Beruflich Dokumente
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The Japanese Navy was the third largest navy in the world by 1920,
behind the Royal Navy and the United States Navy (USN).[2] It was
supported by the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service for aircraft
and airstrike operation from the fleet. It was the primary opponent Ensign of the Imperial Japanese Navy
of the Western Allies in the Pacific War.
Active 18681945
The origins of the Imperial Japanese Navy go back to early Country Empire of Japan
interactions with nations on the Asian continent, beginning in the
Allegiance Imperial General
early medieval period and reaching a peak of activity during the
16th and 17th centuries at a time of cultural exchange with Headquarters
European powers during the Age of Discovery. After two centuries Ministry of the Navy
of stagnation during the country's ensuing seclusion policy under Navy General Staff
the shoguns of the Edo period, Japan's navy was comparatively Branch Combined Fleet
backward when the country was forced open to trade by American Navy Air Service
intervention in 1854. This eventually led to the Meiji Restoration.
Navy Land Forces
Accompanying the re-ascendance of the Emperor came a period of
frantic modernization and industrialization. The navy's history of Type Navy
successes, sometimes against much more powerful foes as in the Engagements Invasion of Taiwan
Sino-Japanese war and the Russo-Japanese War, ended in almost First Sino-Japanese
complete annihilation during the concluding days of World War II,
War
largely by the USN.
Russo-Japanese War
World War I
Second Sino-Japanese
Contents War
World War II
1 Origins
1.1 Western studies and the end of Seclusion Commanders
1.2 Development of Shogunal and Domain naval Current Hirohito
forces commander
2 Creation of the Imperial Japanese Navy (186872)
2.1 Boshin war Ceremonial chief Emperor of Japan
2.2 Consolidation Notable Isoroku Yamamoto
3 Secondary Service (18721880) commanders Tg Heihachir
3.1 British support and Influence
Itoh Sukeyuki
3.2 First interventions abroad (Taiwan 1874, Korea
187576) Prince Fushimi
4 Naval expansion (18801893) Hiroyasu
4.1 Further modernization (1870s) and many others
4.2 Influence of the French "Jeune cole" (1880s)
4.3 British shipbuilding
5 Sino-Japanese War (18941895)
6 Suppression of the Boxer rebellion (1900)
7 Russo-Japanese War (19041905)
8 Towards an autonomous national navy (19051914)
9 World War I (19141918)
10 Interwar years (19181937)
11 World War II
12 Self-Defense Forces
13 Personnel scale of promotions
14 See also Naval battle of Dan-no-ura in 1185
15 Notes
16 References
17 Further reading
18 External links
Origins
Japan has a long history of naval interaction with the Asian continent,
involving transportation of troops between Korea and Japan, starting at
least with the beginning of the Kofun period in the 3rd century.[3]
Japan built her first large ocean-going warships in the beginning of the
17th century, following contacts with the Western nations during the
Nanban trade period. In 1613, the daimy of Sendai, in agreement with
the Tokugawa Bakufu, built Date Maru, a 500-ton galleon-type ship A Japanese Red seal ship, combining
that transported the Japanese embassy of Hasekura Tsunenaga to the eastern and western naval technologies
Americas, which then continued to Europe.[7] From 1604 the Bakufu
also commissioned about 350 Red seal ships, usually armed and
incorporating some Western technologies, mainly for Southeast Asian trade.[8][9]
For more than 200 years, beginning in the 1640s, the Japanese policy of seclusion ("sakoku") forbade contacts
with the outside world and prohibited the construction of ocean-going ships on pain of death.[10] Contacts were
maintained, however, with the Dutch through the port of Nagasaki, the Chinese also through Nagasaki and the
Ryukyus and Korea through intermediaries with Tsushima. The study of Western sciences, called "rangaku"
through the Dutch enclave of Dejima in Nagasaki led to the transfer of knowledge related to the Western
technological and scientific revolution which allowed Japan to remain aware of naval sciences, such as
cartography, optics and mechanical sciences, seclusion however, led to loss of any naval and maritime
traditions the nation possessed.[5]
Apart from Dutch trade ships no other Western vessels were allowed to
enter Japanese ports, a notable exception was during the Napoleonic
wars, when neutral ships flew the Dutch flag. However frictions with
foreign ships started from the beginning of the 19th century. The
Nagasaki Harbour Incident involving the HMS Phaeton in 1808 and
other subsequent incidents in the following decades led to the
Shogunate to enact an edict to repel foreign vessels. Western ships
which were increasing their presence around Japan due to whaling and
the trade with China began to challenge the seclusion policy.
Shhei Maru (1854) was built from
The Morrison Incident in 1837 and news of China's defeat during the Dutch technical drawings.
Opium War, however, led to the Shogunate to repeal the law to execute
foreigners and instead to adopt the Order for the Provision of Firewood
and Water. The shogunate also began to strengthen the nation's coastal defenses. Many Japanese realized that
traditional ways would not be sufficient to repel further intrusions and western knowledge was utilized through
the Dutch at Dejima to reinforce Japan's capability to repel the foreigners; field guns, mortars and firearms
were obtained and coastal defenses reinforced. Numerous attempts to open Japan ended in failure in part to
Japanese resistance, this was until the early 1850s.
During 1853 and 1854, American warships under the command of Commodore Matthew Perry entered Edo
Bay and made demonstrations of force requesting trade negotiations. After two hundred years of seclusion the
1854 Convention of Kanagawa led to the opening of Japan to international trade and interaction. This was soon
followed by the 1858 Treaty of Amity and Commerce and treaties with other powers.
By the mid 1860s the Shogunate had a fleet of eight warships and thirty-six auxiliaries.[16] Satsuma (which had
the largest domain fleet) had nine steamships,[17] Choshu had five ships plus numerous auxiliary craft, Kaga
had ten ships and Chikuzen eight.[17] Numerous smaller domains also had acquired a number of ships.
However these fleets resembled maritime organizations rather than actual navies with ships functioning as
transports as well as combat vessels,[12] they were also manned by personnel who lacked experienced
seamanship except for coastal sailing and who had virtually no combat training.[12]
Boshin war
Although the Meiji reformers had overthrown the Tokugawa shogunate, The British-built Ryj was the flagship
tensions between the former ruler and the restoration leaders led to the of the Imperial Japanese Navy until
Boshin War (January 1868 to June 1869). The early part of the conflict 1881.
largely involved land battles, with naval forces playing a minimal role
transporting troops from western to eastern Japan.[19] Only the Battle of
Awa (28 January 1868) was significant; this also proved one of the few
Tokugawa successes in the war. Tokugawa Yoshinobu eventually
surrendered after the fall of Edo in July 1868, and as a result most of
Japan accepted the emperor's rule, however resistance continued in the
North.
On 26 March 1868 the first naval review in Japan took place in Osaka
Bay, with six ships from the private domain navies of Saga, Chsh,
Satsuma, Kurume, Kumamoto and Hiroshima participating. The total Naval battle of Hakodate
tonnage of these ships was 2,252 tons, which was far smaller than the
tonnage of the single foreign vessel (from the French Navy) that also
participated. The following year, in July 1869, the Imperial Japanese Navy was formally established, two
months after the last combat of the Boshin War.
Enomoto Takeaki, the admiral of the Shogun's navy, refused to surrender all his ships, remitting just four
vessels, and escaped to northern Honsh with the remnants of the Shogun's navy: eight steam warships and
2,000 men. Following the defeat of pro-shogunate resistance on Honsh, Admiral Enomoto Takeaki fled to
Hokkaid, where he established the breakaway Republic of Ezo (27 January 1869). The new Meiji government
dispatched a military force to defeat the rebels, culminating with the Naval Battle of Hakodate in May 1869.[20]
The Imperial side took delivery (February 1869) of the French-built ironclad Kotetsu (originally ordered by the
Tokugawa shogunate) and used it decisively towards the end of the conflict.[21]
Consolidation
In February 1868 the government had placed all captured Shogunate naval vessels under the Navy Army affairs
section.[19] In the following months, military forces of the government were put under several organizations
which were created and then disbanded until the creation of the establishment of Ministry of Military Affairs
(Hybush). For the first two years of the Meiji state no national, centrally controlled navy existed,[22] the
Meiji government only administered those Tokugawa vessels captured from the early phase of the Boshin
war.[22] All other naval vessels remained under the control of the various domains which had been acquired
war.[22] All other naval vessels remained under the control of the various domains which had been acquired
during the bakumatsu period. The naval forces mirrored that of the political environment of Japan at the time in
which the domains retained their political as well as military independence from the imperial government.
Katsu Kaish a former Tokugawa navy leader was brought into the government because of his naval experience
and his ability to control Tokugawa personnel who retained positions in the government naval forces. Upon
assuming office Katsu Kaishu recommended the rapid centralization of all naval forces government and domain
under one agency.[22] However, the nascent Meiji government at the time did not have the necessary political
and military force to implement it and so like much of the government the naval forces retained a decentralized
structure in most of 1869 through 1870.
The incident involving Enomoto Takeakis' refusal to surrender and his escape to Hokkaid with a large part of
former Tokugawa Navy's best warships embarrassed the Meiji government politically. The imperial side had to
rely on considerable naval assistance from the most powerful domains as the government did not have enough
naval power to put down the rebellion on its own.[22] Although the rebel forces in Hokkaid surrendered, the
government's response to the rebellion demonstrated the need for a strong centralized naval force.[18] Even
before the rebellion the restoration leaders had realized the need for greater political, economic and military
centralization and by August 1869 most of the domains had returned their lands and population registers to the
government.[18] In 1871 the domains were abolished altogether and as with the political context the
centralization of the navy began with the domains donating their forces to the central government.[18] As a
result, in 1871 Japan could finally boast a centrally controlled navy, this was also the institutional beginning of
the Imperial Japanese Navy.[18]
In February 1872, the Ministry of Military Affairs was replaced by a separate Army Ministry and Navy
Ministry. In October 1873, Katsu Kaish became Navy Minister.[23]
In 1870, the new government drafted an ambitious plan to create a navy with 200 ships organized into ten
fleets. It was abandoned within a year due to lack of resources.[20] Financial considerations was also a major
factor which restricted the growth of the navy during the 1870s.[24] Japan at the time was not a wealthy state.
Soon, however domestic rebellions, the Saga Rebellion (1874) and especially the Satsuma Rebellion (1877),
forced the government to focus on land warfare and the army gained prominence.[20] Naval policy, expressed
by the slogan Shusei Kokub (lit. "Static Defense"), focused on coastal defenses,[20] and a standing army
(established with the assistance of the second French Military Mission to Japan), and a coastal navy, leading to
a military organization under the Rikushu Kaij (Army first, Navy second) principle.[20] The army gained the
bulk of the military expenditures.[25] During the 1870s and 1880s, the Imperial Japanese Navy remained an
essentially coastal defense force, although the Meiji government continued to modernize it. Jo Sho Maru (soon
renamed Ryj Maru) commissioned by Thomas Glover was launched at Aberdeen, Scotland on 27 March
1869.
In 1870, an Imperial decree determined that Britain's Royal Navy should be the model for development, instead
of the Netherlands.[26] In 1873, a thirty-four-man British naval mission, headed by Lt. Comdr. Archibald
Douglas, arrived in Japan. Douglas directed instruction at the Naval Academy at Tsukiji for several years, the
mission remained in Japan until 1879, substantially advancing the development of the navy and firmly
establishing British traditions within the Japanese navy from matters of seamanship to the style of its uniforms
and the attitudes of its officers.[26]
From September 1870, the English Lieutenant Horse, a former gunnery instructor for the Saga fief during the
Bakumatsu period, was put in charge of gunnery practice on board the Ryj. In 1871, the ministry resolved to
send 16 trainees abroad for training in naval sciences (14 to Great Britain, two to the United States), among
which was Heihachir Tg. A 34-member British naval mission visited Japan in 1873 for two years, headed
by Commander Archibald Douglas. Later, Commander L.P. Willan was hired in 1879 to train naval cadets.[26]
Ships such as the Fus, Kong and Hiei were built in British shipyards specifically for the Imperial Japanese
Navy.[24][29] Private construction companies such as Ishikawajima and Kawasaki also emerged around this
time.
In 1883, two large warships were ordered from British shipyards. The
Naniwa and Takachiho were 3,650 ton ships. They were capable of
speeds up to 18 kn (33 km/h; 21 mph) and were armed with 54 to
76 mm (2 to 3 in) deck armor and two 260 mm (10 in) Krupp guns. The
naval architect Sas Sach designed these on the line of the Elswick
class of protected cruisers but with superior specifications.[30] An arms
race was taking place with China however, who equipped herself with Armoured corvette Kong.
two 7,335 ton German-built battleships (Ting Yan and Chen-Yan).
Unable to confront the Chinese fleet with only two modern cruisers,
Japan resorted to French assistance to build a large, modern fleet which could prevail in the upcoming
conflict.[30]
The Meiji government issued its First Naval Expansion bill in 1882,
requiring the construction of 48 warships, of which 22 were to be
torpedo boats.[30] The naval successes of the French Navy against
China in the Sino-French War of 188385 seemed to validate the
potential of torpedo boats, an approach which was also attractive to the
limited resources of Japan.[30] In 1885, the new Navy slogan became
Kaikoku Nippon (Jp:, "Maritime Japan").[32]
The French-built Matsushima, flagship
In 1885, the leading French Navy engineer mile Bertin was hired for of the Imperial Japanese Navy at the
four years to reinforce the Japanese Navy and to direct the construction Battle of the Yalu River (1894)
of the arsenals of Kure and Sasebo.[30] He developed the Sankeikan
class of cruisers; three units featuring a single powerful main gun, the
320 mm (13 in) Canet gun.[30] Altogether, Bertin supervised the building of more than 20 units. They helped
establish the first true modern naval force of Japan. It allowed Japan to achieve mastery in the building of large
units, since some of the ships were imported, and some others were built domestically at the arsenal of
Yokosuka:
This period also allowed Japan "to embrace the revolutionary new The 320 mm (13 in) Canet gun aboard
Matsushima
technologies embodied in torpedoes, torpedo-boats and mines, of which
the French at the time were probably the world's best exponents".[34]
Japan acquired its first torpedoes in 1884, and established a "Torpedo
Training Center" at Yokosuka in 1886.[30]
These ships, ordered during the fiscal years 1885 and 1886, were the last major orders placed with France. The
unexplained sinking of Unebi en route from France to Japan in December 1886, created embarrassment
however.[31][35]
British shipbuilding
The Sino-Japanese war was officially declared on 1 August 1894, though some naval fighting had already taken
place.[39] A Japanese squadron had intercepted and defeated a Chinese force near Korea weeks before.[38] The
Japanese Navy devastated Qing's Beiyang Fleet off the mouth of the Yalu River during the Battle of Yalu River
on 17 September 1894, in which the Chinese fleet lost eight out of 12 warships.[40][41] Although Japan turned
out victorious, the two large German-made battleships of the Chinese Navy remained almost impervious to
Japanese guns, highlighting the need for bigger capital ships in the Japanese Navy (Ting Yuan was finally sunk
by torpedoes, and Chen Yuan was captured with little damage). The next step of the Imperial Japanese Navy's
expansion would thus involve a combination of heavily armed large warships, with smaller and innovative
offensive units permitting aggressive tactics.[42]
As a result of the conflict, under the Treaty of Shimonoseki (April 17, 1895), Taiwan and the Pescadores
Islands were transferred to Japan.[43] The Imperial Japanese Navy took possession of the island and quelled
opposition movements between March to October 1895, and the islands continued to be a Japanese colony until
1945. Japan also obtained the Liaodong Peninsula, although she was forced by Russia, Germany and France to
return it to China (Triple Intervention), only to see Russia take possession of it soon after.
The conflict allowed Japan to enter combat together with Western nations and to acquire first-hand
understanding of their fighting methods.
Russo-Japanese War (19041905)
Following the Sino-Japanese War, and the humiliation of the forced return of the Liaotung peninsula to China
under Russian pressure (the "Triple Intervention"), Japan began to build up its military strength in preparation
for further confrontations.[46] Japan promulgated a 215 million 10-year naval build-up program,[47] under the
slogan "Perseverance and determination" (, Gashinshtan), in which the Japanese commissioned 109
warships, for a total of 200,000 tons, and increased its Navy personnel from 15,100 to 40,800.[48] The new fleet
consisted of:[49]
The period immediately after Tsushima also saw the IJN, under the influence of the navalist theoretician Sat
Tetsutar, adopt an explicit policy of building for a potential future conflict against the United States Navy.
Sat called for a battlefleet at least 70% as strong as that of the USA. In 1907, the official policy of the Navy
became an 'eight-eight fleet' of eight modern battleships and eight battlecruisers. However, financial constraints
prevented this ideal ever becoming a reality.[58]
By 1920, the Imperial Japanese Navy was the world's third largest navy and a leader in naval development:
Following its 1897 invention by Marconi, the Japanese Navy was the first navy to employ wireless
telegraphy in combat, at the 1905 Battle of Tsushima.[59]
In 1905, it began building the battleship Satsuma, at the time the largest warship in the world by
displacement, and the first ship to be designed, ordered and laid down as an "all-big-gun" battleship,
about one year prior to the launching of HMS Dreadnought. However, due to a lack of material, she was
completed with a mixed battery of rifles, launched on 15 November 1906, and completed on 25 March
1910.[60][61]
Between 1903[60] and 1910, Japan began to build battleships domestically. The 1906 battleship Satsuma
was built in Japan with about 80% material imported from Great Britain, with the following battleship
class in 1909,[62] the Kawachi, being built with only 20% imported parts.
In the Siege of Tsingtao, the Japanese Navy helped seize the German
colony of Tsingtao. During the siege, beginning on 5 September 1914, The Japanese seaplane carrier Wakamiya
conducted the world's first sea-launched
Wakamiya conducted the world's first successful sea-launched air
air raids in September 1914.
strikes. On 6 September 1914, in the very first air-sea battle in history, a
Farman aircraft launched by Wakamiya attacked the Austro-Hungarian
cruiser Kaiserin Elisabeth and the German gunboat Jaguar off
Tsingtao.[63][64] from Kiaochow Bay.[65] Four Maurice Farman seaplanes bombarded German land targets like
communication and command centers, and damaged a German minelayer in the Tsingtao peninsula from
September to 6 November 1914 when the Germans surrendered.[66][67]
A battle group was also sent to the central Pacific in August and September to pursue the German East Asiatic
squadron, which then moved into the Southern Atlantic, where it encountered British naval forces and was
destroyed at the Battle of the Falkland Islands. Japan seized former German possessions in northern
Micronesia, which remained Japanese colonies until the end of World War II, under the League of Nations'
South Pacific Mandate.[68]
Hard pressed in Europe, where she had only a narrow margin of superiority against Germany, Britain had
requested, but was denied, the loan of Japan's four newest Kong-class battlecruisers (Kong, Hiei, Haruna,
and Kirishima), some of the first ships in the world to be equipped with 356 mm (14 in) guns, and the most
formidable battlecruisers in the world at the time.[69]
Following a further request by the British and the initiation of unrestricted submarine warfare by Germany the
Japanese, in March 1917, sent a special force of destroyers to the Mediterranean. This force, consisting of one
armoured cruiser, Akashi as flotilla leader and eight of the Navy's newest destroyers (Ume, Kusunoki, Kaede,
Katsura, Kashiwa, Matsu, Sugi, and Sakaki), under Admiral Sat Kz, was based in Malta and efficiently
protected allied shipping between Marseille, Taranto, and ports in Egypt until the end of the War.[70] In June,
Akashi was replaced by Izumo, and four more destroyers were added (Kashi, Hinoki, Momo, and Yanagi). They
were later joined by the cruiser Nisshin. By the end of the war, the Japanese had escorted 788 allied transports.
One destroyer, Sakaki, was torpedoed on 11 June 1917 by a German submarine with the loss of 59 officers and
men. A memorial at the Kalkara Naval Cemetery in Malta was dedicated to the 72 Japanese sailors who died in
action during the Mediterranean convoy patrols.[71]
In 1917, Japan exported 12 Arabe-class destroyers to France. In 1918, ships such as Azuma were assigned to
convoy escort in the Indian Ocean between Singapore and the Suez Canal as part of Japans contribution to the
war effort under the Anglo-Japanese alliance. After the conflict, the Japanese Navy received seven German
submarines as spoils of war, which were brought to Japan and analysed, contributing greatly to the
development of the Japanese submarine industry.[72]
This was in conflict with Japan's doctrine of "decisive battle" (, Kantai kessen, which did not require
long range),[73] in which IJN would allow the U.S. to sail across the Pacific, using submarines to damage it,
then engage the U.S. Navy in a "decisive battle area", near Japan, after inflicting such attrition.[74] This is in
keeping with the theory of Alfred T. Mahan, to which every major navy subscribed before World War II, in
which wars would be decided by engagements between opposing surface fleets[75] (as they had been for over
300 years). Following the dictates of Sat (who doubtless was influenced by Mahan),[76] it was the basis for
Japan's demand for a 70% ratio (10:10:7) at the Washington Naval Conference, which would give Japan
superiority in the "decisive battle area", and the U.S.' insistence on a 60% ratio, which meant parity.[77] Japan,
unlike other navies, clung to it even after it had been demonstrated to be obsolete.
It was also in conflict with her past experience. Japan's numerical and industrial inferiority led her to seek
technical superiority (fewer, but faster, more powerful ships), qualitative superiority (better training), and
aggressive tactics (daring and speedy attacks overwhelming the enemy, a recipe for success in her previous
conflicts), but failed to take account of any of these traits. She failed to take account of the fact her opponents
in the Pacific War did not face the political and geographical constraints of her previous wars, nor did she allow
for losses in ships and crews.[78]
At the Washington Naval Conference, total tonnage limits were instituted for the 5 great naval powers. Britain
and the United States were allocated the greatest tonnage of 525,000 tons, Japan was given 315,000, and France
and Italy were to not exceed 175,000. Many naval leaders in Japans delegation were outraged by these
limitations, as Japan would always be behind its chief rivals. However, in the end it was concluded that even
these unfavorable limitations would be better than an unrestricted arms race with the industrially dominant
United States.[79] The Washington System may have made Japan a junior partner with the US and Britain, but it
also curtailed the rise of China and the Soviet Union, who both sought to challenge Japan in Asia.[80]
Between the wars, Japan took the lead in many areas of warship development:
In 1921, it launched the Hsh, the first purpose-designed aircraft
carrier in the world to be completed,[81] and subsequently
developed a fleet of aircraft carriers second to none.
In keeping with its doctrine, the Imperial Navy was the first to
mount 356 mm (14 in) guns (in Kong), 406 mm (16 in) guns (in
Nagato), and then completed the only battleships ever to mount
460 mm (18.1 in) guns (in the Yamato class).[82]
In 1928, she launched the innovative Fubuki-class destroyer,
introducing enclosed dual 127 mm (5 in) turrets capable of anti- Hsh, the world's first purpose built
aircraft fire. The new destroyer design was soon emulated by aircraft carrier, completed (1922).
other navies. The Fubukis also featured the first torpedo tubes
enclosed in splinterproof turrets.[83]
Japan developed the 610 mm (24 in) oxygen fuelled Type 93 torpedo, generally recognized as the best
torpedo of World War II.[84]
By 1921, Japan's naval expenditure reached nearly 32% of the national budget. In 1941, the Imperial Japanese
Navy possessed 10 battleships, 10 aircraft carriers, 38 cruisers (heavy and light), 112 destroyers, 65
submarines, and various auxiliary ships.[85]
Japan at times continued to solicit foreign expertise in areas in which the IJN was inexperienced, such as naval
aviation. In 1918, Japan invited the French military mission to Japan (191819), composed of 50 members and
equipped with several of the newest types of airplanes to establish the fundamentals of Japanese naval aviation
(the planes were several Salmson 2A2, Nieuport, Spad XIII, two Breguet XIV, as well as Caquot dirigibles). In
1921, Japan hosted for a year and a half the Sempill Mission, a group of British instructors who were able to
train and advise the Imperial Japanese Navy on several new aircraft such as the Gloster Sparrowhawk, and on
various techniques such as torpedo bombing and flight control.[86]
During the pre-war years, two schools of thought battled over whether
the navy should be organized around powerful battleships, ultimately
able to defeat American ones in Japanese waters, or around aircraft
carriers. Neither really prevailed, and both lines of ships were
developed, with the result neither solution displayed overwhelming
strength over the American adversary. A consistent weakness of
Japanese warship development was the tendency to incorporate too
much armament, and too much engine power, in comparison to ship Imperial Japanese Army's landing craft
carrier "Shinsh Maru", the worldwide
size (a side-effect of the Washington Treaty), leading to shortcomings in
first of its kind (1937).
stability, protection and structural strength.[87]
The Imperial Japanese Navy was faced, before and during World War
II, with considerable challenges, probably more so than any other navy in the world.[88] Japan, like Britain, was
almost entirely dependent on foreign resources to supply its economy. To achieve Japans expansionist policies,
IJN had to secure and protect distant sources of raw material (especially Southeast Asian oil and raw materials),
controlled by foreign countries (Britain, France, and the Netherlands). To achieve this goal, she had to build
large warships capable of long range assault.
World War II
In order to combat the numerically superior American navy, the IJN devoted large amounts of resources to
creating a force superior in quality,[90] the objective being of "making up for quantity by means of quality".[91]
[92] Betting on the agile success of aggressive tactics which stemmed from Mahanian doctrine and the concept
of decisive battle,[93] Japan did not invest significantly in capabilities needed to protect its long shipping lines
against enemy submarines,[94] particularly under-investing in the vital area of antisubmarine warfare (both
escort ships and escort carriers), and in the specialized training and organization to support it.[95] Imperial
Japan's reluctance to use its submarine fleet for commerce raiding and failure to secure its communications also
hastened its defeat.
During the first
six months of Imperial Japanese Navy vs US Navy shipbuilding
the Pacific War, (19371945, in Standard Tons Displacement )[89]
the IJN enjoyed
spectacular IJN USN
success
1937 45,000 75,000
inflicting heavy
defeats on 1938 40,000 80,000
Allied
Yamashiro (Japanese Battleship, 1917) in
forces.[96] The 1939 35,000 70,000
Tokyo Bay, Japan, after 1935. Behind her
are the battleships Fuso and Haruna
attack on Pearl 1940 50,000 50,000
(most distant). Faintly visible in the right Harbor crippled
distance are two cruisers and an aircraft the battle line of 1941 180,000 130,000
carrier (1938). the US Pacific
194245 550,000 3,200,000
fleet[97] while
Allied navies
were devastated during the conquest of Southeast Asia.[98] Japanese naval aircraft were also responsible for the
sinkings of the Prince of Wales and Repulse which was the first time that capital ships were sunk by aerial
attack while underway.[99] In April 1942, the Indian Ocean raid drove the Royal Navy from South East
Asia.[100]
After these successes, the IJN now concentrated on the elimination and neutralization of strategic points from
where the Allies could launch counteroffensives against Japanese conquests.[98] However, at Coral Sea the
Japanese were forced to abandon their attempts to isolate Australia[98] while the defeat in the Midway
Campaign saw the Japanese forced on the defensive. The campaign in the Solomon Islands, in which the
Japanese lost the war of attrition, was the most decisive; the Japanese failed to commit enough forces in
sufficient time.[101] During 1943 the Allies were able to reorganize their forces and American industrial
strength began to turn the tide of the war.[102] American forces ultimately managed to gain the upper hand
through a vastly greater industrial output and a modernization of its air and naval forces.[103]
In 1943, the Japanese also turned their attention to the defensive perimeters of their previous conquests. Forces
on Japanese held islands in Micronesia were to absorb and wear down an expected American
counteroffensive.[102] However, American industrial power become apparent and the military forces that faced
the Japanese in 1943 were overwhelming in firepower and equipment.[102] From the end of 1943 to 1944
Japan's defensive perimeter failed to hold.[102]
Defeat at the Philippine Sea was a disaster for Japanese naval air power with American pilots terming the
slanted air/sea battle the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot, mostly going in the favor of the U.S.,[104] while the
battle of Leyte Gulf led to the destruction of a large part of the surface fleet.[105] During the last phase of the
war, the Imperial Japanese Navy resorted to a series of desperate measures, including a variety of Special
Attack Units which were popularly called kamikaze.[106] By May 1945, most of the Imperial Japanese Navy
had been sunk and the remnants had taken refuge in Japan's harbors.[105] By July 1945, all but one of the
Imperial Japanese Navy capital ships had been sunk in raids by the United States Navy.
Self-Defense Forces
Following Japan's surrender and subsequent occupation by the Allies at the conclusion of World War II, the
Imperial Japanese Navy was dissolved in 1945. In the new constitution of Japan which was drawn up in 1947,
Article 9 specifies that "The Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the
threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes." The prevalent view in Japan is that this
article allows for military forces to be kept for the purposes of self-defense.
In 1952, the Coastal Safety Force was formed within the Maritime
Safety Agency, incorporating the minesweeping fleet and other military
vessels, mainly destroyers, given by the United States. In 1954, the
Coastal Safety Force was separated, and the JMSDF was formally
created as the naval branch of the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF),
following the passage of the 1954 Self-Defense Forces Law. Japan's
current navy falls under the umbrella of the Japan Self-Defense Forces
(JSDF) as the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF).
Japanese sailors beside theJapan
Personnel scale of promotions Maritime Self-Defense Force(JMSDF)
training vessel JDS Kashima, in Pearl
Harbor, May 4, 2004.
Prior to the Second World War, the three grades of seaman were third,
second and first class. Petty officers were selected from among the first-
class seamen, and were likewise graded from the third through the first
classes. After a certain period, a first-class petty officer would be eligible for promotion to warrant officer.
After five years of meritorious service as a warrant officer, he could be commissioned as a special-service
officer in the rank of second (acting) sub-lieutenant. Such special-service officers could rise to the rank of
special-service lieutenant-commander, or possibly even higher.
After the rank of lieutenant-commander, promotion was highly competitive and solely by selection. Promotions
to the ranks of commander through rear-admiral were typically scheduled in two-year intervals, though in
practice, promotions to commander were made after five years at the rank of lieutenant-commander and
promotions to captain made after four years as a commander. Promotions to rear-admiral usually came after
five to six years as a captain, with promotions to vice-admiral coming after three years in the rank of rear-
admiral. During wartime, promotion time limits were reduced by half. In general, vice-admiral was the highest
regular rank an officer could achieve in the IJN. Promotion to the rank of full admiral was by direct Imperial
appointment only, and came only to vice-admirals after long service or to those recognised for special merits.
The ceremonial rank of marshal-admiral (fleet admiral) was also only by direct Imperial appointment, more in
the nature of a special award than a substantive rank.
Posthumous promotions and commissions were also common, typically coming after the officer or sailor had
been killed in action or had died after a long and distinguished career.[107]
See also
Admiral of the Fleet (Japan)
Carrier Striking Task Force
Combined Fleet
Fleet Faction Navy political group
Imperial Japanese Naval Academy
Imperial Japanese Navy Armor Units
Imperial Japanese Navy Aviation Bureau
Imperial Japanese Navy bases and facilities
Imperial Japanese Navy fuel
Imperial Japanese Navy Land Forces
Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors
Imperial Way Faction
Japanese nationalism
Japanese Special Naval Landing Forces
Kaientai
List of Japanese Navy ships and war vessels in World War II
Marshal (Japan)
May 15 Incident coup d'tat with Navy support
Ministry of the Military (Ritsury)
"Strike South" Doctrine
Tokkeitai Navy Military Police
Tomogashima
Treaty Faction Navy political group
Notes
1. Library of Congress Country Studies, Japan> National Security> Self-Defense Forces> Early
Development (http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/jptoc.html)
2. Evans, Kaigun
3. "Early Samurai" (https://books.google.com/books?id=FxTNBAAJaqEC&pg=PA7). google.com.
Retrieved 1 April 2015.
4. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 3.
5. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 4.
6. THE FIRST IRONCLADS In Japanese: [1] (http://s-mizoe.hp.infoseek.co.jp/m160.html). Also in English:
[2] (http://www.samurai-archives.com/mth.html): "Iron clad ships, however, were not new to Japan and
Hideyoshi; Oda Nobunaga, in fact, had many iron clad ships in his fleet." (referring to the anteriority of
Japanese ironclads (1578) to the Korean Turtle ships (1592)). In Western sources, Japanese ironclads are
described in CR Boxer "The Christian Century in Japan 15491650", p122, quoting the account of the
Italian Jesuit Organtino visiting Japan in 1578. Nobunaga's ironclad fleet is also described in "A History
of Japan, 13341615", Georges Samson, p309 ISBN 0-8047-0525-9. Admiral Yi Sun-sin invented
Korea's "ironclad Turtle ships", first documented in 1592. Incidentally, Korea's iron plates only covered
the roof (to prevent intrusion), and not the sides of their ships. The first Western ironclads date to 1859
with the French Gloire ("Steam, Steel and Shellfire").
7. Japan encyclopedia by Louis Frdric p.293 (https://books.google.com/books?id=p2QnPijAEmEC&pg=
PA293)
8. Asia in the Making of Europe, Volume III by Donald F. Lach, Edwin J. Van Kley p.29 [3] (https://books.g
oogle.com/books?id=PjVKjJ-WgOYC&pg=PA29)
9. The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 15001800 by Geoffrey Parker
p.110 [4] (https://books.google.com/books?id=cIFiNRH3oWsC&pg=PA110)
10. "A History of Japan" (https://books.google.com/books?id=RZ5w7Qy0W8EC&pg=PA205). google.com.
Retrieved 1 April 2015.
11. Jentschura p. 113
12. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 5.
13. Sims 1998, p. 246.
14. John Pike. "Rise of the Imperial Japanese Navy" (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/ijn-
rise.htm). globalsecurity.org. Retrieved 1 April 2015.
15. Described in "Soie et Lumiere", in a parallel to the French military mission to Japan (186768) for the
Army.
16. Schencking 2005, p. 15.
17. Schencking 2005, p. 16.
18. Schencking 2005, p. 13.
19. Schencking 2005, p. 11.
20. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 7.
21. Sondhaus 2001, p. 100.
22. Schencking 2005, p. 12.
23. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 9.
24. Schencking 2005, p. 19.
25. Schencking 2005, p. 18.
26. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 12.
27. Meiji Japan: Political, Economic and Social History 18681912 Peter F. Kornicki p.191 [5] (https://book
s.google.com/books?id=gxItA6-7RwIC&pg=PA191)
28. The land of scholars: two thousand years of Korean Confucianism by Jae-un Kang, Jae-eun Kang p.450ff
[6] (https://books.google.com/books?id=XB4UYXNQK1wC&pg=PA450)
29. Sondhaus 2001, p. 133.
30. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 14.
31. Sims 1998, p. 250.
32. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 19.
33. Rulers, guns, and money: the global arms trade in the age of imperialism by Jonathan A. Grant p.137 [7]
(https://books.google.com/books?id=l03qgaNVU3oC&pg=PA137)
34. Howe, p.281
35. Sims 1998, p. 354.
36. Chiyoda (II): First Armoured Cruiser of the Imperial Japanese Navy, Kathrin Milanovich, Warship 2006,
Conway Maritime Press, 2006, ISBN 9781844860302
37. Video footage of the Sino-Japanese war: Video (external link) (http://www2.open.ed.jp/real/15655/01.mp
2).
38. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 40.
39. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 41.
40. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 46.
41. Perry, John Curtis (1964). "The Battle off the Tayang, 17 September 1894" (http://www.tandfonline.com/
doi/abs/10.1080/00253359.1964.10657787). The Mariner's Mirror. Taylor & Francis. 50 (4): 243259.
doi:10.1080/00253359.1964.10657787 (https://doi.org/10.1080%2F00253359.1964.10657787).
42. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 48.
43. Schencking 2005, p. 83.
44. Ground warfare: an international encyclopedia by Stanley Sandler p.117 [8] (https://books.google.com/b
ooks?id=L_xxOM85bD8C&pg=PA117)
45. The arc of Japan's economic development by Arthur J. Alexander p.44 [9] (https://books.google.com/boo
ks?id=KptffphJHPIC&pg=PT56)
46. Schencking 2005, p. 87.
47. Schencking 2005, p. 85.
48. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 53.
49. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 52.
50. Evans & Peattie 1997, pp. 6061.
51. Corbett Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War, 2:333
52. Schencking 2005, p. 108.
53. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 116.
54. Schencking 2005, p. 122.
55. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 177.
56. Howe, p.284
57. Howe, p.268
58. Evans & Peattie 1997, pp. 1501.
59. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 84.
60. Jentschura p. 23
61. Jane's Battleships of the 20th Century, p.68
62. Jentschura p. 22
63. Donko, Wilhelm M.: sterreichs Kriegsmarine in Fernost: Alle Fahrten von Schiffen der k.(u.)k.
Kriegsmarine nach Ostasien, Australien und Ozeanien von 1820 bis 1914. epubli, Berlin, 2013 Page 4,
156162, 427
64. Wakamiya is "credited with conducting the first successful carrier air raid in
history"Source:GlobalSecurity.org (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/wakamiya-av.ht
m) Austrian SMS Radetzky launched sea plane raids a year earlier
65. "Sabre et pinceau", Christian Polak, p92
66. John Pike. "IJN Wakamiya Aircraft Carrier" (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/wakami
ya-av.htm). globalsecurity.org. Retrieved 1 April 2015.
67. Peattie 2007, p. 9.
68. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 168.
69. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 161.
70. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 169.
71. Zammit, Roseanne (27 March 2004). "Japanese lieutenant's son visits Japanese war dead at Kalkara
cemetery" (http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20040327/local/japanese-lieutenants-son-visits-w
ar-dead-at-kalkara-cemetery.126734). Times of Malta. Retrieved 25 May 2015.
72. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 212 & 215.
73. Peattie & Evans, Kaigun.
74. Miller, Edward S. War Plan Orange. Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute Press, 1991.
75. Mahan, Alfred T. Influence of Seapower on History, 16601783 (Boston: Little, Brown, n.d.).
76. Peattie and Evans, Kaigun
77. Miller, op. cit. The United States would be able to enforce a 60% ratio thanks to reading signals from the
Japanese government to her negotiators, thanks to having broken the Japanese diplomatic code. Yardly,
American Black Chamber.
78. Peattie & Evans, op. cit., and Willmott, H. P.,The Barrier and the Javelin. Annapolis, MD: United States
Naval Institute Press, 1983.
79. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 193
80. Cambridge History of Japan Vol. 6. Ed. John Whitney Hall and Marius B. Jansen. Cambridge University
Press, 1988
81. "The Imperial Japanese Navy was a pioneer in naval aviation, having commissioned the world's first
built-from-the-keel-up carrier, the Hsh." Source (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/ij
n.htm).
82. The British had used 18-inch guns during the First World War on the large "light" cruiser HMS Furious,
converted to an aircraft carrier during the 1920s, and also two of the eight monitors of the Lord Clive
class, namely Lord Clive and General Wolfe.
83. Fitzsimons, Bernard, ed. The Illustrated Encyclopedia of 20th Century Weapons and Warfare (London:
Phoebus, 1978), Volum3 10, p.1041, "Fubuki".
84. Westwood, Fighting Ships
85. John Pike. "Rise of the Imperial Japanese Navy" (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/ijn-
rise.htm). globalsecurity.org. Retrieved 1 April 2015.
86. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 181 and 301.
87. Lyon World War II warships p. 35
88. Lyon World War II Warships p. 34
89. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 355 & 367.
90. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 205 & 370.
91. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 357.
92. Howe, p286
93. Stille 2014, p. 13.
94. Stille 2014, p. 371.
95. Parillo, Mark. Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II. Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute
Press, 1993.
96. Stille 2014, p. 9.
97. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 488.
98. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 489.
99. Peattie 2007, p. 169.
100. Peattie 2007, p. 172.
101. Evans & Peattie 1997, pp. 490.
102. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 491.
103. The origins of Japanese trade supremacy: development and technology in Asia by Christopher Howe
p.313 [10] (https://books.google.com/books?id=XkCRcv0iXn0C&pg=PA313)
104. Peattie 2007, p. 188-189.
105. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 492.
106. The Divine Wind: Japan's Kamikaze Force in World War II Rikihei Inoguchi, Tadashi Nakajima, Roger
Pineau p.150 [11] (https://books.google.com/books?id=5ZUwqtaN3IYC&pg=PA150)
107. pg 114115, "Chapter IX: National Defence: Section II: The Navy-Part 3, Personnel," The Japan-
Manchukuo Year Book 1938, Japan-Manchukuo Year Book Co., Tokyo
References
Dull, Paul S. (1978) A Battle History of The Imperial Japanese Navy ISBN 0-85059-295-X
Boyd, Carl; Akihiko Yoshida (1995). The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II. Annapolis,
Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-55750-015-0.
Evans, David C; Peattie, Mark R (1997). Kaigun: strategy, tactics, and technology in the Imperial
Japanese Navy, 18871941. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-192-7.
Howe, Christopher (1996) The origins of Japanese Trade Supremacy, Development and technology in
Asia from 1540 to the Pacific War, The University of Chicago Press ISBN 0-226-35485-7
Ireland, Bernard (1996) Jane's Battleships of the 20th Century ISBN 0-00-470997-7
Lyon, D.J. (1976) World War II warships, Excalibur Books ISBN 0-85613-220-9
Sims, Richard (1998). French Policy Towards the Bakufu and Meiji Japan 185495. Psychology Press.
ISBN 1-87341-061-1.
Sondhaus, Lawrence (2001). Naval Warfare, 18151914. Routledge. ISBN 0-41521-477-7.
Jentschura, Hansgeorg; Jung, Dieter; Mickel, Peter (1977). Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy.
Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute. ISBN 0-87021-893-X.
Jordan, John (2011). Warships after Washington: The Development of Five Major Fleets 19221930.
Seaforth Publishing. ISBN 1-84832-117-1.
Peattie, Mark R (2007). Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 19091941. Annapolis,
Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-61251-436-7.
Schencking, J. Charles (2005). Making Waves: Politics, Propaganda, And The Emergence Of The
Imperial Japanese Navy, 18681922. Stanford University Press. ISBN 0-8047-4977-9.
Stille, Mark (2014). The Imperial Japanese Navy in the Pacific War. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 1-47280-
146-6.
Further reading
Boxer, C.R. (1993) The Christian Century in Japan 15491650, ISBN 1-85754-035-2
D'Albas, Andrieu (1965). Death of a Navy: Japanese Naval Action in World War II. Devin-Adair Pub.
ISBN 0-8159-5302-X.
Delorme, Pierre, Les Grandes Batailles de l'Histoire, Port-Arthur 1904, Socomer Editions (French)
Gardiner, Robert (editor) (2001) Steam, Steel and Shellfire, The Steam Warship 18151905, ISBN 0-
7858-1413-2
Hara, Tameichi (1961). Japanese Destroyer Captain. New York & Toronto: Ballantine Books. ISBN 0-
345-27894-1.
Hashimoto, Mochitsura (2010) [1954]. Sunk: The Story of the Japanese Submarine Fleet, 19411945.
New York: Henry Holt; reprint: Progressive Press. ISBN 1-61577-581-1.
Lacroix, Eric; Linton Wells (1997). Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-
87021-311-3.
Nagazumi, Yko () Red Seal Ships (), ISBN 4-642-06659-4 (Japanese)
Polak, Christian. (2001). Soie et lumires: L'ge d'or des changes franco-japonais (des origines aux
annes 1950). Tokyo: Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie Franaise du Japon, Hachette Fujin Gahsha
().
Polak, Christian. (2002). : 100 (-1950) Kinu to
hikari: shirarezaru Nichi-Futsu kry 100-nen no rekishi (Edo jidai-1950-nendai). Tokyo: Ashetto
Fujin Gahsha, 2002. ISBN 978-4-573-06210-8; OCLC 50875162
Seki, Eiji. (2006). Mrs. Ferguson's Tea-Set, Japan and the Second World War: The Global Consequences
Following Germany's Sinking of the SS Automedon in 1940. London: Global Oriental. ISBN 978-1-
905246-28-1 (cloth) [reprinted by University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 2007 previously announced as
Sinking of the SS Automedon and the Role of the Japanese Navy: A New Interpretation.]
Tg Shrine and Tg Association (), Togo Heihachiro in images, illustrated Meiji
Navy (), (Japanese)
Japanese submarines , Jinbutsu publishing () (Japanese)
External links
Axis History Factbook Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN)
Nobunaga's ironclad navy
Hiroshi Nishida's IJN site
Imperial Japanese Navy page
Imperial Japanese Navy Awards of the Golden Kite in World War 2, a Note
Imperial Japanese Navy in World War 1, 191418 including warship losses