PACU V SECRETARY OF EDUCATION 97 PHIL 806
Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to challenge the
The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assailed the
constitutionality of Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and
Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws sought to regulate the ownership of
private schools in the country. It is provided by these laws that a permit should
first be secured from the Secretary of Education before a person may be
granted the right to own and operate a private school. This also gives the
Secretary of Education the discretion to ascertain standards that must be
followed by private schools. It also provides that the Secretary of Education can
and may ban certain textbooks from being used in schools.
PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is
guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental
approval or permit before such person could exercise said right, amounts to
censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our system of law and
government. PACU also avers that such power granted to the Secretary of
Education is an undue delegation of legislative power; that there is undue
delegation because the law did not specify the basis or the standard upon which
the Secretary must exercise said discretion; that the power to ban books
granted to the Secretary amounts to censorship.
ISSUE: Whether or not Act No, 2706 as amended is unconstitutional.
HELD: No. In the first place, there is no justiciable controversy presented. PACU
did not show that it suffered any injury from the exercise of the Secretary of
Education of such powers granted to him by the said law.
Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the ownership of
schools. The Constitution provides for state control of all educational institutions
even as it enumerates certain fundamental objectives of all education to wit, the
development of moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience and
vocational efficiency, and instruction in the duties of citizenship. The State
control of private education was intended by the organic law.
Third, the State has the power to ban illegal textbooks or those that are
offensive to Filipino morals. This is still part of the power of control and
regulation by the State over all schools.
Mariano v COMELEC
G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995, 242 SCRA 211
This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief filed by petitioners Juanito
Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz,
Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante
Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of
Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing
as taxpayers, they assail sections 2, 51, and 52 of Republic Act No. 7854 as
unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
constitutionality of one of the questioned sections of R.A. No. 7854.
HELD:
The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law
are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy;
(2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the
constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
(4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself.
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is
premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay
will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in
said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the
1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen,
petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual
case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano)
are not also the proper partiesto raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this
futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no
jurisdiction.
JOYA VS. PCGG
[225 SCRA 568; G.R. No. 96541; 24 Aug 1993]
On 9 August 1990, Mateo A.T. Caparas, then Chairman of PCGG, wrote then
President Corazon C. Aquino, requesting her for authority to sign the proposed
Consignment Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines through PCGG
and Christie, Manson and Woods International, Inc concerning the scheduled
sale on 11 January 1991 of eighty-two) Old Masters Paintings and antique
silverware seized from Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila
alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his
relatives and cronies. On 14 August 1990, then President Aquino, through
former Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., authorized Chairman Caparas
to sign the Consignment Agreement allowing Christie's of New York to auction
off the subject art pieces for and in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. On
15 August 1990, PCGG, through Chairman Caparas, representing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed the Consignment
Agreement with Christie's of New York. According to the agreement, PCGG shall
consign to CHRISTIE'S for sale at public auction the eighty-two Old Masters
Paintings then found at the Metropolitan Museum of Manila as well as the
silverware contained in seventy-one cartons in the custody of the Central Bank
of the Philippines, and such other property as may subsequently be identified by
PCGG and accepted by CHRISTIE'S to be subject to the provisions of the
agreement.
On 26 October 1990, the Commission on Audit through then Chairman Eufemio
C. Domingo submitted to President Aquino the audit findings and observations
of COA on the Consignment Agreement of 15 August 1990 to the effect that:
the authority of former PCGG Chairman Caparas to enter into the Consignment
Agreement was of doubtful legality; the contract was highly disadvantageous to
the government; PCGG had a poor track record in asset disposal by auction in
the U.S.; and, the assets subject of auction were historical relics and had
cultural significance, hence, their disposal was prohibited by law.
After the oral arguments of the parties on 9 January 1991, we issued
immediately our resolution denying the application for preliminary injunction to
restrain the scheduled sale of the artworks on the ground that petitioners had
not presented a clear legal right to a restraining order and that proper parties
had not been impleaded.
On 11 January 1991, the sale at public auction proceeded as scheduled and the
proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.
Whether or not the Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware are embraced
in the phrase "cultural treasure of the nation".
Whether or not the paintings and silverware are properties of public dominion
on which can be disposed of through the joint concurrence of the President and
Congress.
Whether or not PCGG has complied with the due process clause and other
statutory requirements for the exportation and sale of the subject items.
Whether or not the petition has become moot and academic, and if so, whether
the above Issue warrant resolution from this Court.
Held:
This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that
every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest, and that all persons having interest in the subject of the action and in
obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. The Court will
exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a
party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question.
"Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" is material
interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished
from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.
Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based
on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party.
There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to
the rule on legal standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to
procure the enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public right
recognized by the Constitution, and when a taxpayer questions the validity of a
governmental act authorizing the disbursement of public funds.
Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law.
The ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or
corporation or the members thereof, although the public has been given the
opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they were placed on
exhibit.
The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration however
should not be understood to mean that the ownership of these paintings has
automatically passed on the government without complying with constitutional
and statutory requirements of due process and just compensation. If these
properties were already acquired by the government, any constitutional or
statutory defect in their acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be
raised only by the proper parties the true owners thereof whose authority to
recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by statutes
and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the
artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do
not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged
unauthorized disposition.
Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Obviously, petitioners
are not challenging any expenditure involving public funds but the disposition of
what they allege to be public properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners
admit that the paintings and antique silverware were acquired from private
sources and not with public money.
Anent the second requisite of actual controversy, petitioners argue that this
case should be resolved by this Court as an exception to the rule on moot and
academic cases; that although the sale of the paintings and silver has long been
consummated and the possibility of retrieving the treasure trove is nil, yet the
novelty and importance of the Issue raised by the petition deserve this Court's
attention. They submit that the resolution by the Court of the Issue in this case
will establish future guiding principles and doctrines on the preservation of the
nation's priceless artistic and cultural possessions for the benefit of the public as
a whole.
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case of
controversy one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be
moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not
cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its
purpose has become stale, such as the case before us. Since the purpose of this
petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials from holding the
auction sale of the artworks on a particular date 11 January 1991 which is
long past, the Issue raised in the petition have become moot and academic.
The cultural properties of the nation which shall be under the protection of the
state are classified as the "important cultural properties" and the "national
cultural treasures." On the other hand, a "national cultural treasures" is a
unique object found locally, possessing outstanding historical, cultural, artistic
and/or scientific value which is highly significant and important to this country
and nation. This Court takes note of the certification issued by the Director of
the Museum that the Italian paintings and silverware subject of this petition do
not constitute protected cultural properties and are not among those listed in
the Cultural Properties Register of the National Museum.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition for prohibition and mandamus is
DISMISSED.
OPOSA VS. FACTORAN, JR.
[224 SCRA 792; G.R. No. 101083; 30 Jul 1993]
Principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their
respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine
Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit
corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action
geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original
defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in
this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was
subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. The complaint was
instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens
of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use
and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin
tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally
concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it
is impracticable to bring them all before the Court."
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion
to Dismiss the complaint based on two grounds, namely: the plaintiffs have no
cause of action against him and, the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political
question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of
Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners
maintain that, the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action,
the motion is dilatory and the action presents a justiciable question as it
involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the
aforementioned motion to dismiss. In the said order, not only was the
defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against him and
that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled
that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of
contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the
dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors
not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause
of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound
environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human
Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR,
Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental
Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational
genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-
preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise
rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to
safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave
abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more
areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-
impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this
case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs
may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may
still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
Issue:
1 Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi.
2 Whether or not the petiton is in a form of a class suit.
3 Whether or not the TLAs can be out rightly cancelled.
4 Whether or not the petition should be dismissed.
Held:
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the
same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a
TLA remains effective for a certain period of time usually for twenty-five (25)
years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled
unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated
the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners'
proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite
hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.
The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just
to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties
are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all
of them before the court. The plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative
enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the
requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant
petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Nature
means the created world in its entirety. Every generation has a responsibility to
the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a
balanced and healthful ecology. The minors' assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation
to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section
16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it
does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement
of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution
for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now
explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-
founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself,
thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a
solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the
day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present
generation, but also for those to come generations which stand to inherit
nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and
the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution
concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's
natural resources, then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June
1987 E.O. No. 192, Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of
the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing
lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas,
and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all
natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable
sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and
future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement
of policy:
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological
balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section
2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the
DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being
subject to law and higher authority.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the
"environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977,
P.D. No. 1151 and P.D. No. 1152 were issued. Thus, the right of the petitioners
to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its
mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the
Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or
obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done
with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful
ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should
be renewed or granted.
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground
that the complaint fails to state a cause of action; the question submitted to the
court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint
itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of
the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed
hypothetically admitted. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or
legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is
principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already
formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized
that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to
the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive
and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the
instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the
cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-
impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that
a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the
same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause.
This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only
been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of
advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology,
promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare.
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment
clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary
from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed
in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not
entitled to it as a matter of right.
Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of
18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The
petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the
holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
KILOSBAYAN V GUIGONA JR 232 SCRA 110
In 1993, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office decided to put up an on-line
lottery system which will establish a national network system that will in turn
expand PCSOs source of income.
A bidding was made. Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) won
it. A contract of lease was awarded in favor of PGMC.
Kilosbayan opposed the said agreement between PCSO and PGMC as it alleged
that:
PGMC does not meet the nationality requirement because it is 75% foreign vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners
owned (owned by a Malaysian firm Berjaya Group Berhad); seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing
PCSO, under Section 1 of its charter (RA 1169), is prohibited from holding and because they were not parties to the contract
conducting lotteries in collaboration, association or joint venture with any
person, association, company or entity; ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioners have standing?
The network system sought to be built by PGMC for PCSO is a
telecommunications network. Under the law (Act No. 3846), a franchise is HELD:
needed to be granted by the Congress before any person may be allowed to set NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing
up such; of the petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on real parties in
PGMCs articles of incorporation, as well as the Foreign Investments Act (R.A.
interest because no constitutional issues were actually involved. LAW OF THE
No. 7042) does not allow it to install, establish and operate the on-line lotto and
CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same one litigated by
telecommunications systems.
theparties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any
PGMC and PCSO, through Teofisto Guingona, Jr. and Renato Corona, Executive
sense be regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but the
Secretary and Asst. Executive Secretary respectively, alleged that PGMC is not a
cases are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually
collaborator but merely a contractor for a piece of work, i.e., the building of the
and directly passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn
network; that PGMC is a mere lessor of the network it will build as evidenced by
in question in any future action between the same parties involving a different
the nature of the contract agreed upon, i.e., Contract of Lease.
cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when
substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding
ISSUE: Whether or not Kilosbayan is correct.
involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable
from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second
HELD: Yes, but only on issues 2, 3, and 4.
proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue.
Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude
On the issue of nationality, it seems that PGMCs foreign ownership was reduced
determination of the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a concept in
to 40% though.
constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The
On issues 2, 3, and 4, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42,
more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in
prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries in collaboration,
INTEREST.
association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity,
whether domestic or foreign. There is undoubtedly a collaboration between
Bugnay Construction v. Laron Digest
PCSO and PGMC and not merely a contract of lease. The relations between
G.R. No. 79983 August 10, 1989
PCSO and PGMC cannot be defined simply by the designation they used, i.e., a
contract of lease. Pursuant to the wordings of their agreement, PGMC at its own
1. A lease contract between the City of Dagupan and P & M Agro was executed
expense shall build, operate, and manage the network system including its
for the use of a city lot called the Magsaysay Market Area. Subsequently, the
facilities needed to operate a nationwide online lottery system. PCSO bears no
City filed a case to rescind the contract due to the failure of P&M to comply with
risk and all it does is to provide its franchise in violation of its charter.
the lease contract conditions.
Necessarily, the use of such franchise by PGMC is a violation of Act No. 3846.
2. Thereafter, the City issued a resolution granting the lease of said lot to the
KILOSBAYAN vs. MANUEL L. MORATO
petitioner Bugnay COnstruction for the establishment of a Magsaysay Market
G.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995.
building. As a result, respondent Ravanzo filed a taxpayer's suit against the City
assailing the validity of the lease contract between the petitioner and the city.
In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA)
Ravanzo was the counsel of P&M Agro in the earlier case.
wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental
of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal
Issue: Whether or not the respondent is the real party in interest
annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8
years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities.
HELD: NO.
Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million.
Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same
1. The Court held that the respondent has no standing to file the case.
as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the Contract
There was no disbursement of public funds involved in this case since it
of Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law
is the petitioner, a private party which will fund the planned
regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987
construction of the market building.
Constitution. Standing can no longer be questioned because it has become the
law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the Contract of Lease.
There is no bidding required. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous is

CHAVEZ V PEA AND AMARI GR NO 133250 JULY 9 2002
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential
Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land,
including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire,
lease and sell any and all kinds of lands." On the same date, then President
Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands
reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under the Manila-
Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special
Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so
reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project
(MCCRRP) containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand
eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently, on April
9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paraaque issued Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering
the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the
southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Paraaque City.
PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public
bidding. On April 28, 1995, the Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No.
1245, confirmed the JVA. On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos,
through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.
The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate
Committee Report No. 560 dated September 16, 1997. Among the conclusions
of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI
under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not
classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2)
the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the
JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential
Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on
the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The
members of the Legal Task Force were the Secretary of Justice, the Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel, and the Government Corporate Counsel. The Legal
Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions reached
by the Senate Committees.
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a
taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner
contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of
the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the
terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and
Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President,
petitioner now prays that on "constitutional and statutory grounds the
renegotiated contract be declared null and void."
Issue: The issues raised by petitioner, PEA and AMARI are as follows:
1. Whether the reliefs prayed for are moot and academic because of
subsequent events;
2. Whether the petition should be dismissed for failing to observe the
principle of governing the heirarchy of courts;
3. Whether the petition should be dismissed for non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies;
4. Whether petitioner has locus standi;
5. Whether the constitutional right to information includes information on
on-going neogtiations BEFORE a final agreement;
6. Whether the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for the
transfer to AMARI of certain lands, reclaimed and still to be reclaimed violate
the 1987 Constitution; and
7. Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the issue whether the amended
JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the government
Held: 1. We rule that the signing and of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI
and its approval by the President cannot operate to moot the petition and divest
the Court of its jurisdiction.
PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The prayer to
enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily
includes preventing its implementation if in the meantime PEA and AMARI have
signed one in violation of the Constitution. Petitioner's principal basis in assailing
the renegotiation of the JVA is its violation of the Section 3, Article XII of the
Constitution, which prohibits the government from alienating lands of the public
domain to private corporations. The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial
contract but one which seeks to transfer title and ownership to 367.5 hectares
of reclaimed lands and submerged areas of Manila Bay to a single private
corporation.
Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression being a wholly
government owned corporation performing public as well as proprietary
functions. All previous decisions of the Court involving Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution, or its counterpart provision in the 1973 Constitution,
covered agricultural lands sold to private corporations which acquired the lands
from private parties.
Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised
in this petition because of the possible transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of
title and ownership to portions of the reclaimed lands. Under the Amended JVA,
PEA is obligated to transfer to AMARI the latter's seventy percent proportionate
share in the reclaimed areas as the reclamation progresses, The Amended JVA
even allows AMARI to mortgage at any time the entire reclaimed area to raise
financing for the reclamation project.
2. The instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental
importance to the public. The Court can resolve this case without determining
any factual issue related to the case. Also, the instant case is a petition for
mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section
5, Article VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction
over the instant case.
3. PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the terms
and conditions for the sale of its lands. The law obligated PEA make this public
disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from anyone. PEA failed to
make this public disclosure because the original JVA, like the Amended JVA, was
the result of a negotiated contract, not of a public bidding. Considering that PEA
had an affirmative statutory duty to make the public disclosure, and was even in
breach of this legal duty, petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial
intervention.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when
the issue involved is a purely legal or constitutional question. The principal issue
in the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands held by PEA in view
of the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain
to private corporations. We rule that the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply in the instant case.
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition
seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. There are two
constitutional issues involved here. First is the right of citizens to information on
matters of public concern. Second is the application of a constitutional provision
intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public
domain among Filipino Citizens.
The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of
hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in violation of the Constitution,
compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation.
4. Ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions
questioning the validity of acts or orders of government agencies or
instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of 'paramount public interest,' and if
they 'immediately affect the social, economic and moral well being of the
people.'
We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the
enforcement of constitutional rights to information and to the equitable
diffusion of natural resources matters of transcendental public importance,
the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.
5. The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public
interest reinforces the people's right to information on matters of public
concern. This State policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of the
Constitution, thus: Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the
State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest."
Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986
Constitutional Commission understood that the right to information
"contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the
transaction." Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the
exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise
the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be
too late for the public to expose its defects.
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the
contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even
illegal, becomes a fait accompli.
However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like relating to the renegotiation of the JVA. 34
The right only affords access to records, documents and papers, which means
the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who exercises the right must
copy the records, documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of the
right is also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the
public records and to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules
specifying when and how to conduct the inspection and copying.
6. Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion
as follows:
"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that
of a similar character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general
public use, is employed in some public service, or in the development of the
national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of
the territory, and mines, until granted to private individuals.
Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the
public. In contrast, property devoted to public service referred to property used
for some specific public service and open only to those authorized to use the
property.Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to
public use, but also to property not so used but employed to develop the
national wealth. This class of property constituted property of public dominion
although employed for some economic or commercial activity to increase the
national wealth.
"Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public
use or to the defense of the territory, shall become a part of the private
property of the State." This provision, however, was not self-executing. The
legislature, or the executive department pursuant to law, must declare the
property no longer needed for public use or territorial defense before the
government could lease or alienate the property to private parties.
Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature
Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber
nor mineral land, shall be classified as suitable for residential purposes or for
commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural
purposes, and shall be open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed of
under the provisions of this chapter, and not otherwise.
The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy public lands for non-agricultural purposes retain their
inherent potential as areas for public service. This is the reason the government
prohibited the sale, and only allowed the lease, of these lands to private parties.
The State always reserved these lands for some future public service.
However, government reclaimed and marshy lands, although subject to
classification as disposable public agricultural lands, could only be leased and
not sold to private parties because of Act No. 2874.
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution
banning private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private
corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. As
in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the general law governing the lease to
private corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the
public domain is still CA No. 141.
Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the
maximum area of alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up
corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as
many corporations as his means would allow him. An individual could even hide
his ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders of the
corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the
constitutional limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the
public domain.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special
patent covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation
classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. Being neither timber, mineral, nor national park lands, the reclaimed
Freedom Islands necessarily fall under the classification of agricultural lands of
the public domain. Under the 1987 Constitution, agricultural lands of the public
domain are the only natural resources that the State may alienate to qualified
private parties. All other natural resources, such as the seas or bays, are
"waters . . . owned by the State" forming part of the public domain, and are
inalienable pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of
areas under water, while PEA is vested with the power to undertake the physical
reclamation of areas under water whether directly or through private
contractors. DENR is also empowered to classify lands of the public domain into
alienable or disposable lands subject to the approval of the President. On the
other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed alienable lands
of the public domain.
Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or
submerged areas does not make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the
mere transfer by the National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA
does not make the lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain,
much less patrimonial lands of PEA.
There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for
PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085 merely transferred "ownership and
administration" of lands reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525
declared that lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by PEA."
PEA's charter, however, expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire,
administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands
. . . owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the government." 87
(Emphasis supplied) There is, therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to
sell its lands, whether patrimonial or alienable lands of the public domain. PEA
may sell to private parties its patrimonial properties in accordance with the PEA
charter free from constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain does not apply
to the sale of PEA's patrimonial lands.
Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the
Government Auditing Code, the government is required to sell valuable
government property through public bidding. Section 79 of PD No. 1445
mandates that:... "In the event that the public auction fails, the property may
be sold at a private sale at such price as may be fixed by the same committee
or body concerned and approved by the Commission."
However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom
Islands and the additional 250 hectares still to be reclaimed, it also granted an
option to AMARI to reclaim another 350 hectares. The original JVA, a negotiated
contract, enlarged the reclamation area to 750 hectares. The failure of public
bidding on December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84 hectares, is not a valid
justification for a negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double the area
publicly auctioned.
Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the
certificate of title the alienable land of the public domain automatically becomes
private land cannot apply to government units and entities like PEA.
The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with
Section 60 of CA No. 141 does not automatically convert alienable lands of the
public domain into private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the public
domain must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to government
entities not tasked to dispose of public lands, before these lands can become
private or patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban will become
illusory if Congress can declare lands of the public domain as private or
patrimonial lands in the hands of a government agency tasked to dispose of
public lands.
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred
to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban
on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain. This scheme can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of the
public domain since PEA can "acquire . . . any and all kinds of lands."
The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands,
now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of
the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may
not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations.
7. Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no
necessity to rule on this last issue. Besides, the Court is not the trier of facts,
and this last issue involves a determination of factual matters.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and
Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from
implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby declared
NULL and VOID ab initio.
BAYAN ET AL V ZAMORA GR NO 128570 OCTOBER 10 2000
The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an
agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was
treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-
President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of
the Philippine Senate.
The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the
Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further
defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter of
criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and
exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates 25, Article XVIII of the
1987 Constitution, which provides that foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.
ISSUE: Was the VFA unconstitutional?
RULING:
[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners did
not commit grave abuse of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality of the
VFA.]
NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in
the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must
be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and,
when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the
people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of
the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in 25,
Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.
xxx xxx xxx
This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a treaty means
that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a
treaty. To require the other contracting state, the United States of America in
this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence
pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.
Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to
be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in
which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should
be understood in the sense they have in common use.
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as
an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive
agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses
the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to
be taken equally as a treaty.
xxx xxx xxx
The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador
Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully
committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the United States
of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further
to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked
compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.
Zandueta v. de la Costa
66 Phil. 615 (1938)
In re: Necessity of deciding Constitutional Questions
The case is an original quo warranto action with the Supreme Court instituted
by Honorable Francisco Zandueta against Honorable Sixto de la Costa to obtain
from the Supreme Court a judgment declaring the respondent to be illegally
occupying the office of Judge of the Fifth Branch of the CFI of Manila, Fourth
Judicial District, ousting him from the said office and holding that the petitioner
is entitled to continue occupying the office in question by placing him in
possession thereof.
Facts:
Prior to the promulgation of the Commonwealth Act No. 145, petitioner, the
Honorable Francisco Zandueta was discharging the office of judge of first
instance, Ninth Judicial District, comprising solely of the City of Manila and was
presiding over the Fifth Branch of the CFI of the said city, by virtue of an ad
interim appointment issued by the President of the Philippines in his favor on
June 2, 1936, with the corresponding confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of the National Assembly on September 8th of the same year.
On November 7, 1936, the date on which the Commonwealth Act No. 145,
otherwise known as the Judicial Reorganization Law, took effect, petitioner
received from the President of the Commonwealth a new ad interim
appointment as judge of first instance, this time of the Fourth Judicial District,
with authority to preside over the Courts of First Instance of Manila and
Palawan. The new appointment of the petitioner was not acted upon by the
Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly and as it adjourned on
November 20, 1937, the petitioner was issued with a new ad interim
appointment to the same office, over which the petitioner took oath on
November 22, 1937 and subsequently discharged the duties of the said office.
The petitioner, acting as executive judge, performed several executive acts
which consist of designation of several personnel to the Courts over his
jurisdiction.
On May 19, 1938, the Commission on Appointments disapproved the aforesaid
ad interim appointment of the petitioner, prompting the President of the
Philippines to appoint the Honorable Sixto de la Costa to the same office, who
took the necessary oath and discharged the duties of the said office, and was
subsequently confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
Issues:
1. Can the petitioner impugn the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No.
145?
2. Is the petitioner entitled to continue to discharge the duties of the office he
occupied prior to his appointment by virtue of the Commonwealth Act No. 145?
Held:
The petitioner cannot impugn the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which
he was appointed. The petitioner is estopped by his own act proceeding to
question the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 145, by virtue of which
he was appointed, by accepting said appointment and entering into the
performance of the duties appertaining to the office conferred therein.
In accepting the new appointment on November 7, 1936 and qualifying for the
exercise of the functions of the office conferred by it, by taking the necessary
oath on November 22, 1937, and in discharging the same, disposing of both
judicial and administrative cases corresponding to the CFI of Manila and
Palawan, the petitioner abandoned his appointment of June 2, 1936, and ceased
to exercise of the functions of the office occupied by him by virtue thereof. The
petitioner abandons his old office and cannot claim to be entitled to repossess it
or question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which his new
appointment has been issued; and said new appointment disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, neither can he claim to
continue occupying the office conferred upon him by said new appointment,
having ipso jure ceased in the discharge of the functions thereof.
Petition denied and dismissed.
BACANI VS NACOCO G.R. No. L-9657 100 Phil 471 November 29,
1956
LEOPOLDO T. BACANI and MATEO A. MATOTO, PlaintiffsAppellees,
NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION, ET AL., Defendants, NATIONAL
COCONUT CORPORATION and BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS, Defendants
Appellants.
Plaintiffs Bacani and Matto are both court stenographers assigned in Branch VI
of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
During the pendency of a civil case in the said court, Francisco Sycip vs.
National Coconut Corporation, Assistant Corporate Counsel Federico Alikpala,
counsel for Defendant, requested said stenographers for copies of the transcript
of the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied
with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript
containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for the
payment of their fees.
The National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO) paid the amount of P564 to
Leopoldo T. Bacani and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said transcript at the rate
of P1 per page. But the Auditor General required the plaintiffs to reimburse said
amounts by virtue of a Department of Justice circular which stated that
NACOCO, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees
in question. For reimbursement to take place, it was further ordered that the
amount of P25 per payday be deducted from the salary of Bacani and P10 from
the salary of Matoto.
Petitioners filed an action in Court countering that NACOCO is not a government
entity within the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. On the
other hand, the defendants set up a defense that NACOCO is a government
entity within the purview of section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of
1917 hence, it is exempted from paying the stenographers fees under Rule 130
of the Rules of Court.
Issues: Whether or not National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO), which
performs certain functions of government, make them a part of the Government
of the Philippines.
Discussions:
NACOCO is not considered a government entity and is not exempted from
paying the stenographers fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Sec. 2 of the Revised Administrative Code defines the scope of the term
Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The term Government may
be defined as that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an
independent society makes and carries out those rules of action which are
necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which are imposed upon the
people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority of
prescribing them (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332). This institution, when referring
to the national government, has reference to what our Constitution has
established composed of three great departments, the legislative, executive,
and the judicial, through which the powers and functions of government are
exercised. These functions are twofold: constitute and ministrant. The former
are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory in
nature; the latter are those that are undertaken only by way of advancing the
general interests of society, and are merely optional.
Rulings:
No. NACOCO do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they do not
come under the classification of municipal or public corporation. While NACOCO
was organized for the purpose of adjusting the coconut industry to a position
independent of trade preferences in the United States and of providing
Facilities for the better curing of copra products and the proper utilization of
coconut by-products, a function which our government has chosen to exercise
to promote the coconut industry. It was given a corporate power separate and
distinct from the government, as it was made subject to the provisions of the
Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers that it may
exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may
sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private corporations, and in
this sense it is an entity different from our government.
G.R. No. L-32052 65 SCRA 416 July 25, 1975
Petitioner: Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration
Respondent: Court of Industrial Relations
Private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime
services (in excess of their 8 regular hours a day) and the failure to pay for said
compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444.
Section 1: The legal working day for any person employed by another shall not
be of more than eight (8) hours daily.
Petitioner denies allegations for lack of a cause of action and jurisdiction.
Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari on grounds that the corporation is
exercising governmental functions and is therefore exempt from CA No. 444
which was denied and dismissed by RTC and CA. Motion for Reconsideration
were also DENIED.
ISSUE: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary
functions and is exempt from CA No. 444.
HELD: It is an inherent state function which makes government required to
support its people and promote their general welfare. This case explains and
portrays the expanded role of government necessitated by the increased
responsibility to provide for the general welfare.
The Court held that the distinction and between constituent and ministrant
functions, which the Chief Justice points out, is already irrelevant considering
the needs of the present time. He says that "The growing complexities of
modern society have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of
government obsolete." The distinction between constituent and ministrant
functions is now considered obsolete.
The Court affirms that the Petition as well as the subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration be DENIED.
CO KIM CHAN v. VALDEZ TAN KEH
75 PHIL 113
FACTS:
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the case and to continue
the proceedings in petitioners case on the ground that the proclamation issued
on October 23, 1944 by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified
all judicial proceedings and judgments of court during the Japanese occupation.
Respondent contends that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to continue
pending judicial proceedings and that the government established during the
Japanese occupation was no de facto government.
ISSUE:
1. Do the judicial acts and proceedings of the court during the Japanese
occupation remain good and valid?
2. Did the proclamation of MacArthur invalidated all judgments and judicial
acts and proceedings of said court?
3. May the present courts continue those proceedings pending in said courts?
HELD:
It is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil government
established by military forces and thus a de facto government of the second
kind. Legislative, as well as judicial, acts of de facto governments, which are not
of political complexion, remain valid after reoccupation. It is presumed that the
proclamation of General MacArthur did not specifically refer to judicial processes
thus it has not invalidated all the judgments and proceedings of the courts
during the Japanese regime. The existence of the courts depend upon the laws
which create and confer upon them their jurisdiction. Such laws, not political in
nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty and continue in force until
repealed by legislative acts. It is thus obvious that the present courts have
jurisdiction to continue proceedings in cases not of political complexion.
PEOPLE V GOZO 53 SCRA 475
Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot which was located inside the US Naval
Reservation which is within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Upon the
advice of an assistant in the Mayors Office and some neighbors, she demolished
the house standing thereon without acquiring the necessary permits and then
later on erected another house. She was then charged by the City Engineers
Office for violating a municipal order which requires her to secure permits for
any demolition and/or construction within the City. She was convicted in
violation thereof by the lower court. She appealed and countered that the City
of Olongapo has no administrative jurisdiction over the said lot because it is
within a Naval Base of a foreign country.
ISSUE: Is the Municipal Ordinance enforceable within the US Naval Base?
HELD: Yes. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over
the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of
jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the
United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction
of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights
not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military
authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of (Military Bases
Agreement). Hence, in the exercise of its sovereignty, the State through the
City of Olongapo does have administrative jurisdiction over the lot located
within the US Naval Base.
LAUREL v. MISA
77 PHIL 856
FACTS:
Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus contending that he cannot be
prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by the Article 114 of
the Revised Penal Code on the grounds that the sovereignty of the legitimate
government and the allegiance of Filipino citizens was then suspended, and that
there was a change of sovereignty over the Philippines upon the proclamation of
the Philippine Republic.
ISSUE:
1. Is the absolute allegiance of the citizens suspended during Japanese
occupation?
2. Is the petitioner subject to Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code?
HELD:
The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory
occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government on sovereign is not
abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation because the sovereignty of the
government or sovereign de jure is not transferred to the occupier. There is no
such thing as suspended allegiance.
The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the change of form of
government does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of
treason because it is an offense to the same government and same sovereign
people.
RUFFY v. CHIEF OF STAFF
75 PHIL 875
FACTS:
Ramon Ruffy was the provincial commander stationed in Mindoro at the
outbreak of war on December 8, 1941. When the Japanese forces landed in
Mindoro on February 27, 1942, Mayor Ruffy retreated to the mountains and
organized and led a guerrilla outfit known as the Bolo Combat team of Bolo
Area. The case at bar is a petition for prohibition praying that respondents be
commanded to desist from further proceedings in the trial of the petitioners on
the ground that petitioners were not subject to military law at the time of
offense.
ISSUE:
1. Are the petitioners subject to military law at the time of war and Japanese
occupation?
2. Is 93d Article of War constitutional?
HELD:
Petitioners were subject to military jurisdiction as provided for in Article of War
(2d). The Bolo Area was a contingent of the 6th military district which had been
recognized by the United States army. The petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of 93d Article of War on the ground that it violates Article VIII
Section 2 par. 4 of the Constitution which provides that National Assembly may
not deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over all criminal cases
in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment. The petitioners are
in error for courts martial are agencies of executive character and are not a
portion of the judiciary. The petition thus has no merits and is dismissed with
costs.
GR 143377, February 20, 2001
SHIPSIDE INCORPORATED, petitioner,
vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS [Special Former Twelfth Division],
HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 26 (San Fernando City, La
Union) & The REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts: The petitioner filed a certiorari with the CA containing the requisite
certification on non-forum shopping but failed to attach proof that the person
signing the certification was authorized to do so. The CA dismissed the petition.
The petitioner submits a motion for reconsideration which attached a secretarys
certificate attesting to the signatorys authority to sign certificates against forum
shopping on behalf of the petitioner. When the court of CA denied the motion,
the petitioner sought relief with the SC.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition of Shipside Inc.
Ruling: Yes, the CA erred in the dismissal of the petition. The SC revised the
decision of CA recognizing the belated filing of the certifications against forum
shopping as permitted in exceptional circumstances. It further held that with
more reason should a petition be given due course when this incorporates a
certification on non-forum shopping without evidence that the person signing
the certifications was an authorized signatory and the petitioner subsequently
submits a secretarys certificate attesting to the signatorys authority in its
motion for consideration.
The court allows belated submission of certifications showing proof of the
signatorys authority in signing the certification of forum shopping.
[G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986] LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER
PHILIPPINES AND/OR OLIVER A. LOZANO VS. PRESIDENT CORAZON C.
AQUINO, ET AL.
SIRS/MESDAMES:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court MAY 22,
1986.
In G.R. No. 73748, Lawyers League for a Better Philippines vs. President
Corazon C. Aquino, et al.; G.R. No. 73972, People's Crusade for Supremacy of
the Constitution vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al., and G.R. No. 73990, Councilor
Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et al., the legitimacy of the government
of President Aquino is questioned. It is claimed that her government is illegal
because it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
As early as April 10, 1986, this Court* had already voted to dismiss the
petitions for the reasons to be stated below. On April 17, 1986, Atty. Lozano as
counsel for the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 73748 and 73972 withdrew the petitions
and manifested that they would pursue the question by extra-judicial methods.
The withdrawal is functus oficio.
The three petitions obviously are not impressed with merit. Petitioners have no
personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy
of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of
politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people
have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President
Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is
not merely a de factogovernment but is in fact and law a de jure government.
Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the
present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have
sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government.
In view of the foregoing, the petitions are hereby dismissed.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) GLORIA C. PARAS
Clerk of Court
* The Court was then composed of Teehankee, C.J. and Abad Santos., Melencio-
Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Gutierrez, Jr., Cuevas, Alampay and Patajo, JJ.----------
--------------------------------
DIGEST
FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1
announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the
Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government
was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people
assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but
belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge.
The Court further held that:
The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of
the entire country;
It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure
government; and
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new
government.
Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo G.R. No.
146738, March 2 2001
[Immunity from Suit; Resignation of the President; Justiciable
controversy]
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-
taking, illegal gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against
Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000,
Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment
proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more serious allegations of
graft and corruption against Estrada were made and were only stopped on
January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in
suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment
trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and
Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and
joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election
to be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001.
He added that he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that
the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada constructively resigned
his post. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at
EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacaang Palace.
Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to
enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in
cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for
judgment confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the
Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his
office.
ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.
3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial
publicity.
RULING:
1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch
of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality of a particular measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
EDSA I
EDSA II
exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole
government.
exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to
petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office
of the President.
extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted
from it cannot be the subject of judicial review
intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused
and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial
review.
presented a political question;involves legal questions.
The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for
resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987
Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of
governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call for a
ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the
correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.
2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of
relinquishment. Both were present when President Estrada left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence
bearing material relevant issuesPresident Estrada is deemed to have
resigned constructive resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as
confirmed by his leaving Malacaan Palace. In the press release containing his
final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order
to begin the healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind
of disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the
disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as
President (without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in
the same service of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resignmust be accompanied by act of relinquishmentact or
omission before, during and after January 20, 2001.
3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support
to Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and
subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona
Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment
Courts as Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that both
houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that
recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as
the Congress has clearly rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in
nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if
Estrada can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that
he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern
temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that
Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government
cannot be reviewed by this Court.
4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve
plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can
these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by
the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any
decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and
wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful
acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally
is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.
5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are
incompatible. Also, since our justice system does not use the jury system, the
judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily
manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did not present
enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has influenced the
judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that
the cases against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the
publicity of the case would really have no permanent effect on the judge and
that the prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and less with
prosecution.
Estrada V. Arroyo G.R. No. 146738
Petitioner sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any
further proceedings in any criminal complaint that may be filed in his office,
until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally
warranted. Erap also filed a Quo Warranto case, praying for
judgment confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the
Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his
office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the
Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of
the Constitution.
HELD:
FIRST: The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions.
The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain
provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II, and section 8
of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section II of
Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential
immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of
petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v.
Madison, the doctrine has been laid down that it is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . .
The Court also distinguished between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People
Power II. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which
overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of
freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for
redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is
extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted
from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra
constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the
succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review.
EDSA I presented political question; EDSA II involves legal questions.
SECOND: Using the totality test, the SC held that petitioner resigned as
President.
The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a
candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency
even at that time.
The Angara diary shows that the President wanted only five-day period
promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelop to clear his name.
"If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.
"The President says. Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit.
Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I dont want
any more of this its too painful. Im tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy,
the intrigue.)
"I just want to clear my name, then I will go.
The SC held that this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned.
The intent to resign is clear when he said x x x Ayoko na masyado nang
masakit. Ayoko na are words of resignation.
During the negotiations, the resignation of the petitioner was treated as a given
fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken
by the parties during and after transition period.
His resignation was also confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press
release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of
the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its
legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the
presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of
our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability
and he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability
disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to
serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him
to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any
future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
Petitioners reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the
president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him
in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained
if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioners
valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense.
THIRD: The petitioner is permanently unable to act as President.
Section 11 of Article VII provides that Congress has the ultimate authority
under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of
performing his functions. Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent
Arroyo as the President.
The House of Representative passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No.
l75 which states: RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OFTHE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS
SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF
THE NATIONS GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. The Senate also passed
Senate Resolution No. 82 which states: RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYOS NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner
Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioners claim
of inability. Even if petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is
merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by
Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made
by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.
FOURTH: The petitioner does not enjoy immunity from suit.
The Supreme Court rejected petitioners argument that he cannot be prosecuted
for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.
The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the
prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. On
February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 Recognizing
that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio. Since the Impeachment Court
is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should
first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea, if
granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. The debates in the
Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings
have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal
and civil cases may already be filed against him.
The SC also ruled in In re: Saturnino Bermudez that incumbent Presidents are
immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their
incumbency and tenure but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance
that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and
thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner cannot demand as a condition sine
qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted
in the impeachment proceedings.
Also, petitioner cannot cite any decision of the SC licensing the President to
commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability.
The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the
officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as
any other trespasser.
FIFTH: Petitioner was not denied the right to impartial trial.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair
trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-
gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the
mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. In the case at bar, the
records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant
as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of
his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial
judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is
incapable if change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has
the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.
SEAFDEC VS. NLRC G.R. Nos. 97468-70, September 2 1993, 241 SCRA
580
Two labor cases were filed by the herein private respondents against the
petitioner, Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC), before
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch,
Iloilo City. In these cases, the private respondents claim having been wrongfully
terminated from their employment by the petitioner. The petitioner, who claims
to be an international inter-government organization composed of various
Southeast Asian countries, filed a Motion to Dismiss, challenged the jurisdiction
of the public respondent in taking cognizance of the above cases. The private
respondents, as well as respondent labor arbiter, allege that the petitioner is not
immune from suit and assuming that if, indeed, it is an international
organization, it has, however, impliedly, if not expressly, waived its immunity by
belatedly raising the issue of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is immune from suit.
RULING: The Court ruled for the petitioner. It is beyond question that
petitioner SEAFDEC is an international agency enjoying diplomatic immunity. It
has already been held in Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-
Aquaculture Department vs. National Labor Relations Commission (G.R. No.
86773, 206 SCRA 283/1992). Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development
Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an international agency
beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC. Being an intergovernmental
organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD),enjoys functional
independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office
is located. One of the basic immunities of an international organization is
immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and
processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious
reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of
the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host
government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its
policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such objection to local
jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its
responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states.
Sanders v. Veridano
GR No. L-46930; June 10, 1988
FACTS:
Petitioner Dale Sanders was the special services of the US Naval Station
(NAVSTA) in Olongapo city. Private respondents Anthony Rossi and Ralph Wyers
are American citizens permanently residing in the Philippines and who were
employed as gameroom attendants in the special services department of
NAVSTA. On October 3, 1975, the respondents were advised that their
employment had been converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-
time. In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the
hearing officers report of the reinstatement of private respondents to
permanent full-time status plus backwages. Respondents allege that the letters
contained libellous imputations which caused them to be ridiculed and thus filed
for damages against petitioners.
ISSUE:
1) Were the petitioners acting officially or only in their private capacities when
they did the acts for which the private respondents sued them for damages?
2) Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?
HELD:
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioner
are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their
official duties. Given the official character of the letters, the petioners were,
legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government. As
such, the complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held
ultimately liable has given its consent to be sued. The private respondents must
pursue their claim against the petitioners in accordance with the laws of the
Unites States of which they are all citizens and under whose jurisdiction the
alleged offenses were committed for the Philippine courts have no jurisdiction
over the case.
REPUBLIC V SANDOVAL 220 SCRA 124
Farmer-rallyists marched to Malacanang calling for a genuine land reform
program. There was a marchers-police confrontation which resulted in the death
of 12 rallyists and scores were wounded. As a result, then Pres. Aquino issued
AO 11 creating the Citizens Mendiola Commission for the purpose of conducting
an investigation. The most significant recommendation of the Commission was
for the heirs of the deceased and wounded victims to be compensated by the
government. Based on such recommendation, the victims of Mendiola massacre
filed an action for damages against the Republic and the military/police officers
involved in the incident.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not there is a valid waiver of immunity
(2) Whether or not the State is liable for damages
Held: The Court held that there was no valid waiver of immunity as claimed by
the petitioners. The recommendation made by the Commission to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased and the victims does not in any way mean that liability
attaches to the State. AO 11 merely states the purpose of the creation of the
Commission and, therefore, whatever is the finding of the Commission only
serves as the basis for a cause of action in the event any party decides to
litigate the same. Thus, the recommendation of the Commission does not in any
way bind the State.
The State cannot be made liable because the military/police officers who
allegedly were responsible for the death and injuries suffered by the marchers
acted beyond the scope of their authority. It is a settled rule that the State as a
person can commit no wrong. The military and police officers who were
responsible for the atrocities can be held personally liable for damages as they
exceeded their authority, hence, the acts cannot be considered official.
FESTEJO v. FERNANDO
GR No. L-5156; March 11, 1954
FACTS:
The defendant, as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, took possession of the
three parcels of land on February 1951 without obtaining first a right of way,
without consent and knowledge of plaintiff, and against her express objection.
The petitioner demands that the lands be restored to its former condition and
the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P19, 343.20 for the unlawful taking
possession of the defendant.
ISSUE:
Is the defendant liable for the unlawful possession of the lands?
HELD:
The evidence and conceded facts permitted the jury in finding that in the
trespass on plaintiffs land, defendant committed acts outside the scope of his
authority. There can be no claim that he thus invaded plaintiffs land
southeasterly of the right of way innocently for the surveys clearly marked the
limits of the land appropriated for the right of way. It is a general rule that an
officer-executive, administrative, quasi-judicial, ministerial, or otherwise who
acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction and without authorization of law may
thereby render himself amenable to personal liability in a civil suit. He cannot
shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his
office and not personally.
USA v. GUINTO
182 SCRA 644
FACTS:
The cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state
immunity. In GR No. 76607, private respondents re suing several officers of the
US Air Force in connection with the bidding for barbering services in Clark Air
Base. In GR No. 80018, Luis Bautista was arrested following a buy-bust
operation for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Bautista then filed a
complaint for damages claiming that because of the acts of the respondents, he
lost his job. In GR No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages
against petitioner for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force. In GR No.
80258, complaint for damage was filed by the respondents against petitioners
for injuries allegedly sustained by plaintiffs. All cases invoke the doctrine of
state immunity as ground to dismiss the same.
ISSUE:
Are the petitioners immune from suit?
HELD:
It is clear that the petitioners in GR No. 80018 were acting in the exercise of
their official functions. They cannot be directly impleaded for the US
government has not given its consent to be sued. In GR No. 79470, petitioners
are not immune for restaurants are commercial enterprises, however, claim of
damages by Genove cannot be allowed on the strength of the evidence
presented. Barber shops are also commercial enterprises operated by private
persons, thus, petitioners in GR No. 76607 cannot plead any immunity from the
complaint filed. In GR No. 80258, the respondent court will have to receive the
evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions
before it can be known in what capacity the petitioners were acting at the time
of the incident.
VICTORIA AMIGABLE vs. NICOLAS CUENCA G.R. No. L-26400 February
29, 1972
FACTS: Victoria Amigable is the is the registered owner of a lot which, without
prior expropriation proceedings or negotiated sale, was used by the
government. Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines
requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been expropriated by the
government.
Amigable later filed a case against Cuenca, the Commissioner of Public
Highways, for recovery of ownership and possession of the said lot. She also
sought payment for comlensatory damages, moral damages and attorney's fees.
The defendant said that the case was premature, barred by prescription, and
the government did not give its consent to be sued.
ISSUE: W/N the appellant may properly sue the government.
HELD: Where the government takes away property from a private landowner
for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or
negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the
government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit.
The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. The only relief available is for the
government to make due compensation which it could and should have done
years ago. To determine just compensation of the land, the basis should be the
price or value at the time of the taking.
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 204 SCRA 212
The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1)
as a device, along with the pre-trial hearing, to narrow and clarify the basic
issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts
relative to those issues. The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable the parties,
consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain fullest possible knowledge of the
issues and facts before civil trails and thus prevent that said trials are carried on
in the dark. To this end, the field of inquiry that may be covered by depositions
or interrogatories is as broad as when the interrogated party is called as a
witness to testify orally at trial. The inquiry extends to all facts which are
relevant, whether they be ultimate or evidentiary, excepting only those matters
which are privileged. The objective is as much to give every party the fullest
possible information of all relevant facts before the trial as to obtain evidence
for use upon said trial.
In line with the principle of according liberal treatment to the deposition-
discovery mechanism, such modes of discovery as a) depositions (whether by
oral examination or written interrogatories), (b) interrogatories to parties, and
(c) requests for admissions, may be availed of without leave of court, and
generally, without court intervention. The Rules of Court explicitly provide that
leave of court is not necessary to avail of said modes of discovery after an
answer to the complaint has been served. It is only when an answer has not yet
been filed (but after jurisdiction has been obtained over the defendant or
property subject of the action) that prior leave of court is needed to avail of
these modes of discovery, the reason being that at that time the issues are not
yet joined and the disputed facts are not clear.
On the other hand, leave of court is required as regards discovery by (a)
production or inspection of documents or things in accordance with Rule 27, or
(b) physical and mental examination of persons under Rule 28, which may be
granted upon due application and a showing of due course.
REPUBLIC VS FELICIANO G.R. No. 70853 148 SCRA 424 March 12, 1987
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee,
PABLO FELICIANO and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
respondents-appellants
The appeal was filed by 86 settlers of Barrio of Salvacion, representing the
Republic of the Philippines to dismiss the complaint filed by Feliciano, on the
ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued without its consent.
Prior to this appeal, respondent Pablo Feliciano filed a complaint with the Court
of First Instance against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land
Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land
consisting of four lots. The trial court rendered a decision declaring Lot No. 1 to
be the private property of Feliciano and the rest of the property, Lots 2, 3 and
4, reverted to the public domain.
The trial court reopened the case due to the filing of a motion to intervene and
to set aside the decision of the trial court by 86 settlers, alleging that they had
been in possession of the land for more than 20 years under claim of ownership.
The trial court ordered the settlers to present their evidence but they did not
appear at the day of presentation of evidence. Feliciano, on the other hand,
presented additional evidence. Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision
and the trial court ruled in favor of Feliciano.
The settlers immediately filed a motion for reconsideration. The case was
reopened to allow them to present their evidence. But before this motion was
acted upon, Feliciano filed a motion for execution with the Appellate Court but it
was denied.
The settlers filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Republic of the
Philippines cannot be sued without its consent and hence the action cannot
prosper. The motion was opposed by Feliciano.
Issue/s: Whether or not the state can be sued for recovery and possession of a
parcel of land.
Discussions:
A suit against the State, under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except
upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by
implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted.
It may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings.
Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred
lightly. but must be construed in strictissimi juris (of strictest right). Moreover,
the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued
must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be
made by an act of the legislative body.
Ruling/s:
No. The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application in this case.
The plaintiff has impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an
action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, bringing the
State to court just like any private person who is claimed to be usurping a piece
of property. A suit for the recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an
action in personam. It is an action directed against a specific party or parties,
and any judgment therein binds only such party or parties. The complaint filed
by plaintiff, the private respondent herein, is directed against the Republic of
the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, a governmental agency
created by Republic Act No. 3844.
The complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under settled
jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State has
consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of
statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. There is no such showing in
the instant case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the existence of such
consent.
G.R. No. L-35645 136 scra 487 May 22, 1985
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I.
COLLINS and ROBERT GOHIER, petitioners,vs. HON. V. M. RUIZ,
Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal and
ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.
This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain perpetually the
proceedings done by Hon. Ruiz for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial
court.
The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base
was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the
Philippines and the United States. Sometime in May, 1972, the United States
invited the submission of bids for a couple of repair projects. Eligio de Guzman
land Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent
thereto, the company received from the US two telegrams requesting it to
confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The
company construed this as an acceptance of its offer so they complied with the
requests. The company received a letter which was signed by William I. Collins
of Department of the Navy of the United States, also one of the petitioners
herein informing that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the
projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating in repairs,
and that the projects were awarded to third parties. For this reason, a suit for
specific performance was filed by him against the US.
Issues: Whether or not the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise
governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity.
Discussions:
The traditional role of the state immunity exempts a state from being sued in
the courts of another state without its consent or waiver. This rule is necessary
consequence of the principle of independence and equality of states. However,
the rules of international law are not petrified; they are continually and evolving
and because the activities of states have multiplied. It has been necessary to
distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and
private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that
State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil. The restrictive application
of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and
other states in western Europe.
Rulings:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the contract relates to the exercise of its
sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval
base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the
Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order, they
are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. Its
commercial activities of economic affairs. A state may be descended to the level
of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be
sued. Only when it enters into business contracts.
REPUBLIC V VILLASOR GR No. L-30671, November 28 1973, 54 SCRA 84
On July 3, 1961, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No.
2156-R in favor of respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and
International Construction Corporation, and against the petitioner herein,
confirming the arbitration award subject of Special Proceedings.
On June 24, 1969, respondent Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, issued
an Order declaring the aforestated decision of July 3, 1961 final and executory,
directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City [as well as] Manila to
execute the said decision. Pursuant to the said Order, the corresponding Alias
Writ of Execution was issued. On the strength of the afore-mentioned Alias Writ
of Execution, the respondent Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served notices of
garnishment with several Banks, specially on the `monies due the Armed Forces
of the Philippines in the form of deposits, sufficient to cover the amount
mentioned in the said Writ of Execution; the Philippine Veterans Bank received
the same notice of garnishment. The funds of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines on deposit with the Banks, particularly, with the Philippine Veterans
Bank and the Philippine National Bank [or] their branches are public funds duly
appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and
allowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and
operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Petitioner then alleged that respondent Judge, Honorable Guillermo P.
Villasor, acted in excess of jurisdiction [or] with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of an alias writ of
execution against the properties of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, hence,
the Alias Writ of Execution and notices of garnishment issued pursuant thereto
are null and void."
In the answer filed by respondents, the facts set forth were admitted
with the only qualification being that the total award was in the amount of
P2,372,331.40.
ISSUE: Whether or not the notices of garnishment are null and void.
HELD:
The Republic of the Philippines did right in filing this certiorari and
prohibition proceeding. What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity
with the dictates of the Constitution.
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the
juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is
immune from suit unless it gives its consent. It is readily understandable why it
must be so. In the classic formulation of Holmes: "A sovereign is exempt from
suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical
and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority
that makes the law on which the right depends." Sociological jurisprudence
supplies an answer not dissimilar.
This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935 Constitution is now
made explicit in the revised charter. It is therein expressly provided: "The State
may not be sued without its consent." A corollary, both dictated by logic and
sound sense from such a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object
of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously
granted and the state liability adjudged.
G.R. No. 104269 November 11, 1993 DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, petitioner,vs.THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., respondents.
The case is regarding money claim against Department of Agriculture
(DA) as filed and requested by National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Petitioner Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency
entered into a contract for security services to be provided by the latter to the
said governmental entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were
deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of the DA.
Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-
payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay,
holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DA and the
security agency.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and
severally liable with the security agency for the payment of money claims of the
complainant security guards. The DA and the security agency did not appeal the
decision. Thus, the decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter
issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute the judgment against the
property of the DA and the security agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied
on execution the motor vehicles of the DA.
The petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for
refusing to quash the writ of execution. The petitioner faults the NLRC for
assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against the Department, which, it
claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More
importantly, the petitioner asserts, the NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule
on the non-suability of the State.
The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner
has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by concluding a service contract
with Sultan Security Agency.
Issues: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the
case.
Discussions: Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of the State to be
sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express
or implied. However, the money claim should first be brought to the
Commission on Audit. Act 3083 stands as the general law waiving the States
immunity from suit, subject to its general limitation expressed in Section 7
thereof that no execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any Court
against the Government of the (Philippines), and that the conditions provided in
Commonwealth Act 327 for filing money claims against the Government must
be strictly observed.
Rulings:
No. The rule does not say that the State may not be sued under any
circumstances. The State may at times be sued. The general law waiving the
immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine
government consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving
liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of
civil action between private parties.
In this case, The DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity
apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned
contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in
character. But the claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute
money claims.
BUREAU OF PRINTING V BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSO 1
SCRA 340
BPEA (respondents) filed a complaint by an acting prosecutor of the Industrial
Court against petitioners BOP (secretary of Department of General Services and
Director of BOP). The complaint alleged that both the secretary of DOG and the
director of BOP have been engaging in unfair labor practices. Answering the
complaint, the petitioners (BOP), denied the charges of unfair labor practices
attributed to them and alleged that the BPEA complainants were suspended
pending result of administrative investigation against them for breach of Civil
Service rules and regulations; that the BOP is not an industrial concern engaged
for the purpose of gain but of the republic performing governmental functions.
For relief, they prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. But
later on January 27, 1959, the trial judge of Industrial Court sustained the
jurisdiction of the court on the theory that the functions of the BOP are
exclusively proprietary in nature, since they receives outside jobs and that
many of its employees are paid for overtime work on regular working days and
holidays, therefore consequently denied the prayed for dismissal, which brought
the petitioners (BOP) to present petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Issue: Whether or not the BOP can be sued.
Held: As an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical
personality, the BOP cannot be sued (Sec.1, Rule 33, Rules of court).
It is true that BOP receives outside jobs and that many of its employees are
paid for overtime work on regular working days and holidays, but these facts do
not justify the conclusion that its functions are exclusively proprietary in
nature. Overtime work in the BOP is done only when the interest of the service
so requires. As a matter of administrative policy, the overtime compensation
may be paid, but such payment is discretionary with the head of the Bureau
depending upon its current appropriations, so that it cannot be the basis for
holding that the functions of said Bureau are wholly proprietary in character.
Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would
actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the
rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much
less over its jurisdiction.
Disposition: The petition for a writ of prohibition is granted. The orders
complained of are set aside and the complaint for unfair labor practice against
the petitioners is dismissed, with costs against respondents other than the
respondent court.
G.R. No. L-23139 18 SCRA 1120 December 17, 1966
MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, INC., plaintiff-appellant,vs.
CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE and BUREAU of CUSTOMS, defendants-
appellees
This case was filed by Mobil Phil Exploration Inc. against the Customs Arrastre
Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case
of rotary drill parts.
Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad, consigned to Mobil
Philippines Exploration, Inc. The shipment was discharged to the custody of the
Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of Customs then handling
arrastre operations therein. The Customs Arrastre Service later delivered to the
broker of the consignee three cases only of the shipment. Mobil Philippines
Exploration, Inc filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the
Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the
undelivered case plus other damages.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being
persons under the law, defendants cannot be sued. Appellant contends that not
all government entities are immune from suit; that defendant Bureau of
Customs as operator of the arrastre service at the Port of Manila, is discharging
proprietary functions and as such, can be sued by private individuals.
Issues: Whether or not both Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of
Customs can invoke state immunity.
Discussions:
The Bureau of Custom, is a part of Department of Finance. It does not have a
separate juridical personality of its own apart from that of the national
government. Its primary function is governmental, that of assessing and
collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs
duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties (Sec. 602, R.A. 1937). To this
function, arrastre service is a necessary incident. As stated in the law, agencies
of the government is not suable if it is performing governmental functions and if
it an unincorporated government entity without a separate juridical personality.
Rulings:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the Bureau of Customs cannot be sued for
recovery of money and damages involving arrastre services, considering that
said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, because it is a necessary
incident of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs.
The Court ruled that the fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a
function proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If
said non-governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its
governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity
from suit extended to such government entity. The Supreme Court ruled that
the plaintiff should have filed its present claim to the General Auditing Office, it
being for money under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 327, which state
the conditions under which money claims against the Government may be filed.
EPG CONSTRUCTION V SEC VIGILAR GR NO 131544 MARCH 16 2001
In 1983, the Ministry of Human Settlement (MHS), through the BLISS
Development Corporation, intiated a housing project on a government property
along the east bank of Manggahan Floodway in Pasig
The MHS entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with
Ministry of Public Works and Highways (MPWH) where the latter undertook to
develop the housing site and construct thereon 145 housing units
By virtue of the MOA, MPWH forged individual contracts with petitioners
EPG, Ciper, Septa, Phil. Plumbing, Home Construction, World Builders, Glass
World, Performance Builders, and De Leon Araneta Construction for the
construction of the housing units
Under the contracts, the scope of construction and funding covered only
around "2/3 of each housing unit"
Petitioners agreed to undertake and perform "additional constructions"
for the completion of the housing units despite the fact that there was only a
verbal promise, and not a written contract, by the MPWH Undersecretary Aber
Canlas that additional funds will be available and forthcoming
Unpaid balance for the additional constructions amounted to
P5,918,315.63
Upon a demand letter from the petitioners, on November 14, 1988,
DPWH Asst. Secretary Madamba opined that payment of petitioners' money
claims should be based on quantum meruit (what one has earned) and should
be forwarded to the Commission on Audit (COA)
In a Letter of the Undersecretary of Budget and Management dated
December 20, 1994, the amount of P5,819,316.00 was then released for the
payment of the petitioners' money claims under Advise of Allotment No. A4-
1303-04-41-303
In an indorsement dated December 27, 1995, the COA referred anew
the money claims to the DPWH
In a letter dated August 26, 1996, respondent Secretary Gregorio
Vigilar denied the subject money claims
Petitioners filed before the RTC of QC, Branch 226 a Petition for Mandamus to
order the respondent to pay petitioners their money claims plus damages and
attorney's fees.
Lower court denied the petition on February 18, 1997
Issue:
1 Whether or not the implied, verbal contracts between the petitioners and then
Undersecretary Canlas should be upheld
2 Whether or not the State is immune from suit
Holding:
1 Yes.
2 No.
Ratio:
While the court agrees with the respondent that the implied contracts are void,
in view of violation of applicable laws, auditing rules, and lack of legal
requirements, it still finds merit in the instant petition
The illegality of the implied contracts proceeds from an express declaration or
prohibition by law, not from any intrinsic illegality
"in the interest of substantial justice," petitioners-contractors' right to be
compensated is upheld, applying the principle of quantum meruit
Even the DPWH Asst. Sec. for Legal Affairs recommends their compensation;
even the DPWH Auditor did not object to the payment of the money claims
2. The respondent may not conveniently hide under the State's cloak of
invincibility against suit, considering that this principle yields to certain settled
exceptions.
The State's immunity cannot serve as an instrument perpetrating injustice
Petition granted. RTC decision reversed and set aside.
MINUCHER VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 142396, 2003 February 11
Sometime in May 1986, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act
was filed against petitioner Khosrow Minucher with the RTC. The criminal charge
followed a "buy-bust operation" concluded by the Philippine police narcotic
agent in the house if Minucher where a quantity of heroin, a prohibited drug,
was said to have been seized. The narcotic agents were accompanied by private
respondent Arthur Scalzo who would, in due time, become one of the principal
witnesses for the prosecution. On January 1988, Presiding Judge Migrino
rendered a decision acquitting the accused. Minucher filed Civil Case before the
RTC for damages on account of what he claimed to have been trumped-up
charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic immunity
2. Whether the Doctrine of State Immunity from suit is applicable herein
RULING
1. Scalzo contends that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to which
the Philippines is a signatory, grants him absolute immunity from suit being an
agent of the US Drugs Enforcement Agency. However, the main yardstick in
ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the
determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature. The
Vienna Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include
(a) ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the heads of state, (b) envoys,
ministers or inter nuncios accredited to the head of states, and (c) charges d'
affairs accredited to the ministers of foreign affairs. The Convention defines
"diplomatic agents" as the heads of missions or members of the diplomatic staff,
thus impliedly withholding the same privileges from all others. Scalzo asserted
that he was an Assistant Attache of the US diplomatic mission. Attaches assist a
chief of mission in his duties and are administratively under him. These officials
are not generally regarded as members of the diplomatic mission, nor they
normally designated as having diplomatic rank.
2. While the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain contentions, it
was sufficiently established that, indeed, he worked for the USDEA. If it should
be ascertained that Scalzo was acting well within his assigned functions when he
committed the acts allegedly complained of, the present controversy could then
be resolved under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit. While the
doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against against the State without its
consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the State for
acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The official
exchanges of communication, certifications from officials, as well as
participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command may be
inadequate to support to support the diplomatic status of Scalzo but they give
enough indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur to
the activities of Scalzo. It can hardly be said that he acted beyond the scope of
his official function or duties. All told, Scalzo is entitled to the defense os state
immunity from suit.
against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner. Petitioner
filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action,
non-suability of the State, prescription of cause of action and the negligence of
the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney as the proximate cause of the
collision.
The trial court rendered a decision ordering the petitioner and Bislig to pay the
plaintiffs. The owner and driver of the jeepney were absolved from liability.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was dismissed for having
been filed out of time.
Issues: Whether or not the respondent court committed grave abuse of
discretion when it deferred and failed to resolve the defense of non-suability of
the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss.
Discussions:
The test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver
acting in behalf of the municipality is performing governmental or proprietary
functions. Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them
the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable
for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can
be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary
capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the
claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental
capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the
exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
Rulings:
Yes. In the case at bar, the judge deferred the resolution of the defense of non-
suability of the State until trial. However, the respondent judge failed to resolve
such defense, proceeded with the trial and thereafter rendered a decision
against the municipality and its driver.

G.R. No. L-52179 195 SCRA 692 April 8, 1991
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION, petitioner vs.
HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME, JUANA RIMANDO-BANIA, IAUREANO
BANIA, JR., SOR MARIETA BANIA, MONTANO BANIA, ORJA BANIA,
AND LYDIA R. BANIA, respondents.
The case was filed by petitioner, which is a municipal corporation existing under
and in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
A collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney owned by the Estate of
Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a
dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo
Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano
Bania Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and four others
suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.
The private respondents instituted a compliant for damages against the Estate
of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of
the passenger jeepney. However, the defendants filed a Third Party Complaint
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN MIGUEL BULACAN V FERNANDEZ 130 SCRA 56
VILLAVICENCIO v. LUKBAN
39 PHIL 778
FACTS:
Justo Lukban, mayor of Manila, ordered the district of ill-repute women closed.
One hundred and seventy women were deported to Davao without their
knowledge and consent. The women were received as laborers in a banana
plantation. Some of the women were able to escape and return to Manila. The
attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees
presented an application for heabes corpus to the Supreme Court
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the respondents had authority to deport the women to
Davao; and
2) Whether or not the City of Manila has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas
corpus to Davao
HELD:
The respondents had no authority to deport the women. No official, no matter
how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum which function to
safeguard liberty and to punish official transgressors. The essential object and
purpose of writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. If the
mayor and the chief of police could deport the women, they must have the
means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents may not be
permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her
domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts. The great writ of
liberty may not be easily evaded. No one of the defense offered constituted a
legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.
Gregorio Honasan II petitioner vs. The Panel of Investigating
Prosecutors Of the Department of Justice G.R.No. 159747 April 13,2004
Lessons Applicable: Rule on Interpretative Regulations (persons), Powers of
the Ombudsman (consti), concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the
DOJ to conduct preliminary investigation (consti)
Law Applicable: Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, Art. 2 Civil Code
Facts:
August 4, 2003: CIDG-PNP/P Director Edguardo Matillano filed an
affidavit-complaint with the Department of Justice (DOJ) which contains the
following in part:
o July 27, 2003: crime of coup d etat was committed by military personnel
who occupied Oakwood and Senator Gregorio Gringo Honasan, II
o On or about 11 p.m. June 4,2003: A meeting was held and presided by
Senator Honasan in a house located in San Juan, Metro Manila
o Early morning of July 27, 2003: Capt. Gerardo Gambala, in behalf of the
military rebels occupying Oakwood, made a public statement aired on national
television, stating their withdrawal of support to the chain of command of the
AFP and the Government of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Willing to risk
their lives to achieve the National Recovery Agenda (NRA) of Senator Honasan
which they believe is the only program that would solve the ills of society.
Sworn statement of AFP Major Perfecto Ragil stated that:
o June 4, 2003 about 11 pm: Senator Gregorio Gringo Honasan arrived with
Capt. Turinga to hold the NRP meeting where they concluded the use of force,
violence and armed struggle to achieve the vision of NRP where a junta will be
constituted which will run the new government. They had a blood compact and
that he only participated due to the threat made by Senator Honasan when he
said Kung kaya nating pumatay sa ating mga kalaban, kaya din nating
pumatay sa mga kasamahang magtataksil.
o July 27, 2003: He saw on TV that Lieutenant Antonio Trillanes, Captain
Gerardo Gambala, Captain Alejano and some others who were present during
the NRP meeting he attended, having a press conference about their occupation
of the Oakwood Hotel. He saw that the letter "I" on the arm bands and the
banner is the same letter "I" in the banner is the same as their blood compact
wound.
August 27, 2003: Senator Honasan appeared with counsel at the DOJ to
file a a Motion for Clarification questioning DOJ's jurisdiction over the case since
the imputed acts were committed in relation to his public office by a group of
public officials with Salary Grade 31 which should be handled by the Office of
the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan
Senator Honasan then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court against the DOJ Panel and its members, CIDG-PNP-P/Director
Eduardo Matillano and Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, attributing grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the DOJ Panel in issuing the aforequoted Order of
September 10, 2003 directing him to file his respective counter-affidavits and
controverting evidence on the ground that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to
conduct the preliminary investigation
Issues:
1 Whether in regards to Ombudsman-DOJ Circular no. 95-001, the office of the
Ombudsman should deputize the prosecutors of the DOJ to conduct the
preliminary investigation.
2 Whether the Ombudsman-DOJ Joint Circular no. 95-001 is ineffective on the
ground that it was not published
3 Whether the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary
investigation because the petitioner is a public officer with salary grade 31
(Grade 27 or Higher) thereby falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandigan
Bayan.
Held: Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit
1. No.
Ombudsman cases involving criminal offenses may be subdivided into two
classes, to wit: (1) those cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and (2) those falling
under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The difference between the two,
aside from the category of the courts wherein they are filed, is on the authority
to investigate as distinguished from the authority to prosecute
The power to investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation on any
Ombudsman case may be exercised by an investigator or prosecutor of the
Office of the Ombudsman, or by any Provincial or City Prosecutor or their
assistance, either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman
prosecutors.
circular supports the view of the respondent Ombudsman that it is just an
internal agreement between the Ombudsman and the DOJ
The Constitution, The Ombudsman Act of 1989, Administrative order no. 8 of
the office of the Ombudsman. The prevailing jurisprudence and under the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, All recognize and uphold the concurrent
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ to conduct preliminary investigation
on charges filed against public officers and employees.
The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor deputized by the Ombudsman to
conduct the preliminary investigation for complaints filed with it because the
DOJ's authority to act as the principal law agency of the government and
investigate the commission of crimes under the Revised Penal Code is derived
from the Revised Administrative Code which had been held in the Natividad
case13 as not being contrary to the Constitution. Thus, there is not even a need
to delegate the conduct of the preliminary investigation to an agency which has
the jurisdiction to do so in the first place. However, the Ombudsman may assert
its primary jurisdiction at any stage of the investigation.

2. No.
In the case of People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 (1954). The only
circulars and regulations which prescribe a penalty for its violation should be
published before becoming effective.
In the case of Taada V. Tuvera, 146 Scra 453 (1986), The Honorable
Court rules that:
o Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public,
need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so called letters of
instructions issued by the administrative superiors concerning the rules on
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in performance of their duties.
OMB-DOJ Joint Circulars no. 95-001 is merely an internal circular between the
DOJ and the office of the Ombudsman, Outlining authority and responsibilities
among prosecutors of the DOJ and of the office of the Ombudsman in the
conduct of preliminary investigation. It does not regulate the conduct of persons
or the public, in general.
2. No. Whether or not the offense is within exclusive jurisdiction or not will
not resolve the present petition so as not to pre-empt the result of the
investigation conducted by the DOJ Panel.
G.R. No. 159357 April 28, 2004
Brother MARIANO "MIKE" Z. VELARDE, petitioner, vs. SOCIAL JUSTICE
SOCIETY, respondent.
On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief before the RTC-
Manila against Velarde and his co-respondents Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin,
Executive Minister Erao Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F.
Soriano.
SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several
constitutional provisions, specifically on the separation of church and state; and
a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders
endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the members
of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.
The petitioner filed a Motion to dismiss before the trial court owing to the fact
that alleged that the questioned SJS Petition did not state a cause of action and
that there was no justiciable controversy.
The trial court denied the Motions to Dismiss, and the Motions for
Reconsideration filed by Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive
Minister Erao Manalo and said that it had jurisdiction over the SJS petition,
because in praying for a determination as to whether the actions imputed to the
respondents were violative of Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, the
petition has raised only a question of law. It then proceeded to a lengthy
discussion of the issue raised in the Petition the separation of church and state
even tracing, to some extent, the historical background of the principle.
Through its discourse, the court quipped at some point that the "endorsement of
specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the
separation clause."
After its essay on the legal issue, however, the trial court failed to include a
dispositive portion in its assailed Decision. Thus, Velarde and Soriano filed
separate Motions for Reconsideration which, as mentioned earlier, were denied
by the lower court. Hence, this Petition for Review.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC Decision conform to the form and substance
required by the Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court?
Held:
NO. The Constitution commands that no decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which
it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of
the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the basis
therefore.
Consistent with this are Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules on Civil Procedure,
Rule 120 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure, Administrative Circular
No. 1, which states that , A judgment or final order determining the merits of
the case shall be rendered. The decision shall be in writing, personally and
directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and law on
which it is based, signed by the issuing magistrate, and filed with the clerk of
court. In the same vein, Section 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court on Criminal
Procedure states, "Sec.2, Form and contents of judgments. -- The judgment
must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the
judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of
the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the
judgment is based. The SC reminded the magistrates to heed the demand of
Section 4, Art VIII of the constitution. This was evinced in Yao v. Court of
Appeals where Chief Justice Davide said that faithful adherence to the
requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a
paramount component of due process and fair play.
The assailed Decision contains no statement of facts (much less an assessment
or analysis thereof) or of the courts findings as to the probable facts. The
assailed Decision begins with a statement of the nature of the action and the
question or issue presented. Then follows a brief explanation of the
constitutional provisions involved, and what the Petition sought to achieve.
Thereafter, the ensuing procedural incidents before the trial court are tracked.
The Decision proceeds to a full-length opinion on the nature and the extent of
the separation of church and state. Without expressly stating the final
conclusion she has reached or specifying the relief granted or denied, the trial
judge ends her Decision with the clause SO ORDERED.
A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on
which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is
precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible
errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the
requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge
did so through the processes of legal reasoning.
Respondent SJS insisted that the dispositive portion can be found in the body in
the last paragraph of page 10 of the assailed 14-page Decision, stating
Endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear
violation of the separation clause. The Court held that the statement is merely
an answer to a hypothetical legal question and just a part of the opinion of the
trial court. It does not conclusively declare the rights (or obligations) of the
parties to the Petition. Neither does it grant any -- much less, the proper --
relief under the circumstances, as required of a dispositive portion. Failure to
comply with the constitutional injunction is a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Decisions or orders issued in
careless disregard of the constitutional mandate are a patent nullity and must
be struck down as void.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review of Brother Mike Velarde is GRANTED. The
assailed June 12, 2003 Decision and July 29, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila (Branch 49) are hereby DECLARED NULL AND VOID and thus
SET ASIDE. The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief is DISMISSED for failure to
state a cause of action.
Tuason v. Register of Deeds
FACTS:
Petitioners bought in 1965 from Carmel Farms Inc. a piece of land in Caloocan
City by virtue of which they were issued a title in their names and they took
possession of their property. In 1973, President Marcos, exercising martial law
powers, issued PD 293 cancelling the certificates of titles of Carmel Farms and
declaring the lands covered to be open for disposition and sale to members of
the Malacaang Association Inc.
ISSUE:
W/N the President has the power to cancel certificates of titles
HELD:
The Decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function.
Since he was never vested with judicial power -- such power, as everyone
knows, being vested in the SC and such inferior courts as may be established by
law -- the judicial acts done by him were under the circumstances alien to his
office as chief executive.
IN RE RODOLFO U. MANZANO 166 SCRA 246
Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, sent a
letter to the Court which requests it to issue a resolution that his membership in
the Committee on Justice, as neither violative of the independence of the
Judiciary nor a violation of Section 12, Article of the Constitution, and that it will
not amount to an abandonment of his position as Executive Judge and as a
member of the Judiciary; and to consider it as part of the primary functions of
an Executive Judge.
Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-
judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).
ISSUE: Whether the function of a member of the Committee on Justice an
administrative function
HELD: YES. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and
control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the
promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the
legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the
organic law of its existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring
Services Inc., vs. Tapucar, SP-07599-R, 29 September 1978, Blacks Law
Dictionary). An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals
that Committees on Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of cases
of detainees, particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus
alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail conditions. Among the
functions of the Committee are to receive complaints against any apprehending
officer, jail warden, final or judge who may be found to have committed abuses
in the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper authority for
appropriate action; and to recommend the revision of any law or regulation
which is believed prejudicial to the proper administration of criminal justice.
Thus, the membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial
Committee on Justice, which discharges administrative functions, will be in
violation of the Constitution.
Dissenting Opinions: "Administrative functions" as used in Section 12 refers to
the executive machinery of government and the performance by that machinery
of governmental acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations, and
orders of executive officials as they administer the laws and try to make
government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision or
control. Membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not
involve any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals.
Neither will the Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor
exercise any quasilegislative functions. Its work is purely advisory. The
Committee on Justice cannot be likened to an administrative agency of
government. It is a study group with recommendatory functions.
Bondoc vs. Pineda 201 SCRA 792
In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio
Bondoc of the NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the
Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a
protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is
composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6
are members of the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP
and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in
which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with
the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the
winner of the contest.
On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura
received a letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for
allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for
allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On
the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a
letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the
House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the
election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET.

ISSUE: Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the
dominant political party therein, may change that partys representation in the
HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in
an election contest pending therein.
RULING:
The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission
was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of
contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must
discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and
independence even independence from the political party to which they belong.
Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds
for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman
Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote in favor of Bondoc,
based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots
and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives
committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the
Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is,
therefore, null and void.
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of
Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasuras right to security of
tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional election contests,
are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security
of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not
be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the members
congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from
the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another
political party or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled
by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that he has
formally affiliated with another.
TANADA V CUENCO 103 PHIL 1051
After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was
overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator
was Lorenzo Taada who belonged to the Citizens Party. Diosdado Macapagal
on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was
contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision
the SET would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET should
be composed of 9 members comprised of the following: 3 justices of the
Supreme Court, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the
minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two SET
members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the NP. Taada
assailed this process before the Supreme Court. So did Macapagal because he
deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a
member of the Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his election contest.
Senator Mariano Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the Supreme
Court cannot take cognizance of the issue because it is a political question.
Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the SET is vested in
the Senate alone and the remedy for Taada and Macapagal was not to raise
the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public
opinion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.
HELD: No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a
justiciable question. The term Political Question connotes what it means in
ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is
not being asked by Taada to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The issue
being raised by Taada was whether or not the elections of the 5 NP members
to the SET are valid which is a judicial question. Note that the SET is a
separate and independent body from the Senate which does not perform
legislative acts.
But how should the gridlock be resolved?
The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of
the minority members) must not come from the majority party. In this case, the
Chairman of the SET, apparently already appointed members that would fill in
the minority seats (even though those will come from the majority party). This
is still valid provided the majority members of the SET (referring to those legally
sitting) concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its own rules in
situations like this provided such rules comply with the Constitution.
DEFENSOR SANTIAGO V GUNGONA GR NO 134577 NOV 18 1998
During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan
was declared the duly elected President of the Senate. The following were
likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin M.
Drilon as majority leader.
Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator
Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the
position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator
Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted for him, the
losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."
During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan
M. Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
Party numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator
Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on the matter was arrived at.
The following session day, the debate on the question continued, with Senators
Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the
Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body chat he was in receipt
of a letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they
had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the
Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader
of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the
subject petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona
had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate
minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to
Senator Tatad.
ISSUES:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the
position of Senate minority leader
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing
Respondent Guingona as the minority leader?
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE
The Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was the rightful
Senate President, since it was deemed a political controversy falling exclusively
within the domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for reconsideration, however,
the Court ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1) "in the light of subsequent events
which justify its intervention;" and (2) because the resolution of the issue
hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional provision on the presence of a
quorum to hold a session and therein elect a Senate President (read Avelino vs.
Cuenco about the scope of the Court's power of judicial review).
The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal by the senators was not a political question. The choice of
these members did not depend on the Senate's "full discretionary authority,"
but was subject to mandatory constitutional limitations. Thus, the Court held
that not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the
selection proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and determine the
issue.
SECOND ISSUE
There was no violation. The Court finds that the interpretation proposed by
petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of
the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. The Constitution
mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number
constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it however does not
provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute
the "minority," who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or
regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the
minority leader. While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a
Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the
manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the
Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may
deem necessary." The method of choosing who will be such other officers is
merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the
aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be
prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
THIRD ISSUE
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise
of power by one without color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto. A
quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or
title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment.
The action may be brought by the solicitor general or a public prosecutor or any
person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or
unlawfully held or exercise by another.
In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must
show that he or she has a clearright to the contested office or to use or exercise
the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the
respondent. In this case, petitioners present not sufficient proof of a clear and
indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader. Furthermore,
no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific
acts as minority leader.
FOURTH ISSUE
Grave abuse of discretion - such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.
By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse
his discretion as Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the
minority leader. To recall, the latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the
Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of
this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the
Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only
after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were
liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.
Therefore, the Senate President cannot be accused of "capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility." Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even
the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated,
disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to
Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.
ARANETA v. DINGLASAN
84 PHIL 368
FACTS:
The five cases are consolidated for all of them present the same fundamental
question. Antonio Araneta is being charged for violating EO 62 which regulates
rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. Another case is of Leon Ma.
Guerrero seeking to have a permit issued for the exportation of his
manufactured shoes. Another is of Eulogio Rodriguez seeking to prohibit the
treasury from disbursing funds pursuant to EO 225, while another is of Antonio
Barredo attacking EO 226 which appropriated funds to hold the national
elections. They all content that CA 671 or the emergency Powers Act is already
inoperative and that all EOs issued under said Act also ceased
ISSUE: Whether or not the Emergency Powers Act has ceased to have any force
and effect
HELD:
CA 671 does not fix the duration of its effectiveness. The intention of the act has
to be sought for in its nature, object to be accomplished, the purpose to be
subserved and its relation to the Constitution. Article VI of the Constitution
provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be for a limited period.
It is presumed that CA 671 was approved with this limitation in view. The
opposite theory would make the law repugnant to the Constitution, and is
contrary to the principle that the legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of
the Constitutional scope of its power. CA 671 became inoperative when
Congress met in regular session of May 25, 1946, and that EO Nos. 62, 192,
225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In a regular session, the
power if Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except by the limitations
imposed by the organic law.
RODRIGUEZ V GELLA 92 PHIL 603
Eulogio Rodriguez et al seek to invalidate Executive Orders 545 and 546 issued
in 1952, the first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential
public works, and the second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in
the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes,
volcanic action and other calamities. They sought to have Vicente Gella, then
National Treasurer, be enjoined from releasing funds pursuant to said EOs.
These EOs were pursuant to Commonwealth Act 671. Note that prior to Araneta
vs Dinglasan, Congress passed House Bill 727 intending to revoke CA 671 but
the same was vetoed by the President due to the Korean War and his perception
that war is still subsisting as a fact. Note also that CA 671 was already declared
inoperative by the Supreme Court in the same case of Araneta vs Dinglasan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the EOs are valid.
HELD: No. As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EOs issued in pursuant
to CA 671 shall be rendered ineffective. The president did not invoke any actual
emergencies or calamities emanating from the last world war for which CA 671
has been intended. Without such invocation, the veto of the president cannot be
of merit for the emergency he feared cannot be attributed to the war
contemplated in CA 671. Even if the president vetoed the repealing bill the
intent of Congress must be given due weight. For it would be absurd to contend
otherwise. For while Congress might delegate its power by a simple majority, it
might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it
would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back.
This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law. Act No. 671 may be
likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of the agent is
necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in
the same way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity
or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agency created
under the Act is coupled with interest.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V POEA 166 SCRA 533
GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of Legislative Power
EXCEPTION: Subordinate Legislation
Tests for Valid Delegation of Legislative Power
FACTS:
Vitaliano Saco, the Chief Officer of a ship, was killed in an accident in Tokyo,
Japan. The widow filed a complaint for damages against the Eastern Shipping
Lines with the POEA, based on Memorandum Circular No. 2 issued by the latter
which stipulated death benefits and burial expenses for the family of an
overseas worker. Eastern Shipping Lines questioned the validity of the
memorandum circular. Nevertheless, the POEA assumed jurisdiction and
decided the case.
ISSUE: W/N the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-
delegation of powers
HELD: SC held that there was valid delegation of powers.
In questioning the validity of the memorandum circular, Eastern Shipping Lines
contended that POEA was given no authority to promulgate the regulation, and
even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative
discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of powers; exception
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law
cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how
the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the
latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be
abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.
Two Tests of Valid Delegation of Legislative Power
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid
delegation of legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate
the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard
test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running
riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to
the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and
exercise a power essentially legislative.
Xxx The delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-
delegation the exception.
Rationale for Delegation of Legislative Power
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the
growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems
demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and
created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected to reasonably comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has
become necessary. Too many of the problems attendant upon present-day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the
required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions
may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts
in the particular fields.
Power of Subordinate Legislation
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are
particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of
specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national
legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative
agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the
statute. This is called the power of subordinate legislation.
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid
down in statute by filling in the details which the Congress may not have the
opportunity or competence to provide. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such
administrative regulation.
TABLARIN V GUTIERREZ 152 SCRA 730
The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports,
the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement
from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and
MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring
the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of
eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking
the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and
in the future. The trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT
was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as
the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner:
"SECTION 1. Objectives. This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the
standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for
registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the
practice of medicine in the Philippines."
The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its
functions as specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following:
"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized
college of medicine;
xxx
(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and
keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from said
applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the
operating fund of the Board of Medical Education;
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical
schools:
"Admission requirements. The medical college may admit any student who
has not been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense
involving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record of completion of a
bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to
a medical school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good
moral character issued by two former professors in the college of liberal arts;
and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit any
college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other
entrance requirements that may be deemed admissible.
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture
and Sports and dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform admission test
called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement
for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the
Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to
state that: "2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument
toward upgrading the selection of applicants for admission into the medical
schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical education in the
country. The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on
the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education
after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT
rating of each applicant, together with the other admission requirements as
presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance
of the prescribed certificate of eligibility for admission into the medical colleges.
Issue: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as
amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional.
Held: Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain
minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the
Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.
The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable
power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important
interests and needs in a word, the public order of the general community.
An important component of that public order is the health and physical safety
and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a
legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only
issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable
relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for
admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health
and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is
perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the
practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable
method of protecting the health and safety of the public.
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type:
the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of
medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body
of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of
admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to
those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and
eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of
maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical
schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic
development, are widely known. We believe that the government is entitled to
prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated
objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools"
and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country. We are
entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the
ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to
recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of
incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies
and minds for disease or trauma.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the
respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
Ynot v IAC (1987) 148 SCRA 659
Petitioner transported 6 caracbaos from Masbate to Iloilo in 1984 and these wer
confiscated by the station commander in Barotac, Iloilo for violating E.O. 626 A
which prohibits transportation of a carabao or carabeef from one province to
another. Confiscation will be a result of this.
The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City
issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00.
After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of
the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the
confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality
of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also
for its presumed validity.
The same result was decided in the trial court.
In the Supreme Court, he then petitioned against the constitutionality of the
E.O. due to the outright confiscation without giving the owner the right to heard
before an impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He also challenged the
improper exercise of legislative power by the former president under
Amendment 6 of the 1973 constitution wherein Marcos was given emergency
powers to issue letters of instruction that had the force of law.
Issue: Is the E.O. constitutional?
Holding: The EO is unconstitutional. Petition granted.
Ratio: The lower courts are not prevented from examining the constitutionality
of a law.
Constitutional grant to the supreme court to review.
Justice Laurel's said, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by
simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the
contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, and
so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really
presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an
existing law due to the grant of legislative authority over the president under
Amendment number 6.
Provisions of the constitution should be cast in precise language to avoid
controversy. In the due process clause, however, the wording was ambiguous
so it would remain resilient. This was due to the avoidance of an iron rule
laying down a stiff command for all circumstances. There was flexibility to allow
it to adapt to every situation with varying degrees at protection for the changing
conditions.
Courts have also refrained to adopt a standard definition for due process lest
they be confined to its interpretation like a straitjacket.
There must be requirements of notice and hearing as a safeguard against
arbitrariness.
There are exceptions such as conclusive presumption which bars omission of
contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience
or rational connection between facts proved and fact presumed. An examples is
a passport of a person with a criminal offense cancelled without hearing.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of police power
which both restrains and is restrained by due process. This power was invoked
in 626-A, in addition to 626 which prohibits slaughter of carabos with an
exception.
While 626-A has the same lawful subjects the original executive order, it cant
be said that it complies with the existence of a lawful method. The transport
prohibition and the purpose sought has a gap.
Summary action may be taken in valid admin proceedings as procedural due
process is not juridical only due to the urgency needed to correct it.
There was no reason why the offense in the E.O. would not have been proved in
a court of justice with the accused acquired the rights in the constitution.
The challenged measure was an invalid exercise of police power because the
method to confiscate carabos was oppressive.
Due process was violated because the owner was denied the right to be heard
or his defense and punished immediately.
This was a clear encroachment on judicial functions and against the separation
of powers.
The policeman wasnt liable for damages since the law during that time was
valid.
G.R. No. 17122 43 Phil 1 February 27, 1922
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANG TANG HO, defendant-
appellant.
During a special session, the Philippine Legislature passed and approved Act No.
2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and
Corn. The said act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes the Governor
General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the
distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, the Governor General issued
Executive Order 53 fixing the price at which rice should be sold.
Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a ganta of
rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way
higher than that prescribed by the Executive Order. He was charged in violation
of the said Executive Order and was found guilty as charged and was sentenced
to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence
countering that there was an undue delegation of power to the Governor
General.
Issues: Whether or not there was an undue delegation of power to the
Governor General.
Discussions:
By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to constitutional limitations, the
power to legislate and enact laws is vested exclusively in the Legislative, which
is elected by a direct vote of the people of the Philippine Islands. As to the
question here involved, the authority of the Governor-General to fix the
maximum price at which palay, rice and corn may be sold in the manner power
in violation of the organic law.
Act No. 2868, as analysed by the Court, wholly fails to provide definitely and
clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as
a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the
determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the
exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without
which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all
its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government
and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or
delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its
details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary,
upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
Rulings:
Yes. When Act No. 2868 was analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of
the Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it
was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to
the sole discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not
any cause for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not an
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, and under certain
undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice should be sold, without regard
to grade or quality, also to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if so,
when, and whether or not the law should be enforced, how long it should be
enforced, and when the law should be suspended. The Legislature did not
specify or define what was any cause, or what was an extraordinary rise in
the price of rice, palay or corn, Neither did it specify or define the conditions
upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the
proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at
all, because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. The act or
proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or qualities of
rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale of one ganta of rice at the
price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater than that fixed by
Executive order No. 53.