,isnotajusticiable
issuebutapoliticalquestionandthereforenotsubjecttojudicialreview.
Itmustbeborneinmind,however,thatwhileamember'sopinionexpressedonthefloorof
the Constitutional Convention is valuable, it is not necessarily expressive of the people's
intent.55TheproceedingsoftheConventionarelessconclusiveontheproperconstructionof
thefundamentallawthanarelegislativeproceedingsoftheproperconstructionofastatute,for
in the latter case it is the intent of the legislature the courts seek, while in the former, courts
seek to arrive at the intent of the people through the discussions and deliberations of their
representatives.56 The conventional wisdom is that the Constitution does not derive its force
fromtheconventionwhichframedit,butfromthepeoplewhoratifiedit,theintenttobearrived
atisthatofthepeople.57
It is true that the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
expresslygivestheCourtthepowertoreviewthesufficiencyofthefactualbasesused
bythePresidentinthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusandthe
declaration of martial law. It does not follow, however, that just because the same
provisiondidnotgranttothisCourtthepowertoreviewtheexerciseofthecallingout
powerbythePresident,ergo,thisCourtcannotpassuponthevalidityofitsexercise.
Given the light of our constitutional history, this express grant of power merely
means that the Court cannot decline the exercise of its power because of the political
question doctrine as it did in the past. In fine, the express grant simply stresses the
mandatorydutyofthisCourttochecktheexerciseofthecommanderinchiefpowersof
the President. It eliminated the discretion of the Court not to wield its power of review
thrutheuseofthepoliticalquestiondoctrine.
It may be conceded that the calling out power may be a "lesser power" compared to the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to declare martial
law.Eventhen,itsexercisecannotbelefttotheabsolutediscretionoftheChiefExecutiveas
CommanderinChiefofthearmedforces,asitsimpactontherightsofourpeopleprotectedby
the Constitution cannot be downgraded. We cannot hold that acts of the commanderinchief
cannotbereviewedonthegroundthattheyhavelesserimpactonthecivilandpoliticalrightsof
ourpeople.Theexerciseofthecallingoutpowermaybe"benign"inthecaseatbarbutmay
notbesoinfuturecases.
The counsel of Mr. Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in his Dissenting and Concurring
OpinioninLansang that it would be dangerous and misleading to push the political question
doctrine too far, is apropos. It will not be complementary to the Court if it handcuffs itself to
helplessnesswhenagrievouslyinjuredcitizenseeksrelieffromapalpablyunwarranteduseof
presidential or military power, especially when the question at issue falls in the penumbra
betweenthe"political"andthe"justiciable."58
Weshouldnotwaterdowntherulingthatdecidingwhetheramatterhasbeencommittedby
theConstitutiontoanotherbranchofgovernment,orwhethertheactionofthatbranchexceeds
whatever authority has been committed, is a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation,
andisaresponsibilityoftheCourtasultimateinterpreterofthefundamentallaw.59When
private justiciable rights are involved in a suit, the Court must not refuse to assume jurisdiction
eventhoughquestionsofextremepoliticalimportancearenecessarilyinvolved.60Everyofficer
under a constitutional government must act according to law and subject to the controlling
powerofthepeople,actingthroughthecourts,aswellasthroughtheexecutiveandlegislative.
Onedepartmentisjustasrepresentativeoftheother,andthejudiciaryisthedepartmentwhich
is charged with the special duty of determining the limitations which the law places upon all
officialaction.61ThishistoricroleoftheCourtisthefoundationstoneofagovernmentoflaws
andnotofmen.62
IjointheDecisioninitsresult.
SEPARATEOPINION
VITUG,J.:
In the equation of judicial power, neither of two extremes one totalistic and the other
bounded is acceptable nor ideal. The 1987 Constitution has introduced its definition of the
term"judicialpower"tobethatwhich
xxxincludesthedutyofthecourtsofjusticetosettleactualcontroversiesinvolvingrights
whicharelegallydemandableandenforceable,andtodeterminewhetherornottherehas
beengraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartof
anybranchorinstrumentalityoftheGovernment.1
It is not meant that the Supreme Court must be deemed vested with the awesome power of
overseeing the entire bureaucracy, let alone of institutionalizing judicial absolutism, under its
mandate.ButwhilethisCourtdoesnotwieldunlimitedauthoritytostrikedownanactofitstwo
coequalbranchesofgovernment,itmustnotwitherundertechnicalguiseonitsconstitutionally
ordainedtasktointervene,andtonullifyifneedbe,anysuchactasandwhenitisattendedby
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The proscription then
againstaninterpositionbytheCourtintopurelypoliticalquestions,heretoforeknown,nolonger
holdswithinthatcontext.
Justice Feria, in the case of Avelino vs. Cuenco,2 has aptly elucidated in his concurring
opinion:
"xxx[I]concurwiththemajoritythatthisCourthasjurisdictionovercaseslikethepresentxxx
soastoestablishinthiscountrythejudicialsupremacy,withtheSupremeCourtasthefinal
arbiter,toseethatnoonebranchoragencyofthegovernmenttranscendstheConstitution,not
onlyinjusticeablebutpoliticalquestionsaswell."3
ItisherewhentheCourtmusthavetodepartfromthebroadprincipleofseparationofpowers
thatdisallowsanintrusionbyitinrespecttothepurelypoliticaldecisionsofitsindependentand
coordinateagenciesofgovernment.
The term grave abuse of discretion is long understood in our jurisprudence as being, and
confinedto,acapriciousandwhimsicalordespoticexerciseofjudgmentamountingtolackor
excessofjurisdiction.Minusthenotsounusualexaggerationsofteninvokedbylitigantsinthe
duel of views, the act of the President in simply calling on the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, an executive prerogative, to assist the Philippine National Police in "joint
visibilitypatrols"inthemetropolisdoesnot,Ibelieve,constitutegraveabuseofdiscretionthat
would now warrant an exercise by the Supreme Court of its extraordinary power as so
envisionedbythefundamentallaw.
Accordingly,Ivoteforthedismissalofthepetition.
MENDOZA,J.,concurringanddissenting:
I concur in the opinion of the Court insofar as it holds petitioner to be without standing to
question the validity of LOI 02/2000 which mandates the Philippine Marines to conduct "joint
visibility"patrolswiththepoliceinMetroManila.ButIdissentinsofarastheopiniondismisses
the petition in this case on other grounds. I submit that judgment on the substantive
constitutional issues raised by petitioner must await an actual case involving real parties with
"injuries" to show as a result of the operation of the challenged executive action.While as an
organizationfortheadvancementoftheruleoflawpetitionerhasaninterestinupholdingthe
Constitution,itsinterestisindistinguishablefromtheinterestoftherestofthecitizenryandfalls
shortofthatwhichisnecessarytogivepetitionerstanding.
As I have indicated elsewhere, a citizens' suit challenging the constitutionality of
governmentalactionrequiresthat(1)thepetitionermusthavesufferedan"injuryinfact"ofan
actual or imminent nature (2) there must be a causal connection between the injury and the
conductcomplainedofand(3)theinjuryislikelytoberedressedbyafavorableactionbythis
Court.1The"injuryinfact"testrequiresmorethaninjurytoacognizableinterest.Itrequiresthat
thepartyseekingreviewbehimselfamongthoseinjured.2
My insistence on compliance with the standing requirement is grounded in the conviction
thatonlyapartyinjuredbytheoperationofthegovernmentalactionchallengedisinthebest
position to aid the Court in determining the precise nature of the problem presented. Many a
timewehaveadvertedtothepowerofjudicialreviewasanawesomepowernottobeexercised
save in the most exigent situation.For, indeed, sound judgment on momentous constitutional
questions is not likely to be reached unless it is the result of a clash of adversary arguments
whichonlypartieswithdirectandspecificinterestintheoutcomeofthecontroversycanmake.
Thisistruenotonlywhenwestrikedownalaworofficialactionbutalsowhenweupholdit.
Inthiscase,becauseoftheabsenceofpartieswithrealandsubstantialinteresttoprotect,
we do not have evidence on the effect of military presence in malls and commercial centers,
i.e.,whethersuchpresenceiscoerciveorbenign.Wedonotknowwhetherthepresenceofso
manymarinesandpolicemenscaresshoppers,tourists,andpeacefulcivilians,orwhetheritis
reassuring to them. To be sure, the deployment of troops to such places is not like parading
themattheLunetaonIndependenceDay.Neitherisit,however,likecallingthemoutbecause
ofactualfightingortheoutbreakofviolence.
We need to have evidence on these questions because, under the Constitution, the
President'spowertocalloutthearmedforcesinordertosuppresslawlessviolence,invasionor
rebellionissubjecttothelimitationthattheexerciseofthispowerisrequiredintheinterestof
publicsafety.3
Indeed,whetheritisthecallingoutofthearmedforcesaloneinordertosuppresslawless
violence, invasion or rebellion or also the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpusortheproclamationofmartiallaw(incaseofinvasionorrebellion),theexerciseofthe
President'spowersascommanderinchief,requiresproofnotmereassertion.4 As has been
pointed out, "Standing is not `an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable' . . . but
requires...afactualshowingofperceptibleharm."5
Becauseoftheabsenceofsuchrecordevidence,wearelefttoguessorevenspeculateon
thesequestions.Thus,atonepoint,themajorityopinionsaysthatwhatisinvolvedhereisnot
eventhecallingoutofthearmedforcesbutonlytheuseofmarinesforlawenforcement.(p.13)
Atanotherpoint,however,themajorityopinionsomersaultsandsaysthatbecauseofbombings
perpetrated by lawless elements, the deployment of troops in shopping centers and public
utilitiesisjustified.(p.24)
Wearelikelytoerrindismissingthesuitbroughtinthiscaseonthegroundthatthecalling
outofthemilitarydoesnotviolatetheConstitution,justaswearelikelytodosoifwegrantthe
petitionandinvalidatetheexecutiveissuanceinquestion.Forindeed,thelackofareal,earnest
and vital controversy can only impoverish the judicial process. That is why, as Justice Laurel
emphasized in the Angara case, "this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited
furthertotheconstitutionalquestionraisedortheverylismotapresented."6
Wearetold,however,thattheissuesraisedinthiscaseareof"paramountinterest"tothe
nation.Itispreciselybecausetheissuesraisedareofparamountimportancethatweshouldall
themoreforegorulingontheconstitutionalissuesraisedbypetitionerandlimitthedismissalof
this petition on the ground of lack of standing of petitioner. A Fabian policy of leaving well
enoughaloneisacounselofprudence.
For these reasons and with due appreciation of the scholarly attention lavished by the
majorityopinionontheconstitutionalquestionsraised,Iamconstrainedtolimitmyconcurrence
tothedismissalofthissuitonthegroundoflackofstandingofpetitionerandtheconsequent
lackofanactualcaseorcontroversy.
1Sec.1,ArticleVIII,1987Constitution.
2Tanadav.Cuenco,103Phil.1051,1067[1957],citing16C.J.S.413.
3Tanadav.Cuenco,supra,1067,quotingInreMcConaughy,119NW408[1909].
4Bernas,The1987ConstitutionoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesACommentary,p.859[1996].
55Phil.87[1905].
6Id.at97.
7Id.at104.
8SeeCruz,PhilippinePoliticallaw,p.87[1998].
9Id.at113114.
10Id.at106107.
1146Phil.83[1924].
12Id.at97.
1377Phil.192[1946].
1478Phil.1[1947].
15Id.at45.Thecourtalsoadoptedtheenrolledbilltheorywhich,likefindingsunderthepoliticalquestiondoctrine,imports
absoluteverityonthecourtsat12.
1697Phil.358[1955].
17109Phil.863[1960].
1883Phil.17[1949].
19Id.at2122.
20Id.at6869.
21103Phil.1051[1957].
22Id.at1068.
23Id.at1083.
245SCRA1[1962].
2521SCRA774[1967].
2641SCRA702[1971].
27Id.at785786.
28Id.at787.
2941SCRAat713.
30Bernas,The1987ConstitutionoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesACommentary,p.861[1996].
3116Phil.366[1910].
32Id.at401.
3345Phil.612[1924].
34Id.At630.
35Id.at637638.
3616Phil.534[1910].
37Id.at568569,576.
3894Phil.903[1954].
39Untalv.ChiefofStaff,AFP,84Phil.586[1949]Raquizav.Bradford,75Phil.50[1945].
4091Phil.882[1952].
41Id.at887.
4242SCRA448[1971].
43Id.at474.
44Id.at480481.
4550SCRA30[1973].
46Id.at138,140141.
4759SCRA183[1973].
48Ibid.
49121SCRA472[1983].
50Id.at490491.
51Id.at500501.
52121SCRA538[1983].
53Id.at563.
54SeeConcepcionssponsorshipspeech,IRecord434435seealsoBernas,theConstitutionoftheRepublicofthePhilippines
ACommentary,p.863[1996].
55J.M.Tuason&Co.,Inc.v.LandTenureAdministration,31SCRA413,423426[1970].
56Verav.Avelino,77Phil.192,215[1946]seealsoAgpalo,StatutoryConstruction,4thed.,p.454[1998].
57Black,HandbookontheConstructionandInterpretationofthelaws,2ded.,p.39[1911].
58SCRAat506507,seealsoRossiter,TheSupremeCourtandtheCommanderinChief,pp.1617[1951].
59Bakerv.Carr,7LEd2dat682.
60WilloughbyontheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates,vol.3,2ded.,p.1336[1929].
61Tanadav.Macapagal,103Phil.At1067,quotingInreMcConaughy,119NW408[1909].
62Id.
1Section1,ArticleVIIIoftheConstitution.
283Phil.17.
3Sen.MiriamDefensorSantiago,etal.vs.Sen.TeofistoGuingona,Jr.,etal.,298SCRA756.
1Tatadv.Garcia,243SCRA436,473(1995)(concurring).Accord,TelecommunicationandBroadcastAttorneysofthe
Philippinesv.COMELEC,289SCRA343(1998).
2Lujanv.DefendersofWildlife,504U.S.555,119L.Ed.2d351(1992).
3SeeCONST.,ART.VII,18.
4SeeLansangv.Garcia,42SCRA448(1971).
5Lujanv.DefendersofWildlife,supra.
6Angarav.ElectoralCommission,63Phil.139,158(1936)
[1]Rollo,pp.1721.
[2] As of 19 May 2000, the Marines have been recalled from their areas of deployment to join the military operations in
Mindanao, and replaced by Air Force personnel who took over their functions in the joint visibility patrols.The Air Force
personnel,justliketheMarines,wereorderedtoassistthePNP,alsobyvirtueofLOI2/2000.SinceboththeMarinesandAir
ForcebelongtotheArmedForces,thecontroversyhasnotbeenrenderedmootandacademicbythereplacementoftheformer
bythelatter.Thevalidityofthedeploymentofthearmedforcesinthejointvisibilitypatrolsthusremainanissue.
[3]Rollo,pp.7576.
[4]Id.,at75.
[5]Id.
[6]Id.
[7]Rollo,p.75.
[8]Id.,at1718.
[9]Id.
[10]Rollo,p.7.
[11]Id.,at24.
[12]PhilippineConstitutionAssociationv.Enriquez,235SCRA506(1994)citingLuzFarmsv.SecretaryoftheDepartment
ofAgrarianReform,192SCRA51(1990)Dumlaov.CommissiononElections,95SCRA392(1980)and,Peoplev.Vera,
65Phil.56(1937).
[13]Joyav.PresidentialCommissiononGoodGovenment,225SCRA568,576(1993).
[14] Ibid., citing House International Building Tenants Association, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 703
(1987).
[15]Bakerv.Carr,369U.S.186,82S.Ct.691,7L.Ed.2d663,678(1962).
[16]Joyav.PresidentialCommissiononGoodGovernment,supranote13,at579citingDumlaov.CommissiononElections,
95SCRA392(1980).
[17] Tatadv.SecretaryoftheDepartmentofEnergy,281SCRA330,349(1997)citingGarcia v. ExecutiveSecretary, 211
SCRA 219 (1992)Osmea v. COMELEC, 199 SCRA 750 (1991) Basco v. Pagcor,197 SCRA 52 (1991) and, Araneta v.
Dinglasan,84Phil.368(1949).
[18]Santiagov.COMELEC,270SCRA106(1997)Joyav.PresidentialCommissiononGoodGovernment,225SCRA568
(1993)Dazav.Singson,180SCRA496(1989).AsformulatedbyMr.Justice(nowChiefJustice)HilarioG.Davide,Jr.in
Kilosbayan,Inc.vs.Guingona,Jr.,[232SCRA110(1994)]"(a)party'sstandingbeforethisCourtisaproceduraltechnicality
whichitmay,intheexerciseofitsdiscretion,setasideinviewoftheimportanceoftheissuesraised,"favorablycitingour
rulingintheEmergencyPowersCases[L2044(Aranetav.Dinglasan)L2756(Aranetav.Angeles) L3054 (Rodriquez v.
Tesorero de Filipinas) and L3056 (Barredo v. COMELEC), 84 Phil. 368 (1940)] where this Court brushed aside this
technicality because "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and
definitely,brushingaside,ifwemust,technicalrulesofprocedure."Aninflexibleruleonlocusstandiwouldresultinwhat
Mr.JusticeFlorentinoP.Felicianoaptlydescribedasadoctrinalballandchainxxxclampedonourownlimbs."[Kilosbayan,
Inc.v.Morato,250SCRA130(1995)].
[19]Rollo,p.12
[20]ArticleII,Sections4and5oftheConstitutionprovide:
Sec.4.TheprimedutyoftheGovernmentistoserveandprotectthepeople.TheGovernmentmaycalluponthepeopleto
defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render
personal,militaryorcivilservice.
Sec.5.The maintenance of peace and order, the protection oflife, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general
welfareareessentialfortheenjoymentbyallthepeopleoftheblessingsofdemocracy.
[21]177SCRA668,694(1989).
[22]WESTSLEGALTHESAURUS/DICTIONARY(SpecialDeluxeEdition)p.440(1986).
[23]103Phil.1051(1957).
[24]369U.S.186,82Sct.691,7L.Ed.2d663,678(1962).
[25]ArticleVIII,Sec.1ofthe1987CONSTITUTION.
[26]Santiagov.Guingona,Jr.,298SCRA756(1998).
[27]Bengzon,Jr.v.SenateBlueRibbonCommittee,203SCRA767(1991).
[28] Marcosv.Manglapus,,supranote21,seealsoDazav.Singson,180SCRA496(1988)Cosetengv. Mitra, 187 SCRA

377(1990).
[29]Sinonv.CivilServiceCommission,215SCRA410(1992)SeealsoProducersBankv.NLRC,165SCRA284(1988)
LittonMillsv.GalleonTrader,Inc.,163SCRA494(1988).
[30]Ledesmav.CourtofAppeals,278SCRA659(1997).
[31]Bondocv.Pineda,201SCRA792(1991).
[32]Drilonv.Lim,235SCRA135(1994).
[33]Sarmientov.Mison,156SCRA549(1987).
[34]IIRECORDOFTHECONSTITUTIONALCOMMISSION:PROCEEDINGSANDDEBATES,pp.409,412(1986).
[35]Rollo,p.75.
[36]Section3,provides:
Civilianauthority,isatalltimes,supremeoverthemilitary.TheArmedForcesofthePhilippinesistheprotectorofthepeople
andtheState.ItsgoalistosecurethesovereigntyoftheStateandtheintegrityofthenationalterritory.
[37]No.9oftheLOIprovides:COORDINATINGINSTRUCTIONS:
a.RD,NCRPOisdesignatedasTaskForceCommanderTULUNGAN.
[38]No.6oftheLOIstates:DEPLOYMENT/EMPLOYMENTOFJOINTNCRPOPHILIPPINEMARINES:
b. Before their deployment/employment, receiving units shall properly brief/orient the troops on police patrol/visibility
procedures.
[39]No.8oftheLOIprovides:TASKS:
k.POLICEDISTRICTS/STATIONS
ProvidedirectionandmanagethedeploymentofallPhilippineMarinespersonneldeployedinyourAORforpolicevisibility
operations.
Conductbriefing/orientationtoPhilippineMarinespersonnelonthedosanddontsofpolicevisibilitypatrols.
ProvidetransportationtoPhilippineMarinesfromdistrictsheadquarterstodifferentstationsandPCPs.
Performothertasksasdirected.
[40]No.8oftheLOIstates:TASKS:
c.RLD/R4
Coordinate with the Directorate for Logistics for the issuance of the following equipments (sic) to be utilize (sic) by the
PhilippineMarinespersonnel:500piecesProbaton,500whistle(sic),500piecesbrazzardblazoned.
Coordinate with the Directorate for Logistics for the issuance of the following for use of PNP personnel involved in the
visibilitypatroloperations:
1,000setsofPNPGOAUniform
500eachraincoats
500eachProbaton
500eachWhistle
500eachhandcuffs
500eachCombatBoots
500eachlowcutshoes
ProvidetransportationtothePhilippineMarinespersonnelincoordinationwithLSS,NHQPNP.
ProvideadditionalgasallocationtoPhilippineMarinesmembersoftheInspectionTeams.
Performothertasksasdirected.40
[41]Sec.5(4),ArticleXVI,provides:
No member of the Armed Forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed in the government including
governmentownedandcontrolledcorporationsoranyoftheirsubsidiaries.
[42]CONSTITUTION,ArticleIXC,Section2ComelecResolutionNo.3071(1999),whichisentitledInReGuidelinesfor
the Designation of Registration Centers and the Accountable Officers for the Polaroid Instant Cameras for Purposes of the
Registration of Voters on 89 May 1999 in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao Comelec Resolution No. 3059
(1999),whichisentitled,IntheMatterofDeputizingtheArmedForcesofthePhilippinesandtheThree(3)AFPComponents,
Namely:PhilippineArmy,PhilippineNavyandPhilippineAirForce,forthePurposeofEnsuringFree,Orderly,Honestand
PeacefulPrecinctMapping,RegistrationofVotersandtheHoldingoftheSeptember13,1999ElectionsintheAutonomous
RegioninMuslimMindanao(ARMM)Republic Act No. 7166 (1991), Section 33, which is entitled An Act Providing for
Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations therefor, and for other
PurposesAdministrativeCodeof1987,BookV,TitleI,SubtitleC,Chapter1,Sections2(4)and3BatasPambansaBlg.881,
ArticleVI,Sections52(b)and57(3)(1985),whichisalsoknownasOmnibusElectionCode.
[43] Republic Act No. 95 (1947), Section 5, which is entitled An Act to Incorporate the Philippine National Red Cross
SectionRepublicActNo.855(1953),Section1,whichisentitledAnActtoAmendSectionVofRepublicActNumbered
NinetyFive,entitledAnActtoIncorporatethePhilippineNationalRedCross.
[44] Republic Act No. 7077 (1991), Article III, Section 7, which is entitled An Act Providing for the Development,
Administration,Organization,Training,MaintenanceandUtilizationoftheCitizenArmedForcesoftheArmedForcesofthe
PhilippinesandforotherPurposes.
[45] Republic Act No. 6847 (1990), Section 7, which is entitled An Act Creating and Establishing The Philippine Sports
Commission,DefiningitsPowers,FunctionsandResponsibilities,AppropriatingFundstherefor,andforotherPurposes.
[46]RepublicActNo.8492(1998),Section20,whichisentitledAnActEstablishingaNationalMuseumSystem,Providing
foritsPermanentHomeandforotherPurposes.
[47]RepublicActNo.8550(1998),Section124,whichisentitledAnActProvidingfortheDevelopment,Managementand
Conservation of the Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, Integrating All Laws Pertinent Thereto, and for other Purposes
MemorandumCircularNo.150(1996),whichisentitledAmendingMemorandumCircularNo.128,datedJuly20,1995by
ReorganizingthePresidentialTaskForceonTubbatahaReefNationalMarineParkExecutiveOrderNo.544(1979),LetterI,
whichisentitledCreatingaPresidentialCommitteefortheConservationoftheTamaraw,DefiningitsPowersandforother
Purposes.
[48]ExecutiveOrderNo.129A(1987)Section5(m),whichisentitledModifyingExecutiveOrderNo.129Reorganizingand
StrengtheningtheDepartmentofAgrarianReformandforotherPurposes.
[49] Republic Act No. 1937 (1957), Section 2003, which is entitled An Act to Revised and Codify the Tariff and Customs
LawsofthePhilippinesExecutiveOrderNo.45(1998),whichisentitledCreatingaPresidentialAntiSmugglingTaskForce
to Investigate and Prosecute Crimes Involving LargeScale Smuggling and other Frauds upon Customs and Providing
MeasurestoExpediteSeizureProceedings
[50] These cases involved joint military and civilian law enforcement operations: People v. Escalante, G.R No. 106633,
December1,1994Peoplev.Bernardo,G.R.No.97393,March17,1993Peoplev.DelaCruz,G.R.No.83260,April18,
1990Guanzonv.deVilla,181SCRA623,631(1990).(This case recognizes the complementary roles of the PNP and the
militaryinconductinganticrimecampaigns,providedthatthepeoplesrightsarenotviolatedinthesewords:Ifthemilitary
andthepolicemustconductconcertedcampaignstoflushoutandcatchcriminalelements,suchdrivesmustbeconsistentwith
theconstitutionalandstatutoryrightsofallpeopleaffectedbysuchactions.ThecreationoftheTaskForcealsofindssupport
inValmonte v. de Villa, 185 SCRA 665 (1990).Executive Order No. 62 (1999), which is entitled Creating the Philippine
Center on Transnational Crime to Formulate and Implement a Concerted Program of Action of All Law Enforcement,
IntelligenceandotherAgenciesforthePreventionandControlofTransnationalCrimeExecutiveOrderNo.8(1998),which
isentitledCreatingaPresidentialAntiOrganizedCrimeCommissionandaPresidentialAntiOrganizedCrimeTaskForce,to
Investigate and Prosecute Criminal Elements in the Country Executive Order No. 280 (1995), which is entitled Creating a
Presidential Task Force of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence to Identify, Arrest and Cause the Investigation and
Prosecution of Military and other Law Enforcement Personnel on their Former Members and Their Cohorts Involved in
CriminalActivities.
[51]MemorandumCircularNo.141(1996),whichisentitledEnjoiningGovernmentAgenciesConcernedtoExtendOptimum
SupportandAssistancetotheProfessionalRegulationCommissioninitsConductofLicensureExaminations.
[52] Memorandum Circular No. 32 (1999), which is entitled Directing the Government Agencies Concerned to Extend
MaximumSupportandAssistancetotheNationalEducationalTestingandResearchCenter(NETRC)oftheDepartmentof
Education,CultureandSports(DECS)intheConductofTestsofNationalCoverage.
[53] Executive Order No. 61 (1999), which is entitled Creating the National Drug Law Enforcement and Prevention
CoordinatingCentertoOrchestrateEffortsofnationalGovernmentAgencies,LocalGovernmentUnits,andNonGovernment
OrganizationsforaMoreEffectiveAntiDrugCampaign.
[54]RepublicActNo.4089(1964),whichisentitledAnActMakingtheCityHealthOfficerofBacolodCitytheLocalCivil
Registrar,AmendingforthePurposeSectionFortyThreeoftheCharterofsaidCity"RepublicActNo.537(1950),whichis
entitled"AnActtoRevisetheCharterofQuezonCityCommonwealthActNo.592(1940),whichisentitledAnActtoCreate
theCityofDansalanCommonwealthActNo.509(1939),whichisentitledAnActtoCreateQuezonCityCommonwealth
Act No. 326 (1938), which is entitled An Act Creating the City of Bacolod Commonwealth Act No. 39 (1936), which is
entitledAnActCreatingtheCityofZamboangaCommonwealthActNo.51(1936),whichisentitledAnActCreatingthe
CityofDavao.
[55]RepublicActNo.36(1946),whichisentitledCensusActofNineteenHundredandFortySix.
[56]RepublicActNo.776(1952),Section5,whichisentitledAnActtoReorganizetheCivilAeronauticsBoardandtheCivil
Aeronautics Administration, To Provide for the Regulation of Civil Aeronautics in the Philippines and Authorizing the
AppropriationofFundsTherefor.
[57] Republic Act No. 6613 (1972), Section 4, which is entitled An Act Declaring a Policy of the State to Adopt Modern
Scientific Methods to Moderate Typhoons and Prevent Destruction by Floods, Rains and Droughts, Creating a Council on
Typhoons and Prevent Destruction by Flood, Rains and Droughts, Creating a Council on Typhoon Moderation and Flood
ControlResearchandDevelopment,ProvidingforitsPowersandFunctionsandAppropriatingFundsTherefor.
[58]LocalGovernmentCodeof1991,BookI,TitleSeven,Section116.
[59] ThistheoryonglossofexecutivepowerwasadvancedbyJusticeFrankfurterinhisconcurringopinioninYoungstown
SheetandTubev.Sawyer,343US579,610611(1952).
[60]Bissonettev.Haig,766F.2d1384,1389(1985).
[61]18U.S.C.A1385(1878).
[62]Ibid.
[63]Bissonettev.Haig,supranote60,at1390.
[64] A power regulatory in nature is one which controls or directs. It is proscriptive if it prohibits or condemns and
compulsory if it exerts some coercive force. See US v. Yunis, 681 F.Supp. 891 (D.D.C., 1988). See also FOURTH
AMENDMENT AND POSSE COMITATUS ACT RESTRICTIONS ON MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN CIVIL LAW
ENFORCEMENT,
[65]L.O.I.02/2000,TULUNGAN,Rollo,pp.1722.
[66] No. 6 of the LOI states: DEPLOYMENT/EMPLOYMENT OF JOINT NCRPO-PHILIPPINE MARINES:
a. The PNP NCPRO thru Police Districts will continue to deploy uniformed PNP personnel dedicated for police visibility
patrolsintandemwiththePhilippineMarines.
b.Beforetheirdeployment/employment,receivingunitsshallproperlybrief/orientthetroopsonpolicepatrol/visibility
procedures.66
[67]Supranote34.
[68]Supranote32.
[69] No. 9 of the LOI states:
d.Incaseofapprehensions,arrestedperson/sshallbebroughttothenearestpolicestations/PCPs.
[70]Supranote35.
[71]Rollo,p.70.

IBP V Zamora

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8/12/2015 Integrated Bar of the Phil vs Zamora : 141284 : August 15, 2000 : J.

Legal standing or locusstandihas been defined as a personal and substantial interest in

[28] Marcosv.Manglapus,,supranote21,seealsoDazav.Singson,180SCRA496(1988)Cosetengv. Mitra, 187 SCRA

[66] No. 6 of the LOI states: DEPLOYMENT/EMPLOYMENT OF JOINT NCRPO-PHILIPPINE MARINES:

[69] No. 9 of the LOI states:

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