COGNITION AND EMOTION

2006, 20 (1), 92113

What determines a feeling's position in affective

space? A case for appraisal
Klaus R. Scherer, Elise S. Dan, and Anders Flykt
University of Geneva, Switzerland

The location of verbally reported feelings in a three-dimensional affective space is

determined by the results of appraisal processes that elicit the respective states.
One group of participants rated their evaluation of 59 pictures from the Interna-
tional Affective Picture System (IAPS) on a profile of nine appraisal criteria.
Another group rated their affective reactions to the same pictures on the classic
dimensions of affective meaning (valence, arousal, potency). The ratings on the
affect dimensions correlate differentially with specific appraisal ratings. These
results can be interpreted as showing that the reactions to the IAPS pictures are
predictably produced through appraisal of picture content. The relevance of the
findings for emotion induction paradigms and for emotion theory in general is
discussed.

Ever since Wundt's (1896) pioneering effort, based on introspection, to map

feelings into three dimensions (pleasantness vs. unpleasantness, excitement vs.
depression, and tension vs. relaxation; see Reisenzein, 1992), dimensional
models of affect have dominated the grey area between what philosophers call
the ``garden variety'' of emotions (generally referred to as basic emotions by
post-Darwinian theorists) and vague sensations with uncertain affect pedigree.
An extraordinary number of empirical studies have demonstrated that pre-
ferences, attitudes, moods, emotions, and many other feeling states, as repre-
sented by lexical labels or facial and vocal expressions, can indeed be
conveniently mapped into a two-dimensional valence by activation space and
reliably distinguished by their relative position (Abelson & Sermat, 1962;
Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Davitz, 1964; Ertel, 1964; Fillenbaum & Rapaport,

Correspondence should be addressed to Klaus R. Scherer, Department of Psychology, University

of Geneva, 40, Bd. du Pont d'Arve, CH-1205 Geneva, Switzerland;
e-mail: Klaus.Scherer@pse.unige.ch
This research was supported by grant FNRS 11-61659.00 of the Swiss National Science Foun-
dation to Klaus Scherer and Anders Flykt. The authors thank Tanja Banziger, Dajana Kapusova, and
Didier Grandjean for their precious contribution.

# 2006 Psychology Press Ltd

http://www.psypress.com/cogemotion DOI:10.1080/02699930500305016
 POSITION OF FEELING IN AFFECTIVE SPACE 93

1971; Osgood, May, & Miron, 1975; Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1967;
Russell, 1980; Traxel, 1961). Yet, it seems that, theoretically, there has been
little advance over Wundt's original conceptualisation. Although many journal
pages have been devoted to issues concerning the nature of affective space, most
of this work has been narrowly focused on the polarity of the valence dimension
or the arrangement of verbal labels in valence by activation space (Cacioppo,
Gardner, & Berntson, 1999; Feldman Barrett & Russell, 1999; Russell & Car-
roll, 1999; Watson & Tellegen, 1985; Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegen,
1999).
In this article, we ask a more fundamental theoretical question: What factors
determine the position of a feeling in affective space? Although there is abun-
dant evidence that people will readily rate a momentary affect state with respect
to its relative positive and/or negative valence and the degree of felt arousal or
activation, there has been relatively little concern with how this particular
feeling quality has been produced. In addressing this issue, we return to Wundt,
highlighting two specific issues: (1) the distinction between emotion and feeling;
and (2) the number of dimensions of affective space. As to (1), Wundt (1896)
suggested: ``An emotion is a unitary whole which is distinguished from a
composite feeling only through the two characteristics that it has a definite
temporal course and that it exercises a more intense present and subsequent
effect on the interconnection of psychical processes'' (p. 170). Although Wundt
proposed the classic dimensional space as the organising principle (quality) for
feelings, he assumed a classification based on quality, intensity, and form of
occurrence (sudden-gradual) for emotions. Although his model has been sur-
passed by the theoretical and empirical development of psychology in the last
century, the distinction between feelings and emotions remains important. In his
component process model of emotion (Scherer, 1984a, 2001), the senior author
has suggested that emotions are a special class of affective phenomena char-
acterised by their episodic character (Wundt's ``definite temporal course'') and
a synchronisation of the changes in all constituent components of the emotion
process (reminiscent of Wundt's idea of intense effects on the interconnection of
psychical processes). In this model, feeling is seen as a component of the
emotion process, serving a monitoring function and constituting the basis for
emotion regulation. Concretely, Scherer (2004a) has proposed that feelings
integrate the central representation of appraisal-driven response organisation in
emotion in the form of highly differentiated qualia, unique forms of subjective
experience that reflect the configuration of component changes during the
emotion episode for the individual. He has suggested that these qualia form the
primitive organisation of feeling, which can then be mapped into language-
specific semantic fields or into a dimensional affective space of the kind sug-
gested by Wundt (Scherer, 2004b, 2005). This model contrasts with Russell's
(2003) claim that the position in valence-arousal space constitutes primitive core
affect, which is only subsequently differentiated by perception and causal
94 SCHERER, DAN, FLYKT

attribution [``These basic processes spawn a broad framework that includes

perception of the core-affect-altering properties of stimuli, motives, empathy,
emotional meta-experience, and affect versus emotion regulation; it accounts for
prototypical emotional episodes, such as fear and anger, as core affect attributed
to something plus various nonemotional processes'' (p. 145)]. Although the
issue is difficult to settle through experimentation, we hold that the position
advocated by Scherer would be supported by evidence showing that the location
of feelings in affective space (which are primitive and irreducible for Russell)
can in fact be predicted by specific appraisal profiles. The study reported here
was designed to provide some first evidence for this theoretical position.
As to (2), Wundt suggested that three dimensions were needed to exhaus-
tively map the varieties of feeling. However, his third dimension, tension-
relaxation, has fared less well than valence and activation in subsequent
empirical work. Schlosberg's (1954) proposal of attention-rejection as a third
dimension did not do much better. However, there is a sizeable literature sug-
gesting, often based on empirical evidence, that a third dimension con-
ceptualised as potency or dominance may well be a reasonable assumption.
Osgood (1969) defended such a three-dimensional evaluation, potency, activity
(EPA) model. Mehrabian and Russell also suggested, and found evidence for, a
three-dimensional model of emotion with dominance-submissiveness as the third
factor (Mehrabian & Russell, 1974; Russell & Mehrabian, 1977). Similarly,
Bradley and Lang (1994) and Hamm and Vaitl (1989) endorsed a 3-dimensional
model including dominance. It has been suggested repeatedly (see also
MacKinnon & Keating, 1989; Morgan & Heise, 1988) that a third dimension is
necessary to disambiguate the negative emotions. In this article, we advocate to
continue the effort directed at the identification of a third dimension of affective
space, even though it is likely to be less homogeneous than valence and arousal
and to explain only a small proportion of the variance.
What are the determinants of the position of a feeling state (as defined above)
in a three-dimensional affective space? An early suggestion was made by the
first author in a textbook chapter on the role of emotion in aggression (Scherer,
Abeles, & Fischer, 1975, p. 138; summarised in Scherer, 1984b, p. 38):
``Specifically, the positive/negative dimension was seen to result from the
intrinsic or inherent pleasantness or unpleasantness of a stimulus, the activity
dimension from a mismatch between goal-/plan-related expectations and the
actual state (requiring action), and the potency dimension from the organism's
estimate of how well it would be able to cope with the particular stimulus event
and its consequences''. Later, this suggestion played an important role in the
development of the first author's component process theory of emotion (see
Scherer, 1984b, pp. 3842), which was developed during the period of renewed
interest in the determinants of emotions, such as anger, sadness, fear, or joy, in
the early 1980s (when mainstream research was focused almost exclusively on
emotional response patterns). The simultaneous development of several theories
 POSITION OF FEELING IN AFFECTIVE SPACE 95

on the pioneering work by Arnold (1960) and Lazarus (1968) led to the advent
of appraisal theory (for overviews, see Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Roseman &
Smith, 2001; Scherer, 1999), which predicts that emotions are elicited and
differentiated on the basis of the subjective evaluation of an event on a set of
standard criteria. Empirical research has confirmed many of these predictions
and there is emerging evidence that appraisal outcomes might be the key to the
prediction of emotional response patterns, including feeling states (see con-
tributions in Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001). So far, most appraisal the-
orists have focused on the prediction of basic or modal (Scherer, 1994) emotions
rather than more diffuse feeling states as characterised by the position in a
multidimensional affective space.
In one of the few studies trying to link appraisal theorising to dimensional
models of affect, Gehm and Scherer (1988) found empirical support for the
notion that appraisal criteria can predict the dimensional mapping of German
affect words. On the basis of extensive nonmetrical cluster analyses of their
similarity data, they suggested a tetrahedral model of affective space formed by
the dimensions of hedonic valence, activation, and control/power (see Figure 1).
The label of control/power, rather than potency or dominance, as suggested in

Figure 1. Tetrahedral model of the emotional space. From Factors determining the dimensions of
subjective emotional space. (From T. H. Gehm and K. R. Scherer, in Facets of Emotion: Recent
Research (p. 112), edited by K. R. Scherer, 1988, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Reprinted with permission.)
96 SCHERER, DAN, FLYKT

earlier studies, was chosen for the third dimension because it seemed to best
reflect the mapping of the affect words used in the study along this dimension
(as well as being in line with the suggested appraisal framework). In this work,
we want to examine the utility of adding this third dimension for locating feeling
states in affective space.
In examining the two questions outlined above, we focus on the feeling states
that are induced through presentation of a set of colour slides published as the
International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert,
1999). Because this photo series is freely distributed, it has known an unpre-
cedented success as affect-inducing stimulus material (e.g., Ito, Cacioppo, &
Lang, 1998). In addition, the developers of the series have provided normative
material (in the form of mean ratings on valence, activation, and dominance for
each picture), which conveniently allows researchers to choose stimulus sets
likely to induce states that will be localised in specific quadrants of a multi-
dimensional affective space. So far, researchers who use the IAPS to plot par-
ticipants' reactions into (generally two-dimensional) affective space have shown
little interest in the mechanisms that produce these states. They seem content to
be able to produce states that participants reliably characterise by positive and/or
negative valence and a variable degree of arousal.
It is interesting to ask what mechanism underlies the production of such
highly predictable feeling states (at least in terms of their position in two-
dimensional affect space), as indicated by verbal report, through exposure to the
objects or scenes depicted in these pictures. For some pictures, one can assume
the existence of evolutionarily old schemata, such as postulated by O hman and
his collaborators for snakes and spiders (e.g., see O hman, 1988; O hman,
Esteves, Flykt, & Soares, 1993). Other pictures may elicit deep-seated disgust
schemata (Rozin & Fallon, 1987). For the baby pictures, one can assume the
operation of a Kindchen-Schema, as postulated by Lorenz (see Eibl-Eibesfeldt,
1989). However, such explanations do not work for many of the photos, such as
those showing interpersonal threat with or without weapons. Research com-
paring skin conductance responses to biological and cultural threat directed
toward the viewer (i.e., pictures of snakes and guns) suggests that there may
only be minor differences between these kinds of threat stimuli with respect to
processing (Flykt, 1998/1999). It is not unreasonable to suggest, then, that the
feeling state that is supposedly produced by exposure to a picture is due to the
viewer's interpretation of the meaning of the objects or scenes depicted in the
photos, in other words, an appraisal of the pertinence and significance of the
content (in general or by imagination of potential implications). Such inter-
pretations by the viewer seems to need no, or only a minimum of, conscious
resources, and could well be processed on the schematic level in the hierarchy
proposed by Leventhal and Scherer (1987). Thus, preconscious appraisal of
intrinsic pleasantness (see Scherer, 1988) would correspond to what Zajonc
(1984) ascribed to valence detection by a primary, noncognitive affect system.
 POSITION OF FEELING IN AFFECTIVE SPACE 97

In the present study, we propose to explain the position of self-reported

feelings in three-dimensional affective space, produced by systematically
selected IAPS pictures, through appraisal profiles that are based on a standard
set of criteria (or ``stimulus evaluation checks''; Scherer, 1984a, 2001) postu-
lated by many appraisal theorists. We used two groups of participants. One rated
their evaluations of the content of a subset of IAPS pictures on nine appraisal
criteria. The other rated their affective reactions or feelings produced by the
same set of pictures on the classic three affect dimensions (valence, activation/
arousal, and power/control). The question was whether profiles of appraisal
criteria can statistically predict the position of verbally reported feeling states in
three-dimensional affect space. We made the following predictions (translating
the senior author's earlier suggestions into current appraisal criteria): (1) the
intrinsic pleasantness of certain objects and/or the goal conduciveness of certain
scenes should determine the valence of the affective response; (2) the unex-
pectedness of the depicted scene and the perceived importance of further con-
sequences of viewing the scene should determine activation or arousal; and (3)
the degree of perceived coping potential (implying both control and power)
should determine the position on the power/control dimension.

METHOD
Participants
Appraisal rating group. A total of 16 psychology students (2 M, 14 F),
mean age 24.8 (SD 8.92), with a median of 21.5 and a range of 1850 years,
participated in fulfilment of a course requirement.

Affect rating group. A total of 16 psychology students (4 M, 12 F), mean

age 22.3 (SD 2.57), with a median of 21.5 and a range of 1929 years,
participated in fulfilment of a course requirement.

Stimulus selection and presentation

A total of 59 pictures were selected from the IAPS CD (Lang et al., 1999) in
such a fashion as to represent the four quadrants of the two-dimensional Valence
6 Activity (i.e., Arousal) space in as pronounced a fashion as possible (i.e.,
pictures which, according to the standardisation ratings made available by the
developers, had the most extreme scores on both dimensions defining each
quadrant). It was decided to work with pictures characterised by relatively
extreme positions, with either low or high valence and either low or high
arousal. A selection procedure based on the published arousal and valence rat-
ings yielded 12 images for each combination of the two variables. For ethical
reasons, erotic and mutilation pictures were excluded from the selection. An
98 SCHERER, DAN, FLYKT

effort was made to include pictures representing a wide variety of themes. Apart
from the 48 selected pictures (12 for each of the four quadrants), 4 anchor
pictures (to serve as reference points) with moderate scores on one of the two
variables and extreme scores on the other variable were selected, as well as one
further anchor picture with moderate scores on both variables. In addition, 6
thematically ``neutral'' pictures with moderate to high valence and low or
moderate arousal were included, yielding a total of 59 stimulus pictures. The
dominance dimension was not included in the selection, as the IAPS material is
not ideally suited for obtaining stimuli that vary relatively independently on the
arousal and dominance dimensions (the normative valence and dominance IAPS
ratings correlate with r = .82, p < .001)
The pictures, imported as BMP files into a computerised rating program
(written in Authorware) were presented on a 17-inch screen in such a way that
the largest possible area of the screen was filled (using a PC running under
Windows 98). The rating program randomised the order of presentation of all
stimuli for each individual participant.

Instructions and rating scales

On a first screen in the rating program, participants in both rating conditions
were given the following instructions (translated from the French original):

In this study we are interested in the ways in which people are affected by visually
presented scenes. We will show you a number of photographs that are part of a
series that is frequently used in psychological experiments. There are all kinds of
sceneslandscapes, objects, people, behaviors, events, situations, etc. We ask you
to view each photo attentively as it appears on the screen and to let you become
involved in what you see. Following each photo presentation we will ask you to
respond to a series of questions concerning your reaction to each photo.

Each photo was shown for 5 s (the exposure time having been chosen on the
basis of the literature and the results of a pilot study). Following each full-screen
photo presentation, participants were shown a screen with the response scales
specific to the respective rating group. On the screen showing the rating scales, a
miniature image of the respective stimulus picture was shown on top of the page
to remind participants of the picture content during the rating process. In each
case, and for each scale, they were asked to respond on bipolar scales by moving
a slider to the desired position on the scale. The midpoint of the scale was
indicated and the poles were labelled. The scale position chosen with the help of
the slider was converted to a number ranging from 0 to 100 according to the
distance to the left scale pole.

Appraisal rating group. The instructions given to this group were as

follows (labels in brackets provide variable names used in the Results section
 POSITION OF FEELING IN AFFECTIVE SPACE 99

and the direction of polarity of the ratings; labels in parentheses provide the
label for the corresponding appraisal criterion or stimulus evaluation check
according to Scherer, 2001, pp. 9499):

The questions we ask you for each photo concern the process of mental evaluation
which occurred while you were looking at the scene shown in a photo. In order to
analyse your evaluation in a detailed manner, we will provide you with the fol-
lowing nine scales:
Novelty/Familiarity: Is the scene presented in the photo familiar to you, that is,
have you already frequently seen it before, or is it rather novel, that is, you have
seen this only rarely or never at all? [Novel/familiar] (Novelty)
Unpleasantness/Pleasantness: Do you consider the scene shown as pleasant or as
unpleasant? [Unpleasant/Pleasant] (Intrinsic pleasantness)
Presence/Absence of an effect: To which extent has the scene had an effect or
impact on you? Did it produce only a very small effect, that is, the photo did not
affect you much at all, or did the photo have a strong effect on you? [Has no/strong
effect] (Goal relevance)
Cause/Responsibility: Did the photo show an object that exists in nature or a
situation that can occur by chance, or was it an event that had been caused by an
intentional action of one or several persons? [Chance/human agency] (Causal
attribution)
Consequences: Is it likely that the scene shown will produce important further
consequences or does it represent a stable state that is unlikely to change further?
[No/further consequences] (Outcome probability)
Expectations: Were you prepared to see a scene like this (that is, you had
expected to see something like this) or did you not at all expect to see such a scene
(that is, it did not correspond to your expectations)? [Expected/unexpected]
(Discrepancy from expectation)
Effect on your well-being: Do you have the impression that the effect of the
photo tends to increase or decrease your well-being at that moment? [Decreases/
increases well-being] (Goal/need conduciveness)
Coping with the effect: Do you think that you can easily cope with or live with
the effect of the photo or do you have the impression that you may have difficulties
in dealing with the effect produced by the photo? [Low/high coping potential]
(Coping potential)
Acceptability: Is the scene shown in the photo acceptable from the point of view
of social norms and morality or do you think that the acts or events shown are due
to unfair or even immoral acts? [Acceptable/unjust, immoral] (Normative sig-
nificance).

These appraisal criteria and the questions used to tap them correspond to
those suggested by most appraisal theorists (see Scherer et al., 2001), except for
the goal relevance criterion, in which the question asks about the presence or
absence of a strong effect of a picture. It is implicitly assumed that if a picture
has a strong effect, its contents have strong significance to the viewer with
respect to needs, desires, preferences, values, and norms, as well as with respect
100 SCHERER, DAN, FLYKT

to instrumental goals (the term ``goal relevance'' being used here as a shorthand,
as is often the case in appraisal theory). This implicit approach was chosen
because it is difficult, if not impossible, to ask participants which of the moti-
vational factors listed above is addressed by the content of a picture, because
desires, values, norms, and so forth are generally not salient and available to
consciousness. In addition, when confronted with ``goal'' questions, participants
have a tendency to focus only on the immediate task (see Scherer, 1997a, 1997b;
in this case, responding to pictures). For the same reason, ``goal conduciveness''
was operationalised as ``increase/decrease in well-being''.

Affect rating group. The instructions specifically given to this group were
as follows (original French scale designations given in parentheses):

We ask you to describe the feeling state that the respective photo induced in you
with the help of the following six scales: happy-unhappy (content/mecontent),
calm-excited (calme/excite), having-losing control (sous controle/perte de con-
trole), negative-positive (negatif/positif), weak-strong (faible/fort), aroused-
relaxed (stimule/detendu).

Procedure
Participants came to a laboratory equipped with six computer workstations in
groups of two or four and were placed in front of the computer by an experi-
menter. They were told that all instructions would be given on the screen.
Although the presentation of the photos was timed, participants could perform
the ratings at their own pace. After the end of the ratings, participants were
thanked. No debriefing was necessary, because the instructions corresponded
exactly to the aims of the study.

RESULTS
Agreement Between Participants
Appraisal rating group. Three participants showing mean intercorrelations
of r < .05 with all other participants were excluded from further analysis,
because we assumed that they might not have understood or followed the
instruction. However, their exclusion did not affect the stability of the average
ratings (mean ratings based on 16 participants were perfectly correlated with
those based on 13 participants). The mean intercorrelations between the 13
participants retained (across all nine rating scales over 59 stimuli) reached r =
.58 (corresponding to an effective reliablility of .95). The mean intercorrelations
for each affect scale were as follows: novel/familiar 0.45, unpleasant/pleasant
0.82, has no/strong effect 0.33, chance/human agency 0.66, no/further
consequences 0.51, expected/unexpected 0.44, increases/decreases well-being
0.70, high/low coping potential 0.65, acceptable/unjust, immoral 0.69.
 POSITION OF FEELING IN AFFECTIVE SPACE 101

Affect rating group. As the average interrater correlations were of

comparable size for the 16 participants, all data were used. Across all six
rating scales, the mean intercorrelations between participants over 59 stimuli
reached r = .52 (corresponding to an effective reliability of .94; see Rosenthal,
1987, pp. 914). The mean rater intercorrelations for each affect scale were as
follows: happy-unhappy 0.77, calm-excited 0.53, having-losing control 0.34,
negative-positive 0.76, weak-strong 0.31, and aroused-relaxed 0.41. As
expected, there was greater agreement for the valence scales compared with
the scales for activation/arousal and power/control.

Composite scales and intercorrelations

Because the stimuli (N = 59 pictures) were used as units of analysis, the raw
ratings were aggregated over participants to compute values for each stimulus
and each of the scales.

Appraisal rating group. The intercorrelations between the appraisal scales,

shown in Table 1, are uncommonly high as compared with earlier studies (see
Scherer, 1997a, 1997b). This is explained by the nature of the IAPS photo rating
task and the selection of extreme representatives of the four quadrants of
affective space. Thus, most negative, high-arousal photos show violence or
physical deformation, and most positive, low-arousal photos show nature
landscapes or coloured patterns. Not surprisingly, the appraisal patterns for these
scenes are likely to be highly similar within a quadrant and diagonally opposite
among quadrants, tending to produce the very high correlation coefficients
shown in Table 1. However, if one disregards absolute size and looks at the
pattern of the intercorrelations, these seem highly appropriate to the stimuli and
tend to replicate the general patterns found in other studies of appraisal (see
Scherer, 1997a; Scherer & Wallbott, 1994).
From these intercorrelations (and an exploratory factor analysis forcing the
extraction of four factors) and the content overlap between items, we computed
two composite appraisal scales: an agreeable/well-being composite (the mean of
intrinsic pleasantness and increasing well-being) and a novel/unexpected com-
posite. Apart from the high statistical dependence of these variables, their
combination is also justified by the fact that they are not differentiated in the
predictions.

Affect rating group. The two scales that had been originally chosen to
represent each of the three affect dimensions were averaged to provide a
composite scale for each dimension, as they correlated very highly with each
other (valence r = .99, p < .001; arousal r = .95, p < .001; control/power r = .88,
p < .001). The correlations of these three composite scales with the pictures'
standardisation scores on the three dimensions (valence, arousal, dominance, as
102
TABLE 1
Intercorrelations among the appraisal scales

Novel/ Unpleasant/ Has Chance/ No/further Expected/ Decreases/ Low/high

familiar pleasant no/strong human consequences unexpected increases coping
effect agency well-being potential

Unpleasant/pleasant 0.75**
Has no/strong effect 70.19 70.25
Chance/human agency 70.51** 70.53** 70.16
No/further consequences 70.62** 70.86** 0.45** 0.57**
Expected/unexpected 70.82** 70.95** 0.15 0.62** 0.80**
Decreases/increases well-being 0.75** 0.99** 70.24 70.52** 70.85** 70.94**
Low/high coping potential 0.77** 0.95** 70.46** 70.48** 70.88** 70.89** 0.95**
Acceptable/unjust, immoral 70.76** 70.92** 0.37* 0.62** 0.87** 0.90** 70.89** 70.93**

* p < .01; ** p < .001.

 POSITION OF FEELING IN AFFECTIVE SPACE 103
TABLE 2
Intercorrelations among composite affect scales and International Affect Picture
System (IAPS) standardization ratings

IAPS IAPS IAPS Valence Arousal

valence arousal dominance

IAPS arousal 70.22

IAPS dominance 0.87** 70.51**
Valence 0.96** 70.31* 0.85**
Arousal 70.56** 0.82** 70.65** 70.65**
Power 0.91** 70.50** 0.91** 0.94** 70.77**

* p < .05; ** p < .01.

given by Lang et al., 1999) and their respective intercorrelations are shown in
Table 2.
The internal intercorrelations between the affect dimensions in this study are
comparable in their overall pattern and size to the intercorrelations between the
standardisation ratings (except for a somewhat lower correlation between
arousal and valence in the standardisation ratings). The correlation coefficients
between the corresponding dimensions in the two sets of ratings are very high,
demonstrating that the participants in the current affect rating group reproduced
the affective structure of the standardisation group almost perfectly. This result
confirms the stability of the results obtained with the IAPS picture series in
different laboratories in different cultures (Lang et al., 1999). As for the nor-
mative dominance ratings, the correlation between the power and the valence
dimensions is very high (r = .94), raising the issue of the independence of the
two dimensions.

Patterns of correlations between affect and

appraisal Ratings
The intercorrelations between the affect and the appraisal measures are shown in
Table 3. The generally inflated size of the correlations, explained by the nature
of the IAPS photos and the selection of extreme cases from the four quadrants,
makes it difficult to interpret differences in the size of the respective coeffi-
cients. However, if the high level of the coefficients is disregarded, there does
seem to be a pattern that confirms, at least partially, the expectations outlined
above. Below, we briefly comment on the correlations that are pertinent to the
predictions (all coefficients reported in parentheses are rs and all are significant
at p < .001). Although the valence dimension is highly correlated with nearly all
appraisal criteria, the highest correlations were found with the agreeable/well-
being composite (.99). For the arousal dimension, we found, as predicted, the
104 SCHERER, DAN, FLYKT

TABLE 3
Intercorrelations between the composite affect and the appraisal scales

Valence Arousal Power

Agreeable/well-being composite 0.99** 70.67** 0.95**

Has no/strong effect 70.22 0.15 70.32*
Chance/human agency 70.52** 0.72** 70.53**
No/further consequences 70.85** 0.65** 70.85**
Novel/unexpected composite 70.86** 0.72** 70.87**
Low/high coping potential 0.93** 70.68** 0.95**
Acceptable/unjust, immoral 70.90** 0.69** 70.89**

* p < .05; ** p < .01.

highest correlation with the novel/unexpected composite (.724). However, an

almost equally high correlation was found for human agency (.718), whereas the
correlation with importance of consequences was lower (.654). The power/
control dimension, as predicted, correlated most highly with coping potential
(.951), but the agreeable/well-being composite was at the same level (.950),
again demonstrating the generally high correlation between valence and dom-
inance in the IAPS set.
In order to control for the multicollinearity in the correlation matrix, we ran
multiple regressions, using a stepwise criterion, to determine the appraisal
factors that account most strongly for the variance in affect ratings. The results,
shown in Table 4, confirm the pattern described above. The valence variance is
completely explained by the agreeable/well-being composite. The arousal var-
iance is jointly explained by the novel/unexpected composite and human
agency, with the latter adding about .13 to the cumulative R2. Given the high
correlation between the valence and the power dimension, the results of the
latter must be viewed with caution particularly because the variable that entered
the regression equation first as a result of the highest zero-order correlation
(coping potential) had only a very small advantage over the next highest cor-
relation. Yet, it is interesting that both coping potential and the agreeable/well-
being composite enter the model under the stepwise criteria (even though the
increase in cumulative R2 due to the latter is minimal).
The impression that the power dimension, despite its high correlation with
valence, may reflect some unique variance is supported by the significant cor-
relation with the relative effect that the individual photos had on participants (r =
7.32, p < .05). This variable correlates significantly with consequences, coping
potential, and immorality appraisal (see Table 2). In other words, affective state
is lower on the power dimension when participants are strongly affected by
immoral scenes and expect further consequences that are difficult to cope with.
 POSITION OF FEELING IN AFFECTIVE SPACE 105
TABLE 4
Stepwise linear regressions of appraisal ratings on composite affect scales

Affect scale Predictor(s) Standardised b t p Cumulated

adjusted R2

Valence Agreeable/well-being .987 45.75 < .001 .974

composite
Arousal Novel/unexpected .461 5.69 < .001 .525
composite .445 74.938 < .001 .653
Chance/human agency
Power/control Low/high coping ability .499 4.73 < .001 .903
Agreeable/well-being .475 4.56 < .001 .923
composite

Note: Inclusion criterion for entering additional variables into the model = R2 increase > .05.

Contrary to what one may expect, the reported effect of a photo does not
correlate linearly with reported arousal (r = .15, n.s.). Figure 2 shows a scatter
plot of the composite arousal scale and the effect rating. The arrangement of the
photos suggests that there may be a curvilinear relationship between reported
effect and judged arousal, in that very low arousal photos (such as a mother with
her baby) and highly arousing photos (such as a starved child) can provoke a
strong affective impact. A regression analysis with curve estimation showed that
a quadratic model provided a very good fit to the data (F = 14.31, df = 56,
p < .001).

DISCUSSION
The major aim of this study was to explore the feasibility of using appraisal
profiles to explain the position of feeling states in three-dimensional affect
space. Expectations as to which specific appraisal criteria (or stimulus evalua-
tion checks) should determine the position on particular dimensions of affect
were based on a pattern suggested earlier by the first author. On the whole, the
results obtained in this research seem to encourage the pursuit of these ideas. We
chose a particularly tough paradigm to examine the theoretical proposal, in that a
photo-viewing paradigm is not the best context for the use of appraisal criteria,
which are generally based on an individual's goals and plans in a given situation.
Furthermore, the selection of stimuli on the basis of valence and arousal only (as
dominance is not independent of valence in the IAPS) limits the possibility to
compare two-dimensional vs. three-dimensional paradigms. Finally, the selec-
tion of relatively extreme exemplars tends to increase multicollinearity in the
data and makes it difficult to examine subtle effects.
106
Figure 2. Scatter plot for the effect appraisal variable and the composite arousal scale.
 POSITION OF FEELING IN AFFECTIVE SPACE 107

Despite these difficult conditions, the data tend to confirm prior expectations
that are based on appraisal theorising. It is not surprising to see the suggestion
that valence is determined by the appraisal of intrinsic pleasantness and that goal
conduciveness is strongly supported. The same underlying mechanism, plea-
santness or desirability evaluation on some level of information processing, is
assumed by both dimensional affect theorists and appraisal theorists. To our
knowledge, dimensional affect theorists have not ventured any predictions that
go beyond pleasantness or agreeableness perception. In our data, the variable we
intended to measure, goal conduciveness (which we phrased in terms of decrease
or increase of well-being because participants often have problems under-
standing the psychological goal concept), correlated very highly with the
intrinsic pleasantness variable, and thus a composite variable was formed.
However, we expect that in other types of situations in which an individual's
concrete needs or goals play a more central role than in a picture rating
experiment, goal conduciveness will predict valence responses. Scherer (1988,
p. 93) suggested the need to conceptualise these two types of ``positive''
appraisals in an orthogonal fashion and experimentally determine main and
interaction effects on response domains other than verbal report (because lay
people have difficulties of understanding the difference). Some recent studies
show the promise of this approach (van Reekum et al., 2004)
The arousal dimension, in line with prediction, was determined in large part
by novelty and unexpectedness. In addition, human agency added importantly to
the explanation of the variance. Both of these predictors correspond to the spirit
of our original proposal: Arousal should be high when action is needed unex-
pectedly. Action is appropriate when human agency has produced events the
consequences of which one may attempt to change (which is not true for events
produced by chance).
Finally, as expected, the composite control/power scale can be accounted for
by coping potential appraisal. Although this third affect dimension is difficult to
establish on the bases of factor analyses or multidimensional scaling (as is again
demonstrated in this study), the finding that it is the appraisal criterion that
predicts this dimension best does speak to the necessity to conceptually dis-
tinguish it. The high correlations with valence that are generally found and
confirmed in this study may reflect an ecological covariation (one generally
feels powerful in positive situations) that may not hold under all circumstances.
Unfortunately, an indiscriminate use of factor analysis may blind one to the
multiple relationships between causal factors. The fact that different variables
load on the same factor is often taken to indicate that they are not distin-
guishable. However, in certain contexts, there may be strong habitual associa-
tions between conceptually clearly separate variables.
One could argue that the results reported above are tautological, as they are
based on correlations between self-reports (albeit by different groups). We do
not agree. It is certainly true that correlational analyses cannot be used to
108 SCHERER, DAN, FLYKT

demonstrate causality. However, we used two clearly different instructions and

very different scales for the rating tasks of the two groups, the appraisal criteria
scales clearly referring to how the participants evaluated or appraised the con-
tent of the pictures, and the dimensional affect scales clearly asking about the
feeling state that had been produced by the picture. Thus, we measured two
different variables and two different underlying concepts. Theoretically, we
postulate that feeling integrates all other components of the affective process,
including the appraisal results. Thus, there is a clear prediction that appraisal
should determine feeling. We agree with Lewis (1996, 2005) and Frijda and
Zeelenberg (2001) that there are recursive effects (i.e., feeling being able to
affect subsequent appraisal). However, we do not believe (and so far there is no
empirical evidence) in a complete circular causality that would make it
impossible to argue that appraisal determines feeling (see Sander & Scherer,
2005). It seems likely that there is a strong and immediate effect of appraisal
(and the consequent physiological and expressive changes) on feeling, which is
then followed by a weaker but more continuous tuning of appraisal by feeling in
the course of emotion regulation.
As to the interpretation of the data, specifically the regression analyses, it is
standard practice to use a large predictor set (as the appraisal criteria) to predict
a small criterion set (the affect dimensions), whereas it seems problematical to
want to predict a large set of criterion variables (appraisal criteria) by a small
number of predictors (e.g., valence and arousal). In fact, there are many IAPS
pictures in our selection that do not differ much on valence-arousal coordinates
but that have different appraisal profiles. Clearly, plausibility does not constitute
evidence of causality, but it seems to us that strong empirical proof requires
experimental studies using brain imaging of appraisal and feeling processes to
examine sequence and cause (see Grandjean & Scherer, 2003, for first efforts in
this direction).
On the whole, then, it seems reasonable to expect that any induction of an
affective state that can be described by a Valence 6 Arousal coordinate can
also be explained as the result of an appraisal operation. However, under cer-
tain circumstances, the affective significance of a stimulus or event might be
better described by an appraisal profile than by a coordinate in a multi-
dimensional affect space. This consideration is motivated by the fact that
arousal ratings have a curvilinear relationship with the reported affective
impact that the photos had on the participants. This finding may have impor-
tant methodological implications. If researchers interested in inducing physio-
logical responses choose photos that are high on the arousal dimension, they
may miss many photos that might have a strong impact on participants in
experiments and thereby produce sympathetic activation. In short, the current
findings challenge the frequently made assumption that the rated arousal
dimension is directly and linearly linked to the rater's level of sympathetic
activation.
 POSITION OF FEELING IN AFFECTIVE SPACE 109

This raises a more general issue. Appraisal is a cognitive evaluation process

that can produce affect and emotion because the evaluation is based on criteria
that reflect personal relevance of needs, goals, and values. This relevance
``heats up'' what is otherwise a cold cognitive process. As mentioned above, in
the case of the IAPS picture series or other stimulus material used in affective
dimension research, the extent to which personal relevance plays a role is often
not clear. It is possible that affect ratings produced on the basis of such stimuli
are basically just products of ``cold'' appraisal processes, yielding the predicted
positions in affective space because of the links between appraisal criteria and
affect dimensions suggested in this paper. In other words, participants may
produce an affect rating that corresponds to an underlying appraisal process
without actually feeling the corresponding state. Although this may not be a very
serious problem for the valence dimension that seems very stable and con-
sensual, it may render the arousal ratings less useful for the measurement of felt
affect.
For the latter, it may be necessary to focus more on pertinence appraisal and
the affective impact that is likely to follow. One important aspect is that per-
tinence/effect is likely to vary much more across participants than other
appraisal ratings. For example, the average rater intercorrelation for the strength
of effect/pertinence ratings in this study was .33, which is much lower than the
level of agreement found for most other scales. This result is as it should be
according to appraisal theory: Individuals differ widely in their assessment of
what is pertinent to them. With respect to photos, snake phobics should be more
affected by photos of snakes than persons indifferent to these animals, whereas
individuals who like babies should be greatly affected by photos of babies. It is
not unreasonable, then, to assume that real affect is only induced when the
stimulus is appraised as pertinent by the individual and the process goes beyond
cold evaluation, that is, really has an affective impact.
Future research should try to disentangle the results of fairly simple, ste-
reotyped, cold evaluation processes and how these differ from cases in which
real affect is produced because of the perceived pertinence and consequent
involvement of the individual. We submit that standard two-dimensional affect
ratings are not sufficient to disambiguate these cases.
As intimated above, these deliberations have important methodological
implications. Researchers wanting to induce real affect may need to select sti-
muli in a highly sophisticated fashion in order to maximise their chances. For
example, it may be necessary to run preliminary studies, using an appraisal
framework that can help to predict what factors are likely to have an affective
impact on many different individuals. This approach is all the more important,
as ethical considerations bar researchers from using strong manipulations that
would have a better chance of producing similar reactions in different indivi-
duals. The results of this study could also help to unify the different research
strands on affect and emotion. So far, there seems to be a cleavage between
110 SCHERER, DAN, FLYKT

affect researchers, mostly interested in valence (and sometimes arousal), and

emotion researchers, focused on more or less basic discrete emotions (the
demonstration, based on Wundt's theorising, that discrete emotions can be
represented in two- or three-dimensional affect space has not much furthered
integration). If it can be successfully shown that appraisal processes underlie all
affective phenomena, from weak and unspecific feeling states to highly pat-
terned emotions, research on affect and emotion should adopt a unified frame-
work, permitting the prediction of response patterning on the basis of the
antecedent appraisal processes.
Finally, with respect to theoretical issues, the current findings challenge
Russell's (2003) claim of core affect, consisting of primitive valence-arousal
feelings that are further differentiated by causal attribution and appraisal in a
second step. As described above, one can statistically predict a small set of
outcome variables (e.g., valence and arousal) from a larger set of predictor
variables (e.g., appraisal criteria), whereas the opposite is impossible. Thus, it
seems more plausible and parsimonious to assume that feeling represents
complex appraisal outcomes (as well as proprioceptive feedback from physio-
logical reactions and motor behaviour) and can subsequently be mapped into a
Valence 6 Arousal 6 Potency space, as suggested by Scherer's component
process model.
Manuscript received 11 June 2003
Revised manuscript received 14 December 2004

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