On October 11, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration of the dismissal, 3 attaching the following
documents to support its petition for reconstitution, namely: (1) the copy of the original application for
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 176508. January 12, 2015.]
SAINT MARY CRUSADE TO ALLEVIATE POVERTY OF BRETHREN FOUNDATION,
INC., petitioner, vs. HON. TEODORO T. RIEL, ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 85, QUEZON
CITY, respondent.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J p:
A petition for the judicial reconstitution of a Torrens title must strictly comply with the requirements
prescribed in Republic Act No. 26; 1 otherwise, the petition should be dismissed.
This case is a direct resort to the Court by petition for certiorari and mandamus. The petitioner applied
for the judicial reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1609 of the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City, and for the issuance of a new OCT in place thereof, docketed as L.R.C. Case No. Q-18987 (04),
but respondent Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 85 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City
dismissed the petition for reconstitution through the assailed order dated September 12, 2006. The
petitioner alleges that the respondent Judge thereby committed grave abuse of discretion and unlawful
neglect of performance of an act specifically enjoined upon him. Equally assailed is the ensuing denial of
its motion for reconsideration through the order dated February 5, 2007.
The antecedents follow.
On October 28, 2004, the petitioner claimed in its petition for reconstitution that the original copy of OCT
No. 1609 had been burnt and lost in the fire that gutted the Quezon City Register of Deeds in the late 80's.
Initially, respondent Judge gave due course to the petition, but after the preliminary hearing, he
dismissed the petition for reconstitution through the first assailed order of September 12, 2006, 2 to wit:
With the receipt of Report dated July 14, 2006 from Land Registration Authority (LRA)
recommending that the petition be dismissed, and considering the Opposition filed by
the Republic of the Philippines and University of the Philippines, the above-entitled
petition is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
registration dated January 27, 1955; (2) the notice of initial hearing dated June 23, 1955; (3) the letter of
transmittal to the Court of First Instance in Quezon City; (4) the copy of the Spanish Testimonial Title No.
3261054 dated March 25, 1977 in the name of Eladio Tiburcio; (5) the copy of Tax Assessment No.
14238; and (6) the approved Plan SWD-37457. SAaTHc
On February 5, 2007, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of any cogent or justifiable
ground to reconsider. 4
Hence, on February 22, 2007, the petitioner came directly to the Court alleging that respondent Judge had
"unfairly abused his discretion and unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which is specifically
enjoined upon him as a duly [sic] under Rule 7, Section 8, of the Revised Rules of Court;" 5 that "in finally
dismissing the herein subject Petition for Reconsideration, respondent Honorable Acting Presiding Judge
has acted without and in excess of his authority and with grave abuse of discretion to the further damage
and prejudice of the herein petitioner;" 6 and that it had no other remedy in the course of law except
through the present petition for certiorari and mandamus.
Issues
The Court directed respondent Judge and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the
petition for certiorari and mandamus. Respondent Judge submitted his comment on May 23, 2007, 7 and
the OSG its comment on July 19, 2007. 8 On November 13, 2007, the University of the Philippines (UP)
sought leave to intervene, attaching to its motion the intended comment/opposition-in-
intervention. 9 The motion for the UP's intervention was granted on November 28, 2007. 10 In turn, the
petitioner presented its consolidated reply on February 8, 2008. 11 The parties, except respondent Judge,
then filed their memoranda in compliance with the Court's directive.
Respondent Judge justified the dismissal of the petition for reconstitution by citing the opposition by the
OSG and the UP, as well as the recommendation of the Land Registration Authority (LRA). He pointed out
that the petitioner did not present its purported Torrens title to be reconstituted; that the petitioner's
claim was doubtful given the magnitude of 4,304,623 square meters as the land area involved; 12 and
that the UP's ownership of the portion of land covered by petitioner's claim had long been settled by the
Court in a long line of cases. 13
The OSG and the UP argued that by directly coming to the Court by petition for certiorari and mandamus,
the petitioner had availed itself of the wrong remedies to substitute for its lost appeal; that the correct
recourse for the petitioner was an appeal considering that the two assailed orders already finally
disposed of the case; that the petitioner intended its petition for certiorari and mandamus to reverse the
final orders; 14 that the petitioner further failed to observe the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, despite
the Court of Appeals (CA) having concurrent jurisdiction with the Court over special civil actions under
Rule 65; 15 that the RTC would have gravely erred had it proceeded on the petition for reconstitution
despite the petitioner not having notified the adjoining owners of the land or other parties with interest
over the land; 16 that the petitioner had no factual and legal bases for reconstitution due to its failure to
prove the existence and validity of the certificate of title sought to be reconstituted, in addition to the
ownership of the land covered by the petition for reconstitution being already settled in a long line of
cases; that the petitioner's claim over the land was derived from the Deed of Assignment executed by one
Marcelino Tiburcio the same person whose claim had long been settled and disposed of in Tiburcio v.
People's Homesite and Housing Corporation and University of the Philippines (106 Phil. 477), which vested
title in the UP, and in Caero v. University of the Philippines (437 SCRA 630); and that the Deed of Transfer
and Conveyance dated November 26, 1925 executed by Tiburcio in favor of St. Mary Village Association,
Inc. was not a basis for the judicial reconstitution of title accepted under Section 2 of Republic Act No.
26. EICSTa
In its memorandum, the petitioner indicates that the RTC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack
or excess of its jurisdiction in dismissing its petition for reconstitution on the basis of the
recommendation of the LRA and the opposition of the Republic and the UP despite having initially given
due course to the petition for reconstitution. It urges that the dismissal should be overturned because it
was not given a chance to comment on the recommendation of the LRA, or to controvert the oppositions
filed. 17 It contends that the LRA report did not substantiate the allegation of dismissal of the application
for registration of Marcelino Tiburcio on October 17, 1955, in addition to the veracity of the report being
questionable by virtue of its not having been under oath. 18
Ruling
The petition for certiorari and mandamus, being devoid of procedural and substantive merit, is dismissed.
Firstly, certiorari,being an extraordinary remedy, is granted only under the conditions defined by
the Rules of Court. The conditions are that: (1) the respondent tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 19 Without jurisdiction means that the court acted with
absolute lack of authority; there is excess of jurisdiction when the court transcends its power or acts
without any statutory authority; grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is
so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 20
The petition for certiorari and mandamus did not show how respondent Judge could have been guilty of
lacking or exceeding his jurisdiction, or could have gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Under Section 12 21 of Republic Act No. 26, the law on the judicial reconstitution of
a Torrens title, the Regional Trial Court (as the successor of the Court of First Instance) had the original
and exclusive jurisdiction to act on the petition for judicial reconstitution of title. Hence, the RTC neither
lacked nor exceeded its authority in acting on and dismissing the petition. Nor did respondent Judge
gravely abuse his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that the petition for
reconstitution involved land already registered in the name of the UP, as confirmed by the LRA. Instead, it
would have been contrary to law had respondent Judge dealt with and granted the petition for judicial
reconstitution of title of the petitioner.
Secondly, the petitioner did not present the duplicate or certified copy of OCT No. 1609. Thereby, it
disobeyed Section 2 and Section 3 of Republic Act No. 26, the provisions that expressly listed the
acceptable bases for judicial reconstitution of an existing Torrens title, to wit:
Sec. 2. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources
hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:
(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds
or by a legal custodian thereof;
(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be,
pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued; aHcACI
(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description
of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an
authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered;
and
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper
basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
Sec. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources
hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:
(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds
or by a legal custodian thereof;
(d) The deed of transfer or other document, on file in the registry of deeds, containing
the description of the property, or an authenticated copy thereof, showing that its
original had been registered, and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed transfer
certificate of title was issued;
(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description
of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an
authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered;
and
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper
basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
Thirdly, with the questioned orders of the RTC having finally disposed of the application for judicial
reconstitution, nothing more was left for the RTC to do in the case. As of then, therefore, the correct
recourse for the petitioner was to appeal to the Court of Appeals by notice of appeal within 15 days from
notice of the denial of its motion for reconsideration. By allowing the period of appeal to elapse without
taking action, it squandered its right to appeal. Its present resort to certiorari is impermissible, for an
extraordinary remedy like certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal. That the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari is not an alternative to an available remedy in the ordinary course of law is clear
from Section 1 of Rule 65, which requires that there must be no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Indeed, no error of judgment by a court will be corrected
by certiorari, which corrects only jurisdictional errors. 22
Fourthly, the filing of the instant special civil action directly in this Court is in disregard of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. Although the Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals in issuing
the writ of certiorari, direct resort is allowed only when there are special, extra-ordinary or compelling
reasons that justify the same. The Court enforces the observance of the hierarchy of courts in order to
free itself from unnecessary, frivolous and impertinent cases and thus afford time for it to deal with the
more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it. 23 There being no
special, important or compelling reason, the petitioner thereby violated the observance of the hierarchy
of courts, warranting the dismissal of the petition for certiorari.
Finally, the land covered by the petition for judicial reconstitution related to the same area that formed
the UP campus. The UP's registered ownership of the land comprising its campus has long been settled
under the law. Accordingly, the dismissal of the petition for judicial reconstitution by respondent Judge
only safeguarded the UP's registered ownership. In so doing, respondent Judge actually heeded the clear
warnings to the lower courts and the Law Profession in general against mounting or abetting any attack
against such ownership. One such warning was that in Caero v. University of the Philippines, 24 as
follows: TACEDI
We strongly admonish courts and unscrupulous lawyers to stop entertaining spurious
cases seeking further to assail respondent UP's title. These cases open the dissolute
avenues of graft to unscrupulous land-grabbers who prey like vultures upon the
campus of respondent UP. By such actions, they wittingly or unwittingly aid the
hucksters who want to earn a quick buck by misleading the gullible to buy the
Philippine counterpart of the proverbial London Bridge. It is well past time for courts
and lawyers to cease wasting their time and resources on these worthless causes and
take judicial notice of the fact that respondent UP's title had already been validated
countless times by this Court. Any ruling deviating from such doctrine is to be viewed
as a deliberate intent to sabotage the rule of law and will no longer be
countenanced. 25
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari and mandamus for lack of merit;
and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Perez and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.An Act Providing a Special Procedure for the Reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Title Lost or
Destroyed.
2.Rollo, p. 24.
3.Id. at 25-29.
4.Id. at 32-33.
5.Id. at 5.
6.Id.
7.Id. at 40-45.
8.Id. at 107-133.
9.Id. at 136-151.
10.Id. at 153.
11.Id. at 155-158.
12.Id. at 41.
13.Listing the cases as Tiburcio v. P.H.H.C., 106 Phil. 477 (1959); Galvez v. Tuason, No. L-15644,
February 29, 1964, 10 SCRA 344; People's Homesite and Housing Corporation v. Mencias, No. L-
24114, August 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 1031; Varsity Hills, Inc. v. Mariano, No. L-30546, June 30,
1998, 163 SCRA 132; Heirs of Antonio Pael v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133547, November 11,
2003, 415 SCRA 451; Caero v. University of the Philippines, G.R. No. 156380, September 8,
2004, 437 SCRA 630.
14.Rollo, pp. 275-276 (Memorandum of Republic); pp. 190-191 (Memorandum of UP).
15.Id. at 277-290; 191-192.
16.Id. at 281-284; 189-190.
17.Id. at 309-311.
18.Id. at 310-311.
19.Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
20.De los Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 169498, December 11, 2008, 573 SCRA 691, 700.
21.Sec. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in sections 2 (c), 2 (d), 2 (e), 2 (f), 3
(c), 3 (d), 3 (e) and/or 3 (f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court of First Instance,
by the registered owner, his assigns, or any person having an interest in the property. The
petition shall state or contain, among other things, the following: (a) that the owner's duplicate
of the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owner's mortgagee's or
lessee's duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been issued, the same had been lost or
destroyed; (c) the location, area and boundaries of the property; (d) the nature and description
of the buildings or improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the
names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements; (e) the names and
addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of the
adjoining properties and all persons who may have any interest in the property; (f) a detailed
description of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g) a statement that no
deeds or other instruments affecting the property have been presented for registration, or, if
there be any, the registration thereof has not been accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or
 authenticated copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence in support of the petition for
reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That in case the
reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in section 2 (f) of 3 (f) of this
Act, the petition shall be further be accompanied with a plan and technical description of the
property duly approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or with a certified
copy of the description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property.
22.Rigor v. Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167400, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 375, 378-
379.
23.Baez, Jr. v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 159508, August 29, 2012, 679 SCRA 237, 250.
24.G.R. No. 156380, September 8, 2004, 437 SCRA 630.
25.Id. at 646-647.
||| (Saint Mary Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Brethren Foundation, Inc. v. Riel, G.R. No. 176508, [January
12, 2015])
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 146081. July 17, 2006.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the Land Registration
Authority, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES ROBERTO and MARINA SANCHEZ, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
This is a petition for review 1 of the Decision 2 dated 31 August 2000 and Resolution dated 17 November
2000 of the Court of Appeals. The 31 August 2000 Decision granted the petition of respondent spouses
Roberto and Marina Sanchez ("respondents") to set aside the ruling of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City, Branch 225 ("trial court") in a suit for reconstitution of title. The 17 November 2000 Resolution
denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner Land Registration Authority ("petitioner").
The Facts
On 28 May 1996, respondents filed a petition ("LRC Case No. Q-96-8296") in the trial court to reconstitute
the original of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 252708 ("TCT No. 252708"), covering a parcel of land
measuring 2,991 square meters ("Lot 1"). 3 Respondents claimed that TCT No. 252708 was issued in the
name of respondent Marina Sanchez ("Marina") by the Register of Deeds, Quezon City. Respondents
alleged that the original of TCT No. 252708 was among the documents destroyed by the fire which razed
the Office of the Register of Deeds, Quezon City in June 1988. Respondents sought reconstitution under
Section 3(a) 4 of Republic Act No. 26 5 ("RA 26") based on Marina's duplicate title.
The trial court scheduled the case for hearing on 15 August 1996. The notice of hearing dated 30 May
1996 was published in the 8 and 15 July 1996 issues of the Official Gazette and posted at the main
entrance of the City Hall and the Hall of Justice, Quezon City on 1 July 1996. Petitioner, the Office of the
Solicitor General, the Land Management Section, Surveys Division of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, the Office of the Quezon City Prosecutor, and the Register of Deeds, Quezon City were
furnished copies of the notice of hearing.
The Solicitor General filed his Comment to the petition, noting that since the petition is based on Section
3(a) of RA 26, the trial court should defer acting on the petition until the Land Registration Authority
(LRA) has submitted its Report on the petition as required under Land Registration Commission (now
LRA) Circular No. 35 ("Circular No. 35"). 6
In response to the Solicitor General's Comment, respondents submitted a Report, dated 5 September
1996 ("First Report"), signed by Benjamin Bustos ("Bustos"), Chief, Reconstitution Division, LRA. The
First Report, which was endorsed 7to the trial court in a letter signed by Salvador L. Oriel ("Oriel"), Chief,
Docket Division, LRA, reads in full:
REPORT
COMES NOW the Land Registration Authority and to the Honorable Court respectfully
reports that:
(1) The present petition seeks the reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
252708, allegedly lost or destroyed and supposedly covering Lots 12, 13, 14, 15, & 16
all of Blocks 5, of (LRC) Psd-4786, respectively, on the basis of the owner's duplicate
thereof, reproductions of which, not certified by the clerk of Court, as required under
LRC circular 35, Series of 1983, were submitted to this Authority.
(2) The technical description of the consolidation of Lots, 12, 13, 14, 15 & 16 all of
Block 5, Psd-4786, appearing in the reproduction of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
252708, respectively, have been examined and verified against the technical
description on file in the Volume 2753 in the Vault Section Docket Division, this
Authority. Said technical description when plotted in the Municipal Index Sheet No.
3669-C do [sic] not appear to overlap previously plotted/decreed properties in the
area. HETDAC
The technical description of Lot 1, Pcn-04-000007 of the cosolidation [sic] of Lots 12,
13, 14, 15 & 16 of Block 5, appearing in the reproductions of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 252708, respectively have been examined and verified against the Lot
Description on file in the vault section, Docket Division, this Authority. Said technical
descriptions when plotted in the Municipal Index Sheet No. 3669-C do not appear to
overlap previously plotted/decreed properties in the area.
 WHEREFORE, the foregoing information anent the lots in question is respectfully
submitted for consideration in the resolution of the instant petition, and if the
Honorable Court, after notice and hearing, finds justification pursuant to Section 15 of
the Republic Act No. 26 to grant the same, the owners [sic] duplicate of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 252708 may be used as sources [sic] of the desired
reconstitution pursuant to Section 3 (a) of said Act. Provided, however, that in case the
petition is granted, the reconstituted title should be made subject to such
encumbrances as maybe subsisting, and provided, further, that no certificate of title
covering the same parcels of land exists in the office of the Register of Deeds
Concerned [sic].
Quezon City, Philippines, September 5, 1996.
REYNALDO Y. MAULIT
Administrator
By:
[Sgd.]
BENJAMIN M. BUSTOS
Reconstituting Officer & Chief,
Reconstitution Division 8
As no opposition was filed against the petition, the trial court allowed respondents to present evidence ex
parte. Apart from the First Report, respondents also presented a Certification, dated 14 December 1994,
of the Quezon City Register of Deeds, that the original of TCT No. 252708 was among those destroyed in
the 1988 fire. Respondents further presented a Certification, dated 14 May 1996, of the Office of the City
Treasurer, Quezon City, confirming that respondents last paid the real estate taxes on Lot No. 1 in January
1996.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its Order dated 28 October 1996 ("28 October 1996 Order"), the trial court granted reconstitution and
ordered TCT No. 252708 reconstituted. The 28 October 1996 Order became final on 6 January 1997. The
Register of Deeds, Quezon City issued to respondents reconstituted Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-
115027 (252708) ("TCT No. RT-115027").
In a letter dated 4 November 1997, Oriel submitted to the trial court another Report, dated 24 October
1997 ("Second Report"), also signed by Bustos. Oriel informed the trial court that the First Report was
fake. The Second Report, which recommended that the trial court set aside the 28 October 1996 Order,
reads:
REPORT
COMES NOW the Land Registration Authority, and to the Honorable Court respectfully
reports that:
(1) The above-entitled case appears to seek the reconstitution of Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 252708 allegedly lost or destroyed and supposedly covering Lot 1, Pcn-04-
000007, situated at Quezon City, as indicated in the copy of the Notice of Hearing
dated May 30, 1996, submitted to this Authority. Attached also to our records of this
case is a xerox copy of the purported Transfer Certificate of Title No. 252708 covering
Lot 1, Pcn-04-000007 in the name of Marina Sanchez, not certified by the Clerk of
Court, as required under LRC Circular 35, Series of 1983.
(2) In the 1st Indorsement dated October 21, 1997 of Engr. Alberto H. Lingayo, Acting
Chief, Ordinary and Cadastral Decree Division, this Authority, xerox copy attached as
Annex "A", the following information are stated relative to the above-entitled petition
and its enclosures[] to wit:
1. On or about October 1, 1997, a certain Marvin Bautista came to this office to
inquire about the above petition, showing a copy of the reconstituted title No.
RT-115027 (252708) and a copy of a report purportedly issued by this
Authority, xerox copies attached as Annexes "B" & "C";
2. We checked our records and found out that on August 6, 1996, we sent a
letter to the Clerk of Court requiring petitioner to submit to this Authority,
certain documents, however, petitioner has not yet complied as of this
date, hence, we could not have rendered a report, xerox copy attached as
Annex "D";
3. On October 2, 1997, we secured from the RTC Branch 225, Quezon
City, certified copies of pertinent documents relative to the above-
petition and found out that there is indeed a copy of a fake LRA Report,
copies attached hereto;
4. Initial verification of the purported TCT No. 252708 reveals that the
same is a questionable title, because, among other reasons, the Serial
No. 3002163 appearing on the face of the certificate pertains to . . .
judicial forms issued to the Registry of Deeds of Manila on January 13,
1976, as per records on file at the Property Section, this Authority; and it
overlaps properties covered by TCT Nos. 187042 and 187040 when
plotted on our Municipal Index Map. IaESCH
5. It is suggested that this case be referred to proper authorities for
investigation and prosecution of the perpetrators, and that the order of
reconstitution rendered by the court be recommended vacated or set aside
because it was obtained through fraud and forgery.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing observation anent the lot in question is respectfully
submitted for the information and guidance of the Honorable Court, with the
recommendation that the order of reconstitution rendered relative to the purported
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 252708 be ordered vacated or set aside and the
corresponding title that was issued be declared null and void.
 That the person[] or persons responsible for the reconstitution of this questionable
title be investigated and if evidence warrants be charged or prosecuted in Court.
Quezon City, Philippines, October 24, 1997.
REYNALDO Y. MAULIT
Administrator
By:
[Sgd.]
BENJAMIN M. BUSTOS
Reconstituting Officer &
Chief, Reconstitution Division 9
On 24 March 1998, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion to set aside the 28 October 1996 Order.
Petitioner contended that considering the Second Report, respondents' petition should be considered as
having been filed under Section 3(f) 10 of RA 26, that is, based on "any other document." Petitioner
pointed out that under Section 13 11 in relation to Section 12 12 of RA 26, the notice of a petition for
reconstitution of lost or destroyed titles based on Section 3(f) should not only be published and posted
but also served on, among others, the owners of the adjoining properties. For non-compliance with this
requirement, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over LRC Case No. Q-96-8296.
Respondents opposed petitioner's motion, primarily on the ground that the 28 October 1996 Order had
become final.
The heirs of Mario Uy ("Heirs"), whose predecessor-in-interest allegedly owned Lot No. 12 covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 187042, filed an "amicus curiae" brief disclosing that they have caused the
filing of criminal complaints against respondents for Falsification of TCT No. 252708 (Criminal Case No.
77668) and Use of Falsified Public Document (Criminal Case No. 90649). 13 Mario Uy and Maria Corazon
Uy-Zalamea ("Zalamea), the latter being the alleged owner of Lot No. 13 covered by TCT No. 187042, had
earlier sued respondents in the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 227 ("Civil Case No. Q-96-
29545") for quieting of title, nullity of [TCT No. 252708], recovery of possession and damages. 14
In its Order of 17 July 1998 ("17 July 1998 Resolution"), the trial court set aside the 28 October 1996
Order and dismissed LRC Case No. Q-96-8296. The trial court held:
Records reveal, . . ., that TCT No. 25[2]708, the title to be reconstituted, overlaps TCT
Nos. 187040 and 187042. Petitioners' design of having their title reconstituted,
notwithstanding the fact that the same is covered in two other titles, eludes the
comprehension of this Court.
xxx xxx xxx
The unscrupulous manner by which the petitioners misled the Court is glaring in two
(2) instances, to wit: 1) the petition unceremoniously omitted the names of the
registered owners of TCT Nos. 187040 and 187042; and 2) the spurious LRA Report
submitted by the petitioners.
This Court is of the view that the failure to notify the registered owners of TCT Nos.
187040 and 187042 of the Reconstitution proceeding proved to be a mistake.
Section 13, Republic Act No. 26 . . . provides that ". . . . The Court shall likewise cause a
copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the
petitioner, to every person named therein whose address is known, at least thirty days
prior to the date of the hearing. Said notice shall state among other things, the number
of the lost or destroyed certificate[] of title[,] if known, the name of the registered
owner, the name[s] of the occupants or persons in possession of the property,
the owner[s] of the adjoining properties and all other interested parties, the location,
area and boundaries of the property, and the date on which all persons having any
interest therein, must appear and file their claim o[r] objection to the petition. The
petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service of
the notice as directed by the court."
Petitioners' failure to comply with this provision is a fatal defect for the same is
mandatory and jurisdictional (Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership vs. Velasco,
234 SCRA 435).
When this Court issued the questioned order dated October 28, 1996, it was under the
impression that there was no legal impediment for the reconstitution of TCT No.
252708. Had it been apprised at that time that the LRA report submitted by the
petitioner was spurious then it would not have issued the same. 15 (Italicization in the
original)
Respondents sought reconsideration but the trial court denied their motion on 4 January 1999.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The appellate court initially dismissed
the petition for respondents' failure to submit a certified true copy or duplicate original of the trial court's
17 July 1998 and 4 January 1999 Resolutions. However, on respondents' motion, the Court of Appeals,
without giving due course to the petition, required petitioner and respondents to file Comment and
Reply, respectively.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision of 31 August 2000, the Court of Appeals granted respondents' petition, set aside the trial
court's 17 July 1998 and 4 January 1999 Resolutions, and reinstated the 28 October 1996 Order. The
appellate court held:
The motion to set aside the [28 October 1996 Order] contemplates a petition for relief
from a final order entered against a party in any court through fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
which must be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the final order,
and not more than six (6) months after such final order was entered, and must be
 accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial
cause of action or defense, as the case may be. SHEIDC
xxx xxx xxx
As mentioned previously, the LRA, represented by the OSG, contends that notice of the
petition should have been served on adjoining landowners as one of the jurisdictional
requirements, since the Authentic LRA Report of 24 October 1997 found petitioners'
title to be a fake title. However, a mere LRA Report cannot declare a certificate of title
spurious without the proper court declaring its nullity and cancellation. A certificate of
title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled
only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. Incidentally, private respondents
filed an action for quieting of title, nullity of title (viz., TCT No. 252708), recovery of
possession and damages against petitioners, which is still pending before Branch 227,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Until the trial court declares TCT No. 252708 to
be void and orders its cancellation, [w]e cannot but recognize the validity of the same.
Granting that a suspicion or cloud of doubt was cast on the genuineness and
authenticity of petitioners' certificate of title, the same was brought to the fore
belatedly. A Certificate of Finality had already been issued on 06 January 1997.
Presumably, the proper parties received a copy of the Order dated 28 October 1996 on
or before 21 December 1996. Entry of Judgment having been made on 06 January
1997, a petition for relief from judgment should have been filed on or before 05 July
1997. The Manifestation and Motion was only filed on 24 March 1998, long after the
order of reconstitution had become final and a reconstituted title actually issued
petitioners. There having been no sufficient evidence to discredit petitioners'
duplicate of the certificate of title within the time to appeal, move for new trial or file a
petition for relief, there is no need to serve notice of the petition on the adjoining
landowners under Section 13 of RA No. 26. Said section applies only when the source
of reconstitution is other than the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title. . . . . Thus,
at the time the Order of 28 October 1996 was rendered, respondent court was
properly clothed with jurisdiction. After said order became final, and the petition for
relief having been foreclosed against aggrieved parties, respondent judge was without
jurisdiction to entertain the attack against the order of reconstitution. . . . .
Moreover, it must be remembered that the fallo of the Decision dated 28 October 1996
contains a caveat, i.e., "provided, however, that no certificate of title covering the same
parcel of land exists in the office of the Register of Deeds." The reconstituted title
issued petitioners militates against any doubt or suspicion cast on their title. The
Registrar of Deeds concerned would not have issued a reconstituted title had the land
covered by TCT No. 252708 already been covered by another certificate of title. Thus,
[w]e reiterate, until Branch 227, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City declares TCT No.
252708 to be void and orders its cancellation, [w]e cannot but recognize the validity of
the same.
The allegation of fraud requires a higher burden of persuasion, but this Court
maintains that the reconstitution proceeding, which has now become final, is not the
proper forum to thresh out the same. It is a fundamental rule that when a final
judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable and any
amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is
null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that
purpose. Thus, it is as if no Manifestation and Motion was filed and no suspicion or
cloud of doubt was cast on the genuineness and authenticity of petitioners' certificate
of title by the presentation of the LRA Report of 24 October 1997. 16
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the appellate court denied its motion in the Resolution of 17
November 2000.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner reiterates its claim that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
LRC Case No. Q-96-8296 for lack of actual notice to all interested parties as required under Section 13 in
relation to Section 12 of RA 26.
In their Comment, respondents countered that the actual notice requirement in Section 13 does not apply
to LRC Case No. Q-96-8296 because that case was based on Marina's duplicate copy of TCT No. 252708.
At any rate, respondents contended that it is the posting and publication of the notice of hearing, not its
actual service, which vests jurisdiction to the trial court, citing our ruling in Calalang v. Register of
Deeds of Quezon City. 17 Lastly, respondents maintained that the 28 October 1996 Order is already final
and can no longer be set aside.
The Issue
The question is whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over LRC Case No. Q-96-8296.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold in the negative and accordingly grant the petition.
The Actual Notice Requirement under Section 13 in Relation to Section 12 of RA 26 Applies Here
Respondents are correct in saying that the service of notice of the petition for reconstitution filed
under RA 26 to the occupants of the property, owners of the adjoining properties, and all persons who
may have any interest in the property is not required if the petition is based on the owner's duplicate
certificate of title or on that of the co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's. This was our ruling in Puzon v.
Sta Lucia Realty and Development, Inc., 18 involving a petition filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 80, ("Branch 80") for reconstitution of the original of two Torrens certificates of title
based on Puzon's duplicate certificates of title. We held in that case:
[T]he first sentence of Section 13 provides that the requirements therein pertain only
to petitions for reconstitution filed under "the preceding section," Section 12, which in
turn governs those petitions based on specified sources. We quote Section 12 below:
"SEC. 12. Petition for reconstitution from sources enumerated in Section 2(c),
2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e), and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the
proper Court of First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns, or any
person having an interest in the property. The petition shall state or contain,
among other things, the following: . . . (e) the name and addresses of the
 occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of the
adjoining properties and of all persons who may have interest in the
property; . . . . All the documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to be
introduced in evidence in support to the petition for reconstitution shall be
attached thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That in case the
reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in Section
2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall be further accompanied with a plan
and technical description of the property duly approved by the Commissioner
of Land Registration, or with a certified copy of the description taken from a
prior certificate of title covering the same property."
In other words, the requirements under Sections 12 and 13 do not apply
to all petitions for judicial reconstitution, but only to those based on any of the sources
specified in Section 12, that is, "sources enumerated in Section 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f),
3(c), 3(d), 3(e), and/or 3(f) of this Act."
Sections 2 and 3 of RA 26 provide as follows:
"SEC. 2. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the
sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:
(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of
title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register
of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;
(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case
may be, pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued;
(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the
description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or
encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its
original had been registered; and
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and
proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
"SEC. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the
sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:
(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register
of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;
(d) The deed of transfer or other document on file in the registry of deeds,
containing the description of the property, or an authenticated copy thereof,
showing that its original had been registered, and pursuant to which the lost
or destroyed transfer certificate of title was issued;
(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property the
description of which is given in said documents, is mortgaged, leased or
encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its
original had been registered; and
(f) Any other document[] which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and
proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title." . . .
In the present case, the source of the Petition for the reconstitution of title was
petitioner's duplicate copies of the two TCTs mentioned in Section 3(a). Clearly, the
Petition is governed, not by Sections 12 and 13, but by Section 10 of RA 26. We quote
said Section 10 in full:
"SEC. 10. Nothing hereinabove provided shall prevent any registered owner
or person in interest from filing the petition mentioned in Section Five of this
Act directly with the proper Court of First Instance, based on sources
enumerated in Section 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and/or 4(a) of this Act: Provided,
however, That the Court shall cause a notice of the petition, before hearing
and granting the same, to be published in the manner stated in Section Nine
hereof: And provided, further, That certificates of title reconstituted pursuant
to this section shall not be subject to the encumbrance referred to in Section
Seven of this Act."
Nothing in this provision requires that notices be sent to owners of adjoining lots.
Verily, that requirement is found in Section 13, which does not apply to petitions
based on an existing owner's duplicate TCT. CaHcET
Put differently, Sections 9 and 10 of RA 26 require that 30 days before the date of
hearing, (1) a notice be published in two successive issues of the Official Gazette at the
expense of the petitioner, and (2) such notice be posted at the main entrances of the
provincial building and of the municipal hall where the property is located. The notice
shall state the following: (1) the number of the certificate of title, (2) the name of the
registered owner, (3) the names of the interested parties appearing in the
reconstituted certificate of title, (4) the location of the property, and (5) the date on
which all persons having an interest in the property, must appear and file such claims
as they may have.
For petitions based on sources enumerated in Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d),
3(e) and 3(f), Section 13 adds another requirement: that the notice be mailed to
occupants, owners of adjoining lots, and all other persons who may have an interest in
the property. To repeat, mailing the notice is not required for a petition based on
Sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b) and 4(a), as in the present case.
 xxx xxx xxx
[T]here is no question that in [petitions for] reconstitution involving Sections 12
and 13 of RA 26], notices to adjoining owners and to the actual occupants of the
land are mandatory and jurisdictional. But in petitions for reconstitution falling
under Sections 9 and 10 of RA 26 where, as in the present case, the source is the
owner's duplicate copy, notices to adjoining owners and to actual occupants of the
land are not required. When the law is clear, the mandate of the courts is simply to
apply it, not to interpret or to speculate on it.
In sum, RA 26 separates petitions for reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of
title into two main groups with two different requirements and procedures. Sources
enumerated in Sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and 4(a) of RA 26 are lumped under one
group (Group A); and sources enumerated in Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d),
3(e), and 3(f) are placed together under another group (Group B). For Group A, the
requirements for judicial reconstitution are set forth in Section 10 in relation to
Section 9 of RA 26; while for Group B, the requirements are in Sections 12 and 13 of
the same law. 19 (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied)
However, contrary to respondents' claim, Puzon finds no application here. No report from a pertinent
government agency challenging the authenticity of Puzon's duplicate certificates of title was presented
in Puzon. Thus, when Branch 80 granted reconstitution, Puzon's duplicate transfer certificates of title
remained unchallenged. 20
In contrast, the trial court in the present case was misled into treating LRC Case No. Q-96-8296 as having
been filed under Section 3(a) based on Marina's purported duplicate title. Thus, the trial court followed
Section 10 21 in connection with Section 9 22 of RA 26 to publicize LRC Case No. Q-96-8296. Relying on
the First Report's finding that TCT No. 252708 "do[es] not appear to overlap previously plotted/decreed
properties in the area," the trial court granted reconstitution. However, petitioner later informed the trial
court of the First Report's spuriousness, the serious doubts on TCT No. 252708's authenticity, and the
existence of two other titles that overlapped Lot No. 1. After hearing the parties, the trial court dismissed
LRC Case No. Q-96-8296 for lack of jurisdiction as all interested parties were not actually notified of the
petition as required under Section 13 in relation to Section 12 of RA 26.
We hold that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
We were faced with substantially the same situation in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals. 23 In that
case, the petition for reconstitution, as in the present case, was filed under Section 3(a) of RA 26 based on
an alleged owner's duplicate certificate of title. However, the Director of Lands, in an adverse Report,
challenged the authenticity of the purported duplicate certificate of title. The trial court denied
reconstitution but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling. Upon further review, we
reversed the Court of Appeals and dismissed the reconstitution petition. We held that with the Director of
Lands' Report, the petition for reconstitution "falls squarely" under Section 3(f) of RA 26, thus:
In the instant case, the change in the number of the certificate of title sought to be
reconstituted from T-12/79 to TCT No. 42449 rendered at once the authenticity or
genuineness of respondent's certificate of title under suspicion or cloud of doubt. And
since respondent alleges that the technical descriptions under both certificates of title
are identical and the same, . . ., We hold that the instant petition for judicial
reconstitution falls squarely under Section 3(f), Republic Act No. 26, because the
Director of Lands claims that the respondent's duplicate of the Certificate of
Title No. T-12/79 or TCT No. 42449 are [sic] both fake and
fictitious. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
Consequently, we applied Sections 12 and 13 of RA 26 and held that for non-compliance with these
provisions, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition for reconstitution.
Contrary to the Court of Appeals' finding, the Second Report is not a "collateral attack" on TCT No.
252708. Circular No. 35 requires the submission of an LRA Report in all proceedings to judicially
reconstitute lost or destroyed Torrens certificates of title. 25 Indeed, to ". . . prevent duplication of titles, .
. . and [the] irregular reconstitution of lost or destroyed land certificates of title based on unauthorized
sources," this Court issued Administrative Circular No. 7-96 ("Circular 7-96") on 15 July 1996 reminding
trial court judges and clerks of courts "under pain of disciplinary sanctions, . . . to comply strictly" with,
among others, Circular No. 35. Trial courts hearing reconstitution petitions under RA 26 are thus duty-
bound to take into account the LRA's Report. When the trial court considered the authentic Second
Report in issuing the 17 July 1998 Resolution, it merely complied with Circular 7-96.
True, petitioner submitted the Second Report after the period to appeal, or seek relief against, the 28
October 1996 Order had lapsed. However, this is no bar for the trial court to consider the Second Report.
Petitioner was not at fault when it did not submit its Report before the trial court resolved LRC Case No.
Q-96-8296. Petitioner explained that respondents failed to submit the documents petitioner had
requested in its letter of 6 August 1996. But more than this, courts have inherent power to correct fatal
infirmities in its proceedings, 26 especially if, as here, the flaw was intentionally brought about by a party
who employed deceit in misleading the trial court. To hold otherwise would render courts helpless in
maintaining the integrity of its proceedings and correspondingly embolden parties to make a mockery of
judicial rules. The trial court merely exercised such inherent power in the higher interest of justice. 27
The issuance by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City of TCT No. RT-115027 does not erase the doubts the
Second Report raises on the authenticity of TCT No. 252708. Nor does it negate the existence of TCT Nos.
187040 and 187042. Paragraph 12 of Circular No. 35 requires that the Register of Deeds shall submit
"written findings" on the status of the title sought to be reconstituted. 28 No such "written findings" exist
in the records of this case. What respondents submitted was a Certification dated 14 December 1994 that
the original of TCT No. 252708 was among those destroyed in the 1988 fire. This falls short of what
paragraph 12 of Circular 35 requires. cIaCTS
Consequently, it is Section 13 in relation to Section 12 of RA 26 which applies to LRC Case No. Q-96-8296.
Hence, in addition to its posting and publication, the notice of hearing of LRC Case No. Q-96-8296 should
also have been served through mail on the owners of the adjoining properties and all persons who may
have any interest in the property. 29 The records show that neither Lot No. 1's adjoining owners 30 nor
the other interested parties, namely, Mario Uy and Maria Corazon Uy-Zalamea ("Uy and Zalamea"), in
whose names TCT Nos. 187042 and 187040 were issued, were notified of respondents' petition in LRC
Case No. Q-96-8296. 31
The Actual Notice Requirement in Section 13 in Relation to Section 12, RA 26 is Jurisdictional
That the requirement of actual notice in Section 13 in relation to Section 12 of RA 26 is jurisdictional was
settled in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals where we held:
To ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction or not, the provisions of the law should
be inquired into (Auyong vs. Hon. Court of Tax Appeals, L-25181, Jan. 11, 1967, 19
SCRA 10). In all cases where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a
statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory and must strictly
be complied with, or the proceedings will be utterly void (Caltex, et al. vs. CIR, et al., L-
28472, April 30, 1968, 23 SCRA 492). So that where there is defect of publication of
petition, such defect deprives the court of jurisdiction (Po vs. Republic, L-27443, July
19, 1971, 40 SCRA 37). And when the court a quo lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance
of a case, the same lacks authority over the whole case and all its aspects (Development
Bank of the Phils. Employees Union vs. Juan Perez, L-22584 and L-23083, May 30, 1972,
45 SCRA 179, 187). Further, absent jurisdiction the court cannot pass upon the merits
of the petition (Pinza vs. Aldovino, 25 SCRA 220, 224).
In the case at bar, the jurisdiction or authority of the Court of First Instance is
conferred upon it by Republic Act 26 entitled "An Act providing a special procedure
for the reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Title lost or destroyed," approved on
September 25, 1946. The Act specifically provides the special requirements and mode
of procedure that must be followed before the court can act on the petition and grant
to the petitioner the remedy sought for. These requirements and procedure are
mandatory. The petition for reconstitution must allege the jurisdictional facts;
the notice of hearing must also be published and posted in particular places and
the same sent to specified persons. Specifically, the requirements and procedure are
set forth in detail under Sections 12 and 13 of the Act [.] . . . . 32 (Emphasis supplied)
On the particular requirement of service of notice to all interested parties, we held in the earlier case
of Manila Railroad Company v. Moya:
It is clear from section 13 of Republic Act No. 26 that notice by publication is not
sufficient under the circumstances. Notice must be actually sent or delivered to
parties affected by the petition for reconstitution. The order of reconstitution,
therefore, having been issued without compliance with the said requirement,
has never become final as it was null and void. The Manila Railroad cannot then
complain that the motion to set aside was filed beyond the reglementary
period. 33 (Emphasis supplied)
We have since reiterated this ruling in Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco 34 and
Puzon.
Respondents erroneously invoke Calalang as authority for their claim that it is only the publication and
posting of the notice of hearing which are mandatory. The question of whether the actual notice
requirement in Section 13 in relation to Section 12 of RA 26 is mandatory and jurisdictional was not the
main issue in that case it was whether the petitioners were bound by our ruling in De la Cruz v. De la
Cruz, 35 affirming the validity of a Torrens certificate of title issued to one who had obtained the
property covered by the title through a conveyance duly recorded in the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
and who had the title subsequently reconstituted. We answered in the affirmative and dismissed the
petitions principally on the ground of res judicata. 36 Notably, we found in Calalang that the predecessor-
in-interest of the petitioners did not own the disputed property, thus the latter could not claim any better
right than the former.
For non-compliance with the actual notice requirement in Section 13 in relation to Section 12 of RA 26,
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over LRC Case No. Q-96-8296. The proceedings in that case
were thus a nullity and the 28 October 1996 Order was void.
Void Rulings Subject to Challenge at any Time
In MWSS v. Sison, also involving a motion to set aside a "final" reconstitution order for non-compliance
with Section 13 of RA 26, we laid down the attributes of a void judgment or ruling:
. . . a void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment, but may
be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is
sought to be given to it. It is attended by none of the consequences of a valid
adjudication. It has no legal or binding effect or efficacy for any purpose or at any
place. It cannot affect, impair or create rights. It is not entitled to enforcement and is,
ordinarily, no protection to those who seek to enforce. All proceedings founded on the
void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid. In other words, a void judgment is
regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be if there were no
judgment. It, accordingly, leaves the parties litigants in the same position they were in
before the trial. 37
Guided by this rule, we had set aside so-called "final" reconstitution Orders for being void for non-
compliance with Section 13 of RA 26 where the Orders were challenged either through a motion filed
in the trial court issuing the reconstitution order 38 or through a petition under Rule 47 of the Rules
of Court filed with the Court of Appeals. 39Here, petitioner availed of the former remedy. 40
However, a modification in the disposition of LRC Case No. Q-96-8296 is in order. In its 17 July 1998
Resolution, the trial court set aside the 28 October 1996 and dismissed LRC Case No. Q-96-8296. At that
time, however, the Register of Deeds, Quezon City had already issued reconstituted TCT No. RT-115027.
That title must similarly be set aside, emanating as it did from a void ruling. HAEDCT
A Final Word
Reconstitution proceedings under RA 26 has for their purpose the restoration in the original form and
condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of land. 41 Thus,
reconstitution must be granted only upon clear proof that the title sought to be restored was indeed
issued to the petitioner. Strict observance of this rule is vital to prevent parties from exploiting
reconstitution proceedings as a quick but illegal way to obtain Torrens certificates of titles over parcels of
land which turn out to be already covered by existing titles. 42 The social and economic costs of
such modus operandi cannot be underestimated. 43 As we observed in Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals:
The efficacy and integrity of the Torrens System must be protected and preserved to
ensure the stability and security of land titles for otherwise land ownership in the
country would be rendered erratic and restless and can certainly be a potent and
 veritable cause of social unrest and agrarian agitation. . . . . The real purpose of the
Torrens System which is to quiet title to the land must be upheld and defended, and
once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting
in the portals of the court or sitting in the mirador de su casa to avoid the possibility of
losing his land. 44
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Decision dated 31 August 2000 and the
Resolution dated 17 November 2000 of the Court of Appeals. We ENTER a new judgment declaring the
reconstitution proceedings in LRC Case No. Q-96-8296 VOID for lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, we
declare VOID the Order dated 28 October 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 225
and the reconstituted Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-115027 (252708). We direct the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City to CANCEL Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-115027 (252708).
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the Register of Deeds, Quezon City.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Carpio Morales, Tinga and Velasco, Jr., JJ. concur.
Footnotes
1.Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2.Penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner with Associate Justices Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr.,
and Andres B. Reyes, Jr., concurring.
3.The technical description of the property reads in part: "Lot No. 1, Pcn-04-000007, . . ., being a
[b]oundary of the consolidation of Lots 12, 13, 14, 15, & 16, all of Block 5, (LRC) Psd-4786, LRC
(GLRO) Rec. No. 5975[.]" (Records, p. 5)
4."Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated
as may be available, in the following order:
(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;
xxx xxx xxx"
5."AN ACT PROVIDING A SPECIAL PROCEDURE FOR THE RECONSTITUTION OF TORRENS
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE LOST OR DESTROYED," approved on 25 September 1946.
6."Supplemental Rules and Regulations Governing the Reconstitution of Lost or Destroyed Land
Certificate of Title," dated 13 June 1983.
7.The endorsement, dated 5 September 1996, erroneously indicated the date of the First Report as 20
August 1996.
8.Records, p. 25.
9.Id. at 52-53. (Emphasis supplied)
10."Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated
as may be available, in the following order:
xxx xxx xxx
(f) Any other document, which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for
reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title."
11."The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding section, to be published, at
the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted
on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building of the
municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least thirty days prior to the date of
hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail
or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein whose
address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. Said notice shall state,
among other things, the number of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, if known, the name
of the registered owner, the names of the occupants or persons in possession of the property,
the owners of the adjoining properties and all other interested parties, the location, area and
boundaries of the property, and the date on which all persons having any interest therein,
must appear and file their claim or objections to the petition. The petitioner shall, at the
hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by
the court." (Emphasis supplied)
12."Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c),
3(d), 3(e), and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court of First Instance, by the
registered owner, his assigns, or any person having an interest in the property. The petition
shall state or contain, among other things, the following: (a) that the owner's duplicate of the
certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owner's, mortgagee's or lessee's
duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been issued, the same had been lost or destroyed; (c)
the location, area and boundaries of the property; (d) the nature and description of the
buildings or improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names
and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements; (e) the names and
addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of
the adjoining properties and of all persons who may have any interest in the
property; (f) a detailed description of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g)
a statement that no deeds or other instruments affecting the property have been presented for
registration, or, if there be any, the registration thereof has not been accomplished, as yet. All
the documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence in support of the
petition for reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That in
case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in Sections 2(f) or
3(f) of this Act, the petition shall be further accompanied with a plan and technical description
of the property duly approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or with a
certified copy of the description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same
property." (Emphasis supplied)
13.The Metropolitan Trial Court in Cities of Metro Manila, Branch 32, dismissed Criminal Case No.
90649 on 12 February 2001 because of the desistance of the private complainant, one Juanita
Uy Tirona (rollo, p. 659).
14.The Heirs also filed a petition in the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 48322 to annul the 28
October 1996 Order but the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of affidavit of
merit and for non-disclosure of Civil Case No. Q-96-29545.
15.Records, pp. 117-118.
16.Rollo, pp. 159-161.
17.G.R. No. 76265, 11 March 1994, 231 SCRA 88.
18.G.R. No. 139518, 6 March 2001, 353 SCRA 699.
19.Id. at 699, 705-709.
20.It was only two years after Branch 80 rendered judgment granting reconstitution on 11 February
1994, that the LRA, on 29 March 1996, issued a Report adverse to Puzon's titles in connection
with Civil Case No. Q-97-32725 (entitled "Benjamin Cruz v. Evangeline Puzon") pending with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99.
21."Nothing hereinbefore provided shall prevent any registered owner or person in interest from filing
the petition mentioned in section five of this Act directly with the proper Court of First
Instance, based on sources enumerated in sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and/or 4(a) of this
Act: Provided, however, That the court shall cause a notice of the petition, before hearing and
granting the same, to be published in the manner stated in section nine hereof: And,
provided, further, That certificates of title reconstituted pursuant to this section shall not be
subject to the encumbrance referred to in section seven of this Act." (Emphasis supplied)
22."A registered owner desiring to have his reconstituted certificate of title freed from the
encumbrance mentioned in section seven of this Act, may file a petition to that end with the
proper Court of First Instance, giving his reason or reasons therefor. A similar petition may,
likewise, be filed by a mortgagee, lessees or other lien holder whose interest is annotated in
the reconstituted certificate of title. Thereupon, the court shall cause a notice of the
petition to be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of
the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and
of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land lies, at least thirty
days prior to the date of hearing, and after hearing, shall determine the petition and render
such judgment as justice and equity may require. The notice shall specify, among other things,
the number of the certificate of title, the name of the registered owner, the names of the
interested parties appearing in the reconstituted certificate of title, the location of the
property, and the date on which all persons having an interest in the property must appear and
file such claim as they may have. The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the
publication and posting of the notice: Provided, however, That after the expiration of two years
from the date of the reconstitution of a certificate of title, if no petition has been filed within
that period under the preceding section, the court shall, on motion ex parte by the registered
owner or other person having registered interest in the reconstituted certificate of title, order
the register of deeds to cancel, proper annotation, the encumbrance mentioned in section
seven hereof." (Emphasis supplied)
23.No. L-45168, 27 January 1981, 102 SCRA 370.
24.Id. at 439.
25.Circular 35 pertinently provides:
3. Within five (5) days from receipt of the petition, the Clerk of Court shall forward to this Commission
a signed copy of the petition together with the necessary requirements as prescribed in Secs. 4
and 5 hereof; . . . .
8. Upon receipt of the petition, the Records Section of this Commission shall, after the same is
recorded in a separate book used exclusively for reconstitution cases, forward all the papers to
the Clerks of Court Division for processing. If the Chief, Clerks of Court Division, finds that the
requirements as called for by these guidelines have not been complied with, or that the plan
and technical description as submitted by the petitioner are deficient or defective, the Court
shall be immediately informed thereof so that action on the petition may be held in abeyance
until after the requirements shall have been complied with.
9. Thereafter, the Chief, Clerks of Court Division, shall forward the entire records of the case, properly
foldered, to the Head Geodetic Engineer of the Division of Original Registration for
examination and verification.
10. After the processing and approval of the plan and technical description pursuant to Administrative
Order No. 13, dated July 7, 1969 and the verification and examination of the documents to be
used as the source of the reconstitution shall have been accomplished, the Head Geodetic
Engineer shall return the entire records of the case, together with his written comments
and/or findings, to the Chief, Clerks of Court Division, for the preparation of the corresponding
report.
11. All papers, together with the Report, shall be forwarded to the Chief, Docket Division, the
Commission, who shall transmit the same to the proper Regional Trial Court, thru the Records
Section.
12. The Register of Deeds, upon receipt of a copy of the petition and notice of hearing, shall verify the
status of the title whether valid and subsisting at the time of the alleged loss; whether or not
another title exists in the said office covering the same property; and as to the existence of
transactions registered or pending registration which may be adversely affected thereby. He
shall submit his written findings to the Court on or before the date of initial hearing of the
petition.
13. The Court, after considering the report of the Land Registration Commission and [the] comments
and findings of the Register of Deeds concerned, as well as the documentary and parole
evidence presented by the petitioner, may take such action on the petition as it may deem
proper.
26.Section 5(g), Rule 135 of the Rules of Court provides: "Inherent powers of courts. Every court shall
have power: . . . (g) To . . . control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law
and justice[.]" We further explained in Santiago v. Vasquez (G.R. Nos. 99289-90, 27 January
1993, 217 SCRA 633, 648): "Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be
 implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on
them. These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and
efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the
courts, as well as to the due administration of justice; or are directly appropriate,
convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and include the power to
maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants." (Emphasis
supplied; internal citations omitted)
27.See Abellana v. Dosdos, 121 Phil. 241, 245 (1965) where the Court held: "After a judgment has
become final, if there is evidence of an event or circumstance which would affect or change the
rights of the parties thereto, the court should be allowed to admit evidence of such new facts
and circumstances, and thereafter suspend its execution and grant relief as the new facts and
circumstances warrant."
28."The Register of Deeds, upon receipt of a copy of the petition and notice of hearing, shall verify the
status of the title whether valid and subsisting at the time of the alleged loss; whether or not
another title exists in the said office covering the same property; and as to the existence of
transactions registered or pending registration which may be adversely affected thereby. He
shall submit his written findings to the Court on or before the date of initial hearing of the
petition."
29.Sections 12 and 13 of RA 26 also require actual notice to the occupants of the property. Respondents
claim that they are the sole occupants of Lot 1.
30.Jaime de Paz Lee, Juanito Salandoon, Nenita Salandoon, Walter Maristela, and Manuel Maristela.
31.Respondents contend that Uy and Zalamea have no known addresses and that their titles are
fictitious. However, the fact that both filed Civil Case No. Q-96-29545 in Branch 227 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City belies their incognito status. As to respondents' claim
against the validity of TCT Nos. 187042 and 187040, this should be properly raised as
counterclaim in Civil Case No. Q-96-29545.
32.No. L-45168, 27 January 1981, 102 SCRA 370, 435-436.
33.121 Phil. 1122, 1128 (1965).
34.G.R. No. 109645, 25 July 1994, 234 SCRA 455.
35.215 Phil. 593 (1984).
36.The Court denied the petitions in the Decision of 22 April 1992 (G.R. No. 76265, 22 April 1992, 208
SCRA 215) and the motions for reconsideration in the Resolution of 11 March 1994 (G.R. No.
76265, 11 March 1994, 231 SCRA 88).
37.209 Phil. 325, 335-336 (1983) citing 31 Am Jur. 91-92.
38.MWSS v. Sison, supra.
39.Republic v. Court of Appeals, 368 Phil. 412 (1999).
40.Neither RA 26 nor Circular No. 35 provides the applicable procedure to set aside void reconstitution
orders.
41.Republic v. Court of Appeals, 368 Phil. 412 (1999); See Strait Times, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 356 Phil.
217 (1998).
42.E.g., Alabang Development Corporation v. Hon. Valenzuela, 201 Phil. 727 (1982); Director of Lands v.
Court of Appeals, No. L-45168, 27 January 1981, 102 SCRA 370.
43.Respondents' attempt to obtain a favorable ruling, as they did initially obtain, by presenting a
fictitious LRA Report seems to exemplify this practice. If, as respondents say, it is their Torrens
certificate of title which is valid, and not TCT Nos. 187040 and 187042, and Branch 227 of the
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City in Case No. Q-96-29545 sustains their claim, then they are in
a much better position to seek the reconstitution of the original of TCT No. 252708, if they so
desire.
44.No. L-45168, 27 January 1981, 102 SCRA 370, 451.
||| (Republic v. Spouses Sanchez, G.R. No. 146081, [July 17, 2006], 527 PHIL 571-599)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 149122. July 27, 2007.]
HEIRS OF GREGORIO AND MARY VENTURANZA, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J p:
By this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners seek the reversal of the
decision 1 dated January 31, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 38630, as reiterated in its
resolution of March 22, 2001, denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The assailed CA
decision affirmed [and dismissed the appeal taken by the petitioners from] an earlier decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iriga City, Branch 37, which ordered the cancellation of petitioners'
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2574 and the reversion of the land covered thereby to the mass of
the public domain, in a suit thereat commenced for the purpose by respondent Republic of the
Philippines, originally against the spouses Gregorio Venturanza and Mary Edwards-Venturanza,
predecessors-in-interest of the herein petitioners. TaSEHC
The petition traces its beginning from a complaint filed by the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in the RTC of Iriga City, thereat docketed as Civil Case No. IR-122 and
raffled to Branch 37 thereof, against the Venturanza couple for the cancellation of their TCT No. 2574,
covering a vast tract of land with a combined area of 23,944,635 square meters located at Buhi,
Camarines Sur.
Reviewed, the records unfold the following facts and antecedents:
The title in question TCT No. 2574 of the Registry of Deeds of Camarines Sur was issued sometime
in 1959 in the name of Gregorio Venturanza, married to Mary Edwards-Venturanza. The memorandum of
registration shows that TCT No. 2574 was derived from TCT No. RT-40 (140), which is a reconstituted
title issued to one Florencio Mora who sold the property therein described to Gregorio Venturanza in
1956 for P107,730.00. The same memorandum of registration, however, does not show when the land
covered by TCT No. 2574 was originally registered and the other data were merely noted as (NA).
In 1964, Gregorio Venturanza and the then Abaca Development Board entered into an agreement for
purchase and sale of the property covered by TCT No. 2574, whereby the former agreed to convey the
property to the latter, subject to the approval of the document of sale by the concerned government
office. The final sale, however, did not materialize.
Meanwhile, it appears that in the course of the parties' negotiation for the sale of the property covered by
the title in question, the government's negotiation committee assigned a deputy clerk of the Land
Registration Commission (LRC) to verify the true copies of TCT No. 2574 in the name of Gregorio
Venturanza.
Per verification, it was found out that Venturanzas' TCT No. 2574, was derived from TCT No. RT-40 (140)
in the name of one Florencio Mora (Mora) which covers Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan RS-383-D containing a
combined area of 23,944,635 square meters or 2,394 hectares, situated in the municipality of Buhi,
Camarines Sur. TaHDAS
In turn, TCT No. RT-40 (140) appears to have been reconstituted from TCT No. 140 which was issued to
one Sebastian Moll on June 7, 1928.
TCT No. 140, on the other hand, appears to be a transfer from Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 3480
issued to one Casimiro Natividad.
Upon further investigation, it was discovered that the land subject of LRC No. 3480, originally registered
on July 28, 1911, covered a parcel of land consisting of only 451 square meters and situated in Tigaon,
Camarines Sur.
In the report submitted by the LRC deputy clerk, the latter made a finding that the Venturanzas' TCT No.
2574, a direct transfer from TCT No. RT-40 (140) which was, in turn, derived from TCT No. 140, covers
only a parcel of land with an area of 451 square meters and not 23,944,635 square meters or 2,394
hectares which practically comprise the entire Municipality of Buhi.
Such was the state of things when, sometime in 1965, in the then Court of First Instance (now RTC) of
Camarines Sur, the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed a complaint for the Cancellation of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2574 and the Reversion of the Land Described Therein to the Republic of the
Philippines. Thereat originally docketed as Civil Case No. 5973, the complaint eventually became Civil
Case No. IR-122 which was raffled to Branch 37 of the court.
On April 8, 1992, the trial court came out with its decision 2 ordering the annulment and cancellation of
the Venturanzas' TCT No. 2574 and the reversion of the land covered thereby to the mass of the public
domain. Dispositively, the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered in favor of the Republic of
the Philippines and against the defendants ordering the annulment of TCT No. 2574 in
the name of Gregorio Venturanza, ordering the Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur to
cancel said title, and reverting the land covered by the questioned title, except that
which may have already been alienated by the proper authorities and lawfully passed
to private ownership, to the public domain of the Republic of the Philippines, with
costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED. aSCHIT
In resolving the suit in favor of the Republic, the trial court principally anchored its judgment on the
ground that the reconstituted title issued in the name of Florencio Mora could have been fraudulently
secured, hence, does not legally exist. The court further ruled that since the reconstituted title issued to
Florencio Mora is a nullity, then the order for its reconstitution did not attain finality and therefore may
be attacked anytime.
Therefrom, the Venturanzas went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 38630, arguing that Mora's
reconstituted title from where their TCT No. 2574 was derived is already indefeasible on the ground that
upon the lapse of one (1) year, the decision granting reconstitution of Mora's title becomes final. The
Venturanzas also claimed that they are protected by law as buyers in good faith. Lastly, they argued that
the Republic's action for the cancellation of TCT No. 2574 and the reversion of the land described therein
to the mass of public domain was already barred by the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. No. 20681-R,
entitled, Florencio Mora v. Venancio Infante, et al., which granted the petition for reconstitution of Mora's
TCT No. RT-40 (140).
In the herein assailed decision dated January 31, 2001, the CA affirmed that of the trial court. With their
motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA in its resolution 3 of May 22, 2001, petitioners
as successors-in-interest of the spouses Venturanza are now with this Court via the present recourse
raising the same issues already passed upon by the appellate court.
We DENY.
Petitioners maintain that under Section 112 of Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act), Mora's reconstituted
TCT No. RT-40 (140) is already indefeasible the same having attained finality one (1) year after the CA
granted its reconstitution in CA-G.R. No. 20681-R. Citing the second paragraph of Section 31 of P.D. No.
1529 4 which reads:
The decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subject only to
such exceptions or liens as may be provided by law. It shall be conclusive upon and
against all persons, including the National Government and all branches thereof,
whether mentioned by name in the application or notice, the same being included in
the general description "to all whom it may concern",
 petitioners contend that the two courts below were without authority to annul TCT No. 2574 issued
in the name of Gregorio Venturanza. CIaHDc
Petitioners are wrong. Clearly, the provisions relied upon refer to original decrees of registration and not
to orders of reconstitution. As it is, petitioners cannot even seek refuge in the Land Registration
Act because the land covered by TCT No. 2574 had never been brought within the operation of said law.
As correctly pointed out by the CA to which we are in full accord:
. . . the Land Registration Act is not applicable considering that the land covered by
TCT No. 2574 had never been within the operation of the Land Registration
Act because of the irregularities attending the issuance of the reconstituted title. As
found by the trial court:
TCT No. RT-40 (140) supposedly reconstituted from TCT No. 140 in the name
of Florencio Mora consists of 2,394 hectares supposedly situated in Buhi,
Camarines Sur. It appears from the survey plan that the land was surveyed
only in 11 days, which according to Engr. Antonio Rodriguez was quite
impossible considering the rugged terrain and the mountainous features of
the area. Moreover, it covers timberland.
Significantly, from the exhibits presented by the plaintiff it can be seen that
the resurvey plan (Exh. A) shows that the survey of Lot Nos. 1, 2 and 3 was
based on TCT No. 140 and it covered an area of 23,944,635 square meters and
appeared to have been surveyed on January 20, to January 31, 1953 or a
period of 11 days. Exh. "B" shows that the area supposedly covered by TCT
2574 is within the timberland, Project 12, Block B, L.C. 646 and Project 19,
Block ALC 761, Exh. "C", the official map of Legaspi City shows that the land
covered by TCT 140, which was issued on the basis of the resurvey (Exh. "A")
is a land situated in Tigaon, Camarines Sur, while the land covered by TCT No.
40 (140) is a vast tract of land in Buhi, Camarines Sur; that it further appears
that the lots covered by TCT No. 40 (140) were supposedly registered in
GRLO Sp. Proceedings No. 112 with an area of 23,944,635 square meters but
records of the LRC revealed that GRLO records No. 112 refers to a land
registration case in Iloilo, and not in Camarines Sur. Exh "D" also shows that
Mr. Florencio Mora had never applied for original registration of title covering
a land in the municipality of Buhi, Camarines Sur, and that plan RS-383-D
(without the suffix capital letter D) involving Lots 1 and 2 situated in the
Municipality of Calawag, Quezon, was the subject of Land Registration Case
No. 322, GRLO Record No. 13804 with Maximina Zepeda as applicant.
The stench of anomaly became at once pervading when we consider the
evidence submitted by the plaintiff. The land practically covers the
Municipality of Buhi and are being claimed and possessed by claimants, who
appeared as intervenors in this case. The Venturanzas never materially and
physically occupied the property because there are actual occupants and
possessors. The Venturanzas only asserted ownership over the property in
papers but not in physical possession. 5 ACcISa
As a necessary consequence, no court could have ever acquired jurisdiction to order the reconstitution of
Mora's TCT No. RT-40 (140) over the land which has never been originally registered. As aptly pointed
out by the trial court:
The evidence shows that TCT No. 2574, the title in question, derived its existence from
RT-40 (140) in the name of Florencio Mora which was a reconstituted title based on
TCT No. 140 allegedly obtained by Florencio Mora during the Japanese occupation.
The records of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur, however, do not show how the
land covered by TCT No. 140 supposedly in the name of Florencio Mora was
registered. Neither is there a decree number, when said decree was entered, the OCT
number or LRC Record Number. 6
Corollarily, petitioners' argument that the Republic's action for the cancellation of TCT No. 2574 and the
reversion of the land covered thereby to the State is barred by the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. No. 20681-
R has no leg to stand on.
Aside from the fact that no court could have ever acquired jurisdiction to order the reconstitution of
Mora's title over the property which has never been originally registered, the judgment in CA-G.R. No.
20681-R did not operate as res judicatawhich would bar the Republic's action because there was no
identity of cause of action between CA-G.R. No. 20681-R and the instant case.
The issue in CA-G.R. No. 20681-R was whether or not Mora's evidence in Special Proceedings No. 674 and
the procedures adopted by him for the reconstitution of certificate of title alleged to have been lost or
destroyed were in conformity with the provisions of Republic Act No. 26. The questions of ownership and
whether or not the property or portion thereof was registrable, being a timberland, were never put at
issue in CA-G.R. No. 20681-R. Neither the non-existence of the original title from which Mora's TCT No. RT-
40 (140) and petitioners' TCT No. 2574 were derived, nor the non-registrability of the timberland
included in the area in question which constitute Republic's cause of action against the herein petitioners,
were ever raised, much less, decided by the CA in CA-G.R. No. 20681-R. HAaDcS
Petitioners also claim that they are protected by law considering that they were buyers in good faith.
Again, this assertion is without basis considering that Mora's reconstituted TCT No. RT-40 (140), from
where petitioners' TCT No. 2574 was derived, is void. The only way by which Mora could have acquired
ownership over the subject parcels of land and validly transfer that ownership to the petitioners was for
Mora to apply for their registration in his own name.
What makes petitioners' cause doubly undeserving of merit is the finding of the two courts below that the
land subject matter of this case is part timberland, 7 a finding not even once disputed by petitioners. It is,
thus, safe to conclude that the land subject of TCT No. 2574 could not have been registered in the name of
petitioners or their predecessors-in-interest for the simple reason that under the Constitution,
timberlands, which are part of the public domain, cannot be alienated. 8 A certificate of title covering
inalienable lands of the public domain is void and can be cancelled in whosever hand said title may be
found. 9 Thus, we have ruled that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of the public domain
classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. And any title issued on non-disposable lands even if in REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CONCEPCION LORENZO, ORLANDO
the hands of alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled. 10
FONTANILLA, SAMUEL FONTANILLA, JULIET FONTANILLA, ELIZABETH
All told, the Court finds no reversible error in the assailed decision of the CA, affirming that of the trial FONTANILLA, ROSELA FONTANILLA, RENATO FONTANILLA AND EVELYN
court.
FONTANILLA, respondents.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
DECISION
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
Footnotes
Before the Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the
Decision 1 dated April 17, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80132, entitled "Conception
1.Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices B.A. Adefuin Dela Cruz (now
ret.) and Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, concurring; rollo, pp. 38-45. Lorenzo, Orlando Fontanilla, Samuel Fontanilla, Juliet Fontanilla, Elizabeth Fontanilla, Rosela Fontanilla,
Renato Fontanilla and Evelyn Fontanilla v. Republic of the Philippines." Said Court of Appeals Decision
2.Id. at 50-56.
affirmed the Decision 2 dated August 26, 2003 in LRC Case No. 24-2692 of Branch 24, Regional Trial
3.Id. at 48. Court (RTC), Echague, Isabela.
4.Formerly Section 38 of Act No. 496.
The genesis of the present case can be traced back to the filing before the trial court on February 11, 2002
5.Rollo, pp. 40-41. of a Petition 3 for the reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 3980 covering a parcel of
6.Id. at 54. land measuring 811 square meters, situated in Echague, Isabela.

7.Original Records, p. 83.
8.Sections 2 & 3, Article XII, 1987 Constitution.
9.Lepanto Consolidated Mining Corporation v. Damyung, G.R. Nos. L-31666-68, April 30, 1979, 89 SCRA
532.
10.Ledesma v. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 769 (1926). IDTHcA
||| (Heirs of Venturanza v. Republic, G.R. No. 149122, [July 27, 2007], 555 PHIL 216-225)
In seeking the reconstitution of OCT No. 3980, respondents averred before the trial court:
3. That during the lifetime of Pedro Fontanilla and herein petitioner Concepcion
Lorenzo, husband and wife, respectively, they acquired a parcel of residential land, . .
.; HEcaIC
4. That subject parcel of land is identical to Lot 18 of Echague Cadastre 210, covered
by and embraced under ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 3980 of the Land
Records of Isabela, in the name of Antonia Pascua as her paraphernal property and
being the mother of Pedro Fontanilla;

5. That because of the death of Pedro Fontanilla the lot as covered by the aforesaid
FIRST DIVISION title was settled and adjudicated among the herein petitioners, . . .;

[G.R. No. 172338. December 10, 2012.]

 6. That the OWNER'S DUPLICATE COPY OF OCT NO. 3980 was handed and delivered
unto the spouses Pedro Fontanilla and Concepcion Lorenzo which they have been
keeping only to find out thereafter that it was eaten by white ants (Anay);
7. That the original and office file copy of said OCT NO. 3980 kept and to be on file in
the Registry of Deeds of Isabela is not now available, utmost same was included
burned and lost beyond recovery when the office was razed by fire sometime in 1976,
a certification to this effect as issued by the office is hereto marked as ANNEX "D";
8. That for taxation purposes, the lot as covered by OCT NO. 3980, still in the name of
Antonia Pascua for Lot 18, Cad. 210, with an assessed value of P16,920.00, . . .;
9. That no mortgagee's and/or lessee's co-owner's copy to the subject OCT NO. 3980
was ever issued, and likewise no related documents affecting the land covered thereby
is presented and pending for registration in favor of any person whomsoever, and
henceforth, it is free from lien and encumbrance;
xxx xxx xxx
11. That in support for the reconstitution of [OCT] No. 3980, the following documents
which may constitute as source or basis for the purpose are herewith submitted:
(a) S[E]PIA PLAN with Blue Prints . . .;
(b) Certified technical description of Lot 18, Cad. 210 . . .;
(c) Certification by LRA as to the non-availability of a copy of DECREE NO.
650254 . . . [.] 4 caHCSD
During the trial, the testimony of co-respondent Evelyn Fontanilla-Gozum was offered in order to prove
the above-mentioned allegations in the petition. In her testimony, she declared that she is the daughter of
the late Pedro Fontanilla and co-respondent Concepcion Lorenzo who, during their marriage, acquired a
parcel of land covered and embraced by OCT No. 3890 from her grandmother Antonia Pascua as
evidenced by a Deed of Sale. She also averred that the owner's duplicate of the said Torrens certificate of
title was later discovered to have been eaten by termites and that the original copy of the said Torrens
certificate of title on file with the Register of Deeds of Isabela was certified to be burned and lost beyond
recovery when the office was razed by fire of unknown origin on December 4, 1976 as certified to by the
Register of Deeds. Since both the original copy on file and the owner's duplicate copy are non-existent,
she and her co-heirs, who are also co-respondents in this case, instituted the petition for reconstitution of
lost or destroyed Torrens certificate of title. 5
In its Decision dated August 26, 2003, the trial court granted respondents' petition and directed the
Register of Deeds of Isabela to reconstitute OCT No. 3980 in the name of Antonia Pascua on the basis of
the deed of sale, the technical description and the sketch plans, and to issue another owner's duplicate
copy of the said Torrens certificate of title. The dispositive portion of the said ruling states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
Register of Deeds of Isabela to reconstitute the original copy of OCT No. 3980 in the
name of Antonia Pascua, on the basis of the deed of sale, the technical description and
the sketch plans, and to issue another Owner's Duplicate of the said title after payment
of the necessary legal fees.
Furnish copy of this Order to the Land Registration Authority, The Register of Deeds of
Isabela and the Office of the Solicitor General. 6
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the ruling to
the Court of Appeals arguing that the trial court erred in granting respondents' petition for reconstitution
of Torrens title since they failed to present substantial proof that the purported original certificate of title
was valid and existing at the time of its alleged loss or destruction, and that they failed to present
sufficient basis or source for reconstitution.
The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners appeal in the assailed Decision dated April 17, 2006, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. 7 HScAEC
Hence, the petitioner sought relief before this Court and relied on the following grounds to support its
petition:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER
GRANTING RECONSTITUTION OF ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 3980.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF PARAGRAPH F, SECTION
2 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 26. 8
On the other hand, respondents put forward the following issues for consideration:
 (a) HAS THERE BEEN SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE OF ACT 26, REQUIREMENTS
RECONSTITUTING OCT NO. 3890 AND ISSUANCE OF ANOTHER OWNER'S
DUPLICATE COPY?
(b) DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY SUSTAIN THE RENDERED
DECISION OF THE COURT OF ORIGIN? 9
Petitioner argues that the alleged loss or destruction of the owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. 3980 has
no evidentiary basis and that there is no sufficient basis for the reconstitution of OCT No. 3980. Petitioner
likewise maintains that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are not supported by the evidence on
record. Lastly, petitioner insists that, contrary to respondents' assertion, the government of the Republic
of the Philippines is not estopped by the mistakes, negligence or omission of its agents. acEHSI
For their part, respondents maintain that they have complied with Section 2 of Republic Act No.
26considering that there was no opposition from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG); that the OSG is
guilty of estoppel; that there was a valid basis for reconstitution of OCT No. 3980; that there was
compliance with jurisdictional requirements; that both the original file copy and the owner's copy of the
subject OCT for reconstitution were lost or destroyed beyond discovery; and that questions of fact are not
subject to review by this Court.
In essence, the focal issue of the present case is whether or not the reconstitution of OCT No. 3980 was in
accordance with the pertinent law and jurisprudence on the matter.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The relevant law that governs the reconstitution of a lost or destroyed Torrens certificate of title
is Republic Act No. 26. Section 2 of said statute enumerates the following as valid sources for judicial
reconstitution of title:
SECTION 2. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources
hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order: AHacIS
(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds
or by a legal custodian thereof;
(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be,
pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued;
(e) A document, on file in the Registry of Deeds, by which the property, the description
of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an
authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered;
and
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper
basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
As borne out by the records of this case, respondents were unable to present any of the documents
mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (e) above. Thus, the only documentary evidence the respondents were
able to present as possible sources for the reconstitution of OCT No. 3980 are those that they believed to
fall under the class of "any other document" described in paragraph (f).
In the assailed April 17, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the trial
court's ruling by granting respondents' petition for reconstitution of OCT No. 3980 merely on the bases of
a purported deed of sale, 10 sketch plan, 11 and technical description. 12 The relevant portion of said
Decision reads: EHACcT
The appeal is bereft of merit.
In granting the petition, the trial court ratiocinated:
"As basis for the reconstitution of the lost title, the deed of sale, Exh. "M",
evidencing transaction over the property, in addition to the sketch plan, Exh.
"E" and the technical description, Exh. "D", duly approved under (LRA) PR-02-
00022-R pursuant to the provisions (of) Section 12 of Republic Act No. 26, as
embodied in the report filed by the Land Registration Authority, Exh. "J",
would be sufficient basis for the reconstitution of the lost title." (p. 3, Rollo, p.
38)
Appellees presented the approved sketch plan with its blue print, the certified
technical description of the subject lot, the Deed of Sale executed by Antonia Pascua,
the Tax Declaration, and Tax Payment Receipts. To the mind of this Court, there was
sufficient and preponderant evidence thus presented to warrant the reconstitution of
the original of OCT No. 3980 and the issuance of another Owner's Duplicate Copy
thereof. The enumeration of the preferential documents to be produced, as provided
under Section 2 of Republic Act 26 had been substantially complied with.
Certifications of loss of documents were attested to by the custodian thereof, the Land
Registration Authority of Ilagan, Isabela and Quezon City (Exh. "F", Supra & Annex "H",
 Record, p. 13, respectively). It is on this premise that paragraph (f) of Section 2, RA
26 comes to the fore, viz.: "Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is
sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of
title." 13EAcCHI
As correctly pointed out by petitioner, we had emphasized in Republic v. Holazo 14 that the term "any
other document" in paragraph (f) refers to reliable documents of the kind described in the preceding
enumerations and that the documents referred to in Section 2 (f) may be resorted to only in the absence
of the preceding documents in the list. Therefore, the party praying for the reconstitution of a title must
show that he had, in fact, sought to secure such documents and failed to find them before presentation of
"other documents" as evidence in substitution is allowed. Thus, we stated in Holazo that:
When Rep. Act No. 26, Section 2(f), or 3(f) for that matter, speaks of "any other
document," it must refer to similar documents previously enumerated therein or
documents ejusdem generis as the documents earlier referred to. The documents
alluded to in Section 3(f) must be resorted to in the absence of those preceding in
order. If the petitioner for reconstitution fails to show that he had, in fact, sought to
secure such prior documents (except with respect to the owner's duplicate copy of the
title which it claims had been, likewise, destroyed) and failed to find them, the
presentation of the succeeding documents as substitutionary evidence is
proscribed. 15(Citation omitted.)
Furthermore, in a more recent case, this Court enumerated what should be shown before an order for
reconstitution can validly issue, namely: (a) that the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that
the documents presented by petitioner are sufficient and proper to warrant reconstitution of the lost or
destroyed certificate of title; (c) that the petitioner is the registered owner of the property or had an
interest therein; (d) that the certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost or destroyed; and (e)
that the description, area and boundaries of the property are substantially the same and those contained
in the lost or destroyed certificate of title. 16 cAaDCE
In the case at bar, the respondents were unable to discharge the burden of proof prescribed by law and
jurisprudence for the reconstitution of lost or destroyed Torrens certificate of title. First, respondents
failed to prove that the owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. 3980 was indeed eaten by termites while in the
custody of respondent Concepcion Lorenzo and her late husband Pedro Fontanilla who, inexplicably, did
not execute an affidavit of loss as required by Section 109 17 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. Second,
The Certification 18 dated April 23, 2001 issued by the Register of Deeds of Ilagan, Isabela did not
categorically state that the original copy of OCT No. 3980, which respondents alleged to be on file with
said office, was among those destroyed by the fire that gutted the premises of said office on December 4,
1976. The document only stated that said office "could not give any information/data involving the
existence of Original/Transfer Certificate of Title No. Lot No. 18, area 770 sq. m., located at Taggapan,
Echague, Isabela." Third, a comparison between the aforementioned certification and the technical
description and sketch plan will reveal that there was a discrepancy in the land area of the lot allegedly
covered by OCT No. 3980. What was reflected on the former was a land area of 770 sq. m. while the latter
two documents pertained to a land area of 811 sq. m. Furthermore, respondents were not able to show
adequate proof that a Torrens certificate of title was issued covering the subject parcel of land or that the
same piece of land is what is covered by the allegedly lost or destroyed OCT No. 3980. The
Certification 19 dated December 3, 2001 issued by the Land Registration Authority (LRA) which indicates
that Decree No. 650254 issued on September 1, 1937 is not among the salvaged decrees on file in the LRA
and is presumed to have been lost or destroyed as a consequence of World War II does not support
respondents' assertion that OCT No. 3980 did exist prior to its loss or destruction because said document
failed to show a connection between Decree No. 650254 and OCT No. 3980. From the foregoing, it is
apparent that the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that "(t)he enumeration of the preferential
documents to be produced as provided under Section 2 of Republic Act 26 had been substantially
complied with" had no foundation based on the evidence on record.
Likewise, the deed of sale purportedly between Antonia Pascua, as seller, and Pedro Fontanilla, as buyer,
which involves OCT No. 3980 cannot be relied upon as basis for reconstitution of Torrens certificate of
title. An examination of the deed of sale would reveal that the number of the OCT allegedly covering the
subject parcel of land is clearly indicated, however, the date when said OCT was issued does not appear in
the document. This circumstance is fatal to respondents' cause as we have reiterated in Republic v. El
Gobierno de las Islas Filipinas 20 that the absence of any document, private or official, mentioning the
number of the certificate of title and the date when the certificate of title was issued, does not warrant the
granting of a petition for reconstitution. We held that:
We also find insufficient the index of decree showing that Decree No. 365835 was
issued for Lot No. 1499, as a basis for reconstitution. We noticed that the name of the
applicant as well as the date of the issuance of such decree was illegible. While Decree
No. 365835 existed in the Record Book of Cadastral Lots in the Land Registration
Authority as stated in the Report submitted by it, however, the same report did not
state the number of the original certificate of title, which is not sufficient evidence in
support of the petition for reconstitution. The deed of extrajudicial declaration of heirs
with sale executed by Aguinaldo and Restituto Tumulak Perez and respondent on
February 12, 1979 did not also mention the number of the original certificate of title
but only Tax Declaration No. 00393. As we held in Tahanan Development Corp. v. Court
of Appeals, the absence of any document, private or official, mentioning the
 number of the certificate of title and the date when the certificate of title was
issued, does not warrant the granting of such petition. 21 (Citation omitted,
emphasis supplied.) CDISAc
Lastly, on the peripheral issue of whether or not the OSG should be faulted for not filing an opposition to
respondents' petition for reconstitution before the trial court, we rule that such an apparent oversight
has no bearing on the validity of the appeal which the OSG filed before the Court of Appeals. This Court
has reiterated time and again that the absence of opposition from government agencies is of no
controlling significance because the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its
officials or agents. 22 Neither is the Republic barred from assailing the decision granting the petition for
reconstitution if, on the basis of the law and the evidence on record, such petition has no merit. 23
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 17, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80132 and the August 26, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 24 of Echague, Isabela are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for reconstitution
is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Bersamin, Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
9.Id. at 115.
10.Records, p. 6.
11.Id. at 4.
12.Id. at 11.
13.Rollo, pp. 13-14.
14.480 Phil. 828 (2004).
15.Id. at 840.
16.Republic v. Catarroja, G.R. No. 171774, February 12, 2010, 612 SCRA 472, 478, citing Republic v.
Tuastumban, G.R. No. 173210, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 600, 613-614.
17.SECTION 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. In case of loss or theft of an
owner's duplicate certificate of title, due notice under oath shall be sent by the owner or by
someone in his behalf to the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies as
soon as the loss or theft is discovered. If a duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced by a person applying for the entry of a new certificate to him or for the registration
of any instrument, a sworn statement of the fact of such loss or destruction may be filed by the
registered owner or other person in interest and registered.
18.Records, p. 9.

19.Id. at 13.
1.Rollo, pp. 11-14; penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. de los Santos with Associate Justices Jose C.
Reyes, Jr. and Arturo G. Tayag, concurring. 20.498 Phil. 570 (2005).

2.Id. at 42-44. 21.Id. at 582.

3.Id. at 45-47. 22.Republic v. Manimtim, G.R. No. 169599, March 16, 2011, 645 SCRA 520, 537.

4.Records, pp. 1-2. 23.Republic v. Castro, G.R. No. 172848, December 10, 2008, 573 SCRA 465, 477.
||| (Republic v. Lorenzo, G.R. No. 172338, [December 10, 2012], 700 PHIL 584-597)
5.TSN, March 7, 2003, pp. 1-7.

6.Rollo, p. 44.

7.Id. at 14. THIRD DIVISION

8.Id. at 22. [G.R. No. 133110. March 28, 2007.]

 BARSTOWE PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking the reversal and setting aside the Decision, 2 dated 8 August 1997, and Resolution, 3 dated
18 March 1998, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47522, which in turn, reversed and set aside
the Decision, 4 dated 22 December 1992, of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 80 in
Civil Case No. Q-92-11806.
Antecedent Facts
This case involves the conflicting titles to the same parcels of land (subject lots) of petitioner
Barstowe Philippines Corporation (BPC) and the respondent Republic of the Philippines (Republic).
The subject lots have a total area of 111,447 square meters, and are situated along the northeastern
perimeter boundary of the National Government Center in Payatas, Quezon City.
BPC traces its titles to the subject lots back to Servando Accibal (Servando) who was
supposedly issued on 24 July 1974, at 3:20 p.m., Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs)
No. 200629 and 200630 over the subject lots. TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 were purportedly
signed by Nestor N. Pena, Deputy Register of Deeds of Quezon City. On 10 June 1988, Servando
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject lots to his son Antonio Accibal (Antonio), with the
concurrence of his other heirs. Despite his prior sale of the subject lots to Antonio, Servando, by
virtue of a Deed of Conveyance, dated 8 February 1989, transferred/conveyed the subject lots to BPC
in exchange for subscription of 51% of the capital stock of BPC, such subscription supposedly
amounting to P6,000,000.00. 5 About a year after the death of Servando on 3 October 1989,
particularly on 10 October 1990, Antonio executed another Deed of Conveyance of the subject lots in
favor of BPC in exchange for subscription of 2,450 shares of its capital stock, with an alleged total
value of P49,000,000.00. 6 Due to the fire that gutted the Office of the Quezon City Register of Deeds
on 11 June 1988 and destroyed many certificates of title kept therein, Antonio sought the
administrative reconstitution of the original copies and owner's duplicate copies of TCTs No. 200629
and 200630 with the Land Registration Authority (LRA). On 12 December 1990, the LRA issued TCTs
No. RT-23687 and RT-23688 (reconstituting TCTs No. 200629 and 200630, respectively), which
were transmitted to the Quezon City Register of Deeds and signed by Deputy Register of Deeds
Edgardo Castro on 19 February 1991. Also on 19 February 1991, TCTs No. RT-23687 and RT-23688
were cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCTs No. 30829, 30830, 30831, and 30832 in the name of BPC
were issued. BPC then acquired from the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) a permit
to develop the subject lots into a residential subdivision. Subsequently, BPC entered into Joint
Venture Agreements with other corporations for the development of the subject lots into a
subdivision called Parthenon Hills.
Meanwhile, according to the Republic, prior to 14 November 1979, the subject lots were
owned by First Philippine Holdings Corporation (FPHC). As evidence of its title to the subject lots,
FPHC was issued TCT No. 257672, on an undetermined date, and TCT No. 275201, on 20 January
1981. Pursuant to a Deed of Sale, dated 14 November 1979, FPHC sold one of the subject lots,
covered by TCT No. 257672, to the Republic for P2,757,360.00. Thus, on 22 January 1981, TCT No.
257672 was cancelled and TCT No. 275443 was issued in place thereof in the name of the Republic.
FPHC executed another Deed of Sale on 25 March 1982 in which it sold the remainder of the subject
lots, covered by TCT No. 275201, to the Republic for P9,575,920.00. On 31 May 1982, TCT No.
275201 was cancelled and was replaced by TCT No. 288417 issued in the name of the Republic.
Because of the 11 June 1988 fire which razed the Quezon City Office of the Register of Deeds and
destroyed the original copies of TCTs No. 275443 and 288417, the Republic applied for
administrative reconstitution of the same with the LRA. It was then that the Republic came to know
that another party had applied for reconstitution of TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 which also covered
the subject lots. This prompted the Republic to file before the RTC on 26 March 1992 a petition for
cancellation of title against Antonio, Servando, and BPC, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-92-11806.
Civil Case No. Q-92-11806
Counsel for Antonio and the late Servando filed two successive Motions for extension of time
to file the proper pleading, dated 17 June 1992 and 1 July 1992, but despite the grant thereof by the
RTC, 7 no such responsive pleading on behalf of Antonio and the late Servando was ever filed. Hence,
on 31 July 1992, the RTC issued an Order 8 declaring Antonio and the late Servando in default.
In another Order, 9 also dated 31 July 1992, the RTC, upon the motion of BPC, allowed the
latter to continue with the development of the subject lots. It concluded that
Considering the plight of [BPC] and the possible irreparable damage that
may be caused against the residents in the surrounding developed subdivision, even
as said corporation is possessed of a good title, the court in the exercise of its
discretion grants the motion. More importantly, consideration of equity demands
that the titled owner [BPC] herein must be able to exercise all its dominical right
bloosoming [sic] forth from its ownership of the land in suit.
WHEREFORE, under cool reflection and prescinding from the foregoing, the
motion is hereby granted. [BPC] is hereby permitted and allowed to continue with
the improvement and development of the controverted property into a residential
subdivision. 10
On 12 October 1992, the Republic filed with the Quezon City Register of Deeds a Notice of Lis
Pendensrequesting the recording of the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-92-11806 on TCTs No. 30830,
30831, and 30832, all in the name of BPC.
While Civil Case No. Q-92-11806 was still pending before the RTC, there were two
intervenors.
Gloria Accibal Rettoriano (Gloria) filed with the RTC a Motion for Intervention, with a
Complaint in Intervention, both dated 1 September 1992. Gloria alleged that she was the only child of
Basilia Accibal, Servando's sister; the subject lots were inherited by Basilia, Servando, and their other
siblings from their parents Martin and Mauricia Accibal; upon her mother's death, Gloria inherited
and came into possession of a portion of the subject lots with an area of about 2.5 hectares; Gloria
had been possessing, cultivating and improving her portion of the subject lots for the last 30 years;
Servando, through fraudulent means, was able to secure TCTs over all the subject lots, including
Gloria's portion therein; the inclusion of Gloria's portion in the TCTs of Servando and, later, in those
of BPC, was done through fraud and gross bad faith; and unless the TCTs of Servando and BPC are
declared null and void, Gloria will be deprived of her property without due process and just
compensation. BPC opposed Gloria's intervention in Civil Case No. Q-92-11806 considering that she
had already instituted Civil Case No. Q-91-10933 before the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 76, seeking the
annulment of TCTs No. 30830, 30831, and 30832 of BPC based on the very same grounds she raised
in her present Complaint in Intervention; on 11 February 1992, Gloria entered into a Compromise
Agreement with BPC in which she waived and renounced any and all claims whatsoever which she
may have over the titles of BPC in consideration of the payment by the latter of P2,000,000.00; the
RTC, Branch 76, after finding that the said Compromise Agreement was not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy, approved the same, thus putting an end to Civil Case No.
Q-91-10933; 11 Gloria's cause of action to intervene in Civil Case No. Q-92-11806 was already barred
by prior judgment in Civil Case No. Q-91-10933 and Gloria's Complaint in Intervention is tantamount
to a collateral attack against a TCT. In rejecting Gloria's intervention in Civil Case No. Q-92-11806, the
RTC found as follows
The motion for intervention must be denied and the complaint in
intervention therein attached must be rejected.
For one thing, herein movant Gloria Accibal Rettoriano, was the plaintiff in
the first case (RTC Br. 76 No. Q-91-10933) and with "eyes wide open" she entered
into a compromise agreement with [BPC], which was the basis of the 26 February
1992 decision rendered therein and it being based on a compromise agreement,
said decision became immediately final and executory.
Whether or not the decision rendered in the first case was satisfied is of no
moment in the present case, as herein movant intervenor has all the remedies to
protect her rights therein.
For another, movant intervenor Gloria Accibal Rettoriano, from her
complaint in intervention would ask for the cancellation of the titles issued to their
[sic] relative Servando Accibal and those titles duly issued and registered in the
name of [BPC]. Certainly, this can not be done, as it constitutes a collateral attack on
the questioned titles which the law and settled jurisprudence do not allow. Perforce,
a separate action against the questioned titles is the remedy available for intervenor
Gloria A. Retoriano [sic].
Accordingly, the Court finds the opposition of [BPC] to be impressed with
merit and the motion for intervention does not inspire confidence.
WHEREFORE, the subject motion for intervention is denied and the
complaint in intervention attached thereto must be rejected. 12
Another intervenor in Civil Case No. Q-92-11806 was EL-VI Realty and Development
Corporation (ERDC) which filed with the RTC a Motion for Leave to Intervene, dated 1 September
1992. Subsequently, it filed an Answer in Intervention, dated 15 September 1992, in which, it alleged
that it acquired interest in the subject lots after having entered into a Joint Venture Agreement dated
16 January 1992, with BPC, for the development of the subject lots into a residential subdivision; the
action initiated by the Republic for the cancellation of the TCTs of BPC was already barred by laches
and estoppel because of the recognition accorded upon the said TCTs by the instrumentalities of the
Republic, particularly the Register of Deeds and the HLURB, on which the ERDC relied in all good
faith when it entered into the Joint Venture Agreement with BPC; the Republic is liable to ERDC for
moral damages and attorney's fees; should the RTC find the TCTs of BPC infirm, rendering the Joint
Venture Agreement between ERDC and BPC of no force and effect, then BPC should be held liable to
ERDC, being an innocent third party, for reimbursement of all expenses incurred by the latter in the
development of the subject lots; and should the RTC find that the TCTs of BPC are spurious, then it
should be declared in bad faith when it entered into the Joint Venture Agreement with ERDC, for
which it should be liable for exemplary damages and attorney's fees. In an Order, 13 dated 27
October 1992, the RTC granted ERDC's Motion to Intervene and admitted its Answer in Intervention.
After all the parties had submitted their respective Pre-Trial Briefs, 14 and upon motion by
the BPC, 15 the RTC decided the case on 22 December 1992 on summary judgment. 16 Although it
found both the Republic and the BPC as buyers in good faith, it held that the titles of BPC should
prevail. It ratiocinated thus
3. To the third issue, we rule that the title of [BPC] must prevail over that of
the [Republic].
There is no dispute that the titles of the First Philippine Holdings
Corporation, predecessor-in-interest of [Republic] were either issued in the year
1979 and 1981 (Exh. "A" and "B"). On the other hand, there is likewise no dispute
that the titles of defaulted defendant Servando Accibal, and predecessor-in-interest
of [BPC], were both issued and registered much earlier on July 24, 1974 (Exhs. "F"
and "G", pp. 210-213, record) and/or a difference of 5 or 6 years in point of time.
MORE, Servando Accibal, the predecessor-in-interest of [BPC] has been in
the actual and peaceful physical possession of the lots in suit before he sold them to
[BPC] on February 08, 1991. Upon registration of the same on February 19, 1991,
[BPC], after having subdivided the land into four (4) smaller lots was issued on 19
February TCT Nos. 30829, 30830, 30831, and 30832 (Exhs. 1, 2, 3 and 4).
It is true [Republic] acquired the land in suit on November 14, 1979 and for
which TCT Nos. 275443 and 288417 were issued in the years 1979 and 1981, but
[Republic] never took assertive steps to take actual possession of the land sold to it
by the First Philippine Holdings Corporation. It is even of grave doubt that the latter
took actual possession of the land before the land in suit was sold to the [Republic].
So much so, that the area had been occupied by several squatters, one of them is
Servando Accibal who by the way, was able to have the land in suit titled in his name
as early as July 24, 1974, under TCT Nos. 200629 and 200630 of the land records of
Quezon City. Further, [Republic] and its predecessor-in-interest were not able to
discover the overlapping of their titles by the titles of Servando Accibal for a period
of eighteen (18) long years starting from July 24, 1974 to about June 10, 1992 when
the LRA during a reconstitution of the titles of [Republic] was initiated, as evidenced
 by a report of reconstituting officer Benjamin A. Flestado of that office (Exh. "H", pp.
214-258, record).
Simply stated, [Republic] may be guilty of LACHES.
xxx xxx xxx
Perforce, the claim of [Republic] which was probably
originally VALID became a STALE claim as the years went by. Verily, the titles of
[Republic] must be cancelled and the titles of [BPC] must be upheld and declared as
good and valid titles and [BPC] is entitled to all the rights bloosoming [sic] fourth
from its dominical right of ownership.
More importantly, the predecessor-in-interest of [BPC] had been long in the
actual and physical possession of the lands in suit, while that of the predecessor-in-
interest of [Republic] was not in the actual possession of the land before the sale to
[Republic]. On the other hand, [BPC] immediately after the sale in its favor took
actual, physical and peaceful possession of the land in suit to the exclusion of all
others. It has no knowledge, actual or constructive that said parcels of land were
sold to the [Republic]. When it registered the sale, there was no inscription in the
Land Registry that the same parcels of land were earlier sold to the [Republic].
Hence, there was and is a continuing good faith on the part of [BPC]. (Article
1544, NCC; Cruz vs. Cabana, 129 SCRA 656).
In the same Decision, the RTC found certain irregularities in TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 in
the name of Servando and that the said TCTs should be cancelled, without prejudice to the rights and
interests of BPC. The RTC discussed the matter in this wise
We shall now dwell on the validity of the titles TCT Nos. 200629 and
200630, issued in the name of Servando Accibal on July 24, 1974 by the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City. The LRA report dated 10 June 1992 (Exh. H, pp. 214-258,
record) is competent proof that indeed said titles must be cancelled. In short, the
LRA found after due investigation that the said titles of Servando Accibal were
issued with certain irregularities. It recommended the cancellation therefore, of TCT
Nos. 200629 and 200630, to which the court concurs, as said report must be
accorded due respect and in the absence of fraud or irregularities that attended the
investigation, which the Court finds none, the same must be persuasive, if not
conclusive. Moreover, herein defendant Servando Accibal because of his failure to
answer, despite extension of time given him, failed to file his answer. Upon motion
of [Republic's] counsel, he was declared as in default and since then, he never asked
the court to lift and set aside the default order. There is no way, his title must be
cancelled. For one thing, he was not able to present evidence to controvert the
recommendation of LRA to cancel his titles. For another, Servando Accibal is
deemed to have impliedly admitted the irregularities that attended the issuance of
his aforestated titles.
However, the cancellation of the titles of Servando Accibal, would not affect
the rights and interests of [BPC] as the latter is declared to be a purchaser in good
faith and for value. MORE, under the circumstances of the case, and even when the
titles of Servando Accibal are cancelled, the titles of [BPC] are still good and
indefeasible titles, as it is settled rule that good titles may be sustained even when
the seller has spurious titles.
As for the intervention of ERDC, the RTC addressed the same as follows
Finally, we shall next discuss the claim of intervenor EL-VI Realty and
Development Corporation. A close reading from the Joint Venture Agreement dated
January 16, 1992, shows that in case of litigation, intervenor Realty Corporation
shall have the right to suspend all development activities and the development
period of 5 years shall automatically be suspended until such time as the said case is
finally settled/decided (Exh. "5" and Annex "A" answer in intervention pp. 109-114).
Upon the signing of the said agreement the amount of P1,500,000.00 was received
by [BPC] as advance payment of the 50-50 sharing basis in the sales proceeds.
During the pre-trial conference, herein intervenor tried to enforce a supplemental
agreement dated October 15, 1992, by filing a motion for a writ of preliminary
injunction with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order. Resolution of the same
was held in abeyance to await the decision to be rendered, after [BPC] assured
intervenor herein that it will abide by and strictly comply with its commitments
arising from the aforesaid agreement, after proper accounting is made therefore.
Herein intervenor admits that another financier-developer has entered the area due
to the delay of the project caused by the filing of the present case.
MORE, due to the filing of the present case, herein intervenor was reluctant
to further finance the project because of its big exposure already made. Hence,
intervenor's works and other activities in the area was suspended in accordance
with their Joint Venture Agreement.
Perforce, there is compelling necessity for a proper accounting, more
particularly its substantial exposure to the project, on a quantum meruit basis, in
fairness to all concerned and involved parties in the project, including but not
limited to the present contractor-developer of the area.
Finally, the RTC concluded that
A FORTIORI, the environmental setting and factual scenario of the case, in
relation to its legal ambience will show that the great preponderance of evidence
lies in favor of [BPC]. (Section 01, Rule 133, Revised Rules of Court), and the motion
for summary judgment is granted. The hearing as to damages, including attorney's
fees shall be scheduled soonest possible.
WHEREFORE, under cool reflection and prescinding from the foregoing,
judgment is rendered as follows:
1. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel Transfer
Certificates of Title No. 275443 and 288417 issued in the name of the
[Republic] covering the lots in suit. However, [Republic] being a
purchaser in good faith, and based on considerations of equity and
justice Barstowe Philippine[s] Corporation is ordered to re-imburse
 and pay [Republic], the sum of P12,333,280.00 representing the
purchase price from the vendor, First Philippine Holdings
Corporation soonest possible;
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to officially and finally cancel
from his records, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 200629 and
200630 issued in the name of Servando Accibal, on July 24, 1974,
covering the same lots in suit (Exh. "F" and "G", pp. 210-213, record).
3. Declaring herein defendant Barstowe Philippines Corporation as the
absolute owner in fee simple title over the lots in suit, as evidenced
by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 30829, 30830, 30831 and 30832
of the land records of Quezon City, all issued on February 19, 1991
and the said titles are further more declared valid, existing and
indefeasible titles of [BPC] and as such is entitled to all the dominical
rights bloosoming [sic] forth from its ownership over the lots in suit.
4. Ordering [BPC] to abide by and strictly comply with the terms and
conditions of the supplemental Agreement entered into by it with
herein intervenor EL-VI Realty and Development Corporation dated
October 15, 1992, after proper accounting is made;
5. Perforce, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is likewise ordered to cancel
any and all encumbrances annotated on said titles of defendant
corporation including, but not limited to the lis pendens notice filed
by the [Republic], if any;
6. The hearing as to damages, including the claim for attorney's fees shall be
scheduled soonest.
7. Considering the admissions and agreements of the parties during the pre-
trial conference, which are considered judicial admissions, this
decision acquires the nature of one based on a compromise
agreement. Perforce, the Court declares this decision to be
immediately final and executory.
8. No pronouncement as to costs.
Despite the promulgation of the foregoing Decision by the RTC on 22 December 1992, the
proceedings in Q-92-11806 were still far from over; significant developments still took place
thereafter.
ERDC sought the execution of paragraph 4 of the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision
dated 22 December 1992. In an Order, 17 dated 13 January 1993, the RTC issued a writ of execution
in favor of ERDC, and a notice of levy on execution was accordingly made on the subject lots. In a
dialogue held between the counsels for BPC and ERDC in the chamber of the RTC Judge on 26
February 1993, an amicable settlement was reached whereby BPC agreed to settle the claim of ERDC
in the form of developed subdivision lots in Parthenon Hills, subject to proper accounting. 18 BPC
offered to ERDC 40 developed subdivision lots in Parthenon Hills, valued at P18,543,000.00,
representing 65% of the total claims (prior to proper accounting) of ERDC, which amounted to
P28,787,306.32. However, ERDC refused the offer of BPC and demanded that it be paid the total
amount of its claims. It also brought to the attention of the RTC that, in violation of their Joint Venture
Agreement, BPC contracted another realty developer for the development of Parthenon Hills. Thus,
ERDC opposed the lifting of the notice of levy on execution on the subject lots for the protection of its
interests. In an Order, 19 dated 17 March 1993, the RTC found that BPC already substantially
complied with the terms of its agreement with ERDC and that the rights and interests of the latter
were well-protected and safeguarded. In the same Order, the RTC lifted and set aside the notice of
levy on execution on the subject lots. However, on 20 April 1993, ERDC filed a Motion for
Contempt 20 against BPC and informed the RTC that BPC, fraudulently, maliciously, and in bad faith,
already sold 36 of the 40 subdivision lots it earlier offered to ERDC by accepting downpayments
thereon of only 30% of the selling price. Upon further investigation, it discovered that of the four
remaining lots, two were vacant while the other two were reserved. ERDC subsequently filed two
other motions: (1) A Motion, 21 dated 29 April 1993, to set for trial the claim of ERDC for damages.
Said motion was granted, and the RTC set the hearing on 16 September 1993, at 8:30 a.m., 22 but
upon the motion of the counsel for BPC, the hearing was reset to 7 October 1993; 23 and (2) A
Motion, 24 dated 6 September 1993, for the issuance of a partial writ of execution for the undisputed
amount of P18,543,000.00, representing 65% of the total claims of ERDC. Unfortunately, the records
no longer show the succeeding incidents concerning these motions.
In a Motion for Leave to Intervene 25 dated 8 March 1993, and the attached Complaint in
Intervention, 26 dated 10 March 1993, Kadakilaan Estate expressed its intent to intervene in Civil
Case No. Q-92-11806. It anchored its claims on the contention that the subject lots were already
registered as private property under the Spanish Mortgage Law since 18 May 1891, and under the
Torrens System of Registration since 31 August 1907, by the predecessors-in-interest of Kadakilaan
Estate. The subject lots were supposedly included in a vast tract of land covered by Titulo de la
Propiedad de Terrenos No. 01-4 in the name of Doa Petra Rodriguez, who transferred the same to
her son, Don Gonzalo Yanesay Rodriguez. Kadakilaan Estate came into ownership and possession of
the vast tract of land, including the subject lots, by virtue of its successive sales from Don Gonzalo
Yanesa y Rodriguez to Doa Lourdez Rodriguez Yanesa, and from the latter to Kadakilaan Estate.
Kadakilaan Estate further alleged that the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 333, from which the
TCTs of both BPC and the Republic were ultimately derived, was null and void ab initio, and that the
TCTs of BPC and the Republic were spurious and likewise null and void ab initio, and without any
probative value. Kadakilaan Estate prayed for judgment declaring it the owner of the subject lots;
directing the other parties to respect its ownership, possession, rights and interests over the subject
lots; and ordering the other parties to pay just compensation, damages, and attorney's fees. The RTC,
in an Order 27 dated 27 April 1993, denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene and rejected the
Complaint in Intervention of Kadakilaan Estate for the following reasons
New intervenor Kadakilaan Estate alleges that the titles of the [Republic]
and [Antonio, Servando, and BPC] are all falsified, spurious in origin and null and
void ab initio, as the property in question were already registered as private
properties of [Kadakilaan Estate's] predecessors-in-interest, under Spanish
Mortgage law since May 18, 1891, and under the Torrens System, Act No. 496, as
amended, in Titulo dela propriedad de Terrenos No. 01-4.
 If this is clearly so, then [Kadakilaan Estate] is attacking the validity of the
titles of [Republic] and [Antonio, Servando, and BPC] in this case. It is settled rule
that titles registered under the Torrens System cannot be the subject of a collateral
attack. Perforce, the remedy of [Kadakilaan Estate] is to file a separate action. For, if
the intervention is allowed at this late stage of the proceedings, then it will cause
unnecessary delay in the soonest termination of this case.
MORE, the law and the rules as well as jurisprudence on the matter, will
only allow in the court's discretion, intervention, before or during the trial. Certainly
NOT after the trial and with more reason intervention may no longer be allowed
after the decision has been rendered as in the present case.
In the meantime, on 4 January 1993, the Republic filed a Notice of Appeal 28 of the RTC
Decision, dated 22 December 1992. The RTC, in an Order, 29 dated 16 February 1993, denied the
same. It reasoned that
Considering these judicial dimensions and acquiescence of the [Republic] in
open court during the hearings held and during the pre-trial conference, the court in
its dispositive portion of the questioned decision, declared it to be a judgment based
on a compromise agreement which by operation of law becomes immediately
executory.
It is unfortunate that despite the above declarations of the court [Republic]
failed to ask for a clarification of the said declarations, by way of a motion for
reconsideration of the decision based on fraud, mistake or duress mandated by the
rules.
The notice of appeal must be denied due course.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing, the notice of appeal filed by
plaintiff is rejected and denied due course.
From the foregoing RTC Order, the Republic filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus (with Urgent Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 30647. The Republic primarily questioned the
denial of its Notice of Appeal by the RTC in its Order, dated 16 February 1993, on the basis that the
RTC Decision of 22 December 1992 constitutes a compromise agreement, and is immediately final
and executory. The Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction 30enjoining the RTC
from implementing and enforcing its Order, dated 16 February 1993, during the pendency of CA-G.R.
SP No. 30647 or until otherwise directed by the appellate court. Apparently, from the denial by the
RTC of its Motion for Leave to Intervene and the rejection of its Complaint in Intervention in Civil
Case No. Q-92-11806, the Kadakilaan Estate again filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene in CA-G.R. SP
No. 30647, which in a Resolution, 31 dated 13 September 1993, the Court of Appeals also denied on
the following grounds
We find the stance of [Republic] and [BPC] well-grounded. Not only is
[Kadakilaan Estate] precluded by estoppel from filing the present motion, after
failing to challenge before this Court or the Supreme Court the trial court's denial of
subject motion for intervention, on April 27, 1993; it is too late for [Kadakilaan
Estate] to come in at this stage of the present litigation. Furthermore, as aptly put by
the [Republic] the alleged rights [Kadakilaan Estate] seeks to protect here can be
amply protected in an appropriate action [Kadakilaan Estate] may later bring.
In a Decision, 32 dated 29 June 1994, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic's Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus, ruling in this wise
We rule for [Republic]. Respondent Court's conclusion lost sight of the
nature of a compromise agreement, and the circumstances under which a judgment
based on a compromise may be rendered.
xxx xxx xxx
Guided by the aforecited law and jurisprudence in point, it can be safely
concluded that neither mere silence or acquiescence by the [Republic] in open court
during the hearing nor [Republic's] stipulation of facts, marking of exhibits, alleged
admission of Exhibit 6 which contains [BPC's] offer of compromise during the pre-
trial, be properly considered as a compromise agreement. Had the parties really
intended to enter into a compromise to end their case, they could have executed and
submitted a compromise agreement for the approval of the trial court. But no such
step was taken.
xxx xxx xxx
Records readily show that due to lack of an amicable settlement or any
compromise agreement, the respondent judge directed the parties to present their
documentary exhibits so as to facilitate the trial; no longer for the purpose of
settling the case. Evidently, there was no explicit agreement nor any reciprocal
concession between the parties with an end in view of terminating the litigation.
Absence of these essential elements of a compromise inevitably results in the
absence of a valid compromise agreement. (Merced vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop,
L-24614, August 17, 1967, 20 SCRA 1077). Consequently, the opinion of respondent
Judge that his December 22, 1992 Decision had the nature of a judgment based on
compromise, cannot be upheld.
So also, the doctrine relied on by respondents that a compromise
agreement constitutes the law between the parties and a judgment based thereon is
immediately final, executory and not appealable, is inapplicable under the premises.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the questioned order dated 16
February 1993 is SET ASIDE; and respondent court is hereby ordered to give due
course to [Republic's] Notice of Appeal in Civil Case No. Q-92-11806. Costs against
[BPC].
This Court, in its Resolution, dated 6 February 1995, issued in G.R. No. 117969, in effect, sustained
the afore-mentioned Decision of the Court of Appeals.
CA-G.R. CV No. 47522
 Finally, the Republic was allowed to appeal the RTC Decision, dated 22 December 1992, in
Civil Case No. Q-92-11806, to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 47522. In
a Decision, 33 dated 8 August 1997, the Court of Appeals found in favor of the Republic, and disposed
thus
WHEREFORE, premises considered, plaintiff-appellant Republic of the Philippines'
appeal is GRANTED. Except for paragraph 2 of the dispositive portion of the decision
appealed from declaring TCT Nos. 200629 and 200630 in the name of Servando
Accibal null and void and ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel said
TCT Nos. 200629 and 200630, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new one entered:
(a) declaring and affirming the validity of TCT Nos. 288417 and 275443 of the Registry
of Deeds of Quezon City in the name of appellant Republic of the Philippines and that
appellant Republic has indefeasible title to the property covered thereby;
(b) declaring TCT Nos. 30829, 30830, 30831 and 30832 also of the Registry of Deeds
of Quezon City in the name of Barstowe Philippines Corporation null and void and
ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel said titles;
(c) ordering Barstowe Philippines Corporation to surrender to the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City the owner's duplicate certificates of title of TCT Nos. 30829, 30830,
30831 and 30832 for cancellation;
(d) enjoining defendant-appellee Barstowe Philippines Corporation and intervenor
EL-VI Realty Development Corporation from exercising any act of ownership or
possession of the land in question; and
(e) remanding the case to the court of origin for further proceedings for determination
of the crossclaim of intervenor EL-VI Realty and Development Corporation against
defendant-appellee Barstowe Philippines Corporation.
There is no pronouncement as to costs.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by BPC was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution, 34 dated 18 March 1998.
G.R. No. 133110
Aggrieved, BPC came before this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari 35 under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, dated 28 April 1998, raising the sole issue of who between BPC and the
Republic has a better title over the subject lots. BPC prays that this Court rule in its favor, and reverse
and set aside the Court of Appeals Decision, dated 8 August 1997, in CA-G.R. CV No. 47522, based on
the following grounds
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN NOT
CONSIDERING THE GOOD FAITH OF [BPC] THOUGH IT WAS ADMITTED BY
[REPUBLIC] DURING THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN
UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE TITLE OF [REPUBLIC] OVER THAT OF [BPC.]
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN
ORDERING [BPC] TO SURRENDER ITS TITLE TO THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR
CANCELLATION[.]
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ENJOINING [BPC] FROM
EXERCISING ACTS OF OWNERSHIP OVER THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND[.]
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALES [sic] ERRED IN APPLYING THE
CALALANG CASE (231 SCRA 88) AS IT IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR[.]
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING
[REPUBLIC] GUILTY OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES[.]
After the Republic filed its Comment, dated 29 October 1998, several parties again sought to
intervene in the case.
Winnie U. Nicolas (Nicolas), through her sister and attorney-in-fact, Ditas Felicitas Nicolas-
Agbulos (Nicolas-Agbulos), and Edgardo Q. Abesamis (Abesamis), filed their respective Petitions for
Intervention, dated 22 October 1998 and 9 December 1998, respectively.
Nicolas-Agbulos invokes the provisions of the Rules of Court on the joinder of indispensable
parties and necessary parties for the complete determination of all possible issues, not only between
the parties themselves but also as regards to other persons who may be affected by the judgment.
Nicolas-Agbulos contends that she was a buyer in good faith of Lots No. 27 and 28, Block 13, of
Parthenon Hills, covered by TCTs No. 76497 and 76498, respectively, of the Quezon City Register of
Deeds, derived from TCTs No. 30830, 30831, and 30832 in the name of BPC. Nicolas-Agbulos had
already partially paid BPC for Lots No. 27 and 28 in the amount of P1,500,000.00, and the balance of
P800,000.00 was already deposited in a trust account in the name of BPC with the Far East Bank and
Trust Company (FEBTC). She bought Lots No. 27 and 28 after relying on the face of the TCTs of BPC
which were intact and subsisting in the records of the Quezon City Register of Deeds, and on the
authority granted to BPC by several government agencies, such as the HLURB, LRA, and the Register
of Deeds, for the subdivision, development, and sale of the subject lots to private individuals. She only
came to know, through her sister and attorney-in-fact, Nicolas-Agbulos, that the TCTs of BPC
covering the subject lots, which comprised the Parthenon Hills, were being assailed in Civil Case No.
Q-92-11806 pending before the RTC. Nicolas' inquiry on the matter was answered by BPC with an
assurance that despite the "bad publicity," Parthenon Hills was an on-going project and that she
should continue paying her installments. Acting cautiously, Nicolas-Agbulos decided that instead of
paying the balance of the purchase price for Lots No. 27 and 28 directly to BPC, she would open a
trust account with FEBTC in the name of BPC where she would deposit Nicolas-Agbulos' succeeding
installment payments. Nicolas-Agbulos was compelled to intervene in the instant case because BPC
made no mention of the fact that it had already sold numerous subdivision lots in Parthenon Hills to
innocent purchasers for value, either through absolute or installment sales. She thus sought a ruling
upholding the title of BPC, and recognizing and protecting the rights of Nicolas as an innocent
purchaser for value of Lots No. 27 and 28. 36
Abesamis seeks to intervene in the present case as an indispensable party since no complete
and conclusive determination can be had therein, which shall be legally binding and effective on
Abesamis, unless he be allowed to intervene. Abesamis claims to have acquired by purchase Lot No.
16, Block 4, of Parthenon Hills, for the purchase price of P720,000.00, and evidenced by a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated 9 June 1993. BPC processed and secured TCT No. 92270 covering Lot No. 16 in ownership of BPC, and the issues they raised are similar to those raised by BPC. The fact that Nicolas-
Abesamis' name. He only learned that the subject lots comprising the Parthenon Hills, including his Agbulos and Abesamis are purchasers in good faith will not render their titles valid and indefeasible.
Lot No. 16, was mired in controversy, when he attended an emergency meeting of the Homeowners' The titles of Servando from whom BPC acquired its titles and from whom, in turn, Nicolas-Agbulos
Association of Parthenon Hills. He asserts that, being a bona fide purchaser and holder of a legitimate and Abesamis, derived their titles, were found to be spurious; and the spring cannot rise higher than
and indefeasible title to Lot No. 16, he had valid and enforceable rights against both BPC and the its source. 41
Republic. 37
In the interim, BPC filed its Reply dated 22 January 1999, to the Comment of the Republic.
A third Petition in Intervention, dated 8 February 1999, was filed by spouses Jacinto H.
This Court, in a Resolution, dated 22 March 1999, granted the motion of the Republic for the
Santiago, Jr. and Arlene C. Santiago (spouses Santiago). The spouses Santiago aver that, doing
issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining BPC from selling the remaining unsold portions
business as ACS Trading, they entered into a supply agreement with Proven International
of the subject lots and from allowing buyers to enter and occupy portions thereof. 42
Development Corporation (PIDC), which had a construction contract with BPC, for the development
of Parthenon Hills. The spouses Santiago agreed to accept lots in Parthenon Hills as payment for the Thereafter, BPC, 43 the Republic, 44 spouses Santiago, 45 Abesamis, 46 and Nicolas-
construction materials they supplied BPC since the latter showed them clean TCTs to the subject lots, Agbulos, 47 filed their respective Memoranda.
and HLURB licenses and permits to develop Parthenon Hills. In payment for the construction
However, even before the case could be submitted for decision, Servando's heirs, namely
materials delivered, and financial assistance and various other professional services rendered by the
Virgilio V. Accibal (Virgilio), Virginia A. Macabudbod (Virginia), and Antonio, filed an Urgent Ex
spouses Santiago to BPC, the latter initially executed in their favor 15 Deeds of Assignment for 15
Parte Motion to Defer Resolution of the same. Soon after, they filed a Petition for New Trial, dated 23
subdivision lots in Parthenon Hills. The TCTs for the 15 subdivision lots were transferred in the name
May 2001. 48 Although Servando's heirs concede that the period allowed for the filing of a motion to
of the spouses Santiago free from any lien or encumbrance. The spouses Santiago mortgaged 13 of
set aside the judgment and grant a new trial under Rule 37, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, had
the subdivision lots with the Planters Development Bank and sold the remaining two to different
already lapsed, on grounds of justice and equity, they still move that this Court grant their Petition.
buyers. Thereafter, BPC again executed in favor of the spouses Santigao 71 Deeds of Assignment over
Servando's heirs were allegedly prevented from participating in Civil Case No. Q-92-11806 before the
71 subdivision lots in Parthenon Hills. When the spouses Santiago attempted to transfer the TCTs
RTC by the fraudulent misrepresentations of Rev. Father Antonio O. Ipo (Ipo), BPC President,
covering the 71 subdivision lots to their names, they discovered that the TCTs of BPC already bore
together with the BPC counsel, who convinced the nave Antonio that there was no need to worry
the annotation of the notice of lis pendens. The Quezon City Register of Deeds cancelled the TCTs of
about the case filed by the Republic against them and to hire another counsel as the BPC counsel shall
BPC covering the 71 subdivision lots and issued new ones in the names of the spouses Santiago, still
represent all of them. Unknown to Servando's heirs, the BPC counsel neither represented them nor
bearing the annotation of the notice of lis pendens. The spouses Santiago claim that they were unable
included them in the Answer he filed on behalf of BPC, thus, Servando's heirs were declared in
to intervene earlier in this case because of the pendency of the case filed by BPC against them,
default by the RTC. Because of the extrinsic fraud perpetrated upon them and their excusable
docketed as Civil Case No. 93-18231, with the Quezon City RTC, Branch 84, for the annulment of the
negligence, Servando's heirs should be granted a new trial, otherwise, they would be deprived of
last 71 Deeds of Assignment. This case had since been dismissed. The spouses Santiago invoke that
their constitutional right to due process of law. According to Servando's heirs, neither BPC nor the
they have sufficient interest in the present case which would necessarily be affected by the
Republic was a purchaser in good faith who acquired clean titles to the subject lots. The BPC
resolution/decision thereof, and they must necessarily intervene herein to protect their interest. The
President Ipo, hoodwinked Antonio into agreeing to convey the subject lots to BPC in exchange for
spouses Santiago pray for this Court to declare the assignment to them by BPC of the subdivision lots
51% of its capital stock. However, despite acquiring titles to the subject lots, BPC failed to transfer
as valid, and to direct both BPC and the Republic to recognize and respect their rights and
the promised 51% of its capital stock. On the other hand, the TCTs of FPHC, the Republic's
interest. 38
predecessor-in-interest, were of doubtful origin; and the Republic's acquisition of the subject lots
BPC supports the intervention in the case by Nicolas-Agbulos and Abesamis. It explains that from FPHC was anomalous in the sense that it purchased the said property through ordinary sale
its failure to mention that it has already practically sold all the subdivision lots in Parthenon Hills was when it could have easily expropriated the same.
not by design, but by mere oversight. 39However, BPC opposes the intervention of the spouses
Without formally intervening in the case at bar, Sariling Sikap Pabahay (SSP), through its
Santiago claiming that the latter are not indispensable parties to the case; they acquired their TCTs
President, Elias V. Esraita, submitted to this Court a letter, 49 dated 26 August 2002, together with
through fraudulent means; and Civil Case No. 93-18231 which it instituted against the spouses
other documents to disprove the validity of the titles of Servando and his heirs to the subject lots. SSP
Santiago was dismissed by the Quezon City RTC, Branch 84, without prejudice. According to BPC, the
is a cooperative formed by the urban poor to help secure for its members award from the
supply agreement for construction materials was between the spouses Santiago and PIDC, so that it
government of titles to the portions of the subject lots which they are presently occupying. It
could not be enforced against BPC. This issue, as well as the validity of the 71 Deeds of Assignment
presented the affidavit of a certain Edith C. Mantaring, 50 who attests that the Accibals are still
over 71 subdivision lots supposedly executed by BPC in favor of the spouses Santiago, requires the
misrepresenting themselves as owners of the subject lots and fraudulently selling portions thereof to
holding of a trial, not a mere intervention. 40
unsuspecting buyers.
The Republic opposed all efforts of other parties to intervene in the case. The legal interests
This Court's Ruling
of Nicolas-Agbulos, Abesamis, and the spouses Santiago are totally dependent on the alleged right of
 Ultimately, this Court is called upon to determine which party now has superior title to the
subject lots: the Republic, BPC, the intervenors Abesamis, Nicolas-Agbulos, and spouses Santiago, or
Servando's heirs?
BPC, the intervenors Abesamis, Nicolas-Agbulos, spouses Santiago, and Servando's heirs
derived their title to the subject lots from Servando's TCTs No. 200629 and 200630. This Court then
is compelled to look into the validity, authenticity, and existence of these two TCTs.
It is alleged by BPC and Servando's heirs that Servando was issued TCTs No. 200629 and
200630 on 24 July 1974. However, there is an absolute dearth of information and proof as to how
Servando acquired ownership and came into possession of the subject lots.
An investigation conducted by the LRA revealed even more irregularities which raised
serious doubts as to the validity and authenticity of TCTs No. 200629 and 200630. The LRA Report,
dated 10 June 1992, submitted by Investigator Benjamin A. Flestado (Flestado), found the said
certificates of titles spurious after a very detailed and exhaustive analysis of the evidence available.
First, it should be noted that despite letters sent by Investigator Flestado to BPC President
Ipo, Servando, and Antonio, requesting copies of documents to support the issuance of TCTs No.
200629 and 200630, they failed to file a reply and furnish him with the documents requested. A
certain Atty. Justino Z. Benito (Atty. Benito) appeared before Investigator Flestado claiming to be the
counsel for BPC and promising to contact Servando's heirs. Yet, even by the time the LRA Report was
finalized on 10 June 1992, Atty. Benito still failed to submit the documents requested. Instead, he
wrote letters insisting that TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 be returned to the Quezon City Register of
Deeds since these certificates "were detached and transferred to [your LRA central] office for no
cogent reason or purpose;" and his client, BPC, "is a transferee in good faith and for value, and its
titles unchallenged."
Second, although the 109-D forms on which TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 were printed
appeared to be genuine, and determined to have been issued to the Quezon City Register of Deeds on
5 July 1974, the signature therein of the Quezon City Register of Deeds Atty. Nestor N. Pea (Atty.
Pea) was forged. No less than Atty. Pea himself refuted that the signatures on TCTs No. 200629
and 200630 were his. In his sworn statement, he noted
A. At a glance, I am definitely sure that the signatures appearing here are not mine. My
attention is invited on the loop, on the starting point of the signature. The loop
should be sharp on the last portion of my signature. The portion going-up
starts from a point and is also sharp because that represents hypen [sic] on
letter 'n'. I notice in these titles my surname is typed as 'PENA' and not
'PEA'. If ever there is no '' in the typewriter, I used to add hypen [sic] over
the letter 'n'. Besides, my position here is indicated as Deputy Register of
Deeds. I never signed titles as Deputy Register of Deeds, during my time; and
if ever a title was presented indicating my position as Deputy Register of
Deeds, I would erase the word 'Deputy'. Moreso, the pen used here was a sign-
pen. I never used a signpen, as shown in the other 5 titles I identified earlier.
His employment records revealed that Atty. Pea was appointed as the Quezon City Register of Deeds
on 27 May 1968, and served as such until his retirement in August of 1980, so that at the time when
he supposedly signed TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 on 24 July 1974, he was the Quezon City Register
of Deeds, not the Deputy Register of Deeds.
Third, even the then incumbent Quezon City Register of Deeds Samuel Cleofe (RD Cleofe) and
Deputy Register of Deeds Edgardo Castro (DRD Castro) believed that TCTs No. 200629 and 200630
were spurious. According to RD Cleofe, the size of the area covered by the TCTs made him highly
suspicious of the same. In Quezon City, only a few people own big tracts of land, namely, the Aranetas,
Tuazons, etc. Commonly, ordinary individuals own only 300 to 2,000 square meters of land. Both RD
Cleofe and DRD Castro identified differences in the signatures and designation of Atty. Pea
appearing on the questionable TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 compared to those on five other
admittedly authentic TCTs. 51
Fourth, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), upon request of Investigator Flestado,
conducted an examination and issued Questioned Documents Report No. 636-991, dated 31 March
1992, wherein it noted significant differences in the handwriting characteristics between the
standard/sample signatures of Atty. Pea and those appearing on TCTs No. 200629 and 200630, i.e.,
in the manner of execution, direction/movement of strokes, and other identifying details. The NBI
concluded that "[t]he questioned and the standard/sample signatures of '[N]estor N. Pea' were NOT
WRITTEN by one and the same person."
Finally, Investigator Flestado made inquiries with the Land Management Bureau (LMB)
regarding the consolidation-subdivision plan Pcs-2480 and plan Psu-32606 of Lots 34 and 40 (the
subject lots) as described in TCTs No. 200629 and 200630. LMB Geodetic Surveys Division Chief
Privadi J.G. Dalire, in a letter, dated 29 November 1991, informed Investigator Flestado that LMB had
no records of Pcs-2480, while the original copy of Psu-32606 is no longer available as it had been
badly damaged. Thus, there was no record in the LMB that Lots 34 and 40, Psu-32606, were in fact
consolidated and then subdivided into Lots 3, 4, 5, and 6 pursuant to plan Pcs-2480, as mentioned in
TCTs No. 200629 and 200630.
To rebut the foregoing findings of LRA Investigator Flestado, BPC presented, in support of
the authenticity and validity of TCTs No. 200629 and 200630, the LRA Resolution, 52 dated 4
November 1991, in Consulta No. 1957, and NBI Questioned Documents Report No. 585-891, 53 dated
2 September 1991. A careful study of the said documents does little to support the position of BPC.
The LRA Resolution in Consulta No. 1957 merely allowed the registration of the rescission of
a Joint Venture Agreement on TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 despite the initial adverse finding that
the said certificates were of doubtful authenticity. It did not make any categorical finding as to the
authenticity or validity of the TCTs. In fact, the last paragraph of the said Resolution elucidated that
This resolution, however, should be understood to be limited to the issue
of registrability of the instrument sought to be registered and is without
prejudice to any action, if warranted, that may be filed in court assailing the validity
or authenticity of the certificate of titles. (Emphasis supplied.)
The NBI Questioned Documents Report No. 585-891 was even in accordance with the finding
in the LRA Report that the 109-D forms on which TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 were printed seemed
to be genuine. The NBI concluded that the words "109-D" and the serial numbers printed on the
forms were not altered. The NBI did a very limited examination of the genuineness of the forms on
which TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 were printed, but it did not look into the authenticity of Atty.
Pea's signature (which was the subject of NBI Questioned Documents Report No. 636-991, dated 31
March 1992, mentioned in the LRA Report) or the accuracy of the entries made therein.
The LRA Report, dated 10 June 1992, of Investigator Flestado was submitted as evidence
before the RTC. It must be emphasized that the LRA Report was extensive and thorough. Its findings
are sufficiently supported by independent and reliable proof. The BPC failed to present evidence to
refute the same. The LRA Report deserves great weight sufficient to overcome the presumption that
TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 were genuine, authentic, and indefeasible. 54
It having been established that TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 were forged and spurious,
their reconstitution was also attended with grave irregularities. Once more, this Court relies on the
findings in the LRA Report, dated 10 June 1992, of Investigator Flestado. Quezon City RD Cleofe; the
unnamed Chief of the LRA Micrographics and Computer Division; and Records Officer Viterbo Cahilig
of the Quezon City Register of Deeds, all confirmed that there were no records of any applications for
reconstitution of TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 in the name of Servando. It would seem that an LRA
employee, Cartographer Rovil Ruiz (Ruiz), made it appear that there were applications for
reconstitution of TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 filed, and which were included in Folder 1614. When
Folder 1614 was inspected, TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 were not included in its table of contents;
and although the said folder did have 44 missing pages, the missing pages pertain to the supporting
documents of other TCTs, and there was no showing that TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 and the
applications for reconstitution thereof were among these missing pages. Ruiz undertook by himself
the computation of the tie-lines of the subject lots as described in TCTs No. 200629 and 200630, the
plotting, and examination of the titles. The LRA Report thus recommended that Ruiz be
administratively charged for grave misconduct, it appearing that he was the one who facilitated the
administrative reconstitution of TCTs No. 200629 and 200630.
In contrast, the Republic was able to supply Investigator Flestado with the documents
supporting the transfer of the titles to the subject lots from FPHC to the Republic, among which were
the TCTs of FPHC, the Deeds of Sale executed by FPHC to the Republic, notice to the real property
owners within 300-meter radius from the area, receipts for payment of registration fees, and
payment order for the documentary stamp tax on the sales. TCTs No. 275443 and 288417 in the
name of the Republic were included in LRA Folder No. 1976-B, together with other certificates of title
in the name of the Republic. One of the applications filed by the Republic was docketed as Application
for Reconstitution No. 41869. The Chief of the LRA Micrographics and Computer Division confirmed
that the applications for reconstitution of TCTs No. 275443 and 288417 by the Republic were
recorded in the computerized Administrative Reconstitution System.
BPC was unable to attack the authenticity and validity of the titles of the Republic to the
subject lots, and could only interpose the defense that it was a buyer in good faith. Only Servando's
heirs, in their Petition for New Trial, attempted to raise doubts as to the titles of the Republic to the
subject lots by averring that the transfer thereof from FPHC to the Republic was highly irregular
because the latter could have acquired the property by expropriation. Such an averment is totally
baseless. Expropriation as the means by which the State can acquire private property is always the
remedy of last resort. Expropriation lies only when it is made necessary by the opposition of the
owner of the property to the sale or by the lack of any agreement as to the price. 55 There being, in
the present case, valid and subsisting contracts between the FPHC, the previous owner, and the
Republic, the buyer, for the purchase of the subject lots at an agreed price, there was no reason for
the expropriation.
In consideration of all the foregoing findings, it is indubitable that TCTs No. 275443 and
288417 of the Republic covering the subject lots are authentic and valid, while TCTs No. 200629 and
200630 of Servando covering the same property are not.
However, BPC maintains that it was a purchaser in good faith, for value and without any
inkling about any flaw from Servando's titles. It points out that it purchased the subject lots from
Servando on 8 February 1989 and registered the same on 19 February 1991, way before the titles of
Servando were declared null by the RTC on 22 December 1992. BPC relies on this Court's ruling
in Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, 56 to wit
Under Section 55 of the Land Registration Act, as amended by Section 53
of Presidential Decree No. 1529, an original owner of registered land may seek the
annulment of a transfer thereof on the ground of fraud. However, such a remedy is
without prejudice to the rights of any innocent holder for value with a certificate of
title.
A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the property of
another, without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such
property, and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase or
before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property. In
consonance with this accepted legal definition, petitioner Consorcia Tenio-Obsequio
is a purchaser in good faith. There is no showing whatsoever nor even an allegation
that herein petitioner had any participation, voluntarily or otherwise, in the alleged
forgery.
xxx xxx xxx
The main purpose of the Torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of
title to real estate and to facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public
the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with
the need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual
knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonable cautious man
to make such further inquiry. Where innocent third persons, relying on the
correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the property,
the court cannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the
certificate. The effect of such an outright cancellation would be to impair public
confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property registered
under the Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance as to whether the
title has been regularly or irregularly issued by the court. Every person dealing with
registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued
therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to
determine the condition of the property.
xxx xxx xxx
 It has been consistently ruled that a forged deed can legally be the root of a and purportedly destroyed in the fire, there would have been no way for BPC to have verified the
valid title when an innocent purchaser for value intervenes. A deed of sale executed owner's duplicate copies.
by an impostor without the authority of the owner of the land sold is a nullity, and
In addition, without the original copies and owner's duplicate copies of TCTs No. 200629 and
registration will not validate what otherwise is an invalid document. However,
200630, BPC had to rely on the reconstituted certificates, issued on 12 December 1990, bearing the
where the certificate of title was already transferred from the name of the true
following numbers: TCTs No. RT-23687 (for TCT No. 200629) and RT-23688 (for TCT No. 200630).
owner to the forger and, while it remained that way, the land was subsequently sold
Under section 7 of Republic Act No. 26, 57 "Reconstituted titles shall have the same validity and legal
to an innocent purchaser, the vendee had the right to rely upon what appeared in
effect as the originals thereof" unless the reconstitution was made extrajudicially. 58 In this case,
the certificate and, in the absence of anything to excite suspicion, was under no
TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 were reconstituted administratively, hence, extrajudicially. In contrast
obligation to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor
to the judicial reconstitution of a lost certificate of title which is in rem, the administrative
appearing on the face of said certificate.
reconstitution is essentially ex-parte and without notice. 59 The reconstituted certificates of title do
Now the question is whether BPC qualifies as an innocent purchaser for value which not share the same indefeasible character of the original certificates of title for the following reason
acquired valid titles to the subject lots, despite the fact that the titles of its predecessor-in-interest
were found to be forged and spurious.
. . . The nature of a reconstituted Transfer Certificate Of Title of registered
This Court finds in the negative. land is similar to that of a second Owner's Duplicate Transfer Certificate Of Title.
Both are issued, after the proper proceedings, on the representation of the
Foremost is the fact that there seem to be two documents by which titles to the subject lots
registered owner that the original of the said TCT or the original of the Owner's
were transferred from the Accibals to BPC: (1) A Deed of Conveyance, dated 8 February 1989,
Duplicate TCT, respectively, was lost and could not be located or found despite
executed by Servando in favor of BPC, transferring to the latter titles to the subject lots in exchange
diligent efforts exerted for that purpose. Both, therefore, are subsequent copies of
for 51% of its capital stock; and (2) A Deed of Conveyance, dated 10 October 1990, executed by
the originals thereof. A cursory examination of these subsequent copies would show
Antonio in favor of BPC, transferring to the latter the very same property in exchange for 2,450
that they are not the originals. Anyone dealing with such copies are put on notice of
shares in BPC. It should be noted that even prior to these Deeds of Conveyance, Servando already
such fact and thus warned to be extra-careful. . . . . 60
transferred the subject lots by way of a Deed of Absolute Sale, dated 10 June 1988, in favor of his son
Antonio, with the concurrence of his other heirs. Thus, by the time Servando executed the Deed of The fact that the TCTs were reconstituted should have alerted BPC and its officers to conduct an
Conveyance over the subject lots in favor of BPC on 8 February 1989, he no longer had any right to inquiry or investigation as might be necessary to acquaint themselves with the defects in the titles of
the said property, having sold the same to Antonio. It was probably to rectify this mistake that a Servando. 61
second Deed of Conveyance was executed by Antonio on 10 October 1990. Comparing all these
What is more, BPC again invokes LRA Resolution, dated 4 November 1991, in Consulta No.
transfer documents, the LRA Report, dated 10 June 1992, prepared by Investigator Flestado noted
1957, and NBI Questioned Documents Report No. 585-891, dated 2 September 1991 as proof that it
that Servando's Tax Account Number (TAN) in the Deed of Conveyance, dated 8 February 1989,
did inquire or investigate into the validity and authenticity of Servando's titles. But again, it should be
which he executed over the subject lots in favor of BPC, was "A2140-M1746-A-1;" while in the Deed
noted that these documents were issued after BPC already acquired the subject lots from Servando
of Sale, dated 10 June 1988, which he executed over the subject lots in favor of Antonio, his TAN was
and Antonio.
"4110-241-R." Moreover, despite being executed a year apart, Servando had the same residence
certificate (No. 5901393, issued at Quezon City, on 6 April 1988) appearing in both documents. Lastly, there are serious doubts that BPC acquired the subject lots for value. The Republic
bought the subject lots from FPHC for the combined price of P12,333,280.00. BPC, on the other hand,
Furthermore, BPC cannot really claim that it was a purchaser in good faith which relied upon
supposedly acquired the subject lots from Servando on 8 February 1989 in exchange for 51% of the
the face of Servando's titles. It should be recalled that the Quezon City Register of Deeds caught fire
capital stock of BPC, with a subscription value of P6,000,000.00. In the LRA Report, dated 10 June
on 11 June 1988. Presumably, the original copies of TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 were burnt in the
1992, Investigator Flestado pointed out that in the Articles of Incorporation, dated 16 January 1989,
said fire. Servando's heirs sought the administrative reconstitution of TCTs No. 200629 and 200630
of BPC, submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on 20 January 1989, BPC had an
only in December 1990. The two Deeds of Conveyance over the subject lots were executed in favor of
authorized capital stock of only P1,000,000.00, which was divided into 10,000 shares, with a par
BPC by Servando and Antonio on 8 February 1989 and 10 October 1990, respectively, both prior to
value of P100.00 each; and the amount of capital stock actually subscribed was P250,000.00.
the administrative reconstitution of TCTs No. 200629 and 200630. If BPC bought the subject lots
Therefore, in 1989, fifty-one percent of the capital stock of BPC would be 5,100 shares, with an
after TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 were destroyed when the Quezon City Register of Deeds burned
aggregate value of only P510,000.00. BPC is not saved by the second Deed of Conveyance, executed
down, but before the said certificates were reconstituted, then on the face of what titles did BPC rely
more than a year later by Antonio, again transferring to BPC the subject lots in exchange for 2,450
on before deciding to proceed with the purchase of the subject lots? There was no showing that there
shares in the latter, with the alleged value of P49,000,000.00. Unless BPC is able to present proof that
were surviving owner's duplicate copies of TCTs No. 200629 and 200630, or even if there were,
it applied for, and the SEC approved, a substantial increase in its capital stock, then this Court can
without the original copies of the said TCTs which were stored in the Quezon City Register of Deeds
only assume that its capital stock remained the same as the year before, 2,450 shares in BPC, with a
par value of P100.00 each, amount only to P245,000.00. This Court cannot find a plausible
explanation for the discrepancy in the value of 2,450 shares of BPC between the P245,000.00 it has
hereby computed and the P49,000,000.00 claimed by BPC.
For the above-stated reasons, this Court cannot declare BPC an innocent purchaser for value,
and it acquired no better titles to the subject lots than its predecessors-in-interest, Servando and
Antonio.
At this point, it would seem that the Republic does hold better titles to the subject lots.
Nonetheless, another level of transactions involving the subject lots was brought by intervenors to
the attention of this Court.
From the reconstituted TCTs No. RT-23687 (200629) and RT - 23688 (200630) in the name
of Servando, BPC derived and was issued by the Quezon City Register of Deeds new certificates, TCTs
No. 30829, 30830, 30831 and 30832, in its own name. It was able to secure the necessary licenses
and permits from the appropriate government agencies to subdivide, develop, and sell the subject
lots as Parthenon Hills. The Parthenon Hills project was openly advertised and marketed, and a
substantial portion of the subject lots was already sold by BPC to the public.
Except for the spouses Santiago, BPC recognizes that the intervenors, Nicolas-Agbulos and
Abesamis, together with other legitimate homeowners in Parthenon Hills, acquired from BPC titles to
their respective subdivided lots in good faith and for value. Even the Republic could not refute that
the individuals who acquired lots in Parthenon Hills from BPC were purchasers in good faith and for
value. It insists, however, that these buyers could not acquire better titles to the property than its
predecessors-in-interest BPC, Servando, and Antonio since the spring cannot rise higher than its
source. The law must protect and prefer the lawful holder of registered title over the transferee of a
vendor bereft of any transmissible rights. 62
It is true that the general rule is that a forged deed is a nullity and conveys no title. 63 A
forged deed may be defined as an instrument which purports to have been executed by the person or
persons whose signatures appear thereon, but which, in fact, was not executed, and the signatures
thereon had been merely imitated so as to give them the deceptive appearance of genuineness. 64 In
the case at bar, it was not any of the deeds of transfer or conveyance of the subject lots which was
forged, but TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 themselves. The forged TCTs, nevertheless, just as a forged
deed, can make it appear that one had title, right, or interest to the land, when in truth, he had none,
to the deprivation of the rightful owner. It has been recognized that while a forged instrument is null
and void and of no effect as between the parties, it may nevertheless be the root of a good title; so
that the title of a registered owner who has taken it bona fide and for value, is not affected by reason
of his claiming through someone, that the registration was void because it had been procured by the
presentation of a forged instrument. 65
The forged TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 were later administratively reconstituted, and
although an investigation would show that their reconstitution was also attended with irregularities,
TCTs No. RT-23687 (200629) and RT-23688 (200630) appear, on either face, to have been duly
approved by the LRA and issued by the Quezon City Register of Deeds. With the cancellation of the
reconstituted TCTs and the issuance of new ones, TCTs No. 30829, 30830, 30831, and 30832, in the
name of BPC, any trace of forgery or irregularity as to BPC's titles was eliminated. TCTs No. 30829,
30830, 30831, and 30832 were clean, at least, until the annotation therein of the notice of lis
pendens of the Republic on 21 October 1992. It is a settled doctrine that one who deals with property
registered under the Torrens system need not go beyond the same, but only has to rely on the
certificates of title. He is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the
certificates. 66 Herein intervenors, Nicolas-Agbulos and Abesamis, before purchasing subdivision
lots in Parthenon Hills, looked into the TCTs of BPC and found nothing on the face thereof to raise
doubts or suspicions as to their validity and authenticity. Besides, BPC was the holder of licenses and
permits to subdivide, develop, and sell the subject lots as Parthenon Hills, issued by the appropriate
government agencies, primarily HLURB.
This is definitely a situation which constitutes an exception to the general rule that estoppel
cannot lie against the government. The Republic v. Court of Appeals, 67 provides an illuminating
discourse on when such an exception applies, thus
Is the immunity of the government from laches and estoppel absolute? May
it still recover the ownership of lots sold in good faith by a private developer to
innocent purchasers for value, notwithstanding its approval of the subdivision plan
and its issuance of separate individual certificates of title thereto?
xxx xxx xxx
The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes
or errors of its officials or agents. However, like all general rules, this is also subject
to exceptions, viz:
"Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked
except in rare and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked where
they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to
protect the public. They must be applied with circumspection and should be
applied only in those special cases where the interests of justice clearly
require it. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal
dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble
part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations . . . the doctrine of
equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as
against private individuals."
xxx xxx xxx
Significantly, the other private respondents Spouses Santos, Spouses Calaguian,
Dela Fuente and Madaya bought such "expanded" lots in good faith, relying on the
clean certificates of St. Jude, which had no notice of any flaw in them either. It is only
fair and reasonable to apply the equitable principle of estoppel by laches against the
government to avoid an injustice to the innocent purchasers for value.
Likewise time-settled is the doctrine that where innocent third persons, relying on the
correctness of the certificate of title, acquire rights over the property, courts cannot
disregard such rights and order the cancellation of the certificate. Such cancellation
would impair public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with
property registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance
whether the title has been regularly issued or not. This would be contrary to the very
purpose of the law, which is to stabilize land titles. Verily, all persons dealing with
registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued
therefor, and the law or the courts do not oblige, them to go behind the certificate in
order to investigate again the true condition of the property. They are only charged
with notice of the lions and encumbrances on the property that are noted on the
certificate.
When private respondents-purchasers bought their lots from St. Jude, they did not
have to go behind the titles thereto to verify their contents or search for hidden
defects or inchoate rights that could defeat their rights to said lots. Although they were
bound by liens and encumbrances annotated on the titles, private respondents
purchasers could not have had notice of defects that only an inquiry beyond the face of
the titles could have satisfied. The rationale for this presumption has been stated thus:
"The main purpose of the Torrens System is to avoid possible conflicts of title
to real estate and to facilitate transactions, relative thereto by giving the
public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens Certificate of Title and to
dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned
had actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry (Pascua v. Capuyoc, 77
SCRA 78). Thus, where innocent third persons relying on the correctness of
the certificate thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the court cannot
disregard such rights (Director of Land v. Abache, et al., 73 Phil. 606)."
In another case, this Court further said:
"The Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was believed to
be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to
protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and
recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the
seller's title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that
his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him.
What is worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence in the system
would be eroded and land transactions would have to be attended by
complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of
ownership. The further consequence would be that land conflicts could be
even more abrasive, if not even violent. The Government, recognizing the
worthy purposes of the Torrens System, should be the first to accept the
validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law
are satisfied. [Italics supplied.]
Petitioner never presented proof that the private respondents who had bought their
lots from St. Jude were buyers in bad faith. Consequently, their claim of good faith
prevails. A purchaser good faith and for value is one who buys the property of another
without notice that some other person has a right to or an interest in such property;
and who pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase or before
he or she has notice of the claims or interest of some other person. Good faith is the
honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another.
It also bears to emphasize that the subject lots covered by TCTs No. 30829, 30830, 30831,
and 30832 were already subdivided, and new TCTs were issued in the names of the buyers of each
subdivision lot. To order the cancellation of all these derivative titles and the return of the
subdivision lots to the Republic shall irrefragably be unjust to the innocent purchasers for value and
shall wreak havoc on the Torrens System.
Anyway, the Republic is not without recourse. It can claim damages from BPC, found herein
not to be a buyer of the subject lots in good faith. For its loss of portions of the subdivision lots to
innocent purchasers from BPC, the Republic may recover from BPC the purchase price it paid to
FPHC corresponding to such subdivision lots, with interest at 6% per annum from 26 March 1992
(the date when the Republic instituted its petition for the cancellation of the TCTs of Servando,
Antonio, and BPC) until finality of this Decision, and 12% per annum thereafter until fully paid. 68
Although this Court allowed in the case at bar the intervention of Nicolas-Agbulos and
Abesamis, and recognized their title to their respective subdivision lots in Parthenon Hills as
purchasers in good faith and for value from BPC, it could not do the same for the spouses Santiago,
for the reason that BPC contested their claim that they had acquired titles to the subdivision lots in
Parthenon Hills in good faith and for value, and further asserted that the spouses Santiago acquired
the said subdivision lots by fraudulent means. The allegations by the spouses Santiago of good faith,
on one hand, and by BPC of fraud, on the other, in the acquisition by the spouses Santiago of the
subdivision lots in question, are factual matters, best proven and established before the RTC, which
could receive evidence in support of each party's position during trial. Should the RTC find that the
spouses Santiago have indeed acquired the subdivision lots in good faith and for value, then their
titles thereto shall, likewise, be valid and indefeasible even against that of the Republic. However, in a
contrary case, should the RTC find that the spouses Santiago acquired the subdivision lots by fraud,
then titles thereto return to BPC.
Though estoppel by laches may lie against the Republic when titles to the subdivision lots
are already in the names of the respective innocent purchasers for value from BPC, it may not be used
by BPC to defeat the titles of the Republic as regards the subdivision lots which remain unsold and
the titles to which are still in the name of BPC. It must be recalled that BPC is not a purchaser in good
faith. Estoppel, being an equitable principle, may only be invoked by one who comes to court with
clean hands. 69
Pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code concerning builders in bad faith provide that
ART. 449. He who builds, plants, or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what
is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.
ART. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in
bad faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be
removed, in order to replace things in their former condition at the expense of the
person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to pay
the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.
 ART. 451. In cases of the two preceding articles, the landowner is entitled to damages
from the builder, planter or sower.
ART. 452. The builder, planter or sower in bad faith is entitled to reimbursement for
the necessary expenses of preservation of the land.
Hence, as far as the subdivision lots still in the name of BPC are concerned, the Republic has the
option to either (1) recover the said lots and demand that BPC demolish whatever improvements it
has made therein, to return the lots to their former condition, at the expense of BPC; or (2) compel
BPC to pay the price of the land. The choice can only be made by the Republic, as the rightful owner of
the said subject lots. Should the Republic choose the first option, BPC is under the obligation to
return the possession of the subdivision lots to the Republic and surrender its corresponding TCTs
for cancellation and issuance of new ones in the name of the Republic. Should the Republic select the
second option, then BPC shall pay the Republic the purchase price that the latter had paid to FPHC
corresponding to such subdivision lots, with interest at 6% per annum from 26 March 1992 until
finality of this Decision, and 12% per annum thereafter until fully paid. In either option, the Republic
may claim damages from BPC, while BPC cannot seek indemnity from the Republic for any
improvements made on the subdivision lots, except if these constitute as necessary expenses for the
preservation of the land, for which it shall still be entitled to reimbursement.
As for the Petition for New Trial filed by Servando's heirs, this Court dismisses the same for
lack of legal basis. Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court reads
SECTION 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or reconsideration.
Within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to
set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial for one or more of the
following causes materially affecting the substantial rights of the said party:
(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could
not have guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably
been impaired in his rights; or
(b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have
discovered and produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the
result.
Servando's heirs themselves admit that the period allowed for the filing of a motion to set
aside the judgment and grant a new trial under the afore-quoted provision had already lapsed, but
they still pray that this Court give due course to their Petition on the grounds of justice and equity.
In Malipol v. Lim Tan, 70 this Court ruled that
It is within the sound discretion of the court to set aside an order of default and to
permit a defendant to file his answer and to be heard on the merits even after the
reglementary period for the filing of the answer has expired, but it is not error, or an
abuse of discretion, on the part of the court to refuse to set aside its order of default
and to refuse to accept the answer where it finds no justifiable reason for the delay in
the filing of the answer. In the motions for reconsideration of an order of default, the
moving party has the burden of showing such diligence as would justify his being
excused from not filing the answer within the reglementary period as provided by the
Rules of Court, otherwise these guidelines for an orderly and expeditious procedure
would be rendered meaningless. Unless it is shown clearly that a party has justifiable
reason for the delay, the court will not ordinarily exercise its discretion in his favor.
In the present case, the late Servando and Antonio were already declared in default by the
RTC on 31 July 1992, after their supposed counsel failed to file an answer to the Republic's petition
for cancellation of title. Nothing was heard from Servando's heirs even after the promulgation of the
RTC Decision on 22 December 1992, and the Court of Appeals Decision, dated 8 August 1997, until
they filed their Petition for New Trial, dated 23 May 2001, before this Court, or nine years from the
date they were declared in default.
According to Servando's heirs, due to the extrinsic fraud committed by the President and
counsel of BPC, they were prevented from participating in the proceedings before the trial court.
They allegedly relied on the assurance of the President and counsel of BPC that the latter shall also
represent them and their interests in the subject lots in the case.
This allegation of fraud by Servando's heirs has no leg to stand on. It should be recalled that
the late Servando and Antonio were represented by a counsel at the beginning of the proceedings
before the RTC. Their counsel even submitted two consecutive motions for extension of time to file
the appropriate pleadings. There was no explanation provided as to why, despite the grant of said
motions, the counsel still failed to file an answer to the Republic's petition for cancellation of title. It
is also contrary to common human experience that Servando's heirs, by the mere assurance of the
President and counsel of BPC, adopted a totally hands-off attitude in a case where they supposedly
have substantial interest. There is no showing during the nine years when they were not
participating in the court proceedings, that they, at least, inquired into or followed-up on the status of
the case with BPC. Such blind trust in the President and counsel of BPC is surely difficult to
comprehend, especially if this Court takes into account the contention of Servando's heirs that BPC
failed to deliver the shares of stock in exchange for the subject lots. What is apparent to this Court is
not the alleged fraud committed by BPC but, rather, the inexcusable negligence of Servando's heirs
when it came to protecting their titles, rights, and interests to the subject lots, if indeed, there were
still any.
Worth reproducing herein, is the conclusion 71 made by the Court of Appeals on Servando's
titles
On the strength of the LRA report, Exhibit H (Record, pp. 214-258), the court a
quo found TCT Nos. 200629 and 200630, in the name of Servando Accibal and from
which the titles of defendant-appellee Barstowe Philippines Corporation were
derived, spurious, and ordered the Register of Deeds of Quezon City "to officially and
finally cancel (said titles) from his records. . . " (Par. 2, dispositive portion, Decision, p.
16; Rollo, p. 71). As explained by the court a quo:
"We shall now dwell on the validity of the titles, TCT Nos. 200629 and
200630, issued in the name of Servando Accibal on July 24, 2974 by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City. The LRA Report dated 10 June 1992 (Exh. H,
pp. 214-258, record) is competent proof that indeed said titles must be
cancelled. In short, the LRA found after due investigation that the said titles of
 Servando Accibal were issued with certain irregularties (sic). It recommended
the cancellation therefore, of TCT Nos. 200629 and 200630, to which the
court concurs, as said report must be accorded due respect and in the absence
of fraud or irregularties (sic) that attended the investigation, which the Court
finds none, the same must be persuasive, if not conclusive. Moreover, herein
defendant Servando Accibal because of his failure to answer, despite
extension of time given him, plaintiff's counsel, he was declared as in default
since then, he never asked the court to lift and set aside the default order.
There is no way, his title may be cancelled. For one thing, he was not able to
present evidence to controvert the recommendation of the LRA to cancel his
titles. For another, Servando Accibal is deemed to have impliedly admitted the
irregularties (sic) that attended the issuance of his aforestated titles."
(Decision, pp. 14-15; Rollo, pp. 69-70)
This portion of the decision ordering the cancellation of TCT Nos. 200629 and 200630
in the name of Servando Accibal was not appealed nor assigned as a counter-
assigment of error in the brief of Barstowe Philippines Corporation; hence, is now
final.
Thus, the findings of this Court as to the rights of the parties involved in the present case are
summarized as follows
(1) The certificates of title acquired by Servando over the subject lots were forged and
spurious, and such finding made by both the RTC and Court of Appeals is already final and binding on
Servando's heirs;
(2) BPC did not acquire the subject lots in good faith and for value, and its certificates of title
cannot defeat those of the Republic's;
(3) As between BPC and the Republic, the latter has better titles to the subject lots being the
purchaser thereof in good faith and for value from FPHC;
(4) However, considering that the subject lots had already been subdivided and the
certificates of title had been issued for each subdivision lot, which were derived from the certificates
of title of BPC, it is more practical, convenient, and in consonance with the stability of the Torrens
System that the certificates of title of BPC and its derivative certificates be maintained, while those of
the Republic's be cancelled;
(5) Estoppel lies against the Republic for granting BPC governmental permits and licenses to
subdivide, develop, and sell to the public the subject lots as Parthenon Hills. Relying on the face of the
certificates of title of BPC and the licenses and permits issued to BPC by government agencies,
innocent individuals, including intervenors Nicolas-Agbulos and Abesamis, purchased subdivision
lots in good faith and for value;
(6) The claims of the intervenor spouses Santiago that they acquired portions of the subject
lots in good faith and for value still need to be proven during trial before the court a quo. Unlike the
claims of intervenors Nicolas-Agbulos and Abesamis, which BPC admitted, the claims of the spouses
Santiago were opposed by BPC on the ground of fraud;
(7) Certificates of title over portions of the subject lots, acquired by purchasers in good faith
and for value, from BPC, are valid and indefeasible, even as against the certificates of title of the
Republic. The Republic, however, is entitled to recover from BPC the purchase price the Republic
paid to FPHC for the said portions, plus appropriate interests; and
(8) As portions of the subject lots are still unsold and their corresponding certificates of title
remain in the name of BPC, the Republic may exercise two options: (a) It may recover the said
portions and demand that BPC demolish whatever improvements it has made therein, so as to return
the said portions to their former condition, at the expense of BPC. In such a case, certificates of title of
BPC over the said portions shall be cancelled and new ones issued in the name of the Republic; or (b)
It may surrender the said portions to BPC and just compel BPC to reimburse the Republic for the
purchase price the Republic paid to FPHC for the said portions, plus appropriate interest.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The
Decision, dated 8 August 1997, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47522 is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and a new one is hereby entered, as follows:
(1) In view of the finding that the Transfer Certificates of Title No. 200629 and 200630 in the
name of Servando Accibal are forged and spurious, the Quezon City Register of Deeds is ORDERED to
officially and finally cancel the same from his records;
(2) In view of the finding that the respondent Republic of the Philippines was a purchaser in
good faith of the subject lots from Philippine First Holdings Corporation, but also taking into
consideration the functioning and stability of the Torrens System, as well as the superior rights of
subsequent purchasers in good faith and for value of portions of the subject lots subdivided,
developed, and sold as Parthenon Hills from petitioner Barstowe Philippines Corporation
(a) The Quezon City Register of Deeds is ORDERED to cancel Transfer Certificates of
Title No. 275443 and 288417 in the name of respondent Republic of the Philippines;
(b) The respondent Republic of the Philippines is ORDERED to respect and recognize
the certificates of title to the subject portions of land in the name of purchasers of
good faith and for value from petitioner Republic of the Philippines;
(c) Petitioner Barstowe Philippines Corporation is ORDERED to pay respondent
Republic of the Philippines for the purchase price the latter paid to First Philippine
Holdings Corporation corresponding to the portions of the subject lots which are
already covered by certificates of title in the name of purchasers in good faith and for
value from petitioner Barstowe Philippines Corporation, plus appropriate interest;
(d) The respondent Republic of the Philippines is ORDERED to choose one of the
options available to it as regards the portions of the subject lots which remain unsold
and covered by certificates of title in the name of petitioner Barstowe Philippines
Corporation, either (i) To recover the said portions and demand that petitioner
Barstowe Philippines Corporation demolish whatever improvements it has made
therein, so as to return the said portions to their former condition, at the expense of
the latter, or (ii) To surrender the said portions to petitioner Barstowe Philippines
Corporation and compel the latter to reimburse the respondent Republic of the
Philippines for the purchase price it had paid to First Philippine Holdings Corporation
 for the said portions, plus appropriate interest. Regardless of the option chosen by the
respondent Republic of the Philippines, it is ORDERED to reimburse petitioner
Barstowe Philippines Corporation for any necessary expenses incurred by the latter
for the said portions;
(2) In view of the finding that petitioner Barstowe Philippines Corporation is not a purchaser
and builder in good faith, and depending on the option chosen by respondent Republic of the
Philippines concerning the portions of the subject lots which remain unsold and covered by
certificates of title in the name of petitioner Barstowe Philippines Corporation, as enumerated in
paragraph 2 (d) hereof
(a) In case the respondent Republic of the Philippines chooses the option under
paragraph 2(d)(i) hereof, petitioner Barstowe Philippines Corporation is ORDERED to
demolish whatever improvements it has made on the said portions, so as to return the
same to their former condition, at its own expense. The Quezon City Register of Deeds
is also ORDERED to cancel the certificates of title of petitioner Barstowe Philippines
Corporation over the said portions and to issue in lieu thereof certificates of title in the
name of respondent Republic of the Philippines;
(b) In case the respondent Republic of the Philippines chooses the option under
paragraph 2(d)(ii) hereof, petitioner Barstowe Philippines Corporation is ORDERED to
reimburse the petitioner Republic of the Philippines for the purchase price it had paid
to First Philippine Holdings Corporation for the said portions, plus appropriate
interest;
(c) Petitioner Barstowe Philippines Corporation is ORDERED to pay appropriate
damages to respondent Republic of the Philippines as may be determined by the trial
court;
(3) In view of the finding that intervenors Winnie U. Nicolas-Agbulos and Edgardo Q.
Abesamis are purchasers in good faith and for value of portions of the subject lots subdivided,
developed, and sold as Parthenon Hills from petitioner Barstowe Philippines Corporation, it is
DECLARED that their certificates of title are valid and indefeasible as to all parties;
(4) In view of the finding that the Petition for New Trial filed by the heirs of Servando
Accibal, namely, Virgilio V. Accibal, Virginia A. Macabudbud, and Antonio V. Accibal, lacks merit, the
said Petition is DISMISSED; and
(5) The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for determination of the following
(a) The validity of the claims, and identification of the purchasers, in good faith and for
value, of portions of the subject lots from petitioner Barstowe Philippines Corporation,
other than intervenors Winnie U. Nicolas-Agbulos and Edgardo Q. Abesamis, whose
titles are to be declared valid and indefeasible;
(b) The identification of the portions of the subject lots in the possession and names of
purchasers in good faith and for value and those which remain with petitioner
Barstowe Philippines Corporation;
(c) The computation of the amount of the purchase price which respondent Republic
of the Philippines may recover from petitioner Barstowe Philippines Corporation in
consideration of the preceding paragraphs hereof;
(d) The types and computation of the damages recoverable by the parties; and
(e) The computation and award of the cross-claim of EL-VI Realty and Development
Corporation against petitioner Barstowe Philippines Corporation.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Nachura, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., took no part.
Footnotes
1.Rollo, 6-34.
2.Penned by Associate Justice Eduardo G. Montenegro with Associate Justices Consuelo Ynares-
Santiago (now Associate Justice of this Court) and Maximiano C. Asuncion, concurring; id. at
38-51.
3.Penned by Associate Justice Eduardo G. Montenegro with Associate Justices Consuelo Ynares-
Santiago and Jesus M. Elbinias (vice Maximiano C. Asuncion), concurring; id. at 52-53.
4.Penned by Judge Efren N. Ambrosio; records, 273-288.
5.Land Registration Authority Report, dated 10 June 1992, prepared by Benjamin A. Flestado; id. at
215-216.
6.Id. at 218.
7.See Orders, dated 1 July 1992 and 9 July 1992, penned by Judge Efren N. Ambrosio; id. at 17, 26.
8.Id. at 53.
9.Id. at 49-52.
10.Id. at 52.
11.Decision in Civil Case No. Q-91-10933, dated 26 January 1992, penned by Acting Presiding Judge
Efren N. Ambrosio; id. at 94-95.
12.Order, dated 8 October 1992; id. at 129-130.
13.Id. at 141.
14.Republic of the Philippines; id. at 152-158; Barstowe Philippines Corporation, id. at 163-170; EL-VI
Realty and Development Corporation; id. at 143-147.
15.Id. at 185-186.
16.Id. at 273-288. 43.Dated 18 October 1999; id. at 473-492.
17.Id. at 307. 44.Dated 3 November 1999; id. at 428-437.
18.Id. at 353. 45.Dated 11 November 1999; id. at 440-455.
19.Id. at 435-437. 46.Dated 19 November 1999; id. at 465-472.
20.Id. at 609-612. 47.Dated 20 January 2000; id. at 497-512.
21.Id. at 617. 48.Id. at 580-589.
22.Id. at 627. 49.Id. at 687.
23.Id. at 631. 50.Id. at 689-690.
24.Id. at 628-629. 51.Transfer Certificates of Title No. 199013, 200427, 200744, 202028, and 202476.
25.Id. at 389-390. 52.Penned by LRA Administrator Teodoro C. Bonifacio; records, pp. 34-40.
26.Id. at 392-401. 53.Id. at 41.
27.Id. at 608-608A. 54.Dolfo v. The Register of Deed of Cavite, 395 Phil. 241, 248-249 (2000).
28.Id. at 299. 55.Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) v. Court of Appeals, 99 Phil. 695, 711
(2000); Noble v. City of Manila, 67 Phil. 1, 6 (1938).
29.Id. at 321-324.
56.Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107967, 1 March 1994, 230 SCRA 550, 555-560.
30.Id. at 632-633.
57.An Act Providing a Special Procedure for Reconstitution of Torrens Certificate of Title Lost or
31.Penned by Associate Justice Fidel P. Purisima with Associate Justices Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Eduardo Destroyed.
G. Montenegro, concurring; id. at 634-636.
58.Wright, Jr. v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. and Lednicky, 120 Phil. 495, 499 (1964).
32.Id. at 689-700.
59.Gallardo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-67742, 29 October 1987, 155 SCRA 248, 260-
33.Supra note 2. 261. EHTIDA
34.Supra note 3. 60.Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96141, 2 October 1991, 202 SCRA 228, 241-242.
35.Supra note 1. 61.Id.; Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-46626-27, 27 December 1979, 94 SCRA 865, 872-873.
36.Rollo, pp. 90-107. 62.Calalang v. Register of Deeds, G.R. No. 76265, 11 March 1994, 231 SCRA 88, 104.
37.Id. at 142-146. 63.Director of Lands v. Addison, 49 Phil. 19, 23 (1926).
38.Id. at 173-186. 64.Antonio H. Noblejas and Edilberto H. Noblejas, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES AND DEEDS (1992
39.Id. at 369-370. ed.), 330.

40.Id. at 353-355. 65.Id. at 331.

41.Id. at 373-376, 397-399. 66.Sandoval v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 48, 60 (1996).

42.Id. at 356. 67.361 Phil. 319, 329-333 (1999).

 68.Heirs of Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes v. Mijares, G.R. No. 143826, 28 August 2003, 410 SCRA 97, 112; Liu v.
Loy, Jr., G.R. No. 145982, 3 July 2003, 405 SCRA 316, 338.
69.Pagasa Industrial Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 216 Phil. 533, 535 (1984).
70.154 Phil. 193, 199-200 (1974).
71.Supra note 2, 45-46.
||| (Barstowe Philippines Corp. v. Republic, G.R. No. 133110, [March 28, 2007], 548 PHIL 86-139)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 116111. January 21, 1999.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (Represented by the Acting Commissioner of
Land Registration),petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Spouses CATALINO
SANTOS and THELMA BARRERO SANTOS, ST. JUDE'S ENTERPRISES, INC., Spouses
DOMINGO CALAGUIAN and FELICIDAD CALAGUIAN, VIRGINIA DELA FUENTE and
LUCY MADAYA, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Simeon D. Canlas for Catalino and Thelma Santos.
Cabrera & Associates for private respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Private respondent St. Jude's Enterprises, Inc. is the registered owner of a parcel of land known as Lot
865-B-1 of the subdivision plan (LRC) PSD-52368 and TCT No. 22660. Sometime in 1966, private
respondent subdivided the said lot under subdivision plan (LRC) PSD-55643 and as a result thereof the
Register of Deeds of Caloocan City cancelled TCT. No. 22660 and in lieu thereof issued Certificates of Title
Nos. 23967 up to 24068. The subdivision of Lot 865-B-1 was later found to have expanded from its
original area of 40,523 square meters to 42,044 square meters or an increase of 1,421 square meters. The
expansion in area was confirmed by the Land Registration Commission. Thereafter, private respondent
sold the subdivided lots to different buyers including herein private respondents Sps. Catalino Santos and
Thelma Barreto Santos, Sps. Domingo Calaguian and Felicidad de Jesus, Virginia Dela Fuente, and Lucy
Madaya. On January 29, 1985, then, Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed an action seeking the
annulment of Transfer Certificates of Title of herein private respondents on the ground that said
Certificates of Title were issued on the strength of a null and void subdivision plan (LRC) PSD 55643
which expanded the original area of TCT No. 22660 in the name of St. Jude's Enterprises Inc. The trial
court dismissed the complaint. The trial court concluded that the government was already in estoppel to
question the approved subdivision plan because the said plan was presumed to have been subjected to
investigation, study and verification by the LRC and there was no one to blame for the increase in the area
but the Republic of the Philippines, for having allowed and approved the subdivision plan. The Solicitor
General appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the
decision of the trial court. Hence, the present petition. The issues to be resolved by the court are: (1) the
applicability of estoppel against the state and (2) the Torrens system.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court ruled that the
Republic of the Philippines' prolonged inaction strongly militates against its cause as it is
tantamount to laches. And since the private respondents-purchasers bought such "expanded lots" in
good faith, relying on the clean certificates of private respondent St. Jude's Enterprises Inc., which
had no notice of any flaw in them either. It is only fair and reasonable to apply the equitable
principle of estoppel by laches against the government to avoid an injustice to the innocent
purchasers for value. The Court also observed that petitioner's action derogates the very integrity of
the Torrens System and contrary to the time-honored principle that a Torrens certificate is
evidence of an indefeasible title to property in favor of the person whose name appears
thereon. IASCTD
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS; SALES; GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW; EQUITABLE PRINCIPLE OF
ESTOPPEL; IT IS ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE TO APPLY SAID PRINCIPLE IN CASE AT BAR AGAINST
THE GOVERNMENT IN ORDER TO AVOID AN INJUSTICE TO THE INNOCENT PURCHASERS FOR VALUE.
In the case at bar, for nearly twenty years (starting from the issuance of St. Jude's titles in 1966 up to
the filing of the Complaint in 1985), petitioner failed to correct and recover the alleged increase in the
land area of St. Jude. Its prolonged inaction strongly militates against its cause, as it is tantamount to
laches, which means "the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it." The Court notes private respondents' argument
that, prior to the subdivision, the surveyors erred in the originalsurvey of the whole tract of land covered
by TCT No. 22660, so that less than the actual land area was indicated on the title. Otherwise, the
adjoining owners would have complained upon the partition of the land in accordance with the LRC-
approved subdivision plan. As it is, Florencio Quintos, the owner of the 9,146 square-meter Quintos
Village adjoining the northern portion of St. Jude's property (the portion allegedly "expanded"), even
attested on August 16, 1973 that "there [was] no overlapping of boundaries as per my approved plan
(LRC) PSD 147766 dated September 8, 1971." None of the other neighboring owners ever complained
against St. Jude or the purchasers of its property. It is clear, therefore, that there was no actual damage to
third persons caused by the resurvey and the subdivision. Significantly, the other private respondents
Spouses Santos, Spouses Calaguian, Dela Fuente and Madaya bought such "expanded" lots in good
faith, relying on the clean certificates of St. Jude, which had no notice of any flaw in them either. It is only
fair and reasonable to apply the equitable principle of estoppel by laches against the government to avoid
an injustice to the innocent purchasers for value.
2. ID.; LAND REGISTRATION; TORRENS CERTIFICATE OF TITLE; ALL PERSONS DEALING WITH
REGISTERED LAND MAY SAFELY RELY ON THE CORRECTNESS OF THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE ISSUED
THEREFOR, AND THE LAW OR THE COURTS DO NOT OBLIGE THEM TO GO BEHIND THE CERTIFICATE
IN ORDER TO INVESTIGATE AGAIN THE TRUE CONDITION OF THE PROPERTY. Likewise, time-settled
is the doctrine that where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title,
acquire rights over the property, courts cannot disregard such rights and order the cancellation of the
certificate. Such cancellation would impair public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone
dealing with property registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance
whether the title has been regularly issued or not. This would be contrary to the very purpose of the law,
which is to stabilize land titles. Verily, all persons dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor, and the law or the courts do not oblige them to go
behind the certificate in order to investigate again the true condition of the property. They are only
charged with notice of the liens and encumbrances on the property that are noted on the certificate.
When private respondents-purchasers bought their lots from St. Jude, they did not have to go behind the
titles thereto to verify their contents or search for hidden defects or inchoate rights that could defeat
their rights to said lots. Although they were bound by liens and encumbrances annotated on the titles,
private respondents-purchasers could not have had notice of defects that only an inquiry beyond the face
of the titles could have satisfied.
3. ID.; ID.; TORRENS SYSTEM; TORRENS CERTIFICATE OF TITLE IS EVIDENCE OF AN INDEFEASIBLE
TITLE TO PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF THE PERSON WHOSE NAME APPEARS THEREON; PETITIONER'S
ACTION DEROGATES THE VERY INTEGRITY OF THE SYSTEM. True, the Torrens system is not a means
of acquiring titles to lands; it is merely a system of registration of titles to lands. Consequently, land
erroneously included in a Torrens certificate of title is not necessarily acquired by the holder of such
certificate. But in the interest of justice and equity, neither may the titleholder be made to bear the
unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the State's agents, in the absence of proof of his
complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third persons. First, the real purpose of the Torrens system
is to quiet title to land to put a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title, except claims that
were noted in the certificate at the time of the registration or that may arise subsequent thereto. Second,
as we discussed earlier, estoppel by laches now bars petitioner from questioning private respondents'
titles to the subdivision lots. Third, it was never proven that Private Respondent St. Jude was a party to
the fraud that led to the increase in the area of the property after its subdivision. Finally, because
petitioner even failed to give sufficient proof of any error that might have been committed by its agents
who had surveyed the property, the presumption of regularity in the performance of their functions must
be respected. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system, which petitioner purportedly aims to
protect by filing this case, shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration
officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their duties. We cannot, adhere to the
petitioner's submission that, in filing this suit, it seeks to preserve the integrity of the Torrens system. To
the contrary, it is rather evident from our foregoing discussion that petitioner's action derogates the very
integrity of the system. Time and again, we have said that a Torrens certificate is evidence of an
indefeasible title to property in favor of the person whose name appears thereon. IaEScC
VITUG, J., concurring opinion:
CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; TORRENS SYSTEM; TO ALLOW THE CANCELLATION OF THE TITLES
OF HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WOULD DEFEAT RATHER THAN ENHANCE THE PURPOSE AND
SCHEME OF THE TORRENS SYSTEM. The rule has been to the effect that a purchaser of registered land
is not ordinarily required to explore further than what the record in the Registry indicates on its face in
quest of any hidden defect or inchoate right which might adversely affect the buyer's right over the
property. Undoubtedly, to allow in the instant case the cancellation of the titles of herein private
respondents would defeat rather than enhance the purpose and scheme of the Torrens System. It is my
understanding, however, that the rule that the Court has here announced would not apply to a situation
where the enlargement or expansion in area would result in an encroachment on or reduction of any area
covered by a certificate of title previously issued. To rule otherwise would itself be to downgrade the
integrity of the Torrens System. DcTaEH
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
Is the immunity of the government from laches and estoppel absolute? May it still recover the ownership
of lots sold in good faith by a private developer to innocent purchasers for value, notwithstanding its
approval of the subdivision plan and its issuance of separate individual certificates of title thereto?
The Case
These are the main questions raised in the Petition for Review before us, seeking to set aside the
November 29, 1993 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-GR CV No. 34647. The assailed Decision
affirmed the ruling 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 125, in Civil Case No. C-111708,
which dismissed petitioner's Complaint for the cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) to
several lots in Caloocan City, issued in the name of private respondents. cdasia
In a Resolution 4 dated July 7, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied the Republic's motion for
reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of the case are not disputed. The trial court's summary, which was adopted by the Court of
Appeals, is reproduced below:
"Defendant St. Jude's Enterprises, Inc. is the registered owner of a parcel of land
known as Lot 865-B-1 of the subdivision plan (LRC) PSD-52368, being a portion of Lot
865-B located in Caloocan City containing an area of 40,623 square meters. For Lot
865-B-1 defendant St. Jude's Enterprises, Inc. was issued TCT No. 22660 on July 25,
1966.
"Sometime in March 1966 defendant St. Jude's Enterprises, Inc. subdivided Lot No.
865-B-1 under subdivision plan (LRC) PSD-55643 and as a result thereof the Register
of Deeds of Caloocan City cancelled TCT No. 22660 and in lieu thereof issued
Certificates of Title Nos. 23967 up to 24068 inclusive, all in the name of defendant St.
Jude's Enterprises, Inc. The subdivision of lot 865-B-1 [which was] covered [by] TCT
No. 22660 was later found to have expanded and enlarged from its original area of
40,523 square meters to 42,044 square meters or an increase of 1,421 square meters.
This expansion or increase in area was confirmed by the Land Registration
Commission [to have been made] on the northern portion of Lot 865-B-1.
"Subsequently, defendant St. Jude's Enterprises, Inc. sold the lots covered by TCT Nos.
24013 and 24014 to defendant Sps. Catalino Santos and Thelma Barreto Santos[;] TCT
No. 24019 to defendant Sps. Domingo Calaguian and Felicidad de Jesus[;] TCT No.
24022 to defendant Virginia dela Fuente[;] and TCT No. 2402[3] to defendant Lucy
Madaya. Accordingly, these titles were cancelled and said defendants were issued the
following: TCT No. C-43319 issued in the name of Sps. Santos containing an area of
344 square meters[;] TCT No. 55513 issued in the name of defendants Sps. Calaguian
containing an area of 344 square meters[;] TCT No. 13309 issued in the name of Sps.
Santos[;] TCT No. 24069 issued in the name of Virginia dela Fuente containing an area
of 350 square meters[;] and TCT No. C-46648 issued in the name of defendant Lucy
Madaya with an area of 350 square meters." 5
"[On January 29, 1985, then Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed] an action seeking
. . . the annulment and cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 24015,
24017, 24018, 24020, 24021, 24024, 24025 and 24068 issued in the name of
defendant St. Jude's Enterprises, Inc.[;] Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 13309 and C-
43319 both registered in the name of Sps. Catalino Santos and Thelma B. Santos[;] TCT
No. 55513 registered in the name of Sps. Domingo Calaguian and Felicidad de Jesus[;]
TCT No. 24069 registered in the name of Virginia dela Fuente[;] and TCT No. C-46648
registered in the name of Lucy Madaya, principally on the ground that said Certificates
of Title were issued on the strength of [a] null and void subdivision plan (LRC) PSD-
55643 which expanded the original area of TCT No. 22660 in the name of St. Jude's
Enterprises, Inc. from 40,623 square meters to 42,044 square meters upon its
subdivision.
"Defendants Virginia dela Fuente and Lucy Madaya were declared in default for failure
to file their respective answers within the reglementary period.
"Defendants Sps. Catalino Santos and Thelma Barreto Santos, St. Jude's Enterprises,
Inc. and Sps. Domingo Calaguian and Felicidad Calaguian filed separate answers to the
complaint. Defendants Sps. Domingo Calaguian and Sps. Catalino Santos interposed
defenses, among others, that they acquired the lots in question in good faith from their
former owner, defendant St. Judes Enterprises, Inc. and for value and that the titles
issued to the said defendants were rendered incontrovertible, conclusive and
indefeasible after one year from the date of the issuance of the titles by the Register of
Deeds of Caloocan City. cdtai
"On the other hand, defendant St. Jude's Enterprises, Inc. interposed defenses, among
others, that the cause of action of plaintiff is barred by prior judgment; that the
subdivision plan submitted having been approved by the LRC, the government is now
in estoppel to question the approved subdivision plan; and the plaintiff's allegation
that the area of the subdivision increased by 1,421 square meters is without any basis
in fact and in law." 6
Ruling of the Trial Court
On April 30, 1991, the trial court dismissed the Complaint. 7 While the plaintiff sufficiently proved the
enlargement or expansion of the area of the disputed property, it presented no proof that Respondent St.
Jude Enterprises, Inc. ("St. Jude") had committed fraud when it submitted the subdivision plan to the
Land Registration Commission (LRC) for approval. Because the plan was presumed to have been
subjected to investigation, study and verification by the LRC, there was no one to blame for the increase
in the area "but the plaintiff[,] for having allowed and approved the subdivision plan." Thus, the court
concluded, the government was already "in estoppel to question the approved subdivision plan."
The trial court also took into account the "absence of complaints from adjoining owners whose supposed
lost [were] encroached upon by the defendants,'' as well as the fact that an adjoining owner had
categorically stated that there was no such encroachment. Finding that Spouses Santos, Spouses
Calaguian, Dela Fuente and Madaya had bought their respective lots from St. Jude for value and in good
faith, the court held that their titles could no longer be questioned, because under the Torrens system,
such titles had become absolute and irrevocable. As regards the Republic's allegation that it had filed the
case to protect the integrity of the said system, the court said:
". . . [S]ustaining the position taken by the government would certainly lead to
disastrous consequences. Buyers in good faith would lose their titles. Adjoining
owners who were deprived of a portion of their lot would be forced to accept the
portion of the property allegedly encroached upon. Actions for recovery will be filed
right and left[;] thus instead of preserving the integrity of the Torrens System it would
certainly cause chaos rather than stability. Finally, if only to strengthen the Torrens
System and in the interest of justice, the boundaries of the affected properties of the
defendants should not be disturbed and the status quo should be maintained." 8
The solicitor general appealed the trial court's Decision to the Court of Appeals.
Ruling of the Appellate Court
Citing several cases 9 upholding the indefeasibility of titles issued under the Torrens system, the
appellate court affirmed the trial court. It berated petitioner for bringing the suit only after nineteen (19)
years had passed since the issuance of St. Jude's title and the approval of the subdivision plan. The
pertinent portion of the assailed Decision reads: 10
". . . Rather than make the Torrens system reliable and stable, [its] act of filing the
instant suit rocks the system, as it gives the impression to Torrens title holders, like
appellees, that their titles to properties can be questioned by the same authority who
had approved the same even after a long period of time. In that case, no Torrens title
holder shall be at peace with the ownership and possession of his land, for the
Commission of Land Registration can question his title any time it makes a finding
unfavorable to said Torrens title holder."
Undaunted, petitioner seeks a review by this Court. 11
The Issues
In this petition, the Republic raises the following issues for our resolution: 12
"1. Whether or not the government is estopped from questioning the approved
subdivision plan which expanded the areas covered by the transfer certificates of title
in question;
"2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it did not consider the Torrens
System as merely a means of registering title to land;
"3. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to consider that
petitioner's complaint before the lower court was filed to preserve the integrity of the
Torrens System."
We shall discuss the second and third questions together. Hence, the issues shall be (1) the applicability
of estoppel against the State and (2) the Torrens system. cdasia
The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
First Issue:
Estoppel Against the Government
The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or
agents. 13 However, like all general rules, this is also subject to exceptions, viz.: 14
"Estoppel against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in
rare and unusual circumstances and may not be invoked where they would operate to
defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. They must be
applied with circumspection and should be applied only in those special cases where
the interests of justice clearly require it. Nevertheless, the government must not be
allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an
ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations . . ., the doctrine of
equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as against private
individuals."
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 15 the government, in its effort to recover ill-gotten wealth, tried to skirt
the application of estoppel against it by invoking a specific constitutional provision. 16 The Court
countered: 17
"We agree with the statement that the State is immune from estoppel, but this concept
is understood to refer to acts and mistakes of its officials especially those which are
irregular (Sharp International Marketing vs. Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 299; 306
[1991]; Republic v. Aquino, 120 SCRA 186 [1983]), which peculiar circumstances are
absent in the case at bar. Although the State's right of action to recover ill-gotten
wealth is not vulnerable to estoppel[;] it is non sequitur to suggest that a contract,
freely and in good faith executed between the parties thereto is susceptible to
disturbance ad infinitum. A different interpretation will lead to the absurd scenario of
permitting a party to unilaterally jettison a compromise agreement which is supposed
to have the authority of res judicata (Article 2037, New Civil Code), and like any other
contract, has the force of law between parties thereto (Article 1159, New Civil
Code; Hernaez vs. Kao, 17 SCRA 296 [1966]; 6 Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, 7th ed.,
1987, p. 711; 3 Aquino, Civil Code, 1990 ed., p. 463) . . ."
The Court further declared that "(t)he real office of the equitable norm of estoppel is limited to
supply[ing] deficiency in the law, but it should not supplant positive law." 18
In the case at bar, for nearly twenty years (starting from the issuance of St. Jude's titles in 1966 up to the
filing of the Complaint in 1985), petitioner failed to correct and recover the alleged increase in the land
area of St. Jude. Its prolonged inaction strongly militates against its cause, as it is tantamount to laches,
which means "the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which
by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it." 19
The Court notes private respondents' argument that, prior to the subdivision, the surveyors erred in
the original survey of the whole tract of land covered by TCT No. 22660, so that less than the actual land
area was indicated on the title. Otherwise, the adjoining owners would have complained upon the
partition of the land in accordance with the LRC-approved subdivision plan. As it is, Florencio Quintos,
the owner of the 9,146 square-meter Quintos Village adjoining the northern portion of St. Jude's property
(the portion allegedly "expanded"), even attested on August 16, 1973 that "there [was] no overlapping of
boundaries as per my approved plan (LRC) PSD 147766 dated September 8, 1971." 20 None of the other
neighboring owners ever complained against St. Jude or the purchasers of its property. It is clear,
therefore, that there was no actual damage to third persons caused by the resurvey and the
subdivision. cdlex
Significantly, the other private respondents Spouses Santos, Spouses Calaguian, Dela Fuente and
Madaya bought such "expanded" lots in good faith, relying on the clean certificates of St. Jude, which
had no notice of any flaw in them either. It is only fair and reasonable to apply the equitable principle of
estoppel by laches against the government to avoid an injustice 21 to the innocent purchasers for value.
Likewise time-settled is the doctrine that where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the
certificate of title, acquire rights over the property, courts cannot disregard such rights and order the
cancellation of the certificate. Such cancellation would impair public confidence in the certificate of title,
for everyone dealing with property registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire in every
instance whether the title has been regularly issued or not. This would be contrary to the very purpose of
the law, which is to stabilize land titles. Verily, all persons dealing with registered land may safely rely on
the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor, and the law or the courts do not oblige them to
go behind the certificate in order to investigate again the true condition of the property. They are only
charged with notice of the liens and encumbrances on the property that are noted on the certificate. 22
When private respondents-purchasers bought their lots from St. Jude, they did not have to go behind the
titles thereto to verify their contents or search for hidden defects or inchoate rights that could defeat
their rights to said lots. Although they were bound by liens and encumbrances annotated on the titles,
private respondents-purchasers could not have had notice of defects that only an inquiry beyond the face
of the titles could have satisfied. 23 The rationale for this presumption has been stated thus: 24
 "The main purpose of the Torrens System is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real
estate and to facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public the right to
rely upon the face of a Torrens Certificate of Title and to dispense with the need of
inquiring further, except when the party concerned had actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further
inquiry (Pascua v. Capuyoc, 77 SCRA 78). Thus, where innocent third persons relying
on the correctness of the certificate thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the
court cannot disregard such rights (Director of Land v. Abache, et al., 73 Phil. 606)."
In another case, 25 this Court further said:
"The Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the
most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their
indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person
purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller's title thereto is valid, he
should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all.
This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted,
public confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions would have to
be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of
ownership. The further consequence would be that land conflicts could be even more
abrasive, if not even violent. The Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the
Torrens System, should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued thereunder once
the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied." [Italics supplied.]
Petitioner never presented proof that the private respondents who had bought their lots from St. Jude
were buyers in bad faith. Consequently, their claim of good faith prevails. A purchaser in good faith and
for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or
an interest in such property; and who pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase
or before he or she has notice of the claims or interest of some other person. 26 Good faith is the honest
intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another. 27
Furthermore, it should be stressed that the total area of forty thousand six hundred twenty-three
(40,623) square meters indicated on St. Jude's original title (TCT No. 22660) was not an exact area. Such
figure was followed by the phrase "more or less." This plainly means that the land area indicated was not
precise. Atty. Antonio H. Noblejas, who became the counsel of St. Jude subsequent to his tenure as Land
Registration Commissioner, offers a sensible explanation. In his letter 28 to the LRC dated November 8,
1982, he gave the following information:
"a. Records show that our client owned a large tract of land situated in an area cutting
the boundary of Quezon City and Caloocan City, then known as Lot 865-B, Psd-60608,
and described in T.C.T. No. 100412, containing an area of 96,931 sq. meters, more or
less.
b. It will be noted that on the northern portion of this Lot 865-B, Psd-60608, is . . . Lot
865-A, Psd-60608, which means that at a previous point of time, these 2 lots
composed one whole tract of land.
c. On December 23, 1965, Lot 865-B, Psd-60608, was subdivided into 2 lots,
denominated as Lot 865-B-1, with an area of 40,622 sq. meters, more or less, on the
Caloocan side, and Lot 865-B-2, with an area of 56,308 sq. meters, more or less, on the
Quezon City side, under Plan (LRC) Psd-52368.
d. On March 1-10, 1966, Lot 865-B-1, Psd-52368, then covered by T.C.T. No. N-22660,
was subdivided into residential lots under Plan (LRC) Psd-55643, with a total area of
42,044 sq. meters, more or less.
e. It will be noted that Lot 865-B, Psd-60608, covered by T.C.T. No. 100412, contained
an area of 96,931 sq. meters, more or less, but when subdivided under Plan (LRC) Psd-
52368, into 2 lots, its total area shrank by 1 sq.meter, to wit:
Lot 865-B-1, Psd-52368 40,622 sq. meters
Lot 865-B-2, Psd-52368 56,308 "
96,930 sq. meters
f. There is no allegation whatever in the Perez report that there was error in laying out
the metes and bounds of Lot 865-B-1 in Plan (LRC) Psd-55643, as specified in the
Technical Description of the said lot set forth in T.C.T. No. N-22660 covering the same.
There is likewise no allegation, on the contrary there is confirmation from the
boundary owner on the northern side, Mr. Florencio Quintos, that there is no
overlapping of boundaries on the northern side of Lot 865-B-1, Psd-55643. cdtai
g. We respectfully submit that the area of 42,044 sq. meters stated in Plan (LRC) Psd-
55643 as the size of Lot 865-B-a, is the more accurate area, confirmed by the Perez
report 'as per surveyor[']s findings on the ground', which rectifies previous surveyor's
error in computing its area as 40,622 sq. meters in Plan (LRC) Psd-52368, which is about
3.5% tolerable error (1,422 divided by 40,622 = .035).
[h.] It is well settled that in the identification of a parcel of land covered by a certificate
of title, what is controlling are the metes and bounds as set forth in its Technical
Description and not the area stated therein, which is merely an approximation as
indicated in the 'more or less' phrase placed after the number of square meters.
i. There is thus no unauthorized expansion of the survey occasioned by the subdivision
of Lot 865-B-1 under Plan (LRC) Psd-55643; consequently, LRC Circular No. 167,
Series of 1967, finds no application thereto, as to bar the processing and registration
in due course of transactions involving the subdivision lots of our client, subject
hereof. This is apart from the fact that LRC Circular No. 167 has not been implemented
by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City or any proper government authority since its
issuance in 1967, and that, in the interest of justice and equity, its restrictive and
 oppressive effect on transactions over certificates of titles of subdivisions that WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED. dctai
allegedly expanded on re-surveys, cannot be allowed to continue indefinitely." (Italics
supplied.) SO ORDERED.

The discrepancy in the figures could have been caused by the inadvertence or the negligence of the Romero, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ.,concur.
surveyors. There is no proof, though, that the land area indicated was intentionally and fraudulently Vitug, J., please see concurring opinion.
increased. The property originally registered was the same property that was subdivided. It is well-
settled that what defines a piece of titled property is not the numerical data indicated as the area of the
land, but the boundaries or "metes and bounds" of the property specified in its technical description as Separate Opinion
enclosing it and showing its limits. 29
Petitioner miserably failed to prove any fraud, either on the part of Private Respondent St. Jude or on the VITUG, J., concurring:
part of land registration officials who had approved the subdivision plan and issued the questioned TCTs.
Other than its peremptory statement in the Complaint that the "expansion" of the area was "motivated by The rule has been to the effect that a purchaser of registered land is not ordinarily required to explore
bad faith with intent to defraud, to the damage and prejudice of the government and of public interest," further than what the record in the Registry indicates on its face in quest of any hidden defect or inchoate
petitioner did not allege specifically how fraud was perpetrated to cause an increase in the actual land right which might adversely affect the buyer's right over the property. 1 Undoubtedly, to allow in the
size indicated. Nor was any evidence proffered to substantiate the allegation. That the land registration instant case the cancellation of the titles of herein private respondents would defeat rather than enhance
authorities supposedly erred or committed an irregularity was merely a conclusion drawn from the the purpose and scheme of the Torrens System. It is my understanding, however, that the rule that
"table survey" showing that the aggregate area of the subdivision lots exceeded the area indicated on the the Court has here announced would not apply to a situation where the enlargement or expansion
title of the property before its subdivision. Fraud cannot be presumed, and the failure of petitioner to in area would result in an encroachment on or reduction of any area covered by a certificate of
prove it defeats its own cause. llibris title previously issued. To rule otherwise would itself be to downgrade the integrity of the Torrens
System.
Second Issue:
The Torrens System Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 29-37.
True, the Torrens system is not a means of acquiring titles to lands; it is merely a system of registration of
titles to lands. 30Consequently, land erroneously included in a Torrens certificate of title is not 2.Second Division, composed of JJ. Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros (ponente); concurred in by Vicente V.
necessarily acquired by the holder of such certificate. 31 Mendoza (then chairman of the Division and now an associate justice of the Supreme Court);
and Jesus M. Elbinias, member.
But in the interest of justice and equity, neither may the titleholder be made to bear the unfavorable
effect of the mistake or negligence of the State's agents, in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud 3.Penned by Judge Geronimo S. Mangay.
or of manifest damage to third persons. First, the real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to
land to put a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title, except claims that were noted in the 4.Signed by JJ. Tayo-Jaguros, Elbinias and Cancio C. Garcia; rollo, p. 38.
certificate at the time of the registration or that may arise subsequent thereto. 32 Second, as we discussed 5.Rollo, pp. 31-32.
earlier, estoppel by laches now bars petitioner from questioning private respondents' titles to the
subdivision lots. Third, it was never proven that Private Respondent St. Jude was a party to the fraud that 6.Ibid., pp. 29-31.
led to the increase in the area of the property after its subdivision. Finally, because petitioner even failed
7.CA rollo, pp. 66-71.
to give sufficient proof of any error that might have been committed by its agents who had surveyed the
property, the presumption of regularity in the performance of their functions must be respected. 8.Rollo, pp. 36-37.
Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system, which petitioner purportedly aims to protect by filing this
case, shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration officials, who are 9.Felix Gochan & Sons Realty Corp. v. Caada, 165 SCRA 207, August 31, 1988; Gonzales v. IAC, 157 SCRA
ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their duties. 33 587, January 29, 1988; Umbay v. Alecha, 135 SCRA 427, March 18, 1985; Albienda v. Court of
Appeals, 135 SCRA 402, March 18, 1985.
We cannot, therefore, adhere to the petitioner's submission that, in filing this suit, it seeks to preserve the
integrity of the Torrens system. To the contrary, it is rather evident from our foregoing discussion that 10.Assailed Decision, p. 6; rollo, p. 34.
petitioner's action derogates the very integrity of the system. Time and again, we have said that a Torrens
certificate is evidence of an indefeasible title to property in favor of the person whose name appears
thereon.
11.This case was deemed submitted for resolution upon receipt by the Court of private respondents.
Memorandum on April 2, 1998. (Petitioner's Memorandum was received earlier on February
12, 1998.)
12.Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 8; rollo, p. 227.
13.Lim v. Pacquing, 240 SCRA 649, January 27, 1995, citing Republic v. IAC, 209 SCRA 90, May 19,
1992; GSIS v. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 233, 252, January 29, 1993; DBP v. Commission on
Audit, 231 SCRA 202, 207, March 11, 1994.
31.Pea, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1988 revised ed., p. 171; citing Ledesma v. Municipality of
Iloilo, 49 Phil 769 (1926).
32.Ibid., p. 27. Albienda v. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 406; citing Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil 593.
33.See Cagayan de Oro City Landless Residents Association, Inc. (COCLAI) v. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA
220, 231, March 4, 1996.
VITUG, J., concurring:

14.31 CJS 675-676. 1.Pulido vs. CA, 251 SCRA 673.

15.226 SCRA 314, September 10, 1993, per Melo, J . ||| (Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116111, [January 21, 1999], 361 PHIL 319-338)

16."Sec. 15. [Art. XI] The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials
or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by
prescription, laches, or estoppel."
17.At pp. 325-326.
18.At p. 327.
19.Olizon v. Court of Appeals, September 1, 1994, 236 SCRA 148, 157-158. See also Republic
v. Sandiganbayan, 255 SCRA 438, March 29, 1996; PAL Employees Savings and Loan Association
v. NLRC, 260 SCRA 758, August 22, 1996; Catholic Bishop of Balanga v. Court of Appeals, 264
SCRA 181, November 14, 1996.
20.Record, p. 84.
21.Olizon v. Court of Appeals, supra.
22.Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations, 257 SCRA 174, 184-185, May 30, 1996; citing Pea, Registration
of Land Titles and Deeds, 1994 revised ed., p. 145. Sajonas v. Court of Industrial Relations, 258
SCRA 79, 91, July 5, 1996; citing Reynes v.Barrera, 68 Phil 656.
23.See Sajonas v. Court of Industrial Relations, ibid., p. 92.
24.Pino v. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 434, 440, June 19, 1991, per Paras, J .
25.Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 550, 557, March 1, 1994; per Regalado, J . See
also Sandoval v. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 283, August 1, 1996.
26.Sajonas v. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 100; citing De Santos v. IAC, 157 SCRA 295, January 25, 1988.
27.Ibid., citing Fule v. De Legare, 7 SCRA 351, February 28, 1963.
28.Exh. 3.
29.Balantakbo v. Court of Appeals, 319 Phil. 436, 441, October 16, 1995.
30.Noblejas, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1986 ed., pp. 44-45.