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j p bo
c t a i m l (Ewa n

S HA D WO R T H H . H O D GS O N .

T O N A M O O E N I E O E A O T I A T E P A 1 02 E I H E K A I HM I N



, , ,

1 865 .



1 . A p p ea l s to co n sc i u n e
o s ss


S ubj e c t a nd O bj e c t
Ne c e s s it y a nd Univers a l it y
pi i
Th e t e rm a r o r

M t phy i i phil phy

e a s c s o so

M t phy i nd ligi o n
e a s c a re

C git
o go um o er s

M t phy i nd p y h l o gy
e a s c a s c o

M t phy i nd nt o l gy
e a s c a o o

CH A P T E R I I .


Fi rs t nd int nt i n
a nd s e c o e o s

El m nt s
e nd
e p t f ph n m n
a a s ec s o e o e a

Th f m l l m nt in c n i u n
e o r a e e e o sc o s es s

Th unit y f ph n m n in p
e o e o e a s ac e

Th unity f ph n m n in t im
e o e o e a e

Ti nd
m e a p pu bj ts ac e a s re o ec s

Th xh u ti di i ibility f t im nd p
e e a s ve v s o e a s ace

Th in ni t y f t im
e nd s p c o e a a e



Th e bj t f P y h l gy
o ec o s c o o

Th l f th i
re e c a s s e s o eo r es

Th y f S ul
eo r o a o

Th y f n Eg
eo r o a o

Th ph n m n n o f R c t i n
e e o e o e e o

T h phy i l gi l t h
e y s o o ca eo r

O igin f t h f m l l m nt
r o e o r a e e e

CH A P T E R I V .


24 Th e pi i l g
em r ca e o

25 R p e t ti n
re s e n a o

26 Th i m m di t
e nd e a e a re m o te o bj ec t
27 R m t bj t in
e o e o ec s c o nn c z tio n

CH A P T E R V .


28 R e dint e gra t i o n
29 A na ly i s s o f re di t e n g ti n ra o

30 R ult
es s o f the a n ly i a s s

31 V lit i n
o o

32 D ivi i n s o o f fun t i n in n c io u n
c o s co s s es s



A b t t nd g n e l n t i n
s ra c a e ra o o s

Th i n t u
e r a re

Th l w f P
e i m o ny
a o a rc

C it i l n d
r ca ui i t i ning
aq c s ve re a s o

T h p in ipl
e f c q ui it i
r s ning
c e o a s ve re a o

Indu t i n nd D du t i n
c o a e c o

R l t i n f i t i l nd q ui it i
e a o o ning cr ca a ac s v e re a s o

Th t h e o d E s ndi E xi t ndi C gn s
ree r e rs , s e s e o o c en d i
, ,
C ON TENT S . vii



D I VI S I O N 1 .

FO R M .

41 . E xi t n nd N u
s e xi t n
ce a o -
e s e ce

42 . C n i u n
o sc o nd t h ught s ess a o

43 . O igin f t h l w
r f th ugh t
o e a s o o

44 . Th C n p t f
e o ce -
o rm

45 . S k
o m e re m a r n H g l L gi s o e e s o c

Th e n tua n pt re o f co ce s

So m e c x m in d a se s e a e

T h l gi c l bj t nd t h l gi c l unit
e o a o ec a e o a

C t eg i s
a f m f t h o ught
o r e o r o r s o

Th m bin ti n
e co f o n pt a o o c ce s

Th im p rt f p p it i n
e o o ro o s o s

C t g i l p p iti n
a e o r ca ro o s o s

Hyp th t i c l p p o iti n
o e a ro s o s

D i jun c ti p o p it i n
s ve r o s o s

Hyp th t i o di jun t i p p iti n

o e c s c ve ro o s o s

S yll gi mo s s

1 t C t g i l
s . 2d Hyp th eti l
a 3d
e o r c a . . o ca . . D i sjune
ti 4 t h Hyp th tive di jun ti
. . o e co -
s c ve .

E m pi i l nd f m l
r ca ning a o r a re a s o

R i w f t h n ly i f t h l w f L gi
ev e o e a a s s o e a s o o c

o .


59 . Ca u s e a nd Rea so n
60 Th e
. f m l u o r a ca se

61 . In t uiti n nd th o ught
o a

62 . Nihil A b l ut i so
viii C ONTENT S . :



63 Int uit ive

. in re e c t o

64 . R ning t i n
easo re ec o

65 . R t p t f m t phy i l phil phy

e ro s ec o e a s ca o so

Pl t A i t tl
a o P t A i t t li n phil
. r s o e . o s -
r s o e a o so phy .

G i d n B un Do r t nd h ia uc o r o . es c a r es a s s c es s o r s .

66 . Ot h d in f t h
er o m an s o e re a s o

R l t i n b t w n t hi nd p h y i o
e a o E t hi e ee e c a s . c . Co n
n t i n f t hi nd l w
ec P t y
o o e c a a . o e r .

67 . P g ro o f ci n
res s g n lly s e ce e e ra

CH A P T E R I X .

68 . Cl i t io n o f id
a ss ca ea s

69 . Th in t n c s x m in d
re e s a e e a e

70 . F it h

71 . Th l gic l id
e o Of G d a ea o

I N T R O D UC T I O N .

1 . writer o f the followin g pages submits them


not without a sense o f their i m perfection to the judg ,

ment o f his contemporaries The questions t reated .

o f labour under o n e kind Of dif culty pec uli arly

their o w n It is not every reader who will be pre

pared to admit that in o n e part o f metaphysical

, ,

enquiries the proof to be required di ffers in its nature


from the proof to be required in the purely obj ective

sciences But that it is s o follows from the nature

o f the matter at once subj ective and objective In .


the purely Objective sciences a writer need have no

doubt about his facts ; he can protect h i mself by de
ni t i o n s and by distinctions and can always make ,

clear what the precise object is about whic h he rea ,

sons For instance in P olitical E conomy he can

, ,

obviate ambiguities in his Object matter by dening -

Wealth to mean every commodity which has an
exchangeable va l ue and consequent o n this d e ni ,

tion he can dene P roductive Labour to mean labour


which produces such commodities ; for every one is

agr eed that there are such commodities and such
labour But where this has not been done but is

still in process o f doing there every man must be ,

judge for hi mself whether his o w n internal e x p e ri


ence bears o u t the assertions Of the writer Fo r the .

facts o f metaphysic like those o f e very purely o b je c


tive science are facts of consciousness and their o b

, ,

sc u t i and the dif culty o f observing them make

their interpretation o r their analysis doubtful The
, ,

very questions at issue are What are the facts ? What,

is their analysis and Is there any phenomenon

answering to a given denition o f which there is

no judge but consciousness itself Such qu estions .


for instance are the a nalysis of the cogni tions of


time and space t h e analysis of consciousness in its


simplest concrete shape the q uestion whether we are


immediately conscious of the Will and s o on If the ,


meanin g of the term red was no t su fciently agre ed

upon we should have to appeal to the consciousness

o f indivi duals to decide what colour should be dis

t i ngui s h e d by this name ; and those who were colour

blind would be heard before the decision was arrived
at but not afterwards

A great part of metaphysic not by any means ,

the whole of it and a continually though slowly de


creasing part is in this un x e d and undetermined


state ; and it is natural that this sh ould be the case

with t his the most complicated and dependent of all
branches o f knowledge though it is one which from
, ,

the universal and obvious presence o f some O f its

elements was cultivated among the earliest In this
, .

u n x e d part of metaphysic the appeal to c o n s c l o u s

ness must still be per mitted ; there the proofs must

not only be examined but performed by every one
for himself with a View to the establishment of a

sufcient consensus of judgments and the aim o f the

m etap hysical writer in this part o f his ta sk must be

not to give convin cing inferential proofs of his posi

tions but t o state and describe the phenomena s o as

to lead and as sist the reader in nding the proofs


for himself o r in other words t o aid h i m in going

, ,

through the trains of reasoning in such an original

and independent way as can alone procure I do not
, ,

y the conclusions here reached but any real
c o n

el usion at all .

By the term consciousness in this E ssay is a l

, ,

ways meant consciousness as existing i n an in di vidual

conscious being ; and proofs drawn from such a con
s c i o u s n e s s can have no validity for other conscious

individuals unless they themselves recognise their


truth as descrip tions applicable to the p rocedur e and

phenomena o f their o w n consciousness D octrines .

if true will ultimately be recogni sed as such by all


individuals whose consciousness is formed o n the same

type that is by all h um a n b e i n gs
, ,

C H AP T E R I .


u e u o v u wa a a c a v uew wv : o i Be u a
y s
l / .

Arist o tl e

2. THE true opposite o f the term metaphysic is

empiric whether empiric is employed in dealing with

states o f consciousness o r with external phenomena .

States of consciousness and external phenomena whe ,

ther abstract o r concrete whether considered as parti


o nlar and unclassied o r as general and classied are ,

known to us by experience either direct o r indirect ,

by perception o r by inference ; that is to s a y they ,

are the data o f empirical knowledge o r science ; while

metaphysic is employed in tracing the conditions o f
such data Thus Kant says in the P rolegomena
. I , ,

that metaphysical cognition is a cogni tion which lies

o n the far side o f o r beyond
experience je ns e i t

, ,

der E rfahrung liegende E rke nn t ni s s .

M etaphysic takes its stand at the point o f junction

between the mind which knows and the world which
is known and deals with the relations which obtain

between them s o far as thes e relations are necessary


and uni versal M etaphysic may therefore be a p


r o a c h e d both from the side o f psychology o r the

p ,

laws of consciousness and the organ o f consciousness ,

and from that o f physical science o r the laws of ex ,

ternal phenomena In saying this I am not forget


ting that external phenomena are presented to us


only in consciousness nor o n the other hand that


states Of consciousness when reected o n are as , ,

obj ective as external phenomena I t is enough that .

this difference Of aspect this di stinction z en 0s (a p n

, ,

has given rise to a division o f existences m r o o p kn ,

a di vision o f them into mind and matter and their ,

appropriated sciences psychology and the physic al


sciences F ollowing the route o f either o f thes e


groups o f sciences w e come to ground which is com


mon to it with the other group the common ground ,

o f phenomena with a double aspect subjective and ,

objective This common ground o f psychology and


p y si o
phenomena in their most abstract shape is ,

the proper eld o f meta physic I t considers pheno .

mena as they possess an obj ective and a subj ective

aspect and not as they are dependent o n a series o f

events in the kingdom o f mind o r o n a series o f ,

events in t h e kingdom o f matter I t is an ana l ysis o f .

phenomena as such Standing thus at the meeting


point o f the two groups o f cognitions psychological ,

and physical metaphysic cont a i n s as its proper object

, ,

matter those cogni tions only which a r e com m on to


all objects o f knowledge and to all modes o r states o f

consciousness In other words it is onl y certain

univers a l modes o r forms o f consciousness and o f

objects external to consciousness which are the o b

j e c t matter o f metaphysic
The reason o f this i
. s ,

that all the others fall properly i n to their places in

the other sciences to which they belong whi le thos e ,

which are uni versal both in consciousness and in i t s


obj ects are dis t inguished broadl y by this charac


t e ri s t i c from the rest and besides the place which

, ,

t hey hold in any o f the other sciences have a n ,

other place i n that science o r mode o f contempla ,


tion which brings into o n e View both object a nd


subject as the two only constituents of the whole

imaginable o r conceivable universe The import .

ance and also considering the constitution of our


minds t h e necessity o f this latter science called

, ,

metaphysic rests o n the fact that thi s di stinction o f


subject and object is the most general and ul timate

distinction at which we can arrive in all knowledge .

If the human mind is compelled to push its enquiries


to the furthest point attainable by it it is to this ,

distinction that it will come the last from what ,

ever point o f View it may start and whatever road ,

o r science it may take It is the ul timate di stinction


in the analysis of the un iverse from the human point

o f View and therefore it is the starting point of meta

physic which is the applied logic o f the universe the

, ,

method o f stating the problem in its lowest terms .

Some may suppose that there is a point of view

from which this distinction o f subject and obj ect o r , ,

what is the same thing o f consciousness and the o b ,

j e c t s o f consciousness is not the ultimate and highest


di stinction possible but some other di stinction b e


tween existences as for instance that o f Inn er and


O uter o r that o f F orm and M atter

, F rom such a ; .

point o f View states o f consciousness themselves


would stil l be classed as what i n fact they are , ,

sp ecial modes o f existence and perhaps under the , ,

rst distinction as outward mani festations o f an i n


ward spirit o r under the second di stinction as forms

, , ,

into which the matter o f the external world is cast

and moulded N o w what is there to show that a

method of regarding the universe founded upon such

distinctions as these is n o t more complete and l e gi t i
mate than a method founded on the distinction of

subject a n d obj ect ? This onl y consideratio n so far ,

as can be at present evident namely that it adopts , ,

a single term o r category that o f existence into , ,

which to introduce its distinctions , a category un

explained unconnected meani ngless ; that it leaves
, ,

vague and undetermined because o ut o f relation to ,

any thing else the totality of the phenomena which


it proposes to class i fy and th us in fact starts with


assuming an Absolute O f such a single non relative


existence it must be admitted that it has no meaning ,

and no predicates that it is in short pure nonentity


and merum nih il If however it should be replied


that by existence is meant relative existence such ,

existence as is relative to us and our capacities this ,

is only to admit in other words the greater validi ty

o f the di stinction between subj ect and obj ect Fo r .

by a relative existence is meant an Objective exist

ence an existence the correlate o f consciousness the
, ,

only existence which in fact we can conceive o r ima

gine Let this objective existence be divided o r dis

t i n gui s h e d as it may it w il l still be o n e a spect o nl y


o f the ul timat e distinction into subj ect and object ,

o r rather it will itself involve its opposite the s ub ,

j e c t i v e aspect ; and the fu r ther distinctions i ntro

d u c e d into it will be distin ctions o f the object o f

consciousness only and not o f an absolute existence


apart from c onsciousness .

. 3 N ow with reference to the doctrine that the

cognitions which are the Object matter o f m e t a p h y s i c

are necessary as well as uni versal it must be remarked ,

that the term necessary is but the correlate of the

term u ni vers a l ; what the latter is in the world o f

objects that the former i s in the world o f conscious

ness Whatever is necessary in thought exists al so

al ways without exception in the Object of thought ;

and whatever exists always without exception in the
object o f thought is necessary in thought It is not .

said that whatever exists always in things i n them

- -

selves is necessary in thought for o f things i n them

- -

selves we have no experience ; but s o far as any thing ,

is an object for us whatever is uni versal in the obj ect


is necessary in the subject N ecessity is a term which


has meani n g only i n reference to o ur cognition ; it is

subjective in its reference ; while the term uni ver
sa l i t
y is Objective not referring
however to existence
per s e but to Objective existence for us We shall

have to consider in the course of these pages whether

any causal relation obtains between these two corre
lates necessity and universality F or the present it
, .

is enough to explain that no necessity can be a d


m i t t e d to exist in the obj ective world that what we

call a necessary sequence i s necessary solely in refer
ence to our un derstanding because we refer the con ,

sequent to a special antecedent and bring it thus ,

under some law which we think o f as xed at least ,

s o far as the particular case un der consideration is

concerned ; and that the only thing which c orresponds

to o u r notion o f necessity in nature is the phenomenon
o f universality U niversality means that the thing

in question whatever it is never is otherwise ; n e c e s

, ,

si t
y means that we cann ot conceive it otherwise
In .

the former case there is no i mpossibility in troduced ;

in the latter case there is an impossibility but it is ,

o n e of thought not o f fact subj ective not objective .


Like the terms subject and object themselves the ,

terms necessity and universality are but two as

e c t s inseparable from each other of the same phe
p ,

no m eno n .

drawn o n paper exists only when three lines m eet

each other at three angles ; the three lines and the

three angles are the a priori elements o f the triangle ;
but they are not previous to it in point o f time but ,

exactly simultaneous for the length and position o f


each line and the size o f each angle are determined

, ,

respectively by the length and position o f the Other

lines and the size o f the other angles that is by the , ,

other elements o f the triangle Before the triangle .

was formed there were neither the lines o f such and


such a length and position nor the angles of such a n d


such a size . The triangle is the brief synthetical

expression for these lines and these angles and the , .

lines and the angles are the analysis o f the triangle .

N ow any of these elements o f the triangle whic h ,

being given the rest are deducible or all these ele ,

ments taken together may be called the a priori


elements o f the triangle ; but in neither case are they

prior to the triangle in order of time but only i n ,

order of logic And if the term a p riori is applied


to any o f the metaphysical elements o f objects it must ,

be in this second sense of the term and not in a sense ,

implying priority in order o f time .

Applying these remarks to time and space the ,

results o f any analysis may be considered prior i n

logic to the whole analysed and therefore a priori to

that particular Obj ect ; but time and space are a priori

m r inasmuch as they are a priori to all O b
je c t s of cognition to cogni tion and existence itself

Themselves cognitions generalised from experience ,

and in that poin t o f view later than experience in

f l
order time t h e y a r e discovered to have been also

elements of those very cogni tions o f experience from

which they are generalised present in them as con

st element s undistinguished before an alysis A s

i t u e nt .

to their becoming known to us as separate cognitio ns ,

they are later than many other cognitions ; but as to

their own existence in knowledge unseparated they ,

are simultaneous with all and every other c ognition .

The question of the origin o f these cogni tions wil l be

discussed in C hapter I II but with reference to the .

mind of man as he now exists and to a l l his other ,

cognitions these two cognitions o f time and space at


least are a priori in the sens e just explained ; that


i s are elements o f any and every particular e x p e ri


ence entering into every o n e o f them as its necessary


So far as to the leading features and distin o

5 .

Me a
t phy i c i

s s

tions o f metaphysic as a separate phenomenon It ,

phil o s o ph y .

remains to regard it as a whole and in relation and ,

contrast with other branches Of knowledge M eta .

physic is properly speaking no t a science but a phi

, ,

l o so p h y ; that is it is a science whose end is in itself

, ,

in the gratication and education o f the m i nds which

carry it o n not in any extern al pu r pose such as the
, ,

founding o f any art conducive to the welfare of life .

This is the distinction between science and philo

sophy that science does not include its o w n end but
, ,

is pure knowledge whose end is something external

to itself while philosophy is carried o n for the sake

o f the learning and knowing a l one which it involves .

N or is this the popular distinction between intel

lectual pursuits which lead to something and those ,

which only as it is called sharpen the mind Int el

, ,

lectual pursuits which are employed to sharpen the

mind are already pursued f o r an end external to
themselves and cann ot deserve the name o f philo

sophy. P hilosophy i s p l e a s ura b l e and noble emotion


no less than knowledge ; the two elements are i n

se p arable are logically and not empiric a l ly di scerned

In other words its end is in itself The need to


phil osophise is rooted in o u r natur e as deeply as any ,

other of our needs Tutti gl i uomini naturalmente


desiderano di sapere says D ante a true philosopher , , ,

i n the opening passage o f his C onvito translating ,

Aristotle s words at the beginning o f his M etaphysic ,

II o Z vveg o c v n o z 7 05 si B m z g y o wm : $ 66 9 1
' '

And P lato '


says in the Sophistes m i x xl vxfyv y e fa / ew ao z o u

( , y ) z J

m p 7 56005 z v o c wo o zi m v A nd the attempt to satisfy


this need has at all times produced phi losophies ,

which have been founded o n the special sciences as

they from time to time existed and which have taken ,

from the growth and development o f these latter their

o w n form and colour F or the great problems which

in all ages have proposed themselves to man such as ,

these Whence he and the world came ; Whither they


go ; What is the meani ng o f the whole scene o f ex

i s t e n c e as it unfolds itself before him and of which
, ,

he himself is a part ; Is it truer to explain it by the

analogy Of this o r of that fam i liar phenomenon as
, , ,

o f a dream a tragic or a co m i c drama o f a battle o r

, ,

a war o r a lawsuit o r a j ourney these questions

, ,

and such as these must fo r ever whether answerable ,

o r unanswerable whether conceived as questions o r


only as meditations possess for him the profoundest


interest ; and to attempt their solution must be o n e

o f his most attractive labours N o w the very con .

di tion o f prosecuting the enquiry is metaphysic that ,

is the analysis o f the phenomena whose history and


import is to be studied Before the laws o f the s u c .

cession of phenomena and therefore also before the ,

laws o r law o f their tendency and n a l end the ,

. TII E S C O P E OF M E TAP HY S I C . 15

nature o f the phenomena must be analysed This .

analysis o r static a l study o f the nature o f phenomena

is metaphysic M odern philosophy has attained at

least to this that it can no t only state the problem to


be solved but also lay down the conditions o f its


solution with certainty and precision This we o w e .

chiey perhaps to D escartes and Kant But each

, ,

age as it advances to a greater distance from these


fathers o f modern philosophy must perforce alter ,

something in the systems which they moulded and ,

r e state the o l d questions in terms allied to the a d


v a nc i n discoveries o f the sciences o n which meta

physical philosophy is founded .

I t is idle to object against metaphysical philosophy

that it is not a special science ; and yet it is into such
an obj ection that most o f the com plaints commonly
made against it are resolvable Fo r i n fact all men .

who reect are metaphysicians a n d a l l sciences have ,

a metaphysical side ; a system o f metaphysic is m erely

a gatherin g up in to o n e conn ected whole the scattered
notions which each reectin g man entertains respect
ing the ultimate nature and scope o f his o w n pursuit .

The difc ul ty is to carry the metaphysic a l method

far enough M en soon become tired o f distingui shing

logic a l ly ; they demand that the objects o f reasoni ng

should be exhibited empiricall y or as concrete wholes ,

and ask what the external end o r good is in such

enquiries A s men are most familiar with the special

sciences which are a ll empiric a l o r employed with


whole objects abstract like the gures o f geometry

, ,

o r concrete li ke those o f the s u n a n d stars they are


apt to demand that a ll science sh a l l be r e d uc e d t o the .

same shape that is that metaphysic shal l cease to be

, ,

metaphysic by giving up its distinguishing charac


This demand when it is made without pre

t e ri s t i c .

vion s exam i n ation o f the nature and claims o f meta

physic itself appears to me to be o n e o f Bacon s Idols

o f the Theatre E ven Auguste C omte thought that


i n establishing his P hilosophie P remi ere in the P oli ,

tique P ositive v o l iv page 1 7 3 which c orresponds

. .

to the P rima Philosophia of Bacon and is a system ,

o f the few mo st general laws o f a l l the sciences philo

S ophicall y arranged an ana lysis not o f phenomena as


such but o f the uni verse of phenomena as a whole

he was carrying the metaphysical method far enough .

He went somewhat farther indeed i n his latest work , , ,

the Synth ese Subj ective but even there he did not ,

g o beyond the notion o f a system o f general laws o f

empi rical phenomena and o f thought occupied with ,

empirical ph e nomena as such In my view, however ,


this is but a small part o f true metaphysic It goes .

beyond this and refers even such general laws as


these to their condi tions and elements without rest ,

i n g satised with h aving it shown that they are the

result o f a complete induction If we are t o have a .

philosophy o r a science which is i t s o w n end o r r e


ward i t must advance to the ultimate possible li m it

, ,

and not stop short at the point o f arranging inductive

principles in a philosophic a l mann er ; for this may
aim onl y at the external reward o f aiding the special
sciences .

6 Lord Boli n gbroke in his rst Letter to P ope

, ,

Works v o l v page 8 3 4 edi t 1 8 0 9 distinguishes his

, . .
, .

F irst Phil osophy from what he cal ls metaphysical

pneumatics and from ontology o n the o n e hand and , ,

o n the other from the P rima P hilosophia of Bacon .

P roceeding t o d e s c ri b e what his F irst Philosophy is

he denes it by its theology o r


theism and natural religion o r ethics
I have a l .

ready distingui shed metaphysic from such philosophy

as the P rima P hilosophia o f Bacon and shall later ,

o n distinguish it a l so from ontology ; but I cannot

admit that ethic o r reli gion o r theology are the o b

je c t s o f metaphysic M etaphysic has to .take account
indeed o f every class o f phenomena but i t s special ,

business is with the elements universal and necessary

o f all phenomena alike a s such It must explain all

without exception and deny none o n pain o f being


untrue . But it approaches phenomena from t h e

cogni tive side and treats them a s cogni tions not as
, ,

feelings o r emotions Since the implication o f matter


wi th form i n phenomena is univers a l and the i m p li ,

cation o f different ki n ds o f matter with each other is

almost universal the distinction expressed by the

Aristotelic if o r the Spinozistic qu a tenus is o f almost

, ,

uni versal application ; and is besides the onl y method , ,

o f obviating the illogical vagueness o f such expres

sions as this rather than that thi s more than

that expressions which hav e their ground in the

same almost univers a l implication just spoken o f .

F eelings and emotions are the object matter o f ethic -


religion and theology rather than o f metaphys i c

, ,

What is the reason and extent o f this rather than ?

It is this that since feelings a n d e m o t i o n s are also at

, , '

the same time cognitions metaphysic treats t hem s o ,


far as they are cogni tions and ethi c s o far as they are ,

feelin gs and emotions C ogni tions are the object .

matter o f ethic ; n o t however in their character of

cognitions but only s o far as they are feeli n gs o r

emotions This is the rst step in the limitation o f


ethic ; the next step is that not all feelings and e m o ,

tions as such are the Object matter o f ethic but only

, ,


those feelings and emotions which contain o r with ,

which is combin ed a feeling o r emotion o f a pleasure


able or painful kind E thic thus becomes the general


s 01 enc e o f practice as distinguished from pure speen


lation E thic is a systematic cognition of feelings


metaphysic o f cognitions .

R eligion is a term for a p articular and important

class o f ethical emotions namely those which are of , ,

a spiritual kind o r which satisfy the sense o f delight


i n g i n what is right as distinguished from what is

wrong that is which satisfy the conscience R e
, ,

l i gi o n consists of emotions Thou shalt love the .

Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy ,

soul and with all t h y mind ; and thy neighbour as


thyself o n these two commandments hang all the

Law and the P rophets M a t t h xxii 3 7 But now .

. . .

looking away from the particular emotions which

constitute any particular religion the C hristian for ,

instance religion itself in the abstract h a s never been


in vestigated o r its nature analysed with sufcient

, ,

accuracy It w ill however be fo un d I apprehend

, ,

that it consists in the union o f two charact eristics ,

1 s t that it is an emotion o f some particular kind as

, ,

love o r hope ; 2d that the moral goodness o f this

, ,

emotion is self evident that is the emotion is felt as

, ,

an ultimate end i n itself as being its o w n warrant , ,

needing a n d admitting no proof o f its moral goodness

beyond its actual presence in consciousness All .

those emotions and only tho s e which contain this

, ,

second characteristic are religious emotions R eli .

gion is spiritual emotion .

Theology is the e m b o d i rn e nt o f religion in doc

trines that is in cogni tions which give it a shape
, , ,

cognisable by the in tellect and relate either to the ,


o ne Of the two things distinguished by it namely , ,

consciousness are together the fact which D escartes


here asserts to be beyond the possibility o f doubt .

The rst reection is the rst certainty the rst cer ,

tainty as distinguished from undoubting acquiescence .

And thus reection is t h e starting point o f p h i l o so

phy ; the Object asserted b y it as certain conscious -

ness is the thing which is the object o f philosophy of

, ,

which reection is one mode There are then two .

senses in which the C ogito o r the Co gi t a t ur o f D es

cartes is to be taken one In which it stands for the ,

act o f reection the other in which it stands for o n e


o f the two objects o f reection consciousness gene ,

rally He begins by seeing what thin gs he is not


certain o f beyond the possibility o f doubt N early .

every thing is in this category ; at last he puts the

question about Sense ; M editatio II Sentire ?
nempe etiam h o c non t sin e corpore e t p e rm ul t a ,

sentire visus sum in s o m ni i s qu ae d e i nd e a ni m a d v e rt i

me non s e n s i s s e : Here sense is n o t distinguished
from the objects o f sense ; it therefore shares their
uncertainty He proceeds : C ogitare ? hic i nv e ni o

c o
g i t a t i o e st h a ec sola ,
a me divelli n e
q ui t ego s u m , ,

ego existo c e rt u m e s t ,
Here at last he can d i s

t i ngui s h consciousness from i t s obj ects the operation ,

from the res ul ts In the next page he follows up .

his enquiry : Sed quid igitur s um ? res c o gi t a n s ;

quid e s t h o c ? nempe d ub i t a n s i nt e l li ge n s a f rm a n s , , ,

ne a ns
g volens
, nolens i m a,gi n a n s quoque ,
e t s e n ,

tiens . E t s e nt i e n s here sense is distinguished

from its objects and is become part o f the i n d ub i t

able operation o f reection itself o f the C ogito o r the ,

Co gi t a t ur Here is the rst answer to the question


What is it to exist o r What is existence ? E xistence ,

TH E S C O PE O F M E TAP H Y S I C . 21

is consciousness generally i n some o r all o f its modes ; ,

o r in other words that exists which is revealed by


consciousness .

No w the current theory I believe is this that , , ,

existence o r Being far exceeds consciousness ; that

many things exist o f which we actually have n o t and ,

many other things o f which we cannot h ave the least ,

knowledge ; that consciousness may and does make

progress in penetrating into the former eld that o f ,

actually unknown existence and in making many ,

things actually known to us which before were a o

t u a l l y unkno w n but existing beyond o u r knowledge ;

while it is debarred from all progress whatever in

the latter eld that o f unknowable existence which
, ,

nevertheless is actually existing b e yond o ur possi

b i l i t y o f knowledge If we s o conceive consciousness

may be likened t o a candle shining in a vast circle o f

darkness which it tends to ill uminate more and more ,

while beyond this circle is a space o f neither light n o r

darkness which cannot by its nature b e ever illu
, , ,

m i n a t e d by the candle s rays however powerful they ,

may become There is thus formed a notion o f an


exi stence real and actual but o ut o f all relation to

, ,

consciousness not only unknown at present but un

, ,

knowable for ever ; an Obj ective existence which can

never become subj ective an existence absolute per , ,

s e a world Of things i n themselves

- -

But to this existence I prefer t o give the name

n o n objective existence
for I think it wi l l becom e

clear as we advance that consciousness is li mited,

onl y by existence no less than existence is lim i ted


only by consciousness ; that the two thin gs are c o

extensive ; that each is the opposite aspect o f the
other the gold and silver side o f the same shield
, .

F rom whichever side we approach that side seems ,

to us the smaller of the two appears as a li m i t i m ,

posed O n the other If we approach from the s ub .

e c t i v e side aski ng what we c a n know what can

j , ,

become an object o f o u r consciousness then we r e ,

present to ourselves possible existence as far exceed

ing consciousness and consciousness as conquering

certain limits o f existence w o n from the void a n d ,

formless in ni te If o n the other hand we approach


from the obj ective side and ask what exists o r is ,

capable o f existing then existence seems a small part


o f what we can imagine o r conceive to exist to be as ,

it were an oasis o f rm actu al ground in the m i ddle

o f the desert o f the great M ight b e o r M ight have -

been In the rst case there appears to be a great


eld o f non objective existence in the second case o f

, ,

non existing i magination o r conception The truth


appears to be that existence and consciousness are


coextensive one as wide as and not wider than the

, , ,

other . N o n objective existence and non re a l con



s c i o u sn e s s in conceiving o r imagining are terms with ,

o u t meaning Whatever can be present in conscious


ness has some degree o f reality the only question i s , ,

how much o r o f what sort how permanent how

, , ,

arrived at There may be names which are names


only whether the things supposed to be signied by


them are supposed to lie in non objective existence -

o r in non real c onsciousness

And if we attempt .

to describe the subordinate position supposed to be

occupied either by consciousness to non objective ex -

i s t e n c e or by existence to non re a l consciousness this


very description is and can onl y be by means o f , ,

expressions which i n regard to this case are gura

tive being drawn from cases o f real consciousness

and re a l existence . The language borrowed from

experience within time and space i s here made use o f
to express o ur relation t o thi ngs supposed for the
moment to exist beyond time and space beyond c o n ,

s c i o usne s s . How else can absolute impossibili ty o f

knowledge be characterised except by gurative lan ,

guage ? Fo r whatever man can name that he th i nks ,

he can in some way know and that by naming the ,

unknowable he bri ngs it within the grasp of his know

ledge ; and whether he in fact is s o o r n o t he n e c e s
, ,

s a ri l makes h i m s e l f i n the proceedings o f hi s con

s c i o u s n e s s m i xn y A t e o v O n the o n e hand then the
( a
g .
, ,

attempt to characterise existence beyond the possi

b i li t y o f o ur knowledge requires the use o f gurative
expressions drawn from existence within o ur know
ledge ; and o n the oth er hand there is a natural and ,

spontaneous assumption that every thing that exists

stands in some nameable relation t o o ur conscious
ness All the meani ng o f the names applied to ex

i s t e n c e beyond consciousness is drawn from existence

within consciousness ; and there is a spontaneous as
sumption that we are warranted in applyi n g those
names In other words the terms applied to non

objective existence such as absolute per s e beyond

, , ,

experience t ranscendent and s o o n have a connota

, , ,

tion but no Object denoted by them Y et the very


making use o f them implies the assumption that there

is something denoted by them If then there is .
, ,

something denoted by them this something has pre ,

d i c a t e s drawn from actu a l experience and is o f the ,


same nature as objects o f actual experience E ither .

the term n o n objective existence is a name without


meaning o r the object to which it is applied is an


object within the range o f o ur knowledge In the .


latter case it is synonymous with objective existence ,

o r existence simply Agai n with regard to the term


existence E ither the term existence h a s a meani ng


o r i t h a s none ; if it has none it would be better to ,

cease employing it ; but i f it has a meaning then it ,

must be to the extent o f that meaning an intell i gible

, ,

object o f consciousness So that we can name n o .

thin g with a meaning In the name but what has

, ,

objective existence o r existence fo r consciousness .

T o s um up all in a few words it I s Impossible to ,

know that any thing exists without at the same ,

time knowi ng somethin g o f what it is o r o f what we ,

imagine it t o be .

It i s the assumption o f the subordi nate position o f

consciousness t o existence o f this primary relation of ,

limiti n g and limited o f revealer and revealed which

, ,

is the ultimate ground o f the distinc t ion between

phenomena and things i n themselves the Kantian - -

D inge a n sich If a limit which would n o t other

- -

wise have existed is imposed by the Subject that is

, , ,

by the fact that a l l existence h a s t o be made k nown

to us if at all through consciousness then we must
, ,

assume the possibil ity Of ther e existing both in the ,

things we are conscious o f and also beyond them that ,

is both as to quality and as to quantity both as to

, ,

i n tension and as t o protension something which we ,

do not a n d cann ot know ; not only which we cannot

know perfe c tly but which we cann ot know even

i m perfectly that is at all

The primary dualism

o f subject and Object when conceived as the s ub


ordi n ation o f consciousness to existence the limita ,

tion o f existence by consciousness the revelation o f ,

existence within certain lim its subjective in their


nature by consciousness if unbala nced by the coun

, ,
TH E S C O P E OF ME TAP H Y S I C . 25 .

ter conception o f the subor di nation o f existence t o

consciousness gives an intended meani ng t o the ex

pression thi ngs i n themselves and at the s ame t ime

- -

b a nishes them from o ur consideration ; a dm its t h e

possibili ty o f their existin g but condemns them to ,

a n o n objective existence ; and if the term existence


has a meaning this conception i s self contradi ctory


But the same primary du a l ism when conceived a s a ,

duali sm o f two equal and coextensive factors o r mem

bers mutu a l ly li mi tin g each other is the ground o f
, ,

the expressions All knowledge is relative and Al l

, ,

existence is relative existence And o ne consequence .

o f disregarding metaphysic and busying the mind ,

exclusively with Objective exi stence is that obj ects , ,

themselves the phenomena o f experience come t o

, ,

be considered as things i n themselves ; and thus the - -

popular view o f them i s practically and as by a kind ,

o f forgetfulness adopted by men o f science who

, ,

would be the last willingly t o accept it .

Let us adopt fo r a moment this hypothesis o f a

thing i n itself a D ing a n sich No w what is this D in g
- -
- -

a n sich which we reject from knowledge and from


objective existence o r rath er what is it not ? C on ,

s c i o u s n e s s we will suppose for the moment carves ,


o u t from existence the obj ective world ; the D ing

a n sich is that which c annot be reached o r affected

by consciousness ; and thus wherever we nd an ,

uni versal law o r mode o f consciousness there we ,

assume that we may be in contact with the D ing

a n sich
If things which exist in time and space

are t o that extent knowable by u s then the D ing

, , ,

a n sich which is by hypothesis unknowable must be

, ,

independent o f those forms ; and if things which can

impress o r a ffect o ur sensibil ity a re s o far kn owable ,
26 T HE S C O P E OF ME T AP H Y S I C .

then the D ing a n sich cannot be capable o f i mpressing

- -

o u r sensibility for otherwise it would be knowable


Thus we are guided in o ur notions of what it is not ,

and ipso facto unable to conjecture what it is It .

will be seen in the course o f the E ssay whether there

are any positive grounds for supposing that relative
existence is in ni te in any sense ; that is for holding ,

that there can be n o existence beyond some at least

o f o ur capacities for knowledge F or it may well .

be that o ur consciousness may be li m ited in some

respects and unlimited in others ; if now in any r e
spect it is unlimited in that respect it will include

all existence ; objective and relative existence itself

will be u nl imited in that respect ; and the D ing a n -

sich will in that respect vanish If the necessary and .

universal forms o f consciousness are themselves i n

ni te then the D ing a n sich if it exists at all must be
- -
, ,

included in them and i n that respect o r to that ex

, ,

tent cease t o be a D ing a n sich

- -

O n the non existence o f the D ing a n sich s e e

- - -

Schell ing s V om Ich Oder ti ber das U nbedin gte
, ,

Vol i o f collected Works p 2 1 0 And o n the

. .
. .

complete mutuali ty o f the subjective and O b jective

kingdoms s e e his masterly E inl eitung in the Ideen
, ,

z u einer P hilosophie der N atur V ol ii o f collected . .


Works It is the lasting servic e o f the post Kanti


philosophers F i c h t e Schelling and Hegel each in l l l S

, , , ,

degree to have established the doctrine o f the perfect


coextensiveness and mutuality o f existence and con

s c i o u sn e s s But it is not necessary it is even for

bidden by the method in which alone this doctrine

can be proved to follow them i n characterising this

coextensiveness and mutuality as identity o r as the ,

Absolute The union of the inni te and the ni te


28 . THE S C O PE OF M E TAP H Y S I C .

vielen versagt scheint D aher die Unfa h i gke i t sich


die reine Subjekt O b je kt i v i t a t der absoluten F orm a l s


absolute E inheit z u denken But I ask by what .


right can that which constantly appears as third

be transformed into that which is in itsel f rst
It can only be done by abstracting from the form O f
time i n o ne moment in order to exhibit the obj ect

in its essence o r value an essence simultaneous with


the object itself and then the next moment r e intro


d u c i ng the form o f ti m e i n order to exhibit the object


in its essence as prior to the obj ect as a phenomenon .

Taking for instance any series o f phenomena i n order

, ,

o f history the last phenomenon o r the result o f the

, , ,

series is analysed into its elements in order of logic ;

and then that element which is most important in
order o f logic where abstraction is made o f time
, ,

being necessary to the existence o f the whole pheno

menon analysed is considered to have been present

as a cause from the rst in the earliest phenomenon ,

o f the series in order o f history It is true that what .

is rst i n order of history is Often last in order of

cognition ; but where the cogni tion is a logi cal c o gni
tion considering i t s o b je c t staticall y and classing its
, ,

elements i n order o f logical im portance there it does ,

not follow that what is last i n order o f cogni tion o r ,

rst in order o f logic is rst also in order o f history


Thus founded on the dualism o f subject and o b


je c t conceived as two equal and coextensive members


o r factors there arises before us the conception o f the


world di stingui shed not divided into two ki n gdoms

, ,

the kingdom o f knowi n g and the ki ngdom of being , ,

a principium c o gn o s c e n di a n d a principium e x i s t e n d i .

A s in a court o f justice guilt does not exist till it is

proved s o here existence is nothing until known
, .

But we require if possible some more speci a l know

, ,

ledge O f this dualism ; we wish t o s e e the modu s

operandi o f consciousness its method and its nature ;
, ,

to s e e whether besides witnessing t o the fact and to

, ,

some particular modes o f existence it witnesses also

, ,

to any necessary o r u ni versal modes o f it I t was .

such questions as these which received an answer in

the doctrines o f Kant as to time and space which ,

doctrines will be reconsidered i n these pages The .

doctrines o f Kant form a system which n o t only is

more complete than any that preceded it but also ,

contains principles which are the rm e s t foundation

for the labours o f succeeding phi losophers The mar .

v e l l o u s system o f Hegel reposes o n a Kantian basis ;

but reasons wi ll be given later o n for the conclusion ,

that this was not the true edice which should have
arisen o n that foundation The fundamental prin .

c i l e s still remain and the following pages are an

p ;
attempt rst to analyse and interpret them and then
, , ,

to raise o n them the true superstructure o f philo

sophy M uch will be found in thi s E ssay which has

been said and in many instances far better said by

, ,

other post Kantian writers Schel l ing Hegel C ole

, , ,

ridge Schopenh auer Sir W Hamilton M r M ansel

, ,

P rofessor F e rri e r M r J S Mill M r H Spencer

. . .
. .

for instance ; resemblances to whose doctrines and ,

diff erences from them and at the same time also


some o f my many obligations to their writings wi ll ,

disclose themselves to the reader a s he proceeds .

What is distinctive and new i n it will I think be , ,

found to arise chiey from its keeping more exclu

si v el
y t o a purely metaphysic al as distinguished ,

from either a psychological or an ontological point ,

of view .

8 . What is the difference between psychology

and metaphysic ? A difference in their object matter -

The Object matter o f psychology is the mind o r con


s c i o u s n e s s in relation to the bodily organs whic h a r e

its seat ; that of metaphysic is consciousness in rela

tion to its obj ects . P sychology is thus a special part
o f physiology that part which links physiology to
, .

metaphysic ; it is a special science o r a portion o f

special science and may be called the natural history

o f consciousness To put the distinc tion between


metaphysic and psychology in another shape it may ,

be said that psychology regards the mind and its

states o f consciousness as members o f the kingdom o f
Being alone ; while for metaphysic they in common ,

with all other kinds o f obj ects are considered as mem ,

bers o f both the kingdoms of Being and Knowing .

Thus psychology is occupied not only with the organs

o f consciousness its material conditions and its con
, , ,

d i t i o n s o f existence but also with its results con


s i d e r e d as Objects that is with the laws o f the asso

, ,

c i a t i o n o f ideas and l i a t i o n o f Opinions and systems


o f philosophy as concrete phenomena o f conscious


ness ; while metaphysic is busied with these obj ects

onl y s o far as they are objects o f consciousness ; in
order rst t o di st inguish in them their subjective
, ,

from their objective aspect and secondly to analyse , ,

them into their component parts and classify the ,

elements which compose them .

.9 M etaphysic has been characterise d in I as , ,

the appli ed logic o f the u ni verse A s such it is an .

entirely statical and not a dynamical theory In .

other words it is no theory of the causae e x i s t e n d i of


the world o r of conscio usness ; it does not give the

origin or the genesis o f existence ; this s o far as it is ,

possible is the task o f the special empirical sciences

, ,

whether physical o r psychical But it is the causa .

e s s e n di o r nature
o f the world o f existence which

metaphysic undertakes to examin e ; to analyse the

structure o f Objects as objects o f consciousness and to
, ,

resolve them i nto their elements It does n o t pretend .

to determine whether the ultimate elements which it ,

reaches in its analysis existed separately prior to the ,

wholes o r empiric a l obj ects which are their synthesis ,

n o r to show how this is possible Such a problem .

would be o f a dynamical nature There is no reason .

given in metaphysic for supposing that historically in ,

the order Of nature the si mple existed before the ,

compound stil l less that the a priori elements existed


separately before the empirical objects which yield

them to o u r analysis What is rst in analysis is .

last in synthesis and vice vers a ; but both analysis


and synthesis whether employed upon particular


obj ects o f perception o r upon general notions o r uni

versals are modes o f static a l enquiry and warrant
, ,

no conclusion as to what is rst and what last in

dynamical enquiry o r in the order o f history How

consciousness is produced how motion arises in o b ,

e c t s h o w feelings come to b e combined with c o ni

j , g
tions how the world itself came into existence
, ,

these are questions with which metaphysic has n o

thing to do ; metaph ysic has but to accept the facts
as they are and to an a l yse them into their simplest

elements What and where are the elephant the


tortoise and the stone these are dynami cal not



statical empirical not metaphysical questions ; they

, ,

relate to the history of empirical events not t o the ,

analysis Of facts .

T o mistake the ultimate elements in an alysis for


the rst empirical e xistences i n historical o rder o f

time and from this to suppose that metaphysic can

o r ought to assign a cause o r causes o f existence to

the universe is to transform metaphysic into onto


logy N ot indeed by the route of t h e D ing a n sich

- -

o r by that o f an imagined substance o r substratum of

objects but by a route not less cert ain If in meta


physic we can go s o far back in a n a l y s1 s as to name ,

elements o f objects which are themselves a priori o r

logically previous to all experience and non empi -

ri c a l
it is directly contrary to o ur o w n procedure
and principles to make these into caus ae e x i s t e n d i of
empirical objects ; for to do s o we must rst trans
form them i n to empiric a l obj ects themselves .

O ntology rests on the transformation o f a b s t r a c

tions into complete objects o r complete existences .

But all ontological systems do n o t adopt the same

kind o f abstractions to transform in to complete exist
e nc e s . O n e route t o ontology has just been pointed
o ut
that which adopts abstract elements o f objects
o r o f cog ni tions for this purpose There is another

which adopts abstract aspects o f phenomena that is , ,

either their Objective o r their subjective aspect An .

instance o f the rst is Spino z a s system instances of ,

the second are Schelling s and Hegel s Spinoza re .

gards the Absolute as Substance Schelli ng as R eason

, ,

Hegel as M ind All such transformation is foreign


to metaphysic whose last word is a nalysis



I n ni t um i l li n c i d e m q ue p e r o m a ni s ,
tu hi
A q e e o ni t um p p i in
ro r o s e ne v e id tu r .

G i
o rd a n o B ru n o .

1 0 H UME
. has the merit o f being o ne o f those phi
l o s 0p h e rs w h o have kept closest t o phenomena them
selves without m i xing up with the analysis o f them

considerations o f their possibl e origin o r causes ; phe

nomena a r e with him t h e beginning middle and end , ,

o f his investigations But in doing this h e produced


a picture o f the universe as if it were unconn ected ,

the work o f chance incoherent ; especia l ly was this


the case with his theory o f causation whi ch led Kant ,

to undertake a still more searching investigation o f

phenomena resulting in a discovery in phenomena

themselves o f the principl e o f their connection and

consistence He did this by directing his attention

to an o l d distinction which had its origin with the

philosophers o f Greece and was always considered
o n e o f the cardinal distinctions o f philosophy the ,

di stinction o f M atter and F orm This di stinction


taken together with that between analytic and syn

thetic judgments is the corner stone t h e guiding

thread in Kant s work the Kritik der R einen V er
, ,

nun ft ; and o n that point p hi losophy 1 s st l standin g

il .

The application which Kant made o f this di stinction ,

the part icular shape which his system built upon it



assumed has been often and in many points success

, ,

full y attacked ; yet the distinction remains a n essen


tia l and an ulti mate one and especially s o in that


matter to which he rst applied it the theory o f per ,

c e p t i o n ; the distinction itself apart from the theory


which Kant built upon it is sound And this dis

, .

tinction will be buil t upon throughou t the course of

this E ssay with what success remains to be proved

by the event .

But there is another distinction onl y less import ,

ant and g eneral than that between matter and form ,

which owing its origin equally to Grecian antiquity

, ,

is also equally applicable and essential n o w to meta

physical questions ; and o n this distinction in a d ,

dition to that between matter and form and in con ,

junction with i t I hope t o establish the theory o f thi s


E ssay Aristotle drew the distinction between 7 5 57 77

. 5

and Bevr ga o zm a in the C ategories ; the Schoolmen ,

o r rather I believe the N o m i n a l i s t s among t h e School

men transformed this distinction into o n e between


prima and secunda intentio anim i S e e William o f


O ckham Summ a t o t i u s Lo gi c ae P ars I cap xii xiv

, ,
. . . .

N ow without entering into the question as to the

exact meaning attached by Aristotle o r the School
m e n to these phrases I will give what I think is the

true modern shape of the distinction as available for ,

philosophical discussions a t the present day retaining ,

the nomenclature o f the N o m i n a l i st s and distinguish

ing rst from second intentions .

It is a current theory at the present day that all ,

perception includes comparison ; n o t onl y that a pro

cess t a k es place in the nerves or brain which is equi
valent to or r esults in comparison but that when we ,

perceive any object we perceive it as a di stinct obj ect


act perception o f all other objects is an act o f com


parison The rst and simplest obj ects of perception


are complex all other obj ects of perception are com


pounds o f these .

But now are the rst and simplest objects o f per

c e t i o n complex ?
p The reply can only be N ame any '

object that is not s o abstract o r c o n c r e t e a thought

, ,

o r a th i ng There will be found t o be none ; and for


this assertion to be proved true I trust rather to the ,

course o f this E ss a y as a whole than to any remarks

which I could make here at once The object per .

c e i v e d and the act of perceiving it are then each of

them complex even in the case o f the least possible


object or moment of consciousness .

But to call the act and the obj ect complex is to

c all it distinguishable into parts o r elements in itself ;

for otherwise it would be simple Here then we . .

reach the distinction mentioned in the preceding

chapter between empirical and metaphysical objects ;
empirical Objects are complex complete objects , ,

met aphysical Objects are incomplete elementary o b , ,

c t s o nl y in combination forming complex complete

j e , ,

o r empirical Objects See the distinction between


metaphysical and physical analysis stated and applied

to the distinction between matter and form in Cior ,

dano Bruno s D ialogue D e la C ausa P rincipio e t U no ,

. vol i p 2 5 2 Wagner s edit The same holds
. . .

o f acts ; empirical acts are complex and complete

metaphysical acts are the elements or moments o f these .

And both metaphysical acts and metaphysic a l objects

differ from empirical acts and objects by having an

existence only in logic M y ? (M r/a v vegy efga B o f}

N ow the case O f the metaphysical objects or ele

m ents in perception I leave for the present content ,
OF TI M E A ND S PA C E . 37

with having h ere shown their nature and position .

But I follow up the c ase o f the metaphysical acts ,

elements o r moments of the empirical act O f percep


tion since this will lead most readily to the d i s t i n c


tion between rst and second intentions The s i m .

l e s t empirical act o f perception includes it has been

p ,

seen three elementary acts : 1 s t the perception o f


element A 2d the perception o f element B 3 d the

, ,

perception o f their relation ; these three taken t o

gether constitute the empirical perception o f the
object A o r o f the element A as a n obj ect But

how is it known that these are the elementary acts

and these the elementary objects included in the em
i r i c a l perception when by hypothesis the three ele
p ,

mentary acts and Objects cannot be known separately ?

Solely by analogy from cases where an empirical o b

j ec t is compared with other empirical Obj ects and
perceived in consequence as what it is ; where fo r
instance an object is perceived as a marble statue
from being classed with former o r other instances o f
marble statues F rom the analysis o f the doubly

concrete case names are given to the elements in the

analysis of the simply concrete case where the mem ,

bers o f the analysis are not concrete perceptions but

elements o f perception We name the metaphysic a l

elements of analysis as if they were empiric a l objects

o f perception ; but this cannot alter thei r nature and

give them independ ent existence Let us now ex .

amine the d oubly concrete case farther What is the .

character o f the three acts o f perception wh ich c o n

s t i t ut e it ? They are not all exactly alike If I had .

never seen marble statues before should I be unable


to s e e this o n e if it were presented t o me ? I should

not be unable If I had had no sight before sho ul d

I be unable to s e e this marble statue if it were pre

sented to me ? I should still s e e it If I had had .

no sensations at all before the statue was presented

to me should I be unable to s e e it o n i t s being pre

sented ? I should s t ill s e e it I should have the .

sensation o f whiteness and o f a certain extension o f

whiteness but I should not know what that sensation

o r that extension was If now I had seen other o b


e c t s I should know something more o f this sensation

j ,

by comparison with them ; if I had seen other marble

statues I should know that this was o f the same sort
, ,

though I should not know the m e a nm g o f its being

o f the same sort o r o f the term sameness
Here we .

have the three concrete acts contained in the doubly

concrete act o f perception The rst is that which .

presents o r in which is present ed the object in ques

tion as it would be presented to a man w h c had had

no other perceptions The second is that in which


certain other Objects marble statues I n thi s case are

, ,

presented o r represented as the case may be ; and ,

the third is that in which the object o f the rst act

is classed with or excluded from the objects o f the
second act Here are three concrete acts o f percep

tion s o closely connected together and performed s o

quickly that they can only be di stinguished by close

mental inspection ; but yet each act a complete em

p i ri c a l act n o t only,
existing logically o r as a meta
physical act and with a separate character o f its o w n

The rst o f these three acts o f perception I call a

perception Of an object in its rst intention ; when
we perceive an obj ect as a man would perceive it
who s a w I n I t an object for the rst time or when we ,

voluntaril y abstract from a p erceived obj ect all that

is imported into it by o ur perceptions o f other rela


tions and obj ects in both o f these cases I call it


having before us an object in i t s rst intention The .

rst case arises in perception and witho ut volition ,

the second arises in reasoning and in consequence o f

volition; the rst case is intuitional the second 10 ,

i c a l ; the rst a percept the second a concept The

g ,

second o f the three acts composing the doubly con

crete perception may o r may n o t give an Obj ect in its
rst intention ; if a man had seen but o n e marble
statue before the representation o f that would be a

rst intention ; but usually the class to which an

object is referred in perception is perceived as an
object or collection o f objects in the second in tention .

The third o f the three constitutive acts gives already

an object in its second intention fo r we cannot s up

pose that the relation whi ch is its object is thought

, ,

o f o r perceived i n such an abstract way as would

make it fall under the second o r logic a l class o f rst

intentions F inall y the whole doubly concrete per

c e t i o n itself the perception o f the Obj ect as a marble

p ,

statue is a perception o f the obj ect in its second i n


tention ; and this is the perception which is properly

opposed to the rst o f the three constitutive percep
tions namely that o f the object in its rst intention
, ,

F irst intentions may accordingly be dened a s Objects

i n relation to consciousness alone ; second intentions ,

as objects in relation to other objects in consciousness .

The di stinction between rst and second i n t e n

tions though arising in perception can onl y be em
ployed by logic ; it is discovered in perception by
an a l ytical reasoning ; it is a fact in all domains o f
consciousness but it is a n in strument only i n reason

. The neglect o f this di stinction I believe t o
vitiate more arguments than the neglect o f any other
logical di stinction perhaps with t h e sole exception o f

that between the caus ae e x i s t e n d i e s s e n d i and cog , ,

n o s c e n di O n this di stinction between rst and second


intentions h a n gs that between deni tion and d e s c ri p

tion for the doctrine that all perception incl u des
comparison taken without the limits here assign ed to

it has naturally led to the conf usion between the two


kinds of acts It was thought that all perception not


only included but could be analysed into acts o f com

parison and as description was the result o f compari
, ,

s o n therefore i t was concluded de ni tion must be a

, , ,

result o f comparison also and therefore only a more ,

accurate kind o f description The fact however i s .


that it is as necessary to keep description and d e ni

tion separate as it is to keep separate rst and second

intentions D eni tion is the exp ression Of a rst


intention descrip t ion o f a second intention ; denition


ought to give those qualities of an object which b e

long to it by itself without reference to other objects
, ,

o r to whether these qualities belong to other objects

a lso ; description ought to give those qualities which

show the tness o f an object for such and such a pur

pose its similarity to its rank and importance among
, , ,

other objects ; de n ition gives the analysis o f an O b

j ec t, description characterises it D enition and de .

s cription supply a corrective fo r the unavoidable

ambiguity i nvolved i n the shortness o f single nam
The name o f an object may be meant to be taken o r

may be actually taken to mean either the rst or ,

second intention o f the ob ject it is applied to or a m ,

b i gu o u sl y to cove r both E xpand the name however


i nto a sentence or a phrase and it is more easily seen ,

w hether it results in a denition o r a description


whether the sentence presents a n object intended to


be kept strictly and solely before the mind in the

traits mentioned o r whether its equ a lity o r inequality
, ,

its similarity o r dissimilarity to other objects its

, ,

relative position and importance is the thin g present ,

to the mi nd o f the speaker It may be as ked How


can a deni tion express a rst intention since a d e ,

ni t i o n consists o f t w o objects at the very least con

, ,

n e c t e d together since it expresses the analysis of the


Object o r name t o be dened ? The answer i s that ,

any object however complex may be made a rst

, ,

intention by keeping it alone before the mind and

separat ing it from other objects ; it may include any
number o f relations within it but m ust not be com

pared with objects without it It is then an obj ect


in relation t o consciousness a l one as distin guished ,

from an object in relation t o other obj ects in con

s c i o u s n e s s ; an object taken in relation to other objects

in consciousness is a different obj ect from itself o u t

o f that relation ; the t w o sets o f obj ects together b e
come a new object i n the rst intention The d i s .

tinction o f objects of rst and second intention is

discovered to exist i n very simpl e cases o f empirical
perception but this di stinction found in nature and
, ,

independent o f o u r volition is capable of being a p


plied vol untarily to other cases in reasonin g ; the

process o f nature in perception can be repeated v o l un
t a ri l y in reasoni ng . The discovery o f it i n perception
shows that it is a natural and legitimate process it ,

does n o t restrict the process to the spontaneous pro

c e e d i n s o f consciousness The names of simple feel
g .

ings o r the feelings themselves cannot be dened for ,

instance the sensation White If a denition is a t


tempted i t must be by a reference to something else ,

for instance by its causes as the meeting of a parti


o nlar ray of light wi th the retina o r by its effects as, ,

the absorption o f rays O f heat o r by its relations as the

, ,

opposite o f black ; and in these cases there arises a de

scription o f White and we have before us a new object

composed o f the original Object White and some o f , ,

its relations to other obj ects and the description o f


White is a deni tion not o f the original obj ect but

o f this together with some o f its relations to other

objects ; and o f this object there is perhaps no single

n a me but the d efinition serves for one and this object
, ,

is an object of the rst intention The same phrase .

may be a deni tion o f an object and a description o f

part o f it a denition of it i n its rst intention and a

description of that part Of it in its second intention .

There may be names o f complex obj ects as well as o f

simple objects there may be descriptions o f complex

objects as well as simple ; but there can be denitions

only o f complex objects There may be names o f

simple obj ects o f the rst intention as well as o f com

plex objects of the rst intention ; but there can be
denitions only o f complex objects o f the rst i nt e n
tion ; which is equivalent to saying that deni tions
belong t o reasoning a voluntary process of conscious

ness while names belong both to spontaneous and to


voluntary processes o f consciousness both to percep ,

tion and to reasoning F rom this it also follows that


denitions are not necessarily denitions o f names ,

there may be denitions o f objects o f which there are

not names and there may be names o f objects of

which there are not denitions Both names and .

deni tions are marks for others o r expressions fo r ,

ourselves o f objects of consciousness ; marks which


have their distinctive properties and uses The fol .

lowing is a distinction o f objects which wa s current

whom are and some Of whom a r e not patriots and ,

I indicate his comparative value among men by the

description But if in saying these words I x my

thoughts o n what D emosthenes is irrespective of ,

what other men are and place him as an Obj ect


before me as a man who feels and acts from the


feeling o f love to his country I ha ve before me an ,

entirely different object an Object composed o f D e


m o s t h e n e s and his cou ntry and his feelings and acts

towards his country ; and this is an obj ect in the
rst intention and the words which convey o r ex

press this Object are a denition and not a d e s c r i p

tion ; they may not be a perfect denition the perfect ,

denition o f an Obj ect s o complex as a human being

would ll a book but they are part of a denition

and not part of a description The use o f names and


phrases in the rst intention implies neither praise

nor blame but states simply facts o f analysis ; but

their use in the second intention involving com ,

parison with others nearly always implies either


praise o r blame ; and thus the confusion between

the two intentions is not onl y the fruitful source o f
errors in reasoning but o f quarrels in practice when ,

words spoken in the rst intention without arriere ,

pense are understood in the second i ntention as i m


plying blame D eni tions and descriptions have n o


marks in grammatical form o r structure by which

they can be distinguished from each other ; if they
had the subj ect would have been cleared up long

ago ; but the Objec t s which they expr ess the things ,

signied by them are essentially different It is o f


the utmost importance in reasoni ng to distinguish

which kind of object or s i gni c a t um it is which i s
expressed or concealed by a word or s et o f words ;
, ,

whether that object is a rst or a second intention ,

and the set o f words a deni tion o r a description .

True as it is that the subtilty of nature far surpasses

the subtilty o f thought it is no less true that the ,

subtilty of thought far surpasses the subtilty o f lan

guage It may be hoped that some day o r other
, ,

language will develop forms corresponding to the

above di stinguished forms o f consciousness .

1 1 I return now to the point passed over shortly


before the consideration of the analysis o f objects into


their metaphysical elements and make an appl ication ,

o f the distinction now established between rst and

second intentions An analysis o f any obj ect conned


strictly to that object itself witho ut drawing its rela ,

tions to other objects into the analysis is an analysis ,

Of the object in its rst in tention Such an analysis .

will include neither the cause nor the mode of origin

Of the object analysed nor its importance o r meaning

compared with other Obj ects ; it wil l classify not the ,

Object as a whole but its parts as parts o f the Object ;


it wi ll not classify its parts as si milar o r dissimilar to

corresponding parts i n other objects but solely with ,

respect to their functions in the object itself to which

they belong The result will be to give the elements

o f the object analysed and not its aspects o r any of


its aspects Take now any empirical phenomenon


from the simplest to the most complex isolate it from ,

others treat it as an obj ect of the rst intention and

, ,

analyse it as such without askin g how it came to be


what it is or whence it derived its characteristics o r

, ,

what other things it is li ke It will be found that .

a l l its characteristics fa l l into two classes ; some are

material or particular feelings others are form a l

, , ,

o r particular forms in which these feelings appear



E very feeling must exist a certain length Of tim e fo r ,

and some feelings must exist also I n a certain position

in space and some also i n a c ertain extent o f space

The time and the space i n which feeli n gs exist is

called the formal element o f the p henomenon ; t h e
feeling whatever may be its kind is call ed the ma
, ,

t e ri a l element of the phenomenon Whether spac e .

is always include d in every phenomenon whether it ,

is always a part o f the formal element in phenomena ,

may be left for the present undecided ; it is clear that

time always is so for if we had not a feeling in some

duration however short we should have it not at all

, ,

empiric a l ly S O that leaving o ut o f View the ques


tion whether the formal element a l ways includes space

as well as time it is still quite certain that a formal

and a material element is i n cluded in every empirical

phenomenon These t w o elements are entirely dif

fe r e nt in kind from each other : and there is nothing

in any phenomenon whatever which does not fall
under o ne o r other o f these two heads I d o not .

know what it is o r h o w to name it if there is any ,

such ; but if there is then as Hume says I desire

, , ,

that it may be produced Here then we have the .

two ultimate heterogeneous inseparable e lements o f

, , ,

all phenomena in their rst intention namely F eelin g ,

and Tim e o r as it may turn o ut afterwards Time and


Space ; and these names F eeli n g Time a n d Space , , , ,

are names o f the elements in their rst intention ;

names o f them in the second intention a r e M atter and
F orm o r material and formal elements o f phenomena
, .

E very phenomenon as such contains these two ele

ments time o r time and space o n t h e o n e side and
, , , ,

feeling o n the other T hi s i s empirically and e x p e ri


menta l ly certain ; o n this a s a veriable fact I tak e


my stand and shall appeal to the experience o f e very


o n e whether it is not so whether he knows any phe ,

n o m e n o n which does not contain these t w o elements ,

and farther whether he knows any phenomenon which

contains more than these two elements ; for I shall
attempt to show that no phenomenon o r variety o f
phenomena as such however rare o r complex c o n
, , ,

tains any thing which cannot be reduced to o r ana

lysed into these This is the analysis of phenomena

i n their rst intention .

It is generally supposed that two other things are

elements o f phenomena either besides o r instead o f ,

those which have been mentioned These two ele .

ments which are supposed to be elements o f all and


every phenomenon w ithout exception are the Sub ,

j ec t and the O bject long with whatever
. any
intelli gence knows says P rof F e rri er; it must as
, ,

the ground o r condition o f its kn owledge have some ,

cognisance o f itself Institutes of M etaphysic Sect



I P rop 1
. . . E very phenomenon accordin g to this ,

whatever other elements it may contain must contain ,

as e l e m e nt s a n obj ect and a subject ; o n e o f its elements


must be the object another must be the subj ect The


meaning o f this I apprehend to be that feeling itself , ,

the material element of perception is capable o f being ,

considered by itself as an object of the rst i ntention

, ,

o r at least by way of abstraction and without re ud

p j g
i n g the question whether it is o r is not separable from
the formal element ; that feeling itself considered in
its rst intention is capable o f further analysis and ,

that s o an a l ysed it consists o f o r at any rate contains

as elements a Self and a N o t self F eeling according -

to this view is not an ultimate obj ect o r element

, ,

m a de objective but is capable o f ana l ysis P heno

, .

mena s o far as they contain feeling and s o far only

, ,

abstracting from their formal element are not inde ,

composable but two inseparable elements are present


in them which combined constitute feeli ng that i s , ,

constitute every determinate particular feeling no ,

matter which These elements a re Self and N ot self


It seems to me that to st ate this theory is to di sprove

it ; to bring it clearly before the mind s eye is to
show its i ncorrectness Fo r what are these elements ?

What is Self what impression does it make what is

, ,

it i n its rst intention ? What is N o t self its impres -


sion in the rst intention ? Is it not clear that w e

have no distinct notion of either o f these elements as ,

we have of the feeling of light o r sound o f the time ,

a sound lasts o r o f the space a light occupies ? Is it


not clear also that we must ask these questions about

them and so must refer them to o ne o r other o f the

before mentioned elements o f phenomena the formal


o r the material ; that if they were known to us dis ,

t i ngui sh a b l e by us as elements of phenomena it would ,

be as modes o r a mode o r particular ki n d o f feeling ?

, ,

Whatever then Self and N o t self may be they are -


not elements o f phenomena generall y .

If however they are not elements o f phenomena

generally they must fa l l under the second mode of

looking at phenomena they must belong to pheno ,

mena considered n o t in their rst intention but in ,

some o f their second intentions ; they must arise in

phenomena in consequence o f a l ater introduced dis -

tinction from a comparison o f some phenomena with


others from the relations Of a phenomenon to others


and not from its elements within itself This they .

do ; and the distinction in question between Self and

N o t self being fundamentally the same as that b e

O F T I M E AND S PAC E . 49

tween Subject and O bject is o n e which applies t o a l l


phenomena w ithout exception ; it is the fundamental

distinction in philosophy although it is n o t a di s t i nc

tion at all in di rect ana l ysis of phenomena ; the reason

of which is evident for a l l philosophy is reection ;

and these notions Subject and O bject arise rst and

, , ,

are the rst to arise in reection and are i n fact

, ,

that object which distinguishes reection from dir ect

consciousness This distinction is the Object which

as the obj ect o f a particular mode Of consciousness ,

di stinguishes that mode from others ; consciousness

drawing thi s di sti nction o r having thi s distinction

as its obj ect is called reection It wo uld no doubt


simpli fy matters very much and would therefore be ,

very desirable if circumstances would pe rm i t to s up

, ,

pose that consciousness is i n i t s ultimate and simplest

empirical perceptions reective as well as perceptive .

The richer the germ the easier it is to imagine the


growth o f the entire tree from it But o n the other .

hand the fewer the elements in the germ the more

, ,

complet e i s the explanation if it succeeds which , ,

deduces from it the tree .

U su a l ly this question is treated without distinction

o f rst a n d second intentions P henomena are no .

sooner mentioned than it is considered how they

arise o r what they relate to instead o f what they
, ,

are P henomena are divided into subj ects and o b


e c t s a n d then straightway are asserted to arise from

j ,

the meeting o f subj ects and objects O r if subject .

and object are held not to be phenomen a then phe ,

n o m e n a are said to arise from a conjunction of an

Unk nown which underlies consciousness with an

Unknown which underlies objects But known o r .

unknown subject a nd object are straightway assigned



as the condi tion o f the existenc e o f phenomena and ,

phenomena explained by a reference to their mode o f

origin o r by a disti nction between them and what is

called absolute existence The phenomenon becomes


thus a tertium quid arising from the meeting of two


factors known o r unknown called the subj ect and

, ,

t h e obj ect ; and each o f the t w o factors is besides

often supposed to contribute something from its o w n
fund towards constituting the phenomenon ; either
t h e subject contributes the matter and the Obj ect ,

the form ; o r vice vers a ; o r else the object contri

butes both and the subject contains the c o nt ri b u
tions ; o r the subject contributes both and creates
the obj ect as their receptacle But what is the fact ?

D o either o f the two elements material and formal, ,

bear marks of a subjective o r an obj ective origin of ,

being contributed by the subj ect o r by the object ?

Is either o f them subjective and n o t objective or o b ,

e c t i v e and not subjective ? I am entirely at a loss

to determine which o f the two elements should most
properly have either character exclusively attributed
to it They both appear to me to be equally and

alike subj ective equal ly and alike objective and to

, ,

bear both characters at once I can indeed attend


to the subjective character o f either o f them and I ,

can attend to the Obj ective character o f either o f

them ; but this is by a voluntary act and an act o f ,

abstraction I cannot avoid seeing them in both


characters alternately Both characters o f each o f


the two elements are entirely independent of my w il l

when once I have made the distinction o f subject and
Object every thing appears to me as bearing both

characters ; this onl y depends o n my will which ,

character at any particular time I will a ttend to .


among objects ; but i n either way whether viewed ,

from the obj ective Or subj ective point of view each ,

aspect contains the same two elements formal and ,

material The annexed diagram may help t o make


my meani n g clearer .

The two ele ments matter and form in the phe

, ,

no m e no n ,
are distinguished by direct attention I n
perception ; the two aspects subjective and Objective
, ,

are distinguished by attention in reection ; but the

analysis o f the process o f reection the origin and ,

nature of the two aspe cts subjective and objective

, ,

the introduction o f the cognitions Subj ect and O b


j c e t into phenomena o r t h e transformation of phe

, ,

n o m e n a i nto modes o f consciousness and modes o f

existence is reserved for the next chapter where it

, ,

will be introduced in a diff erent connection Keeping .

however this further examination in reserve it will ,

be useful to dwell o n the distinction between the two

modes o f e xamination a little more at length P he .

n o m e n a in their rst intention are objects of con

s c i o u s n e s s consistin g o f two elements form and mat


ter ; phenomena i n their second intentions are ex

i s t e n c e s which in addition to this character o f being

objects of consciousness are related objectively to


each other These two characters a r e p o s s e s s e d by


a ll phenomena without exception and must be p o s ,

sessed also by those if any such should di sclose them


selves which a ppear to be the conditions o r contri


buting causes o f the rest M ind and matter subjectsu


an d objects if they assume a distin ct place among


phenomena as causes or conditions o f other phe

nomena must be themselves also phenomena and
, ,

present the characteristics o f phenomena ; that i s ,

must consist o f elements in their rst intention and ,

possess a s ubjective and Objective as pect in their

second intention S O that in accordance with this

view we shall have nothing before us but phenomena ,

i nstead o f having before u s phenomena resulting from

the concurrence o f two unknown substances mind on ,

the o ne side and existence o r matter on the other o r

, ,

composed o f the contributions o f two kinds o f ex

i s t e n c e s m ental o r absolute o n the o n e side and
, ,

material or absolute o n the other What is cal led .

mind and what are called existences and that which

, ,

Kant calls der t ra n s c e n d e nt a l e G egenstand will have ,

melted in to phenomena o ut o f which indeed they,

origina l ly g rew We shall no longer be able to s a y


with the N o m i n a li s t s such and such a conception is

not a real existence it is a mere ction o r intention


o f the mind nor with the R e a lists such and such

an object has no t rue existence it is merely em ,

p i ri c a l for a l l phenomena are at once both objective

and subj ective and i f they are the o n e must of n e


c e ssi t
y be the other In the. next place it wil l be
seen that theories o f perception are a part not o f
metaphysic but o f psychology o f the science which ,

examines the laws o f the conditions and causes o f

consciousness as obj ects not Of that which an a l yses

the phenomena o f consciousness themselves ; o f a


scienc e in short which treats o f obj ects in some o f

their second intentions And it follows that what .

are called o n the theory o f a representative percep


tion impressions images and ideas o f objects are

, , , ,

the objects themselves and no t merely evi dence o f ,

the obj ects ; that in fact there are no objects but

these s o called evidences o f objects F rom the sub .

e c t i v e side o r in their subj ective aspect these

j , s o ,

called evidences o f Obj ects are not merely evidences

to the mi n d but they are the mind itself Thus
, .

with whichever o f the t w o we begin the mind per ,

c e i vi n o r the object perceived w e nd o n e thing

g ,

only before us namely the phenomenon which was

, , ,

before thought t o be onl y the intermediary between

the mind and the object And be it Observed that .

this o l d division into three mind obj ect and inter , , ,

mediary exists equally o n a theory o f immedi ate


presentative as o n a theory o f mediate representa

, ,

tive perception The difference between them is


solely this that o n the former theory the i n t e rm e


diary phenomena are t h e result o f the contact o f

mind with the object are that which springs fr om ,

the concurrence o r o ut o f the contributions o f two
thin gs o r substances more o r less unknown and mys

t e ri o u s called mind and object ; while o n the latter


theory the intermediary phenomena are the me di um

and condition Of that concurrence But in the view .

here brought forward both min d a n d the object , ,

whether conceived as entirely unknown o r more o r

less known are wrapped up in and developed out of
, , ,

the phenomena analysed ; h o w much known and ,

how wrapped up in and developed o ut o f phenomena ,

must remain undetermined till the process o f r e e c

tion is examined in the following chapter P heno .

mena alone remain in the world and mind and the ,

obj ect are no longer separate empiric a l things o r ,

separate unknown things or separate absolute things

, ,

but two inseparable aspects o f phenomena F rom .

o n e side the world is a ll mind from the other all


existence It is impossible that any thing should


exist unless possibly present to consciousness ; it is

impossible that any thing should be present to con
s c i o u s n e s s unless possibly existing A nd since con .

s c i o u s n e s s and existence are completely correlative

and coextensive therefore it is impossible that any


thing absolute shoul d exist N either o n the side o f .

the unknown mind nor o n that o f the unkn own exist


ence is it possible that an absol ute can exist o r be ;


for eve ry thing whatever exists call it what we will

, , ,

is relative to consciousness o r has a subjective side


If it is argued that we may imagine o r conceive an

existence transcen ding o ur faculties and beyond the
range o f o ur knowledge I reply that the very doing

so bri ngs it within them fo r we are furnishing an


instance o f t h e very thing which i s here observed ,

namely conceiving o r imagining an existence and


supplying it with a subjective side ; such existence

would be while imagined o r conceived to exist pre
, ,

sent as a possible existence in consciousness ; its

essence qua existence would exist for it would be
, , ,

already present in consciousness as possible as ana ,

l o go u s in point of existence t o all actual existences ,

in b eing s o present Analogous there lies the point


Unknown existence s o far as it is existence must be

, ,

a n alogous to known existence either the word exist

ence has a meaning o r it has not ; if it has it is the ,

same in both cases and if it has not then it has no

, ,

m e aning in the phrase known existence I nd all

philosopher s wi th two exceptions with exc eption of ,

the met aphysi c al ontologists such as Schell i ng and ,

Hegel who deduce every thing from mind and of the

, ,

empiric a l ontologists who deduce every thing from


matter ( in their sense o f the term ) with these two

exceptions I nd all philosophers conceiving the


world as produced by two independent factors ,

o u sl
y conceived both in their nature and in their
connection with each other ; for instance mind some ,

times as the coefcient sometimes as the mirror of


matter but still two separate independent factors

, ,

mind and matter ; and this whether they nd these ,

two factors both immediately present to conscious

ness in every i n stance o f external perception with ,

P rof F e rri e r o r only inferred to be present from


those perceptions and their Objects which is the more ,

usual way I o n the c ontrary conceive the world


not as produced by two factors these o r any others , ,

but as presenting t w o characters o r aspects in o n e o f ,

which it is entirely mind in the other entirely mat ,

ter ( to adopt terms in their current m e a m ng though

, ,

more suitable to the current theories than to mine ) .

M ind a nd matter become transformed in my theory , ,

from factors i nto aspects of the world each o f which ,

is an aspect o f the other and the world i n d i e r e nt l y


o n e o r the other according as it is regarded

My .

theory therefore is no t a theory of causation but o f ,

analysis o f the world a n applied Logic o f the world


as I have already said .

I f these conclus i ons s o far as they respect the


complete correlation o f existence and con sciousness ,

are a ccepte d by any o ne with difc ul ty the cause ,

will not be far to seek T h e cause will be the habit


Of regarding the existence o r non existence o f parti -


o nlar obj ects as entirely independent minds o f o ur ,

and o f our imaginations concerning them F rom .

this habit we reason to the world o f existences in

general and conceive that this also is independent
, ,

as to its existence o r non existence o f o ur minds and


imaginations When we speak o f the existence o f a


particular Object i n a particular time and place w e ,

mean that it could be seen touche d o r otherwise


, ,

perceived if we were present at that time and place ;


s o also o f the world o f existences in general we mean ,

by i t s existence now and here that it is present to

consciousness now and here The parallel is exact .

and we argue thus : as the presence o f the particular

thing there and then was independent o f o u r con
s c i o u s ne s s s o the presence o f the world o f existences

here and now is independent Of o ur consciousness ,

and s o a l so the presence o f other absolute o r un ,

known existences is independent o f o ur conscious


ness True the p a rallel is exact ; but both cases


include the same fallacy The absence o f the parti


o nl ar thing was not its absence from consciousness


but from presentative consciousness it could not be ,

seen o r touched o r perceived presentatively If it .

were absent from consciousness altogether we could ,

not bring it before the m i nd and s a y o f it that it w a s

absent T o go back to the o l d phrase when we


speak o f the existence o f a particul ar thing in a par

t i c ul a r place and time we mean
what that it
could be seen touched o r otherw ise perceived if we
, ,

were present at that place and time Is this being .

independent of c ons c iousness ? It is o n the con ,

t r a ry explain ing existence to mean capability o f being


perceived ; it is making actual existence equival ent

to being actually perceived a nd actual existence at a

particular place and time equivalent to being actually

perceived at that place and time And so al so in the

case o f existences generally ; by the absence o f the

whole world o f existences is meant its absence from
presentative consciousness ; if it were absent from
consciousness altogether i t s absence could not b e

brought before the mind at all Such an absence .

would be equivalent to the ceasing o f consciousness .

The fallacy in both cases is the same ; exi stence is

not the equivalent O f presentative consciousness but ,

i s in dependent o f presentative consciousness ; and that

whether we are thinking o f the existence o f an object
o f daily experienc e o r o f worlds unknown F rom .

this it is argued that existence is independent o f con

s c i o u s n e s s altogether which is equally false both in

the case o f particular fami l iar objects and o f imagined

worlds Such is the nature o f the fallacy ; but what

is its history and h o w come we to be deceived by it ?


Through neglecting the disti nction between obj ects

in their relation to consciousness alone and objects in
their relations to other Objects in consciousness b e ,

tween objects i n themselves and objects in their origin

and causes that is the distinction between rst and
, ,

second intentions When we s a y that particular


objects existi ng in a particular place and time are

independent o f o ur conscio usness we mean that the ,

causes o f their existence there and then as objects

are not to be found in us but in other objects ; we

mean that w e di d not produce them but that some ,

thin g else independent o f us was the condition o f

their existence Independence i n this sense in which

i t is truly asserted o f objects is then fallaciously a p


plied t o Objects conside red in themselves o r in rela

tion t o consciousness only ; and the assertio n that ,

c i sm o n P lato s theo ry
the $2077 M etaph : B x n cap o f ,
. . .

4 , 5 and which
as I remember with pleasure
was ,

rst pointed o ut t o me by P rof J M Wilson o f . . .

C C C O xford E xistence i s obscure enough as it

. . . .

is without inventing a second existence beyond it


The true a n swer to the question What is existence ? ,

is not ontological but metaphysical It is impossible .

to refer existence the most general class o r name of


a ll to a higher o r more comprehensive class o r genus


To use Aristotle s phraseology it is im possible to ,

make it a species by differentiatin g the genu s to which

it belongs for it is itself the highest genu s But it

may be possible to point o ut its characteristics its ,

propria some quality or qualities which are coex


tensive with it belong t o it in all its instances and

, ,

belong to all instances of it s o far as they are exist

e nc e s There I s o n e s uch characteristic namely that
, ,

o f being present in consciousness taking conscious ,

ness in its widest sense and includi n g therefore both

possible and actual presence in consciousness This .

is an analytical and therefore a metaphysical not an


ontologic a l answer to t h e question What is exist ,

ence ? Analytical not indeed from the point o f view ,

o f di rect perception but o f reection as has been ,


explained already Whatever therefore can be per .

c ei ve d conceived o r imagined exists ; exists either

, , ,

potentially o r actually in the past o r present or future ,


It is necessary to classify existences and no t t o con ,

foun d o n e kind with another o r value all a l i ke F or ,


metaphysical purposes the classication s hould be i n

stituted by asking how objects are present in con
s c i o u sn e s s F irst presentative must be di stinguished

from representative perceptions in t he former the ,

Object is as a rule more vivid than in the latter

, ,

R epresentative perceptions again are divisible into

those which are capable and those which are incapa
ble of verication by presentation o r by testimony ,

founded o n the presentations of others A nd r e p r e .

s e n t a t i v e perceptions which are capable o f v e r i c a

tion may again be divided i nto those which are capa

ble of verication at present and those which are ,

conceived as capable of verication at some distant

t ime. In short some scale o f truth must be intro

d u c e d into the conception o f existences by which ,

they may be distinguished from each other .

1 2 I come now to the speci a l subject o f this


chapter the consideration o f the form al element o f


c onsciousness in its rst intention O f the two points .

o f view already distinguished the objective and the ,

subjective the subjective is the onl y o n e which is


necessarily universal ; in adopting the Objective poin t

o f view abstraction is made o f the subj ective but in
, ,

adopting the s ubj ective it is impossible to abstract

from the obj ective The subjective contains both

aspects at once the obj ective only o ne The s ub je c


tive point o f view therefore is the o n e proper to this

chapter to the consideration o f all objects in their

rst intention .

F eeling is the material element in consciousness ,

the element which in some mo di cation o r other c o n

s t i t u t e s all consciousness The question is What is .

the formal element combined with feel i ng in a ll cases ,

whether it is time o r t i rn e and space o r time and

, ,

motion or motion alone o r space a l one o r S pace and

, , ,

motion o r whether there are any other form a l ele


ments in addition to o r in exclusion o f these ; and


again What are the connections o f these with feeling


and with each other whether o n e is derived from ,


another an d which are the original and which the


derived elements ; such in general a r e the questions

to be answered .

F eelin gs may b e roughly classi ed as foll ows

1 s t the feelings o f the ve special senses which have

dened organs sight touch hearing taste and smell ;

, , , , ,

2d feelings which have as yet no specially dened


organs such as hunger the sensus communis in all

, ,

its branches feeli ngs o f heat and cold o f musc ul ar

, ,

tension and others these t w o classes are commonly



called sensations ; 3 d feelings whic h arise onl y in ,

redintegration Of the feeli n gs o f the t w o rst classes ,

such as desire aversion love hate anger fear joy

, , , , , , ,

grief adm i ration feeli n g o f right and wrong o f hon

, , ,

o u r and di shonour o f justice and injustice o f e ffort

, ,

and resolution and many others all Of which are

, ,

called emotions and which are a l so s ometimes dis


t i ngui s h e d either by differences in kind o r by d i f


fe r e n c e s only in degree into two classes emo t ions , ,

a n d passions These three classes comprehend all


feelings N Ow every feeling whether sensation o r


emotion must occupy some duration o f time however


short ; it could n o t be a feeling if it did not ; and

this I think is immediately and empirically certain to
every o n e But only two o f these feelings must in

and by themselves occupy extension in S pace as well

as ti me ; these two feel ings are the sensations Of
sight and touch ; and o f these sensations o f sight , ,

cannot be assumed t o occupy by themselves more

th a n t w o di mensions o f space namely length and , ,

breadth o r supercial extension ; sensations o f touch


a l so appear primaril y or in the rs t instance that is

, , ,

in one single touch uncompared with others to o c ,

c up
y only supercial extension o r two dimensions o f

space The questions accordingly have been raised


rst whether space in its three dimensions i s not


capable o f analysis into its two di mensions occupied

by sensations o f sight and by single sensations of
touch and secondly whether these two di mensions
, ,

o f space are not themselves capable o f analysis into

s e n s a t i c n s occupying time successively If the latter .

were the case the entire range o f o ur feelings would


be capable of an a l ysis into two elements onl y time ,

and feeli n g .

Another series o f questions has been opened up

by the current distinction o f feeli ngs into internal
a n d external .Taki ng its origi n from the apparent
place of the Object perceived from the di stinction ,

between the body of the Observer and objects external

to his body the distinction between the intern a l and

external sense was origin a l ly a distinction between

feelings which arose withi n the body and those which
arose from obj ects outside the body But when this .

distinction between body and external objects gave

place in consequence o f physiological and psycho

logical investigation to a more subti l o n e between a


m i nd o r soul dwellin g somewhere and somehow in


the body and things external to the mind o r soul

, ,

among which the body itse l f was included then the ,

d istin ction between the internal and extern a l sense

had to support itself o n other considerations ; and the
two senses were then distinguished from each other
by their respective forms the internal sense was that

which had tim e the external sense was that which


had space for its form Time and Space became the

distin guishin g characteristics of the two senses the ,

internal and the external Since however the mind


w a s conceived a s a single mind a s the unity o f these


nternal and external , an d not as consist


t wo se nse s,

ing of two isolated senses the perceptions o f the one ,

sense were necessarily conceived as passin g over into

perceptions o f the other sense A ccordingly what .

the external sense was to outward obj ects that the ,

internal sense became to the externa l sense and ,

translated the S pace relations o f the external sense

into time relations of the in ternal sense ; the internal
sense becam e in fact the mind and the external
, , ,

sense became its organ for supplying it with i nt e l l i

gence o f every thing outside itself inclu di ng the body ,

which it inh abited All feelin gs which existed only


in relations o f time that is in succession and not , , ,

also i n relations o f S pace a n d these feeli ngs only , ,

constituted the m i nd properly s o called ; and these

feelings existed as Hume observed literally no w h er e
, ,
the greatest part o f beings he says do and must
, ,

exist after this manner Treatise o f Human N ature .


P art iv Sect 5 The distinction o f internal and

. . .

external objects thus became a distincti on between

the mind and objects ; in other words the distin ction ,

between Subject and O bject coincided with that b e

tween objects i n ti me and Obj ects in S pace Those .

things alone were objective which occupied space ,

those were subjective which occupied onl y time .

What was internal was mental what was external ,

was m aterial Y et the mind itself was conceived as


existing in the body an external obj ect and couse , ,

quently as having position in s pace ; and the mind

was the object o f psychology Hence from the ex .

planation o f the terms mental and internal to mean

existing in time onl y arose the insoluble c o nt ra di c ,

tions o f a mind existing onl y in ti me a n d yet having

a p osition in space and having a position in space,

a n yet not occupying space ; besides the difficulty
o f seein g how a mind ,
conceived as an obj ect not
occupying S pace could be brought into connection

with space occupying objects Kant though adopt


ing the distinction of internal and external sense ,

does not fall into the error of makin g this distinction

coin cide with the mind as the object o f psychology

, ,

and the world of materi a l objects ; for he replaces the

mind by his U nity o f Apperception the Ich denk e a , ,

subj ective act which binds together all states o f con

s c i o u s n e s s and all phe no mena and o f which the i n

ternal and external senses are modes o f operation ;

the Ich denke can never be a n Object by itself Y et .

since the distinction o f the internal and external sense

may be retained together with the notion o f an o b
e c t i v e mind to which they belong it will be useful
j ,

to devote a few words to its consideration ; and as it ,

was S hown before that the distinction o f the material

and formal elements in consciousness di d not coincide
with that between Object and subject so now I wil l ,

attempt to Show the same in the distinction between

the form a l element in the internal and external
senses .

I will attempt to Show four things ; l s t That ,

phenomena which are perceived in two dimensions o f

Space phenomena o f the senses o f touch and S ight
, ,

although a l so occupyi n g time do not o w e their o c c u


patiou o f supercial extension to their occupation of

time but that their S pace relations are n o t capable o f

analysis into relations o f time ; which is the answer

to the second of the two questions proposed above ;
2d That phenomena occupying time do not o w e their

objectivity t o their being referred to phenomena o c

c u
py g i n space ; 3 d
That phenomena occupyi n g spac e


do n o t o w e their subjectivity to their being perceived

in time ; 4t h That phenomena o f both kinds in time
, ,

and in space owe both their objectivity and their


subjectivity to reection irrespective o f their being


represented in reection as occupyi n g space o r time .

1 s t If we had not the senses o f sight and touch


we should be wi thout any cogni tion o f S pace F eel .

ings which coexisted in o ur bodies would appear as a

succession either o f S imple and deni te o r complex ,

and indenite feeli n gs Analysis o f coexistent feel


i n gs would be nothing else than resolvi ng the com

plex in to a succession o f S i rnp l e feelings P henomena .

would be nothing but a series o r succession o f feel

ings now simple now complex With sight however
, ,

the case is different The eye Opened to the light


sees a w h o l e surface o n e small portion o f it distinctly

, ,

the rest indistinctly ; it sees part bright part dark , ,

part clear the rest obscure ; this is the phenomenon


o f seeing ; and I cannot conceive h o w any o n e can

suppose that the space relations o f thi s surface of


light are reducible to relations o f time It is enough .

to contrast the two things in their Si mplest forms , ,

with each other to s e e the di fference in ki n d between


the two ; the form o f sight is as different from the

form o f hearing as the sensation o f sight from the

sensation o f hearing The i n terpretation o f the phe


n o m e n o n o f seeing is another thing ; the comparativ e

magni tude o f the parts o f the surface their compara ,

tive shape and distance may need other senses to ,

bring them into notice the sensation o f muscular,

tension and o f the degree o f effort i nvolved i n it in ,

the machinery o f the eye for i nstance But the ex ,


tended surface is seen a t once and is seen as some ,

thing diff erent from feelings which are not extended .


are if more brief and compendious y e t more explicit

, ,

and distinct than the time relations which they are -

supposed to express and what they lose in poin t o f


time they acquire in another direction in space I ,


conclude then that time relations and space relations

, ,
- -

o f supercial extension are di fferent in ki nd and can ,

not be resolved o n e into the other .

2d Suppose a man not to have the senses of sight


and touch but only those senses which presen t feel


ings in succession ; would those feeli n gs which he

h a s in succession be unre a l o r less re a l than before ? ,

E very one will answer that they would be equall y

real They will be phenomena just as much as if

they were accompanied with other feeli n gs which

occupy dimensions o f space Their connection with .

those other feelings can alter nothing in their reality ,

as rst intentions though it suppli es them with new


relations and in this way with new signi cance But

, .

this reality is the ground o f their afterwards appear ~

ing as w ill be seen in the answer to the 4t h point

, ,

objective ; that i s their reali ty is the ground o f their


obj ectivity .

3 d P henomena occupying space do indeed all o f


them also occupy time but this is no t the cause o f ,

their having reality The reality o f these phenomena


as o f those which occupy onl y time consists in the ,

feeling which they contain not in the form in which ,

that feeling appears In both cases the reality o f the


phenomenon is in its being felt not in the mode of ,

its being fel t And its reality is the ground o f its


subjectivity .

4 t h Both kinds of phenomena are equally real


for both contain feeling ; but as yet they are pheno

mena only they are present in consciousness but not
, ,
o r TI ME A ND S PAC E . 69

present as either subjective o r obj ective The re a l ity 1

. m .

6 H
o f either kind does not depend upon the reali ty o f

the other ; o n e km d I S more complex than the other f l

o rm a

but the additional character which that kind possesses 2352213

1 6
(30 8 1

is n o t a modication o f the time relations common t o

both kinds but an addition o f a new and di fferent

nature The reality o f each is independent of the


other and depends upon the feeling which each pos


sesses equally The reality is the ground of the dis


tinction o f subjective and objective not the difference ,

i n the form of the two reali ties It is within the


re a l ity o f the phenomena o r within the phenomena


so far as they are real o r contain feeling that the ,

distinction into objective and subjective arises and ,

not within them so far as they contain a di fferent

kind o f form If the distinction o f Objective and s ub

e c t i v e arose from the different kind o f form in phe

n o m e n a then this distinction wo ul d be already there

as soon as the two ki nds o f phenomena had arisen ;

and would not be remaining still to arise in them .

But it has not already arisen in them but they ,

are as yet mere phenomena mere feel ings possessin g


equal reality o r unreality It must be from some


thin g i n the phenomena still t o be differentiated

, ,

that the distinction o f objective and subj ective arises ,

a n d not from what is already differentiated namely , ,

t h e form a l element into time and S pace E very de .

v el o m e n t o f a new character in phenomena in the

p ,

present case o f the new character of subjectivity and

objectivity is a sinking back into the nature o f the

phenomenon in which it is developed ; Hegel s word
for it is V ertiefen ; it is a bringin g out of something
latent in the phenomena and each new character o r

forward movement of development is also a back


ward movement o r the stirring up deeper and deeper


depths and the bringing to light o f som e cause a



caus e o f the kind known as potentia l ity o r

from below or beh i nd the phenomenon which de
v el o s itself and both e ffect and cause energy and
p , ,

potentia l i ty begin to exist at t h e same mom ent N ow


it is a commonplace o f philosophical criticism that ,

we must not mistake the occasions of o ur com i ng to

the knowledge o f a nything for the coming into exist
ence of the thin g itself ; for instance we must not ,

mistake t h e i n crease in the returns o f crime owing ,

to the more perfect means o f statistical information ,

for an increase in the amount o f crimes committed ;

and i n application of this rule it may be supposed
that o ur coming to the knowledg e o f the newly de
v el o e d characters in phenomena namely their s ub
p , ,

j e c t i vi t y and objectivity is not coincident with t h e


rst existing o f these characters in phenomena but ,

that they existed previo usly as subjectivity and o b

j e c t i vi t
y and
we afterwards nd it o u t But how is .

this possible ? How is it possible that they S hould

exist previously i n phenomena as subj ectivity and
Objectiv ity without being perceived as such ? It is

impossible for it is a contradiction i n the terms


Their previo us existence was a potential o n e 001 0250 2: ,


vegy e qo 0 055
z And their potentiality is an inference

arising as w il l be seen more clearly from the C hapter


o n the R atio S u f c i e n s from the form o f time ; an


inference from their actuality that is from the actual

, ,

development of the new character in consciousness .

N othing new can arise without bringing with it the

inf erence o f its potentiality previous to its arising .

But this potentiality is not actu a l ity has not the ,

character which is its v gy em Subjectiv ity and o b


jec t i vi t y exist rst when they exist actually The y.

do not exist actually in the p henomena o f direct per

c e tio n
p Time
. and space do exist actually i n the

phenomena o f di rect perception ; we are actually con

scious o f them though we do not reect that we are
conscious o f them and though we have not distin

ui sh e d them from their content But Obj ectiv i ty

g .

and subjectivity we are not conscious Of at a ll unti l

we reect o n di rect perceptions They then rst .

exist actually and their previous potentiality is then


rst inferred Time and space have no potentiality


fo r they are always and in every thing actu a l

, ,
I .

conclude therefore that since the distinction o f o b


j e c t i vi t
y and subjectivity has still to arise in pheno
mena it does not arise from the di stinction o f the

two kinds o f form in phenomena time and S pace ,


It is difc ul t to s e e what use there would be for

the terms objective and subjective supposing them ,

to depend o n the difference o f form in phenomena ,

unl ess they were intended to express a different

degree o f re a l ity in the phenomena di ffering a s to
form And this is the meaning which is usually

attached to those terms ; the term objective signi es ,

as usually employed something more re a l than s ub


e c t i v e ; and t h e term subjective usu a l ly signies

something comparatively unreal So that i f the two.

ki n ds o f phenomena are equ a l l y real and yet the ,

terms objective and subjective coincide respectively

with these two kinds o f phenomena either the terms ,

objective and subjective must cease to signify di ffer

ence in p o in t o f re a l i ty o r the characters which they

signify must depend o n something else besides the

difference in form o f the two kinds o f phenomena ,

that is they must depend on some di stinction in the

feeling they contain If however the terms objective

and subjective do n o t coincide respectively with these

two kinds o f phenomena then they may depend on

the feeling o r material element in phenomena , in

virtue o f which phenomena are real without s i gni ,

fy i ng a difference in degree o f reality between the

classes of phenomena which they are employed to
designate The distinction into objective and Sub

e c t i v e is o n e which arises within the reality o f phe

n o m e n a and distinguishes that reality into two kinds
, ,

not different in poin t o f degree o f reality but in point

of the character o f that reality When many pheno .

mena have occurred in consciousness that is at a , ,

certain advanced point in the history of every in di

vidual man a di stinction is drawn between what is

common to all phenomena and what is peculiar to

S ingle phenomena o r sets o f phenomena They are .

recogni sed as being all alike in bein g feelings and ,

different i n being partic ul ar determ i nate feelings as

the rst they are all o n e as the second they are all

different The rst perception that phenomena are


all alike in being feelings is the rst dawn o f r e e c

tion ; it is the rst generalisation in matter o f con
s c i o u s n e s s ; phenomena have already been compared

with o n e another i n their differences o f feel ing and

form and already formed into groups which we call

usually objects nurse and mother table and food , ,

&c. 65 0 have been alread y distinguished ; but that


these groups have any connection o f kind with each

other has not yet been perceived ; the rst perception
that they are all alike in being feeli ngs is the rst
perception that they are subjective and at the same ,

instant also that they are obj ective that is are still as

di fferent as before from each other in their deter


minate particular qualities They were before per .

c e i v e d as diff erent they are now perceived as the


same ; which gives new meaning t o the previously

perceived difference They were phenomena they.

are now objective and subj ective ; each and all phe
n o m e n a are both at once and bear both characters at

once C onnected as feeli n gs and i n this com mon


character they a l together form a group lik e the

, ,

groups o f objects a l ready formed ; but it is a group

o f a different character and expressed by a di fferent

word ; Baby has become I ; not that any thing

is proved by the word but that my meani ng is ren,

dered clear by it The perception o f self o r self


consciousness the perception that feelings are m i ne

, ,

is in fact the same thing as that which is expressed

by saying that feelings are all alike feeling What .

ever things are ali ke in o n e point are o n e in that

point ; when these things are feeli n gs they are sub
j ec t i vel
y o n e for
feeling is a word which we all
un derstand by experience as well as by any e x p l a
nation ; there is no understanding it and we must ,

content ourselves with fami l iarity ; it is alre a d y a

subj ective word and if we would have an explana

tion we must explain the word subj ective by feelin g ,

a n d not feeling by subj ective .

This operation of reection refers equ a l ly to phe

no m ena in space and to phenomena in time ; for
both are equally feelings and both are equ a l ly real ,

P henomena o f both classes have acquired a double

character a r eference to each other and a reference

to consciousness o r as it has been previously ex


pressed a subjective and a n objective aspect each o f ,

which aspects contains both elements of the pheno

menon the form a l and the material

The consideration o f this fourth poin t has caused

me to make a spri n g in the regular development o f
the subject to pass over the forma l element directly

present to consciousness and take up the thread at ,

the point o f reection ; the reason being that the di s

tinction o f objective and subjective is as yet usually
considered t o b e involved in that o f time and space
relations if n o t as a necessary element yet at least as
, ,

a condi tion o f all phenomena The purpose o f meta .

p hysic is to arrive at the lowest empiric a l phenomena

o f consciousness then at their elements whether o n e ,
, ,

two o r more ; to trace as it were the stream o f con


s c i o u s n e s s and of existence to its source o r sources ,

and to decide the relation o f these sources to each

other The sources o f a l l phenomena must be di s

covered ; whether th e re are any sources which belong

to all phenomena without exception ; whether all the
sources do s o ; and if any do no t whether these are
, ,

deducible from the others o r have an independent

existence It must be remembered that in isolating

any phenomenon whatever even an element o f con ,

s c i o u sn e s s we treat it as if it were an empirical or


complet e object and as if there might have been a


time previous to its coming into existence This .

method which is common to all reasoning does not

, ,

however make the elements o f consciousness into

empiric a l objects but leaves them at the conclusion


o f the process just what they were at the beginni ng


unl ess reasons shoul d have been discovered in the

course o f it for considering them to be di fferent .

To reason about an element o f consciousn ess is to

assume for the purposes o f reasonin g that it is a
, ,

complete object ; a nd the reasoning ended the as

, ,

sumption is dropped .

together those relations with phenomena of the other

senses and gives these phenomena relations to the

rest in S pace A distinct portion of space is marked


o u t by the senses o f touch and S ight combined with

the sense o f muscular tension all thre e o f which ,

senses involve time relations ; this space is called


the body and within it sensations o f hearin g taste

, , ,

smell hunger heat cold and others together with

, , , , ,

the emotions are perceived as arising and existin g

, ,

a ll perceived as in themselves occupyi n g time and ,

from this connection perceived as also occupying ,

though not perhaps lling a denite portion o f space ,


That portion Of Space in three di mensions called the

, ,

body gives unity in point o f space to all its feelings


whether inte rn a l o r e xternal that is to all its world , ,

o f phenomena But inasmuch as it is a portion o f


space in three di mensions the portions of space from ,

which it is marked o ut must have three dimensions

also for they are perceived as enclosing it o n all

sides ; and in fact the three space dimensions o c c u -

pied by other phenomena are perceived pari passu

with the same three dimensions in the body itself ;
the body is perceived by being separated from other
phenomena o f sight and touch .

We started however with only t w o perceived

di m ensions of S pace and have ended w i th the per

c e t i o n of three which are involved in the perception

p ,

o f o ur o w n bodies as solid Obj ects surrounded on all

sides by other objects at various distances This .

perception has been produced by the combination o f

three senses sight touch and muscular tension none
, , , ,

o f which alone could give it If any single sense .

alone could give the perception o f the t hird d i m e n

sion of s pace as M r Abbott in his Sight and Touch

argues that sight can the work o f the metaphysicia n

C 11 H

in this point would be much S implied But I c a n

. .

not admit that S ight a l one can give this perception Thl f nt i

e o rm a l
e em e n

When for instance we s e e an object passing as we c n i n

, , ,
o s c o us e ss .

know a f t erwards behind another and conce a l ed by it

, ,

what is really seen is the concealment o r becoming

invisible o f o n e at the moment o f its contact with
the other ; and it is referring this phenomenon t o a
suppo sed cause and not ana l ysing the phenomenon

itself to s a y that o ne o f the objects must be behind


the other What is depth o r distance in depth in

, ,

its rst intention ? It has no explanation no analysis , ,

but itself the third dimension o f space But how


does it diff er from the other t w o dimensi ons o f space ?

In requiring the two former to be given in order to
its being understood A s up e r c i e s must be taken

and then objects o u t o f that s up e r c i e s are in depth ;

that is a point o f departure must be taken to con

trast it with directions from which it is excluded


N o w in empiric a l perception this point of departure


is given only by sensations o f touch Imagine a man .

xing his eye o n a point in the horizon turni n g ,

round and thus combini n g sensations o f muscular

tension with sight and coming again to the same

observed point in the horizon ; this will no t give h i m

a perception o f the circul ar gure of the horizon ; he
will s e e the same s up e r c i e s repeated as often a s he ,

turns completely round but he w ill not know that


he is in the centre o f it ; he will have n o xed

point wherewith to contrast the coloured s up e r c i e s .

Imagine him no w to s e e hi s o w n body in addition ,

and this will be a xed part o f the same s up e r c i e s ;

but still a part o f a s up e r c i e s only n o t the central,

part of a circular s up e r c i e s but only a xed part o f


it while the other parts are changing Suppose him .

however n o w t o be endowed with touch and to touch ,

as well as see his o w n body ; then the xed part of

the visual landscape o r coloured s up e r c i e s always
, ,

seen when any other parts o f t h e l a n dscape are seen ,

becomes in addition t h e onl y object o f touch the ,

onl y object which he perceives by both the senses o f

S ight and touch He gains by the addi tion o f the

sense o f touch a point o f dep a rture from which to


measure the s up e r c i e s which he s a w previously as


onl y supercially extended ; and the third di mension

Of S pace means for hi m now di stance from something
actually tangible The meani ng o f the third di m e n

sion o f S pace is originally then the distance from

, ,

o ne tangible point to another in objects o f sight .

Whatever may be the proportions in which these two

senses o r that o f muscular tension contribute after
, ,

wards to the interpretation o r measurement o f com

a r a t i v e di stances o r magnitudes f li n ear r super
p o ,

c i a l extension o r o f depth the sense o f touch is

, ,

indispensable a s a constituent o f the perceptions in

which depth r st becomes an Object o f consciousness .

E qually inadequate is the sense o f tou ch either ,

alone o r combin e d with muscular tension b ut w ithout ,

sight to supply perceptions in which the third d i m e n


s ion o f S pace is perceived Sensations o f touch alone ,


o r combined with those o f muscul ar tension can give


a succession of feel ings o f supercia l extension but ,

cannot bind these sens a tions into a solid whole with

o ut the combination o f vis ual sensations I can .

touch a surface but I do not solely from that kn ow


in what direction the series o f touches go nor dis ,

t i ngu i sh a direction o f a surface from a direction

vertic a l to it The only kind o f cases where a com
O F T I ME A ND S PAC E . 79

bination o f a whole series Of touch sensations into a -

solid whole is apparently possible i s in grasping a

small object where the ngers meet each Other a s

well as touch the surface all round Here we have .

an entire series o f touches o n the outside o f a n o b

jcet just as in the above case o f vision we had an

entire series o f visu a l images seen from the inside

o f the object the horizon ; we receive the i m pression

o f resistance at all poin ts but we get no perception


o f the solid S pace between those points No r if we .


did receive this p erception could we extend the ex


e r i e n c e to other cases where the series o f touches

could not be complete that i s t o Space generally fo r
, , ,

there is nothing to connect the t w o kinds o f cases ;

without sight we cannot perceive o u r o w n bodies as
solid and consequently not space genera ll y in three

dimensions Sight therefore is an essential consti


tuent o f the perception o f depth But again the .

s ame remark must be made here namely that this , ,

fact does not show in what relative proportion touch

and sight are necessary t o the measurement o r inter
r e t a t i o n o f magnitudes T h sense o f muscular
p e .

tension alone is obviously less competent than touch

to give the perception o f depth o r distance for it ,

does not even give that o f supercial extension .

If we could assume space in its three di mensions ,

and Objects occupying it a s a l ready existi ng in and


by itself and needing only to be perceived by us

, ,

then perhaps sight alone o r touch alone would suf ce

, ,

to this perception ; for the question then would be

o n e o f mere in terpretation But to assume this is in

fact to assume that we possess the perception o f S pace ,

as a form of consciousness previous to its becom i ng


lled by sensible impressions These t w o apparently .


opposi te ass umptions are fundamentally the same ; in

both of them space is conceived as lying before us, as
an absolute to be perceived and i n terpreted But if

the very existence o f space is its being perceived and ,

if Consequently in reasoni ng about it it must be con

, ,

c e i v e d as rst coming into existence when it is rst

perceived then we have t o account not only for its


interpretation but for its original perception ; and the

senses have to produce its perception and its exist
ence And for this purpose the senses have to be

exam ined separately in order to s e e what each sense


by itself involves and how much it can separately


contribute to the c Om p l e t e perception o f space in

three di mensions Sight contributes at the least
, ,

perception o f supercial extension ; s o also touch ; the

combination o f the two produces at the l e ast per , ,

c e t i o n s of the three di mensions for part o f the visual

p ,

s u e r c i e s is pushed t o a distan c e from the xed part

p ,

the body when we touch the bo d y and not the rest


o f the s u e r c i e s and yet the part of the s u e r c i e s

p , p
so pushed remains a s up e r c i e s stil l T his is the .

origi n the creation of the third dimension Of S pace

, , ,

when reasoned o f as if it were an empirical Object .

Sight and touch however come into operation toge

ther and consequently the perception o f the third

dimension o f space begins simultaneously with that

o f its superci a l extension The object a nd the state

o f consciousness called perception o f things in space

Of three dimensions is a highly complex state and

object but not necessaril y later in time than any of

the simpler states o r objects o f which it is composed ;

it is we who import the notion of growth i n time into
it by o u r analysing it into its element s and then

composing it a fresh by their combination In other .


words the senses o f sight and touch contain the


logical elements b ut not the historical causes Of the

, ,

perception o f objects in three dimensions .

Logical language and the language of reection ,

together with the modes of thought this language

expresses being that necessari ly used by us in ana

lysing the phenomena o f perception we naturally but , ,

not therefore correctly imagi ne that perception a d


v a n c e d by the same stages a s those which we have

discovered in the analysis o f its Obj ects and that it ,

n o t o nl y reached that result which we an a l yse but ,

that it reached it by the same route and gained ,

successively the same stages as o u r two processes , ,

analytical and synthetical successively traversed and


reached Fo r inst a n ce we have a nalysed Space into


three di mensions a n d therefore imagine that percep


tion s a w rst o n e of these and then the others ; o r we

distin guish the rst and second from the third and ,

then imagine that perception saw the rst and second

together as distin guished from the third But there .

is nothing to show that this was the case Visual .

perception sees a s up e r c i e s but it does not s e e a


s u e r c i e s as distinguished from a solid ; if it did so

p ,

it must have previously seen the solid It sees what .

we afterwards in order to distinguish it from a solid

, ,

call a s up e r c i e s It has never conceived the ques


tion whether there is any thing behind the s up e r c i e s

o r not ; it sees colours which may be either super

c i e s or solid and which turn out to be solid

A .

s u e r c i e s without a solid and a li ne o r a point

p ,

without a s up e r c i e s are obj ects o f abstraction p r o

, ,

visional images only ; and when it is said on o ne side

and admitted o n the other that Sight sees onl y a,

coloured s up e r c i e s it is meant that this is the least

, ,


0o c m y x oc i o y ,
which in o ur reective and logical lan


guage can be expressed to be seen ; that sight sees

this at the least without asking h o w far it may go

towards the next logical mark o r division trinal ex ,

tension which would in clude too much and without

, ,

entering in any way into t h e question what potenti

a l i t i e s may b e involved in this perception o f super

c i e s ; for the phenomenon o f sight the coloured ,

surface has not been yet analysed by t h e perceptive


conscio usne ss The addition of touch to S ight com


b i ne d in time does not add a new distinct direction


to an o l d distinct one do es not add depth as d istin


u i s h e d from surface to surfa ce as distinguished from

depth ; but it changes t h e previously potential super
c i e s into an actual solid ; it makes us s e e into t h e
s u e r c i e s and perceive it as o r transform it into
p , , ,

solidity Space in three dimensions therefore does

, ,

no t become such by a composition of distinct sepa ,

rate parts o r directions but by a combination o f

, ,

se nsatio ns in to one indivisible whole a whole which , ,

although complex is not separable except logically


and provi sionally .

Since space in three dimensions is an indivisible

though c omplex whole it does not arise i n c o n s e ,

u e n c e of comparison o r reasoning which are pro

q ,

cesses concerned with complete empirical objects o r ,

with abstractions treated as such objects But in .

perceiving s p a Ce in three dimensions no such empi

r i c a l o r complete ob ect has been arrived at u ntil
j ,

space itself has been perceived ; and the three d i m e n

sions of space are not capable o f being treated as
such empirical objects until the y have been abstracted

from S pace itself as a whole In the perception of

space there is synthe sis but no t comparison ,

togeth er and not because each succession is a motion
, ,

that objects in three dimensions arise .

It may now be objected that there is more than

these elements there is their combination ; and that

this combination is motion The answer is this


their combination is time F eelings succeeding o n e .

another i n time are combined already ; if those feelings

are also in space they are still combined as before in

time ; that is their succession is their combination ;


and are besides combined in space by their space

relations . Their combination has already been a c
counted for that is r e ferred t o its proper element in
, ,

the analysis A ccounted for in this sense it has been


fully ; but accounted for in another sense it has not

been and the mixing up these t w o senses in which

phenomena can be accounted fo r is a common source

o f error. Was it meant by asking after the com
bination o f feelings in motion to ask how they came
to be combined o r what was the cause o f their being

combined in stead o f asking what was the analysis o f


the phenomenon o f their being combined ? Was it

meant to ask how feelings come to be combined with
time and space relations the material with the

formal element o f cognition a n d h o w phenomena

come to contain these t w o elements at all ? These
are questions w hich are not answered here and ,

which never h a ve been answered ; they involve an

attempt to sprin g beyond the last elements o f con
s c i o u sne s s and they move only by emp loying the

cogni tions the cause of which they ask for they are
intelligible only because they contain the cognitions
which they seek to render intelligible .

M otion is sometimes conceived as the combination

o f feelings in time with feelings in sp a ce o r o f the ,

time rel a tions wi th the S pac e relation s in feelings o r

- -

i n
as a succession o f feelings in space relations -

which sense it has been already analysed ; and some

times i t is conceived as the cause o r the fact the ,

obj ective fact as it is called o r the occult cause o r


fact as it is sometimes called underlying that c o m ,

bin ation Here comes o ut the result o f dividing the


world into t w o sets o f obj ects subj ects o r min ds o n ,

o n e side and Objects known o r knowable by these


subj ects o n the other O n this supposition there


must be occult facts o r occult causes which are ,

known only by their e ffects o r manifestations which ,

are phenomena ; there must be occult facts o r occult

causes on the side o f the subjects which are known ,

only by their e ffects o r manifestations the cognitions ,

o r states o f consciousness E verywhere are Things


i n themselves unknowable but imagin ed as existing ;


imagined as the double o f phenomenal existence in

order to account for it ; there must be a cause o f
every thing it is said even o f the ele ments o f
, ,

phenomena ; multiply then these elements by 2 and ,

call the result their cause And that this is really


the origin o f the conception o f Things i n themselves - -

o r occult facts o r causes is shown in this instance by


the exact similarity in nature and position between

the real c o mbination o f feelin gs namely time and the , ,

imagined one , motion as an occult cause M otion .

contains nothing but the formal element in cognition ;

it is Simply that element made into an object by itself
a l one without a material element and supposed t o ,

be the Object perceived in i t s manifestations in per ,

c ei vi n pheno m ena
g .

O n e o f the questions which was proposed at the

begin ning o f this section has no w been answer ed ,

namely whether motion was o n e o f the formal


elements in consciousness It has been Shown that .

it is not but is an empirical fact o r phenomenon

, ,

capable o f analysis into feeling time and supercial , ,

extension o f Space And if motion is thus put aside


I do not know what other claimant there can be for

s uch a rank Fo r force about which s o much is

s aid in physical science is but motion considered as


determined to a particular direction o r mode and ,

s ometimes to a particular degree o r measure o f

in tensity . B ut the claim o f space in its thre e ,

dimensions to that rank may yet b e contested In

, ,

fact it has been shown that this cognition spac e in ,

three dimensions do es not spring up full formed


with the rst o r simplest exercise o f consciousness ,

but that its growth can be traced through com

b i n ation of the data o f the t w o senses o f touch and
s ight ; besides which its being original only with

two o f the senses and with those two only in


c ombination while the majority o f the senses a r e


o ri i nally without it
g seems to show
that it is not
u ni versal in phenomena o r necessary in conscious
n ess
. N o w if its necessity in consciousness required

the support o f a theory o f its being an innat e o r

connate form o f an obj ective min d then these con ,

s iderations would be fatal to its claim ; for they

would S how that the connection between that p sy
c ho lo i c a l object and this its form o f consciousness
was not universal and without interruption but that ,

the mind might and originally did operate without

operating under this form But t h e necessity and .

consequent universali ty o f space i n three d i m e n ,

s ions is not dependent o n any objective s c ho lo i

, p y g
cal theory Space is necessary not becaus e it i s a

native form o f the operation o f the mind but b e ,

cau se being irreducible to any thing else it is all

, ,

embracing and exhaustive in its nature and occupies ,

the whole eld o f being True the particular


phenomena in which it arises may be pointed o u t ,

namely the two senses o f sight and touch in com


bination ; these are its sources o r the phenomena in,

which it is involved But in the rst place these

, ,

cases never arise alone but always in conjunction


with some Of the other phenom e na o f which the

entire consciousness is composed ; and then this ,

being s o the nature o f the cognition o f space s o

, ,

combined with the rest determines its n ecessity for

, ,

its nature is such that no feeling can escape it ; it

combines with the rest as their frame and dwelling
place from which they can afterwards only be

released provisionally and durin g a process o f a h

s t ra c t i o n
. True space is composite ; but it is com

posed only o f itself true it is not like time present


in every moment o f every feeli n g b ut except by an , ,

effort o f volition every moment o f every feeling is


present in it Space is the necessary formal element


of the senses of sight and touch taken together ; but

it is the necessary formal element Of the other feel
ings only on the supposition that these two senses
are an inseparable part o f the consciousness which is
the c omplex of those other feelings in other words ,

it is only for an individual human consciousness as ,

we nd it actually existing that Objects i n space are


inseparable from Objects in time but this is enough

for the purposes o f analysis of an individu a l human
consciousness .

1 3 With the arising o f phenomena in three


dimensions arises also the distinction o f the pheno

mena into thos e within and those without the body :
F o r the perception o f the third dimension of space
takes place onl y in distinguishing the body as a solid
and tangible Object from the space surrounding it ,

which must be therefore perceived as solid o r in three

di m ensions The phenomena are thus conceived as

capable o f being separated from each other in the

third dim ension o f space Another conception is con .

n e c t e d with this that o f matter as impenetrable ; in


which sense s o far from being taken t o mean as in

, ,

this E ssay only the material element in conscious


ness it means masses o r molecules o f some impene


t r a b l e stu ff which is in some way o r other the oppo


site o f feeling o r consciousness P utting these two .

conceptions together there ari ses the conception of a


world which is a congeries o f material obj ects s ur ,

rounding the body o n all sides and endowed with ,

qualities which operate upon each other and u pon ,

the body and produce changes in it which modify


the states of the consciousness seated within it .

It is easy to imagine how these two conceptions

were combined s o as to produce the conception o f a

world o f materi a l objects The quality o f impene .

t r a b i l i t y is nothing else than the sensation o f touch

including o r combined with the sense o f muscular
tension I do not speak Of the causes o r antecedent

conditions o f this quality but o f what it is for con ,

s c i o u s n e s s alone and if we are told o f or imagine

Objects which are i m penetrable but in s o sli ght a ,

degree that we cannot perceive them to be such actu

ally but can only infer the quality by proof of its

e ffects as for instance in the case o f the air o n a

, , ,

still day yet it is plain that the inferred resistance


or impenetrability o f the a i r is o nly und erstood o r


imagined by referring it to cases o f actually p erceived

resistance In the great majority o f instances o f actu

ally experienced tangibility th is sensation i s aecom


a ni e d by sensations of sight and by sensations o f

p ,

sight i n which a continuity o r contact o f surface with

the body is seen Break the visible continuity and

the sensation o f touch ceases renew o n e and the other ,

is renewed Again other sensations such a s odour

, ,

a n d sound become stronger in proportion as the tan


i b l e obj ect is brought nearer to the body and weaker

g ,

as it is removed When we actually have sensations


o f touch we actu a l ly have also in most cases a

, , ,

variety o f other sensations ; but this is the case with

no other o f the sensations to any thing like the same ,

degree N 0 other brings with it the other sensations


we may hear s e e smell in some cases even taste

, , , ,

without touchin g or feeli n g any muscular tension ;

but if we touch we can also do some o n e o r more o f

the rest Touch then with the sense o f muscular


tension is a sense with which all o r any o f the rest


can be comb i n ed ; at the same time it is impossible to

be closer to any object than in touching it ; the object
supposed to be touched is in visible continuity with
the b o dy ; and the quality o f impenetrability is not
capable of bein g expressed o r c o nceived ultimately in
any other way than a s a sensation o f touch combined
with mu scular tension .

Suppose n o w the very frequent case o f obj ects ,

which have been touched removed to a distance but ,

still visible ; they will be represented as tangible we ,

sh a l l remember that we touched them ; yet the s ur

face stil l actually visible is n o longer actually tangible .

The t w o senses are no longer in combination but w e ,

know by experience that a tangible surface must be

also visible though a visible o n e need not be tangible ;

we remember that the more distinctly visible any ,

thing is the easier it b ecomes t o touch it and that

, ,

the same holds good of the other senses Tangibil ity .

is thus conceived as the condition o f the other senses ;

and sin ce w e represent the once touched and still
visible object as tangible we now make it the seat o f ,

visibility and consider the object as tangible to be


the object proper a n d the other sensations visibility

, , ,

Odour sound and taste as inherent in o r dependent

, , ,

o n it
. The cognition o f space in its three dimensions
havin g been already gained this Obj ect is then r e ,

ferred to some part o f space distant from the body ,

and space thus becomes lled with tangible obj ects ,

that is with different masses o f matter in which the


other sensations inhere .

The removal however of the seat o f these sensa

tions to a distance while they are felt all the time in

the body compels a change in o ur way of regarding


them ; they must be regarded as caused in us by a

property Of the tangible object ; in other words we ,

cease to look at the sensations as obj ects for con

s c i o u s n e s s alone and to ask what is their range as

sensations and we begin to enquire how they are


produced in the tangible objects and t ransmitted

from them to o ur bodies P henomena which are .

visible but not actually touched become thus removed

by the imagination to a d istance because conscious , ,

ness argues with itself if they were at the surface of


the body they could be touched ; S ince they a re not

touched they are not at the surface of the body

Where are they then ? Somewhere in that third

dimension o f space which has been already discovered .

They must exist in the two rst dimensions of space ,


the space between us and the s un ; a Sound or an

odour occupies the space b etween us and the tangibl e
object perceived by these senses Suppose conscious .

ness to be placed at any intermediate spot with t h e

requisite media the atmosphere for instance and i t

, ,

would have the same sensation The sensation is .

there if its conditions are ; and by being there i s

meant that if consciousness were there it would have


the sensation just as in the case o f other objects


This is the view which I wish to establish in place of

the conception above described o f what I may call
, ,

the duplicity o f phenomena as cause there and effect ,

here as quality in the tangible object and feeling

, ,

caused by the quality in the body o f the obs erver ,


F eelings and qualities are convertible or at least ,

equivalent terms o n e the subjective aspect o f t h e

, ,

other ; where o n e is there is the other ; and t h e,

same causes are the causes of both .

The question is o n e concerning the distribution o f

the contents o f space The erroneous conception i s .

that the extension represented as tangible is the ex

tension actually seen ; the true conception is that t h e ,

e xtension actually seen is continuo u s with but n o t ,

the same a s the extension represented as tangible ;


that the visibility o f the extension is combin ed with

its tangibility but not conned to the limits to which

its tangibility is conned If I take the object t o .

mean its tangibility combined with its visibility then ,

the object occupies all the space as far as it is visible ,

while its tangibility occupies a small portion at the ,

c entre o f that S pace

The s un for instance is not

the object seen when we s e e li ght but is the tangibl e ,

centre o f the obj ect light ; a tree o r house or any


other su c h Object in the same Wa y is the tangible

, ,

object at the c entre O f the coloured rays which are

the visible object P erhaps the object is audible

odorous gustable as well as tangible and visible ; if

, ,

it occupies the whole o f the space occupied by t h e
widest o f these properties Suppose now the Object .

to be presented t o consciousness ; part o f it only as

just described is presented the rest is represented ; ,

the parts not actually touched the rays o f light o r ,

colour of sound o f taste not falli ng o n the senses of

, , ,

the body are represented So that whether we take


the obj ect in the widest sweep o f its qualities o r ,

limit it to the sweep Of its tangible qu a l ity only we ,

must have a large portion o f it an Object o f r e p r e

s c utation The common opini on limits the obj ect not

t o the sweep Of its presented tangible quality but to ,

that o f its tangible quality presented and represented .

It can derive no support from the coincidence o f i t s

limit with the distinction between presentation and
representation ; for both views equally overstep this
line The rest o f the qualities o f the object m their

wide sweep it calls e ffects o f the object I n those t a n

g i b l e limits e ffects
o f the motion o f its particles .

Here are two opinions both describing the same


Object but in different ways ; o n e describes the


phenomena as consisting o f an object and its

e ffects the other as consisting o f a combinatio n o f

objects .

The test to which I bring these two conceptions

is the distinction between rst and second intentions .

A re no t e ffects o f an Object themselves objects

Have they not a nature a kind o f their o w n pre
, , ,

v i o u s to being known as the e ffects o f another object ?

Is n o t the term effect applied to them in their second

and no t in their rst intention ? They may be e ff ects
o f some other object or o f some constitution o r cause

in that other Object ; but the present question is ,

what they are for consciousness alone and not what ,

their relation is to other objects in consciousness or ,

what they are in that relation N o w for conscio us .


ness alone every quality is a sensation and the single ,

name of colour sound and so o n expresses the two

, , , ,

things rst the sensation then the sensation as ex

, ,

tended i n space o r as quality All these qualities


except tangibility may certainly be considered also


as e ffects o f the motion o f tangible particles if it is ,

remembered at the same time that they are some

thing else for consciousness alone namely sensations , ,

o f sight sound and so on

, ,
But if they are conceived .

as inherent in the tangible objects and yet as direct ,

objects for consciousness they become reduced all to ,

o n e quality tangibility as the sensation of motion in

, ,

tangible particles ; and then we must consider tangi

b i l i t y as the onl y sensation which is absurd The ,

sensations other than touch cannot be analysed in ,

their rst intention into sensations of touch though

, ,

their antecedent conditions may perhaps be so ana

lysed that is though they may be found to depend
, ,

upon different kinds o f motion in tangible objects .

C onceive them as qualities inherent i n the tangible

object only and they become themselves modes o f

tangi b ility ; but conceive them in their own shape as

sensations and they occupy space in three dimensions
, ,

precisely as tangibility itself does .

On e of these theories has been called true the ,

other erroneous ; but are not both true and each of ,

them compatible with the other ? They are i n c o m

patible onl y if both are regarded as metaphysical
conceptions or conceptions of ultimat e analysis ; but
s t a nt lpresent as a complex o f feelings in conscious
y , ,

ness When the action and reaction o f feelings o n


each other in space is in question those feelings b e ,

come to us qualities since we abstract from their


relation to the mind ; when we ask what they are to

ourselves they remain feelings And this is the case

wherever we may imagine ourselves to be : a feeling

does not cease to be a feeling and begin to be a quality
at a hairsbreadth distance from the body o r nervous
matter ; light which is a feeling extends from the s un
in all directions and is felt by the sense o f sight

everywhere ; in all space it is a qu a l ity and in all ,

space it is a feeling .

The world Of qualities as diffe rent from the world


o f feelin gs arises only in consequence o f an abstra e


tion supposed to be complete from the consciousness

which perceives them ; and this supposed complete
abstraction is thought to be possible and natural onl y
in consequence o f dividing consciousness in space from
its feeli ngs and making both into obj ects But this

complete abstraction is a delusion and impossible ,

because even while the separation is being made

, ,

both the things separated are Obj ects and feel ings o f
the same consciousness ; the qualities themselves are
feeli ngs when present to consciousness for the pur
pose o f being divided from the mind and the mind is ,

in the same case P sychological division in space o f


the m i nd from its feelings makes both members o f

the division into an absolute into obj ects each o f ,

which is supposed to exist even if the other should

not exist But metaphysical disti n ction makes these

qualities again into feelings notwithstanding that ,

th ey may occupy the whole o f sp ace F eelings and .

qualities are t h e t w o aspects o f the same world ; but

S PA C E 97

O F T I M E A ND .


for metaphysic the world is a world of fe e l i ngs s i n c e ,

the conception o f feeling includes that o f something

felt that is quality but the conception of quality
, , ,

does not include that of feeling .

V ery early the distinction was drawn between

objects which touched o ne another and obj ects o n e
o f which had besides this the sensation of being
, ,

touched by the other A ll obj ects could be felt onl y


by means of touch in the former sense if the Obj ect

felt did not itself touch the body which felt it it ,

must put in motion something which did ; and t h e

question was what this medium 7 0 {A ss a i d was ;
, ,

whether it belonged to the feeling body as in the ,

case Of the senses of touch and taste or was some ,

thing foreign to it as in sight and hearing Arist


. .

D e Anima ii i 6 e t seqq Touch i n the rst sense


which may be called contact was evidently an ,

i nterpretation o f touch in the second sense that is of , ,

touch as a sensation ; the closeness between objects

in contact was an inference from the sensation of
closeness in the sensation o f touching visible objects .

A ristotle showed that even obj ects o f touch were not

strictly close to the part of the body which felt them ,

but were felt through a medium just as the objects

of the other senses were though this medium was ,

part of the body itself D e Anima iii I I But the

. .

imagination had already rmly established the notion

o f objects bein g separate independent existences led ,

thereto by the sense of touch wrongly interpreted ,

a n d a ll enquiry had t o be conducted on that basis .

The consequence was the distinction between objects

and their qualities by which the objects were known

as au di ble visible tangible and s o on Take for

, , , .

instance a visibl e and tangible object as the object of


enquiry e g a table ; it has the tangible quality

. .

hardness the v isible quality brown ness Both these

, .

qualities are known if either is by an e ffect they , ,

produce in the medium between the object and the

sensitive part i n our bodies A s an Object the table .

requires this medium as much in the sense of touch ,

in order to produce the s ensation O f hardness as i n ,

the sense o f sight to produce that o f brownness .

The object is not immediately touched there is the

skin covering the nerve extremities and the nerve -

substance itself o r as A ristotle called it the 0025 5

, ,

intervening The original opinion was that the o b


j c et touched was immediately present to the sensitive

part in touch to Show that there was a medium was
virtually to S how that the Object s o conceived was a
ction of the imagination and that the object touched ,

was the quality Of tangibility not a supposed object ,

Of which this was a quality inherent ; for i n that case

a quality in the medium would be what was i m
mediately present to the sensitive part o f the body .

And thus we may read a profound meaning into

A ristotle s words D e Anim a i i i 1 2 K a o ko v 03

, ,

77 2
32 77 02
077; 3 3
05 097 0e 027 M c eTv 15 (1 211 00 091701 ;
7 07 1

7 0

Bez The 8707 was0
z ou 7 0
511 39
00 0 177 0
511 51 0
711 00vev 7 57g zz Mg .

the object itself the substance o f which the qualities


were properties or accidents o r in modern G erman , , ,

the D ing a n s i c h z Y et though Aristotle established

- -

clearly that in touch we perceive a quality and not

the thing itself he s a w neither that after this there

was no ground remaining to believe in the existence

o f the 37 77 nor that the co nf usion between the {1707

d tangibility was the cause o f t h e di stinction drawn

between an object in itself and its qualities a n d he
continued to argue on t h e same basis o f an u nknown
feelings consequently are in the body in the same
way as those o f the sense o f touch are All the .

senses are in this way a kind of touch in the sense of

contact but each with a peculiarity of its own which

procures it its name All feelings o f all the senses

, ,

are continuous indivisible into an objective part and


a subjective part and solid ; but one kind alone is


the feelin g o f touch ; from the three dimensions of

which latter kind of feeling when Combined with ,

sight all the other feelings derive not tangibility but


solidity The formal element is transferred from


touch and sight to other feelings ; its o w n material

element remains peculiar to touch B ut it may be .

objected here that if we are not justied in trans

, ,

ferring the material element of tangibility to objects

of sight and sound by association neither ar e we jus ,

t i e d in transferring the formal element of solidity to

the other senses besides touch and sight Transfer .

it may be said both or neither B ut solidity and


tangibility I reply are quite different th ings and

, ,

stand on quite different grounds The sensation of .

touch is the last of a series of conditions on the com

l e t i o n o f which the perception of solidity ari ses the
perception of a body as solid arises from the combi
nation o f feelings of sight and touch i n supercial
extension with their time relations The perception -

o f our own body as solid arises in this way and the

perception o f our own body as solid gives solidity to
every thing about it ; for if the space which it oce n
pies is solid the space which surrounds it must be

solid also ; for the body is perceived as solid only by

being distinguished from Objects o n all sides of it .

The perception o f solidity therefore is not due to

associati on as the transference o f tangi bi lity to O b
OF TI M E A ND S PA C E . 1 01

jec tsof sight is Solidity is always

. perceived when
it has been perceived once but tangibility may be ,

erroneously inferred .

P henomena whether o f one or more or all the


senses exist accordingly both in time and in three


dimensions of space NO here and there in phe .

n o m e n a is possible ; there is only one continuous phe

n o m e n o n in which and o f which are all its di fferences

, ,

parts a n d kinds There is one consciousness and o n e


universe ; each fact is the counterpart but not the

cause or the e ffect o f the other C onsciousness with .

all its modes o f feeling and its two modes of form is

one and indivisible the universe with all its quali
ties and its two modes of form the same two modes ,

as in consciousness is o n e and indivisible also Sight


reveals continuity of supercial extension touch and ,

sight together reveal continuity of supercial and

solid extension Suppose now that in these modes

o f extension an empty place were found that in the


surface revealed by sight a portion was dark and i n

visible that i n the surface revealed by touch a por

tion was intangible and did not affect the nerve of

touch cases which are frequent ; then the dark por

tion and the intangible portion being contrasted with ,

the light and the tangible portions become portions ,

o f space have position and gure

Space suffers no .

rupture but its material c o element o nl y What is


the cause o f this phenomenon ? Has it not been


shown that the material element is equally essential

to consciousness with the formal ? If then the mate
rial element vanishes anywhere ought not there the ,

formal element to vanish also ? Th e sol ution is that ,

the place left empty o f the material element is l led

w ith the representation of that element ; there is no
A RT I . material element in presentative perception at that
place but the gap is bridged over either by a mate

rial element supplied by representation from what ,

ever source this may be draw n o r by a representation ,

o f the gap becoming lled without designating by .

what kind of material element The dark portion o f .

the visible surface is only itself present to conscious

ness by being contrasted with the light portions ; t h e
intangible portion o f the tangible surface i s only pre
sent to consciousness by being contrasted with the
tangible portions In other words the formal element

I S always actually and presentatively present in all

consciousness the material element may be present

in representation onl y and provisionally Hence the .

power which we have o f forming an image of space

a nd of time without any particular material element ;

in this image the material element is only provision

ally present But the material element can never be

present in consciousness without the actual presence

o f the formal element Some time or some time and

space together every feeling must occupy I do not


some denite time some denite gure
, ; these
may be provisionally present But while we can .

banish matter from time and space and keep it only ,

provisionally there that is without specifying what

, ,

kind of matter it is to be we cannot so banish time


and space from matter Sensations o f sight and of


touch must always be in time and space ; sensations

o f the other senses must always be in time The .

cause of this is probably to be sought in the innite

number o f modications of the material element while ,

the formal element has but two modications ti m e ,

and space Time and space may be presented as


empty without any particular material content ; in


this shows that the o l d division into an internal sub

e c t i v e and an ext e rnal obj ective sense is correct
j ,

the fact is that there are two separate kinds and two
separate portions o f time contained in those feelings
which occupy space as well as time ; there is o ne
time element which is subjective and o f the same

kind as that occupied by feelings which occupy time

alone and there is another which is objective and is

occupied by the feelings in exactly the same objective

way i n which they occupy space Tangible and visi .

ble objects are present in consciousness for a certain

time subjectively they occupy space objectively and

for that time ; but not onl y for that time but also for ,

as long as they occupy s p ace ; they have a place and

a duration in time in the world of objects as well as ,

a place in space When I s e e an o a k it exists for a


minute in my mind but it exists ve hundred years


objectively and in the same objective sense as that in


which it is said to exist as part of the visible and tan

g i b l e landscape . There is therefore an objective
, ,

and a s ubjective time though you have only men


t i o n e d one the subj ective


If I should not succeed in answering this o b je c

tion I hope that the plainness with which I have

exhibited it will shield me from the imputation of

wishing to leave any dif culties dark My answer to .

this objection is that the o a k considered as occupying


this second portion of time this objective portion of,

time does not exist as part o f the object o r p h e n o m e


non of presentative perception with the analysis of ,

which we are more directly concerned The oak ex .

i s t i ng in that second Objective portion of time the

, , ,

ve hundred years is an object o f representation onl y

, ,

believed on evidence interpreted by my experience o f

OF TI M E A ND S PAC E . 1 05

time in presentative perceptions The universe in its . I um I .

c H n
e n t l r e d u ra t l o n pr i or to th i s actually present moment
0 o 0
0 0 0

nay even thi s actually present moment I tself I f I t be

Tl e u ni t y o f
p l

true that
L nt nj p l t d ej l in d
e m o m e o ei a r e es a o e m o ,

is in the same case There remains therefore no .

other time in presentative phenomena than the time

wh ich I spoke o f as the only o n e the same in kind ,

with the time involved in feelings which exist in time

o nly ; and this time is both objective and subj ective ,

equally the o n e equally the other as is discovered by

, ,

reection ; that is it is mine and the tree s both at

once Similarly with space ; the visible and tangible


landscape O f which the o a k w a s a portion is the only

extended object present in presentative perception .

Beyond an exten t which M r Bain describes as a .

range of about a third o f a circle right and left up , ,

and down all other visible and tangible Objects are

present to consciousness onl y in representation T h e .

object which I have before me in presentation is this

portion o f space and the rst portion o f time the ,

minute lled together by certain feelings If I mix


up with them or add to them in the followi ng min ute

, ,

representative perceptions I may in that next minute ,

have before me the ve hundred years o f the oak s
life and ages before that also and also the whole
, ,

depth of sky above and beneath the earth E urope , ,

E ngland the eld of many one with the o a k there

, ,

standing the events that have passed around it and


that may pas s before it is gone and i n times when it ,

shall have gone and been forgotten The s o called .


objective portion o f time then turns o ut to be time , ,

as the form of an object of representation not o f pre

scutation But nothing I n representation is o r can
1 06 T H E NA T U RE OF .
be more real than things perceived in presentation .

So that if this portion o f time is called Obje c tive to

di stinguish it from the minute in which it is per
c e i v e d it cannot be in the sense that what is s ubjee

tive is less real than what is objective .

Will however any one maintain that the d i s t i n c

tion between subjective and objective coincides with
that between representation and presentation that ,

every thin g which is merely represented is merely

subjective every thing which is really presented is

really Objective ? In that case every thing not con ,

t a i n e d in the actual object o f the present moment is

merely subjective ; the course of the world up to the
present moment the space o f sky seen at the Anti

podes our own ancestors are m erely subjective ; nor

, ,

will it avail to reply that they are now indeed s ub ,

e c t i v e but have been actually presented to conscious

j ,

ness once that our ancestors have lived in a world Of


people to whom they were objects of presentation ;

for the people themselves the consciousnesses to ,

whom they were objects of presentation are them ,

selves merely subjective too all alike are Objects o f ,

Ou r representation The addition of a further cha


r a c t e r i s t i c to those Obj ects cannot make them more

real if the added characteristic is itself also merely


subj ective The Objects then o f representation not

, ,

onl y are now subj ective but wher e they do not , ,

belong to the actual experience of the person re p r e

senting them i e where they are imagined as well as
. .

represented they have never been any thing else ;


w hile as obj ects of former presentation they are i n

fe r e n c e s from obj ects of present or actual presenta
tion This conclusion is inevitable on the supposition

that the distinction between subjective and objective


Obj ects a n d e v e n t s which it mirrors o n the othe r


These classes o f objects have their separate a nd a p

r 0 r i a t e times and spaces in which th ey exist and in
p p
which they are perceived to exist ; but both are o b
e c t i v e and subj ective in the same sense that is both
j , ,

are what are commonly called obj ects and neither is ,

a subject The distinction between the two kinds of


time and space occupied respectively by the obj ect

, ,

as an object o f this mind and by this mind itself a s

, ,

contain ing their image in its consciousness is accord ,

i ngl y a distinction which arises in a particular kind of

reection on the phenomenon of representation a n d ,

not in this phenomenon of representation by itself ,

that is as it rst arises in consciousness or as it is

, ,

interpreted by reection alone in its proper sense .

But in order here to decide the question o f the

unity o f phenomena generally whether presentative ,

o r representative in time the nature of representa

, ,

tive phenomena must be examined What then is .

the phenomenon of representation as distinguished

by reection proper from the phenomenon o f pre
s e nt a t i o n ? The obj ect o f representation is distin
ui s h e d from that o f presentation solely by an i n
fe ri o r degree o f vivi dness distinctness and complete
, ,

ness in its material element The events and objects


of yesterday from noon to midni ght were presented

to me yesterday and occupied twelve hours To day .

they are represented to me and occupy ve minutes .

They are equal ly objects in both cases and equally ,

subjective In both cases their pre sence in the mind


and the time they occupy in that can be distin

ui sh e d in the kind f reection above described
g ,
o ,

from the time the events themselves occupy as O b

j e c. t s In both cases the times occupied are equal ,
OF TI M E AND S PAC E . 1 09

are really the same In the presentation the time is


twelve hours ; in the representation the time is ve

minutes .
NO you object ; the objective time in the

representation is twelve hours the subj ective is ve


minutes Hence the difference

. Times which con
tain the same events and o b j ects are the same length
o f time ; but do the ve minutes and the twelve
hours in representation contain the same events ;
that is are they lled with the same material ele

ment ? C ertainly they are Just as the small circle


of the retina contain s the same colours and forms

which are spread out over the whole surface o f the
object seen so the ve minutes contain the same

objects and even ts which are spread o ut over the

twelve hours in the representation A s the object .

in the former case was o n e object i n supercial ex

tension o f space so here in the representation o f the

events and objects of a day there is one obj ect in o ne

time which may be called ve m i nutes o r twelve

hours according as we consider it as part of the mind

or as part of the other Objects mirrored by the mind .

D istinguished however into two objects by reection

proper that is distinguished into two objects of ve
, ,

minutes and twelve hours respectively but without ,

being placed in different portions of space that i s , ,

in the mind and without it ; distinguished therefore

into two aspects of the same object what is the ,

difference be t ween them ? The difference between

them in this c a s e is solely the difference in the
distribution of the material element In the ve .

minutes that element is gathered together in the ,

twelve hours it is separated by spaces of time pro

visionally n o t actually present The twelve hours

contain just s o much material element as c a n be con


t a i ne d by v e m i nutes and this diff erence in length

is rectied by the recollection that there a re gaps
containing other matter which is omitted In other .

words the ve minutes o r twelve hours Obj ects o f

, ,

representation are a repetition o f part only and that

, ,

a less vividly present part o f the same twelve hours ,

as an object o f presentation This omission o f the .

matter enables the twelve hou rs to be the equivalent

O f the v e minutes since if all the matter was con

t a i n e d in them which was contain ed in presentation ,

they would require a n equal length of time in r e

presentation ; it would require from noon to mid
night to day t o represent the events and objects con

t a i n e d in t h e time from noon to midnight which

were presented yesterday Th e same remarks a p

ply to the case of the ve hundred years o f the

o a k tree ; only that in this case these years are not

remembered but imagined If events su fcient to.

ll every minute of ve hundred years were i m

i n e d o n e by o n e not one minute but ve hundred
g ,

years would be required for t h e purpose In all .

cases o f representation there is a decrease either i n

vividness or in amount o r in distinctness of the
, ,

order o f occurrence of the material element o r in all ,

at once in the object represented compared to the

, ,

obj ect as it was presented Somethin g is omitted ,.

either from the material element itself or from its ,

arrangement or from both in the object o f presen

, ,

tatie n ; and the object with these om i ssions is the

object of representation In order to signalise that

there are such omissions and that the obj ect o f ,

representation is a faithful transcript or repetition o f

the object of presentation only s o far a allowance is
made for such omissions the object of representation

second in which they are represented The twelve .

hours and the second are o n e object in o n e time:just

as the visible landscape and the impression on the
retina are o n e obj ect in one space .

If representation diffe r s from presentation only

in the vivi dness distinctness and arrangement o f its
, ,

material element then the formal element in presen


t a t i o n and in representation is the same ; there is n o

diff erence between presentation and representation in
so far as their formal element is concerned In an .

Object presented and in the same object represented

the time and the space occupied is the same ; the two
Objects di ffer only i e in point o f position in
. .

their times of being present to consciousness ( which

as will b e seen farther on is the characteristic S i g
n a li s e d by the term Sameness and in certain changes
) ,

in their material element There is no correspond


ing change in their formal element Just as it was .

shown above that in presentative perception a space


empty o f feelin g was still space the matter o f which


was supplied by representation from other parts of

space s o also in the objects o f representation the

omitted material element is what is supplied by r e

presentation the formal el ement remains the same as

before It makes no difference whether the object


present in consciousness is one of presentation or re

presentation the formal element in it is equally vivid

in both cases I do not s a y that it is equally distinct


or the arrangement of its parts the same because d i s ,

t i n c t n e s s and arrangement o f parts depend upon the

material element contained in the object as well as
upon its formal element ; in other words upon the ,

division of the formal element by the material as w ill ,

be seen farther o n The p r e s e nc e no t of particular

OF TI M E AND S PAC E . 1 13

lengths gures o r arrangement o f part s in the

, , ,

formal element but o f the formal element itself in


the object is equally certain and equally vi vi d in


representation and in presentation The same might .

be said o f the material element itse l f taken generally ,

and in the abstract that is Of feeling if the word

, , ,

feeling could be understood as meaning not this o r

that particular feeling but merely as signi fying that

representation invol ves feeling of some kind o r other

equally with presentation O f feeling however the .
, ,

modes are innumerable of the formal element the ,

modes are only two time and space ; s o that we can


S peak o f time and space in their rst intention with a

denite precision incompetible to the object feeling , ,

in its rst in tention for feeling has inn umerable


modes while time and S pace have o nl y di vi sions


O r to put the case in another way it may be said ,

that feeling is one obj ect divided by time and space

and co e xtensive with them ; but the feelin g here and
the feeling there and there and there diff er from
, , ,

each other in kin d as well as in position and quan


tity in time and space and that innumerably and i n


nitely while the parts of time and space so divided

, ,

though equally innumerable and innite diff er not ,

from each oth e r in kind And this I believe is what .

is meant by those who maintain that wh i le feeling is , ,

a general and abstract term time and space are not ,

general and abstract but particular terms indi catin g

, ,

objects o r forms of thought of a particular nat ure .

There is a time and a space d istinct from every par

t i c ul a r portion o f either of them ; the relation b e
tween those portions and time and space generally is
that o f parts t o a whole But there is no such thing

a s feeling distinct from every particular feelin g ; the


relation between these is that between a l ogical ab ?

stract and general term and a logical concrete and

particular term ; feeling in the abstract can never be
anything but a provisional image but time a nd space ,

are always also an actual image ; feeli ng generally

and time and space generally are wholes o f very dif
fe r e nt kinds and in t w o very di fferent senses

If then there is only o n e time and only o n e space ,

and if these are equally vivid in representation and in

presentation we may truly say that time and space

are always presented even in representation The


di fference between presentation and representation

lies solely in the material element When I look .

straight before me I see a surface occupying about

a third o f a circle right and left up and down this

, ,

is the object o f presentation When I recall the fact


th at I can turn round and s e e a similar surface o n all

sides of me the material element contained in those

represented surfaces is less v ivid th an i n the pre

sented surface and they are said to be represented

on that ground ; but the space contained in them is

as vividly present as in the presented surface and is ,

presented t o me in them while the material element


is represented only When I interpret these surfaces


by experiences drawn from the sense o f touch the ,

surfaces become solid and I nd myself in a space o f


three dimensions presented to consciousness just as

before O n e and the same space in three dimension s

is presented to me disclosed indeed partially by one


sense partially by another but completely by all

, ,

together There is one consciousness and corres


pondingly there is o n e space whatever may be the,

cause o f there b eing but one o f each But what is .

meant by there being but one consciousness ? This ;


of consciousness ; for by necessary I mean as was

said in the preceding chapter the subjective aspect of ,

universality It is impossible to be conscious and


not be conscious of a feeling in time and space The .

proof o f their necessity is di rect practical empirical , , ,

inevitable Since however we never have feeling in


the abstract but always some determinate feeli ng ,

and determinate feelings are inn umerable while time ,

and space modes of the formal element are two only ;

, ,

in other words since feeling in its rst intention is


informal unlimit e d and we can only know about it

, ,

that it is in consciousness not wh at it is while time

, ,

and space we can know in their rst intention not

, ,

only that they are in consciousness but also what ,

they are ( a distinction which has already been pointed

o ut as o n e o f the greatest importance between the
qually necessary formal and material elements in
, ,

consciousness ) I shall cease noticing except incident

, ,

ally the necessity o f the material element and speak

, ,

only o f that of the formal element time and Space ,


I t may be said that we can have feelings not in space .

I admit that the majority o f our feelings all except ,

those Of the senses o f sight and touch can be r e p r e ,

sented i n consci ousness with abstraction made o f


other feelings occupying space and of space relations ; -

I admit that in representation the abstraction o f tim e

from space is possible s o as to represent feeli n gs in

time alone without S pace though it is impossible to


represent feelings in space without time But I assert .

that fee lin gs s o abstractedly represented as occupy ing

time alone are provisional objects onl y and never are ,

represente d without the proviso tacitly made that

they exist in space as well as in time I do not admit .

Hume s postulate that wh atever we can imagine to
OF TI M E A ND S PAC E . 1 17

e xist separately can possibly really exist separately .

Whatever we imagine to e xist separately does actu

ally exist separately in the way in which we imagine
it ; now we imagine time to be provisionally separate
from space ; it is therefore provisionally separate from
S pace I do not grant that because we c a n provision
ally separate them they can exist actually separate

This postulate rests on the theory o f two substances ,

o f the Object and its evidence in the mind which I ,

renounce M y imagini n g two things separate is taken


for evidence o f their being p ossibly separate in a

world of absolute existences N o M y imagining
. .

two things separate is their being separate s o far as ,

I can and do imagine them to be s o And this I .

ad m it to be the case with time and space namely , ,

that I can represent ti me to myself in a provisional

image independent of space space in a provisional

image independent o f time except the time occupied

in representing it and feeling in a provisional image

independent o f either o r both except the time o c c u


pied in representing it ; consequently that the pro ,

visional image of space includes as its pro visionally


present elements time and feeling ; but that time


may be represented in a provisional image o f which

feeling is a provisional element but space only a p ro

visional accompaniment F eelings i n time are never


presented or represented separate from the provisional

accompaniment o f space ; though this may be owing
to their constant association by the simultaneous ex
e r c i s e o f the di fferent senses or to some laws of nature

which are the obj ective aspect of that association .

C onsciousness has two formal modes time and space , ,

different but inseparable and simultaneous ; the two

s enses which reveal space ,
sight and touch exist ,
s imultaneously with those which reveal time by itself ;
hence their inseparability in any way excep t provi
s i o na l l
y; and hence the di fference in the modes o f
connection between them namely that in all ti m e
, ,

there is involved space as its accompaniment in all ,

Space there is involved time as i t s element .

No w as t o the necessity o f time a n d S pace it i s ,

not said that they are necessary per s e o r obj ectively , ,

but that t hey are necessary to o ur consciousness o r ,

subjectively U niversality or presence in all Objects


without exception is necessity subjectively o r i n

, ,

consciousness ; they are two sides o r aspects o f the

same phenomenon N ecessity if used in an objective

sense can only be a conditioned necessity ; for i n


s t ance i f it rains the earth w ill be wet ; the earth

, ,

will n o t necessarily be wet unless o n the supposition

that it rains So in time and S pace objectively if I

sa a l l existence is necessarily existence in time and


space you directly ask me why ? that is under what

, ,

condi tion I assert that it i s s o N o w universality


cannot have an ob j ective condition for then it would ,

not be universality There i s then no obj ective con


di tion of this universal fact ; and its necessity consists

onl y in the knowledge o f the fact that is it is its , ,

subj ective aspect .

It is sometimes held that time and space are

merely generalisations from experience A ll abstract .

and general cogni tions may be generalised from e x p e

ri e n c e and as those o f time and space are general

and abstract in the highest degree they also may be ,

gene ralised in the same way But this property .


which they possess in common with other general

and abstract cogni tions does not prove that they do

not possess other properties which are peculi ar to

unable t o present o r represent a ny object or any
feeling to o ur consciousness e x c e p t un d e r these forms .

In other words time and S pace are necessary not b e


cause we know the causes which produce them not ,

because they depend o n an innate or supersensu al

constitution o f the mind or soul but solely because,

their negation is inconceivable It is the mo ment of


consciousness which is decisive for itself and while it

l asts
. The effort to escape from these forms o f c o n
s c i o u s n e s s is convincing to any man o f their necessity

to him at that moment at any rate E very such .

e ffort only rivets them faster for it supplies an i n


stance of doing against your wil l the very thing

which y o u labour not to do Yo u are trying to

miss a mark which you are under an absolute com

pulsion to hit So long as this is the case so long

must the marksman regard his mark as necessary .

The view here taken rest s o n no theory o f the o b

j e c t i ve constitution Of the mind E very
. theory
which regards the mind and its forms o f thought as
objective existences cannot attri bute necessity in
, ,

the present sense to either o f them as such The


argument fo r the necessity o f time and space can

receive no support from any such theory ; and o n the
other hand it cannot be weakened by any such theory ,

by any explanation relating t o their origin o r condi

tions of existence such as will be found in the fol

lowing chapter What time and space as cognitions


o r as forms o f feelin g are is a question to be kept

, ,

e ntirely distinct from the question as to how we o r


minds involved in bodies come by them Their


nature value and importance to consciousness alone

, , ,

are distinct from their history .

It is quite true th a t this s ubjective necessity is an

OF T I M E AND S PAC E . 1 21

e mpirical fact and it may appear to some that all PCHA RT1 11

cognitions which come from experi ence that is all

. .

, ,
e m pirical facts are matters Of fact only and never Ti d Sp

m e an ac e

bj t
, ,
p as ur e o ec s.

contain in themselves necessity o r a cognition that

they m ust be as they are as well a s that they are s o ; ,

and that therefore this subjective necessity is o n e in

appearance only But the appearance is in this case

the reality It is not an inference from the pheno


menon but an inseparable aspect o f the p h e n o m e


non itself I t is to the empirical evidence o f the


necessity of time and S pace that appeal is made t o ,

the fact in every one s experience that time and space
are irremovable from consciousness either in imagina ,

tion o r actual inspection o f obj ects Let any o n e try .

to think at all and all his thoughts will presuppose


them ; or starting intentionally from Within them h e

w ill nd himself unable to transcend o r go beyond
them The negation o f every other object is con

c ei va b l e only n o t o f these ; for what is negation


itself b ut the removing an Object in imagination out

o f time and S pace ? C onsciousness is feeling in the
forms o f time and space .

Taking now time and space as separate objects ,

in which the material element is provisiona l ly pre

s ent the following de n itions o f them o r anal yses o f
, ,

them in their rst intention arise ; part o f which de ,

ni t i o n s h a s been proved by what h a s already been

said and part remains still to be proved in what

fol lows T i rne and Space as such objects are called


the pure Object .

T I ME Time has o n e di mension length

It is .

innitely divisible in thought ; it is innitely exten

sible in thought It admits o f no min imum in divi .

sion and of no maximum in extension F or these


reasons it contains every thing ; nothing is short

enough to slip through it nothing long enough to ,

outr un it It is one in nature for all its parts are


still time It is incompressible for no sin gle par t


can be anni hilated .

S PAC E Space has three dimens i ons

length , ,

breadth and depth

It is innitely divisible in

thought ; it is innitely extensible in tho ught It .

admits of no minimum in division and o f no maxi ,

mum i n extension F or these reasons it contains .

every thing ; nothing is small enough to slip through

it nothing is great enough to o utstand it It is o n e

in nature for all its parts are still space It is i n


compressible for no single part can be ann ihilated


We thus obtain such a datum as is required by

M r Spencer in his P ri n ciples o f P sych ology P art

chap I 2 as the beginn ing of all philosophy ; a


datum within the limits o f consciousness a beli ef o r ,

a cogni tion The characteristic o r second intention

, ,

o f such a datum namely that i t must be an imme

, ,

diate ineradicable belief does not give the datum ,

itself in its rst intention does not tell us what the ,

datum is Belief is no datum but the characteristic


o f certain classes of data F eeling the material ele .


ment i n conscio usness though a necessary and uni ,

versal eleme nt and ineradicably certain offers no

, ,

criterion for distinguishing o n e phenomenon from

another for it is the same in all phenomena alike ; it

is impossible to s a y w h a t it is in its rst intention . .

Time and space alone uni te the properties of being

imme di ately and ineradicably certain of being uni ,

v e rs a l l present in a ll phenomena of being knowable

y ,

in their rst intention and dened as what they are ,

and of being in nature the same in all obj e cts however ,

Witho ut such an element the process o f reasoning ,

contains no more truth than the process o f wal king

or of eating With such an element it is the process

o f acquiring true and systematic knowledge All .

men reason ; the question i s what is the n ature of ,

that process which all alike perform and of the re ,

s ul t s which all alike reach It will be my endeavour


to S how and to Sho w by analysis t hat this process

, ,

and its results whatever they may be do as a fact

, ,

contain a necessary element and the same necessary , ,

element which is contained in the process of presen

t a t i v e perception and in the simplest instances o f con
s c i o us n e s s
. N 0 one not even the Sceptic doubts
, ,

the reality o f a phenomenon while it is a p h e n o m e ,

non The Sceptic doubts not its reality but its truth ;

he doubts that i t s nature can be discovered because ,

he doubts that its nature is perceived But its nature .

is perceived ; in every phenomenon is perceived its

formal and its material element ; and the same formal
element i s perceived i n every phenomenon namely , ,

i t s time and its space The criterion and its proof


instead o f m o v m g m a V I CI O us c ircle coincide ; instead ,

Of presupposin g each other as a condition they are ,

given at once in o n e c ognition ; both characters are

borne at once both by time and by space N either .

the formal nor the material element need any demon

s t r a t i o n for they together constitute the phenomenon

But the formal elemen t as being the same in all phe


no m e na ,
is the source o f their truth the starting ,

point Of all demonstration The criterion therefore .


which the Sceptics requir e to be proved is as certain ,

as the phenomena to which it is to be applied and ,

about which the Sceptics do not doubt See Sextus .

E mp P y rrh Hyp lib II cap 9 5 t a w 7 1 $ 0021 EM S g
. . . . . . . 1 .
OF TIM E A ND S PAC E . 1 25

I GMT h e most important feature in time and PA RT I .

CH 1 L
space I S the i r d ivi s ib il ity Wi thout res i duum or the i r

exhaustive divisibility It will be seen in the second Th i l g

. ut i e c s v

P art that on this property depends the whole of logic t i d p m e an s

and the postulates D i visions are in troduced into


pure continuous time and space by the material ele

ment in cognition ; where o n e sensation ends another ,

begins ; where o n e colour for instance ends o r where ,

one sound ends another begins ; and in emotions

, ,

when we cease to be affected by one feeling we ,

begin to be affected by another There is nothing .

intermediate between the two sensations or feelings .

Wherever we are conscious o f a difference in feeling ,

whether it is between colours on a surface o r between ,

feeling resistance to touch and ceasing t o feel it o r ,

between the presence and absence o f any feeling ,

there time and space are divided N ow between two .

such states of consciousness we are accustomed to

speak as if a line o f division existed o r as if a point ,

o f time intervened which lines o r points were them


selves portions o f space o r of tim e r) By using this

l a nguage we render ourselves liable to o n e o f two
opposite errors and lay ourselves open to one o f two

opposite objections E i t her this line in space and


this point in time are conceived as occupyi ng space

and time a n d then they become themselves subject

to be divided again in conformity to Aristotle s prin

ci p i c N at A u s c lib VI cap I
. . .
3 77 0
61 J uve t g 0
x . 1 001 2
5 .

1 21 0
5 1; 0 1 05 1 27 2 and t h en we have only added to the
5 0

portions o f time and space which need to be divide d ,

and have not really divided them at all ; o r the lin e is

conceived as length without bre a dth and the point i s ,

conceived as containing no q uantity of time and both ,

thus become unreal inasmuch a s they are i nc o nc e i v


PART 1 able as separate objects o f consciousness If we choose .


to adopt the terms point lin e surface as divisions o f

. .

, , ,
The ex h ti Space and the term point o r present moment as a

a us ve
di i ib ility f division of time we must bear in mind while we do
v s o
, , ,

m e an d p s a c e. , ,

so that these terms are names no t o f objects but o f


operations o f events the resul t o f which they ex

, ,

press ; that they have no separate existence but are ,

modes of representin g the fact of a divi sion i n con

s c i o u s n e s s ; the instantaneous change in the current

o f o u r consciousness a n d of which we are conscious , ,

is rendered plai n to us under the gure o f a visual

lin e o r point of demarcation a
line o r point which ,

cannot be an object o f consciousness except the two ,

Objects which it divides are present in consciousness ,

when it exists as a modication part o r element of , , ,

that whole divided object .

Space metaph ysically considered has nothing to

, ,

do with the geometrical abstractions of points lines , ,

and surfaces A S these terms are used in geometry


they are abstractions o r qualities o n which the a t ,

tention is xed to the exclusion o f other qualities

which are equally essential to the nature o f the o b
j c et common to both A point has no parts and no .

magnitude that is we attend to its position al one
, , .

A line is length without breadth that is we a t

, ,

tend to its length alone A surface h a s length and .

breadth alone that is we abstract from its depth , , .

These are concepts or as I prefer to call them at , ,

present provisional images o f obj ects o f perception

, , ,

formed by abstraction for certain scientic purposes .

If now we speak of space being divided by points ,

lines and surfaces meaning such abstractions as just

, ,

described we lay ourselves open to misunderstand


ing either as i f we asserte d space to be divided by

out what this condition is namely that the divi , ,

sions points lines and surfaces are hypostasised by

, , , ,

mathematic that is made into or treated as if they

, ,

were empirical Objects from which abstraction o f ,

length breadth and depth could be made The di

, ,

visions in mathemati c and metaphysic are the same

ultimately that is are inseparable from the objects

which they divide but the difference is that while , ,

in metaphysic they bear this character all along from ,

beginning to end o f its procedure ( for the scope of

metaphysic is to examine what they really are ) in ,

mathematic they reach it only by abstraction of pro

e r t i e s which have been attributed to them by mathe
matic itself for its o w n purposes ; mathematic rst
imagines that its divisions have a separate empirical ,

existence and then abstracts from them portions o r


elements of this existence it rst makes them c o n

crete and then makes them abstract in order to i n
, ,

v e s t i a t e how space and time may be divided and

g ,

the relations which its divided parts bear to each



Space metaphysically considered is not divided by

points lines and surfaces at all understan d the terms
, , ,

as we will either as geometrical abstractions o r as

, ,

e mpirical visible o r tangible Objects Wh en two s e n .

s a t i o n s limit ea c h other in consciousness when we ,

are conscious o f a change in sensation space is a l ,

ready divided ; and if a line o f demarcation is per

i v e d it is as the result o f the process and not as

the condition o f it ; that is the obj ects o n both sides


of the demarcation are perceived before the demarca

tion itself The same is the case with sensations in

time The change from o n e sensation to another is


i nstantan eous a n d the moment in which it take s


place is empirically indivisible E ven when there i s .

a series o f changes each s o slight that we cann ot ,

name can hardly even perceive it even then the

, ,

moment when we do perceive each change in the

series is indivisible There is no time occupied in .

the passage for we are conscious all the time and

, ,

are conscious o f none Hence the division is ex .

h a u s t i v e without residuum
Time is bisected i n a .

moment no time elapsing between the two segments


The indi v isibility of the moment o f division change , ,

o r transition in consciousness is the fact which con

, ,

s t i t u t e s or necessitates the indivisibility o f the point

o r l i ne of demarcation in objects considered as such , ,

both in tim e and S p a c e l t We have nothing t o d o /

with the points lines and su rf aces o f geometry and

, , ,

are clear o f all such controversies as whether these

are portions o f Space or not ; whether solids consist
o f or are divisible into o r are formed by the motion
, ,

o f surfaces ; whether surfaces hold similar relations

to nes a nd li n es to points ; and whether poin ts

, ,

lines and surfaces exist really as they are geometri


cally conceived to exist ; and clear also of t h e c o r

responding questions about time such as whether ,

time is composed o f present moments 7 0s v u and , ,

how long such a present moment is to be conceived

to last .

It is enough for the metaphysician that
experience shows that by means of the materi a l ele ,

ment in consciousness di visions are introduced into ,

time and space divisions which occupy no portion of


time and space except as belonging to t h e portions


which they divide and which therefore cannot be ,

ag a i n divided These di visions are n o t objects by


themselves either empirical or provision a l they are


not portions of time and space they cann ot be pre


sented to consciousness alone apart from t h e s e n ,

s a t i o n s o f whic h they are divisions but they inhere

in sensations ; they are dividings not divisions modes ,

o f sensation acts o f consciousness ,

wh ich do not b e ,

come independent Obj ects because we afterwards ex

press them by empirical extended signs as li nes and


points D id these acts occupy an empirical moment


o f time we should be conscious o f them during the


transition ; but this is not the case we are conscious

only o f the change when it has happened and when ,

the terminus a quo and the terminus ad qu em are

visible at once E mpirically speaking and with r e

ference to the minima o f consciousness I n time and

space it is true to s a y B e o t m ev 5 0 BZ OV for as an

empirical moment of time the moment o f transit i s

indivisible .

The moment that we x o u r attention o n the

division itself that moment we erect it into an object
, ,

and must conceive or imagine it as occupying time

and space and not merely as dividing them ; but this

need not and can not be as occupying time and space

, ,

by itself but together with the feelings o n each S ide


o f it between which it is the limit

This is a second .

step ; we have the division completed before we need

to take this step and we need to take the step at all

only in the interest of the geometer o r mathematician

o r logician not in that o f the metaphysician until he

becomes a logician The considera t ion of divisions .

as instrumenta divisionis o f time and space as objects ,

expressed by points lines and surfaces belongs to , , ,

the m athematician ; that o f time and space themselves

and their division in consciousness apart from the ,

mode in which that division is expressed i s the busi ,

nes s o f t h e metaphysician .

It remain s t o consider the inni ty of time

17 .

and space In ni ty no less than necessity when pre


d i c a t e d of time and space is a relative term that is , ,

applicable to consciousness only or to Objects in rela ,

tion to a Subject Those two objects in o r under .


which we perceive all other Objects are themselves ,

obj ects o f consciousness and have no absolute cha

ra c t e r A s such objects they are innite that is
, ,

they cann ot be transcended by consciousness but ,

must always be b efore the mind when it is conscious .

C onsequently they cann ot be seen or thought of as

complete wholes It is this character o f time and .

space which is marked by the word Inni te .

Aristotle who seems to have tried to eliminate


the innite 7 0 from philosophy as far as he


could is yet constrained to admit that it leads to con


t r a d i c t i o n s to deny the innite in all senses o f the

term In the N at A u s c book I I I ch 6 he says
. . . . .

071 0
07 1 11 0 3
0 7 21 01) 2 1 07;
0 71 77 0AA00 00
0 6V007 00

B o u va
077A0V '

7 5 xg o vo v 307 001
7 00 7 2 0 7 1; da y ) m e ? 7 5

Az um i , 70001 7 00 t a / 977 013 01 001 27 00 5 1; 1 025 1 8 700
( g 5 3000 ;

0 100 307 001 0 7 0011 00001 5 1 071 9 01 1) 1 3

0 7 01 ;
( 0 0
1 1 7 27
5 01 ;

g at /11 177 001 v0x203 001 , 01 001 7 177 05 027,

z o u 0731 011 07 1

307 1 , 7 3; 0 06
0 The umpire which he needs he nds

in his ruli ng distinction o f 061 0071 ; and t w eA xem But 1 1 1 .

this is vague to modern minds and requires i n t e rp r e ,

t a t i o n ; and moreover A ristotle does not follow it to

the ful l extent o f its guiding power for he will not ,

all ow an 017 9 15 01 10007 02 7 5 005 201 1 in space to exist even

: 1

001 02705 1
1 But it is a weighty support to the view

taken in this E ssay that the in nity of time and that ,

o f space eg 3 17 in some sense is placed by A ristotle

n ,
, ,

among the facts to be explained by a ny true theory

of these m a t t e r s f
OF TI M E A ND S PA C E . 1 33

But even against the relative innity which is

here maintained as appertaining to time and space
there are arguments brought forward apparently con ,

elusive arguments which bring us back to the posi


tion of A ristotle in search of an umpire for they seem ,

to S how that the conception o f an innite in any sense

is an impossible o n e that is that it involves contra
, ,

dictions ; and consequently that we can think neither

o f time nor of space nor o f any other nameable obj ect

whatever as innite .

The relative innity here maintained has two

modes in space and two in time ; that is time is i n ,

nite in extension z 007 00
and in division z oo 7 00 ,

and S pace the same ; in other words time ,

and space cannot be divided s o far that they are not

divisible farther nor extended s o far that they are

not extensible farther ; and must be so represented

in thought N ow it is these assertions which are on

the other side alleged to contain implicitly contra , ,

dictions ; a n d since it is asserted at the same time

that the opposite V I e w to this the view namely that

time and space are nite that is that i n division and

, ,

extension a point can be reached beyond which we

can neither divide nor extend farther is also o n e ,

which involves contradictions ; and that since by the ,

logical laws o f contradiction and excluded middle

one of these views must be false and the other its , ,

contradictory must be true while both as involvi ng

, ,

contradictions can be shown as is alleged to be false

, , ,

the mind in its consciousness is thrown into contra

dictions with itself from which there is apparently no
escape But it is the business of philosophy to recon

cile apparent contradictions not to acquiesce in them

, .

C ontradictions unsolved are the stronghold Of s c e p t i


c i sm ,
and that class of contradictions now und er d i s
c u s s i o n was the stronghold of the philosophical sect

o f Sceptics in G reece contradictions which were not


solved but overridden by N e o P latonism Kant a t -


tempted their solution i n the Antinomies o f P ure

R eason ; and Hegel took them up and incorporated
them in his logical system which renders his system ,

the most profound and complete system of O ntology

which has ever been proposed ; but it is un s a t i s fa c
tory not because it incorp orates and therefore solves

these contradictions but because it does s o only by


recourse to O ntology He maintains that Co n t ra d i c


tion is the ultimate essence and the ultimate law of

all things o f the universe and all its parts from the

greatest to the least thus bringing all things indeed


to the same level but not by bringin g the c o nt r a d i c


tory up to the level of the non contradictory but by -


bringing the non contradictory down to the level of


the contradictory ; and this is only possible by trans

forming logical and relative notions into absolute
entities that is by making the assumption that me
, ,

t a p h y s i c is a science of the Absolute that is an , ,

O ntology O ntology i s like an attempt to leap O ff


from one s o w n shadow ; it attempts to predicate a
second intention o f the Sum of things as such ; as if
the Sum o f things could as such be related to any , ,

thing else i n consciousness and as if it must not ,

always be related to consciousness itself ; reect on

this relation o f the Sum o f things to consciousness
, ,

and then that consciousness i s included in the Sum o f

things and the consciousness which reects on both

together takes the place o f that consciousness now _

included in the Sum of thin gs ; repeat the process for

ever and nothing further comes o ut of it never is an
, ,
tum . Nunc te ,
D ae d a l e ,
rogo ; h ae d uae partes sunt
n e ni t ae an i n ni t ae ? D F i ni t ae P h I t a ex d uo b u s
. . .

ni t i s c o m p o n e r e t u r i n n i t u m quod r e p ugn a t D . .

F a t e o r e rr o r e m . I n n i t ae sunt P h Jam in S c y l
. .

lam incidis : ita partes e s s e nt aeq u a l e s toti ; i n ni t um

e ni m inni t e a equale e s t ; P raet e r e a vides ut r a m q ue
partem in puncto a t e rm i n a ri ; non igitur ni b u s e t
terminis caret .

The argument proceeds farther but rests always ,

o n the same principles which are here involved ; a n d

as I am not goin g to al lege either the obj ection sup

posed by We r e nfe l s nor with Spinoza and C larke

that innite quantity is not composed o f parts at ,

least as an esc ape from this reasoning I need not ,

quote the rest o f the passage I agree with the re .

mark quoted in the same note from C larke that i n ,

nites are not equals ; and for the answer to this rea
soning I look to the di stinction between voluntary
and involuntary modes of consciousness which I h o ld ,

to be the ground of the distinction between c o n c e i v

ing and imagining a concept being an imagination

o r a perception sei z ed and li mited by volition as will


be more fully drawn o ut in a following chapter .

A 1 001 7 777 05 05 7 .I nd that umpire in the d i s t i nc

tion between voluntary and involuntary logical and ,

i ntuitive processes between perception representa

, , ,

tion imagination and these lim i ted by volition The

, ,

strength of the arg ument quoted above li es in a covert

passing over from o n e mode to the other in s ub s t i ,

tutin g a denition for an intuition and in substituting

a wrong denition o r in including in the Object de

ned what was not included in it as perceived What .

is the meani ng o f Inni ty as mai n tained above in this

E ssay ? It is that space i n this case the line b e
, , ,
OF T IME A ND S PAC E . 1 37

cannot be s o far extended in either di rection as t o be PA RT 1 .

incapable o f further extension A fortiori i t s l im i t


f ii t y
c a m i o t be assigned But an assigned limit is requi Th e i ii o f

t un e an
Site in order to compare it as to its lengt h with

, ,

another line o r to compare the two li n es ab ac toge

, , ,

ther and to as sert M a ni fe s t um est has partes inter

, ,

se esse ae q ua l e s They are not known as equals


u ntil a limit has been assign ed to them besides the ,

common limit in the point a This assumption o f .

equality therefore violates the hypo thesis U ltra ter ,

minos b e t c i n i n ni t um protendi But it may be .

said A re not two i n ni t e s equ a l though we do not


know their limits ? I answer that th ey are not until ,

the objects to which the name is applied in each i n

stance are compared Thus there is substituted for

the object o f perception named innite that is , ,

object o f which we can never s e e the whole a dened ,

object o f which solely because it is dened we are

, , ,

supposed to s e e the w hole The obj ects the t w o .


lines extended from the point a are not equal but , ,

they have one property i n common that o f being ,

greater than we can present to ourselves in conscious

ness ; they are equal not qu a tenus Objects but q ua ,

tenus innite ; their innity is equ a l not their length ; ,

but the question is not about the length o f their i n

ni t y but about the in ni ty o f their length ; and

about this whether it exists at all The deni tion

, .

o f both from the same point o f view the logical cate ,

gory o r genus under which they fall that o f i n ,

ni tes is the same ; but the objects are no t the same

, ,

nor is their extent the same If the matter o f the .

comp a rison instead of be i ng the same as two l ines o r

, ,

two spaces had been di fferent as for instance a line

, ,

o f time and a line o f space o r a line and a surface o r

, ,

a line and a solid the fallacy would be seen in a


moment But the case is really the same when two


o b jects o f the same kind as when two objects o f dif


fe r e nt kinds are compared It makes no difference .

at all whether the two Objects compared together fall

alike under o n e o r two o r more denitions of kind .

It is as objects that they are compared together dif ,

fe r e nt i n numero and in this case o f the in nite lines

, , ,

in order to s e e whether they are equal or with refer ,

ence to their equality in point of extent ; and that

they are both to be dened as in ni te does not Show
that they are but in fact precludes their being de
, ,

ned as equal And this appears to be C larke s

argument or part o f it

Let us x our attention o n the facts as perceived .

It is perfectly true that in making innite space or ,

innite time a distinct obj ect o f consciousness we

, ,

are compelled to introduce a limit into them To .

become a distinct object is to become subject to

limitation The o bject space limited by conscious

ness is not innite s o far as it is included within


those limits s e t by consciousness but the conscious ,

ness o f space is extensible ad i n ni t um we can go ,

o n being conscious o f further and further portions o f

limited space without ever reaching a limit not s e t

by ourselves by w e a rm e s s I n exertion of conscious

ness ; and all these further portions o f space ar e still

space in kind each portion is limited only by another

o f the same nature Here we have an innite serie s


o f limited ,
nite portions o f space ; but now comes

o ut another fact in the production o f this series .

Wherever we are compell ed to draw o ur line and

stop we perceive time and space beyond which w e
, ,

resolve not to present in detail o r a s a distinct object


being its modes We cannot make time and space


as inni te a distinct obj ect Why ? Because o ur


consciousness i s limited in i t s degree o f power And .

again keeping in view the distinction to be hereafter

, ,

more fully explained between conceivi n g and i m ,

g i ni n
we must conceive time and space as nite .

Why ? Because consciousness in o n e of its modes ,

namely conception is voluntary limitation or i m p o s


ing o f a limit We must imagine them as innite

. .

Why ? Because s o long as we are conscious we are

conscious of time and space T i me and space are

limited only by incapacity of exhausting them that ,

is o f continuing to be conscious o f them ; and the


limit imposed upon them is imposed by o u r volition .

C onception is imagination limited by a voluntary e f

fort and for a certain purpose But when an obj ect .

is li m ited by volition the object s o limited is not the


contradi ctory of an unlimited obj ect u nless that o b ,

e c t is volunta rily unl im i ted ; for the two objects are

then not limited and u nl imited secundum idem The .

obj ect time o r space is limited and unlim i ted at once

, , ,

and is o n e object but is not lim i ted and u nl imited


in the same sense o r from the same point o f view


Time and space as nite are concepts that is are , ,

limited by voli tion ; as such they are not c o nt r a d i c

tories o f time and space as innite ; this would r e
quire that their innity should be im posed by voli
tion which it is not Time and space as nite are

modes o f voluntary consciousness o f consciousness ,

adopting a purposed limitation ; as in nite they are

modes o f involuntary consciousness which we can ,

never transcend s o long as we are conscious at all

Aristotle tells us N at A u s c b 1 1 1 cap 6
, 7. . . . . . .

that the Pythagoreans and others against whom he ,

o r TIM E AND S PAC E . 1 41

was arguing dened the innite 7 0 01 7 21g01 as that
, ,

05 32 307 1
01 He himself starting from the con

0 0
t e m p l a t i o n Of the innite 14 01 7 0 1 1 1 9 01
9 denes it as 0 11

that 05 002 7 1 32 207 1

1 But though neither d e ni
01 .

tion is adequate o r correct taken alone yet taken ,

together they are applicable to both modes o f the

innite in time and to both i n space Thus the true

denition o f the innite is Quod nihil ultra s e habet

praeter s e ipsum Time is never limited except by

time ; S pace never except by Space ; but both are

limited by themselves always Thus Hegel says .

Logik Book 1 Abschnitt 1 p 1 3 6 Werke v o l 3

. . .
, ,
. .

D arin selbst dass etwas als Schranke bestimmt ist

, ,

d a r i i b e r bereits hinausgegangen ist That is a ll limi .


t a t i o n involves an outside as well as an in side This .

fact is nothing else but the fact o f the innity of

intuition o r imagination in time and space .

The problem of the innity o f time and S pace has

been thrown into a complete shape in o ur days by
Sir W Hamilton and M r M ansel ; and it must be
. .

remembered that prudens qu aestio d i m i d i um scientise

e st
. The question is not simply I S there an innite ,

in time and space o r is there not ? But it is The

innite is impossible therefore its contra di ctory onl y

exists namely the nite yet the nite is impossible

, ,

therefore its contradictory onl y exists namely the ,

in nite ; reconcile these reverberated contradi ctions .

The way which has been taken here seems to offer a

satisfactory solution o f this problem fo r it has shown ,

o n the one h and that there i s not onl y negative but


positive ground for afrming the innite in one sense ;

and not only negative but positive ground for a f rm
ing the ni te in another sense ; and on the other
h and that the innite in the sense in which it is a f

rmed is not open to the charge of involving contra

dictions ( fo r the innite is not a concept but a per
cept ) and thus ne c essitating the substitution o f the

nite ; and that the ni te also in the sense i n which

it is afrmed is equally secure from the same charge ,

and thus necessitating the substitution o f the innite .

In other words it has been shown that the nite


and the innite are not contradictories but products ,

o f consciousness in two separate parts of its domain

o r in two separate functions .

But now if it is admitted that the apparent con


t r a d i c t i o n involved rst in each View taken separately

, ,

and secondly and consequently in the two views taken

together has been dissolved and that time and space
, ,

are shown to be i n o n e sense nite and in another ,

in nite a further question arises which is this


the two attributes nite and innite resting each o n ,

its o w n ground and predicated from i t s o w n point of

view which is the most essential the most funda
, ,

mental expressing best the nature o f time and space ;


o r
what comes to the same thing which point of ,

view is the most commanding which is that to which ,

the other is subordi nate ? There can be but one

answer It is that point of view which keeps equally

in sight both O bject and subject Time and space .

when they are treated as Obj ects only their subje e ,

tive character bein g lost sight o f for the moment ,

when they are considered as h a v mg already become

Objects o f consciousness are then regarded as nite

The point o f view from which they are called nite ,

i s that from whi ch they are regarded as obj ects of

cogni tion onl y That from which they are called

inni te is one from which the moment o f their passing

in to consciousnes s i s seized and xed o n in which ,



I I 9 f 9/ 0/
c u 7 1 ye v e o

w r a t/ 7 a m
06 o vm a v 6 1!

18 . HE RE
we leave that central point of view which
em b races at once subject and object and pass over ,

into the objective kin gdom that of obj ects as such ,

and their conn ections between them selves We .

make abstraction o f the principium c o gno s c e nd i and ,

consider only the principium e x i st e nd i C ogni tions .

themselves are existences for they are objects ; the ,

evi dence o f their existence is o u r conscio usness If .

what has been said i n the precedin g chapter o f the

nature and value o f the two cognitions time and ,

space as the starting point o f all philosophical ana


lysis and the ens unum in multis in a ll cognitions is

, ,

admitted it is o f secondary im port a nce what theory


is held as to their origin in the m i n d .

The objective kingdom is the ki ngdom of e m p i ri

cal that is complete objects as Opposed to elements
, , ,

o f objects o r members o f analysis of objects which

, ,

have become obj ects only in conjunction with each

other Such elements o f objects can never be re

garded as causes o r the cause o f the objects o f which

they are elements ; for in the rst place all the ele
OF TI M E A ND S PAC E . 1 45

ments o f the obj ect give and receive meaning and

existence from each other rst in combination and ,

in this same combination the object a l so which they

compose rst exists ; the object and its elements are
simultaneous in existence and not o n e precedent the
, ,

other subsequent ; and in the second place were the ,

elements regarded as existing rst and separately a ,

further cause would have t o be sought a cause o f ,

their being brought into conjunc t ion in the object .

All causation all history must accordingly be dis

, ,

t i ngui s h e d from metaphysical analysis and must be ,

conceived as obtain ing between empiric a l o r complete

obj ects considered as former and latter in point of

time .

The result o f the analysis in the precedi ng chapter

w a s that every instance o f cons ciousness contained

two elements formal and material that is some par

, , ,

t i c ul a r feeling in some partic ul ar time and some par

t i c ul a r space ; which is equivalent to saying that ,

every obj ect o f consciousness contained two elements ,

form a l and material that is some partic ul ar quality

, ,

in some p a rticular time and some particul ar space ;

for that which is feelin g from the subj ective point of
view is quality from the obj ective The elements in .

every cognition are time space and feel i ng and in

, , ,

every object are time space and quality C onsci

, ,

o u s n e s s is feeling in time and space ; obj ects are

qualities in time and space But when it is said .

C onsciousness generally i s feeling in t i me and sp a ce ,

attentio n must be c a l led t o an ambiguity in the term

feeling as in a l l genera l and abstract terms It is

the same ambiguity whi ch kept up the N o rni n a l i s t

and R eali st controversy and is s o natura l and almost

unavoidable that its inuence has long outlived as it ,


long p receded that controversy When an abstract


and general term is used for instance roundness is it

, ,

imagin ed by speaker o r hearer to be an object itself

apart from all and every particular and determinate
instance o f roundness from which it is generalised ?

E very one will say that it is not ; but not every one
will be on his guard again st s o employing and imagin
ing it In the case o f feeling this abstract and gene

ral term feeling may be taken as indicating the class

o f all the particular and determinate feelings without

spec i fying any of them or it may be taken as indi


cating feeli n g by itself as a real substratum but with

, ,

o ut any particular determinate feeling ; i t may be

imagined either as havi n g no determination but still ,

real ly existing o r as having some determination but

, ,

o n e not specied o r expressed In the latter sense it


may be called a provisional im age but a p rO V I S I o n a l ,

image doubly abstract o r doubly provisional ; for rst


all particular modes o f the formal elements o f time

and space are abstracted from secondly the deter ,

minate feel ings are abstracted from that i s are r e , ,

t a i n e d provisionally only in the general and abstract

notion expressed by the term feeling And this is .

the sense in which the term wil l be employed here .

See Hume who refers to Berkeley o n this subj ect

, , ,

Treatise of Human N ature P art I 7 ,

. .

C onsciousness then being feeling in time and

space the three elements being I n every instance and

in every object Inseparable constituting one complete

, ,

empirical object o f consciousness it foll ows t hat to

, ,

assign the cause or invariable condition of the origin

Of its o n e element time and S pace is impossible with
, ,

o u t assignin g also the cause o r invariable condition o f

the origin of its oth er element feeling ; and thus the ,

there employed to make this clear was a circle sup ,

posed to be seen from two sides by a person changing

his point o f view from o n e S ide to the other ; and this
person symbolised reection But in fact reection .

arises within those very phenomena a n d is o n e o f ,

them It neither di vides t h e aspects from each other


nor itself fr om either o f them ; but distinguishes them

into feelings and qualities every phenomenon being ,

feeling and quality at once ; and for reection both

feelings and qualities are objects but only qualities ,

are objects for direct consciousness ; for feelings are

perceived by reection as di rect consciousness itself .

But in the mode o f reection which is entered o n in

this chapter psychological not metaphysical reection
, ,

the object o f enquiry is the m i n d an Obj ect consisting ,

partly o f feelin gs and partly o f qualities ; which latter

must be included in the Obj ect since the c i r c um s c ri p

tion o f the feelings is given by them ; and since the

former the feelings o f the mind are circumscribed by
, ,

the latter the body they are divided in S pace from

, ,

other feelin gs P sychological reection therefore may


be represented as standi ng between the two obj ects o f

which it examines the connection between the mind ,

o n the o n e side and the world Of quali ties outside it

o n the other the mind occupying a di stinct portion

o f space by being placed in the body N ow any par .

t i c u l a r portion of the world o f feelings may have an

origin and a history conditions o f existence and of

development a place in order o f time in the whole


world o f feelings as well as a place in space ; and the


question of this chapter is what are the condition s of


existence what objects feel i n gs o r qualities must

, , ,

invariably precede the appear ance of that portion o f ,

the world of feelings known a s the mind This i s the .

OF TI ME A ND S PAC E . 1 49

s ense in which alone it is legitimate to speak o f the

origin or conditions o f existence o f consciousness .

But since I am about to examine some classes o f

already existing theories a nd this distinction as here

drawn i s no t recogni sed in them but consciousness ,

is treated as capable o f isolation as an object by ,

itself without reference t o the condition Of this isola


tion namely its inhabiting a particular portion o f the

, ,

world o f qualities I Shall not at rst insist o n this


point but take consciousness in the way in which it


is presented in those theories And it will after .

wards be poi nted o ut how the want o f this di stinction

enables theories whic h are at least legitimate while

partial and subordinate to pass into theories o f the


same class which are illegitimate because put forward

as complete ; for instance it will be seen how the ,

partial and subordinate psychological theories which ,

refer consciousness respectively to a soul and to a

brain become theories of absolute idealism and a b s o

lute materialism .

1 9 A ll theories possible and actual as to the

, ,

origin o f consciousness may be divided rst into , ,

such as place its cause in an obj e c t outside o f c o n

s c i o u s n e s s inferred t o be its cause from examination

of the phenomena and such as place its cause in an


obj ect within consciousness revealed by an analysis ,

o f consciousness itself Another division o f such


theories is the division into such as are idealistic ,

seeking the cause o f consciousness i n an immateria l

object o r essence and such as are materi a listic seek
, ,

i n g its cause i n a material Object and its properties .

A third di vision is into such a s place t h e cause o f

consciousness in an object o r essence considered stati
cally and such as place it in a movement o r an ac

t i vi t y, which theories may b e called dynamical All

theories must fall since these divisions are each of


them exhaustive under o n e alternative at least o f


each o f these three pairs .

Taking the rst of these divi sions as a basis the ,

theories o f the other t w o divisions may be referred

to it Then under those theories which infer an

obj ect to be the cause o f consciousness will fall

those idealistic theories which assert an immaterial
so ul considered as an Object existing statically and
, ,

those materialistic theories which assert a mat erial

object as the brain o r nervous matter to be the
, ,

cause of consciousness considered also statically

, ,

o r as existing previous to its operation U nder .

those theories which hold that the cause o f con

s c i o u s n e s s lies within consciousness and is revealed ,

by an analysis o f consciousness will fall those ideal ,

i s t i c theories which assert an E go considered dyna ,

m i c a ll
y as pure or absolute activity whatever may ,

be the laws regulating the development o f th i s a c

tivity ; these theories are found in the works o f
F i c h t e Schelli n g and Hegel among others There
, , ,

will thus be three classes o f theories : rst thos e ,

which inf er an external immaterial obj ect called a ,

Soul to be the invariable condition o r cause of con


s c i o u s n e s s ; secondly those which nd by analysis


an internal immaterial activity called by F i c h t e the ,

E go by Schelling the R eason by Hegel the Spirit

, , ,

as the cause o f consciousness this activity bein g also ,

the Absolute the cause o f all things as well as o f


consciousness and the s um as well as the cause o f


all its effects and thir dl y those which i n fer an ex,

ternal material object such as the organi sed body

, ,

o r the brain or ne rvous matter belonging to such a

, ,

to b oth the materialistic and idealistic branches at

once and my classication will be s o far unsuited

for the explanation o f the theory The M onads again .

are aid to be the true atoms o f nature the ele

(3 ) s ,

ments of things ; and ( 9 ) those M onads which have

perception more d istinct and accompanied by memory
are called Souls Although therefore the above dis .

t i n c t i o n s can be appli ed to all theories yet they are ,

not suitable to the explanation o f all ; if any o n e

Shed to explain Leibni tz s theory he must d o s o ,

not by pointing o ut these distinctions but by point ,

ing o ut other distinctions o r principles which Leib

nitz employed or along which he moved in tra, ,

versing and obliteratin g these .

Agai n it is difcult to brin g under any single


head o f the present division the theory of M C ousin ; .

for although he maintains that t h e soul l e moi is , ,

inferred as the supporter o f consciousness by a prin ,

c i l e which i s call ed the law o f substance loi des

p ,

substances yet he holds that it is inferred in every


a c t o f sensation the rst as well as subsequent acts



See for instance his P remiers E ssais Anne 1 8 1 6

, , , ,

. ix Since it immediately accompanies every act

o f sensation it should be di scoverable by the an a l ysis


o f that act notwithstanding that it is an inferenc e


and not a perception M C ousin maintains that we . .

do not perceive the substance but infer that some ,

thing exists which we call by that name and argues

accordingly that it would be no valid obj ection to
ask What this substance itself was ? for its existence

onl y is inferred and not its nature perceived But .

the act o f i n ference at least must be known t o u s ,

which accompanies o r is involved in the act of per

c e tio n I think it will become apparent as we pro
p .

c eed ,
that this substance supposed t o be inferr ed is .

nothing but what I call the formal element in per

c e
p t i o n .

20 T ospeak now o f the rst class Of theories


those which infer an i mmateria l substance t o be the

cause o f consciousness In the rst place it is i m

possible to imagine a substance strictly im m ateria l

accordi n g to the explanation o f matter gi ven in the
preceding chapter namely a s a partic ul ar feeling in
, ,

a particular ti me and s pace ; fo r nothing can be pre

sent i n consciousness without being present as some
feeli ng ; the feeling in consciousness is the matter o r
qual ity o f the object I do n o t s a y that the feeli n g

must be o n e o f those o f the v e deni te senses T h e .

soul may be i magined as a substance which h a s quali

ties o r a quality which have n o obj ective names as
qualities but only subjective names as feelings The

soul may be i magined t o be an obj ect which if we ,

had presentative perception o f it would excite the ,

feeli n g o f j oy o r pride o r love o r reverence o r such

, , , ,

li k e N othing can possibly be more opposed to my


theory than to deny the existence o f obj ects o f whi ch

we have not o r have never had presentative percep
, ,

tion Such feeling would be the matter o f the soul

. .

But this would be to make the soul material if my ,

phraseology were adopted ; it would be to make it

immaterial in the sense in whi ch ide a l i sts have usu

ally employed t h e term Such is the notion whi ch I .

frame to myse l f Of the me a n in g o f those who speak

o f the soul as an immateri a l substance ; and I thi nk

that this mean in g is logically correct that such an ,

Obj ect is capable o f bein g imagined o r conceived with

o u t inconsistency .

But from this it does not follow that such an


object i s the Cause of consciousness it d oes not fol low

that because we can represent it as an obj ect o f pre

s e n t a t i v e perception it is actually at any time an


object of presentative perception It exists true but .

, ,

how ? A s an obj ect o f representation imagined a c ,

cording to the requirements o f an Obj ect of possible

presentation It is an Object o f possible not of a et u a l
, ,

presentation F rom this a further step is requisite to


imaginin g it as the invariable condition of the origin

of consciousness T w o steps must therefore be taken

by the idealist of this school rst from the possible ,

to the actual secondly from actual existence to exist


ence in the relation of cause to a particular effect I .

believe t hat it is the need o f taking the latter step

which has led idealists o f this school to take also the
rst step ; that the need o f accounting for certain
phenomena in consciousness has led them to infer t h e
actual existence of the Obj ect which seemed to them ,

alone capable of explaining the phenomena i n ques

tion I will mention and examine the principal of

these phenomena and attempt to show that the o b, ,

jc e t inferred to account for them furnishes no better

explanation o f them than the material obj ect does ,

the brain o r nervous matter in an organised body ,

which is undoubtedly an object of presentative per

c e
p t i o n .

These principal phenomena o f consciousness are ,

s o far as I know the following : l s t the tot a l differ

, ,

ence in kind between consciousness and every other

affection or quality o r mode o f existence in objects ;
, , ,

2d the unity or oneness in ev ery moment o f con


s c i o u sne s s no matter how multiform the obj ects of


that moment of consciousness may be o r whether ,

they are a combination o f presentations o r o f r e p r e


an i mmaterial substance and the material sub stanc e
o f brain o r nerve In this case the soul is conceived

as a force analogous to the vital force and the nerv e


force and this mi n d force is the supporter o f c o n


s c i o u sne s s there is an immaterial substance t h e ,

soul but it has a force o r mode o f action o f i t s o w n

, ,

and on this m i nd force in reaction with nerve force

depends consciousness All o u r perceptions o ri .

i n a t e in the action and reaction which take place

between the nervous system and the m i nd says ,

M r M orell Introd t o M ental P hilosophy page 1 0 6


At p age 3 6 he had said The view we have taken ,

in the previous chapter o f the vit a l and mental forc es

is Opposed to the common notion that the body with
its functions is o ne thing the mind and its functions ,

another Physiology has rendered this notion wholly


untenable The alternative o f the o l d dualistic theory


however is by no means t o force us into materialism


So far from that we may hold that there is already ,

a nascent spark o f intelligence i n the primary cell ,

from which the i ndividual man is developed and that ,

this is in fact the s o ul in its primary unconscious

, ,

state already commencing that series o f acts which


reach up in o n e unbroken chai n t o the highest efforts

, ,

o f reason and will So that although it is a force

o n which consciousness depends yet this force b e ,

longs to an i mmateria l substance as its supporter the ,

Spark o f intelligence in the primary cell and the

force belonging to it supported o r exerted by it is , ,

Objective and unconscious whether it is considered ,

as belonging to an immaterial or to a material s ub

stance ; i n short the same observations are applicable
to this mode of conceiving it as t o the former There .

fore in whichever way the supporter o f consciousness

, ,
OF TI M E A ND S PAC E . 157

the conscious substance is conceived whether a s i m

, ,

materi a l o r material o r as the force o f an immaterial


o r o f a material substance the gap between conscious


ness and objects is not bridged the causation o f o n e ,

by the other is as inexplicable in o n e way as in the

other Al l that can be said o f the causation o f o ne

phenomenon by another is after A B N o two



phenomena are perfectly S im ilar It may be that o f .

t w o phenomena equ a l ly invariable as antecedents o f


a third phenomenon the o n e which is most similar t o


it is said to be its cause ; but it serves no purpose to

invent a phenomenon S imilar t o the o n e t o be a c
counted for when there is already a phenom enon

di scovered as its invariable antecedent o n the gro und ,

that this actually existing phenomenon I s n o t s uf

c i e nt l
y sim i lar t o the phenomenon t o be accounted fo r .

The second ground for maintai ni ng the existence

o f an immaterial substance as the supporter o f con

s c i o u s ne s s is the u ni ty o f consciousness known by the ,

name o f the u ni ty o f apprehension We are con .

scious o f objects as u ni ts and however diverse these


Objects may be and whether they are objects o f pre


s e n t a t i o n o r o f representation o r contain both o n e


and the other they are still combin ed i nto o n e single


Obj ect in a single moment o f consciousness The .

supporter o f that consciousness therefore it is argued , ,

must be a single in di visible unit ; and since no mate

rial substance is indivisible it must fart her be M a

t e ri a l
. N ow if this indivisible and i mmaterial uni t
is itself a n obj ect o f consciousness in the moment of
consciousness s o as t o be used as a standard fo r i n

t r o d u c i n g un ity into the objects perceived along with

it it must be discoverable by the analysis o f consci

o u s n e s s in reection and becomes conceived therefore


as a n E go and not as a Soul it is d irectly perceived in


consciousness and not inferred ; it becomes in f act the

unity of apperception and not of apprehension But .

if it is conceived as a soul and not as an ego if it is

, ,

inferred and not directly perceived to exist as a

, ,

single indivi sible and i mmaterial u ni t then there is ,

no way in which such an unit can be represented to

consciousness except as a mathematical point ; and no
mathematical poin t has a complete empirical exist , ,

ence but always involves an extended substance of

, ,

which it is a boundary o r in which it lies S O far .

then from bei ng capable o f serving as the cause of

consciousness such an unit has no complete empi
, ,

ri c a l
existence o f its own Supposing it to be a

point existin g in an extended material substance it ,

becomes a mode o f the existence of that substance ,

a differentiation o r a property of it So far from .

offering a better explanation o f the u nity of a p p r e

h e n s i o n than is o ffered by a material substance it ,

cannot properly be said to offer any explanation at

all Is there any insuperable dif culty in supposing

unity of apprehension to arise in a compound mate

rial substance such as the brain o r nervous matter ?

I cannot s e e that there is ; there is indeed a great

dissimilarity between consciousness and objects whic h
are not conscious ; but the unity of apprehension
offers no such dif culty ; the unity o f apprehension
fully corresponds to the unity O f objects apprehended .

What is the unity o f apprehension ? That an object

is perceived as o n e and that objects differing only in

point of their times o f bein g perceived a re perceived

as the same The perception of difference precedes

the perception of sameness both logically and histo

rically We start from the p erception of a single

PART 1 . u nity of time that is to consist in the very thing


which it is introduced to account for ? This is no

thing but the old process o f doubli ng the pheno
menon to be accounted fo r .

The third argument is the sense of indi vi dual per

s o n a li t
y o f personal identity throughout life
F rom .

this it is inferred that there must be an I mmaterial


soul the supporter o f this sense o f identity The


body changes all its particles o f matter during life ,

yet the conscious being feels that he is the same per

s o n from childhood t o Old age If memory it is .

argued depended solely o n the changing matter o f


the body we shoul d preserve no memory o f what we


were when o ur body consisted o f a completely dif

fe r e nt s e t o f material particles from those whi ch it
consists o f at any present time ; t h e particles would
have vanished and the memory attached to them and

dependi n g o n them would have vanished also T o .

this it may be replied that though the particles o f


matter in the body vani sh and are replaced by others ,

yet the change is gradual enough to allow that qua

l i t y in the van ishing particle o n which consciousness
, ,

and memory depend to be communicated to the par


tiele which takes its place ; and thi s is true in what

ever way we imagine to ourselves the connection
between the material particles and consciousness ,

whether as wax and seal o r as some kind of move


ment mechani cal o r molecular or magnetic ae com ,

a ni e d o r unaccompanied by heat o r light o r sound

p .

A ll such gures are o f course only aids to the imagi

nation i n default of knowledge But whatever the .

nature o f the operation which goes on in the brain

may be each particle whic h takes the place o f a
, ,

vanishing o ne has this quality o r this nature c o m m u

O F T IM E A ND S PAC E . 1 61

m icated to it becomes a part o f the o l d structure and

, ,

bears its part in s upporting the consciousness which

the o l d structure supported The body then is in .

o n e sense the same body from chil dh ood to Old age ,

notw ithstanding the ch a n ge i n its particles ; and it is

in a sense exactly paral lel to this that the conscious
ness o f the in di vidual is said t o be the same through
o ut life P articular feelings and thoughts vani sh

and are replaced by others ; the body o f t h e child

does n o t more differ from the body o f the man than ,

the thoughts o f the child from the thoughts o f the

man The u ni ty o f organi c growth and develop

ment o f the body is exactly parallel to the unity in

growth and development o f the consciousness which
is attached to it In t h e brain are stored up impres

sions qu a l ities o r modes o f operation the causes o f

, , ,

memory which are communicated to and the n pre


served by every fresh particl e o f matter which is

t a k en up into the brain The brain becomes richer

in these impressions qualities o r modes o f operation

, , ,

and they constitute o n e part o f the life o f the brain ,

and make with each other a conn ected whole So .

also do t h e thoughts and images in consciousness and ,

this i s what is meant by personal identity If the .

supposition o f an immaterial soul was adopted we ,

should stil l have t o suppose that this immaterial

soul was subject to changes to the exchange o f the

thoughts o f the chil d for those o f the man ; the bind

i n g o f these together is all that the immaterial soul is
adopted in order to explain But this bond is found

a s readily in the organi c unit o f the development o f

the brain as in the u ni ty o f an immateria l soul and
, ,

therefore it is superuous to have recourse t o the

latter supposition .

The fourth argument is the sense o f effort o r v o

li t i o n the consciousness of Wil l
Properly indeed .

this is an argument for the existence o f an ego not ,

for the existence o f an im m aterial soul ; the object is

thought to be directly envisaged in the moment Of
volition not to be in ferred in order to account for the

phenomenon o f volition ; but Since this distinction is


not alw ays drawn I will s a y a few words o n it here


The sense o f e ffort l e ffo rt voulu as for instance in
, ,

the phenomenon o f attention is among the simplest ,

and earliest states o f consciousness perhaps as early ,

historic a l ly as any ; it is an immediate not an i n ,

ferred fact o f consciousness E ffort is a sensation


which we perceive immediately as we perceive anger , ,

fear hunger warmth and s o o n This sense o f e ffort

, , ,

has been thought notably by M ain e de Biran to

, ,

reveal to us immediately the M oi o r substantial i m ,

materia l Self ; and it was thought that the self reveals

itself to itself in its consciousness o f its own volition .

But the sense o f effort whether it is effort for a dis ,

tinct purpose o r volition proper o r only i n d e t e rm i

, ,

nate effort reveals the self neither more n o r less nor


in any other sense th a n other perceptions do They .

all contribute to self consciousness which is the rst-


reective act o f consciousness in which self and not ,

self are for the rst time perceived In other words v o .


l i t i o n is not reection All reection is volition that .


is i nvolves sense of effort for a purpose ; but all sense


o f e ffort for a purpose i s not reection Attention .

involves sense o f effort indetermi nately but it does ,

not involve envisaging self as an object E ffort again .

is roused by an in t erest felt but it does not require ,

that we Should be conscious that w e are feeling an

interest This would suppose an ana l ysis o f the feel

kind is Conc e ived as existing objectively the e x p l a

, ,

nation o f that freedom as a fact is quite a s i na d e

u a t el supp li ed by the supposition o f an immaterial
q y ,

as by the supposition o f a material substance as the ,

ground and supporter o f the attribute o f freedom .

It is as dif cult to suppose a n immaterial substance

isolated from others and originating actions by itself
, ,

as a material substance ; it is as dif cult to imagine

an immaterial as a material substance producing a c
tions entirely arbitrary in the sense o f follow i n g no,

law and being incapable o f prediction ; it is as di f

cult to imagine an immaterial as it is to imagine a
material substance producing judgments unaffected

by desires or entertain ing desires uncontrolled by


judgments o r originating actions which have n o form


and no content I admit that to conceive these things


i n either way seems to me equally impossible ; but

what I contend for i s that it is as impossible in o n e

way as in the other ; and this being so it remains ,

onl y to attempt to throw some light on the pheno

menon o f freedom as a fact o f consciousness by the
, ,

analysis o f the phenomenon o f reection .

21 To come now to the second class o f theories


those which place the cause o f consciousness in an

i mmaterial E go o r an i mmaterial ac t ivity which is

at once subject and object o f every moment o f con

s c i o u s ne s s and therefore to be discovered by analysis

of the object o r o f the moment of perception ; foremost

among the supporters of which Kant himself is t o be
reckoned See his Transcendental deduction o f the

C ategories Kritik der R einen V ernunft Werke v o l

, , ,

. ed R osenkranz und Schubert page 9 0 1 1 6 He

speaks of the transcendental apperception as bei n g at

once trans cendental and a state o f consciousness ,
OF T IM E A ND S PAC E . 1 65

dieses rein e ursp ru ngl i c h e unwandelbare Bewusst

se n
y ,
page 99 and this I can conceive in no other
way than as being what I call an aspect o f a state o f
consciou sness but an aspect perceived at once in the

same act by which the obj ect o r state o f conscious

ness is itself perceived He seems to have con

s i d e re d every state o f consciousness to have had

three such inseparable aspects as containing or being ,

at once a consciousness o f the identity o f self o r the

conscious Subj ect o f the identity o f the function o f

being conscious and o f the identity o f the empirical


object perceived ; o f these three aspects the c o n

s c i o u s n e s s o f the identity o f the action o r function ,

Handlung was the condition o f the other two the

, ,

transcendental uni ty o f apperception See the pass .

age a t page I O O E ben di ese t ra n s c e nd e nt a l e E inh eit


zuerst m e l i c h macht What Kant sought to ex

g .

plain t o himself was h o w was the fact o f uni ty o r


oneness anywhere and everywhere to be accounted

, ,

fo r.
He s a w that there was this cognition in all con
s c i o u s n e s s a n d in a l l objects o f consciousness uni ,

v e rs a l l
y and without exception It must therefore .

have o r be some transcendent a l condition i n nature ,

com m on to all its instances every o n e o f which s up ,

posed i t and in every o n e o f which it also was mani


fe s t e d . The conception was like that o f P lato s 7 0 ,

1 310
7 0 17 and 7 0 00200177 01 only reappearin g in the
, ,

kingdom o f mind and consciousness instead o f in the

kingdom o f existences Like that too it w a s but a .

doubling o f the phenomenon to be accounted for a ,

choosing o f o n e aspect o f the phenomenon and ele

va t i n
g it into the condition o f the phenomenon It .

makes n o difference h o w that U nity is regarded

which is conceived as the condition o f phenomenal
1 66 T HE O RI G I N o r T HE C O G NI T IO NS
ity for all unity which can be brought before o ur
n ,
consc io u sness at all consists o f t w o elements at the
least time and feeling and any condition o f these

elements becomi n g united o r being referred to each ,

other must itself consist o f these two elements E very


existence can be analysed into elements which have

no existence apart from each other .

Kant s Ich denke is then the reappeara n ce o f

Plato s 7 0 31 but it is after passing it through the

crucible o f D escartes C ogito ergo Sum It is the .

C ogito ergo Sum analysed and made into an actual

and universal element o f all knowledge and a ll exist
ence an element which is at once their cause and

their consequent But it was not this with D e s


cartes With D escartes it arose in answer to the


question What is the ultimate certainty o f whi ch it


i s I mpossible to doubt o r What is that fact which

, ,

contains its o w n certainty combined with its exist

ence ? The si mplest fact containing at once these
t w o elements existence and certainty is the fact o r
, ,

state of consciousness c a l l e d r e e c t i o n and the s i m

l e s t ex ression o f this fact is C ogito Sum Ich

p p o r -

denke a fact which may be combined with o r form ,

par t of any other state o f consciousness but which

, ,

is not essentia l to a l l It is composed o f elements


which a r e themselves complete states o f conscious

ness It is therefore the central point o f philosophy

but not o f experience the starting poin t o f exam i na


tion o f consciousness and interrogation o f nature but ,

not of consciousness itself Y et i n some way it is .

containe d in all consciousness for it is developed ,

out o f it and is the return of consciousness upon i t


self The question is how and in what manner con


t a i n e d in and developed out of consciousness Just .

but by attention dwell ing upon it and analysing
, ,

it I can distinguish its feeling from its form its

, ,

material and its formal element Attention and its

results must not be confounded wi th reection and

its results ; the rst rough perception without the
analysis o f attention can b e di stinguished it i s true , ,

from perception together with such attention ; but

then this second analysing perception can be dis
t i ngui sh e d a l so n o less from perception reecting
as well as analysing Thos e who nd the ego i n .

direct perception seem t o me t o distinguish only

two things the rst rough perception o n the o ne

hand from perception analysing and reectin g at

once o n the other But there a r e thre e things not

two to be distinguished perception attention and

, , , ,

reection By reection I distin guish the I t h e



feeling from the obj ect the particular mode o f
, ,

the feeling the colour sound taste 800 There is

, , , ,

neither substratum o f the colour no r substratum o f

the feeling If in reection I x my thoughts o n

the feeli ng I may call it the subject ; if o n the mode


o f the feeling I may call it the object In seeing an .


external object I do no t feel that I am and that the

object is but I have a feeling under the forms Of

time and space ; I am conscious and am conscious ,

o f an Obj ect exist i n g in time and space I am awar e

o f the feeling o f the space it occupies and o f the tim e
, ,

it occupies ; but before I can di stinguish the feeling

from feeling generall y the incomplete from the com ,

p l e t e moment o f consciousness the act of conscious ,

ness from its result I must have represented o r redin


t e gr a t e d the feeling in consciousness and compared it

with others that is I must have reected upon it

, ,

The question how consciousness is related t o o r

OF T IM E A ND S PAC E . 1 69

distinguished from self consciousness i s o ne o f the


most difcult in philosophy It is the most central .

and the most important question in phil osophy just ,

as the Ich denke i s the most central a n d important

point in the system o f Kant There are t w o chief .

ways o f answering it E ither self consciousness dif


fers from consciousness onl y as a develope d di ffer ,

e nt i a t e d
whole differs frOm the same whole unde
v el o e d and und i fferentiated for example a s a plan t
p ,

from i t s seed in which case s elf consciousness would


be capable o f discovery in consciousness by a s uf

c i e nt l y searching and properly di rected analysis ,

and a l l consciousness would be rightly described as

self consciousness ; and this i s the theory o f Kant

Jacobi and many others ; o r self consciousness dif


fers from consciousness as o n e phenomenon differs

from another whic h it invariably under certain c o n ,

d i t i o n s supplants and succeeds but which except fo r

, ,

this relation can n o t be called the s a me with it as ,

fo r example o n e mode o f physical force such as fric ,

tion passes into another such a s heat o r as elec

, , ,

t r i c i t y passes into o r is supplanted by light ; and

this is the theory which I wish to establish here .

In both cases consciousness is potentia l self con -

s c i o u sn e s s
the 06000001 ; o f which sel f consciousness is -

the v gy em but this distinction o f A ristotle s is very
wide and embraces many modes o r i nstances The .

question is this : Is consciousness the lowest mode o f

self consciousness but self consciousness still ; o r is

self consciousness a differentiation o f consciousness


which cannot be traced at a l l in consciousness ?

When we are fully self conscious do we merely ana

lyse an obj ect and s e e clearly in it a circumstance


which i s already there diml y present to conscious


ness or does that circumstance rst arise when we


are rst clearly conscious o f it ? And if the latter

alternative in these two questions is true and s up ,

posing i t to be a l ready established is there not then , ,

as a separate question an easy explanation at hand

, ,

why the opposite alternatives S hould appear s o pro

bable as they have done in the fact o f the extreme ,

di fculty w e have in throwing ourselves back in

imagination Into a position once occupied but long
Since abandoned the readi ness with which we i m

agine ourselves always t o have felt what w e at pre

sent feel the comparative in ability as it would be I n
this case to separate direct consc i ousness from self

consciousness when we have long accustomed o ur

selves to speak o f feelings as ours that is as a l
, ,

ways combined with self consciousness ? Both sides -

admit that potentially self consciousness is contained -

in consciousness ; but t o me it appears that it can

only be said to be actually present in consciousness
when it is clearly perceived as an obj ect and when ,

self and not self are counter di stinguished ; and that

- -

this is rst done in reection preceded by many i n ,

stances o f perception The question is by n o means


o n e about mere words and nomenclature but about ,

the analysis o f simple elementary feeling the material ,

element in dir ect perception which I main tain cannot ,

be analysed into a self and a n o t self does not con -


tain a self and a not self though it does contain a


forma l element a n d which comes to contain a self


and a not self in a particul ar act later tha n and de


pendent o n perception namely the act o f reection

, ,

P erhaps the decisive solution o f the question awaits

the clearer because more practised insight o f the
future .

in to which it was divided ; the thread which corre

s o n d s to the time and the colour which corresponds

to the feeling are contin uous and the unity thus ,

introduced into the series o f determinate colours is

the result o f generalisation o f the provi sional image ,

colour from the several determi nate colours When


stat e s o f consciousness are the Object matter Of the -

generalisation the generalisation i s called reection

, ,

because it is the obj ect itself which generalises from

itself because the same series o f feelings prolongs

itself in t h e act o f generalising from its previous

states instead o f having a series o f objects before it

different from itself The u ni ty o f feeling generally


o r in the abstract in a continuous time is a fact i n


consciousness which is rst discovered by reection ,

cannot be given by a single perception but must be ,

collected from many perceptions before it is itself an

object o f perception In other words we do not per .

c e i v e a n object to be one and the same object by

referring it to a continuous feeli ng still less by re ,

ferring it t o an Ich denk e but we di scover that there

is a conti n uous feeli n g determi ned into many special
feelings after havin g many times experienced such

Special feelin gs connected in a continuous time F eel .

ing in a conti n uous time as a fact and not the know ,

ledge o f this fact constitutes the simple perception o f


every single object If it S hould be asked Why and


how it comes to pass that feelin g is continuous that ,

is combined with time at al l that we ever have the

, , ,

feeli ng of oneness it must be confessed that no answer


can be given N o cause O f the fact can be assigned


but only the analysis o f the fact O neness is an ulti .

mate fact in consciousness as it i s in every single ,

object o f consciousness The same question might .

O F TIM E A ND S PAC E . 1 73

be asked in the case o f every thing from the most ,

concrete to the most abstract objects o f all O neness .

in a material obj ect a n d oneness in consciousness o r ,

the feeli n g o f oneness are not di fferent facts o n e o f

, ,

which can be explained by the other as its cause but ,

they are the objective and subjectiv e aspects o f o n e

and the same fact beyond which in the way o f as
, ,

signi n g causes a t least we cannot reach


D id we go no farther than the stage Of direct per

c e t i o n s however richly o ur senses furnished us with
p ,

them we should have no knowledge but o f pheno


mena and the relations between them whether these ,

were phenomena in time alone o r in time and space


together ; we Should have no knowledge o f their rela

tions to what we call ourselves o r o f ourselves in ,

relation t o them And in many ani mals except man

, ,

and in man himself in his infancy we may suppose ,

this to be the case T h e notion o f Self is in troduced


by reection which itself contai ns and in essence con


sists o f the same simple unity o f apprehension but of ,

apprehension applied t o a particular kin d o f complex

object an object composed o f previous cases o f c o n

s c i o u sne s s,
o f an apprehension in which their o n e

common feature is contrasted with their many di vers e

features the general indeterm i nat e feeling with the

particular determinate feelings It remains now to


describe the process o f reection in order to s e e h o w


the notion o f self is introduced by it o r superinduced ,

upon t h e simple perceptions The unity o f a p p r e


h e n s i o n in reection is called U ni ty o f A pperception .

And here is reached the poin t s o often referred t o in

the present and precedi ng chapters .

R eection is a genera l isation di ffering from other


generalisations in hav ing modes o f consciousness as

such for its obj ect matter ; it is consciousness of per

c e t i o ns s o
p far a s they contain the common element

o f fee l ing abstracting from their other diff erences


In point o f being feelings they are all alike however ,

much o ne determinate feeling differs from another a ,

sound from a colour a colour from a taste o r o n e

, ,

colour from another for instance It is inevitable,


that familiarity with the perceptions should bring to

light this ground di fference existing in all of them

namely that what they all are in common shoul d be


dis t inguished from what some are and others are n o t .

R eection rst draws then follows up this distinction

, ,

and in vestigates the element comm on to all s o far as

it is common and not determinate The method pur .

sued by reection i n this is the following The r e .

e c t i ng consciousness considers those feelings which

are nearest to it i n point o f tim e it gets as close to ,

its object as it can ; that i s it turns its look back o n


the feeling o f the moment immediately previous to

itself that is represents o r redintegrates it in con
, ,

s c i o u sn e s s R eection is a particular kind o f redin


t e gr a t i o n di stinguished from other kinds by its parti


c ul a r object which object is the common element o f


feeling the feeling comm on to all instances o f feeling

, ,

a logical and provisiona l object In fo l l o w m g this .

course reection perceives that it has produced the

same phenomenon in poin t o f ki nd with that which it
, ,

s e t out to examine Instances have been produced


i n the course o f reecting o f the same phenomenon ,

of feeling o f determinate kinds and in separate but

continuous moments of time ; and these instances
have been produced by the same reecting conscious
ness The chain Of feeling o r the series o f feelings

has prolonged itself and since it h a s been prolonged

, ,

deni tely marked ; it includes o r may include if ,

memory is clear enough all past states o f conscious


ness but nothing which has not been conscious ness


This whole is the P erson the identical man the E m

, ,

i r i c a l E go as he appears t o himself as the object o f

p ,

consciousness the Object o f that consciousness by


which it has been produced as an Object in its pro

gress The phrase E mpirical E go will be fam i l iar to

readers o f Schelling See his V om Ich Oder ber


das Um b e d i ngt e S a m m t l Werke vol 1

. .

But a name must be found also for the general

and provisional term F eeling as existing i n d e t e rm i

nate and in time for its existence in time gives it


continuity as a provisional image a nd time is i t s ,

substance when it is regarded as existing ; but it

must be a name which does not express more than
the analysis warrants us in assigni ng to it a nam e ,

which does not impl y that it has empirical existence ;

and for this purpose let the name of Subj ect be chosen ,

a n d in order t o d i s t i n ui s h it from the empirical ego

, g ,

let it be called the P ure E go The name Subject .

will distinguish it from its objects whether d e t e rm i ,

nate feelings o r determinate qualities ; the name P ur e

E go will d istinguish it from the complex o f thos e
determ i n ate feel i ngs the empirical e go
The nam e .

o f Subject bes t marks the fact that t h e feelin g i n

tended by i t is gener a l and provisional and never an ,

object by itself Whenever feeling exists empirically


it exists determinately and in a moment of time which


is an empirical obj ect and has empirical duration If .

we divide in thought this least empirical moment o f

time or feeling in time the feeling vanishes but t h e
, , ,

time remains ; the time becomes an incomplete mo

ment a 061 001s 1 g but it still remains as time present to
, ,
OF T I M E A ND S PAC E . 1 77

o ur consciousness But what has becom e o f the de


terminate feeling ? I t does not exist as feeling any

more o ur sensibility is not ac ute enough to perceive

it below the point c a l led by hypothesis the least em

p i ri c a l moment It has not
. become feeling generally
o r in the abstract for this is a generalisation from all

the empirical determinate feelings and cannot there ,

fore include a case which is not a determinate feeling .

Sir W Hamilton would perhaps s a y that the feeling


had become latent ; but what is a feeling which is not

felt ? To say that it is latent is only to s a y t h a t it is

not a feeling There i s only one adequate mode o f


conceiving the phenomenon of the vanishing o f feel

ing in an incomplete moment o f time It remains .

potential o r latent not as feeling but as organ o r as

, , ,

a mode o f the material organ to which it is attached ;

the sensibility of the organ is no t di visible so far as
the form in which that sensibility Operates Starting .

then from the incomplete moment o f time and letti ng

it continue till it is complete that is til l it is long, ,

enough for feeling to arise in it we see that a deter ,

mi n ate feeling is the result o f a completed moment of

time and that consciousness arises at the end of the

moment At that instant we have an obj ect of con


s c i o u sne s s Suppose that the next complete moment


o f time is a moment of reection and its Object will


be the previous complete moment In this way we .

may be a l ways conscious but never conscious that we


are conscious but onl y that we have been so ; except

indeed as has been already said by inference in which
, , ,

sense we may be said also to be conscious that we

Shall be conscious hereafter The present moment .

of consciousness i s the darkes t spot in the whole

series o f moments o f reection The fact that con .


is eeting in point of time that it escapes

s c i o u s ne s s ,

observation in the moment o f consciousness s o that ,

we are never conscious that we a r e feeli n g but onl y

that we have felt the fact that we are never able to

seize consciousness itself but only its product war ,

rants u s in di stinguishing a Subject from an O bject .

C ould consciousness be its o w n imme di ate Object ,

could reection and perception be o n e could sensi ,

b i li t y be as innitely divisible as its form then every ,

thing would be in differently subj ective and objective ,

we should distinguish neither subject nor object in

phenomena the ultimate dualism o f metaphysic would

be done away with and existence and consciousness


would constitute a true Absolute .

If we were to follow up this clue i t would pro ,

bably occur t o us that the s o called substance o f the


soul is time just as the s o called substan ce of exter


nal tangible and visible objects is space Time has .

been called the form o f the inner sense space the ,

form of the outer sense ; but both in ner and outer

sense belong t o o ne conscious being and this o n e ,

conscious bein g as an existing object is now under

investigation The question before us is D oes the

reection of this conscious being o n itself discover ,

in its object itself a constant and complete Object to

, , ,

which its changing states are attached or with which ,

they are bound up so that this constant and com


p l e t e object may be considered as the invariable con

di tion of consciousness and its changing states ? The

answer given by the analysis o f reection is that the ,

only constant element in the object O f reection is

time which is also the form o f the inner sense Time
, .

therefore is the condition o f the subjective unity o f

the objects of the inner sense of the series o f states

condition apprehension That which is a pe e n

o f .

l i a ri t y o f some states o f consciousness is not to be

erected into a con di tion o f existence of all states o f
The same erroneous procedure is found in Schel
ling the error o f ja d o p t i ng as the cause o f a pheno
, ,

menon the differentia o r the denition o f it It is


seen in the rst sentence o f the System des Trans

cend Idealismus S a m m t l Werke v o l 3
. .

Wissen beruht auf der Ue b e r e i n s t i m m ung eines O b

e kt i v e n mit einem Subj ektiven But knowledg
j e .

does not r es t up o n the agreement o f an obj ective w ith

a subjective but may be described as being such an

agreement ; there is no causal conn ection between

the two things knowledge and the agreement of an


obj ective with a subjective ; each is another term for ,

or mode o f regarding the other But let this be ,


exhibited more particularly In the same work at .

p 3 6 7 v o l 3 Schelling say s : M an i i b e rl a s s e sich


ganz der u nw i l l ki i rl i c h e n Succession der V o r s t e l l un

gen s o werden dies e V orstellungen s o mannigfaltig
, ,

und verschieden s i e seyu m Oge n doch als z u E inem ,

identischen Subjekt ge h Ori g erscheinen R e e kt i r e .

ich auf diese I d e nt i t a t des Subjekts in den V o r s t e l


lungen s o entsteht mir der Satz : Ich denke D ieses


Ich denke i s t es was alle V orstellungen begleitet und


die Co nt i nu i t a t des B e w u s s t s e y n s zwischen ih nen
unterh a lt O n this it is to be remarked that in

every series o f perceptions in all consciousness there , ,

is a continuity of the consciousness of the feeling or ,

feelings In reection this continuity of feeling is


xed upon by the attention observed and called the , ,

Ich denke The fact is the continuity of feeling


the expression or characterisation of it when isolated ,


by the attention is the Ich denke The fa ct aecom


a ni e s inseparably all the V orstellungen the expres

p ;
sion for it arises afterwards in reection But Schel ,

lin g here maintains not onl y that the Ich denke a c

compani es all the V orstellunge n which wo uld be ,

tr ue in s o far as this that t h e fact now c a l l ed Ich


denk e does s o but a l so that it i s the cause o f the


phenomenon o f their continuity unterh a lt di e C onti ,

n ui t a t des B e w u ss t s e n s zwischen ihnen But it is

y .

clear that this is not the case S ince the thought Ich ,

denk e itself invol ves continuity o f consciousness and ,

is onl y possible in a continuous time C ontinuity o f .

consciousness and Ich denke a re t w o terms for the

s ame thing ; the rst is a name for it as an object

o f perception unseparated from the phenomena the ,

second as an object o f reection isolated in a p ro ,

visional image from t h e phenomena ; they are not

two objects but o n e object in two shapes Co n

t i nui t y o f consciousness is common t o a l l possibl e

m odes o f consciousness ; but t h e thought Ich denke

belongs to o ne mode o f consciousness onl y namely to ,

reection .

The Ich o f the Ich denke bec o mes according t o ,

Schelli n g its own object in intellectual intui tion

, ,

intellektuelle Anschauung I adm it that Intellectual.

intuition is a good name for reection ; but I deny

that under either name it reveals any other E go
, ,

than the empiric a l e go o n the o ne hand and that ,

general o r provisional image the Subject o n t h e , ,

other There are two reasons why the Subject can


not be conceived as a complete o r empirical obj e ct ,

rst because it appears as abstract and genera l feel


ing never given in perception except as an abstrae


tion ; secondl y because when we try t o think o f it a s

, ,

existing separately we must think o f it a s existing


in an incomplete moment Of ti me ; fo r if we thi n k o f

it as in a completed moment o f time it i s n o longer ,

general and abstract but a determin ate objective feel

ing the materi al element in a perception

The analysis o f reection is no w complete It .

will be Observed that I have used the word obj ects

i n speaking o f phenomena previous to reection both ,

in this and the prece di ng chapter although pheno ,

mena become Objective and subj ective and feelings ,

are distinguished from qualities rst in reection ,


NO other course was open t o me and fo r thi s reason , ,

that language the articulate language o f men is rst

, ,

formed when reection h a s arisen and thus describes ,

objects and has names for objects only as they appear

to a reecting consciousness Things as they appear.

t o consciousness previous t o reection are not de

scribed i n such language but are s o far as the lan
, ,

guage is concerned no n existent ; language itself is


a late product o f consciousness a n d expresses things


a s they appear at the stage when it arises If any .

ani ma ls besides man were found to have a language

g rounded o n generalisation this would I th
i nk be
justly regarded as a proof that they had reected and
w ere possessed o f reason Fo r they could har dl y

h a ve generalised s o much and s o xedly as to possess

a language without having also genera l ised the com

mon element o f feeling But though phenomena


h ave been spoken o f a s if they were a lready di stin

g u i sh e d into their subjective and objective aspects

into feelings and qualities before reection has arisen

, ,

this must not make us forget that this was onl y an

imperfect way o f speaking a n d that the way i n which

this distinction arises in reection had still to be


gu i s h i ng o the
f course o f feelin g i nto pure and deter

minate feelings in time alone abstracting provision

, ,

a l ly from space : no matter what space these feelin gs

m a
y occupy reection ,
considers them only s o far as

they occupy time R eection abstracts provisionall y


from space that is from the particular space occ u pied

, ,

by the feelings the s u ccession o f which it exami n es


Though all these feeli n gs occupy o r are placed i n

s ome portion o f space yet this circumstance is a b

s t ra c t e d from and o nl y their succession is considered


In this consideration arises the distinction between

the Subject t h e incomplete moment of time and its
, ,

objects the whole series o f determinate feelin gs


P henomena have resolv e d themselves in to this dis

tinction ; the objects o f the Subject are a succession .

o f feelings But this abstraction was only provisional


for these feelings a l so occupy o r are contained in

s pace the comparatively constant feelin gs which
, ,

are the body and the less constant feelings which


s urround it o n a ll sides and the feelings which a c,

company these two classes such as the emotions t h e , ,

position o f which i s d if cult t o determine These all .

occupy Space and time together are a succession of ,

feelings and a succession o f feeli ngs in space relations -


When I take the feelings as a whole in these t w o , ,

rel ations at once as distinguished from the same


feelings with provisional abstraction o f space I con ,


sider them as qualities ; for they are considered as

statical and xed in space and in the whole o f tim e ;
they become the universe o f quali ties but without
ceasing to be feeli n gs When any particul ar s e t Of .

feelings is xed on and considered in these two rela

tions at once it becomes a complex o f qualities with
, ,

a certain gure in Space and duration o f time yet i n ,

O F T I ME AND S PAC E . 1 85

this case t o o without ce a sing t o be a complex o f

feeli ngs When I take a succession of these parti

c a lar objects some occupying a larger and some a


small er space some occupying an indeni te and some


a deni te position in space I am said to have trains


o f thought o r association o f ideas ; and this is t h e

condition in which consciousness is norm a l ly found ,

and which i s the groundwork o f all its elaborate and

completed reasoni ngs .

Qualities in the metaphysical sense o f the term

a r e then to be distinguished from qualities in t h e

psychologic a l sense In the former they are feelings


considered as occupying space as well as ti me ; in the

latter they are feelings considered as occupying all o r
any space except that occupied by the mind whi ch ,

is the place o f their effects and o f their evidence .

Qualities in the metaphysical sense are the Objectiv e

aspect o f feelings objective to reection when having
, ,

drawn the distinction between Subj ect and O bject it ,

proceeds t o distinguish its method in doing this from

the facts o r objects i n which its method is involved .

I t s method i s to abstract provisionally from S pace

but t h e objects i n which that method I s Involved all
occupy space Its method then is t h e subjective

aspect o f its objects And this method is the s ub


j e c t i v e aspect o f the empirical ego ; the objects o f i t

a r e the objective aspect Both together are the o b


e c t o f reection and therefore both together are the

j ,

obj ect o f metaphysic a l enquiry .

Al l thoughts which arise in reection are m o d i

cations di fferentiations o f this thought that the O bject
, ,

is different from the Subject ; o r in Kant s phrase , ,

they are accompani ed by a n Ich denke The two .

aspects o f phenomena subjective and objective a r e

, ,

therefor e in reection as inseparable yet a s distin ct

a s the two elements formal and material are di stinct
, ,

and inseparable in direct perception .

It is impossible here and I d o not pretend to ex

, ,

h i b i t even in outline t h e various idealistic theories o f

the E go o r in any way t o enter o n their respective

merits Hegel s logical idealism will be i n some mea

sure discu s sed i n another part Here I have offered .

onl y an analysis o f reection which seems to me to ,

take away t h e common ground o n which all idealistic

theories o f the E go must stand Fo r whether t h e .

in di vidual E go is deduced from t h e Absolute o r t h e ,

Absolute from the individual E go it is reection in ,

both cases which furnishes t h e content o f the c o n c e p

tion formed It makes no d ifference whether t h e

universe is considered as o ne vast person o r the i n ,

divi dual person as the constructor o f an ideal universe ;

reection is equally the source o f the conceptions a p
plicable to both If reection is a mode o f intuition

and if its analysis h a s been rightly given an answer ,

has been supplied not onl y to the i ncorrect conclusions

o f theories o f intellectual intuition but also to theories

which do no t recognise reection as intuition at all .

But the question o f the possibility o f a purely logical

ide a l ism such as Hegel s requires a more direct and
, ,

express treatment and must be postponed fo r the


present ; and for this reason that Hegel is as careful ,

to bring together the t w o domains o f nature and his

, and y vem g as I am to keep them apart ;

and as the y vem g is with hi m inseparably bound up

with the 000 00 and this 000704 is o f a logic a l nature his
, ,

theory of the origin o f consciousness and o f its forms

cann ot be understood until the natur e o f hi s l ogic is
considered a n d this w ill nd i t s proper place in the

E m p n d ung, feeling is in a si milar manner t h e

o r ,

completion of the rst step in the return of the Idea

to itself out of its differential state to its state o f
, ,

identity with itself as G eist ; that is it is the rst

, ,

step in the third part o f the E n c y c l o p i d i e the P hilo ,

s ophie des G eistes So far from considering feeling


as an ultimate element o f consciousness the material ,

element incapable o f analysis Hegel derives it ulti

, ,

mately from thought in Some o f its forms a n d con ,

s iders that t h e ultimate nature o f feeli n g consists i n

the circumst a n ce o f what is general allgemeines , ,

becoming also particular o r determinate bestimmt , ,

w ithout losing its character o f generality D as N icht .

animalische he says e m p nd e t eben d e s sh a l b nicht

, , ,

weil in demselben das Allgemeine in die Bestimmt

heit versenkt bleibt in dieser nicht f ur sich wird

D as ge fa rb t e Wasser zum Beispiel ist nur f a r o ne

, ,

unterschieden v o n seinem Ge fa rb t s e yn und v o n sein er

Unge fa rb t h e i t Wa re ein und dasselbe Wasser z u

gleich a llgemei nes und ge fa rb t e s Wasser s o w i i r d e ,

d iese unterscheidende Bestimmtheit fur das Wasser

s elber s e n dieses somit E m nd ung haben ; denn
y , p
E m p n d ung hat E t w as dadurch dass d asselbe in ,

sei n er Bestimmtheit sich a l s ein a l l ge m e m e s erhalt .

Phil osophie des G eistes E ncycl 399 . Werke . .


vo l 7 d di p This i rst to take feeling

2 v 1
. 1
5 . s .
, ,

in o n e o f its second intentions instead o f in its rst

intention ; and secondl y and consequently it is to , ,

deduce feeling from what I should call the formal

element Of consciousness as it appears i n thought .

Such is a very brief S ketch o f Hegel s system s o ,

far as is r equisite to understand the position which

the question o f the origin o r the history o f tim e , , ,

space and consciousness occupies with him ; and it is

1 89

clear t h a t no t h i ng said in this chapter from the point ,

of view adopted here of the relation of the history o f

a part to the nature o f the whole can be an answer

to a theory founded o n such a totall y opposite view

as Hegel s The answer to Hegel s theory requires

an examination into the nature of logic and the con ,

t r o v e r s y must be a logical one N othing decisive


can be brought forward therefore in the rst part o f

this E ssay What I think has been now shown is

that self consciousness is on the o n e hand n o t an ele


ment in a l l cases o f consciousness and o n the other ,

not a simpler b ut a more complex phenomenon than

consciousness ; and farther that self consciousness ,

does not reveal to us any E go o r Subject O bj ect but -


only the empirical ego o n the o n e hand and the pure

ego or Subj ect on the other ; neither of which can be
regarded as the cause either o f consciousness o r o f
self consciousness still less o f their forms time and
, ,

space either generally o r in the mind ; and that self


consciousness as the more complex phenomenon o f


the two must be explained by a reference to c o n


s c i o usne s s
and the object of self consciousness by a -

reference to the obj ect o f conscio usness by statin g it ,

in terms of time space and feeling and pointing out

, , ,

the addi tional element namely reection which it

, ,

contains The Subj ec t such as it is indeterminate

, ,

feeling in incomplete moments o f time lies within ,

consciousness is discovered therein by reection ; and


o n account o f its incomplete nature is incapable of

being the cause o f consciousness P sychology there .

fore is debarred from all theories o f the E go as the

cause of consciousness for the whole ground where

the E go could be fo und is searched by reection and ,

the E go not found there But whether physiological


psychology will ev er succeed in establishing by i n
ference the existence o f an immaterial Soul o r as I , ,

should prefer t o express it an intangible and m v 1 s i b l e


Soul as the cause o f consciousness and i n inserting

, ,

such a soul between the material organ the brain o r ,

nervous matter and consciousness o r in placing it

, ,

before both consciousness and the material organ as

the invariable condition o f both the o n e and the
other this is a question which cannot perhaps yet


be decided in the negative and which it is not in ,

place to discuss here What science would gain by


this being established is not clear ; a more compli

c a t e d cause would be substituted fo r a simpler o n e ,

but then this would be by hypothesis demanded by

, ,

the facts But until this has been done it remains


to the metaphysician to have recourse to that cause

o r invariable condition o f consciousness which is an

empirical obj ect o f presentative perception to follow ,

the physiological path as far as it leads him secure ,

that on that path he is at least o n the safe road

towards truth .

But before proceeding to consider the third class

o f theories o f the origin o f consciousness let m e be ,

allowed to ill ustrate by a comparison the process of

con sciousness developing into reection a process ,

which has al ready been described as accurately and

un u r a t i v e l as the language at my command per
g y
mits C onsciousness in this process may be c o m

pared to a man walking backwards who does not s e e ,

each step as he t a kes it but only immediately after


it has been taken ; who sees the ground beneath his

feet only when he has passed over it not while it is ,

bei n g passed over He sees the past but neither the


present nor the future landscape It spreads to his .


p l et ed an d the uncompleted moment o f Co n

no t in
S CI o u sne s s a fact rst told to us by reection this
, ,

fact seems to me to be o n e ground at least o f the , ,

ineradicable sense o f freedom which we call free ,

dom o f the will D as gebe ich dir says Jacobi .

, ,

ohne Widerrede z u : dass das G ebiet der F r e i h e i t

das G ebiet der Un vvi s s e nh e i t s ey Ich set z e nur .

noch hin z u : E iner dem M enschen unu b e rw i n d l i c h e n .

Werke v o l 2 page 3 2 2 But I do not know that


Jacobi would have given his words such an a p p l i

cation .

22 I come now to the third clas s o f theories


that class usually but wrongly distinguished as ma

t e ri a l i s t i c a n d which ought properly to be distin

g ui sh e d as physiological F or the rst class of theo .

ries is also materialistic according to the true meaning

of the term Some matter the Soul of t h e s e theories

must possess o r it would not be an Object at all


If m a t t er su re t h e m o s t re ne d
, ,

High wro ught a nd t em p e re d int o m ind ,

S o m e d a rling d a ught er o f t h e d a y ,

A nd b o di d by h
e er n ti
a v e ra y;

this it may b e but it is matter unmistakeably still


Both these classes o f theories are materialistic in the

same sense Of the term and both become equally o b ,

e c t i o n a b l e if it is Objectionable to be o n e sided only

j ,

if they are put forward as the whole account to be

given of consciousness if they profess to decide the ,

nature o f consciousness by an enquiry into its origin

and history in the mind O n this point I must s a y a .

few more words before entering into the physiological

theory .

The analysis of the phenomenon of reection has

brought us back t o the conception o f subject and

OF T IM E AND S PAC E . 1 93

object as t w o aspects o f the same thing c o extensive

, ,

and coeval with each other the conception which ,

was exhibited though imperfectly in the diagram in

, ,

the preceding chapter And since reection is the .

last e ffort o f consciousness the nal analysis which ,

is reached by reection must be the ultimate analysis

and nature o f the thing analysed ; the conception ex
h i b i t e d by it cannot be overridden by o r made sub ,

ordin ate to any other mode o f conceiving obj ects


A ccordingly every thing that follows I n this chapter

, ,

the enquiry into the history and origin o f conscious

ness must be entirely subordinate to that conception

o f the nature o f consciousness a n d its obj ects as two ,

aspects o f o ne and the same thing But how is this .

t o be done ; in what way can the origin o f conscious

ness be conceived when it has been shown that it

is coeval and coextensive with its Obj ects wi th its ,

forms time and space and with its materi a l element

, ,

o r feelings ,
these being innite both in time and
space ? T o enquire into the origin o f consciousness
is to suppose that there was a time when and a space ,

where it did not exist ; yet reection has forbidden


us to suppose that there ever was such a t i In e and

such a space C an consciousness have a beginn ing

i n time and S pace and yet be coeval and coextensive


wi th t i me and space ; or be coeval and coextensiv e

with its objects and yet be preceded by some o f i t s

objects as its causes ? The individual consciousness

seems to have an origin in time and space before ,

which obj ects existed ; and t o await its end in time

and space after a short l ife after which objects wil l
, ,

exist as before Y et these objects before and after


life are objects only o f the individ ual consciousness ,

and when either of these two relatives are taken


away the other which is only its relative must it

, , ,

seems share its fate Here is a manifest c o n t r a d i c


tion or at any rate what seems to be such ; and the


pro of o f the difculty being really felt is the fact of

the many the o ries ad o pted in order to escape from it .

Three ways have been struck into corresponding to ,

the three classes of theories exhibited i n this chap

ter and ado p ting the same principles respectively
, ,

in order to explain t h e origin and history o f the

world o r o f consciousness E ach o f these ways is .

essentially a theory o f an Abs o lute and each trans ,

fo r ms the theory o f origin from a subordinate theory

into a theory sometimes covertly and sometimes pro
fe s s e d l y complete and all embracin g C orrespon di ng

to the rst class o f theories there is the theory o f

thorough goin g Idealism It escapes from the d i t

culty o f supposing that the individual consciousnes s

has an origin in time and space and yet that time ,

and space and Objects exist only as objects o f con

s c i o u s ne s s by conceiving that the obj ective side Of

the eq uation o r pair o f relatives that is the objec t s , ,

of consciousness are a mere appeara n ce a mirror o f

, , ,

the other side consciousness itself ; that consciousness


is the only real existence while its obj ects are a ,

phantasm o f consciousness thrown o ff by it and last ,

ing only w hile consciousness exists consciousness ,

existing absolutely and in itself and o u t o f reference ,

to any obj ect whatever C orrespondi n g to the third


class of theories is the theory o f thorough going ma -

t e ri a l i s m ; as idealism anni hilates Obj ects s o mate


ri a l i sm consciousness The origin of consciousness


is here directly in question C onsciousness is c o n .

c e i v e d as a phantasm o r a mi rror o f objects which

, ,

exist really i n time and S pace of magnitudes which ,


to unfold all th at it has i nit in Hegel s phraseology , ,

to become a n und fur sich all that it is already an

- - -

sich How s o ? Its natur e is to be subject and o b


jc e t two o p p o s I t e s always and sometimes c o nt r a di c

, ,

tories at once It is all subject but it is all o b


jc e t ; it is all obj ect and subject but it is neither ,

alone ; therefore it is Begriff for a Begriff o r C on '


cept form is that which is the Identity o f c o nt r a d i c


tories In other words the nature of the Absolute


der Begriff is to produce ever new forms because


it contains i n itself N egation N egation is the e s .

s e n t i a l point in the Begri ff a n d two negations com ,

l e t e every Begriff ; and the Begriff itself is the 7 07
p 1

071 0 1 o f the Absolute ; negation therefore is the


mai n spring o f its development o r history The his .

tory and the nature are one and the same thin g ; it is
only the special determi nate forms o f existence the ,

inadequate C oncepts Begriffe which have an origin

, , .

Such briey and inadequately expressed is one view

of the grandest idea which the mind o f man has ever
conceived .

Thus the theory of the second class has no par

tial theory o f origin o f origin considered as sub

ordinate to nature corresponding t o it because I t

, ,

contains both itself and precludes the possibili ty


o f a partial the o ry fou n ded o n the same prin ciple .

The two partial theories o f origin are theories o f the

rst and o f t h e third class R easons have already .

been offered for rejecting theories o f the rst class :

the third class o f theories has yet to be examined .

But the question remains to be previ ously answered ,

how the apparent contradiction is to be solved b e

tween the equal claims O f nature and origin the ,

avoidance o f which contradiction was the motive

OF TI M E A ND S PAC E . 1 97

which caused the substitution o f the theories o f a b

solute idealism and absolute materialism in the place
o f subordi nate and partial theories corresponding to

them O n what principle can the question o f origin


b e m a de subordi nate to the question o f nature ? The

true answer is the same in some respects with that o f
Hegel It is that the questions o f nature and his

tory o f consciousness and its objects are though no t ,

identical yet inseparably combined ; but that S ince


both o f them nature and history are in nite in time

, ,

and space no question o f origin can arise about them ;


while questions both o f history and origin arise with

respect to any and every particular Obj ect o f con
s c i o usn e s s . The history o f consciousness is founded
in its nature as much though n o t i n the same way
, ,

as in Hegel s theory The history of consciousness

is founded in its nature not because its nature i s t h e


C oncept form and contains N egation but because


Ti m e is o n e o f its forms ; consciousness begins to

have a history as soon as it begins t o exist and that ,

is at any point y o u can reach the furthest going back ,

into innite time A ll particular Obj ects o f consci


o u s n e s s o n the other hand have an origin as well a s a

history ; and o n e o f these particular objects o f con

s c i o u s n e s s is the connection o f the empirical ego with

that small portion o f the universe which i s most fr e

quently presented actually and may be presented ,

always to consciousness that is with the body inha , ,

bited by it In other words the conscious life o f the


empiric a l ego is the obj ect o f the investigations of

psychology C onsciousness is a term o f very wid e

meani ng and therefore may embrace very di fferent


particular meanings Henc e the apparent c o nt ra d i c


tion If consciousness i s taken to me an either the

Subject o r the subjective aspect o f phenomena it h a s ,

no origin ; if it is taken to mean the conscious life o f

the empirical ego as distinguished from the u ni verse
, ,

it has an origin as a particular obj ect o f consci


o u s n e ss
. The conscious life o f an individual o r o f ,

the empirical ego may be imaged as a ring sliding


along a pole from end to end to which ring cords

, ,

are attached going o ff from it in all directions s o as ,

to make it the centre o f a globe of which the cords

are radii D urin g life that is from the ti me when
, ,

the ring i s p ut o n the pole to that when it falls o ff

at the other end it is in con nection with inni ty by

means o f the cords The cords represent the percep


tions and their objects in innite time and sp a ce


The ring and the cords in the comparison are both

tangible Obj ects and S I m i l a rl y the empirical ego in

connection with its body is itself an obj ect o f c o n

s c i o us n e s s in just the same sense as other obj ects are

namely it is o n e o f the objects which constitute the


Obj ective aspect o f phenomena ; it is as much an o b

j c e t a s those Obj ects are which are farthest removed
from it i n space and time ; before reection entered
there was no difference at all bot h were phen omena ; ,

after reection both became objects differing in s pace

, ,

and time relations the conscious life o f the empirical


ego occupying that portion o f space which i s always

nearest to the centre which the Subj ect always per ,

c ei ve s or may perceive whenever it perceives any

, ,

thing in space and that portion o f time which i m


m ediately precedes the moment o f reection The .

connection o f this portion o f time and space with

the more distant portions of both is the question o f
psychology .

Any moment however Short in the cours e o f the


tion ; when we imagine the future that is follow t h e , ,

chain o f e ffects instead o f causes o f existence that ,

which is last in order of perception is also as a rule , ,

last in order o f existence Both the past and the .

future the past dating back from the time o f birth

, ,

and the future dating forward from the present m o

ment o f consciousness are Obj ects o f the imagina ,

tion and are both constructed out o f the same fund ,


namely the fund o f perceptions presentative and r e


presentative which have been present from the ti me


o f birth to the present moment of consciousness The .

l ife time bein g a xed moment i n ti m e with time


, ,

before it and after it causes t h e s e obj ects which are


imagined last t o be placed at the furthest point of

time from itself ; that is earliest I n past time latest , ,

in future time ; and thus the apparent anomaly o f ,

what is last in order o f knowledge being rst in order

o f time is removed
There is thus a double order

o f knowledge and o f existence ; a progress in two

directions at once fo r the order of knowledge is itself


a prolongation of the order o f existence in a forward

direction while the Objects which it imagines as

existing i n past time are a prolongation of the order


of knowledge in the reverse direction This i s what .

I understand t o be in Heg el s mind when he speaks
of the progress o f the development o f the Begriff
being a progress at once in two di rections a R u c kke h r ,

and a F ortgang a V ertiefen into and an E ntw ickelung


out o f its essence E verywhere what Hegel says


must be interpreted as alone it can be expressed by

, ,

a reference to t h e forms o f time and space The .

forms of time and space he at the root of all the con

c e t i o n s he forms o f the universe and o f thought I
p .

do not s a y only that the language he employs a n d

O F T IME A ND S PAC E . 201

must employ involves depends o n and e xpresses , ,

those forms for th is is by n o means conclusive ; but


that the meaning o f that language itself rests entirely

o n time and space and the thoughts represent Objects

only in those forms .

E very thing which is n o t contained in the i nc o m

l e t e moment of consciousness the Subj ect i s an o b
p , ,

e c t o f consciousness and every thin g h a s existence

j ,

in the same sense ; the objects o f existence pre v ious

to birth are obj e c ts o f imagin ation that is object s , ,

not simply represented but constructed o u t o f o b ,

e c t s represented representations in a new shape

j ,

P ast and future Obj ects each kind dating from t h e ,

present moment are present in consciousness as past


and future because ti me and S pace are forms o f


every moment o f consciousness P ast and futur e .

objects are revealed to us and exist in present c o n

s c i o u s n e s s as the long line o f Banquo s descendants

a r e rev ealed by the glass carried by the eighth o f

the royal phantoms in M acbeth Their existence as .

past and future objects in cludes in it a reference to

the present moment of consciousness The empirical .

ego belongs to past present and future time The

, ,

connection of the empirical e go with the body belongs ,

as an object of representation and not o f imagination ,

to the present and part of the past time only A ll .

objects without distinction have the same title to

existence namely presence in consciousness but all
, ,

have not the same certainty duration or truth , , .

That there has been a course o f existence prior t o

the birth o f the empirical ego into the body o r , ,

what is the same thing o f the body into the em ,

p i ri c a l ego
no consciousnes s can doubt A lthough .

this is an object of the imagination it is no t on ,


that account uncertain It is the province o f r e a s o n .

ing to decide o n the certainty o r the truth o f objects

and classes of objects U p to the present moment o f .

consciousness then there has been a series o f obj ects

, ,

and events empirical taking place in the order o f

, ,

existence and o f which the connection o f the body


with the empirical ego is part The invariable con .

n e c t i o n s between the Objects and events contained in

this series and in the future as well as in the past

, ,

since C ujus rei ordo est etiam p rze d i c t i o e s t are , ,

the eld o f enquiry o f the special sciences P sych .

ology investigates the invariable antecedents o f t h e

conscious life o f the empirical ego ; not what c o n
s c i o u s n e ss is but which objects o f consciousness a r e

they which invariably precede i n order o f exist ,

ence those feelings o r objects o f reection which


exist in the body during life and the removal o f ,

which invariably precedes the cessation o f those feel

ings . The physiological class o f th eories o n this
question remains to be examined .

A ccording t o the physiological theories the ex ,

i s t e n c e o f the conscious li f e o f the empirical e go ,

o r o f the connection o f the empirical ego with t h e

body depends o n the existence o f nervous mat


ter and its degrees o f development depend o n the


degrees o f development o f that nervous matter in

quantity and complexit y B ro u s s a i s in the l s t chap .

ter of his work D e l I rri t a t i o n e t de la F olie v o l 1 ,
. .

page 4 2 d edit expresses himself thus : O n voit

. .

q u e l i rri t a b i l i t est commune a tous les et r e s v i

vants depuis l e vgtal ju s q u a l homme e t q u elle
, ,

est continue tandis que la sensibilit est une facult

propre a certains animaux qu elle n est pas con ,

tinne e t qu elle n e s e manifeste que sous d e s con

seek the causes of the conscious life o f the empirical

ego in something which is not included in that con
scious li f e itself ; they both infer a cause and do not ,

nd it b y an a l ysis o f the feelings caused Co n se .

quently no ph ysiological theory can logically confuse

the brain with its feelin gs o r thoughts ; the separa
tion o f the two things i n kind is provided for by the
metaphysical di stinction between feelin gs and quali
ties F eelings can never be qualities unless they are

considered as gathered up into xed portions o f

space The brain itself is such a complex o f feelings

but t h e fe e l i ngs supported o r caused by the brain a r e

by the hypothesis by the condition o f the enquiry
, ,

exempted from such a transformation into qualities ,

for it is their connection as feelin gs with the brain as

a complex o f qualities which is being examined The .

inference o f a cause supposes it to be different frOm

its effect and no t contained in it

F our things are to be di stinguished the Subject ;


the empirical ego o r the world Of feelings ; the uni


verse of obj ects o r the world o f qualities ; the brain

, ,

a particular obj ect consisting o f certain quali ties a s ,

the cause of the connection o f the empirical ego with

a small and distinct portion o f the world o f qualities .

The S ubj ect is n o empirical o r complete object any ,

more than time space and feelin g are The union

, ,

of the three last constitutes empirical o r complete

phenomena ; the uni on o f phenomena with t h e Sub
jcet constitutes empirical o r complete objects T h e .

Subject taken a l one would be necessarily conceived

as out o f all time and space in other words the a t
, ,

tempt to consider it as an object is di r ectly self con -

t r a di c t o ry ; the moment it is conceived as an obj ec t

by uni on with phenomena that moment it i s c o n

OF T I ME A ND S PAC E . 205

c ei ve d as xed in time and space as belonging to the ,

empirical ego The natural tendency o f every o n e is


to conceive every thing as an empirical object to ,

make even the elements and aspects o f phenomena

empirical and to deal with them as such P ure

metaphysic which refuses t o hypostasise u ltimate


elements and aspects o f phenomena has thus n e c e s ,

s a ri l
y an unsatisfactory because incomplete appear
ance ; and there will always be a tendency to trans
cend it and make some o f its elements and aspects

empirical and therefore absolute An idealist who


should hypostasise the Subj ect might say If the Sub ,

c t is a necessary aspect o f phenomena and pheno

je ,

mena are eternal and innite a parte ante must no t ,

the Subject be s o also ? But this is t o make the

Subj ect into somethin g which besides being a mem ,

ber o f a relation has a separate and complete exist


ence o f its o w n ; just as fo r instance master and s e r

, ,

vant are members o f a relation and o n e cannot be a ,

master without havi ng a servant nor a servant with ,

o u t having a master yet a man who is a master can


exist as a man without h aving a servant and a man ,

who is a servant the same Here the existence sepa .

ra t el as men is a prior condition o f the subsequent

relation o f master and servant But the Subject has .

no such prior separate existence the only existence ,

which it has is as an aspect of phenomena ; and this

does not require that it should alone exist in the , ,

time and space relations which the complete pheno

mena exist in The Often employed comparison of

light and darkness is much more to the point in this

case The rst act of creation in the book of G enesis

is Let there be light : and there was light The .

arising o f light created an innity and an eternity o f


darkness a parte ante ; at that mo ment red by the


arising of light there bega n to be darkness which had


existed from eterni ty Light created darkness in the


sense o f giving it a meaning and a nature ; fo r dark

ness is o n e o f those things which have meaning o nl y
in reference to something else the rst intention o f

which is a second intention D arkness is the negation


o f all feeling of sight ; light o n the contrary has a

rst intention it is t h e feeling of sight ; in its second


intention it is the negation o f darkness Hence light .

gives existence to darkness which nevertheless o c c u


pies an eternity and an innity previous to the exist

ence o f light So must the relation o f the Subj ect

and objects prior to it be conceived ; the Subject gives

existence t o Objects which have existed previously

i n the sense o f giving them a meaning and a nature ;

fo r though contained in all phenomena it i s not o b
served to be contained in them and the moment o f ,

its being rst observed is called the moment o f its

rst coming into existence ; and it is thus treated
provisionally as a nite object whic h has a beginnin g ,

notwithstanding that its nature is to be no obj ect at

all and consequently t o escape from all notion o f

begin nin g and ending What is true o f the Subject


is true also o f the empirical ego and the world of

qualities the two members o f the distinction between

the subjective and Obj ective aspect o f phenomena for ,

the Subject is that moment o f time on the completion

o f which this distinction and consequently the two

members o f it arise These three the Subj ect t h e

, .
, ,

empirical ego the world of qualities are coexistent

, ,

and coeval aspects of phenomena and constitute the ,

entire metaphysical analysis or logic Of phenomena .

Wh en any one of them is taken and considered as an


another yet without resorting to a n Absolute In


those theories the question o f nature and the question

o f history hold an equal rank E mpirical obj ects .

make mind what it is as its causes and m i nd makes ,

objects what they are i n their nature Both min d .

a n d its obj ects are empirical objects and yet each is ,

the cause o f the o t her O bj ects are the cause of the


existence of mind and yet mind i s the cause o f the


existence o f Obj ects since without mind obj ects would


not be what they are and therefore we could not tell


that they were the cause of mind And if it is said .

that objects cause mind rst and then appear to it in ,

a new Shape as the Objects we are acquainted with

, ,

this is to have recourse to an Absolute in the shape

o f the D ing a n sich - -
E ach claims to be the cause of

the existence o f the other that is the cause o f the , ,

other in the same sense in which that other makes

the same claim These claims a r e not only i n c o m

l e t e taken separately ; that would be by itself no

p , ,

objection ; but they are contradictory and incapabl e

o f combination unless by making o n e or the other

o f the two objects o r both together

an Absolute ,

Transform however all obj ects into modes o f con

s c i o u s n e s s that i s into the Objective aspect o f m i nd
, , ,

and transform mind into the subjective aspect o f

objects a n d the question o f history and ori gin is at

once subordinated t o the question of nature What .

is an object a quali ty time space motion causation

, , , , , ,

the series o f obj ects in time the series o f obj ects i n ,

space ? Take each separately and think o f it and ,

the answer must b e a mode o f consciousness But .

in this the question o f history is decided ; the history

or the sequence o f causes o f any Object however far ,

back it may go is a mode o f consciousness ; that is to

O F TI ME A ND S PAC E . 209

say is included in the question o f nat ure . There is


nothing previ ous to consciousness for those things ,

which were supposed to be previous to i t are modes

o f itself ; the laws which govern the sequences and

coexistences o f these modes are all that can be e n

quired into There is nothing but time beyond time ;

nothing but Space beyond space ; the s um of thin gs ,

existence which is the objective aspect o f conscious


ness has no second intention for it has nothing out

, ,

side itself or before itself in relation to which it


stands C onsciousness and its objects are coeval and


i nseparable two aspects of the same thing which

, ,

have no cause o f existence o ut of themselves but ,

only a law o f existence within themselves Thus .

the question o f origin and history dealing with em ,

i r i c a l objects is subordinate t o the question o f na

p ,

ture de a ling with metaphysical elements and aspects

o f Objects .

It is not only in this part of psychology that d i f

c ul t i e s arise from the separation o f mind from its

objects as two empiric a l obj ects di fferent in nature


Here the dif culty is to s e e h o w objects can be the

cause o f consciousness as an Object when conscious ,

ness is the cause o f them at the same time Later .

o n
, a difculty will be suggested by the course o f
the discussion as to the mode o f the action and re
action o f mi n d o n objects o f sight and touch and ,

these Objects o n mind ; how for inst a n ce a feeling o f

pain can cause the Shutting o f an eye o r the with ,

drawing o f a hand from a sunbeam or a candle It


is not only the physical action of the sensitive and

motor nerves that is present and operative here ; the
feeli ngs o f pain are not only present by the side of
and a l ong with these physical processes but are links ,

in the chai n of events are caused by the ac tion on


the sensitive nerve and produce the action on the


motor nerve If not why should exactly those a c


tions be p ro d u c e d ii t vh i c h withdraw the eye and the

hand from the source o f pain the sunbeam o r the ,

candle ? To escape from the pain a nal cause is , ,

plainly the directing power the motive in these , ,

actions ; feelings are a causative link in the series o f

phenomena not merely an accompani ment o f a series

Of phenomen a in the nerves and muscles Here then .

m i nd must react o nphysical bodies How is this to .

be conceived ? It is clear that mind and physical

bodies must be brought under some common cate
gory or have some commo n nature

.23 Aft er the physiological theories o f the o ri

gin o f the com m on s li fe o f the empirical ego comes
the consideration o f the physiological theori es o f t h e
origin o f the formal element in the cogni tions o f the
conscious individu a l mind namely o f the cogni tions
, ,

o f time and space These theories may be reduced


so far as I know to three all o f similar nature and

, ,

distin guished only by their respective degrees o f com

p l et ene s s
according as they are founded o n a singl e

class o f circumstances o r o n the combination o f this


with a second o r with a second and a third class

, .

They all seek t h e causa e x i s t e ndi o f the cogni tions o f

time and space during the conscious li f e in objects ;
, ,

they a l l consider time and S pace existing in objects , ,

as the cause o f their existing a l so in the cognitions o f

the individual T h e rst o f thes e thre e theories i s

that time and S pace being universally present in O b

j e c t s of presentative perception
, in every state of the
consciousness o f an indi vidua l from bir t h to death ,

and being the only points in which a l l objects how ,


o f origin in the conscious li fe o f the empirical ego is

but the complement o f the theory of the nature of
these cogni tions s o far as they are necessary ; while

in the Vi ew o f many o f those who hold o r reject , ,

such a theory o f their origin as the present it is con ,

s i d e r e d to be antagonistic to and destructive of that

theory o f their nature in which they are exhibited as

necessary ; and this i n consequence o f not keeping
clear the distinction between the questions of history
a n d nature Sim il ar has been t h e case with other

doctrines in other subjects for instance i n anthro ,

p o lo
gy with the doctrine of development o f species

by natural selection ; the dignity and nature o f man

has been thought to be endangered by any theory Of
his ori gin that di d not consecrate a special creative
act to the production o f mankind ; but the question
is here also what man is what his powers and endow
, ,

ments are not how he or they came to be what they


are what the steps are by which his present actual


position has been reac hed It is o f the greatest i m.

portance to keep these two questions o f history and ,

nature distinct ; and the question of the history of


any particular thing includes that o f its origin as the ,

rst li nk in its history In psychology and meta .

physic it is especially important for the careful dis ,

tinction of these two questions can al one prevent us

from falling into the onesidedness which is the r e
proach of a materialism which has treated the ques
tion o f origin as if it was the whole question over ,

riding superseding or supplying with a ready made

, ,

answer the question o f nature ; which has thus given


half truths for whole truths and i n d o I ng s o prepared


the way for a falling back into two opposite errors ,

the transformation o f obj ects into a deceitful appear


. 21 3

ance o n the o ne hand and into an absolute exis tenc e

, ,

o n the other .

A ccording t o this second theory the cognitions ,

o f time and space are with the l ife o f the empirical


ego o f which they form a part functions o f the brain

, ,

and appear as a kind o f intellectual instinct ; nor is

there a n y thing absurd in regar ding cogni tions a s ,

well a s feelings and actions as functiona l o r i n,

st i nc t i ve
. It is very probable that the phenomena
which we call instinct the actions which we class as

instinctive a r e due to transmitted habits actions

, ,

performed s o invariably during countless generations ,

that though at r st performed with consciousness


and discovered by a tentative process they are at ,

last performed unconsciously and S pont a n eously for ,

instance the action o f the young o f mam m alia seek

ing the breast Instinctive actions include both reex

and consensual nervous actions ; those are instinctive

which appear t o be performed fo r a purpose i n order ,

to an e n d but yet without apparent kn owledge o r


perception of the end fo r which they are done o r in ,

which the kn owledge o f the end is not the moti ve o f

the action The terms in stinct and instinctive are

thus popular rather than scientic ; they are the r e

s ul t s of a crude and not an exact theory o f the phe

n o m e n a to which they are applied ; and it was thi s

character of an end being sought blindl y and without ,

apparent knowledge o f it which attracted attention

, ,

and caused the phenomena to be attributed t o some

divine o r supernatura l o r un known power ; a power
which inspir ed the action as it were i n its o w n supe
, ,

rior wisdom and knowledge o f what was tting and

requisite for the ends o f nature And what reason is .

there again st supposing that a mode o f cognition as


well as a mode o f action h a s in this way become

habitual and functional ? N othing o r very little is
indeed known o f the pr ocess which takes place in the
nervous matter o f the brain in consciousness ; but
it i s impossible t o suppose that consciousness takes
place wi thout action o r movement o f some sort in
the nervous matter It has been Shown I n the last

chapter that movement is an all pervading pheno -

menon belonging to the kingdom o f objects though ,

not an ultimate element o f objects The movements .

to which some cogni tion s a re attached may fo r aught ,

that i s known to the contrary and in accordance ,

with much which is known have become habitual,

and functional s o that the cogni tions attached to


them may share in their habitu a l that is their func , ,

t i o na l nature ; o r t o put it in another light that par t ,

o f the movement essential to cogni tion which is a

p ,

ro ri a t e d t o the formal part f the cogn ition may

p p o ,

be the same i n all c a ses o f cogn ition and then the ,

cognitions attached o r resulting n a mely tim e and , ,

space will derive their uni versal o r functiona l p r o


perty from this part o f the movement


The thir d theory I will put in the form o f a s ug

gestion The bra in h a s been singled o ut a s the cause

o f the conscious li f e o f the empiric a l e o yet n o t in

g ,

isolation without the concurrence o f and action and

, ,

reaction with other objects but in such a sense that

, ,

the entrance o r addition o f a brain to other obj ects

completes the series o f circumstances o n the comple
tion o f which the conscious li fe arises Both the con .

s t i t u t i o n o f the brain and that o f other objects are

contributors to the existence o f the conscious life with

its properties such as have been described N ow it .

is well known that the nerves o f the special senses


of the nervous matter togeth er with t h e

c o n s t i t II t i o n

constitution o f the Object perceived ; that a sound o r

light shall be perceived depends upon the nerve that ,

it shall be such and such a sound o r light depends

upon the object M ay not the same hold good in the

case o f the formal element in the same perceptions ?

Why should w e attribute the appearance o f sensations
in the forms o f time and space solely to the object ,

and not also to the constitution o f the nerve ? It is

true that the time and the space occupied by percep
tions in the brain are not the same as the time and
the Space occupied by those same perceptions in the
rest o f the world o f qualities ; in a short moment of
consciousness we can represent to ourselves a year a ,

century or an age ; in a short moment o f conscious


ness and in a small portion o f nervous matter the ,

surface o f the retina w e can present to ourselves a


large portion o f the expanse of heaven ; in a short life

time and in a conned abode we can reproduce and ,

even produce in imagination the perceptions of a ,

great par t o f the worlds o f hi story and astronomy .

But may not the same conception hold good here

which held good in the case o f the matter o f percep
tions ? M ay it not depend o n the constitution o f the
nervous matter that we have ti me and Space at all in
o u r perceptions and on the particular constitution o f

the objects perceived that we have thi s and that size ,

length gure and order in the perceptions ? It is

, ,

true that if we consider the perceptions as they exist


in t h e brain the relations o f the time and the space


which they occupy there to the tim e and the space

occupied by them in the rest of the world O f qual ities
have not beendetermin ed ; that though the time they ,

occupy in the brain i s deni te yet the s pace is inde

O F T IM E AND S PAC E . 21 7

nite except in the cases o f the extremities o f the

nerves o f Sight and touch But the same may b e .

said of the sensations or matter o f perceptions ; i n the

bra i n thes e are indeni te and irrespective o f the par

t i c ul a r sensations o f particular obj ects ; the nerve

constitution supplies only a limit t o the kind that , .

is to the variations o f the particular obj ective sensa


tions So a l so the brain can be conceived as supplying


a limit to the kind o r to the variations o f the par t i

c ul a r S ize gure length a n d* o r d e r in time and space
, , , , ,

o f the perceptions of Obj ects The constitution o f t h e.

brain as p ossessing extension and duration deter

, ,

mines that obj ects shall ap pear as possessing time a n d

space relations wh ile the constitution o f the objects
, ,

in the rest o f the world of qualities outside the brain ,

determines what partic ul ar relations these shall be , .

Thus the time and space and qualities o r matter

o f Obj ects come equally from within equally from ,

without the bra i n ; and owe their origin equ a l ly to


the constitution o f the brain equally t o the c o n s t i t u ,

tion o f other objects This being supposed to be their


rst o r1 g1 n I n the conscious lif e of the empirical e go ,

room is then left fo r the habit o f t h e rst theory a n d

the inheritance o f the second t o operate to continue ,

the work and to give the sense o f necessity to these


elements of perceptions But the question o f origin


i n the conscious life o f conditions o f existing o f both


elements forma l and material since both elements


are equ a l ly necessary should be decided by analogy


If the material element is due partly to the c o n s t i t u

tion o f the brain irrespective o f other objects it is ,

accordin g to analogy to suppose that the formal ele

ment is s o too ; and that objects appear in conscious
ness in the conscious life o f the empirical ego as
, ,

extended not onl y because they have extension them


selves but partly because the nervous matter has


extension ; that they appear as having duration partly

because the nervous matter as well as the objects , ,

has duration It i s more according to analogy t o


suppose the cogni tions o f tim e and space coev a l with

the conscious life because the nervous matter in which

it arises occupies time and space than to suppose t h e ,

conscious life s o far as relates to the form o f its per


c e t i o ns
p ,
existing rst a s a tabula rasa o r sheet o f

whi te paper which is rst mo di ed and written o n


from without ; for the nervous matter in which it

arises is n o t such a tabul a rasa but has both form ,

a n d duration O r if the gure o f a tab ul a rasa is


adhered to it ought to be employed with the addition


o f a

per impossibile for even a tabula rasa has ex
, ,

tension and duration Indeed it appears to be i m p o s


sible to suppose conscious lif e arisin g in a n e xtended

and enduring material substance and yet arising not ,

mo di ed o r c o nditioned by the pro perties o r modes

o f that substance as well as by the objects which

excite that substance t o reaction .


laws but the laws o f i t s nature as exhibited in the


combination o f its elements and I n the history o r ,

progress o f its development ; the general and some

times the universal laws to which its combinations
and its development anywhere and everywhere are
found to conform .

The empirical ego is t h e complex o f all feeli n gs

o r states o f consciousness as distinguished by r e e c

tion from the qualities which are their obj ective

aspect These states o f consciousness are either di

rect o r reective perceptions o r they may contain ,

both direct percep t ion and reection R eections or .

reective processes in consciousness are therefore

themselves part o f the empirical ego and the objects ,

o f a further reection ; they hold two positions bear ,

two characters rst as phenomena o f the empirical


ego states o f consciousness simply o r direct percep

, ,

tions second as processes o f reection inasmuch as

, ,

their Objects are other states o f consciousness which

have preceded them In the present chapter abstrae

tion will be made o f this their second character or ,

their character as reective and they will be con ,

s i d e r e d onl y in their rst character a s direct percep


tions o r s tates of consciousness The eighth chapter


will be devoted to consider them in thei r character

o f reective processes It must be remembered that

investigation like the present is itself an exercise

o f reection .

The empiric a l e go must o n the other hand for .


the purposes o f the present enquiry be disti n guished ,

from objects as qualities which do not enter into it as

feeli n gs The body to which the consciousness of

the empirical ego belongs enters into it as a complex ,

of feelings a n d a s such is combined wit h every o ne o r

, ,

nearly every one o f its stat e s o f consciousness ; but


the brain which is the cause of its conscious life does

not do s o ; it may be represented in some unf requent
states o f its consciousness but it is not commonly pre

sent as a feeling in the empirical ego It is uni ver .

sally present as a contributing cause o f the existence

and continuance and its changes are present a s con

tributing causes o f the changes o f the feelings in the ,

empirical ego ; but this is a fact known by in ference ,

and when we draw this inf erence o r examine the con

n e c t i o n between the brain and the empiric a l ego that ,

is reason psychologically o r as psychologists then

, ,

rst the brain is present as a feeling and an obj ect o f

representation The brain therefore as a complex of

qualities has no more to do with the analysis Of the


combination and development o f the feelings o f the

empirical ego than the air we breathe o r the food
, ,

we eat o r the earth we stand o n ; all these are parti


c ul a r objects o f the empirical ego necessary t o its ,

existence indeed but forming an innitesimal part of


the complex o f its feelings To make these into o b .

j ects o f enquiry in enquiri ng into the empirical ego

, ,

woul d involve giving a history o f the objects o f con

s c i o u sn e s s in a l l its branches such as astronomy , ,

geology civil political and philosophical history

, , , ,

chemistry a n atomy physiology and s o o n But it

, , ,

is the laws o f development o f the empir ic a l ego not ,

the history o f that development whi ch is the pur ,

pose o f the remainder o f this E ssay Leaving then .

the brain and its connection with consciousn e ss apart ,

I shall endeavour to exhibit a n accurate picture o f

t h e complex o f feelings presented o r represented in
the empirical ego .

O f t h e four things di s tinguished from each other


in the empi rica l ego has no w been distin

2 2 , o ne , ,

u i s h e d more at length from t w o o f the others the

g ,

S ubject o r reection as such a n d t h e brain ; the


fourth is the world o f q u a h t i e s which is in fact the ,

objective aspect o f the empiric a l e go The world .

o f qu a l ities and the world o f feelings are identical .

There is no division between t w o Objects the feeling ,

here the quality there ; but both a r e the same It


is nevertheless with t h e subjective aspect o nl y that

we have to do here ; though it might appear that ,

since both were the same it would be indiff erent,

whi ch aspect should be chosen fo r examination It .

is not in di fferent for this reason In their subjective


aspect objects can be presented in their rst i nt e n

tion as they are t o consciousness alone without re
, ,

ference to their relations t o any other objects ; the

same Objects as qualities are very often incapable o f
being presented in their rst intention and without a ,

reference to their causes o r e ffects o r some other r e

, ,

lation to other Objects Th e ultimate analysis o f any


object will a l ways be fo und presented in the form o f

a feeling and no t o f a quality ; when any quality is
named there will always the further question arise

And what is that ? The answer wi l l be a feeling .

Heat is a quality ; it may be a n alysed into motion ,

and a particular ki n d o f motion o r combination o f

motions is heat ; that is o n e kind o f motion is p r o

d uc e d by another o r composed o f others and the rst ,

kind o f motion heat when described a s s o produced

, ,

o r composed is described by a second intention

, Heat .

in its rst intention however when it is so pro

, ,

d u c e d what is it ? The onl y answer possible is that

, ,

it is heat as a feeli ng Beyond this w e cannot go

. .

The subjective aspect includes the objective in it ,


the latter is no perfect correlate o f the former The .

dictum is undeniably true but it does not for all


that destroy the correlation The subtilty of nature


is a fact o f inference and representation wherever it

has not been completely fathomed and perceived by ,

o r translated into the subtilty o f the intellect there

, ,

it is inferred and represented as existing and as ,

remaining to be some day perhaps perceived and

fathomed It exists no doubt ; a n d exists as an

inference and a representation not yet translated ,

into subjectivi ty in its completeness The existing .

subtilty of the in tellect is far inferior to this r e p r e

sented subtilty of nature ; but on the other hand the ,

subtilty o f the intellect completely adequate to the


subti lty of nature exists also in representation and


by inference onl y that it is referred to the future as

, ,

that of nature to the past and the present Some .

day o r other all the subtilties o f nature will be per

c ei ve d
and the subtilty of the intellect brought up
to a correlation with them Both subtilties are i n

fe r e n c e s and representations only o n e is represented


as past and present the other as future The pre


sent degree O f subtilty Of the intellect is cert am far

inferior to the present inferred and represented
, ,

subtilty o f nature ; and man is regarded as the dis

coverer o f a previously existing object ; and in this
sense the di ctum o f Bacon is true without doing any ,

vi olence to the conception of the perfect correlation

o f the two aspects o f phenomena .

Since the world of q ua h t i e s is the correlate o f the

world o f feelings and the general laws of both are

under examination if any general laws of one of the


two correlates are discovered they must also appear


a s general laws o f the other There cannot be


general laws of consciousness which a re not general

laws of Objects ; and this it wi ll be found there are ,

and that they bear both characters objective and ,

subjective Since however these laws are discovered


by reasoning the proper place for their statement


will be when the reasoning process is examined that ,

is in the chapter on voluntary re di ntegration E very


universal law o f consciousness is also an universal law

o f objects ; and every law o f obj ects universal in a ,

particular eld such as chemistry o r mechanics is

, ,

also an u ni versal law o f consciousness when occupied

in that eld P resentative perceptions are the source

from which all others are derived and from th e ir ,

vivid and inevitable nature they give the law to

all others Y et they are no t entirely constant and

unch a ngeable ; on the contrary they are capable of


modication by representative perceptions to which

they have themselves given birth Two kingdoms .

thus arise o ne Of Objects presented and represented

, , ,

considered a s constant and unmodied whether pre ,

v i o u s to o r in consequence o f mo di cation ; the other

Of objects presented and represented considered as

, ,

subj ect to o r in course o f modication ; the rs t

, ,

is what is commonly meant by the term laws o f

nature the second is what is commonly meant by

the term man s empire over nature It wo ul d be .

more correct to call the rst the world as it is at

any particular moment ; and to call the second the
world as it might be o r as capable o f modi cation in

certain ways The second is entirely subordi n ate to


the rst for the very circumstances and laws which

, ,

constitute and govern the modication o f the world ,

are circumstances and laws which belong to and are ,

part o f the world as it actually is P resentative and

, .


representative perceptions inseparably mingled to ,

gether constitute one u ni verse of qualities and o f


feelings o n e universe governed by laws under which


it functionates in one unchangeable course but in ,

the bosom of which and among those very laws , ,

there are found some which mo di fy the Operations

performed under the guidance o f others ; and since ,

the proportion o f the latter s e t of laws is small in

comparison to the former s e t the latter appear to b e ,

changers of the general order o f the u ni verse ; the

truth being that the laws which govern the entir e

order o f the universe embrace both sets o f laws both ,

the modifying and the modied ; and this order of

the universe this unchangeableness Including change
, ,

it is which alone deserves the title o r can be ex

, ,

pressed i n the terms o f universal and necessary laws ,

o f t h e world o f empirical objects .

The change and modication here s a i d to be i n

t r o d u c e d into the world as it actually is at any par ,

t i c ul a r time is n o t the change o r mo di cation o f o n e


s e t of objec t s i n nature by another s e t such as for ,


instance the change introduced into the nature o f


plants o r ani mals by transplantation into different

soil climate o r circumstances ; or such as the change
, ,

introduced into inorganic matter by the implanting

o f organi c matter o r vice vers a

o r the evolution of

force o r motion Of o n e kind from force o r motion o f

another kind and the reaction o f the o ne o n the

other A l l such cases o f change however striking

, ,

are instances o f the reg ul ar and general course o f

nature of the rst o f the two sets of laws mentioned

above The distinction here intended between those


two sets of laws t h e c h a nge apparently e ffected in


the form er by the latter is a change an d a di stinction ,


o ffeelings has been described as a whole composed


o f presentations and representations of sensations

mingled together But there are certain feelings

which arise and are presented to consciousness rst

in the representation o f objects of sensation external
and internal These are the emotions O n their
. .

rst arising they are presented but they arise rst ,

in the representation of obj ects o f sensation When .

we begin therefore with objects o r the world Of s e n

, ,

sation we soon come to a point namely the r e p r e

, , ,

s e n t a t i o n o f i t s objects where feelings o f a new order


enter into consciousness ; and these though presented , ,

yet belong t o representation if representation is taken


to mean repres e ntation o f the world o f sensation .

These new presentations the emotions give a new

, ,

c haracter to the world of obj ects F irst the r e p r e


s e n t a t i o n s in which they arise are modied by them ,

and then indirectly future presentations of objects of

sense are modied a l so ; such presentations o f obj ects
o f sense as are not in harmony with the emotions are

destroyed o r avoided and such as are in harmony


with them are produced o r procured It is necessary .

to take a view o f the classes o f the material element


in cognition in order to se e the bearing o f the fol


lowing enquiry .

F eelings were divided i n 1 2 into sensations and

, ,

emotions and the former into sensations o f deni te


organs and sensations o f indeni te organs O f these .

three classes o f feelings emotions arise only in r e


presentation o f objects belonging to the other two

classes ; but this d oes not imply that they are com
pos ed of the feelings of those other classes How .

ever complex an emotion may be whether i t c a n be ,


analysed into simpler emotions o r not it c a i m o t be ,


analysed into sensations ; nor can it be a nalysed into

sensations and imagination o f them as past o r future ,

probable o r improbable although perhaps imagina


tions o f this kind may be necess a ry as conditions o f

the arising o f the emotion ; for i nsta n ce the emotion
o f hope is very di fferent from the sensation o f health ,

o r any other pleasure o f sensation combined with the,

expectation of enjoying it ; the feeling which we c a l l

hope is something different from this though it may ,

arise immediately and be inseparable from it The .

same may be said o f desire and aversion o f love , ,

anger fe a r and I believe o f a l l t h e feelings which

, ,

we c a ll emotions and passions The same i s true of


moral approbation and di sapprobation o f others and ,

o f a good and bad conscience in ourselves .

There are two other feel i ngs o r mo di cation s o f


feeling which accompany o r can accompany all o th e rs

, ,

whether sensation s o r emotions and arise in di fferently


in presentation and representation o f sensibl e obj e cts ,

I mean the feelings called pleasure and pain If .

these arise in presentation and accompany sens a tions ,

they are commonl y but to the confusion o f a l l a c


curate thought called physical pleasure o r pai n ; if


in representation accompanyi ng emotions they a re

, ,

commonly called but with equ a l conf usion as a couse


q u e n c e mental or moral pleasure o r pain

E very feel.

ing if it has a certain considerable degree o f inten sity ,

o r if it lasts fo r a certain considerable length o f time is ,

accompani e d by the feelin g o f pleasure o r o f pain ; and

even a feelin g accompanied by pleasure if it attains ,

a certain further degree of i ntensity o r lasts fo r a ,

longer time begins to be accompani ed by pain ; and


the pleasure and pain which accompany o ther feel


ings are so m ixed with them that they seem t o mak e


but o ne complex feeling ; a n d this might lead us to

suppose that all feelings were but modes o f pleasure
and pain, were not this forbidden b y the difference in
kind which is always observa ble between the m by
analysis P leasure a nd pain never are Observed pure

that is separate from other elements o f feeling toge

, ,

ther with which they compose a complex feeli n g ; to

separate them in thought from other feelings is to
represent them in a p rovisional image o f which the ,

other fe e h ngs are the parts abstracted from and pro

v i d e d for .

P leasure and pain a r e the bo undary line between

cognition and emotion for some sensations are with

o ut pl e asure and pain but no emotions are s o

E mo .

tion may be dened as feeling a rI s m g I n representa

tion invol ving pleasure o r pain Those feelings which

are no t accompani ed by pleasure o r pain belong to

cognitio n and not to emotion C ognition extends .

over all feelings whatever ; feeling extends over all

cognitions what e ver ; but the addition o f pleasure o r
pain to feelin gs ( and it must be remembered that all
feelings may be accompanied by pleasure and pain )
makes o f feeli n gs two classes o n e class to which i n

t e r e s t attaches the other to which interest does not


These two classes o f feelings and cognitions ,

distinguished from each other by the presence o r

absence o f pleasure and pain in presentation and o f ,

interest in representation ( fo r interest is represented

plea sure and p ain ) are the resp ective contents of

speculation and practice ; and the distinction between

these two classes is the ground o f the distinction b e
tween the t wo domains o f speculative a n d practical
kno wledge All action operation function c o n si

, , ,

dered 118 8 series o f circumstances o r events leads us

1 .

best policy hon esty which is an ultimate end is als o


useful that is productive o f certain tangible a d v a n

, ,

tages ; but this is n o t i t s claim to our esteem And .

it is I n vam to apply the logic of utility here and to ,

y that the claim of honesty to o ur esteem is i t s util

ity in p r o d uc m g an approvin g conscience for hon esty ,

does not produce but is such an approvi ng consci

ence t h e happy fram e o f m i n d called an approving

conscience is included in the state o f m i nd called

honesty ; that i s there is no more desirable state o f

mind produced by honesty than honesty itself ; not

what it produces o r leads to but what it is is what, ,

the v a l ue o f honesty and o f all ultimate ends consists

in S O again with P rayer The logic o f utili ty h a s
. .

been applied to prayer and it has been argued that

, ,

if prayer does no t produce rain o r sunshine it is of ,

no va l ue ; o r again that if it only produces a n e ffect


in the mind o f the person praying it i s either useless ,

o r useless and hypocritic a l both But the truth is .


that prayer is a state o f m i nd which is valua b le fo r

its o w n sake o r as an ultimate end ; and instead o f

asking what it is useful t o prod uce the question ,

ought to be what it is in its ana lysis and its worth

, ,

determ i ned accordin gly U tility implies that all ends


are subordinate whereas some are ultimate In


t e r e s t is a term which i n cludes both and which is ,

therefore coextensive with the term P ractice in i t s

widest sense To judge o f objects which are ul ti

mate ends like honesty and prayer; by the properties


they possess of producing other objects to which as ,

produc i n g them they are subordinate whether those ,

other objects are more o r less noble than themselves ,

is to judge them by an inadequate and therefore a

misleading standard ; from which I may add the , ,

application o f the distinction o f rst and second i nt e n

tions would have s aved us Y et the term U tility .

would be legitimate instead o f Interest if we could ,

adopt a theory o f consciousness being o n e thing and

its Objects another thing in kind ; for then a l l Objects
o f consciousness might be represented as existing for

the sake o f something else n amely Of consciousness

, ,

itself .

Here then in Interest is the great boundary line

, ,

between E thic and M etaphysic between practic a l ,

and Speculative knowledge It is n o t coincident


with the distinction between the formal and material

elements o f cognition ; if it were o ur systems would ,

be much si mpler but as it is they are perhaps better


morticed their parts ly ing over o n e another as brick


layers lay their bricks ; but the di stinction between

S peculative and practical knowledge falls a h t t l e o n
the material side o f the distinction between the for
m a l and the materi a l element P leasure and pain .

o r interest almost universal modes of feeling are the

, ,

boundary line wi thin which all practical knowledg e

consists ; the little more which speculation possesse s
over and above practice the feelin gs which d o not

contain pleasure o r pai n is the circumstance which


assures Speculation its supremacy over practice a ,

supremacy the same in kind as that which the ju

d i c i a l functions have over the admi nistrative in a
well ordered state a supremacy which we justify to

o u r imag i nation by the epithets of calm disinterested , ,

unimpassioned reason All emotion li es within o r


o n the
practical side o f this boundary line and

while all practical knowledge is also theoretical ther e ,

is a small part o f theoretical knowledge whi ch is not

practic a l namely feelings which do no t contain plea
, ,
23 4


sure or pain origi n ally o r from which they have been


purged P utting this small class o f feelings aside and


using it only to remin d us that there is such a thing


as perfectly disin terested cognition though I am ,


far from doing such a contradi ctory thing as hol di n g

that such perfectly disinterested cognition is an ideal
to be admi r ed o r aim ed a t ; con tradictory I hold it


because it would be adopting as an ideal an opinion

which condem n s adoptin g ideals at all for what is an ,

ideal but a conception to which the greatest degree

o f interest is attached keeping then this small por

tion o f feelin gs in mind only as a proof that specula

tive knowledge has a wider foundation than practical ,

and comparing together the two domains o f specula

tive and practic a l knowledge the two elements which ,

each contai ns are found to be the same in kind ma ,

t e ri a l and formal but the material element i n prae


tical knowledge is always considered s o far onl y as

it contains o r consists o f pleasure pain o r interest , ,

P ractical knowledge is Spec ul ative knowledge the .

material element o f which contain s and s o far as ,

it contains pleasure pain o r interest

, ,
, .

tive kn owledge is practical knowledge abstracting

from that part o f its material element That is .

to s a y all knowledge is both speculative and prae


tical in two d ifferent respects ; all knowledge has


a speculative aspect and a practical aspect each a l ,

ways a t the least provisionally present in the other .

In the proportion which the two elements hold to

each other in any moment o f consciousness that is , ,

in the pr oportion which the feeli n gs o f pleasure and


pain hold to the feelings i n which p leasure and p ain

a r e abstracted f rom and vi ce vers a in that propor
, ,

tion wi ll the moment o f consciousness be r eckoned


o fe ffort in cognition is called Attent ion and t h e ,

q ua h t
y which corresponds to it in the Object i s

strangeness or Incomprehensibility ; when we call any

thing strange o r incomprehensible we mean to assert ,

that it would take a greater o r less degree o f atten

tion t o make it harmonise with o ur previous know
ledge o r that it would take more attention than w e

could give to it i n order t o make it do s o

G ene .

rally then i t may be said that all phenomena what , ,

ever other feelings they consist o f include o r may ,

include the feeling o f effort as well as those o f ,

pleasure and pain a n d that even the simplest states

o f consciousness are originally o r may become ; in

their material elements highly complex The aris ,


ing of the sense o f effort in any object i s the arisin g

o f the phenomenon o f attention P revious to thi s .

the object was confused and Obscure ; it now begins

to become disti nct and clear The difference between .

these two stages consists in the addition o f a feeling ,

the sense o f effort a part o f the material element o f


the obj ect which thus is differentiated and developed


Why such a process o r such an addition takes place

at all is not to be explained but must be regarded as ,

an ultimate fact in consciousness li ke many others ,

inexplicable an ultim ate element in analysis o f the


phenomena It is probable besides that this sense o f


effort never arises but when accompanied and never ,

ceases but when it ceases to be accompanied by ,

pleasure pain o r interest E very object o f percep

, ,

tion contains both o r neither T o attend to any .

object o r any sensation supposes either that I feel

pleasure in it o r that I feel forced to attend to it by

the pain it causes yet in both cases without having

a distinct purpose in View either the purpose o f re ,

taining and increasin g the pleasure o r that o f r e m o v ,

ing a n d lesseni ng the pain When there is such a .

distinct purpose in Vi ew it is a nal cause of the a t


tention and such attention may be designated by the


name voluntary as distinguished from the original


and spontaneous attention out o f which it S prang .

Besides the feelings already mentioned there is ,

the formal element to be taken i nto account ; and

then we shall have before us the entire obj ect o f re
e c t i o n the empirical ego the world o f feelings both
, , ,

p resentations and representations exhaustively de ,

scribed in its general outlines This yet remains to .

be done by showing the mode i n which presentations


and representations are combined so as t o form new ,

and more complex obj ects ; The same formal elements

which presentations and representations separately
cont a i n the same formal elements which hold them

together before combination with each other these ,

same formal elements time and space perform the

, ,

same of ce for them when they are combined N 0 .

categories o f the understanding except s o far a s time ,

and space themselves a r e such are required to c o m ,

bine presentations and representations into new o b

je c ts

26 It was said in
. 1 0 that a l l perception and ,

consequently all representative perception involved ,

combination o r synthes is and that all the more com


plex perceptions involved comparison A s we have .

now before us all the elements o f representation we ,

are in a position to enquire into this point When I .

s e e before me a variously coloured surface and regard

it with attention, xing my View now on o ne part ,

n ew o n another I represent o n e part while another is


being presented ; if I recall sensations of touch at the


same time and combine them with the sensations o f

Si I n three d i mens i ons


ght ,
the surface appears and

s es .

gjgp g
breaks up into objects separate I n space and at dif
r t e e
a m

fe r e nt distances from the eye and from each other ,

and the entire surfa ce becomes a n object o f r e p r e s e n

t a t i o n as well as presenta tion it i s presented to S ight ,

and represented to touch N o w in the process s o .

described there are two stages ; rst the visible sur

face is partly presented and partly represented when ,

I traverse it in different directions with the eye ; s e

c o nd l it is represented to touch while presented to
y ,

sight I n both stages comparison is involved In

. .

the rst stage suppos e red in one part o f the surface

, ,

is separated from red in another part o f the surface

by a bright light ; the red in two places is perceived
as red in each o f them and the sensation of red is ,

di stinguished from the sensation o f the bright light

between the two places Instead of three moments .

o f sensation red light red there arise two red and

, , , , ,

light ; that i s , the red in one place and the red in the
other are classed a s the same sensation It makes no .

difference whether I s e e the two places o f red o r r e ,

call o ne while I s e e the other or recall them both ; ,

there is no difference in the sensation there is differ ,

ence only i n t h e p l a c e o r in the ti me and place toge


ther N 0 category or concept o f u ni ty o r sameness


is here applied ; t h e surface is d istinguished di fference ,

is introduced into it by the diff erence in the material


element in the sensations o f red and o f light T h e

, .

perception of the sensation red in two places is the

rst foundation o f the notion Of sameness Where is .

the di fferen ce ? In t h e sensations o f r e d a n d of light


Where is the samene s s ? In the sensation o f red in

two place s There is no sameness in the sensation
, .

PART I . position o f the mate rial element that is in its relation , ,

to other sensations in S pace there is unity in kind and


difference i n position that is there is sameness Thus

, ,

the concept Sameness rst arises as a consequence , ,

not a condition o f the process ; and the process which


ends with classication is called diagnosis o r compari

s o n a putting asunder different sensations and putting

together similar sensations .

In the second stage o f the process also a compa

rison takes place Suppose the surface seen t o be an

open window with two red curtains on either side o f

it The parts of the surface which I can touch sup

pose o n e o f the curtains I have presented to two


senses ; two sensations characterise that portion o f

the surface and di stinguish it from the other por

tions ; I now move and touch the other curtain that ,

is after certain other muscular sensations I nd the


other red portion of the surface become distin guished

by sens ations o f touch and sensations o f touch o f the

same kind as those distinguishing the other curtain .

An d from the place where I now am I can repeat the

same experience with regard to the rst curtain The .

two curtain s then become by comparison the same in

every thing except in position in space But the .

light between them either cannot be touched o r if I ,

put my hand o ut I nd sensations either of warmth

o r cold o r wind or rain very different from the s e n
, , ,

s a t i o n s o f the curtains Still the open space is part


o f the visible surface a u d i f it does not contain sen


s a t i o ns o f touch it c o n t a i n s s e n s a t i o n s O f sight
N ot .

withstanding the difference of the sensations in dif

fe r e n t parts of the visible surface these parts are all ,

alike in point o f containing sensations ; th ere is same

ness between all the parts in this respect and unity ,

24 1

o f the entire surface o r object Thus the second .

stage is a repetition o f the same process o f compa

rison a s before onl y with sensations o f two senses

instead o f with sensations o f o ne sense And I think .

it wi ll be adm itted that if this explanation is val id


for the c a ses now examined it i s valid a l so for cases ,

in which the material element is more various for ,

cases where the material element includes sensations

o f the de ni tely known organs o f the indeni tely ,

kn own organs and feeli n gs which arise rst in the


representation o f thes e sensations All these form .

complete states o f consciousness portions o f time ,

a n d portions o f space occupied by di fferent feelings .

Anger fo r instance is a state o f consciousness in

, ,

which a certain series o f objects and events are r e p r e

sented which bear the character o r q ua h t y o f being

unjust cruel painful o r the li ke The emotion is

, , ,

combi ned with the representation and makes a part ,

o f it correspondin g in consciousness to some quality


o r c i rc umstance represented as existin g in the events

o r causes o f them If this circumsta n ce o r this qua


l i t y is separable from the events and in proportion

, ,

it is separable from them the emotion o f anger ,

ceas es or remits .

The same remarks apply to phenomena which o c

c u
py time alone the only difference being that here
n early a l l the sensations are represented whereas in ,

S pace a great number are presented at once An .

instance o f representation of objects both in time and

space at once and o n a large scale is Gibbo n s treat
, ,

ment o f the history o f the D ecli ne and F a l l o f t h e

R oman E mpire He there represents events not

in the order o f their actual occurrence but o f their ,

af nities for each other relating separately several



series o f events which occurred si multaneously and ,

disintegrating the o n e comp lex cable o f events into

many strands But this is a process which req

a prelimi nary exami n ation o f the original complex

series in order to discover which are the events which

belong to each separate strand ; and this is only pos

sible by Observation of the Similarities and di ssimilari
ties in the material element of the events themselves .

War religion wealth law race and so o n become

, , , , , ,

the heads under which the events are classied a c ,

cording as they contai n elements which p r e d o m i

n a nt l
y bear upon such and such feelings o r emotions

in mankind .

O bjects are phenomena combined in time and

space whether the material element is o f o n e kind

o r more than o n e O ne feeling i n time o r in time


and space makes an object ; and a l so any number o f


feelings combined i n that is considered as occupy

, ,

ing one portion o f time o r o n e portion o f time and


Space together is o n e object also ; but these two


cases require distinction for in the former case the


Object is simple and indecomposable empirically in ,

the latter case it is empirically but perhaps provi ,

s i o n a ll decomposable into simpler obj ects o f which

y ,

it is the aggregate The former may be c a lled the i m


m ediate the latter the remote object

In the former .

case the materia l element limits the formal ; in the


latter case the forma l element already lim i ted by o n e

, ,

o f the material elements which it con t ains i s the lim i t


to within which other material ele m ents are referred .

Take any feeling in a certain time and sp a ce and then ,

s e e what other feelings are contained in those boun

darics ; in this way a remote object arises Take the .

time and the spac e s o lim i ted and contrast it with


o f
the emotion o f aversion but this quality and the
. .

aversion are o n e and the same thing o ne arises and ,

ceases and remits as t h e other does This will p ro .

bably be met by a denial and instances brought such

, ,

as that o f poison ; poison it will be said is i njurious

, ,

to my i n terest yet it does not inspire me with aver


sion unl ess I perceive it to be poison that is unless I , ,

perceive that it has this quality o f producing death .

This quality remains whether I perceive it o r not ,

whether I consequently feel aversion o r not whether ,

I consequently drink the mixture o r not Well let .


us examin e this insta n ce ; and I hope to be excused

if I dwell at some length o n it as such instances are ,

well adapted to s e t the relation of presentation and

representation and o f object to subject generally in
, ,

a clear light .

By q ua h t y is meant here as it has been through


out perceived quali ty The poisonous quality o f a

, .

potion when perceived is aversion in consciousness .

The e xistence o f the quali t y unperceived ( that is ,

imagined o r assumed only by us now and here for

the s a k e o f argument ) is not the cause o r at least ,

not the only cause o f its being perceived by the


person who is about to dr i nk the potion ; whatever

may be the cause o f the quality being perceived by
him when it i s perceived by him he feels aversion
, ,

and feels less aversion the less certain h e is that it i s

poisonous when h e is certain that it is n o t poisonous ,

he feels no aversion at a ll The question i s not as to


the expediency o f enquiring and feeling certain about

the existence o f the poison but as to the nature o f

the phenomenon o f the aversion when it arises The .

question is whether the perception o f t h e qu a lity o f


being poisonous i s the cause o f t h e emotion o f aver


s i on o r Whether t hat perception i s the objective


aspect o f the emotion The qu a l i ty o f bein g p o i


s o no u s is perceived in representatio n an odour o r ,

a colour presented is combined w ith a representation

o f a n injurious o r fatal e ffect o n the body ; o f cours e

it is highly important that I S hould s o represent it

( supposing it
to be poisonous ); it is highly important
that I S hould feel aversion and not drink the potion ;
but the onl y question here is about the connection
between the emotion o f aversion and the r e p re s e n
t a t i o n o f the potion presented as poisonous I ma i n .

tain that they are o ne and the same thing ; that it is

impossibl e t o have the representation and not t o feel
aversion and impossible t o feel aversion and n o t t o

have the representation o f some injurious qu a l ity If .

it is said that some people may have the representa

tion and not feel the aversion the answer is that if so
, , ,

it will be in consequence o f their having a representa

tion o f some overbalancing benet as for instance Of a ,

release from suffering by death The representation .

of the e ffect the potion will have o n the body is the

object o f which the emotio n is the subjective S ide

There is no other object but this representation ; ex

e ri e n c e o r the result o f drinking the potion has t o
p , ,

decide whether that representation was a true o n e ,

whether the object as presented will act in o ne way or

another ; if it produces death we then s a y that it b e

fore contained the poisonous qu a l ity and that the r e ,

presentation was true There is no other obj ect but


the representation If there is what is it ? The p o i


s o n o us qu a l ity itself But this is the Object o f the


representation o r the object a s represented Let us


examine this point We s a y that it w a s poisonous


after it has b een proved to be so But we speak .


proleptically if we s a y it
, p o l s o no us before the
poison i s represented a s contained i n it Suppos e .

Th the glass before us ; is it o r i s it not poisonous ?

a nd r e m o t e
That we can doubt about i t shows that it is no t pre

s ented as OI so n It i s then represented as such

p .
, ,

When it shall have produced death then we s a y that ,

it w a s poisonous all along ; a representation o f what

it has been not of what it i s even now presented a s
, , ,

The proleptical manner o f S peaking i s very common

and very convenient but in the o n e case it expresses

an anticip a tion even though there may be strongest


evidence in the other case a retrospection In both


cases the q u a h t y o f being poisonous i s an object o f

representation When we s a y that it is poison we

mean that it wil l be fol lowed in certain circumstances

by death The word is covers two meanings it


expresses either a fact o f presentation o r a fact o f r e

presentation and gives no distinguishi ng token a s to

w hich of these it is used to express The quality o f .

bei n g poisonous is a fact o f representation when i n ,

ferred before the fact o f producing death ; and how ,

ever certai n we may feel about i t we stil l are spe a k ,

ing by prolepsis if we s a y that the potion is poisonous ,

as if it were a fact o f presentation Aft er the fact o f .

death the quality is again inferred to have been pre


s ent as a cause o f the subsequent death a r e r e s e n

, p ,

t a t i o n again but o n e referred to the past time

The .

quali ty o f being poisonous is never a n object o f pre

s e nt a t i o n unl ess the poti on shoul d be seen i n the

operation o f producing death ; t his operation is that

o n which the whole business hinges .

E motions being attached to representations and

this admits o f no exception for suppose that we s a w ,

a murder committed before o ur eyes the horror felt ,


p l exi t i e s o a c ombatant as
f what to be the parti
wi l l J

c ul a r events which will occur in obedience t o general

laws ; but into the nature and proceedings o f c o n

s c i o u s n e s s generally in the empirical ego irrespective
, ,

o f what others may know about them It is perfectly


true that to a third person the opi nions and feelings

, ,

o f another man are more uncertain and less capable

o f prediction than many facts in physical nature ; and

generally speaking objective quali ties a r e more easy

o f pr ediction than subj ective feeli n gs ; the history
and prediction o f things from the subjective side as ,

they will appear to another person ( the empirical

ego ) is a more complicated affair than the history
and prediction o f them as they w ill appear o r actually
are appeari ng as objects to the observer himself The .

observer has t w o sets o f objects before him the o h ,

e c t s or qualities o f nature perceived by h i mself and

j ,

the objects o r qualities o f nature perceived by another

man ; no wonder the emotions and representations ,

which belong to this second s e t o f objects appear ,

disconn ected from the qualities o f objects which b e

long to the rst s e t These t w o sets o f objects ought

never to have been compared together o r brought ,

into conn ection with each other ; nothing but c o n

fusion can result o r could possibly have resulted as
, ,

i n deed has been the case from such an ill ogic a l p ro


c e d ur e . The objects o f nature and the feelings o f

the mind as they are to o n e and the same in di vidual
, ,

are the object matter o f metaphysic that is o f t h e

, ,

branch o f knowledge o r enquiry which ai ms at i n v e s

t i ga t i ng the conn ection and relations o f consciousness
to objects o f knowledge to things known a nd o f
, ,

mi n d to the objective world We are then right in

judging o f emotions by sensations right in making


b oth them objective a s well a s subjective ; but t h e

o f
error lies in as suming occult causes o r occ ul t quali ,

ties a s the gro und o f either N ot even in visible


and tangible objects is it possible to poin t o ut any

qualities which are no t resolvabl e into sensations

Both emotions and sensations a re the qualities o f

which they a re supposed t o be onl y the evidenc e and

So far the an alysi s o f representations c o n

as to
s i d e r e d a s complet e wholes completed moments o f,

consciousness o r complex objects The following


chapter will be devoted t o the process by which they

are produced the course o f their arising o r their
, ,

genesis ; y e t no t their psychologic a l a s di stinguished

from their metaphysic a l genesis no t their connection ,

with the tangible organ the brain and t h e change s

, ,

o r processes wh ich t a k e place in it ; no r yet the i r h i s

tory as an entire series e ither in the race o r in any


individual which would be the application o f meta


physic t o history ; but the princip le o f their genesis ,

t h e natur e o f the bond which is common t o all th a t ,

i s their metaphysic a l genesis o r analysis as states o f

, ,

consciousness dynam i c a lly a s members o f a succes ,

s ion o f moments ; in other words the conn ection and ,

relation o f moments o f consciousness to each other ,

not as in the present chapter the analysis o f them

, ,

s eparately and fo r themselves .

The moments o f consciousness form a series in ,

which each moment is an object contain ing feelings ,

o r qualities occupying a portion either o f time a l one


o r o f tim e and spac e together ; and this series o f

moments in their connection and concatenation with


each other will be t h e subject o f the following chap


ter I t i s true that the concat enation o f t h e mo ments


o f cons c iousness depen ds o n that o f process e s o r mo

di c a t i o n s which take place in the tangible organ o f
Th consciousness the brain just as each moment o f con
a nd r e m o t e

s c i o u s n e s s by itself that is presentations and re r e

, , p
s e n t a t i o n s separately d epends upon states o r a state

c f the brain ; but to investigate this dependance b e

longs to psychology which i s in its earliest infancy

in this branch since nothing at all or very little is


yet discovered o f the condition o f the brai n either in

perception o r in re di ntegration o f perceptions The .

psychological causation o f redintegration I sh a l l leave

entirely aside and busy myself with attempting t o

discover the order in which moments o f conscious

ness a s such precede and follow each other s o far as ,

these consist o f representations and o f presentations

depending o n them ; for t o investigate the order in
whi ch the original presentations occur presentations ,

independent o f representation would be t o investi ,

gate the ul ti mate laws o f nature themselves These .

objects o f redintegration at least we are acquainted

with ; and if any invari able order can be discovered
in them we shall be entitled to call that phenomenon

which invariably precedes another its cause in con

s c i o u sn e s s ; and those phenomena which invariably
prece d e others that is to s a y that property o r quality
, ,

( whether belonging to the materi a l o r to the formal

elements o f the object ) which determin es what the
succeeding object shall be o r from knowing which

we can predict what the succee di ng object will be ,

that property in objects will be correctly designated

as their motive power i n consciousness or the ef cient ,

cause o f their redintegration This whole subject is .

commonl y known by t h e name o f the A ssociation of

Ideas .

PART I counting back from the second present ation o f the


street .

There is another class o f cases in which the p ro

gress is not from a presentation to a representation ,

but from o n e representation to another Suppose .

that i nstead o f passi ng again through the street the


second day the street is suggested t o m e by some


thing else Then the second day I have a less vivid


perception o f the street than I had i n passin g through

it the day before but I sti ll have a representation o f

it in my mind now and a representation o f it as hav


ing formed part of the presentations o f twenty four -

hours ago ; and thes e t w o representations melt into

o n e just as i n the former case
I refer however t h e

certain ty o f the existence o f the street in both cases

to the presentation I n the rst case I s a y The

street certainly exists now though I may have ,

dreamed it yesterday ; in the second case I s a y The ,

street certainly existed yesterday though I only re ,

present it now I n the second case too the place s


occupied by the p resentation and t h e representation

are different as well as the times ; for on the second

day I am in another place and the representation o f,

the street does no t t i n with the objects o f the pre

sent landscape This chan g e o f place requires a c

counting for ; and this is done onl y by t h e events

which have happened in the course o f the twenty
four hours duri n g which the street is represented as
existing in its o w n landscape its landscape a s an o b,

e c t o f presentation
j .

Presentations and representations diffe rfrom each

other onl y l n degree o f vividness which includes dis ,

t i n c t n e s s in arrangement o f their parts But any .

particular object as a representation differs from the


same object a s a presentation when the t w o are c o m


pared together by a subsequent reection at least in ,

point o f position in time These t w o objects h o w


ever mak e together but o ne object occupyin g the ,

whole o f the time which separates them ; not indeed

occupying the whole o f it with equa l certainty but ,

some parts with greater o r less degrees o f probability ;

a s fo r instance I am certain o f the existence o f the
, ,

street when I s e e it presented when I recall it next

day I am certain onl y o f its existenc e at the former


time ; nor am I s o certain o f i t s havi n g existed then ,

as I should be o f i t s existing n o w if I were again t o


have it presented ; fo r the fact o f its having been

presented is now onl y a representation Such is the .

account in general terms o f the world in which w e

li ve o r in other words o f the empirical ego c o n
, , ,

s i d e r e d as di stinguished i n to presentations and r e

presentations .

All o ur representations have been once presenta

tions o r have been formed o ut o f their elements dif

fe re nt l y modied and combined ; a diff erence which

is capable o f an inni te variety But here arise two .

questions which it i s well to state but which are

, ,

both unanswerable in metaphysic o r as metaphysic a l

questions ; rst why there are presentations at all ;

second why they have a tend ency t o become r e p re


s e nt a t i o n s o r t o be repeated less vividly in conscious


ness The rst question is equiva l ent t o askin g why


there is a world o r an existence at a l l ; a s t o which it

has been shown that we can an al yse its nature but ,

not assign its cause The second question adm i ts


only o f a psychological o r partia l solution Given .

the fact o f representations following presentations o r ,

the tendency o f presentations to be repeated a s r e p re


s e nt a tio then the existence o f the brain its con

ns, ,

n e c t i o n with the rest o f the world o f qualities and ,

its consequent modications is to be regarded as i n ,

some way o r other the condi tion o f this rep roduct ion .

The sequence o f t h e representations depends ulti

mately upon the sequence o f the presentations s o ,

far as these latter are unmodied by volition and

the sequence o f the representa tions either modied ,

o r un modied by volition reacts again upon the pre


s e nt a t i o n s in a degree slight by itself but important


in its accumulat ion for it is this accumulation o f men


tal wealth which transforms and improves the world .

Two other questions arise however with reference

to presenta t ions and representations which may b e ,

answered partially now and perhaps completely i n


the far distant future The rst is What is the law


which d e t e rm l n e s whether such and such a particular

presentation shall be repeated as a presentation o r
not ; for instance whether a man who has seen a

particular street in London to day shall ever have it -

again presented to h i m The answ er to such ques


tions as these depends upon the inductive e xamina

tion o f the course o f nature and cannot be given by ,

any knowledge o f the laws o f consciousness ; n o t b e

caus e the laws and the phenomena o f nature are not
equally phenomena and laws o f consciousness b ut ,

because the phenomena requi re e x p e ri rne nt a l o b s e r

vation and comparison in their relations to each other ,

and their investigation has accordi n gly hitherto treated

the phenomena as belonging to the world o f qualities
and no t to the world o f feelings And in thi s i nv e s .

t i ga t i o n the res ul ts hitherto re a ched have been very

general and men have not yet succeeded in reducing

to knowledge the complicated contingencies of every



Ap 7
78 0 11 6311 7 1. 77 20 6
1 5 6 76 9 6 v 77
7f vf
p i
c o ec

28 . WILL IAM H A M I LT O N has shown Lect 3 1 3 2

SI R ,
, ,

vo l
. 2 p 2 33 referring besides t o A ristotle and St

Augustine that the laws o f association are all o f them


cases o f the single law o f redintegration O f any past .

state o f consciousness whether highly complex o r ,

compar atively simple any part member o r element , , , ,

recurring again either separately o r in conn ection

with other objects and whether it be in presentation

o r representation h a s a tendency o r power o f calli n g


back and redintegrating in consciousness a part larger

a n d more complex than itself o r the whole o f the , ,

past state o f m i n d 1 n a l l its complet eness And since .

the whole o f t h e past conscious life o f an individual

is o ne connected whole any object o r any moment ,

o f this conn ec t ed series has the tendency o r power

o f beginni n g a re di ntegration which m i ght con ,

t i nu e itself until t h e whole conscious life was lived

over again in representation Any object which has .

formed part o f a complex state o f consciousness may

also have formed part o f other complex states and ,

have occurred in an in nite variety o f combinat ions PA T I


. R .

It will have a tendency to redintegrate all o f these ;

f gt i
but it is obvious that it will not redintegrate nearly R ed u t e ra o n

all perhaps not even o n e completely for it will


commence redintegrating o n e and wh i le this 1 8 going ,

o n another object may come into promi nence in the


half ni sh e d redintegration which will change the


course o f thought and become the starting point o f

a new redi ntegration It becomes necessary there .

fore to enquire what are the partic ul ar laws o f red

integration ; what laws determine the preference o f
redintegrations o r the tendency o f particular objects

o r state s o f consciousness to redintegrate other par

t i c ul a r states o f consciousness .

Turning fo r a moment to the psychologic a l order

o f causes o f redintegration in order not to forget i t s ,

position and the relation it holds to the metaphysical

order a homely com parison may perhaps be o f s e r

vice i n connecting the two orders M any peopl e .

will remember seeing children watch the congre

a t i o n go o ut o f church o r doing it themselves as
g ,

childr en A child burns a newspaper and throws it


beneath the re grate ; -

Th e a m e e xt in t h e i ws t h e vi ng
c ,
v e ro re ,

Th e reg o es m y l dy a nd t h ,
g t h q ui
a e re o es e s re ;
Th er e g o es th p
e n h illu t i u p k
a rs o ,
o s r o s s a r ,

A nd th e re s c a r e c l s s illu t i u g t h c l
e s r o s o es e e rk .

But C owper s li n es do not give a ful l picture o f t h e

vagaries o f the illustrious sparks ; they oft en return
o n their steps ( having forgotten perhaps a prayer

book ) and shine where they had shone before ; they


linger ( having forgotten perhaps a prayer ) and ,

others joi n them to s e e what they are about ; they


illuminate the deserted benches and parts

d i e r e nt

o f the church are perhaps many times relled with

their former occupants ; they traverse the church

again and again and only after many partial reil

luminations the whole becomes nally dark It is .

to these partial r e i l l um i na t i o n s o f the newspaper

tinder that I compare the process o f redi n tegration .

The brain is the tinder the perceptions and aggrega


tions o f perceptions are the sparks and masses o f

sparks the redintegrations are the re i l l um i n a t i o n s
, ,

only not s o short lived O f course this is not to be


pushed too far but only employed to assist the ima


i n a t i o n in representing the process o f redintegration

as arising in its tangible organ the brain ,

The law o r laws o f association are thought com

m o nl
y to have been already discovered ; causation ,

resemblance contrast contiguity in place and time

, ,

All of these Sir W Hamilton re d uces to o n e general


law that o f afnity It is true that all moments of


consciousness all objects o f consciousness have a f

, ,

ni t with each other for all are feeli n gs all occupy

y ; ,

time o r time a n d space together and all are parts or

, ,

portions o f o n e series o f moments o f consciousness .


and of o ne corresponding u niverse If however in .


order to come nearer to particulars we distinguish ,

this general law o f affinity into cases o f contrast ,

resemblance and contiguity in place and time o r go

, ,

farther still and add causation to the list this gives ,

us no law of the preference o f contrast to resem

blance contiguity in place o r tim e cause o r effect
, , ,

o r in short o f the preference o f any o f these to any

other of them ; still less does it give us any law o f

preference within the selected category o r p oint o ut

which among the causes o r effects or objects resem , ,

26 0

s econdly the p articular objects which fall under that

notion N either in spontaneous nor in volun tary

redintegration are these categories o f cause resem ,

blance contiguity & c a real explanation of the de

, ,

t e rm i ni ng element i n the objects redintegrating .

Again supposing that we did pass from one object


to another through some one o r other of these notions ,

as the connecting link we should still require an ex


planation o f the li n k which connects that link itself


with the redintegrating object o r obj ect beginning,

the redintegration and t o account fo r why this rela


tion and no other is fixed upon retained and em , ,

ployed as a link with other objects Wh y should the .

sight of a table redintegrate the notion o f cause o r ,

e ffect or resemblance o r contrast o r contiguity in

, , ,

time o r contiguity in place ? Why should we pass


from any object to this class of s i x general notions

Why should we single o u t o n e o f the six in prefer
ence to the rest ? Why should these or any o n e of
them be supposed to be the determining element in
the obj ect table by means o f which it calls up o r
, ,

redintegrates in consciousness s a y a pen a chair a

, , , ,

dinn er a Bench or a Board ?

, ,

T o take an instance ; if my bookcase calls up the

notion o f the carpenter who made it because he is
connected with it as its cause this must be be c ause

I go through the notion o f causation to reach that o f

the carpenter ; for if it calls up the notion o f its car
e nt e r before that of its cause it is clear that car
p ,

e n t e r rather than cause should be the name of the

link o f association ; and the question still remains ,

What determines me to go in this particular instance

from the notion o f the bookcase to that of causation ,

in preference to the other ve notions o r any others


besides th em ? All notions o f objects may be con

n e c t e d together by or under some o r all of these cate

o r i e s ; but this very fact d i s u a l i e s them for being

g q
considered as the leading threads or motive power in
producing o r calling up the notions o f particul ar o b
e c t s o u t o f or in consequence o f the notions o f o ther
j , ,

particular objects .

There is no exciting suggesting o r calling up of, ,

like notions by like o f cause by effect o f neighbour

, ,

by neighbour ; this is no true account o f the process

o f redintegration There is no afnity b etween s epa

rate obj ects o r their representations i n virtue o f which ,

o n e produces o r repr o duces the other It is true .

indeed that something like this may appear to have

taken place when we reect o n the redintegrating
process a n d rst begin to ask after the laws o f con

n e c t i o n o f obj ects supposed to be separate and inde

pendent We have however not really been step

, ,

ping from obj ect to object contiguous similar o r , , ,

dissimilar like the Shadowless M an in Ch a m i s s o s
, ,

tale from isl and to island There is no power o r


quality in the representations considered as images ,

o f objects by which they can summon each other


The general notions which bind them together such ,

as causation contrast contiguity and resemblance

, , , ,

though undoubtedly they form a common element

pervading them yet have no generative power and
, ,

cannot impart any such t o the perc e ptions which they

bind together Time and Space are indifferent to

the p articular empirical objects they may contain .

The whole chain network o r pile of network to

, , ,

which o u r past states o f consciousness may be c o m ~

pared and to which we may consider eve ry ne w


moment o f consciousness whether o f presentation o r ,


PART 1 . repres entation a s adding a new mesh i s o ne con

, ,

n e c t e d and cl o sely netted whole any part Of which ,

R e d m t e gra t i o n may come into consciousness agai n a n d some part O f ,

which must come into consciousness again in every ,

new moment Of consciousness N ot because notions .

have been t o gether in the Objects o r world Of quali ,

ties but because they have been together in con


s c i o u s n e s s the feelings Of the empirical ego do they

, ,

reproduce each other .

How came it t o pass that these categories were

xed upon as t h e l i n ks conn ecting Obj ects in redin

t e gr a t i o n ? It appears t o have been because Objects

were considered separately o n e by one and n o t as , ,

modications Of o n e world o r o n e consciousness Just .

as Objects Of perception were considered separate a ,

table a chair a R oman E mperor a star for instance

, , , , ,

as s o many distinct separate Objects the conjunction ,

Of which in o n e S pace made the world in which we

li ve s o the representations Of these Obj ects were con

si d e r e d not as moments in o n e and the same series ,

and o ne and the same consciousness but as separat e ,

Obj ects in the mind each existing for itself and con
, ,

ne c t e d ,
not i n kind a s parts Of o n e whole but by ,

mere juxtaposition in time in the empirical ego ,


The connection between the parts o f the series o f

i mages in the mind was then sought in the images
s o far as they were representations Of extern al O b

j e c t s that is
in the
time and space relations Of the
images to each other instead of i n the images as mo

ments Of consciousn e ss o r as feelings o f the empi ,

r i c a l ego . Thus not only were the representations

o r ideas as they were called im ages o f external O b ,

j e c t s for in stance my idea Of

a R oman E mperor an
image Of that R oman E mperor as he Once existed in

s e nt a are as i mages Of Objects in perc eption a n d

tio ns ,

xed o n what they are as members Of a subjective

series o f moments Of consciousness as contain ing feel ,

ings a n d not a s containing qualities ; which is vi r tually

what Sir W Hamilton has d one i n his reassertion Of

the general law O f R edintegration then the enquiry

was directed into its proper channel and the process ,

o f lengtheni n g Of the chain Of consciousness in red

integration was e x hibited i n a mann er favourable t o

investigation .

29 Brown in his P hilosophy Of the Human


M ind lect 3 5 in pointin g to emotions as a source of


association and James M ill in his Analysis Of the

, ,

P henomena Of the Human M ind chap 3 in pointing ,


to vividness and frequency as the causes Of strength

in association and connecting vividn ess with pleasure

and pain came very near to what seems to me to be


the truth R eferrin g to the analysis Of representa


tions in 2 5 there will be found only two which can


be regarded as the elements o r qualities determining

redintegration If the re di ntegrating Object is a r e

presentation the factor in it which determines the


redintegration O f the next Object is the predominant

interest which it contains ; if the redintegrating Obj ect
is presented then either t h e pleasure o r pain o r some
, ,

represented pleasure o r pain that is some interest , , ,

is the determining factor Sir W Hamilton too in . .


note to his edition Of R eid p 9 1 3 states as a ,


Secondary o r C oncrete principle what may be

styled ( under protest for it is hardly deserving Of


the title Law ) IX The Law Of P reference .

Thoughts are suggested not merely by force O f the ,

general subjective relation subsisting between them

selves they are also suggested in proportion to the

r el atio n Of interest ( from whatever source ) m which

these stand to the indi vidual mind This however .

taken as it must be in connection with its context ,

goes but a small part O f the way which the principle

it states is capable O f goi ng The method in which .

this principle Operates must no w be examined toge ,

ther with the other Operations which concur t o the

result .

In every Object there is a part which is either

pleasin g o r painful o r may become s o by the con

t i n u a n c e Of t h e Object in consciousness ; if it is pleas

ing that alone rivets the attention ; if it is painful
, ,

the attention is drawn to it equally but with an i n ,

t e r e s t in its absence P leasure in p r esented Objects


interest in represented Obj ects is that which occupies ,

the attention and causes that part Of the Object to


which it is at tached to linger in consciousness and t o

exclude the Other parts Of it from consciousness It .

is true that in objects Of presentation vividness xes

the attention irrespective Of the pleasure o r pain a t

t a c h e d to the part Of the Obj ect which is vivid ; but

then this very vividness while it lasts prevents us
from passing on to another Obj ect the part which is ,

vivid must lose its vividness before we can have a

n e w object in its place ; b ut the pleasure which b e

longs to any part O f an Obj ect is carried o n into the

redintegrated Object V ividness would sufce t o a c

c ount fo r the rst step in redintegration but not for ,

the second as will be seen when the second step is


described V ividness is the cause Of an Obj ect r e


maining in consciousness not Of its melti ng into a n


other Object ; pleasure o n the other hand we dwell

upon while the Obj ect t o which it was attached is let

g o. P leasure rst xes the attention o n a n Object ,


then covers its departure by re m a m i ng while t h e ,

other parts o f it vanish O bjects Of presentation come .

and gO entirely irrespective Of our wishes o ur likings ,

and d i sli ki ngs s o long as an Object O f presentation o r

representation is vivid it remains in consciousness ,

and begi ns no series Of representations But when .

once it pleases us to dwell on it we begin i m m e d i ,

ately in spontaneous not in voluntary redi n tegration

, , ,

to forget the Object and think only Of the pleasure

, ,

and a series of representations i s s e t o n foot The .

Object originally presented or represented is then , ,

the rst in the series Of represented Objects ; tho ugh

we may be looking at it with o ur eyes it is an Object ,

o f representation We exercise no volition but spon


t a n e o u s l y redintegrat e what we may The motive .

power in this seri es the secret spring which eff ects


the changes in it the invariabl e factor antecedent to

every new Object in it is interest ; the interest felt in


the antecedent Object determines what its form shall

be and consequently how the nex t moment shall dif

fer from it when it arises o ut Of it .

Two processes are constantly going o n in r e d i nt e

ra t i o n the n a process f corrosion melting de
g ,
o e O , ,

cay and the other a proces s Of renewing arising

, , ,

b ecoming Unl ess by an e ffort Of voli tion which is


here o u t o f the question no Obj ect Of representation ,

remains long before consciousness in the same state ,

but fades decays and becomes in distinct

, ,
Those .

parts Of the Object however which possess an i n

, ,

t e re s t that is those which a r e attended by a r e p r e

, ,

s e n t a t i o n Of pleasure or pain resist this tendency t o


gradual decay Of the whole Object I do not say .

thos e parts which are most vivid ; that would be a

tautology ; but those parts are most vivid o r resist ,

PART I . ranges itself in i t s Old position ; but scarcely has t h e

process begun when the original law Of interest b e

gins to operate o n this new formation seizes o n the ,

interesting parts and impresses them o n the attention

to the exclusion Of the rest and the whole process is

repeated again with endless variety I vent ure to .

propose this as a complete and true account of the

whole process Of spontaneous redintegration .

Several well known phenomena are accounted for

b y this analysis O f the process Of redintegration .

F irst the difference in kind Of the Objects r e p r e


sented in redintegration according to the cheerful o r

melancholy mood we are in F or though it has a l .

ways been a well known fact that cheerfulness and ,

melancholy were accompanied by representations Of

very different kinds o f Obj ects yet no o ne s o far as I , ,

know h a s pointed o ut any other cause Of this a c c o m


a n i m e n t than the supposed suit ability o f Objects like

d arkness storm confusion slow music to melan
, , , ,

c ho l and Objects s u ch as sunshine owers quick

y, , ,

music to cheerfulness ; a suitability Of which no


other ground could be discovered than the fact Of

the accompaniment s o far as it was a fact Of pre

s e n t a t i o n ; which accompaniment accordingly as a , ,

fact Of presentation M ill in the work already quoted

, , ,

substitutes for the suppos ed suitability as an e x p l a

nation Of the phenomenon Of the accompani ment in
redintegration The connection between the two

circumstances the mood Of mind and the Objects


redin tegrated appears now to be a causal o n e t h e

, ,

interest felt being the common element in the two

Objects the redintegrating and the redintegrated

When melancholy we do not redintegrate such O b j

j e c t s as storm darkness
war ;,
& c because we know .

beforehand that such Obj ects will satisfy an int erest ,

and this must be the case if s ui tability is the cause Of
the redintegration ; this would be to mak e the red

integration voluntary ; nor yet because melancholy

Obj ects such a storm darkness slow music war and
, , , , ,

S O o n have in presentation occurred together and S O

, ,

are reproduced together in redintegration the order

Of redintegration is t o o di fferent from that Of pre
s e nt a t i o n
and that Of presentation t o o varied to a l ,

low o f such an account being accepted as suf cient ;

but the interest in such Objects of representation is
greater in moments when we are melancholy and this ,

is o n e Of the signs Of a melancholy mood ; and then

the interest i s the motive o r efcient cause Of their
redintegration The question is not Why such and

such Objects have an interest for us whe n we are in a

melancholy mood and such and such other Objects

when we are in a cheerful mood ; this is an immediate

and ultimate empirical fact Of consciousness which ,

we can n o more explain o r acco unt for than we can

fo r the sweet o r sour taste Of some Obj ects o r for t h e ,

red o r green colour o f others But the question i s


Why certai n classes Of Obj ects are re di n tegrated when

we are in o n e mood and certain other clas ses when

we are in another mood and the answer is not only ,

that they are Of a melancholy o r cheerful nature ,

which may be called their suitability t o o ur mood ,

but in addition to this that the interest we feel in


them arising from this suitability is the determinin g

, ,

motive in spontaneous re di ntegrations the element ,

o r factor which is common to both the Ob j ects in

redin tegration O ther sensible qualities Of Objects


are xed and constant in them but the in terest they


possess fo r us i s not xed and constant in them a t ,


l e ast is much less so than those sensible qualities are

and thus when the interest becomes the xed point

e n o m e n o n o r series Of phenomena the other ,

qualities Of those phenomena becom e pari passu u n

x e d and inconstant ; and since this is the case in

redintegration the series Of Objects in redintegration


loses that particular regularity and order which its

Objects possessed as presentations and acquires a n ,

other regularity and order determined by or turni ng ,

as it were on the pivot O f interest ,

Anoth er thing accounted for by this analysis is the

apparent melting Of o n e Object i n to another a well ,

known phenomenon in dr eams Scenes and faces .


and even Objects not visible but inferred change i m ,

perceptibly into other forms and characters in dream ,

ing O n e m oment you s e e one face which you kn ow


the next you see that it is not that face but another ;
yet this excites no surprise though you are conscious

Of the change O bjects imagined to be present b ut


not seen in t h e d r e a m change their character in the


same way The unity O f the interest prevents s ur


prise ; i f the interest changes its charact er if for i n ,

stance i n the dream a face which excites interest of

, , ,

a pleasant kind strongly is succeeded in consequence

, ,

Of some external change o f circumstances by a n ,

other the interest O f which is strong but painful

, ,

then surprise is felt .

Thirdly this analysis accounts for the balance


between habit and interest ; people who have few or

weak in terests are d ecided predominantly in their
redintegrations by habit ; those who have many or
powerful interests have redintegrations O f more v a
ri e t
y and more apparent originality Interest is the .

source O f what is called character What a man s .

feeling Of interest in it reillumine s the wh ole state of


consciousness and recalls it as a whole Of which it

, ,

was a part i n the origin al presentation There a r e .

cases no doubt in which the interest felt is a p urely

intellectual o n e and where any obj ect at once leaves

standing out to the exclusion Of its other parts

, ,

notions O f relation o r cause and these again call up


Objects which have been most habitually presented or

represented as instances o f such cases o r such rela
tions ; here the intellectual conception O f a cause or
other relation such as contrast or resemblance is the
, ,

most interesting thing and its interest is its title to


prom i nence and the circumstance which makes it the


lin k between two Objects in the redintegration .

D reams and reveries are the instances Of the mos t

purely spontaneous redintegration without the a d ,

mixture O f volition When in dreaming we are con


scious Of a purpose O f a preference for having or fo r


not havin g such and such a representation before it ,

actu a lly arises then we must be i n a state very near


waking V ery Often in redintegration we do not r e


present the redintegrated objects a s familiar remem

bere d Obj ects but they come before us as quite new

This is called productive imagination and the most ,

perfect instances o f it a r e dreams N O o n e doubt s


that the apparent novelty Of the representations is

due to t h e novelty Of the combinations in which
their parts are represented and this apparent novelty

is quite as intelligible o n the theory now suggested

as on any other The more insignicant and u n

essential the interestin g part Of any object is the ,

more di fferent will the Object which it redintegrate s

probably be from the former Object and the wider ,

will be the range O f possible Obj ects habitually con


ne c t ed with it ; again the more habitual an Object i s

, ,

the less likely is it to impress consciousness and dwell

o n the memory a S O n e Of the li nks in the r e d i n t e ra

tion and thus the points o f interest alone will be

those which w ill appear afterwards to have composed

the series There is another phenomenon wh ich

occurs sometimes o f the very Opposite character to


this Of apparent novelty It is when we have a


strong feeling Of the sameness Of Obj ects o r states Of ,

consciousness in redintegration with some o bject o r ,

state O f conscious ness which has preceded but what ,

o r where we cann ot remember I all ude to cases o f.

dreams and more rarely O f waking perceptions where

, ,

we have a strong conviction O f having been before in

the same place o r the same circumstances as those o f
the present presentation o r representation but never ,

t h e l e s s can rec a l l n o other circumstances which con

rm the conviction Sometimes we dream O f a place

which appears perfectly fam i liar ; sometimes we s e e

a place waki n g which appears famili a r though we
, , ,

know we h ave not seen it before and then perplexed , , ,

y we must have seen it in a dream Here are cases .

Of an inexplicable sense O f famil i arity and recog n ition

Obtainin g in dreams in waki ng or in cases which
, ,

perhaps consist O f both It seems to me probable .


that this sense Of fam i liarity depends o n the rousing

Of the same particular feeling o f inte rest by two o r
more different perceptions ; and that from the iden
tity Of the interest we infer the identity o f the Objects
Of presentation or representation .

30 The laws O f spontaneous redintegration a c


cording to what has been said are three ; 1 s t the , ,

general law O f redintegration that consciousness is ,


o n e connected whole and that a n Object may call

y ,

up either di rectly o r indirectly through other Objects
, ,

y other object or the whole Of past Objects Of con
s c i o u s n e ss 2 d the rst law Of t h e method in which
; ,

this is done namely interest ; 3 d the second law of

, ,

the method namely habit The ques t ion now arises


whether either Of these latter l aws can be reduced to ,

o r subsumed under the oth er ; wheth er habit is a

particular case O f interest o r interest a particular ,

case Of habit or whether both fall under a common


category The latter appears to me to be the truth

. .

Habit s o far as we are conscious Of it o r conscious ,

ness Of the series O f Obj ects s o far as they are

habitual is a pleasure What the physical cause o r

ground Of this may be is a psychological question as , ,

for instance wheth e r it depends o n physical changes


in the brain which continue the same until some

cause arises to turn them into another channel ; this
would be habit as a fact in tangible matter But .

habit as a fact Of uniform s u c c e s s 1 o n 1 n states O f con

s c i o u s n e s s is a pleasure ; it is the pleasure Of the
sense of ease and facility o r the absence O f the sense

Of e ffort That is to s a y habit s o far as we are

, ,

conscious of it is a kind O f pleasure and in this sense

, ,

is a motive power in redintegration ; as a law Of c o n

s c i o u s n e s s it is the law O f minimising e ff ort of moving ,

in the direction Of least resistance exactly parallel to ,

the physical law expressed in these same terms B e .

s i s t a n c e 1 n consciousness is expressed by the term

eff ort

Interest is the representation Of pleasure or pain ;

S O that both habit and interest are referable to a
common notion pleasure Of which habit is o n e par
, ,

t i c u l a r kind and O f which interest is the r e p r e s e n


t atio n . That is to s a y ple a sure either directly a s

, ,

p ain should be s o ; accordingly interest as a mode Of ,

pleasure is Of two kinds ; rst where it represents ,

pleasure it is a pleasure arising from the matter o r ,

feeling contained in its Object ; secondly where it

, ,

represents pain it is a pleasure arising from the form

or cognition Of its Object ; in the former case it is a
pleasure simply in the latter it is a pleasure of intel

lect It must be added that cases O f the latter kind


are rare and that generally where interest as a r e


presentation Of pain is the motive of a redintegration ,

it is S O only through voli tion or voluntary e ffort a n d ,

the redintegration is to that extent not a spontaneous

but a voluntary one .

P leasure as limited above is the determining

power O f the movement O f Objects in spontaneous

redintegration a determin ation Of t h e character of


the series in every succeeding moment o r a motive ,

if we consider the Objects o r moments separately .

The law O f redi ntegration is that it is determined ,

by pleasure limited as above ; this is the general fact

in all redintegrations that is the ef cient cause of , ,

their mov ement o r determi nation in other words , ,

their determi n ing l a w It is hard I grant to banish .

, ,

from the mind the notion O f physical impulsion or

attraction that is Of tangible bo di es pushing o r
, ,

pulli ng each other when motion force power de , , , ,

termi n ation and S O o n are spoken O f ; and even harder

perhaps to avoid thinking Of force and power as some
occult o r unknowable Thi ng i n itself behind o r under - -

the phenomena that is the feelings in time and space

, ,

The commo n inability to do t h e former that is t o , ,

banish the notion Of actions Of tangible bodies o n

each other whenthe terms motion force and power

, ,

are use d gives rise t o the d i f c p l t y which has b een



felt and which will probably be felt a ga i n t h e , ,

d i i i

culty o f representing to oneself how pleasure a mode ,

Of consciousness can be a cause o r motive in trains

, , ,

Of sponta n eous redintegration The difculty is no t .

usually felt at all though it ought to be more acutely


felt in the case O f voluntary redintegration ; the w ill


is a phenomenon s o familiar that we accept a voli ,

tion as a cause O f other phenomena as readily as we

, ,

accept a tangible body as the cause Of motion in

another tangible body A ccordi n gly where the will .

cannot be regarded as the e f cient or motive cause ,

55 5 767) m wz a ewg as it cannot in spontaneous r e d i nt e gr a

tions there recourse is usual ly had t o a tangible

, ,

psychological cause namely the cha nges in the

, , ,

brain as the e fcient cause Of redintegrations and

, ,

to the S O called laws Of association contrast and r e


semblan c e cause and effect contiguity in time and

, ,

place as a framework applied by ourselves afterwards


to the phenomena as a means Of reducing them to ,

some order and making them intelligible to o ur

selves not as laws imposed o n the brain by nature
, ,

b ut o n the re di ntegrations after they have arisen , ,

by our logic F or as it has been shown in

28 ,

if these categories are regarded as in any way e f

cient o r existing in consciousness previously to the

pro duction Of the Object redintegrated under them ,

they can only be causes Of a vol untary and not

Of a spontaneous redintegration they can only be ,

causes employed by some o n e who has already a

purpose more o r less denite in redintegratin g o n e
, ,

class Of Objects and not another If o n the other .

hand they should be regarded by any o ne as e i

cient but yet no t existing in consciousness previ

o us l to the production Of the redin te rated Object

y g

in consciousness then they must be regarded as laws


Of the operation Of the tangible organ Of consci

o usn e s s
namely the brain ; b ut if S O then only in
, ,

the sense that they are expressions Of the result in ,

redintegration o f certain laws Of the Operation Of the


tangible organ which i n their o w n shape a s laws Of


that operation are u nknown o r at least unexpressed


by these laws Of association ; that i s they do not de


scribe how the brain Operates in producing re d i nt e -


r a t i o n but o nl y how the result is constituted which

g ,

that Operation has produced Spontaneous r e d i nt e


r a t i o n is a process in consciousness which requir es a

further analysis than these laws Of association furni sh ;
and this further analysis has been supplied by point
ing o u t the invariable factor in it namely pleasure
, ,

limited as above .

Thus the Old theory Of the laws Of association s o ,

far as it is a theory Of spontaneo us re di n tegration is ,

i ntelligible and complete only when supplemented

with a psychological theory Of the action Of the brain
in consciousness T O this action o f the brain it refers

for the motive o r determinin g power o f the course o f

association The redintegrated states Of conscious

ness are not produced by previous states O f c o n sc i o u s

ness but both are produced by the action O f the

brain ; and conversely there is no ground for saying

, ,

that the redintegrated states Of consciousness react

upon the brain o r modify its action s o as to caus e ,

that action to produce another state O f consciousness .

But the relation between the states Of the brain and

the states Of consciousness must be conc eived as s i
milar to that between the ivory keys O f a pianoforte
and the striking o f the strings by the hammers when ,

I run my n ger a l ong the key board The strings


whatever may be done in that of spontaneous In .

them both the production o f states of consciousness


by states Of the brain has to be conceived ; and in

voluntary redintegration certainly the reaction Of, ,

s tates O f consciousness o n the brain h a s to be con

c e i v e d besides It is impossible there to suppose


consciousness to be a mere foam aura o r melody , , ,

arising from the brain but without reaction upon it

, .

The states o f consciousness are in voluntary redin ,

t e gr a t i o n links in the chain o f physical events o r cir


c um s t a n c e s in the extern al world When t h e s un in .

June shines in at the window I lift my hand and pull ,

down the green blind The sensation O f heat is pain


ful ; representing this I feel an interest in obviatin g

it ; this is a purpose o r nal cause which as efcient
, ,

produces the sensation of e ffort in lifting my hand

and pulling down the blind and a more agreeable ,

state Of sensation is the result The whole procee d .

ing is capable o f analysis into states O f consc i ousness

which follow o n e another according t o regular O b
servable laws There is rst the feeling o f the s un

the blind and the window and O f my o w n body near

, ,

it ; these Objects are states or a st a te Of feelings in

time and space together ; in this s tate arises o r into ,

it is introduced a feeling Of the heat being too great ;


I feel an interest in representing the painful sensation

and its removal ; I x the representation O f the r e
mova l Of the painful sensation in consciousness ; here
is voluntary eff ort ; the representation s o xed com
pletes itself by the general law Of all redintegration ,

and becomes completed with the representation o f the

Objects which must be presented to consciousness if ,

the painful sensation is t o b e re m o v e d ; those Objects


represented become familiar a n d involve an e o rt

, ,

Whi c h is l ess painful as represented than the sensa

, ,

tion Of heat as represented ; the least painful r e p r e


s e nt a t i o n remains alone in consciousness that is c o n , ,

s c i o u s n e s s takes the direction O f least resistance ; and

the new Object exists with greater vividness than

when balanced by the opposite representation that ,

is it becomes a presentation namely the presented

, , ,

fact Of my hand moving and pulling down the blind ;

o n which the heat as presented ceases E xternal
, ,

Objects tangible and visible are modes Of feeling and

, , ,

the brain among them ; the brain is not introduced

into the series just described solely because it is not

included in it as an Obj ect Of consciousness ; its being

Of a visible and tangible nature would be no Obstacle
to its introduction any more than it is in the case O f

the blind the s un and the window The action Of

, ,

the brain may be inferred to exist and accompany

and condition every step Of the process ; but that will
not alter the facts as they at present stand nor intro ,

duce the brain into them as a presented Object But .

it is impossible to explain the phenomena Of voluntary

action as for inst a nce the case just described by the
, ,

mere production O f consciousness by the brain ; for ,

unless a reaction Of consciousness on the brain is i n

t r o d u c e d the particular actions performed are mean

i n gl e s s and no special cause for each o r any Of them


can be a ssigned ; for in stance what determines the ,

brain to guide the muscles to pull down the blind ?

Ca n we conceive that just this phenom enon and no
other would follow if every other circumstance r e

mained the same except that the feeling O f pain from


the heat and representation Of the means to avoid it

were absent ? If spontaneous actions are explained
as automatic o r as results Of t h e action Of a material

organ alo ne still voluntary actions cannot be explained


s o ; and this explanation Of spontaneous actions i n

volv e s the assumption Of the action Of external ma ,

t e ri a l tangible Objects o n consciousness ; while the


corresponding explanation Of voluntary actions 1 n

volves besides this the further assumption Of the
, ,

reaction Of consciousness on those Objects ; that is ,

invol ves twice the notion Of i nuence o r impulse ex

e r c i s e d by one heterogeneous Obj ect o n another ; the

two Objects being at the same time conceived as s o

heterogeneous that the notion o f their having an e n

t i r e l y different and independent o r1 g1 n was adopted

solely to escape from the supposed difculty O f con
c e i vi n
g either Of them as arising o u t of the other .

I argue therefore that keeping consciousness and

, ,

its s o called material and t a ngible Objects apart and


treating them as separate and heterogeneous Objects

Of existence i s a course which leads to insoluble con
t r a d i c t i o n s ; for though we m a y disguise their i n c o n

g rui t
y at starti
n g that is in the theory Of perception
, ,

if we start o n a materialistic basis yet we soon re ,

quire to employ not only the tangible Objects as the

cause Of consciousness but consciousness as the cause

Of the tangible Obj ects a result which might indeed


have been perceived as inevitable from the rst ; a n d

if we start from an ideal istic basis we have this latt er

difculty at the very rst setting o ut If it is main .

t a i n e d that neither can be produced o u t o f o r by the

other because they are heterogeneous then also their
, ,

mutual action and reaction when they have been pro


d u c e d must be admitted to be in conceivable

N or .

can they exist separately from the very rst for ,

then we have the same inconceivability in the very

rst intercourse between them an intercourse which,

distinguished from each oth er a nd the li n e b etween

feeling o r cognition and action o r volition is drawn

, , , ,

at the moment Of arising Of the external event at ,

the moment wh en the representation becomes a pre

scutation But in this account Of the matter it is n o t

made clear how a feeling o r cognition becomes an , ,

action h o w things s o different as these are comm


supposed to be a supposition which leads to the li ne


being drawn where it is commonly drawn can pas s ,

o n e into the other F or the i n terest in the former


moment is the cause O f the physical presented event , ,

in the latter moment and this interest contains the


volition The true account must be that the r e p r e


s e n t a t i o n O f the interest is an action in the same sens e

in which the subsequent presented event i s When .

an interest O f t his kind is included in redintegration ,

the interest is still the determining factor O f the red

integration ; but the knowledge O f the particular
Object sought o r avoided anticipating the presenta ,

tion O f it if Obtained and preventing the presentation


o f it if avoided is the new element which distin

u i s h e s voluntary from spontaneous redintegration
g .

V olition is anticipation Of a result a n d all interest in ,

redintegration which is anticipatory is a voli tion and ,

makes the redintegration voluntary from being spon

t a ne o us .The interest is the ef cient the anticipa ,

tion the nal cause O f the remainder O f the r edi nt e


g ra t i o n . A nticipation in an interest makes the i n

t e r e s t a nal as well as an e f cient cause ; interest in

an anticipation makes the anticipation an e f cient as
well as a nal cause V olition which i s an interest

in an anticipated Object for instance either the i n, ,

creasin g O f an experienced pleasure or the d e c r e a s ,

ing Of an e xperienced pain o r the p ro c urm g Of an ,


imagined pleasure o r the preventing Of an imagi ned


pain volition which in some o r other Of these ways



is interest in an anticipated Object is a nal cause ,

which has become e fcient accordi ng to the scholastic


saying C ausa n a l i s m o v e t ( that is becomes e f cient

, , ,

o r an 65 76 ) m wza ewg non secundum suum sse sed


3 7 e ,

secundum suum esse cognitum .

There are three degrees Of complication in red

integrations : rst when there is pleasure o r interest

but no sense O f e ffort ; second when there is both ,

e ffort and interest ; third when there is e ffort and

, ,

interest and anticipation R edintegrations are per


fe c t when there is interest and anticipation in a high

degree and e ffort in a low degree ; the mi ni mising O f

e ffort is the perfection Of redintegration ; when to

will is to perform to wish is to Obtain R e d i nt e gr a

tions Of the rst degree O f complication where there ,

i s interest but no e ffort or very little are pure e n ,

jyo m e n t ; those Of the second degree where there is ,

eff ort and interest but no nal cause are more or ,

less painful a n d bewilderin g and Of these there are ,

very few and rare instances sin ce they at once and ,

Of themselves pass into re di ntegrations Of the third

degree the p a i n being at once perceived as an Object

to be avoided R edintegrations Of the third degree


containi ng e ffort anticipation and interest that is

, , , ,

voluntary redintegrations are the highest and most ,

important class ; and under this class fa l l all reason

ing processes all action and conduct Of reasoni n g

beings and all happiness O f which such beings are


capable as such In the history Of the development


Of an individual from infancy the sense O f e ffort may ,

have been involved in some Of the earliest instances

of consciousness and volition t h e same T O trac e
, .

the history Of the development Of an individual con

s c i o u s n e s s is not the purpose Of this E ssay but to ,

analyse particular states and particular processes O f

consciousness into their component elements ; and fo r
this purpose the logical order O f increasing com
p l e xi t
y is followed since,
metaphysic is the applied
logic Of consciousness and Of the universe .

. 3 2 The point which has now been reached is

one at which the two elements o f consciousness fo r

mal and material appear to have developed into dis


tinct functions or modes Of operation O f the con

, ,

scious being ; and this is a consideration which

deserves to be dwelt upon N early all enquirers.

into the nature O f man agree i n distinguishing in him

three general or cardinal functions and three only , ,

to which either separately or in combination all

operations Of consciousness may be referred These .

are to adopt Sir W Hamilton s nomenclature F eel

ing C ognition and C onation ; and man is accord

, ,

i ngl y considered in a threefold aspect as a feeling , ,

thinking and acting bein g N ow the rst thing that


strikes the attention in this di vision Of functions is

that it is three fol d while the elements Of conscious

ness are never more than two feelin g a nd form ,


When the feeling or material element Of conscious

ness is made the Obj ect Of consideration in a pro ,

visional image o r ser1 es Of images then man is said ,

to be a feeli n g being and to possess a function O f feel

ing When the formal element Of consciousness is

made the Object Of consideration in similar pro ,

visional images then the cognitive function of man


is inquestion But where has the function O f cona


tion its source ? And what is its claim to rank with

the other two functions ? I t is founded on and i n

PART I . i ng them to employ the wo rds with such a meaning ,

and explain that they use them only to express '

phenomena and not such occult substances essences

, , ,

causes o r gro unds (which is if I rightly understand

, ,

the phrase the distinguishing mark O f the positive


method Of p h il O S O p h i s i ng ) they stil l assume o r sus ,

e c t that there may be such essences o nl y without

p ,

the capability Of being known to us and Of corre ,

s o nd i n
p g to o ur capability Of knowing them O n .

this assumption or suspicion it is not the province Of

special and positive science to enter ; but it is the
province Of metaphysic and especially in cases where
the h y p o s t a s1 s m g O f phenomena interferes with and
Opposes positive results Of actual analysis .

Just as motion power and force cannot be hypo , ,

s t a si s e d s o
neither can conation or voli tion That .

things move o r change more or less rapidly that they ,

move and change at a ll is an ultimate empirical fact ,

in consciousness which is resolvable by analysis into


its elements ti me space and a plurality Of feelings

, , ,

N O cause o r antecedent state to time , space and feel ,

ing generally is conceivable ; time space and feelings , ,

together constitute change or succession in feelin gs .

C onsequently not the cause Of change motion power

, , , ,

or force generally but the ca use o r invariably ante


cedent phenomenon Of this o r that particular change

o r Object arising i n the place O f o r after another is
, ,

conceivable But this is a cause not O f change or


motion but O f the determination O f change o r motion ;


it is a determini ng cause and if not nal is efcient , ,

the 02570} z w a ewg O f this or that Object or feeling .

But as motion force and power have been h y p o s t a

, ,

s i s e d in the external and tangible w orld s o conation ,

and volition have been hypostasised in the empirical .


ego ; and as the universe generally has been regarded

as nothing but an exhibition Of P ower s o all human ,

actions and thoughts have been regarded as nothing

but exhibitions Of a particular kind Of power c a l led
Will subj ect however to restrictions and l i mitations

arising from the uni verse o r exhibition Of other,


power in which the human being was placed Henc e


the Will took its place by the side Of F eeling and

C ognition as their equal at any rate and sometimes
, ,

as their source The conception O f the beginning Of


motion generally as disting uished from that Of t h e


determination o f motion is a provisional i mage o r a

, ,

conception introduced by volition itself for the pur


poses Of facility Of reasoning a n d supposes motion ,

already both befor e and after t h e point where it

chooses to assume the beginning M otion generall y .

is coeval with a plurality Of feelings in time and

space ; the rst difference Of feelings in th ese forms
together is motion ; ther e is n o empirical fact pre
vions to motion V olition is no beginning o r sourc e

Of motion but a determination Of it and the begin

, ,

ning o r source Of a new and separately characterised

portion Of it V olition impresses a character o n

motion and succession Of feelings it is no beginnin g ,

Of motion o r succession .

The normal state Of consciousness is a spontane

o u s state ; it is that from which consciousness starts

and to which it tends passin g through the i nt e rm e


diate state Of vol ition founded o n conation The vast .

importance o f this intermediate state to us practically ,

S ince it occupies in the ordinary business o f li fe o ur

whole attention and is hourly increasing in the ex

tent and complexity Of its Obj ects and absorbs o u r ,

in terest in the character Of a search after practical

29 0 R E D I N TE GRA TI ON .

and theoretical truth hi des from o ur m e w the state s ,

which a r e its sourc e and its issue Y et as t h e

. .

mind progr esses in its search aft er truth it lays b e ,

hind it a serie s Of spontaneous states which though ,

forgotte n i n themselves forgot t en in the form i n ,

which they appeared when new are yet the lever .

, ,

as it were and the i nstrument of all future progress ;


they have become part o f t h e mind itself which .

thenceforth is what it has become The m i nd i s

. .

always taki n g a fresh start and considering itself a s ,

h a ving always been as necessarily being that which , ,

it now nds i tself to be It forgets the origin o f i t s .

Opini ons and principles and considers them only a s ,

produced from its o w n fund as a trustee w h o ,

mixes his o wn and h i s cestui que trust s moneys a t .
- -

his banker s forgets how much is his o w n and how

much his cestui que -


V olunt ary redintegration i s not more independent .

o f the laws Of spo ntaneous redintegration than walk

ing is independent o f the laws Of gr a v i t a t i o n f A s

wa l king ( I borrow the illustration from C oleridge , .

who applies it i n a similar manner ) is a constant .

interruption o f and a constant returni ng to the l a w

, ,

o f gravitation s o the c onscious g uid ing o f the train


o f representations in voluntary redi ntegration by r e ,

fer e nce to a purp ose is a constant interruption Of


, ,

and a co nstant returning t o the law s o f spontaneou s



redin tegration In the former we keep rejecting t h e


representations which the l atter keeps offering to o ur

no tice if they d o n o t appear conducive to the end we

have in vie w the question which we propose to o ur


s elves to answer ; and the perceived non conducive -

ness o f the rej ected representations becomes o ur


guid e in xi ng at last o n repres entations which a r e

. , .

secondly the effect o f men s vol itions o r conations

o n other men is for other men most important .

It is well therefore to mark O ff from others those

states of consciousness which at once involve a ,

sense Of e ffort and produce t h e e ffect o f external

actions o r events towards other men o r o n other
Obj ects and to consider these states Of consciousness
, ,

that is volitions and conations together with t h e

, ,

e ffects o r events which they produce in external

Objects as single but complex phenomena But if

this is done and if volitions and conations together


with the events produced by them are considered as

single phenomena under the name o f actions then
, ,

the distinction must also be retained by which a o

tions are divided into immanent and transitive that ,

i s into those which do not produce a change without


the mind o r in external Objects and those which do

, ,

pass on to such production In metaphysic however .

, ,

conations and volitions are nothing more than parti

c u l a r kinds o f states o f consciousness which like all ,

other states o f consciousness are resolvable into feel

ing the material and time and space the formal
, , , ,

e lement And as feelings are empirically inseparabl e


from cognitions s o also are conations and volitions ;


and though there may be feelings and cognitions

which are neither conations nor volitions there can ,

n o t be conations o r volitions which are not both

feeling s and cognitions When feelings sensations .

, ,

emotions conations volitions and cogni tions a r e

, , ,

spoken Of as separate O b je c t s o r separate states o f

consciousness the terms must always be understood


as provisional and abstract and as i rnp l yi ng a q u a ,


tenus er indicating the character and circumstance



which is particularly intended to be made t h e Obj ect


o f discussion in the phenomena in question A s such .

provisional images cogni tions alone are the special


Obj ects Of metaphysical feelings and volitions o f ,

ethical enquiries ; and it is as belonging to feelings


and volitions that i s to the domain o f E thic that all

, , ,

knowledge and all cognit ions have a n al cause o r

serve an ultimate purpose a truth expressed s o


Often by A ristotle in the famous words 013 7 1 5 01 ; 1

7 562
5 1; C og ni tions and feelings exist each with

reference to the other and for the sake o f t h e other ,

just as the material and formal elements in the least

empirical moment o f consciousness exist for each
o ther and by each other a l one In volition rst an .

end a sake a n al cause and purpose is discerned ;

, , ,

in volition rst it exists A s Obj ect and subj ect


exist rst in reection s o nal causes exist rst in


volition P otentially both are co ntained in pheno


mena before they exist actually for consciousness ;


we discover afterwards that they wer e provided for .

We represent them as havi ng been potentially pre

sent i n the past ; and in the sam e way in the future , ,

higher and wider powers than we have yet any idea

o f may exist already in t h e states and modes Of con

s c i o u s n e s s and o f existence which have already been

, ,

developed in man and in the u ni verse which is now


a ctually his

Who shall limit the endless resur

rections Of fac ul ties yet dormant whose very seeds ,

may be yet uncreated ? Who shall imagine bound s

to the endless power o f development which h a s ,

already in the universe as it is already known to u s

, ,

produced such phenomena as could not possibly hav e

been anticipated until the fa ct itself declared them ,

yet all followin g o n e law and consisting o f the sam e


elements ? No t thos e assuredly w h o contend fo r t h e


o f that l a w and those elements ; not

who s e e unity underlying a ll phenomena and e xist

ence and consciousness o f a piece ; for this is the v er y

c o ndition Of understandin g t h e lowest