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1. People v. Santiago, 51 Phil.

68

Facts:
On November 23, 1926, the appellant asked Felicita, who was then about 18
years of age, to accompany him across the river on some errand. The girl
agreed and they went over the river together into the municipality of San
Leonardo. After crossing the river, the appellant conducted the girl to a place
about twenty paces from the highway where tall grass and other growth hid
them from public view. In this spot the appellant manifested a desire to have
sexual intercourse with the girl, but she refused to give her consent, and he
finally, notwithstanding her resistance, accomplished his purpose by force
and against her will.

After the deed had been done the appellant conducted the girl to the house of
his uncle, Agaton Santiago, who lived not far away. They arrived here about
11 a. m., and remained for several hours. In the course of the afternoon
Agaton Santiago brought in a protestant minister who went through the
ceremony of marrying the couple. After this was over the appellant gave the
girl a few pesos and sent her home. Her father happened to be away that
night, but upon his return the next day, she told him what had happened,
and this prosecution for rape was started.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the marriage of Agaton Santiago and Felicita Masilang
is valid?

Ruling:
1. NO. The manner in which the appellant dealt with the girl after the
marriage, as well as before, shows that he had no bona fide intention
of making her his wife, and the ceremony cannot be considered
binding on her because of duress. The marriage was therefore void for
lack of essential consent, and it supplies no impediment to the
prosecution of the wrongdoer.

2. Jimenez v. Cañizares, L-12790, Aug. 31, 1960

Facts:
The plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the
defendant Remedios Cañizares contracted on 3 August 1950 before a judge of
the municipal court of Zamboanga City, upon the ground that the office of
her genitals or vagina was too small to allow the penetration of a male organ
or penis for copulation; that the condition of her genitals as described above
existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist; and that for that
reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one day after they had been
married.

Issue
1. Whether or not the complaint is a valid ground for annulment?

Ruling:

Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The
presumption is in favor of potency. The lone testimony of the husband that
his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear
asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.

The decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the lower
court for further proceedings.

3. Contreras v. Macaraig, 33 SCRA 222

Facts:

Plaintiff and defendant were married on March 16, 1952 in the Catholic
Church of Quiapo, Manila. Out of their Marriage, three children were born:
Eusebio C. Macaraig, on January 11, 1953; Victoria C. Macaraig, on March
26, 1956; and Alexander C. Macaraig, on August 4, 1958. All the children
are in the care of plaintiff wife.

After the elections of 1961, defendant resigned from MICO Offset to be a
special agent at Malacañang. He began to be away so often and to come home
very late. Upon plaintiff's inquiry, defendant explained that he was out on a
series of confidential missions.

In September, 1962, Avelino Lubos, driver of the family car, told plaintiff
that defendant was living in Singalong with Lily Ann Alcala.

All this while, defendant, if and whenever he returned to the family fold,
would only stay for two or three days but would be gone for a period of about
a month.

After plaintiff received reports that Lily Ann Alcala had given birth to a
baby, she sent Mrs. Felicisima Antioquia, her father's employee, to verify the
reports. Mrs. Antioquia then went to the parish priest of Singalong where she
inquired about the child of Cesar Macaraig and Lily Ann Alcala and she
was given a copy of the baptismal certificate of Maria Vivien Mageline
Macaraig (Exh. G) which she gave to plaintiff sometime in October, 1963.

In the early part of December, 1963, plaintiff, accompanied by her two
children, Victoria and Alexander, and by Mrs. Leticia Lagronio went to talk
to defendant at his place of work. They repaired to Victoria Peak, a nearby
restaurant, where plaintiff pleaded with defendant to give up Lily Ann
Alcala and to return to the conjugal home, assuring him that she was willing
to forgive him. Defendant informed plaintiff that he could no longer leave
Lily Ann and refused to return to his legitimate family.

plaintiff instituted the present action for legal separation. and it was only then that the legal period of one year must be deemed to have commenced. Issue: 1. Yes. the only time when appellant really became cognizant of the infidelity of her husband was in the early part of December 1963. 1963. Whether or not there is a valid ground for legal separation? Ruling: 1. The court rendered holding that appellant is entitled to legal separation as prayed for in her complaint. We are persuaded that. in the eyes of the law. The court conclude that it was only on the occasion mentioned in the preceding paragraph when her husband admitted to her that he was living with and would no longer leave Lily Ann to return to his legitimate family. In the absence of a clear-cut decision of the Supreme Court as to the exact import of the term "cognizant. .On December 14. After a careful review of the record." the practical application of said Article can be attended with difficulty.

Santamaria. that aside from her legal separation from Enrique R. Santamaria. The contention of the Republic finds support in the provisions of Article 372 of the New Civil Code which reads: ART. (Emphasis supplied) The language of the statute is mandatory that the wife. shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation. When legal separation has been granted. there being no severance of the vinculum. Issue: 1. 1939. Whether or not the petition is valid? Ruling: 1. that on March 24. No. That in view of the fact that she has been legally separated from Mr. the wife shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation. that of Elisea L. Enrique R. she married Mr. Republic. Santamaria. Alperal v. This is so because her married status is unaffected by the separation. to wit: ELISEA LAPERAL. it is desirable that she be allowed to change her name and/or be permitted to resume using her maiden name. That during her marriage to Enrique R. Santamaria. she has also ceased to live with him for many years now. 372. she naturally used. Enrique R. 6 SCRA 357 Facts: That petitioner's maiden name is ELISEA LAPERAL.4. even after the legal separation has been decreed. Santamaria and has likewise ceased to live with him for many years. . instead of her maiden name.

No. ie. did not suspect anything about Luida’s condition considering that she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy (highly developed physical manifestation. 1939 (89 days after getting married) Luida. gave birth to a son. who was 9 months pregnant. 19 Facts: Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat met in March 1938. became engaged in September. 1939. Issue: 1. . 72 Phil. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage. the court did not find any proof that there was concealment of pregnancy constituting fraud as a ground for annulment. a first-year law student. Godofredo left Luida and never returned to married life with her. Buccat. Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccat’s marriage be granted on the grounds that Luida concealed her pregnancy before the marriage? Ruling: 1.5. a sacred institution in which the State is interested and where society rests. On March 23. It was unlikely that Godofredo. he filed for an annulment of their marriage on the grounds that when he agreed to married Luida. On Feb 23. Buccat v. she assured him that she was a virgin. After knowing this. and got married in Nov 26. enlarged stomach ) when they got married. In this case.

After their wedding. the latter did not go home to petitioner at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue. Occidental Mindoro. While working in Riyadh. Manila.6. Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that she was married to respondent on 11 October 2000 by Rev. Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines. Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent arrived in the Philippines. Pabustan (Pabustan). at the latter’s residence. Tondo. Manila. respondent proceeded to his parents house in San Jose. Alcazar 603 SCRA 604 Facts: The Complaint was filed by petitioner before the RTC on 22 August 2002. Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code). a ground for marriage to be nullified is present in the case? . On 23 October 2000. Thereafter. Augusto G. Alcazar v. Thus. Petitioner traveled to San Jose. Tondo. There was also no more possibility of reconciliation between petitioner and respondent. Instead. Petitioner tried to call respondent for five times but respondent never answered. Occidental Mindoro. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. where she was informed that respondent had been living with his parents since his arrival in March 2002. respondent left for Riyadh. he never contacted her. the newlyweds went back to Manila. About a year and a half after respondent left for Riyadh. providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph 5. the hometown of respondents parents. Issue: 1. Petitioner was surprised why she was not advised by respondent of his arrival. petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of consummating his marriage with her. but respondent did not live with petitioner at the latters abode at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue. respondent did not communicate with petitioner by phone or by letter. a co-teacher informed petitioner that respondent was about to come home to the Philippines. Occidental Mindoro. Whether or not Article 45 paragraph 5 of the family code. petitioner and respondent lived for five days in San Jose.

No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that respondent was in any way physically incapable to consummate his marriage with petitioner. Petitioner even admitted during her cross- examination that she and respondent had sexual intercourse after their wedding and before respondent left for abroad. there is no ground for annulling petitioner’s marriage to respondent. None.Ruling: 1. Petitioners Complaint was. then. therefore. rightfully dismissed. . There obviously being no physical incapacity on respondent’s part.

Tomas V. also dated 24 November 1986. Bian. Issues: 1. Branch 25. No. and that being unmarried. as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties. they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation. that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years. and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud. On 7 July 1993. Dayot. Republic v. Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall. which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license. Atienza. 550 SCRA 435 Facts: The records disclose that on 24 November 1986. cannot be a mere irregularity. In lieu of a marriage license.7. Whether or not an action for nullity of marriage prescribes? Ruling: 1. or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage. Furthermore. Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Laguna. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986. attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity. It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for “five years” at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and . Whether or not the marriage of Jose to Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn affidavit in lieu of the marriage licence requirement? 2. Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit.

No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. . then it is but a mere scrap of paper. without force and effect. Jose and Felisas marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. Hence. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. and may be raised any time. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie. the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe. In this case. No. attested to by the parties under oath. it is as if there was no affidavit at all. 2.

No. Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC The appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A. 2006. 2006.M. dated August 2. 2006. the RTC issued the order declaring its August 2. in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14. In an order dated September 19. 2003. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.M. the RTC granted the petition for annulment in a Decision. After trial on the merits. 2006 decision final and executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia. 634 SCRA 429 Facts: On July 10. Bolos. 1980 before the Family Code took effect. 2006 A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25.8. a motion to reconsider the denial of Danilo’s appeal was likewise denied. On November 23. He timely filed the Notice of Appeal on September 11. On January 16. 2006." is applicable to the case at bench. 2007. Bolos v. . Whether or not A. Not in conformity. Issues: 1. petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code. the RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial.

Her stance is unavailing. No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution. No. This constitutional policy is echoed in our Family Code. is explicit in its scope. the respondent should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his appeal considering that what is at stake is the sacrosanct institution of marriage.Ruling: 1. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A. 2003. In the case at bench.M.M. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. NO. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15. Petitioner insists that A. Article 1 thereof emphasizes its permanence and inviolability. .

But it does . Issues: 1.9. Cagayan. Trinidad died. Ruling: 1. Eulogio passed away. 2004 which falls within the ambit of the order. covers marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines does not allow it. respondents. Administrative Order No.[5] On 26 August 2004. in Lal-lo. hence. Mary Jane. Eulogio and Trinidad.[6] Six months later. heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. that Eulogio and Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962. The marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated on August 26. Whether of or not the heirs may validly file the declaration of nullity of marriage between Eulogio and Lolita.[7] In her Answer. No. respectively. Heirs of Sps. on 28 October 1988 and 30 October 1991. Michelle and Joseph Lloyd. an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. From their union were born Elvin Enrico and Marco Enrico. 2003.M. Haizel. and solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly. Cagayan. Enrico. 02-11-10-SC. A. Vilma. effective March 14. She further contended that the marriage ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo. Enrico v. As an affirmative defense. they were exempted from the requirement of a marriage license. all surnamed Medinaceli. or on 10 February 2005. herein respondents. Substantially. the complaint alleged. Medinaceli (Eulogio) and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli (Trinidad) filed with the RTC. she sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.[4] On 1 May 2004. Cagayan. namely: Eduardo. No. 534 SCRA 418 Facts: On 17 March 2005. Evelyn.[3] They begot seven children. inter alia. Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo. The order declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.

but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. They can still protect their successional right. not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity. compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses. . for. Legal Separation and Provisional Orders.not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the law. as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages.

They were not exempt from the marriage . On 13 November 1995. No. petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife. presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City. after the ceremony. Whether or not a valid marriage is present in the case? 2. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994. with Judge Jose C. thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. Castro. Issues: 1. Thus. Since the childs birth. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar. Castro v. it is a mere scrap of paper. They planned to get married. Bernabe. The couple got married on the same date. they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. In her complaint. respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter has reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child. Whether or not the petitioner is liable for support of illegitimate child? Ruling: 1. Nevertheless. respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. administering the civil rites. in order to push through with the plan. respondent has been the one supporting her out of her income as a government dentist and from her private practice. De Castro. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever. 542 Scra 379 Facts: Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. in lieu of a marriage license. respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City trial court.10. the marriage license had already expired. On 4 June 1998.

license requirement. 2. we find that the child is petitioner’s illegitimate daughter. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. . Yes. and therefore entitled to support.

petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa City In August 1995. 1992. No. During the lifetime of Felix Carlos. and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code. Whether or not the brother of Teofilo can file nullity of marriage between Teofilo and Felicidad. Sandoval. Whether Juan Carlos brother of Teofilo entitled to intestate proceeding? Ruling: 1. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. In his complaint. against respondents before the court a quo with the following causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity of marriage. Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Carlos v. The agreement was made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. and (e) sum of money and damages. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. In 1994. (c) recovery of property. Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. 574 SCRA 116 Facts: Spouses Felix B.11.M. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son. petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A. in turn. petitioner commenced an action. (b) status of a child. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. docketed as Civil Case No. No. 95-135. Teofilo. Issues: 1. They left six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs. he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. Teofilo died intestate. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate . undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir. (d) reconveyance. 2. On May 13. 02-11-10- SC.

[34] or even an adopted child[35] excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting from the decedent. illegitimate. heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. This is based on the ground that he has no successional right to be protected. then petitioner has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother and respondent Felicidad. hence. For although the marriage in controversy may be found to be void from the beginning. This is because the presence of descendant. petitioner would not inherit. 2. does not have proper interest. or legally adopted son of Teofilo. still. illegitimate. . If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate.

Whether Martini is Psychologically incapacitated him being a mama’s boy? Ruling: 1. Issues: 1. and she soon realized that he was a mamas boy. she would deny that he was around. the root cause thereof must be medically or clinically identified. And she noticed too that when she would call up Martini at his parents house and his mother was the one who answered the call. 1997. The last time the couple talked was on October 14. Lynnette filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of Martinis psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital duties and obligations under Articles 68- 70 of the Family Code. Since then. he always mentioned his mother and his family. Less than three years later or on October 12. Lynnette learned that Martini declared in his employment records that he was single and named his mother as principal allottee. Republic v. Martini never communicated with Lynnette. Hence. 1999 when Martini was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) about to depart for abroad. There is none such in the case at bar. but it cannot be declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity in light of the insufficient evidence presented. There must thus be evidence to adequately establish the same. While the examination by a physician of a person in order to declare him/her psychological incapacitated is not required. Cabantug-Baguio. On investigation. 2000. Lynnette noticed that every time she conversed with Martini. 556 SCRA 711 Facts: Lynnette and Martini contracted marriage on August 12. Lynnettes filing of the complaint for declaration of nullification of marriage. . Lynnettes marriage with Martini may have failed then. No.12.

Rubica did not comply with the Rule on Declaration of AbsoluteNullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. not to the parties to the case nor to their counsel. City Administrator of Silay. 527 SCRA 379 Facts: Ignacio J. filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Rubica (Atty. and that Atty. and that he did not cause the registration of the decree of nullity in the Civil Registry. Salmingo (Salmingo). he cannot be faulted therefor. the same may not be considered. Salmingo alleged that in prosecuting an annulment case. absent any showing of respondents involvement in the lapse in the prescribed procedure. Rubica deliberately concealed Liza Jane’s address so that she could not be served with summons. Atty. Rubica) and a petition for setting aside of the decision holding Liza Jane’s (Jane) marriage as annulled. Issues: 1. not in the present case anyway. Rodney K. Rubica. He is. Salmingo v. 2243-40 and the reopening of the case. Rubica also caused the publication of summons only in a newspaper of local circulation. Salmingo contends that the conduct of Atty. parenthetically. not . Salmingo also contends that Atty Rubica did not serve a copy of his petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor. As for complainants prayer for the setting aside of the decision in Civil Case No. Whether or not Atty Rubica’s alleged non-compliance with the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages is tantamount to gross misconduct which warrants his disbarment Ruling: 1. The requirement that the trial court order the prosecutor to investigate whether collusion exists in case the defendant in the declaration of nullity case files no answer is addressed to the said court. thus enabling him to present evidence ex parte.13.

. By law. His invocation of the States interest in protecting the sanctity of marriage[29] does not give him the standing to question the decision.even a real party in interest to the said case. it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal or the Solicitor General who represents the interest of the State in proceedings for the annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage.

Villegas regarding the spouses' psychological examination. and the written evaluation of Dr. 1994. Orlando and Filipinas filed a petition for dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains. which was granted in a Judgment issued by the RTC of Makati City. Out of their union. Tongol (Orlando) and Filipinas M. 537 SCRA 135 Facts: Orlando G. Evidence for Orlando consisted of his own testimony. the birth of their four children. On the other hand. On May 13. and. they begot four children. a psychiatrist who conducted a psychological examination of both parties. Tongol (Filipinas) were married on August 27. 1967. an employee in the pharmaceutical company owned by the spouses Tongol. born in 1968. Ma. Branch 143 on April 24. Whether there is psychological incapacity in either of the spouses in the case? . Tongol v. Frederick. However. 1995. record shows that evidence for Filipinas only consisted of her own testimony. born in 1969. that of his sister. 1996. Tongol. In her Answer with Counter-Petition. Orlando filed before the RTC of Makati City a verified petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Filipinas on the ground that the latter is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations. Issues: 1. she claims that their marriage failed because it is Orlando who is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his obligations as a married man. Orlando also presented Dr. Angelina Tongol. Orlando submitted documents evidencing their marriage. Cecilia Villegas.14. the RTC decision granting the petition for dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains. Filipinas admitted that efforts at reconciliation have been fruitless and that their marriage is a failure. Cecilia. and of Annaliza Guevara. Olivia. On August 19. born in 1971. namely: Crisanto. born in 1972.

. However. the totality of the evidence presented in the present case does not show that her personality disorder is of the kind contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code as well as jurisprudence as to render her psychologically incapacitated or incapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage.Ruling: 1. It is not disputed that respondent is suffering from a psychological disorder. None.

that sometime in February 1986. Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money. that a son. CA and Roridel Oliviano Molina.15. and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances. Essentially. Reynaldo left Roridel and their child. that a few weeks later. and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family. 1985 at the San Agustin Church4 in Manila. that in March 1987. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. GR 108763 Feb. Whether or not the court erred in judging the marriage void due to psychological incapacity? Ruling: . 1997 Facts: This case was commenced on August 16. 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance. the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14. Republic v. Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila. 1991. and had since then abandoned them. Issues: 1. Andre O. that after a year of marriage. Molina was born. resulting in frequent quarrels between them. 13. On May 14. that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel. and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start. the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. as a result of which their relationship was estranged.

it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved. homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel. there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid. If at all. Yes. . such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative.1. In the case of Reynaldo.

In his answer. Robles (Civ. Jocson commenced in the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court an action for the annulment of her marriage to Ricardo R. On the merits. and costs. that expressly prohibit the rendition of a decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. to contract that marriage with her. on the ground that it was bigamous. she was subjected to physical maltreatment by her husband. Case No. and that said threat and intimidation allegedly persisted until January. attorneys' fees. Whether or not mere a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment be a valid ground for nullity of marriage? Ruling: 1. 1963 when he was finally able to get away and live apart from the plaintiff. The court finding indications of collusion between the parties in their attempt to secure the nullification of said marriage. No. Jocson v. But he charged plaintiffs' parents with having compelled him by force. The affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically amount to these methods not countenanced by the Civil Code. defendant also assailed the validity of the marriage. Robles. Issue: 1. who died three days later. claiming that during their cohabitation. 1963. the Court of Domestic Relations correctly denied the motion for summary judgment in view of the first paragraph of Articles 88 and 1011 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. threat and intimidation. 22 SCRA 521 Facts: On February 4.16. Plaintiff also demanded from the defendant moral and exemplary damages. E-00013). resulting in the premature birth of their first child. Gloria G. notwithstanding their knowledge that he is a married man. .

aside from Jose Arcalas. the evidence thus presented shows that "plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5. where she stayed for one year. In March. 1952. Again. 107Phil. plaintiff filed on July 5. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Whether there is presence of collusion. Nueva Ecija. 35 Facts: Action for legal separation by Jose de Ocampo against his wife Serafina. holding there was confession of judgment. to which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. 1955. They begot several children who are now living with plaintiff. 1938 by a religious ceremony in Guimba. 1955. plaintiff discovered that while in the said city defendant was going out with several other men. plus condonation or consent to the adultery and prescription in the case prohibiting the promulgation of legal separation? Ruling: . plus condonation or consent to the adultery and prescription." Issues: 1. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation. According to the Court of Appeals. when defendant had finished studying her course. Towards the end of June. and had lived thereafter as husband and wife.17. Florenciano. confession of judgment. plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. a petition for legal separation. 1951. on the ground of adultery. Having found the defendant carrying marital relations with another man plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture. "On June 18. Ocampo v. The court of first instance of Nueva Ecija dismissed it. Accordingly. she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately.

1. . is not by itself collusion. it has been held that collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact that the guilty party confesses to the offense and thus enables the other party to procure evidence necessary to prove it. It will be remembered that she "left" him after having sinned with Arcalas and after he had discovered her dates with other men. We do not think plaintiff's failure actively to search for defendant and take her home (after the latter had left him in 1952) constituted condonation or consent to her adulterous relations with Orzame. Hers was the obligation to return. Consequently. And proof that the defendant desires the divorce and makes no defense. None. it was not his duty to search for her to bring her home.

Milagros de la Cruz filed on January 27. 1974 Milagros de la Cruz was charged with bigamy in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. Ejercito. No appeal was taken from that decision. Angeles City Branch IV for having married Sergeant Dominick L. David was undissolved. Yes. 1973 while her prior marriage to Teodoro G. In view of the annulment of her second marriage. 1974 Milagros de la Cruz filed in the same court at its San Fernando Branch III a complaint for the annulment of her marriage to Sergeant Gaccino on the ground of duress On December 16. The private prosecutor and the prosecuting fiscal opposed the motion. It became final.18. 68 SCRA 1 Facts: On May 20. Dela Cruz v. The information was filed at the instance of her first husband On August 1. . The SC hold that the finding in the annulment case that the second marriage contracted by Milagros de la Cruz with Sergeant Gaccino was a nullity is determinative of her innocence and precludes the rendition of a verdict that she committed bigamy. 1975 a motion to dismiss the bigamy charge. Whether or not annulment of Dela Cruz to Gaccino excuses the previous from the crime of bigamy filed by her first husband? Ruling: 1. 1974 Judge Castañeda rendered a decision annulling the marriage of Milagros de la Cruz to Gaccino. Gaccino on September 15. To try the criminal case in the face of such a finding would be unwarranted. Issues: 1.

They filed an extension within which to file an answer.1980. She averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo. 1980 which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to be null and void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita. 20. Cariaga. 1980. the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17. the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita. Thereafter. Pacete v.19. as well as for legal separation between her and Pacete. and 22. Ruling: . The court received plaintiffs’ evidence during the hearings held on February 15. which the court forthwith granted. the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision on March 17. 21. for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion. 231 SCRA 321 FACTS: Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979. After trial. particularly in communication. which the court partly granted.. Due to unwanted misunderstanding. The defendants were each served with summons. Jr. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file their answer. that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage only on August 1979. accounting and separation of property.

to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated. In this interim. Article 103 of the Civil Code. “if the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer. under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract. the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated. Therefore. the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.” The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages.The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. further mandates that an action for legal separation must “in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition. In case of non-appearance of the defendant. now Article 58 of the Family Code.” . and if there is no collusion. the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties exists.” obviously in order to provide the parties a “cooling-off” period. If there is no collusion.

upon failure of Cruz to pay Mendoza. In 1968.20. Mendoza petitioned that the title issued in the name of Cruz be cancelled. The decision became final and executory. Cruz appealed. A stranger or a third party may be dealt with in the land registration proceedings. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Cruz. The only requirements of the law are: (1) that the instrument be presented to the court by the interested party together with a motion that the same be considered in relation with the application. Court of Appeals. The contract of sale was admitted in court in lieu of the pending application for land title. During pendency of the application before the land registration court. Bulacan. The land registration court ruled in favor of Mendoza on the ground that the court erred in its earlier decision in issuing the land title to Cruz – who was not a party to the application of title initiated by Mendoza. 19 SCRA 756 Facts: In 1964. however. Maria. it was proven that a parcel of land located in Sta. Mendoza sold the land to Daniel Cruz. The registration court rendered a decision in July 1965. And the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining in this case show that these requirements have been complied with in this case. Whether or not the title can be dealt with in the name of a “third party”. Menzoza v. Mendoza applied for a title. . Ruling: 1. ISSUE: 1. and (2) that prior notice be given to the parties to the case. is owned by Mendoza. ordering the registration of the two parcels of land in the name of Cruz subject to the usufructuary rights of Mendoza.

The right to give support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person. WON the minor is barred from action for support. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. but the presence or lack thereof must be judicially established and declaration is vested in the Court. this time as the minor’s legal guardian/mother. filiation or paternity must be first shown between the parties. While it is true that in order to claim support. filed an action in 1988 for maintenance and support against the alleged father Manuel De Asis who failed to provide support and maintenance despite repeated demands. The original agreement between the parties to dismiss the initial complaint was in the nature of a compromise regarding future support which is prohibited by law. Vircel later on withdrew the complaint in 1989 for the reason that Manuel denied paternity of the said minor and due to such denial. lack thereof negates the right to claim support. However in 1995. De Asis v. He maintained that since the obligation to give support is based on existence of paternity between the child and putative parent. ISSUE: 1. the Court held that existence of lack thereof of any filial relationship between parties was not a matter which the parties must decide but should be decided by the Court itself. They mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of the complaint with the condition that Manuel will not pursue his counter claim. Hence. No. Manuel interposed maxim of res judicata for the dismissal of the case. CA. HELD: 1. 303 SCRA 176 FACTS: Vircel Andres as legal guardian of Glen Camil Andres de Asis. the first dismissal cannot bar the filing of another action asking for the same relief (no . With respect to Manuel’s contention for the lack of filial relationship between him and the child and agreement of Vircel in not pursuing the original claim. Vircel filed a similar complaint against the alleged father. it seems useless to pursue the said action.21.

the defense of res judicata claimed by Manuel was untenable since future support cannot be the subject of any compromise or waiver. .force and effect). Furthermore.

for the sum of P500. Gayon. alleging substantially that. and located in the barrio of Cabubugan. municipality of Guimbal.00 that plaintiff had since 1961. Issue: 1. They sold to Pedro Galera. That said right of redemption had not been exercised by Silvestre Gayon. Gayon v. but the same have failed. 1952 said spouses executed a deed. however be constructed in the light of Art. This phrase members of the same family should. or any of their heirs or successors. by virtue of deed of sale Dated March 21. . 1967. sold the aforementioned land to plaintiff Pedro Gayon for the sum of P614.22. despite the expiration of the period therefor. It is noteworthy that the impediment arising from this provision applies to suits œfiled or maintained between members of the same family. October 1. subject to the limitations in article 2035. 217 of the same code. 217 of family code Ruling: 1. Pedro Gayon filed said complaint the spouses Gayon and Genoveva de Gayon. a parcel of unregistered land therein described. that said Pedro Galera and his wife Estelita Damaso had. 36 SCRA 104 Facts: The records show that on July 31. Genoveva de Gayon. Whether or not the case at bar would fall under the provision of Art. 1961. provice of Iloilo including the improvements thereon. YES Reason No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made.00.

303 SCRA 176 . Esquivas v.25. CA.