8324980

L ett, Jam es W illiam , J r.

A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS O F CONTEMPORARY ANTHROPOLOGICAL

THEORY

The University of Florida Ph.D. 1983

University
Microfilms
International 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106
 A PHILOSOPHICAL AN A L Y S I S
OF
C O N T E M P O R A R Y A N T H R O P O L O G I C A L THEORY

BY

J A MES WIL L I A M LETT, JR.

A D I S S E R T A T I O N PRESENTED TO THE G R A D U A T E COUNCIL

OF T H E UNIVERSITY OF FLO R I D A IN
PARTIAL F U L F I L L M E N T OF T H E R E Q U I R E M E N T S
FOR THE DEGREE OF D O C T O R OF PH I L O S O P H Y

UNIVERSITY OF FLO R I D A

1983
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My u n d e r g r a d u a t e and graduate careers have been

c h a r a c t e r i z e d by serendipity, for I have had the good

fortune, through no fault of my own, to be associ a t e d w i t h a

number of o u t s t a n d i n g g e n tlemen and s c h o l a r s who have made

my academic progress both possible and pleasurable. I

m e n t i o n a few of those men here, not to di s c h a r g e my

indebtedness, but mere l y to acknowledge it.

Dr. Nathan A l t s h u l e r of the College of W i l l i a m and Mary

first inspired my interest in theory in the fall of 1976. I

r e c o g n i z e d his r e m a r k a b l e insightfulness at the time, but I

ha d to l e arn much m ore about anthro p o l o g y and the world

be f o r e I truly a p p r e c i a t e d his brilliance. He has had a

prof o und i n f luence upon my thinking, and there is

c o n s i d e r a b l e evidence of that influence in these pages.

My i n t ellectual debt to Dr. Marvin Har r i s is amply

evident in this w o r k also. Throughout t h i s dissertation, I

cite specific m i n o r aspects of his theoretical positions

w i t h w h ich I disagree; I fail to mention, however, the major

c h anges t hat he has i nspired in my theoretical p erspective

ii
in the past t w o years. No c o n t e m p o r a r y a n t h r o p o l o g i s t has

r e s p o n ded to t h e challenge of theory m o r e courag e o u s l y or

more c reatively. He has my d eep ad m i r a t i o n and

appreciation.

I regard it as a rare pr i v i l e g e to have had Dr. Charles

Wagley serve on my m a ster's and doctoral committees. His

scholarly b r e a d t h of knowledge and personal g r aciousness

embody e v e r y t h i n g that a t t racted me to anthropology in the

first place. If there is a n y t h i n g in contemporary

anthropology that is likely to stand the test of t i m e

a n y t h ing that w i l l be read and a p p r e c i a t e d y e ars f rom now

for s o m e t h i n g other than its h i s t o r i c a l v a l u e it is to be

found in the sensitive, poignant, lyrical writings of Loren

Eiseley and C h a r l e s Wagley. In my judgment, the list stops

there.

I am grateful to Dr. Robe r t L a w l e s s for his patient and

p e r c eptive criticism. He has p r e v e n t e d many errors of

thought and e x p r e s s i o n that w o u l d o t h erwise have f o u n d their

way into this work, and I have b e n e f i t e d substa n t i a l l y from

his r e m a r k a b l e command of the a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l literature.

I wish to thank Dr. Terry McCoy, who shares my interest

in the Ca r i b b e a n and w h o agreed to serve on my doctoral

c o m mittee for that reason. W h e n I shifted my focus from the

crystal seas of the W est Indies to the murky waters of

philosophy, he generously agreed to stay the course. I

count that as no small favor.

Finally, I owe a special debt of gratitude to the

chairperson of my supervisory committee, Dr. Theron Nunez.

iii
S i nce the very be g i n n i n g of my graduate career, he has been

a c o n stant source of u n e r r i n g l y good advice and u n c o mmonly

resourceful support. Whatever academic success I have had

is directly a t t r i b u t a b l e to his efforts. He knows, I hope,

how much I appreciate his guidance and his friendship.

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S ................................................ ii

A B S T R A C T ........................................................ vii

P R O L O G U E ........................................................ 1

CHAPTER ONE K N O W L E D G E AND I N Q U I R Y ....................... 8

E pis t e m o l o g i c a l F o u n d a t i o n s ......... 11
E pis t e m o l o g i c a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y .................. 14
S c i e n c e Defined a n d D e f e n d e d .................... 18
S c i e n t i f i c E x p l a n a t i o n ............................ 26
Scientific Paradigms
and S c i e n t i f i c P r o g r e s s ....................... 31

C H APTER TWO THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL P E R S P E C T I V E ............. 44

The Science of A n t h r o p o l o g y ...................... 46

The Idea of a Social S c i e n c e .................... 52
The Mainte n a n c e of Human L i f e and
t h e M a i n t e n a n c e of Human I d e n t i t y ........... 54
The Concept of C u l t u r e ............................ 62
The Importance of the
E m i c / E t i c D i s t i n c t i o n ......................... 72
A n t h r o p o l o g y and A n t h r o p o l o g i s t s ................ 83

C H APTER THREE CONTE M P O R A R Y A N T H R O POLOGICAL P A R ADIGMS... 89

Cultural D e t e r m i n i s m ......................,....... 96
Cultural M a t e r i a l i s m .............................. 105
S t r u c t u r a l i s m ....................................... 121
Sym b o l i c A n t h r o p o l o g y ............................. 138
The Q u e s t i o n of V a l u e ............................. 153
The Q u e s t i o n of
Paradi g m a t i c C o m m i t m e n t ....................... 157

v
CHAPTER FOUR THE CLASH OF P A R A D I G M S ....................... 161

Cultural Determinism, Cultural Materialism,

and the Image of L i m i t e d G o o d ................ 168
Cultural Determinism, Cultural Materialism,
and the Sac r e d Cow C o n t r o v e r s y .............. 179
The S o u n d and the F u r y ............................ 1 91*

E P I L O G U E ........................................................ 198

R E F E R E NCES C I T E D ............................................... 202

BIOGRAPHICAL S K E T C H ........................................... 221

vi
 A b s t r a c t of D i s s e r t a t i o n P r e sented to the G r a d u a t e C ouncil
of t he University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
R e q u i r e m e n t s for the D e g r e e of D o c t o r of Philosophy

A P H I L O S O P H I C A L ANA L Y S I S
OF
C O N T E M P O R A R Y A N T H R O P O L O G I C A L THEORY

By

James W i l l i a m Lett, Jr.

April 1983

Ch airman: Dr. Theron Nunez

Major Department: Anthropology

This dissertation p r esents a critique and analysis of

the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l foundations, ontological assumptions,

ana e x p l a n a t o r y principles of contemporary anthropological

theory, as w ell as a critique and a n a l y s i s of t h e social

s c i e n t i f i c and p s e u d o s c i e n t i f i c a l ternatives to the

a n t h r o pological approach. The various epistemological

found ations are summarized and analyzed; e p i s t e mological

r e s p o nsibility is defined as t h e critical appeal to s e nse

experience, logic, and authority. It is argued that

f a i s i fiability is the essential c r i terion of t h e scientific

vii
methoa. Scientific progress is de s c r i b e d as t h e successive

appearance of progressive paradigms, and t e c h n i q u e s for the

comparison and ev a l u a t i o n of comme n s u r a b l e and

i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e paradigms a r e o u t l i n e d and illustrated.

Anthropology is d efined as a science addressed to the

interrelated pro b l e m s of t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of h u m a n l ife and

t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of human identity, whose chief v i r t u e lies

in the d i s t i n c t i o n between culturally-specific (emic) and

objectively-valid (etic) a p p r o a c h e s to kn o w l e d g e of the

hum a n condition. Four c o n t e m p o r a r y anthr o p o l o g i c a l

paradigms cultural determinism, cultural materi a l i s m ,

s t r u c turalism, and symbolic a n t h r o p o l o g y are g i v e n detailed

e x p o s ition and analysis. Cu l t u r a l determ i n i s m is de s c r i b e d

as imprecise, u nparsimonious, and t h e o r e t i c a l l y inadequate;

structuralism is de s c r i b e d as intuitive, u n v e rifiable, and

u n s c i entific. Cultural m a t e r i a l i s m and s y m b o l i c

anthropology are de s c r i b e d as i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e but

complementary paradigms, b o t h of w h i c h address significant,

meaningful, and va l u a b l e q u e s t i o n s in demons t r a b l y

scientific fashion. It is argued that p a r a d i g m a t i c debate

in a n thropology is f r e q uently an emo t i v e activity; d etailed

attention is given to the d e b a t e s surrou n d i n g t h e image of

limited g o o d and t h e sacred cow of India to i l l u s t r a t e that

argument. This study's m a j o r c o n c lusion is t h a t the

discipline of anthropology c o n s t i t u t e s the d e m o n s t r a b l y best

approach t o the u n d e r s t a n d i n g and e x p l a n a t i o n of hum a n

behavior a m o n g all of the social scient i f i c and

p s e u d o s c i e n t i f i c alternatives.

viii
 PROLOGUE

All order, I've come to understand, is

t heoretical, u n r e a l a harmless, sensible,
smiling m a s k m e n slide between the two great,
dark realities, the self and the world.
John Gardner, Grendel

At the heart of the human predicament lies the dilemma

of e p i s t e m o l o g y . All debates, all controversies, all

q u e s t i o n s of fact or value are u l t i mately r e d ucible to the

q u e s t i o n of knowledge: how do w e know what w e know? The

one great lesson of e p i stemology is that knowledge is

notoriously problematic. Even the i n f o r m a t i o n provided by

our five senses is variable, subjective, and sometimes

misleading. Our p e r c e p t i o n of the external w o r l d is

necessarily selective. It depends upon a pa r t i c u l a r frame

of re ference mol d e d by context, experience, and

predisposition. T h e range of our p e r c eption is r e s t ricted

by the limits of our sensory apparatus. Perception requires

active, though usually not deliberate, interpretation.

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 2

There is an irreducibly h u man d i m ension to all that is

knowable, for it is i m p o ssible to describe the really

real except in human terms. W hat is real is determined by

the i d i o s y n c r a c i e s of human perception and cognition. Our

u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the w o r l d is founded upon the concepts w e

form and hold about the world, but those concepts are forged

in the c rucible of human experience. They are not, in any

sense of the term, determined by the real or true nature of

the w o r l d itself. This is w h a t p h ilosophers mean when they

say there is a "loose fit b etween the m i n d and the w o r l d . "

Knowledge, in short, depends upon theories, the

vari a bly implicit and exp l i c i t frameworks for i n t e r p r e t a t i o n

that shape our perceptions, guide our judgments, color our

analyses, and i n f luence our beliefs. In popular

usage, fact and theory refer to funda m e n t a l l y different

sorts of things. Facts are ass u m e d to h a v e an independent,

obj e c tive existence. Asp e c t s and e ntities that are part of

o b j e ctive reality are facts. T h e o r i e s , on the

other hand, are re g a r d e d as h y p othetical abstractions,

unproven or even pr e m a t u r e suppositions about the nature and

re l a t i o n s h i p s of facts. In everyday parlance, a fact is a

fact, but a theory is often "just a theory."

In actuality, though, facts do not exist apart from

theories. Facts are de t e r m i n e d by the in s t r u m e n t s (whether

h u man or artificial) used to m e a s u r e them. Sapir and W h o r f

have suggested that the percep t i o n of fac t s is influenced by

the l anguage of the observer. The ident i f i c a t i o n of facts

is u n q u e s t i o n a b l y c onditioned by the influence of culture

 3

(the l a r g e numb e r of E s k i m o words for snow is a familiar

example). M ost importantly, facts are d e t e r m i n e d by the

t heories w h i c h define t h e i r existence. Theoretical

and u n r e a l are not sy n o n y m o u s terms. There is

no a t h e o r e t i c a l way to des c r i b e and unders t a n d reality.

B e c a u s e m a n y of our the o r i e s are i m p l i c i t perhaps even

u n k n o w a b l e t h e r e is a s i g n i f i c a n t tacit c o m p o n e n t to our

k no w l edge of t h e world. Do you know what it is a b o u t your

friend's voice that mak e s it recognizable on the t e l e phone?

Can y o u describe the f r a g r a n c e of your f a v o r i t e cologne?

How do w e a r r i v e at a e s t h e t i c judgments? What is

creativity? H o w does the i m a g i n a t i o n work? This is what

Michael Pol a n y i (1958) m e a n s when he says w e know m o r e than

we can say. Knowledge is elusive; certain knowledge (if

such a d i s t i n c t i o n can be made) is perhaps unattainable.

Despite all this, it w o u l d be a severe m i s t a k e to

embrace the d espair of knowledge. It would be similarly

irresponsible and i n d e f e n s i b l e to conclude t hat all

k n owledge is relative. T h e bar r i e r s to kn o w l e d g e are

practical, not logical. Our ability to p r e d i c t and control

empirical phenomena d e m o n s t r a t e s that our k n o w l e d g e of the

world is m ore than mere illusion. Indeed, the so-called

" p r a g m a t i c 11 perspe c t i v e s o f fer the best s o l u t i o n to the

ph i l o sophical problem of t r u t h . A true p r o p o s i t i o n is

one w h i c h consistently and r eliably satisfies our desire and

need to perceive, understand, predict, and control the

world.
 4

T his does not mean, incidentally, that w h a t is

e xp e d ient is true. While it may be useful at t i mes to

believe false statements (for example, to accept your own

r a t i o nal i z a t i o n s ) , the p r a g m a t i c criteria for t r uth are not

so easily satisfied. That w h i c h is e s t a b l i s h e d as true on

p ra g m atic grounds must be true for all people in all places

in all times. It is not s u f f i c i e n t to say that a particular

individual or a particular g r oup find it useful to accept

some p a r t i c u l a r claim in o r d e r to establish the truth of

that claim. A c c e p t i n g a p r a g m a t i c j u s t i f i c a t i o n for truth

simply a f f i r m s that there are logical p r oblems as s o c i a t e d

with the a t t e m p t s that have been made to define truth in

terms of corre s p o n d e n c e w i t h the "facts" or in terms of

c o h erence w i t h other "true" propositions.

This, then, is the c h a l l e n g e of theory: to tailor the

loose fit bet w e e n the mind and the world; to be aware of the

limits of perception; to r e c o g n i z e the p e r vasive

s i g n i ficance of theory; to d e v e l o p standards of proof and

disproof; to specify the c r i t e r i a for belief; to examine our

p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s and assumptions; to make our h y p o t h e s e s as

comprehensive, consistent, and reliable as possible; to

accept the i m plications of c o n t r a d i c t i o n and to abandon

those b e l i e f s that have been contradicted; to c r i t ically

evaluate c o m p e t i n g accounts of the world; to m a k e our

k n o wledge of the w o rld as c e r t a i n and s e l f - c o r r e c t i n g as

possible; in short, to see b e y o n d the "smiling m a s k of

order" to the "dark reality of the world." The challenge of

theory is the challenge of r e s p o n s i b l e inquiry.

 5

The domain of pos s i b l e inquiry is infinitely large, but

t h e one pro b l e m w h i c h has never failed to beguile human

be i n g s is the puzzle of the human condition. Who are w e ?

How did w e come to be? W hat are the reasons and pur p o s e s

a n a c o n s e q u e n c e s for and of our lives and our actions? W hat

d o e s it all mean? The human condition is the

anthropological domain of inquiry.

Th r o u g h o u t t his book, I am c o n cerned w ith a single

que s t i on: w hat w o u l d responsible inquiry into the human

condition entail? The study p r e sented h e r e is a

philosophical inquiry into the nature of a n thropological

t h o u g h t and theory. I argue, I think consistently, for a

particular perspective on anthr o p o l o g i c a l knowledge:

w h a t we know about the human condition is funda m e n t a l l y

dependent, in the f u l l e s t sense, upon h o w we know w hat we

know. That premise u n d e r l i e s my analysis of scientific

progr ess a n d its m e c h a n i s m s ; it forms the basis of my

evaluation of c o m p e t i n g a n t h r o p ological paradigms; and it is

e s s e n tial to my c r i t i q u e of n o n a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l accounts of

th e human condition.

Any answer to the q u e s t i o n of what r e s p o n s i b l e inquiry

into the h u m a n c o n d i t i o n wou l d entail should involve several

dimensions. Anthropological t h e orists m u s t contend w i t h

t h r e e separate c h a l l e n g e s to the v alidity of their accounts

a n d explanations. The first is a philosophical challenge

demanding epistemological responsibility, conceptual

clarity, and pr e c i s i o n of expression. C h apters One and Two

e x p l o r e t h i s c h a llenge of p h i l o s o p h y . The second is a

 6

specifically anthropological challenge d e m a n d i n g the

c o n s t r u c t i o n of p r o d u c t i v e paradigms and t h e critical,

o b j e c t i v e e v a l u a t i o n of competing paradigms. Chapters T h r e e

ana Four examine this challenge of a n t h r o p o l o g y . The

third is a c o m p e t i t i v e challenge ari s i n g from the fact t h a t

t h e r e are i n n u m e r a b l e alternatives, both inside and out s i d e

s c i e n c e and academia, to anth r o p o l o g i c a l acc o u n t s of the

human condition. In a later book, I intend to address

this challenge of c o m p e t i t i o n . T his book, however, is

i n t e n d e d expressly and exclus i v e l y for an a n thropological

audience. T h e cha p t e r s should not be read out of sequence,

since the ar g u m e n t s presented in e ach chapter presume a

familiarity with the a n alyses and c o n c l u s i o n s to be found in

the p r e c e d i n g chapters.

I start with t h e broadest pos s i b l e questions. What is

k n o w l edge? W h a t is s c ience? What do we m e a n by

explanation? How d oes scient i f i c k n o w l e d g e grow and

develop? T h e s e q u e s t i o n s are a d d r e s s e d in Chapter One,

which is concerned w i t h epist e m o l o g y and related issues in

the p h i l osophy of science.

Next I c o nsider w hat a social science should be. Is it

p o s s i b l e to conduct a scientific inquiry into the human

c o n d i tion? If so, w h a t aspects of the h u m a n condition

require explanation? W h a t would c o n s t i t u t e an adequate

e x p l a n a t i o n of the h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e ? These issues are

c o n s i d e r e d in Chapter Two, which exa m i n e s the essential

f e a t u r e s of the anthr o p o l o g i c a l ap p r o a c h to the study of

humanity.
 7

T hen I l o o k at the ongoing process of theory b u ilding

in c o n tem p o r a r y anthropology. Which paradigms or r e search

s t r a t e g i e s are fav o r e d among a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s today? W h ich

of the extant pa r a d i g m s best s a t isfies the criteria of

responsible i nquiry? To w h i c h contemporary paradigm should

a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s c o m m i t themse l v e s ? These q u e s t i o n s are

examined in Chapter Three, w h i c h is devoted to a review and

a n a l y s i s of c o n t e m p o r a r y a n t h r o p ological theory.

Finally, I focus a t t e n t i o n upon the conduct of

anthropological r e s e a r c h and analysis. How adept are

a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s at the r ecognition and analysis of

p a r a d i g m a t i c issues? How e ffectively are p a r a d i g m a t i c

d i f f e r e n c e s c o m m u n i c a t e d and debated? W h a t are the criteria

by w h i c h a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s accept or reject rival paradigms?

T h e s e q u e s t i o n s are co n s i d e r e d in Chapter Four, which

e x a m i n e s the nature of paradigmatic debate in anthropology.

 CHA P T E R ONE
K N O WLEDGE AND INQ U I R Y

I do not b e l i e v e in Belief.
E.M. Forster, "What I Believe"

First thin g s first. The crucial q uestion im p l i c i t in

any statement is the q u e s t i o n of epistemology. Simply

defined, epistemology is the study of the nature and source

of knowledge. Any statement of fact, whether d e s c r i p t i v e or

analytic, is a claim to knowledge; episte m o l o g y is concerned

w i t h the v a l i d i t y or a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of such claims. The

initial p r o b l e m to be considered, therefore, is

t h e nature of knowledge.

In English, the verb 3 know has a highly a m b iguous and

imprecise meaning. W e use it w hen w e speak of kno w i n g a

person, or knowing how to p e r f o r m a task, or knowing

w h a t the facts of a given s i t u a t i o n are. Many other

l a n g u a g e s r e s o l v e this a m b iguity somewhat by d i s t i n g u i s h i n g

b e tween k n o w l e d g e by a c q uaintance and knowledge about

entities, events, and relationships. Thus French

8
 9

has connaitre and s a v o i r t Spanish has conocer

and s a b e r , Italian has conoscere and s a p e r e , and

G e r m a n has kennen and w i s s e n . The sense of the verb to

k n o w which is most directly relevant to the concerns of

epistemology is the propositional sense, or the sense

of knowing w hat is the case. Propositional knowledge is

k n o w l edge that is either true or false.

A propositional statement is an assertion; it m a k e s a

c l a i m about the w o r l d w h ich either is or is not valid. Many

of our statements are not propositional, a lthough they

n e v e r theless convey information. S t a t e m e n t s w h ich express

s e ntiment or w h o s e intent is to persuade are often dev o i d of

pr o p o sitional content. Such statements h a v e instead an

e m o t i v e meaning, but emotive statements are often expressed

in w h a t appears to be pr opositional form. During a recent

o fficial visit to the Vatican, for example, the

Vice-President of the United States said t hat the Pope had

"a special u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the spiritual dimensions of the

p r o b l e m of w o r l d peace. It is absolutely essential to

d i s t i n g u i s h between emotive and propos i t i o n a l statements.

To be valid, any claim to p r o p ositional knowledge must

satisfy three criteria. First, obviously, it must be true.

You can hardly claim to know that today is Friday if today

is in fact Thursday. If people claim to k now that the earth

if flat, then they are m a k i n g a statement of belief, not

o f f e r i n g a claim to knowledge. T r u t h is a necessary

c o n d i tion for knowledge, although t r uth by itself is not

knowledge, for reasons that I will discuss momentarily.

 10

Second, you m u s t believe that J2 is true (where stands

for any p r o p ositional statement) in order to claim that you

k n o w . If you k n o w a proposition to be true, it w o u l d

be absurd to say t hat you believe it to be false. You can

b e l i e v e something and not know it, but you cann o t know

s o m e t h i n g and not bel i e v e it. B e l i e f is a n e c essary but not

sufficient condition for knowledge.

Third, propositional knowledge must be s u b s t a n t i a t e d by

e v i d e n c e that is, y o u must have g ood reasons for

believing in order to claim that y o u know jj. Lucky

g u e sses or wishful t h i n k i n g do not c o n s titute knowledge.

Fo r example, you m a y believe that y o u hold t h e w i n n i n g

t i c k e t in next w e e k s lottery, and it might come to pass

t h a t you do in fact w i n the grand prize. T h e fact t h a t you

h e l d a true belief, however, does not mean t h a t you k n e w you

w o u l d win. No kn o w l e d g e is possible without some b a s i s for

knowledge. In addition, you cannot claim to have k n o wledge

of any proposition if there is evidence that c o n t r a d i c t s the

t r u t h of that proposition. Nor is the posses s i o n of

r e l i a ble evidence su f f i c i e n t to guarantee knowledge. We

h a v e all had the e x p e r i e n c e of being told t h e solution to a

ri d d l e and thinking that w e should h a v e been able to

deci p h er it ourselves. E v i d e n c e , l ike truth and

beliei, is a n e c essary but i n s u f f i c i e n t co n d i t i o n for

knowledge.

Taken together, however, truth, belief, and evi d e n c e

constitute a sufficient condition for propositional

knowledge. Truth and belief are s e lf-evident conditions;

 11

ep i s t emological d i s c u s s i o n s and d e b a t e s generally focus upon

the q u e s t i o n of adequate evidence.

But what c o n s t i t u t e s "sufficient evidence" for

knowledge? What are the "good r e a s o n s " w h i c h s u b stantiate

and v a l i d a t e our claims to p r o p ositional knowledge? The s e

q u e s t i o n s a ddress the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l con c e r n with

the source of kn o w l e d g e , and c h a l l e n g e us to specify how we

know w h a t we know.

Epistemological F o undations

There are sev e r a l alleged b a s e s for knowledge, some

more reputable t h a n others. P h i l o s o p h e r s generally identify

six to nine d i f f e r e n t w a y s of k n o w i n g (Hospers 1967:122-141;

Abel 1976:24-26); I want to list, a n d dis c u s s briefly, seven

pur p o rted e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l foundations. Each of the

f o l l o w i n g is f r e q u e n t l y used to j u s t i f y claims to kn o w l e d g e :

1. Sense E x p e r i e n c e . This is t h e most obvious and

most common of all epistemological foundations. Knowledge

o b t a i n e d through sense experience is kno w l e d g e o btained by

seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, and/or smelling. We

have other p h y s i c a l senses, too, that are not always

incl u ded within the traditional l ist of five basic senses,

such as the k i n e s t h e t i c sense w h i c h provides information

about body m o t i o n and position. But sensory perception is

not a direct p ath to knowledge. Environmental conditions,

e motional and b i o c h e m i c a l states, and l e a r n e d p r e c o n c e p t i o n s

c ontribute to m a k e sensory p e r c e ptions subjective and

changeable. The h u m a n brain o r g a n i z e s sense data in

 12
p a r t i c u l a r w ays d e p e n d e n t upon learning, context,

experience, language, and a host of other variables. Any

act of sensory p e r c e p t i o n is a selective act of

interpretation.

2. L o g i c . T his e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l foundation is

c o n c e r n e d only w i t h the v a l i d i t y of inference. It t e lls us

whether a co n c l u s i o n is jus t i f i e d by its premises. T hus we

know that S o c r a t e s is m o r t a l if we know that S o crates is a

m a n and that all men are mortal, but our k n o w l e d g e of

Socrates' mortality is j u s t i f i e d only if it is true that

S o c r a t e s is a man and t h a t all men are m o r t a l and l o gic

alone cannot establish the truth of those premises. T hat is

why D e s c a r t e s elevated reas o n above experience; when he said

"I think, t h e r e f o r e I am,'1 he depended upon no empirical

premises. But reason alone w i l l not yield knowledge of the

exter n al world.

3. A u t h o r i t y . I k now that the moon is

approximately a q u a r t e r - m i l l i o n m i l e s from the earth because

I ac c e pt the authority of astronomers. Whether an appeal to

au t h o r i t y c o n s t i t u t e s a le g i t i m a t e basis for knowledge

d e p e n d s upon the l e g i t i m a c y of the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l

foundations upon w h i c h the a u t h o r i t y ' s k n o wledge is based.

4. C o n sensus G e n t i u m . T h e consensus of the

people, or common knowledge, is often claimed to be a basis

of kn o wledge: "I know it's true because everybody knows

it's true." Everyone knows, for example, that hard work,

thrift, and p e rseverance are guarantors of material success

in c o n tem p o r a r y U.S. s o c i e t y or t hat women, on the whole,

 13

are m o r e emotional than men. Consensus gentium,

obviously, is an entirely un r e l i a b l e f o u n d a t i o n for

k n o w l e d g e yet it is a fo u n d a t i o n to w h i c h frequent appeal

is made.

5. Intuition. This basis for knowledge is perhaps

best defined as unanal y z e d inference. By ap p e a l i n g to

intuition, you really do not describe how you know w hat you

know. D i f ferent people h ave different i n t u i t i o n s about the

same events, entities, and relationships, and there is,

accordingly, no way to di s t i n g u i s h between a c curate and

in a c c u r a t e i n t u i t i o n s on purely intuitional grounds.

6. Revelation. Many people claim to have acquired

k n o w l e d g e as the result of c o m m unication (through dreams,

visions, visitations, sacred books, and the like) with the

sup e r natural realm. But the revelatory kn o w l e d g e claimed by

d i f f e rent people is often contradictory. (Some people

believe, by revelation, that Jesus Christ is the son of God;

others believe, also by revelation, that the true Mes s i a h

has yet to come.) How is it possible to tell a true

r e v e l a t i o n from a false one? To everyone but the claimant,

r e v e l a t i o n is i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from intuition.

7. Faith. Many people claim to know that God

exists because they have faith in G o d's existence. If faith

could e s t a b l i s h knowledge, then w e could claim to know

a n y t h i n g that w e could imagine. The epis t e m o l o g i c a l

f o u n d a t i o n of faith is absolutely unsupportable. Belief

alone is not sufficient to establish knowledge. People who

claim to h a v e knowledge by faith abdicate their

responsibility to offer good rea s o n s for their belief.

There are other sources and supposed s o u r c e s of

knowledge. We justify our claims to knowledge of our own

emotional and cognitive states by appeal

to s e l f - a w a r e n e s s (it w o u l d be po i n t l e s s to a s k someone how

they know that they are angry); memory affords a problematic

knowledge of past events; some people claim to have

direct e x t r a - s e n s o r v knowledge of other people's thoughts.

Most claims to k n o w l e d g e and all those claims w i t h w h i c h

this book is c o n c e r n e d are based upon one or m o r e of the

seven e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n s listed above. All of

t h e m sense experience, logic, authority, co n s e n s u s

g e n t i u m , intuition, revelation, and f a i t h are

fallible. This does not abs o l v e us of the o b l i g a t i o n to

justify our claims to knowledge, however. Each of these

seven w a y s of knowing may be problematic, but t hey are not

all equally valuable.

Epistemological Responsibility

No s i n g l e source of k n o w l e d g e is totally reliable at

all times in all situations, but it w o u l d be f o l l y to

conclude that reliable kn o w l e d g e is thereby u n o b tainable.

Because it is always possible that your senses m a y deceive

you, you cannot know with abs o l u t e certainty t h a t you are

reading a b o o k at this m o m e n t but neither can y o u

reasonably doubt it. The p h i l osophical position of

u n q u a l i f i e d and u n c o m p r o m i s i n g e p i s t e m i c sk e p t i c i s m is, as
 15

Cornman and Lehrer (1968:111^ observe, "a sham and a

delusion. W e cannot lead h u m a n lives without acting as

t h o u g h we did have knowledge about the world. Our clai m s to

knowledge are pragmatically j u s t i f i e d by the fact that our

ep istemic a s s u m p t i o n s allow us to predict and control the

world. Our claims to k n o wledge are m o r e than simply

expedient assumptions, however. The first criterion of

pr o p o sitional knowledge, remember, is that the p r o p o s i t i o n

m ust be true. Yet there are tho s e w h o claim that o b j e c t i v e

truth is either u n attainable or nonexistent.

P h e n omenology is the name of the philosophical school

w h i c h holds that "reality" e x i s t s only as it is def i n e d by

human ob s e r v e r s (Schutz 1967; Dou g l a s 1970). Since there

are d i f ferent human observers w i t h different cultural

backgrounds, different experiences, different attitudes, and

different expectations, there are necessarily different

r e a l i t i e s or so runs the phenomeno l o g i c a l argument.

Perception, after all, requires interpretation, and the

phenomenologists conclude that no one i n t e r pretation is any

more real or true than another. Different w i t n e s s e s to a

crime or acc i d e n t commonly r e p o r t quite different det a i l s of

the event; p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t s a r g u e that no report, whether

the v i c t i m s, the police officer's, or the bystander's, is

anyt h ing o t her than one pa r t i c u l a r subjective account.

The w e a k n e s s of the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t ' s argument m a k e s it

difficult to imagine how that a rgument could ever have been

taken seriously. Consider the example of the accident

w i t n e s s e d by several people f r o m several different

 16
cognitive, emotional, and p h y s i c a l vantage points. Either

t h ere is or there is not a standard, o b j e c t i v e v ersion of

the e v e n t in other words, t h e r e either is or is not a

v e r s i o n that is e x i s t e n t i a l l y valid i n d e p e n d e n t of any

observer. If there i s such a version, why is it not

p o s s i b le that one of the o b s e r v e r s could h a v e produced an

a c c o u n t t h a t agreed w i t h it? W h y would it not be possible

to d e v e l o p epistemologica l p r o c e d u r e s that w o u l d

consistently apprehend the o b j e c t i v e v ersion of any event?

Why is it a logical impossibility for any "constituted

r e a l i t y" to agree w i t h o b j e c t i v e reality? T h e r e is no

reason. The b a rriers to o b j e c t i v e knowledge are empirical,

not logical. Moreover, the phen o m e n o l o g i c a l argument is

d o o m e d eit h e r way. If there is not an o b j e c t i v e version of

the accident, then w h a t in t h e world hap p e n e d to inspire the

d i f f e r ent interpretations?

We know the w o r l d exists; w e know that e v e n t s happen in

the world; if we c a n n o t claim to know these things then

there is lit t l e point in any d i s course w h a t s o e v e r about the

na t u r e and source of knowledge. The e m p irical barriers to

k n o w l e dge challenge us to d e v e l o p e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l procedures

that will yield c o n s i s t e n t l y r e liable knowledge. We cannot

at t a i n a bsolute certainty, but w e can seek k n o w l e d g e in a

r e s p o n s i b l e fashion. Epistemological r e s p o n s i b i l i t y demands

that we s eek the gr e a t e s t d e g r e e of certainty possible. In

oth e r words, e p istemologi cal r e s p o nsibility dem a n d s that we

continually evaluate our e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l foundations.

 There is a sim p l e test to determine whe t h e r any

epistemological foundation s a t i s f i e s the criteria of

r e s ponsible inquiry: i s ills k n o w l e d g e .obtained fxoin tJiai

epistemological foundation self-correcting? The

i nfor mation o b t a i n e d from sense e x p e rience may be

misleading, but the validity of sense experience data can be

checked and r e c h e c k e d by i n d e p e n d e n t observers and either

confirmed or denied. Logic y i e l d s infallible k n o w l e d g e if

the premises in q u e s t i o n are true; it is always p o s s i b l e to

recheck the steps used in logical analysis and to con f i r m or

deny the v a l i d i t y of inference. Even authority is l argely

s e l f - correcting, because the a u t h o r i t y ' s creden t i a l s can

always be r e c h e c k e d and d i f f e r e n t author i t i e s can be

q u e s t i o n e d although, of course, the ultimate val i d i t y of

knowledge o b t a i n e d by authority rests upon the v a l i d i t y of

the a u t h o r i t y ' s e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l foundations. Hence sense

experience, logic, and aut h o r i t y are, to varying d e g r e e s and

w i t n certain obv i o u s qualifications, responsible modes of

inquiry.

C o n s e n s u s g e n t i u m , intuition, revelation, and

faith, however, are all i r r e s p o n s i b l e e p istemological

foundations. None are self-correcting. Consensus

gentium may yield consistent i n f o r m a t i o n upon rechecking,

but it is q u i t e like l y to be false information. Intuition,

revelation, and f a i t h are n o t h i n g m o r e than r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s

for the a b r o g a t i o n of e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l responsibility. This

is not to d e n y that intuition is freque n t l y a valuable

 18

source of inspiration, but no claim to knowledge is

supportable if it is based solely upon unanalyzed inference.

W h i c h brings us to science. The scientific a p p r o a c h is

the only mode of inquiry that syste m a t i c a l l y and

c o n s i stently appeals to s e l f - c o r r e c t i n g epist e m o l o g i c a l

foundations. I agree w h o l e h e a r t e d l y w ith Harris (1979:6)

that "science is a superior way for human beings to obtain

k n o w l edge about the w o r l d in w h ich we live." The

epistemological value of science stems in large part from

the fact that science is p r a cticed by a critical c o m munity

of scientists, and that fact has several important

i m p l i c a t i o n s for the conduct of s c i e n t i f i c inquiry and the

a d v ance of scientific knowledge. Before c o n s i d e r i n g those

i mplications, though, it w ill be helpful first to have

precise d efinitions of science and s c i e ntific explanation.

S cience Def i n e d and De f e n d e d

The scientific a p p r o a c h is a re l a t i v e l y recent

invention, but the impetus for s c i e ntific inquiry is as old

as the human species itself. The p h i l o s o p h e r Ernest Nagel

a t t r i b u t e s the m o t i v a t i o n for science to the human need for

relia ble accounts of the world:

It is the desire for e x p l a n a t i o n s which

are at once system a t i c and c o n trollable
by factual evidence that g e n erates
science; and it is the o r g a n i z a t i o n and
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of knowledge on the
basis of e x p l a n a t o r y principles that is
the d istinctive goal of the sciences.
(1961:4)
 19
A c c o r d i n g to Nagel, it is the " s y s t e m a t i c and

controllable" nature of the sc i e n t i f i c en t e r p r i s e that

distinguishes science from "common sense." Common sensical

explanations, unlike s c i e n t i f i c explanations, have limited

a ppli cability, are e x p r e s s e d in i n d e t e r m i n a t e language, and

are often c o n t r a d i c t o r y (ibid.). The value of the

s c i e n tific a pproach l i e s in its potential abi l i t y to

o v e r c o m e these shortcomings.

S c i e n t i f i c inquiry is pr e d i c a t e d upon certain

o n t o l ogical assumptions, chief among them t h e assumption

that an ob j e c t i v e r e a l i t y exists and is ame n a b l e to human

inquiry. T hat a s s u m p t i o n is shared by natural scientists

and social sc i e n t i s t s alike. The a n t h r o p o l o g i s t Marvin

Harris (iyb4:169), for example, writ e s that "the basic

p r e m i se of empirical science is that there a r e things

ou t s i d e of the o b s e r v e r w h i c h no amount of merely logical

manipulation can c r e a t e or destroy." Sci e n c e attempts to

d i s c o ver and explain the nat u r e of those "things" in a

precise, rigorous, and t e s t a b l e manner. The "distinctive

aim of the s c i e n t i f i c e n terprise," a c c o r d i n g to Nagel

(iyb1:15), "is to p r o v i d e systematic and r e s p o n s i b l y

s u p p o rted e x p l a n a t i o n s . "

The aim of the s c i e n t i f i c enterprise is not, however,

to u n cover "absolute truth." Science is a h u m a n enterprise,

de s i g n e d to serve h u m a n needs and interests. We ap p r e h e n d

and c o m p r e h e n d the u n i v e r s e in human terms; w e can only know

w h a t w e can perceive or infer; our i n s t r u m e n t s of p e r c eption

are l imited by our b o d i e s and our ingenuity. T r u t h is thus

 20
best def i n e d in pragmatic terms: a proposition is

considered to be true if it e n a b l e s us to make sense of the

world. But the "truth" of any proposition is alw a y s subject

to r e v i e w astrology allows its adherents to make sense of

the world. A propos i t i o n can always be replaced by another

propo sition that accounts for the w o r l d m o r e reliably, more

consistently, and more c omprehensively. There is then no

"final truth." Ob j e c t i v e reality e x i s t s if there was

not s o m e t h i n g to be known, t h e r e w o u l d be no problem of

k n o w l edge but objectivity is, in a sense, relative. It is

relative to the needs, interests, goals, and sensory

apparatus of human beings. Sci e n c e is intended to explain

the " objective" nature of reality r e lative to h u m a n

be i n g s and that is the only kind of objectivity w h i c h can

truly con c e r n us.

Pelto and Pelto suggest a definition of science that is

p r o v i sionally acceptable:

S c i e n c e is the s t r ucture and the processes

of discovery and v e r i f i c a t i o n of systematic
and r eliable k n o wledge about any relatively
e n d u r i n g aspect of the universe, carried
out by means of empirical observations,
and the d evelopment of concepts and
p r o p o s i t i o n s for i n t e r r e l a t i n g and e x p l a i n i n g
s uch observations. (1978:22)

That d e f i n i t i o n is ade q u a t e but for one omission:

other than to say that the " p r o c e s s e s of discovery and

verification" are "carried o u t by empirical obser v a t i o n s , "

Pelto and P e l t o fail to s pecify exactly w hat those processes

are. S c i e n t i f i c inquiry is c o n d u c t e d under the a s s u m p t i o n

 21

that no concept, no fact, no idea is immune to critical

scrutiny. Every scientific premise is a premise to be

tested again and again and di s c a r d e d if proven untrue. Thus

Nagel (iyb1:13) says t h a t "the practice of scientific meth o d

is the p e r s i s t e n t critique of a rguments." Abel (1976:81)

ma i n t a i n s that "there is no single scientific m e t h o d other

than the u n r e m i t t i n g c r i t i c i s m of evidence and r e a soning in

every way possible."

Scientific statements are critiqued in a special way.

The p h i l o s o p h e r Karl Popper (1959) has shown that scient i f i c

theo r ies are never v e r i f i a b l e ; w h a t was proven true

y e s t e rday could, logically, be untrue tomorrow (the fact

that the sun has risen every m o r n i n g for the past four

b i llion y e a r s does not m e a n that it will necessarily rise

tomorrow). Popper (ibid. :41) arg u e s that the scientific

m e t h o d c o n s i s t s of a ttempts to falsify t heories rather than

to verify them: Jlifc m u s t Jifi p ossible for j n empirical

sc i e n tific system lie r.e fufc& d Jiy e x p e r i e n c e . " if the

real w o r l d of events and en t i t i e s could

never p ossibly disprove a given proposition, then there

w o u l d be no limits, other than the limits of the human

imagination, upon the content of that proposition. It must

be p o ssible to test a sc i e n t i f i c a s s ertion against the

co n d i tions of the world. F a l s i f i a b i l i t y , then, is the

essential c r i terion of sc i e n t i f i c status. Popper (1963:256)

m a i n t a i n s that "a system is to be considered as scientific

only if it m a k e s a s s e rtions w h i c h may clash with

observations."
 22

Some p h i l o s o p h e r s and s c i e n t i s t s have objected that

scientists rarely attempt to f a l s i f y their theories in

p r a c t i c e or, if they do, they r a r e l y a c c e p t evidence of

f a lsification as su f f i c i e n t gro u n d s to d i s c a r d a theory.

Harris (1 y79:17 IB), for example, argues t h a t Popper

neglects to s p e c i f y at w h a t point t h e ev i d e n c e of

falsification s h o u l d be accepted a s sufficient to f a l s i f y a

theory. P o p p e r s cr i t e r i o n of f a l s i f i a b i l i t y , a c c o r d i n g to

Harris, fails to come to grips w i t h scientific practice:

"One bla c k swan d oes not lead to t h e falsification o f the

belief that all swans are white b u t rather to such q u e s t i o n s

as: Is this b l a c k bird w i t h a l o n g neck really a s w a n ? "

( i b i d . :17).

T h a t point is well taken, but I think the thrust of

H a r r i s s criticism, and others l i k e it, is wide of t h e mark.

Popper (1959:86) r e c o g n i z e d that f a l s i f i a b i l i t y and

falsification w e r e not t h e same t h i n g ; he ma i n t a i n e d that

any particular ev i d e n c e of falsif i c a t i o n m u s t have a

"reproducible e f f e c t " in order to falsify a theory. Popper

did not specify at what point c o n t r a d i c t o r y evidence

constitutes f a l s i f i c a t i o n , because that s p e c i f i c a t i o n is up

to the individual s c i entist and is m ade w i t h regard t o a

particular theory. Popper merely insists that scientific

practice consists, s h o u l d c o n s i s t , of t h e precise

identification of the p o i n t of f a l s i f i c a t i o n . As I m r e

La katos (1970:92) argues, "intellectual h o n e s t y c o n s i s t s . .

. in specifying p r e c i s e l y the c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r which one is

w i l l i n g to give up one's position."

 23
I suggest, therefore, that science can be usefully

defined in the f o l l o w i n g manner: science i s .3 systematic

method inquiry b a s e d upon empirical pbS.e.r.y.aiLign w h i c h

_ssi i a pr.a.y.ide c oherent, reliable, a n d testable
explanations e m p i r i c a l p h e nomena and which rejects all
a cc o u nts, descriptions, a n d analyses that .ar.e either nat
faisifiabie ar that h a x e .bse n d e c isiv ely falsified.
Not all p h i l o s o p h e r s agree that the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of

scientific commun i t i e s is a d evelopment to be lauded,

h owever. One of the m ost strident critics of the s c i e n t i f i c

approach is Paul F e y e r abend. Be l i e v i n g that contemporary

W e s t e r n nations have e m b r a c e d the scient i f i c t r a d i t i o n and

institutionalized what amounts to e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l hegemony,

Feyerabend (1975:299) calls for the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of

"epistemological a n a r c h y " an intellectual and social

environment in w h i c h e v e r y o n e w o uld "have a chance to make

up h i s own mind and to live in accordance w i t h the social

b e l i e f s he finds m o s t acceptable." Feyerabend argues that

actual s cience is a far cry from ideal science. In practice,

he says, scientists a r e opp o s e d to s k e p t i c i s m and respond

emotionally and i r r a t i o n a l l y when their t h e o r i e s are

challenged. He i n s i s t s that science is not a "neutral

structure contai n i n g p o s i t i v e knowledge that is independent

of culture, ideology, [and] prejudice" (ibid.:302).

Feyerabend (ibid.:30b) argues further that "a matu r e citizen

is a person who has l e a r n e d to make up his own mind and who

has then decided in f a v o r of what he thinks suits h i m best."

Feyerabend subscribes to an e ssentially p h e nomenological

 24

view of t r u t h : "it is the vote of everyone concerned

that dec i d e s f u n d a m e n t a l issues such as . . . the truth of

basic bel i e f s s uch as the theory of evolution" (ibid.:309).

Feyerabend is correct, of course, in the u n s t a r t l i n g

o b s e r v a t i o n that science is a h u man enterprise. Individual

scientists are som e t i m e s pr e j u d i c e d and irrational, and they

do at times res p o n d e m o t i o n a l l y w hen their t heories are

c h a l l e n g e d as w e shall see in Chapter Four. Cultural bias,

ideology, prejudice, and i r r a t i o n a l i t y do not c h a r a c t e r i z e

science as a whole, however. The gap between actual science

and ideal science is m u c h smaller than F e y e r a b e n d imagines.

As Abel (1976:82) notes, "science is a social and

s e l f - c o r r e c t i n g enterprise"; and, as Harris (1979:27-28)

aptly remarks, "it is precisely as an ideal that the

u n i q ueness of science d e serves to be d e f e n d e d . "

F e y e r a b e n d * s a n a l y s i s is m ore than i n t e l l e c t u a l l y deficient,

however; it is m o r a l l y bankrupt. His definition of a

"mature c itizen" is a portrait of a narrow-minded,

uncritical, e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y - i r r e s p o n s i b l e individual

w i l l i n g to content h i m s e l f or h e r s e l f with unexamined

r a t i o nalizations. "Truth" cannot be establ i s h e d by

c o n s e nsus unless you are w i l l i n g to grant the "truth" of

such u n s u p p o r t a b l e p r o p o s i t i o n s as the i r r a t i o n a l i t y of

women, the i nferiority of blacks, or the presence of

extraterrestrials in Antartica.

Feyerabend*s (1975:299) call for a " s e p a r a t i o n between

state and science" is st riki n g l y similar to the contem p o r a r y

funda mentalist call for a s e p a r a t i o n between state and

 25

"secular h u m a n i s m . " F e y e r a b e n d ' s imp l i c i t analogy between

science and re l i g i o n is who l l y unjustified. Granted,

sc i e n tific inquiry and religious inquiry both yield systems

of belief. But science and r e l i g i o n are d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e

first and f o r e m o s t on e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l grounds. Science

s a tisfies the c riteria of r e s p o n s i b l e inquiry; religion does

not. The p r i v i l e g e d status of s c i e n t i f i c knowledge results

from the fact that scientific inquiry yields ob j e c t i v e

k n o w l e d g e a claim w h i c h neither re l i g i o n nor F e y e r a b e n d ' s

epistemological anarchy can make.

Objectivity carries a p a r t i c u l a r m e a n i n g for

scientists, and it should not be co n f u s e d w ith dog m a t i c

positivism. A c c o r d i n g to F r a n k C u n n i n g h a m (1973:4)

s c i e ntific o b j e c t i v i t y implies two things. First,

o b j e c t ivity m e a n s that accounts, descriptions, and a n alyses

of a phenom e n o n m ust be offered w i t h o u t regard for the

ob s e r v e r ' s t h o u g h t s and feelings about that phenomenon.

Second, o b j e c t i v i t y means that two rival theories about a

given ph e n o m e n o n cannot both be correct. Objectivity, in

other words, is e s s e n tially an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l construct; it

is an a g r eement among s c i e ntists a b out the approp r i a t e ways

of gaining knowledge. The point to be stressed here is that

individual scientists do not e s t a b l i s h the o b j e c tivity of

science; this is w h e r e F e y e rabend m a k e s his mistake.

O b j e c t ivity is the result of the social nature of the

sc i e n tific enterprise. Hempel (1965:334) mai n t a i n s that

s c i e ntific t h e o r i e s are objective if they are "capable of

test by re f e r e n c e to publicly a s c e r t a i n a b l e evidence."

 26

Kaplan and M a n n e r s (1972:25) correctly locate objectivity

"in tne critical traditions of a d i s c i p l i n e . 11 Charles

Frankel has off e r e d the definitive defense of scientific

objectivity:

T h e r e are two principal reasons why

scientific ideas are objective, and
neither has an y t h i n g to do with the
personal merits or social status of
individual scientists. The first is that
these ideas are the result of a
c o - o p e r a t i v e process in w h i c h the
individual has to submit h i s results to
the test of public o b s e r v a t i o n s w h i c h
others can periorm. The second is that
these ideas are the result of a process
in w h i c h no ideas or assumptions are
re g a r d e d as sacrosanct, and all inherited
ideas are subject to the continuing
correc t i o n of experience. (1955:138-139)

"In the enti r e course of prehistory and hi s t o r y , "

wr i t e s Marvin Har r i s (1979:27), "only one way of k n o w i n g has

en c o u raged its own p r a c t i t i o n e r s to doubt t h eir own premises

ana to s ystematically expose their own conclusions to the

h o s tile scrutiny of nonbe l i e v e r s . " T h e scientific approach

is our best strategy for overco m i n g the practical barriers

to k n owledge about the world.

S c i e n t i f i c Explanation

We use the w o r d e x p l a n a t i o n in various w a y s to indicate

the answers to q u e s t i o n s of who, when, what, how, or why,

but it is generally agreed that scientific e x p l a n a t i o n s are

concerned with the answers to whv questions. It is

d i fficult to pin down exactly what w e mean by explanation.

"Very broadly speaking," says Carl Hempel (1965:425), "to

 27

e x p l a i n s o m e t h i n g to a person is to m a k e it plain a n d

intelligible to him." Hospers (1968) not e s that an

explanation is always offered in terms of something other

than the t h i n g to be explained. The criteria for

e xpla natory adequacy are hard to define: "in any g i v e n case

the e x p l a n a t i o n that will satisfy us depends on our intent

in asKing the q u e stion" (ibid. :78). In Abel's (1976:91 )

a p p r o p r i a t e m e t aphor, "the e x p l a n a t i o n releases t h e tension

that provoked the question." E x p l a n a t i o n s by m e t a p h o r and

a n a l o g y are o f t e n the most s a t i s f y i n g kind.

As Hempel (1965:489) observes, " t h e r e is no

s u f f i ciently c l ear generally accepted u n d e r s t a n d i n g as to

what counts as a scientific e x p l a n a t i o n . " A c c o r d i n g to

Hospers (1968:69-72), explan a t i o n s of w h v something occurs

or takes the f o r m it does are offered in many d i f f e r e n t

ways. Thus w e explain by ref e r r i n g to the purpose of a

phenomenon, or by showing a pa r t i c u l a r event to be an

i n s t a nce of a fa m i l i a r class of events, or by c l a s s i n g an

e v e n t as an i n s t a n c e of a general law, or by i d e n t i f y i n g

i n t e r mediate f a c t o r s re l a t i n g two phenomena, or by

describing the "cause" of a phenomenon. Nagel ( 1961:21)

m a i n t ains t hat there are four v a r i e t i e s of sc i e n t i f i c

explanation: deductive, probabilistic, t e l e o l o g i c a l and

g e n e t i c explanations.

Carl H e m p e l has offered w h a t is probably the m o s t

comprehensive and most useful analysis of scientific

explanation, however. A c c o r d i n g to H e m p e l (1965), all

scientific e x p l a n a t i o n s c onform to one of three types:

 28

d eductive-nomological, deductive-statistical, and

inauctive-statistical explanations.

In d e d u c t i v e - n o m o l o g i c a l explanations, the e x p l a n a n d u m

is log ically implied by the explanans. Deductive-

nomol ogical explanations show that the phenomenon in

question "was to be e x p e c t e d " given the particular

c i r c u m s t a n c e s and the applic a t i o n of general laws

(i b i d . :3^71. Thus w e e x p l a i n that the gas in the cylinder

e x p a n d e d w h e n hea t e d by reference to the general law that

the density of gas in a volu m e is d e t e r m i n e d by the

t e m p e r a t u r e of the gas. Not all d e d u c t i v e - n o m o l o g i c a l

e x p l a n a t i o n s are caus a l explanations, however. A c c o r d i n g to

Hempel, many d e d u c t i v e - n o m o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n s appeal to

"laws of c o e x i s t e n c e " (ibid.:352). Abel (1976:93), too,

says that a " s c i e n t i f i c explan a t i o n need not be a causal

law" despite the c o m m o n m i s c o n c e p t i o n that it should be.

Hospers (1968:72), however, observes that "causality" is a

vag u e and ambiguous term, and d e clares that "so loosely is

this w e a s e l - w o r d u s e d that I feel safe in saying that every

explanation is in s o m e sense or other a causal e x p l anation."

Deductive-statistical e x p l a n a t i o n s substitute

statistical probability for logical n e c e s s i t y when

e x p l a i n i n g a given p henomenon. Hempel (ibid.:380) describes

the "gambler's f a l l a c y " to illust r a t e the use of

deductive-statistical explanations. If a fair coin is

f l i p p e d fifty times, the probability of heads on the

f i f t i e t h toss is e x a c t l y .5, even if the previous fo r t y - n i n e

t o s s e s had all turned up heads (the u n i n f o r m e d gambler is

 29

likely to assume that it is m o r e probable for tails to

appear this time). The equal probability of heads or tails

on the fi f t i e t h toss is e x p lained by reference to two

s t a t i stical laws: one, that a random toss of a coin has a

.5 probability of tur n i n g up heads, and two, that the

p r o b a bility a s s o ciated w ith any single flip of the coin is

i n d e p e n d e n t of all previous tosses. Thus w e conclude,

deductively, that the fif t i e t h toss has a .5 probability of

showing heads.

Inductive-statistical e x p l a n a t i o n s also appeal to

stati stical probab i l i t y rather than to logical necessity,

alth o ugh unlike deductive-statistical explanations the

c o n c l u s i o n is not logically implied w ith deductive

certainty. Hempel (ibid.:38l) offers as an example a

patient w h o was cured of a s t r e p t o c o c c u s i n f ection by the

a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of penicillin. Not all patients su f f e r i n g

f r o m s t r e p t o c o c c u s w ill be cured if given p enicillin; some

will die or dev e l o p o t her in f e c t i o n s from other causes. But

we e x plain the p a t i e n t ' s recovery by reference to the

inductive-statistical law w h i c h holds that s t r eptococcus

patients given p e n i c i l l i n are very often cured. That

e x p l a n a t i o n releases t h e tension t hat provoked the q u e s t i o n

even though it d e s c r i b e d not w h a t necess a r i l y had to happen

but only what w a s likely to happen.

Deductive-nomological e x p l a n a t i o n s may c o n s t i t u t e the

ideal of scientific explanation, but statistical-

p r o b a b i l i s t i c e x p l a n a t i o n s are commonly used, especially in

the social sciences. As Hempel explains, statistical-

 30

probabilistic explanations are acc e p t e d to the extent that

they consider the total evidence available. In what has

been a controversial (but, I think, supportable) position,

Hempel has m a i n t a i n e d that all three t y pes of scientific

e x p l a n a t i o n appeal to general cov e r i n g laws. The "laws"

i n v o k ed by a p a r t i c u l a r ex p l a n a t i o n may be implicit,

especially in the case of i n d u c t i v e - s t a t i s t i c a l

e x planations, but l u r k i n g behind every scientific

e x p l a n a t i o n is some g eneralized principle. No scientific

e xp l a nation, in o t h e r words, is purely idiographic

although scientific explanations, of course, are applied to

p urely i d i o g raphic phenomena. But scientific explanations

c o m e in a variety of guises. There is no single c r i terion

for scientific e x p l a n a t i o n other than e m p irical

vulnerability.

A nother way of saying that all scientific explanations

ap p e a l to general c o v e r i n g laws is to say that all

s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n s are scientific theories. The

r e verse is also true. T hus Manners and Kaplan (1968:7) note

t h a t all scientific t h e o r i e s are explanations. Theories

an s w e r w h v ; t h e o r i e s are "generalizations . . . which

r elate classes or t y pes of phenomena to one another in

c e r t a in determ i n a t e w a ys" (ibid.). F a c t s are explained once

they have been s u b s u m e d u n der a set of theoretical

statements, but the facts themse l v e s are determ i n e d by the

theory. In the s t r i c t e s t sense of the term, there is no

s u c h thing as an " o b j e c t i v e " fact. Perception is sel e c t i o n

a n d i nterpretation; theory tells the s c i entist what to

select and how to interpret it. Good theory e x p l a i n s not

just the special case (like c a t a s t r o p h i s m in geology), but

all related cases. It is the f u nction of theory to decide

wh e t h er any two cases are related. Ideally, good theory

relates cases that were p r e v i o u s l y thought unrelated.

Reuben Abel (1976:83) says "a theory is arrived at . . . by

a leap of the imagination to a new unifying idea."

S c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i e s and e x p l a n a t i o n s should be

p a r s i m o n i o u s that is, they should account for much w ith

little. But parsimony has a relative rather than an

a b s o l ute value. If a theory explains e v e r y t h i n g it e x p l a i n s

nothing. Every fact in the world, for example, is c o n g r u e n t

w i t h the theory "Allah w i l l s . "

S c i e n t i f i c theories a r e not for g e d in isolation. They

are p roduced in c onjunction w i t h other theories der i v e d f rom

a common set of theoretical p r i n ciples and assumptions.

That state of affairs has several significant implic a t i o n s

for the con d u c t of s c i e ntific inquiry.

Scientific P a r a d i gms and S c i e ntific Progress

The n o t i o n of sc i e n t i f i c par a d i g m s is most closely

a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the p h i l o sopher Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn (1970a)

d e v e l o p e d the concept of p a r a d i g m a t i c inquiry in an attempt

to a c count for certain o b v i o u s a n o m a l i e s in the his t o r y of

science. Most contemporary p h i l o s o p h e r s of science agree

that the idea of scientific d e v e l o p m e n t - b y - a c c u m u l a t i o n is

untenable. S c i e n t i f i c pr o g r e s s is not an exclus i v e l y

 32

incremental matter. Modern chemistry is built upon a

rejection, not a refinement, of ph l o g i s t i c chemistry.

E i n s t ein's theory of relativity has supplanted N e w t o n i a n

physics, but it is d i f ficult to argue that the s c i e n t i s t s of

N ewt o n's day w ere less s c i e ntific or less rational than

modern scientists. What then ac c o u n t s for the d i f f e r e n c e ?

Why and how do s c iences change and d e velop? It is to these

q u e s t i o n s that the concept of p a r a d i g m a t i c r e search is

applied.

In The St r u c t u r e .& S c i e n t i f i c Revolutions, Kuhn

uses the term p a r a d i g m in two d i stinct senses:

On the one hand, it stands for the entire

c o n s t e l l a t i o n of beliefs, values,
techniques, and so on shared by the
m e m b e r s of a given community. On the
other, it denotes one sort of element in
that constellation, the concrete
p u z z l e - s o l u t i o n s which, emp l o y e d as
m o d e l s or examples, can replace explicit
rules as a basis for the solution of the
r e m a i n i n g puzzles of normal science. ( 1 9 7 0 a : 175)

That second sense of p a r a d i g m is w h a t Kuhn (1977:471)

calls " e x e m p l a r s " the shining ex a m p l e s of successful

research whi c h m e m b e r s of a given scientific community hold

as ideals. Sc i e n t i f i c c o m m u n i t i e s are comprised of

indi v iduals w h o have had e s s e n t i a l l y the same training,

share the same goals, and refer to the same literature.

S c i e n t ific c o m m u n i t i e s are c h a r a c t e r i z e d by relatively full

co m m u n i c a t i o n among their m e m b e r s and by relatively

una n i m ous agreement on m a t t e r s of professional judgment

w i t n i n their ranks (ibid.:461). Sc i e n t i f i c communities, in

 33

short, are c o m prised of scientists w h o share the same

exemplars. Malinowski's Trobriand ethnography might be

c o n s idered an anthropological exemplar.

It is that first sense of p a r a d i g m , how e v e r

p a radigms as c onstellations of bel i e f s and t e c h n i q u e s

which has been most influential. Kuhn ( i b i d . : 4 6 3 J r e f e r s to

a paradigm in this sense as a " d i s c i p l i n a r y matrix"; Harris

(1 y7 9 : 2 b) prefers the term " s c i e n t i f i c research strategy."

D i s c ip l i n a r y m a t r i c e s define the p r o b l e m s for research and

specify the a p p r o p r i a t e methods .& research. T hus p a r adigms

consist of pa r t i c u l a r ontological a s s u m p t i o n s and pa r t i c u l a r

epistemological principles; they embody as well a set of

t heoretical principles, from which, ideally, specific

t e s t able the o r i e s are derived; and p e r h a p s most importantly,

they include a defini t i o n of the a p p r o p r i a t e domain of

inquiry to w h i c h those e p istemological and theoretical

p r i n ciples are to be applied. As p a r a d i g m s become

established, they accumulate a body of particular

e xpla natory theories. Especially successful applications of

theory, then, become exemplars.

Pa r t i c u l a r scientific d i s c i p l i n e s may include one or

more paradigms (here and throughout t h e remainder of t his

book I use p a r a d i g m to mean d i s c i p l i n a r y

matrix or scient i f i c research strategy) . Paradigms are

roughly synonymous w i t h what w e r e once referred to as

d i s c i plinary schools. Anthropology, as we shall see in

Chapter Three, has several rival p a r a d i g m s competing for the

a l l e g iance of c o n tempora ry anth r o p o l o g i s t s . Historical

 34
p a r t i c u l a r i s m and diffusionism are examples of

anthropological paradigms that are no lon g e r popular in the

anthropological community. It is important to re m e m b e r that

p ar a d igms t h e m s e l v e s are not falsifiable, since paradigms

are n e i t h e r true nor false. The specific theories p r o d u c e d

by s c i e n t i f i c paradigms, however, are or should be

f a l s ifiable.

What then do paradigms h a v e to do w i t h the conduct and

development of science? In the usual course of events, Kuhn

argues, s c i e n t i s t s are c o n c e r n e d with a t t e m p t i n g to solve

the p u z z l e s presented by the p a r adigms under w h i c h they are

working. Normal scientific a c t i v i t y consists of a t t e m p t s to

expand t h e knowledge of facts r e vealed (or, if you prefer,

defined) by the paradigm. Most of the time, then,

s c i e n tists have three b r o a d p a r a d i g m a t i c concerns: first,

to d e t e r m i n e the facts at hand; second, to compare those

facts w i t h the p a r a d i g m ' s theoretical predictions; and

third, to d emonstrate and a r t i culate the paradigm's

theoretical principles (Kuhn 19 7 0 a : 2 5 - 2 b ) . Ac c o r d i n g to

Kuhn (iy7Ub:250), these a c t i v i t i e s constitute "normal

science," w h i c h is "the ge n e r a l l y cumulative process by

which the a c c e p t e d beliefs of a s c i e n t i f i c community are

fleshed out, articulated, and e x t e n d e d . "

In t h e pursuit of normal science, s c i e ntists

occasionally encounter new and u n s u s p e c t e d phenomena w i t h

which the e x i s t i n g paradigm c a n n o t deal successfully (Kuhn

1970a:52 passim). Initially, scientists respond to

the a w a r e n e s s of anomaly by c h a l l e n g i n g the o b s e r v a t i o n s

 35

which i d e n t i f i e d the i n t r a c t a b l e fact a n d by a d j u s t i n g the

theories w h i c h attempt to explain it (Kuhn 1 9 7 O b :13) If

m o d i f i c a t i o n s to the paradigm are not s u f f i c i e n t to account

for the perceived anomalies, however, normal science will

give way to s c i e n c e - i n - c r i s i s and the old paradigm w i l l be

overthrown and r e p l a c e d by a new p a r a d i g m w h i c h has

t r a n sf o r m e d the a n o m a l o u s into the e x p e c t e d (Kuhn 1970a:77).

These " scientific r e v o l u t i o n s " are the "central episodes in

scientific advance" (Kuhn 1970b:241).

Thus Kuhn argues that normal s c i e n t i f i c activity does

not consist simply of attempts to f a l s i f y theories. Tests

are frequently p e r f o r m e d in normal science, but they are

tests of the s c i e n t i s t s ingenuity at p u zzle-solving, not

tests of the th e o r i e s th e m s e l v e s (Kuhn 1 9 7 O b :5). The

theo r ies t h e m s e l v e s a r e not t e s t e d u n t i l the advent of a

crisis: "only when t h e y must choose b e t w e e n com p e t i n g

theo r ies do s c i e n t i s t s behave like p h i l o s o p h e r s " (ibid.:7).

This may seem l i k e a direct c h a l l e n g e to the

a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of P o p p e r ' s f a l s i f i a b i l i t y criterion, and,

indeed, Popper h i m s e l f has perceived it as such. Popper

accepts K u h n s c o n t e n t i o n that normal s c i e n t i f i c activity is

not c oncerned w i t h the critical e v a l u a t i o n of f undamental

theoretical assumptions, but he c o n s i d e r s that state of

affairs to be a ser i o u s threat to the s c i e n t i f i c enterprise:

"Normal" s c i e n c e . . . exists. It is the

activity of the non - r e v o l u t i o n a r y , or
m o r e precisely, the n o t - t o o - c r i t i c a l
pr o f essional; of the science student who
 36
accepts the ruling dogma of the day; w h o
does not w i s h to c h a llenge it . . .
(Popper 1970:52)

Kuhn, however, is not arg u i n g for the a b a n d o n m e n t of

the f a l s i f i a b i l i t y criterion as the essential sta n d a r d of

s c i e n t i f i c legitimacy. He is simply o b s erving that, in

practice, scientists are not and could not be strict

f a l s i f icationists. Kuhn (197O b :15) unders t a n d s Popper to

mean that s c i e n t i f i c t heories should be stated in such a way

that any event could be c l a s sified as either a c o n firmation

or a d i s c o n f i r m a t i o n of the theory, unless it w a s irrelevant

to the theory. As Kuhn (ibid.:16) remarks, "no scientific

the o r y satisfies those rigorous requi r e m e n t s . " In normal

science, evi d e n c e of d i s c o n f i r m a t i o n is absolutely

conclusive; some adjust m e n t or m o d i f i c a t i o n of the theory is

a l w a y s possible. Even Kuhn's critics agree w i t h him on this

point. Lakatos (1970:97), for example, ma i n t a i n s that

"d o g m atic f a l s i f i c a t i o n i s m . . . is untenable."

Kuhn is not arguing, like Feyerabend, that actual

science and ideal science are irreconcilable.

Falsifiability i s the essential c r i terion of the scientific

a pproach; it is the criterion by w h i c h any scient i f i c

e x p l a n a t i o n is to be evaluated. Kuhn simply argues that we

cannot u n d e r s t a n d the growth and d evelopment of science if

w e l o o k for e v i d e n c e of f a l s i f i c a t i o n i s m at work. Paradigms

are not aba n d o n e d because their t h eories have been

f a l s ified; they are abandoned bec a u s e they have

been replaced by other paradigms that account for the

 37

a n o m a l i e s with w h i c h the original paradigm could not

account. The a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l paradigm of

structural-functionalism, for example, was not ab a n d o n e d

b e c a u se its th e o r i e s w e r e disproved; it was a b a ndoned

because it was r e p l a c e d by other pa r a d i g m s (initially

neo-evolutionism and cultural ecology) which could account

for sociocultural c h a n g e s o m ething s t r u c t u r a l - f u n c t i o n a l i s m

could not do.

But w h a t factors p recipitate the a w a reness of anomaly?

At w h a t point do sc i e n t i s t s become d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h their

paradigms? This is one of the thorniest problems faci n g

K u h n i a n analysis. Lakatos (1970:178) says that "there is no

p a r t i c u l a r rational cause for the appearance of a Kuhnian

'crisis.'" Laudan (1977:74) critic i z e s Kuhn for the

" a r b i t r a r i n e s s " of the crisis point in normal science that

g i ves rise to the scient i f i c revolution. Kuhn (1970a:65)

a r g u e s that novelty emerges against a p a r a d i g m a t i c backdrop;

t h e s c ientist co m m i t t e d to a particular paradigm knows w ith

p r e c i s i o n w hat to expect in terms of an "ob s e r v a t i o n - t h e o r y

match," and is thus able to r e c o g n i z e the occurrence of

u n a n t i c i p a t e d facts. "Failure of exi s t i n g rules is the

pr elude to a search for new ones" (ibid.:68).

It is often difficult, however, for s c i e ntists to

r e c o g n i z e that the existing rules have failed unless those

rul e s have been c o m p a r e d w ith other rules that have been

successful. Again, paradigms are not simply abandoned; they

are r e placed by other paradigms. Lakatos (1970:116)

m a i n t a i n s that the history of science is the succes s i o n of

 38

" p r o g r e s s i v e problem s hifts." In his view, the crisis which

p r e c i p i t a t e s the r e v o l u t i o n is the ap p e a r a n c e of a

progressive paradigm. Lakatos (ibid.:119) argues, in

e f f ect, t h a t paradigms are p rogressive if they anticipate

the unanticipated: "a g i v e n fact is e x p lained

scientifically if a new f a c t is a l s o ex p l a i n e d w i t h it."

That seems u n o b j e c t i o n a b l e e n o u g h m o r e productive

p a r a d i g m s are better than l e s s pr o d u c t i v e paradigms. That

is a position with which K u h n w o u l d agree, for he suggests

that scientists rega r d " better" p a r a d i g m s as those paradigms

with greater "accuracy, scope, simplicity, fruitfulness, and

the like" ( 1 9 7 0 b :2611. But all of this l e a v e s essentially

unresolved the q u e s t i o n of what e n g e n d e r s paradigmatic

d i s e n c h a n t m e n t s a m o n g p r a c t i c i n g s cientists. Why and how

are old pa r a d i g m s rejected in favor of new ones? Kuhn

(iyyub:19) admits "there is much about t h e s e questions that

I do not u n d e r s t a n d and m u s t not pretend to." In all

probability, scientific r e v o l u t i o n s are in s p i r e d partly by

the failure of e x isting r u l e s and partly by the attraction

of p r o m i s i n g new rules. New rules, of course, are created

to account for the failure of old r u l e s but the failure of

old rules is at l e a s t partially def i n e d by the existence of

new rules. Fact and theory are i n t e r penetrating.

The m ost significant point of c o n t e n t i o n between Kuhn

a n d his critics, however, concerns the q u e s t i o n of

p a r a d i g m a t i c c o m m e nsurability. Paradigms incorporate a

definition of the problems to be i n v e s t i g a t e d and a

s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the t e c h niques to be used in the solution

 39

of those p r o blems. Kuhn argues that paradigms w h i c h define

different problems for i n v e s t i g a t i o n and specify d i f f e r e n t

means of s o l u t i o n are i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e . In the

comparison a n d e v a l u a t i o n of i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e paradigms, the

substantive c o n t e n t s of the p a r a d i g m s cannot be simply and

directly c o m pared. Any two r i v a l paradigms m u s t s h are some

standards of appropriateness in order for their pr o p o n e n t s

to agree u p o n q u e s t i o n s of p a r a d i g m a t i c merit. In a debate

between i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e paradigms, "the premises and valu e s

shared by t h e two parties . . . are not sufficiently

extensive f o r that" (Kuhn 1970a:94). The p a r t i c i p a n t s in

debates o ver i n commensurable p a r a d i g m s often t alk p ast one

another: " e a c h p aradigm will be shown to satisfy m o r e or

less the c r i t e r i a that it d i c t a t e s for itself and to fall

short of a few of those d i ctated by its opponent"

(ibid. :110).

Not all p a r adigms are incommensurable. If two

paradigms a g r e e about the nature of the problem to be solved

and about t h e a p p r o p r i a t e means of solving t hat problem,

they are c o m m e n s u r a b l e . Furthermore, paradigmatic

c o m m e nsur a b i l i t y is a relative m atter. Two p a r a d i g m s may

agree about the problem to be i n v e s t i g a t e d but d i s a g r e e as

to the m e a n s of solution. S c i e n t i f i c evolution and

"scientific c r e a t i o n i s m , " for e x ample, are both c o n c e r n e d

with the o r i g i n s of the human species, but the two p a r a d i g m s

have r a d i c a l l y different epistemological principles. If one

paradigm c h o o s e s to rely upon e x p e r i e n c e as its

epistemological foundation, it c a n m a k e no impact upon a

 40

p a r a d i g m that appeals u l t i m a t e l y to revelation. If the

participants in such a debate r e strict themselves to the

terms and as s u m p t i o n s of their own paradigms, they can h ave

n o t h i n g to say to one another. (This is why e p i s t e m o l o g y is

the common ground in all debates, whe t h e r the d e b a t e

i n v o l v e s c o m m e n s u r a b l e or i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e t heoretical

positions.)

C ritics h ave railed against the concept of p a r a d i g m a t i c

i n c o m mensurability. Karl Popper (1970:56) says "it is just

a d o g m a a dangerous d o g m a that the different f r a m e w o r k s

[of rival paradigms] are like mu t u a l l y unintelligible

languages." Lak a t o s (1970:178) i n t e rprets p a r a d i g m a t i c

incommensurability to m e a n that "there are no ra t i o n a l

s ta n d ards for their c o m p a r i s o n [since] each par a d i g m

contains its own s t a n d a r d s . " He faults Kuhn for arguing,

purportedly, that there is no w a y to j u d g e a theory except

by " a sses s i n g the number, faith, and ener g y of its

supporters" (ibid.:93). Harris (1979:21) accuses K uhn of

f a i l i n g to believe in "the inherent progressivism of

s c i e n t i f i c knowledge."

W h a t disturbs these critics most is the n o t i o n that the

incommensurability of pa r a d i g m s w o uld preclude the

e v a l u a t i o n of paradigms. Laudan (1977:71) insists that the

e v a l u a t i o n of paradigms is a c o m p a r a t i v e matter: "what is

crucial in any c o g nitive assess m e n t of a theory is how it

f a res w i t h respect to its compe t i t o r s . " Popper c o m e s to the

same conclusion:
 41
Thus in science, as distinct from theology,
a critical c o m p a r i s o n of the c o m p e t i n g
theories, of the c o m p e t i n g frameworks,
is always possible. And the denial of
this p ossibility is a mistake. (1970:57)

Each of these cri t i c s has m i s r e a d Kuhn. Yes, the

e v a l u a t i o n of paradigms is a comparative matter. Yes, it

would be a mistake to deny the necessity of t heoretical

comparison. But Kuhn does not deny that n e c e s s i t y nor does

he deny the fact of s c i e n t i f i c progress. Kuhn (1970a:206j

s t a t e s unequivocally that he is "a convinced b e l i e v e r in

s c i e n t i f i c progress." W h a t Kuhn does deny is the

possibility that the c o m p a r i s o n and e v a l u a t i o n of two

i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e p a r a d i g m s can be made in the terms of one

p a r a d i g m or the other. To f a ult a paradigm for its failure

to g r ant its c o m p e t i t o r s theore t i c a l pr i n c i p l e s or for its

disinterest in its c o m p e t i t o r s research p r o b l e m s is to beg

the question. To say that two rival p a r adigms are

i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e is not to imply that the p a r a d i g m s are of

equal value, significance, productivity, or s c i e n t i f i c

m erit. Granted, p a r a d i g m s m u s t be compared, but

p a r a d i g m a t i c theories w h i c h address completely different

q u e s t i o n s are not t h e m s e l v e s directly comparable.

Given that there is such a thing as s c i e n t i f i c

progress, it follows t hat some paradigms m ust be m ore

progressive than o t h e r s and it follows from that that it

must be possible to d e t e r m i n e w h i c h paradigms are m o r e

progressive and why. Kuhn (1970a:296) sug g e s t s that

s u p e r i o r paradigms are c h a r a c t e r i z e d by higher accuracy of

 42

prediction, greater precision of problem definition, and

greater success at pro b l e m solution. It is a fairly

straightforward matter to determine w h i c h of

two c o m m e n s u r a b l e p a r a d i g m s is s u p erior; simply a s c ertain

which solves the sta t e d problem m o r e precisely, reliably,

and accurately. But what about i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e paradi g m s ?

How are they to be evalua t e d ?

The answer is two-fold. In the first place, a paradigm

must be e v a luated in its own right, wit h o u t reference to

other incommensurable paradigms, ac c o r d i n g to the

appropriateness of its internal logic. Does the pa r a d i g m

fulfill its p r o m i s e ? Does it address m e a n i n g f u l q u e s t i o n s

consistently, coherently, and c o g e n t l y ? Is its field of

inquiry s u f ficiently broad and s u f f i c i e n t l y w e l l - d e f i n e d ?

Does it produce t h e o r i e s that are testable and f a l s i f i a b l e ?

A r e its solutions c o m p r e h e n s i v e and c o m p e l l i n g ? D oes it

leave s ignificant problems within its domain of inquiry

u n s o lved? T h e s e are the s t a ndards for the e v a l uation of

incommensurable paradigms.

Secondly, i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e p a r a d i g m s must be compared

with reference to t h e question of value. G i ven two

p a r a digms that a d d r e s s totally d i f f e r e n t questions, the

debate must i n e v i t a b l y touch upon the issue of which

p a r a d igm a d d resses t h e most s ignificant or important

questions (Kuhn 1970a:110). W h e t h e r imp l i c i t or explicit,

value positions are i nseparable f r o m the a ssumptions that

u n d e r lie all paradigms. The q u e s t i o n of value is an

unavoidable question in the selection of scientific

 43

paradigms, but it is not a q u estion whi c h can be answered by

science. It is ins t e a d a moral and p h i losophical question

and must be a d d r e s s e d on those grounds. T h ese principles of

p a r a d i g m a t i c c o m p a r i s o n and e v a l u a t i o n w i l l be illust r a t e d

in C h apter Three.

In summary, I h a v e reached several conclusions in this

chapter: first, that responsible inquiry entails critical

appeal to the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l foundations of experience,

logic, and authority; second, that the s c i e ntific approach

is a p r e - eminently v a luable way of gai n i n g kn o w l e d g e about

the world; and third, that s c i e ntific r e search involves the

c o n s t r u c t i o n and a r t i c u l a t i o n of s c i e n t i f i c paradigms. The

sc i e n t i f i c a p proach can be applied to a very wide range of

questions. The pro b l e m with which I will be concerned in

the chapters that follow is the n a t u r e of the h u man

condition; the a p p l i c a t i o n of the s c i e n t i f i c m e t h o d to that

problem is the subject of Chapter Two.

 CHA P T E R TWO
THE A N T H R O P O L O G I C A L P ERSPECTIVE

My excuse for v e n t u r i n g across disciplines,

continents, and c e n t u r i e s is that the w o r l d
extends across disciplines, continents,
and centuries.
Marvin Harris, .C.Q.W-S..,. .P.iss,,. .tearis A n d .Wikg-h&S

Most h i s t orical acc o u n t s of the d evelopment of

anthropology stress the f a c t that the discipline is hardly

more than a century old. A n t h r o p o l o g i s t s trace the origins

of their d i s c i p l i n e back t o the ancient Greeks, particularly

to H e r o d o t u s (whose parentage they must share w i t h

historians), but a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s have only been calling

themselves anth r o p o l o g i s t s since the latter part of the

nineteenth century. However, w h ile it is true that the

o r i g i n s of anthropology as a distinct discipline may be

t r a c e d to such ni n e t e e n t h century figures as H e r b e r t

Spencer, James Frazer, E d w a r d B. Tylor, and Lewis Henry

Morgan, the r e is nothing w h a t s o e v e r new about

anthropological inquiry. Or, m ore appropriately, there is

nothing whatsoever new a b o u t the field of anthropological

44
inquiry. In Images of M a n , A n n e m a r i e de Waal Malefijt

(lyYH:vii) c o r rectly ascribes the origins of anthropological

investigation to the "universal concern to understand human

experience and human behavi o r . " People have been asking

q u estions about the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between human beings,

nature, and c u l t u r e for as l o n g as there have been people.

The c ontem p o r a r y discipline of anthropology is hardly

original for h a v i n g posed those same questions; the

o r i g i nality and the m e r i t of the discipline lies in the

set of i n v e s t i g a t i v e ap p r o a c h e s and t heoretical assumptions

that c o n s t i t u t e the a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l perspective.

There i s som e t h i n g new about the method of anthropological

inquiry.

Everyone in the w o r l d h o lds t heories about human

nature, the m e a n i n g of human life, and human destiny;

everyone is c o m m i t t e d to some p a r t i c u l a r unders t a n d i n g of

human person a l i t y and human society; and everyone accounts

in some way for the facts of historical and cultural

differences a m o n g the societies of the world. Most of the

people in the world, of course, hold t h eir theories

implicitly. Most are wholly uncritical of the

epis t e mological f oundations of their theoretical

perspectives, and most assume, intuitively and

u n q u e s t i o n i n g l y , that their t h eories are isomorphic w i t h the

reality of the world. Further, no one in the w o r l d holds

wholly original the o r i e s about the human condition.

Explanations of, about, and for the hum a n experience are

central features of the cultural legacy of every society in

 the world. As a result, most p e o p l e base what t h e y know

about human nature and human l i f e primarily upon t h e

epistemological foundations of c o n sensus gentium,

intuition, and authority. (Very often, the "authorities"

whom appeal is made b a s e their k n o wledge upon

intuition, consensus g e n t i u m , a n d / o r revelation;

consider, for example, shamans, priests, celebrities,

astrologers, and "pop" p s ychologists.) The essence of the

anthropological p e r s p ective is a commitment to m o r e

responsible bases of knowledge.

An thropological knowledge, however, is d i s t i n c t not

only from f o l k knowledge, but a l s o from psychological,

so c i o logical, theological, astrological, and other more or

less s y s t e m a t i c sources of knowledge, scientific a n d

otherwise, a b out the h u m a n condition. This chapter

s u m m a rizes t h e essential, d i s t i nguishing features of the

anthropological perspective.

The S c i e n c e o f f l n t h r o p o l n f v

The f i r s t thing t o be noted about the a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l

perspective is that it is, or c o u l d be, or perhaps should

be, a s c i e n t i f i c perspective. T h o s e quali f i c a t i o n s are

necessary b e c a u s e there is not c o m p l e t e agreement among

a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s as to w h e t h e r anthropology is or is not a

science. ( T h e r e is f u r t h e r disag r e e m e n t about w h e t h e r

anthropology is or s h o u l d be " s i m p l y and narrowly"

a so c ial science.) Some contemporary anthropologists

b e l ieve that the anthropological perspe c t i v e d e r i v e s its

d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s f rom the c o m p r e h e n s i v e n e s s of its approach.

T h e y hold that a n t h r o p o l o g y embraces the p hysical sciences,

t h e social sciences, and the h u m a n i t i e s s i multaneously.

A c c o r d i n g to that argument, what makes anthropology

different is the fact that a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s b r ing a unified,

i n t e g r a t i v e vi e w p o i n t to bear on the human condition.

Aesthetic analyses of f o l k l o r e and s t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s e s of

b l o o d t y p e s are both a p p r o p r i a t e ac t i v i t i e s for

a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s to undertake, and t h e d e s i g n a t i o n "science"

is considered too n a r r o w to en c o m p a s s both endeavors. Given

t h a t l i terary a n a l y s e s and t h e like are usually not

s c i e n t i f i c enterprises, the point at issue is w h e t h e r

anthropologists who wish to pursue s uch a c t i v i t i e s should

properly claim to be "doing" anthropology. Or, if they

c l a i m to be p r a c t i c i n g anthropology, w hether a n thropology

should then claim to be a science.

In this book, I intend to follow w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d

p r e c e d e n t s and r e g a r d a n t hropology as a science. If some

anthropologists wish to pursue research under nonscientific

p aradigms, then I w o u l d have no objection a n d w o u l d not be

jealous of the label " anthropology," p r o v i d e d that the

r e s e a r c h qu e s t i o n s to be i n v e s t i g a t e d from a n o n s c i e n t i f i c

perspective could not be b e t t e r invest i g a t e d from a

s c i e n t i f i c viewpoint. (The a e s t h e t i c a n a l y s i s of art w o u l d

be an e x a m p l e of the kind of r e search that w o u l d be better

pu r s u ed v i a a n o n s c i e n t i f i c approach.) I maintain, however,

iHafc ilifi .g.:D.tral c o n c e r n anthronology i s un d e r s t a n d

 48
jjid .e.&Bla ia .human 11L& m d human b e h a v i o r ,, .and .that that
.goal joan best tie .ai.t a innd t.hr.o.u&b .scientific in.Quiry.
" Scientific a n t h r o p o l o g y " has t r a d i t i o n a l l y and

misleadingly been associated w ith ecological or m a t e r i a l i s t

anthropology, primarily because ecological anthropologists

h a v e made the m o s t consis t e n t and e x p l i c i t claims to a

s c i e n t i f i c approach. Julian Steward (1955:3), for example,

r e g a r ded his concept of m u l t i l i n e a r e v o lution as an

explicitly scientific approach, de f i n i n g the "scientific

a p p r o ach" as an attempt "to arrange phenomena in orderly

categories, to r e c o g n i z e consistent r e l a t i o n s h i p s between

them, to e s t a b l i s h laws of regularities, and to make

f o r m u l a t i o n s w h i c h have predictive val u e . " However, he also

co n t r a s t e d the "scientific, g e n e r a l i z i n g ap p r o a c h " w ith the

"historical, p a r t i c u l a r i z i n g ap p r o a c h " and sowed confusion

by s e e m i n g to imply that science is not co n c e r n e d with

e x p l a i n i n g either historical or particular, nonrec u r r e n t

e v e n t s and entities. In Theo r y of Cul t u r e C h a n g e ,

S t e w a r d argues in effect that a s c i e n t i f i c app r o a c h to

anthropological inquiry would n e c e s s a r i l y result in

ec o l o gical anthropology. The co n f u s i o n about science and

history is absent from H a r r i s ' s (1979:26; version of the

s c i e n t i f i c p e r s p e c t i v e "the aim of sc i e n t i f i c research

s t r a t egies . . . is to account for o b s e r v a b l e e n tities and

e v e n t s and their relationships by m e a n s of powerful,

i n t e r r e l a t e d p a r s i m o n i o u s theories subject to correc t i o n and

i m p r o v e m e n t through empirical t e s t i n g " but Har r i s too seems

to equate the s c i e n t i f i c perspe c t i v e in a n t h r o p o l o g y w ith a

 49
p a r t i c u l a r paradigm addressed t o a particular set of

questions, rather than with a p a r t i c u l a r method of inquiry.

H arris's Cultural M a t e r i a l i s m is subtitled T h e S t r u g g le for

.3 Science .& C u l t u r e , and his t h e o r e t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e

is a d i r e c t descendant of Ste w a r d ' s (Harris 1968). Des p i t e

the traditional associations w h i c h the term " s c i e n c e " has

among anthropol o g i s t s , however, the scient i f i c a p p r o a c h is

not e x c l u sively confined to e c o l o g i c a l anthropology.

Instead, it is the m e t h o d o l o g y of anthropological

inquiry, a d d ressed to wha t e v e r p a r t i c u l a r question, that

makes a n t h r o p o l o g y scientific. As Pel to and Pelto conclude:

A n thropology can be c o n s i d e r e d a science

because it involves t h e accumulation of
systematic and r e l i a b l e knowledge about
an aspect of the u n i v e r s e carried out by
empirical o b s e r v a t i o n and interp r e t e d in
terms of the i n t e r r e l a t i n g o f concepts
r e f erable to empirical observation.
(1978:24)

T h eir a s s e s s m e n t is w i d e l y s h a r e d among contemporary

anthropologists, and m o s t recent w r i t e r s who h ave been

c o n c e rned with anthropological theory have chosen to regard

a n t h r o p o l o g y as a science (see, for example, Naroll and

Cohen 1970; Kaplan and Manners 1972; B o h a n n a n and G l a z e r

1973; N a r o l l and Naroll 1973; V o g e t 1975; G a r b a r i n o 1977;

a n d of c o u r s e H a r r i s 1979). Furthermore, most

a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s have accepted P o p p e r ' s notion that

faisiflability is the essential c r i terion of the s c i e n t i f i c

approach. Thus Cohen (1970:32) says t h a t "whether or not

t h e theory is s c i e n t i f i c depends ultimately on w h e t h e r the

 50

ideas in v o l v e d can be submitted to a test of their

v a l i d i t y , " and Naro l l (1970:29) m a i n t a i n s that "scien t i f i c

r e s e a r ch . . . c o nsists of the c o n s t r u c t i o n of general and

elegant t heories to g e t h e r with the s y s t e m a t i c attempt

to disprove t h e m . 11 By these criteria, anthropology is

a science.

In the past twenty years, a r c h e o l o g i s t s have been m o r e

c o n c e r n e d with the scientific status of anthropology than

h a v e s ocio c u l t u r a l anthropologists. The "New A r c h e o l o g y , "

w h i c h appeared in the early 1960's, is an explicit and

t h o r o u g h - g o i n g a t t e m p t to make a r c h e o l o g y scientific

(Watson, LeBlanc and Redman 1971; R e d m a n 1973; W i l l e y and

Sabloff 1974). A r c h e o l o g i s t s t e n d to be m o r e f a miliar w i t h

contemporary iss u e s in the philosophy of science than are

sociocultural anthropologists, and a r c h e o l o g i s t s are m ore

likely than e t h n o l o g i s t s to adopt str o n g positivist

p o s i t i o n s Watson, L e B l a n c and R e d m a n (1974:126), for

example, endorse w i t h o u t q u a l i f i c a t i o n Hem p e l ' s c o n t e n t i o n

t h a t all s c i e ntific explanation is of the "covering law"

type. Fortun a t e l y , most c o ntemporary a r c h e o l o g i s t s c onsider

t h e m s e lves to be f i rst and f oremost anthropol o g i s t s ; if they

h a v e shored t h e s c i e n t i f i c f o u n d a t i o n s of archeology, then

they have hel p e d m a k e a n thropology as a w h o l e more

scientific.

Even though a m a j o r i t y of c o n t e m p o r a r y anthropologists

h a v e chosen to r e g a r d themselves as scientists, anthropology

remains a peculiar discipline and one w h o s e identity is

highly ambiguous. Outside the n a r r o w c o nfines of academia,

 51

anthropology is scarcely recognized. Despite the fact that

the substantial m a jority of A m e r i c a n a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s are

cultural anthropologists, a great many people tend to think

of a n thro p o l o g y as either archeology or paleontology. That

m i s p e r c e p t i o n may be due in part to the prominence of such

p o p u l ar figures as L o uis Leakey and Loren Eiseley, but I

t h i n k there are other factors involved.

The Ame r i c a n public is ignorant of cultural

a n t h r o p o l o g y because it has h e a r d very little of cultural

anthropology. Unless the topic is human evolution, the

ex p e r t opinions of a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s are not likely to be

solicited. If the public w a n t s a ccounts of Navajo

prehistory, it turns to a n t h r o p o l o g y - a r c h e o l o g y , but if it

w a n t s to un d e r s t a n d conte m p o r a r y human behavior, it turns to

psychology. Anthropological and p s y c hological accounts and

e x p l a n a t i o n s of human b e havior are often sharply divergent

and even contradictory, yet a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s have been

no t ably reluctant to challenge the e x p l a n a t i o n s offered by

p s y c h o l o g i s t s and other social scientists. Social

scientists, anthropologists included, tend to grant their

fel l o w scientists their claimed areas of disciplinary

expertise. Cross-disciplinary ch a l l e n g e s are rare. (The

e x c e p t i o n s occur w h e n scient i s t s o v e r s t e p their disciplinary

boundaries, as E.O. W i l s o n did in c reating human

s o c i obiology.) The disci p l i n a r y bo u n d a r i e s that divide the

social sciences are largely illusory; a n t hropology and

psychology, in particular, share m uch of the same domain of

inquiry. If a n thropology is to be a science, it must accept

 52

the c h a l l e n g e to confront c o m p e t i n g accounts f rom other

social sciences. In my view, a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s h a v e not

r e s p o nded a d e q u a t e l y or a p p r o p r i a t e l y to that challenge.

.Itie I dea .a ?o.g,ial S cien ce

Befo r e m o v i n g on to a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the particulars

of the a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l perspective, I should n o t e that there

are those w h o have challenged the very idea of a social

science. It is often claimed that the social or "soft"

s c i e n c es are less sc i e n t i f i c than the physical or "hard"

sciences, since the social s c iences cannot devise

experiments in w h i c h ail the v a r i a b l e s are controlled, and

since the social sciences are una b l e to predict social

events w ith abs o l u t e accuracy. Those critic i s m s stem f rom a

m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of what science is all about. Astronomers

are for the m o s t part unable to ex p e r i m e n t with their data,

and a t om i c p h y s i c i s t s routinely make probabilistic

p r e d i c t i o n s t h a t fall far short of absolute accuracy.

Empirical vulnerability is the essential c r i terion of

science, and t hat c r i terion a p p l i e s w h e t h e r scientific

inquiry is c o n d u c t e d in the la b o r a t o r y or elsewhere.

A more s i g n i f i c a n t ch a l l e n g e to the a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of

social science is as s o c i a t e d w i t h the term V e r s t e h e n ("to

understand"). Those p h i l o s o p h e r s of science w h o subscribe

to the V e r s t e h e n position insist that the met h o d s of the

physical s c iences cannot be app l i e d to the social sciences,

because human beings, unlike in a n i m a t e matter or energy,

inhabit artificial worlds of meaning. In order to

 53

u n d e r s t a n d h u m a n action, runs the argument, the social

sc i e n t i s t must introspectively empathize w ith the subjects

of his or her research. Peter W i n c h (1958) argues that

social scientific investigation is different in kind from

phys i cal scientific investigation, because the object of the

social sc i e n t i s t ' s research re s p o n d s to the presence of the

social scientist. Thus simply by studying his or her data

the social scientist unavoidably alters them.

W h i l e it is true that soci a l scientists are very likely

to alter the data they are s t u d y i n g and w h i l e it is true

that people imbue t h eir a c t i vities w i t h meaning, challenging

the social scientist to take a c c o u n t of the m e a n i n g s in

t h e i r h e a d s these are practical problems, not logical ones.

The r e q u i r e m e n t s for s c i e n t i f i c va l i d i t y remain the same,

r e g a r d l e s s of the particular m e t h o d or object of study.

Obviously subatomic p a r ticles and h u man beings cannot be

st u d i ed in the same way, but clai m s to knowledge about

s u b a t o m i c p a r ticles and human beings can be ev a l u a t e d

a c c o r d i n g to the same standards. For scientists, those

s t a n d ards include precision, reliability, objectivity, and

faisifiability. Charles Frankel has succinctly and

de f i n i t i v e l y dismissed the V e r s t e h e n argument:

Sympathetic identification . . . is neither

sufficient nor essential to guarantee the
discovery of truth in the human studies.
It is not s u f f i c i e n t because the mis t a k e s
that people make w h e n they think they
have id e n t i f i e d w i t h others are notorious;
it is not essential bec a u s e it is possible
to explain another p e r s o n ' s behavior
w i t h o u t i d e n t i f y i n g w i t h him. It w o u l d
be s o m e t h i n g of a n u i s a n c e if we tried to
 54

be s c h i z o p h r e n i c while w e studied
schizophrenia. I conclude, therefore,
that it is false to say that w e understand
the a c t i o n s of other h u m a n beings "only
bec a u s e they are known to us f rom the
w o r k i n g of our own m i n d s . " (1960:99)

The Maintenance of H u m a n Life and the

Maintenance of H u m a n Identity

I have s aid t hat the a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l perspective

e m b o d i e s the o r i e s about the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s between h u m a n

nature, human personality, human society, and human culture.

Now I want to a t t e m p t a m o r e precise de f i n i t i o n of the

domain of a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l inquiry. The social p hilosopher

Hannah Arendt m a k e s the point that the h u man species is

n e i t h er .sjji g e n e r i s nor entirely unoriginal among the forms

of l i f e found on earth:

The h u m a n ar t i f i c e of the w o r l d separates

h u m a n existence from all mere animal
environment, but life i t s e l f is outside
this artificial world, a n d thr o u g h life
man r e m a i n s related to all other liv i n g
organisms. (1958:2)

A r e n d t s point is one that has b e e n f undamental to the

an t h r o p o l o g i c a l perspective since the in c e p t i o n of the

discipline: t h e h u m a n artifice of cul t u r e is the primary

a d a p t ive m e c h a n i s m of the human species. Throughout his

career, Leslie W h i t e insisted upon a de f i n i t i o n of culture

as an e x t r a - s o m a t i c e n e r g y - c a p t u r i n g m e c h a n i s m dependent for

its e x i stence upon the use of symbols. Cl i f f o r d Geertz

(1y73:140) has been influential in the d e v e l o p m e n t of a

 55

c o n t e mporary p a radigm addressed to the c o nsequences and

i m p l i c a t i o n s of the fact that "man is a symbolizing,

conceptualizing, m e a n i n g - s e e k i n g a nimal." To be human,

then, is to live in a w o r l d that is both "real" and

"a r t i ficial," or in a w o r l d that is both shared and not

shared w i t h other animal species. In other words, the h u man

species faces two related but di s t i n c t tasks: the

maintenance of h u man life and the m a i n t e n a n c e of human

identity.

By the m a i n t e n a n c e of human life, I mean those

ac t i v i t i e s whose primary function is to satisfy the physical

and m e t a b o l i c a l r e q u i r e m e n t s of survival. The m a i n t e n a n c e

of human l ife includes those a c t i v i t i e s that may be subsumed

under the he a d i n g s of subsistence, reproduction, health, and

so on. The m a i n t e n a n c e of human l ife invariably implies

such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s as the d i vision of labor and the

maintenance of social order, since h u m a n physical needs are

u n i v e rsally s a t isfied by cultural means.

By the m a i n t e n a n c e of human identity, I mean those

a c t i v ities w h ose primary function is to define and d e m a r c a t e

h u man status, or those a c t i v i t i e s w h o s e express ori g i n lies

in the human t endency to impose symbol-mediated meanings

upon the world. The m a i n t e n a n c e of human identity involves

such activities as art, music, and ritual, and it

e n c o m p a s s e s such issues as the f o r m a t i o n of person a l i t y and

the f o r m u l a t i o n of world view. The Rites sil P a s s a g e ,

A r n o l d van G e n n e p * s (1960; or i g i n a l l y 1909) en d u r i n g cla s s i c

of h o l ocultural research, e xplores some of the p r o c e s s e s by

 56

which human identity is maintained. The philosopher Johan

H uiz i nga is concerned w i t h the m a i n t e n a n c e of human identity

when he argues that play is the f o u n d a t i o n of human culture:

Social l ife is endued w i t h s u p ra-biological

forms, in the shape of play, which
enhances its value. It is through this
playing that society ex p r e s s e s its
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of life and the world.
(1950:46)

The m a i n t e n a n c e of human identity, in fact, is a

problem often i n v e s t i g a t e d by philosophers, artists,

novelists, and other " h u m a n i s t s , 11 r e i n f o r c i n g the

anthropological p r e j u d i c e that only the m a i n t e n a n c e of human

life can or should be invest i g a t e d from a scientific

perspective. The w a y s in w h i c h p roblems associated w i t h the

maintenance of human identity might be i n vestigated from a

s c i e n t ific p e r s p ective will be d i s cussed in Chapter Three.

A m o m e n t ' s r e f l e c t i o n will reveal that the distin c t i o n

between the pursuit of life and the pursuit of

identity cannot be m a i n t a i n e d w ith respect to human

activities. All, or at any rate a very substantial maj o r i t y

of all human ac t i v i t i e s s i m u l taneously involve both the

m a i n t e n a n c e of human l ife and the m a i n t e n a n c e of human

identity. Religious a c t i v i t i e s are among the most

s i g n i f icant w ays in w h i c h human beings define t h e m selves as

h uman beings, yet the content and o r g a n i z a t i o n of religious

beliefs and b e h aviors are closely linked to the particular

cultural strategy of a d a p t a t i o n a strategy whose most

i m m e d i ate and apparent f u nction is the m a i n t e n a n c e of human

life. The phenomenon of voodoo death can scarcely be

classed as a consequence of either the m a i n t e n a n c e of h u m a n

l i f e or the m aintenance of human identity; a n t h r o p ological

a cco u nts of voodoo death h ave explained the phenomenon in

t erms of an interaction between the p h y s i o l o g i c a l and the

psychological (Cannon 1942; Lex 1974). T h e h u man animal,

apparently, is the only animal that can be kil l e d by

suggestion. The very ess e n c e of the human condition, in

fact, is t h a t the m a i n t e n a n c e of human l i f e and the

maintenance of human i d entity are inextricably intertwined.

Nevertheless, I t h i n k it is useful to posit a

di s t i n c t i o n between these two dimensions of the human

experience, for two reasons. First, it is a convenient way

of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between the a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l and the

et h ological domains of inquiry. (Despite K o n r a d Lorenz, we

cannot study people in the same way that w e study geese, nor

does the study of one tell us m u c h at all about the other. )

Second, it is useful bec a u s e most contemporary

a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s tend, in practice, to d i s t i n g u i s h between

t h e two w h e n offering a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n s and

analyses. All a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s share the p e r s p e c t i v e that

human life and identity are mut u a l l y interpenetrating, but,

w h e n d e f i n i n g their p roblems for research, most contemporary

a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s choose to focus upon a pro b l e m that

e m p h a sizes one aspect or the other. I say "emphasizes"

because no study of the h u man condition, obviously, can

e ntirely ignore either aspect unless it d e f i n e s its subject

so narrowly that it is no longer studying any r e cognizable

 58

part of the h u m a n experience (soci o b i o l o g y w o u l d be an

example of such a reduction to the absurd). Anthropologists

have so far f a i l e d to develop a sing l e paradigm that

addresses both p r o b l e m s in a fully integrative fashion, as

w e snail see in Chapter Three.

I t h ink I c a n demonstrate the usefulness of the

disti nction b e t w e e n the m a i n t e n a n c e of human l i f e and the

maintenance of h u m a n identity by r e f erence to t w o brief

examples. Roy R a p p a p o r t ' s (1967) cla s s i c article, "Ritual

Regulation of E n v i ronment al R e l a t i o n s Among a New Guinea

People," is an e x c e l l e n t i l l u s t r a t i o n of the a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l

approach that f o c u s e s on the problems, consequences, and

i m p l i c ations a s s o c i a t e d with the mainte n a n c e o f h u m a n life.

R a ppaport's a r t i c l e was intended t o counter t h e notion, once

common among antnropologists, t hat ritual activity has no

practical effect upon the ex t e r n a l w o r l d other than such

sociological and psychological f u n c t i o n s as t h e preservation

of social cohesion and the a m e l i o r a t i o n (or i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n )

of anxiety. Ra p p a p o r t d e m o n s t r a t e d that T sembaga ritual

cycles play a s i g n i f i c a n t role in the adjustment of the

Tsembaga to t h eir natural environment. Specifically, he

showed that ritual activity r e g u l a t e d the d i s t r i b u t i o n of

land, the f r e q u e n c y of i n t e rgroup fighting, a n d the

d i s t r i b u t i o n of animal protein in the form of sur p l u s pigs.

In short, he exa m i n e d and a n a l y z e d the ritual a c t i v i t i e s of

the Tsembaga "as neither more nor less than p a r t of the

 59
behavioral r e p e r t o i r e emp l o y e d by an a g g regate of organisms

in a d j u s t i n g to its e n v i r o n m e n t " (1967:18).

Ra p p a p o r t was correct, of course, in his statement that

Tsembaga ritual was no less than part of the a daptive

beha v ior of a group of individuals. In addition, he was

heuristically j u s t i f i e d in re g a r d i n g T s embaga ritual as

no more than such behavior, because he was thereby able to

demonstrate the practical c o n s e q u e n c e s of supposedly

"i m p r a c t i c a l " behavior. However, his d e cision to regard

Tsembaga ritual as no m o r e than ada p t i v e be h a v i o r w a s merely

a ma t ter of convenience. Ritual is always "more" than

a d a p t i v e behavior, if for no other reason than that no other

species i n cludes ritual activity in a s s o c i a t i o n w ith

cosmological b e l i e f s as part of its strategy for a d a p tation

to its environment. The c o smological beliefs of the

Tsembaga are i r r e l e v a n t to the practical effects of Tsembaga

rituai, but they are not ir r e l e v a n t to w h a t it m e a n s to be

human. By f o c u s i n g upon the m a i n t e n a n c e of human life, it

is possible to show why p a r t icular rituals and c o s m o l o g i e s

take the form they do, but it is not possible to show why

rituais and c o s m o l o g i e s should exist in the first place. To

e x p l a i n the origin (rather than the m a i n t e n a n c e ) of ritual

behavior, it is nec e s s a r y to focus upon the m a i n t e n a n c e of

human identity.

As an e x a m p l e of a study that focuses upon the

maintenance of human identity, I can refer to my own

r e s e a r c h in the B r i t i s h Vir g i n Islands. In "Ludic and

L i m i n o i d Asp e c t s of Charter Yacht Tou r i s m in the Caribbean"

(Lett l y S S ) , I describe the behavior of U.S. t o urists in the

B.v.I. as a rite of reversal. The tourists w h o v i sit this

C a r i b b e a n archip e l a g o c onsciously and c o n s p i c u o u s l y flout

several of the social and sexual norms of their home

society. Physically, temporally, and s y m b o l i c a l l y separated

from the routine w o r l d of their everyday lives, they abandon

t h e m s e l v e s to revelry and l i c e n t i o u s n e s s w h i l e on vacation

but then return to an o b s e r v a n c e of those v i o l a t e d norms

once the v a c a t i o n is over. By temporarily i n v erting the

rules of social and sexual conduct, the t ourists affirm the

p r opriety of those same rules, since by acting out w h a t they

regard as unusual, exceptional, or deviant they define what

they con s i d e r to be normal and acceptable. In effect,

charter y a c h t tourists in the B r i t i s h V i r g i n Islands are

directly c o n cerned w ith the m a i n t e n a n c e of human identity.

The "practical" c o n s e q u e n c e s of charter y a cht tourism

are not a d d r e s s e d in "Ludic and L i m i n o i d A s p e c t s of Charter

Yacht T o u r i s m in the Ca r i b b e a n . " The article ignores such

q u e s t i o n s as the adaptive or economic s i g n i f i c a n c e of

charter y a c h t tourism, and it does not identify the critical

s t r u ctural or i n f r a s tructural factors in U.S. and B.V.I.

society that make charter y a c h t tourism possible. In other

words, I explain the c o n s e q u e n c e s of charter y a cht tourism

for the m a i n t e n a n c e of human identity, but I do not explain

w h a t i m p l i c a t i o n s charter y a c h t tourism has for the

maintenance of human life. In the conduct of scientific

research, scientists i n e v itably focus upon those aspects of

a given ph e n o m e n o n that they consider to be most salient or

 61

n o t e w orthy (or, at times, those aspects which they believe

to have been previously ignored). W hat is co n s i d e r e d to be

salient or noteworthy is decided partly on the b a sis of

personal interests and partly on the basis of p a r a d i g m a t i c

commitment.

Whether a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s choose to focus upon questions

associated with the m a i n t e n a n c e of human life or the

m a i n t e n a n c e of human identity, they should, ideally, be

aware that no anthr o p o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n of any human

activity is complete until the implic a t i o n s of b oth problems

have been considered. The essence of the anth r o p o l o g i c a l

perspective, again, is the r e c o g n i t i o n that both factors are

at play. J.hg proper domain 12! anth r o p o l o g i c a l inquiry

c onsists ji the origins, consequences, and i m p l i c a t i o n s sil

human eff o r t s Jlq mai n t a i n l i X e and i d e n t i t y .

It is important to keep in mind at this stage, however,

that the d i s t i n c t i o n between the m a i n t e n a n c e of human life

and the m a i n t e n a n c e of human identity does not parallel the

d i s t i n c t i o n s between behavior and thought, etics and emics,

or m a t e r i a l i s m and idealism. B oth the m a i n t e n a n c e of human

life and the m a i n t e n a n c e of human identity include both

behavior and thought; both can be investigated f rom either

an etic or an emic perspective; and the d i s t i n c t i o n between

the two has not h i n g to do w i t h arg u m e n t s over the nature of

cultural causality. Rather, the d istinction is intended to

h i g h l i g h t the essential c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the h u m a n

condition, which is that human beings are s e p arated from all

other f o rms of animal life by the "human artifice," w h i l e at

 62

the same time re m a i n i n g r e l a t e d to all other forms of life

by the fact of life itself. The "human a r t i fice," in

anthropological terms, is culture, and the concept of

c u l t u re is the basic i n g r edient of the a n thropological

perspective.

T h e Con c e p t of Culture

"Know what [an anthropologist] thinks a savage is,"

writes Clifford Geertz (1973:346), "and you have the key to

his w o r k . " More than that, I think, if you know what an

anthropologist defines culture to be y o u will have a good

idea of w h a t he or she intends to study. The

anthropological domain of inquiry en c o m p a s s e s the

maintenance of human life and the m a i n t e n a n c e of human

identity, and the f undam ental premise of the a n t h r o pological

perspective is that the m a i n t e n a n c e of both life and

identity is a c c o m p l i s h e d thr o u g h the m e d i a t i o n of culture.

But there is no standard, accepted de f i n i t i o n of culture in

a n t h r o p o l o g y although, as I w ill argue, there are certain

f e a t u r e s of the concept that are a c cepted by all

anthropologists. If you know what an a n t h r o p o l o g i s t means

by culture, then you know w h i c h area or areas of the

anthropological domain of inquiry he or she w i s h e s to

consider.

Anthr o p o l o g y began w i t h a deiinition of culture,

p r o p o sed by Edward B. Tylor, that e n v i s i o n e d culture as the

tota l ity of human experience:

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C u l t u r e or Civilization, taken in its w ide

e t h n o g r a p h i c sense, is that complex w h o l e
w h i c h includes knowledge, belief, art,
morals, law, custom, and any other
c a p a b i l i t i e s and habits acq u i r e d by man as
a m e m b e r of society. (1973:63; o r i g i n a l l y 1871)

The l a u n d r y - l i s t a p proach to the concept of culture was

dominant in anthr o p o l o g y for m o r e than h a l f a century

f o l l o w i n g the appearance of T y l o r ' s P r i mitive C u l t u r e .

Thus L o wie (1937:253), who a s s e r t e d that the "theoretical

aim [of a n t h ropology] must be to know all c u ltures w ith

equal t h o r o u g h n e s s , " applied the concept of cul t u r e to a

wide range of human phenomena:

[Cu l t u r e is] the sum total of what an

i n d i v i d u a l acquires f rom his s o c i e t y
those beliefs, customs, art i s t i c norms,
food-habits, and crafts w h i c h come to
him . . . as a legacy from the past, conveyed
by formal or informal education. (ibid.:3)

Even in L o w i e ' s time, however, the use of the

term c ulture was bec o m i n g less and less sta n d a r d among

a n t h r o pol o g i s t s . In the early 1950's, Alfred Kro e b e r and

Clyde Kl u c k h o h n compiled a list of de f i n i t i o n s that

a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s thr o u g h the first h a l f of the tw e n t i e t h

century had o f f e r e d for the concept of culture. They

re p r i n ted 164 d e f i n i t i o n of " c u l ture," g rouped into six

categories: descriptive, historical, normative,

p s y c hological, structural, and g e n e t i c (Kroeber and

Kl u c k h o h n 1963; originally 1952). Cou n t i n g the d e f i n i t i o n s

m e n t i o n e d in f o o t n o t e s and other references, the authors

e s t i m a t e d that they had i d e n t i f i e d close to 300 d i f ferent

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notions as to w h a t a n t n r o p o l o g i s t s had in m i n d w h e n they

used the term culture.

At the time Kroeber and K l u c k h o h n w e r e writing, there

w a s an i neffectual debate in a n t h r o p o l o g y over the issue of

whether "culture'1 properly denoted an a b s t r a c t i o n or a

t a n g i b l e aspect of reality. Les l i e W h i t e (1954:462)

cor r e c tly noted tnat the debate was m i s c o n c e i v e d : "culture

. . . is a w o r d that w e may use to label a class of

p h e n o m e n a things and e v e n t s in the external world."

Whether or not any partic u l a r d e f i n i t i o n of cul t u r e is

w o r t h w h i l e or a ppropriate depends upon w h e t h e r that

d e f i n i t i o n is useful in the identification, analysis, and

e x p l a n a t i o n of human phenomena. White's preference for

d e f i n i ng culture in terms of concrete, objective, o b s e rvable

events and e n t i t i e s r e f lected his p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h the

maintenance of human life and his interest in e x p l a i n i n g the

e v o l u t i o n of sociocultural systems.

In the 1950's and 1960's, a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s began to

r e c o g n i z e tnat the lack of c o n sensus re g a r d i n g the concept

of c u lture tn r e a t e n e d to s e r iously h a ndicap the unity,

identity, and e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the discipline, especially if

the concept w a s to be the essential ingredient of a shared

anthropological p e r s p ective i n tended to unite

a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s of varying p a r a d i g m a t i c persuasions. Nearly

ten y e a r s ago, Keesing (1974:73) o b s e r v e d that "the

c h a l l e nge in recent years has been to narrow the concept of

'culture' so that it includes l ess and r e v e a l s more."

Predictably, though, the v a r i o u s a t tempts that h ave been

 65

made to narrow the concept of culture have f r a g m e n t e d rather

than unified the discipline.

K ee s i n g (i b i d . :74-79) i d e n tifies four recent ap p r o a c h e s

to the problem of culture. The first a pproach regards

c u l t u re as an a d a p t i v e syst e m of learned b e l i e f s and

b e h a v i o r s w h ose primary fu n c t i o n is to adjust h u man

s o c i e t i e s to their environments. That a p p r o a c h is

associated with cultural ecology and cultural materialism

ana can be found re f l e c t e d in the w o r k of such influential

figures as J u l i a n Ste w a r d (1955), Leslie W h i t e (1949; 1959),

ana M arv i n Harr i s (1968; 1979). (The concept of culture as

an a d a p t i v e system has bec o m e firmly e s t a b l i s h e d in

contemporary archeo l o g y and is e vident in the w o r k of Lewis

Binford [1962; 1968a] and Kent F lannery [1968] a m ong many

others.) The second of the four ap p r o a c h e s id e n t i f i e d by

K e e s i n g v i ews culture as a c o g n i t i v e system co m p r i s e d of

whatever one w o u l d need to know in order to o p e r a t e in a

manner a c c e p t a b l e to the c u l t u r e ' s native members. That

approach is a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the p a radigm known va r i o u s l y as

etnnoscience, ethnosemantics, or the new ethnography. Its

principal proponents include W a r d G o o d e n o u g h (1964) and

C h a r l es Frake (1964). The third app r o a c h regards culture as

a s t r u ctural system of shared symbols w h i c h has its analogue

in the s t r ucture of the h u man mind. That a p p r o a c h is

c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of structuralism, the paradigm created by

Claude L e v i - S t r a u s s (1963; 1969a). The fourth and final

a p p r o ach to the d i s c i p l i n e ' s pivotal concept among

contemporary a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s views culture as a symbolic

 66

system made up of shared, identifiable, public symbols and

m eanings. That app r o a c h is as s o c i a t e d w ith the p aradigm

known as s y m b o l i c anthropology, w h ich is out l i n e d in the

w o r k of Cl i f f o r d Geertz (19731 and D a vid S c h n e i d e r (1968).

K ee s i n g suggests, then, that there are essent i a l l y two

a p p r o a c h e s to tne concept of c ulture among contem p o r a r y

a n t h r o pologists: those that define culture in terms of both

thought and beh a v i o r (the ada p t i v e approaches), and those

that define c u l t u r e in terms of thought alone (the

" i d e a tional" approaches). Logically, of course, two

additional a p p r o a c h e s are possible: those that w o u l d regard

c u lture as c o m p r i s e d of neither thought nor behavior, and

those that w o u l d regard cul t u r e as c o m prised of b e havior

alone. No one has seriously suggested the first

p ossibility; indeed, it is d i f f i c u l t to even imagine w h a t a

culture that co n s i s t e d of neither thought or behavior could

possibly be. The notion that culture c onsists of behavior

alone has not been seriously p r oposed either, although the

in t e r a ctional a p proach s u g gested by Chappie and A r e n s b e r g

comes close (Chappie and A r e n s b e r g 1940; Arensberg 1972).

But as Robert Murphy (1980:45-50) has explained, no purely

behavioral d e f i n i t i o n of cul t u r e is supportable. All human

behavior cannot be cultural b e h a v i o r if it were, there

w o u l d be litt l e point in a t t a c h i n g the label "cultural" to

it. No purely statistical and behavioral d e f i n i t i o n of

culture is possible, unless w e choose to regard all abnormal

b e h a v i or as no n c u l t u r a l b ehavior and ignore the fact that

m u c h abnormal be h a v i o r conforms to cultural expectations.

 67
Other a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s besides Kee s i n g have seen the

contemporary contro v e r s y over the concept of culture in

t e rms of the thought vs. behavior issue. The most

pe r s i s tent critic of the so-called "ideational" ap p r o a c h to

c u l t u r e has been Marvin Har r i s (1975; 198ua). Harris links

the h i storical separa t i o n between social and cultural

a n t h r o pology to the d e v e l o p m e n t of a purely ideational view

of culture. E t h n o s c i e n t i s t s and others w h o call t h e m selves

" cultural anthropologists" are interested in the study of

c o g n i t i v e e n tities and reserve the term "social

anthropology" for the statistical study of p a t terned social

events. A c c o r d i n g to Harris, however, it is difficult if

not i m p o ssible to find anyone w h o is perfor m i n g the v a l u a b l e

m i s s i o n of "social anthropology":

This imaginary social a n thropology has

been created to avoid the onus of
professional irrelevance i m plicit in an
a n t h r o p o l o g y [i.e., "cultural anthropology"]
that cannot deal w i t h the material,
concrete, historical, behavioral and "etic"
re g u l a r i t i e s of sociocultural life. (I98ua:392)

For Harris, cultural anthro p o l o g y should be concerned not

witn "all the rules that one must know in order to act like

a native" (the ethnoscientists' view of culture), but w i t h

"the total socially a c qui red li f e - s t y l e of a group of people

i n c l u d i n g patterned, re p e t i t i v e ways of thinking, feeling,

and a c ting" (Harris 198ub:106;.

If we look at the e x p l i c i t de f i n i t i o n of culture that

re c e n t a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s have offered, however, there is no

clear consensus on the th ought vs. b e havior i s sue a l though

 68

purely ideational d e f i n i t i o n s of culture do appear to be

re l a t ively rare. The E n c y c l o p e d i a of A n t h r o p o l o g y , for

example, def i n e s culture as "the patterned behavior lea r n e d

by each i n d i vidual from the day of birth" (Hunter and

Whitten 1y y 6:103 J . Kaplan and Man n e r s (1972:3) also

advocate a definition of c u l t u r e that e m p h a s i z e s learned

behavior: " . . . a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s a r e c o n cerned not simply

witn human behavior but w i t h t r a d i t i o n a l or

i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d human behavior." But contemporary

textbooks vary widely with respect to the c o n c e p t of

culture. Keesing (1981:509) glosses c u l t u r e as "the system

of k n o w l e d g e m o r e or less shared by m e m b e r s of a society";

A c e v e s ana King (1979:542) define culture as "learned h u man

behavior that is t r a n s m i t t e d down the generations"; and

K o t t a k (1982:343) d e s cribes culture as "that w h ich is

t r a n s m i t t e d thr o u g h learning, b e havior patterns, and m o d e s

of t h ought a cquired by humans as m e m b e r s of society." Other

textbooks offer highly a m b iguous d e f i n i t i o n s that fail to

specify w h e t h e r culture is thought or b ehavior or both.

A c cording to Oliver (198i:390), for example, culture is "the

design for liv i n g or way of life c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a h o m i n i d

society."

The point I wish to m a k e is that a good deal of

ambiguity about the terms t h o u g h t and b e h a v i o r surrounds the

debate over tne o ntological status of culture. When

a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s say that cul t u r e consists of "learned and

shared b e h a v i o r , " they are hardly e x c luding the cognitive

aspects of cultural transmission, retention, and

 i d e n t i f i c a t i o n f rom their d e f initions; behavior is lea r n e d

ana snared p r e c i s e l y because it is known and thought about.

Similarly, w h e n s y mbolic a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s say that sys t e m s of

m e a n i n g are public, they m ean that culture is b e h a v i o r a l l y

ex p r e ssed and recognized in l i n g u i s t i c performance, body

posture, ritual activity, a r t i s t i c expression, and other

o b s e r vable h u m a n actions. Upon close examination, virtually

all d e f i n i t i o n s of culture embody, as Murphy (19dU:240)

argues tnat tney should, some s y n thesis of thought and

behavior.

Keesing is correct to note that there are e s s e n t i a l l y

two a p p r o a c h e s to the concept of cul t u r e among c o n t e m p o r a r y

anthropologists, but he o v e r s i m p l i f i e s the matter w h e n he

distinguishes the two a p p r o a c h e s a c c o r d i n g to their

behavioral or mental emphases. The important d i s t i n c t i o n s

lie elsewhere. The "adaptive" a p p r o a c h e s regard c u l t u r e as

a s o c i o c u l t u r a l sys t e m c o m prised of b e h aviors and their

at t endant beliefs, while the "idea t i o n a l " a p p r o a c h e s regard

culture as a sy m b o l i c system co m p r i s e d of beliefs and their

a t t endant behaviors. Sociocultural systems are m ade up of

the r o u t i m z e d , adaptive, p a t t e r n e d forms of intera c t i o n

among t h e m e m b e r s of a s o c i e t y forms of intera c t i o n that

are supported, rationalized, and t r a n s m i t t e d by shared

beliefs and perspectives. S y m b o l i c systems are m ade up of

learned, shared, p a t terned sets of mea n i n g s which enable

people to perceive, interpret, and ev a l u a t e l ife sets of

m e a n i ngs that are both exp l i c i t and implicit and t hat are

e m b o d ied and exp r e s s e d in both beliefs and behaviors.

 70

S y m b o l i c systems are thus s ubsets of s o c i o c u l t u r a l systems.

All anthropologists r e c o gnize the e x i stence of both

s o c i o cultural systems and sym b o l i c systems; indeed, there is

c o n s i d e r a b l e p r e cedent for the kind of conceptual

d i s t i n c t i o n I am m a k i n g here (see, for example, Binford

lyoob).

Should we use " c u l t u r e to refer to s o c i o c u l t u r a l

systems, or snould w e reserve the term to refer simply to

s ymb o lic s ystems? If w e agree that both socioc u l t u r a l

systems and sym b o l i c systems exist, then the debate is

l a r g e ly a s e mantic one. Law l e s s (1979:21) sug g e s t s that

c u l ture has seven char a c t e r i s t i c s : it is "learned, shared,

symbolic, integrated, rational, dynamic, and a d a p t i v e . "

M o r e specifically, he suggests that "culture may be . . .

d e fined as tne learned, rational, integrated, shared,

[ s y m b ol-mediated] pa t t e r n s of behavior and beliefs that are

dynamically a daptive and that dep e n d on human social

i n t e r a c t i o n for their ex i s t e n c e " (ibid.:4d). I suggest that

t hat is a concept, a lthough admittedly not a definition,

w i t n w n ich all a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s w o u l d agree and w h i c h lies at

the heart of the a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l perspective. In the

i nt e r ests of conceptual clarity, a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s w o u l d do

well to adopt a consistent d e f i n i t i o n of culture. The

s ymb o l ic a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s h ave a strong argument in their

favor for calling sym b o l i c systems "culture"

ana s o c i o c u l t u r a l s ystems " s o c i o c u l t u r a l s y s t e m s " after

all, it is the human capacity for symbolic c o m m u n i c a t i o n

 71

(read " c u l t u r e ) which d i s t i n g u i s h e s human s o c i o c u l t u r a l

s y stems from other primate social systems.

At this juncture, however, it seems unlikely that those

w h o w ish to call socioc u l t u r a l systems "culture" will

willingly aba n d o n the term. Given the fact that the

c o n t r oversy is e s s e n t i a l l y semantic, there seems little

point in in s i s t i n g that they should. As long as the term

c u l t u re is clearly used, it is not essential that it be

c o n s i stently used. It is mer e l y essential that

a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s specify whe t h e r they mean sociocultural

system or sy m b o l i c system w hen they use the term culture.

For the sake of convenience, culture will be used in this

b o o k to reier to sociocultural systems, since that is the

m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i v e of the two a l t e r n a t i v e definitions.

Whe t h e r they mean s o c iocultural systems or symbolic

s y s t e m s when they use the term, all a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s agree

a b out the p e r v a s i v e n e s s and s i g n i f i c a n c e of culture. Hall

d9b6:lY7) w r i t e s that "no m a t t e r how hard man tries it is

im p o s s i b l e for him to divest h i m s e l f of his own culture, for

it has p e n e trated to the roots of his nervous system and

d e t e r m i n e s how he perceives the w o r l d . " He says further

that JLpeople n a n n o t act sir interact a i .ail i n a n x me a n i n g f u l

w.ay .&pt through ilis m e d i u m sil culture" (ibid.).

This is tne point lost on m ost other social scientists, who

uncritically base their i n v e s t i g a t i o n s upon the fo u n d a t i o n s

of their own cultural assumptions. A n t h r o p o l o g i s t s cannot

avo i d r e f e r r i n g to the concept of culture w hen e x p l a i n i n g

the human condition.

 72

To this point I have identified the sc i e n t i f i c

perspective as the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l fo u n d a t i o n of

a n t h r opology; I have d e s cribed the origins, consequences,

ana i m p l i c a t i o n s of human efforts to m a i n t a i n l ife and

i d e n t ity as the domain of a n t h r o pological inquiry; and I

h a v e pointed to the e x i stence of culture as the fundamental

ontological and t heoretical assumption of the

anthropological perspective. Given these conclusions,

c e r t a in i m p l i c a t i o n s follow for the pursuit of

anthropological inquiry.

All human beings pe r c e i v e and u n d e r s t a n d the w o rld

th r o u g h the medi u m of their culture, and a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s are

no exception. But a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s claim to be scientists

whose u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the w o r l d is objective, accurate, and

reliable. Accordingly, anthropologists (like all social

scie n tists) are faced w i t h the task of distinguishing, in

some m e a n i n g f u l way, between c u l t u r a l l y - s p e c i f i c knowledge

about the human c o n aition and object i v e l y valid knowledge

p e r tinent to the domain of anth r o p o l o g i c a l inquiry. In the

past q u a r t e r - c e n t u r y , a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s h ave a t t e m p t e d to

apply the concept of the e m i c / e t i c d i s t i n c t i o n to tnat task.

.The Im p o r t a n c e o f the Emic/Etic D i s t i n c t i o n

V i r tually all intro d u c t o r y textbooks in anthr o p o l o g y

d e s c r i be the discipline as "holistic" and " c o m p arative."

The a n thropological p e r s p e c t i v e is hol i s t i c because it tries

to e x a mine the w h o l e of human experience. That is, unlike

political scientists, sociologists, or economists,

a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s try to l o o k beyond political or social or

e c o n o m i c behavior to the interplay between all these factors

of human life and to see the c onnections between them. Of

course, anthropologists attempt to i n c o r p o r a t e many more

f a c t o rs into their "holistic" analyses, including

biological, ecological, linguistic, historical, and

ideological variables. The anthr o p o l o g i c a l perspective is

c o m p a rative because it seeks its i n f o r m a t i o n and tests its

e x p l a n a t i o n s among all of the p r e h i s t o r i c a l , historical and

c o n t e mporary cul t u r e s to w h i c h a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s have access.

The a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l a p proach may not always be h o l i s t i c and

c o m p a r a t i v e in practice, but a n thropology is the only

d i s c i pline a m ong the social sciences w h i c h has e s t a b l i s h e d

h o l i s m ana c o m p a r i s o n as ideals to be pursued. As a result,

a n t h r opology has been the only social science to be

systematically c o n cerned w i t h the di s t i n c t i o n bet w e e n emic

ana etic knowledge.

The d i s t i n c t i o n between "emics" and "etics" is

a n a l o g o u s to the d i s t i n c t i o n between "phonemics" and

" p h o n etics;" the lin g u i s t Ken n e t h Pike (1967J, in fact,

d e rived the terms "emic" and "etic" from that analogy.

Simply defined, emic co n s t r u c t s are d e s c r i p t i o n s and

a n a l y s e s conducted in terms of the conceptual schemes and

categories considered meaningful by the p a r t i c i p a n t s in the

event or situation b e i n g d e s c r i b e d and analyzed. Etic

co n s t r u c t s are d e s c r i p t i o n s and ana l y s e s c o n ducted in terms

of the conceptual schemes and ca t e g o r i e s consid e r e d

meaningful by the c o m munity of scientific observers. I will

 74

o f fer more precise d e f i n i t i o n s of emics and etics in a

moment, but first I should note that the t e rms have been the

object of nearly as m u c h semantic d i s c u s s i o n and debate as

has tne concept of culture. Various a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s have

a c c u s e d each other of using "emic" and " e t i c in an

"inco r rect" fashion. I see little to be gai n e d by joining

in the debate over the "correct" use of a ne o l o g i s m w i t h no

established, standard usage or application, and w o u l d rather

attempt to formulate, from a synthesis of the extant

literature, a set of precise and p r o d u c t i v e definitions.

R e aders in t e r e s t e d in the specifics of the debate its e l f may

rerer to Harris (1964; 1976), Burling (1964), G o o d enough

(197U), and Durbin (1972) for a summary of the major issues.

It is di f f i c u l t to skirt the e m i c / e t i c controversy

entirely, however, and it w ill be n e c essary first to say

w h a t emics and etics are n o t . Emics and etics, then,

have n othing w h a t s o e v e r to do w i t h o n t o l o g i c a l issues.

Events, situations, relationships, and f a cts are never

eitner emic or etic. It is possible to s p eak of

emic d e s c r i p t i o n s , or etic a n a l y s e s , or even emic

or etic e x p l a n a t i o n s , but it is not p o s s i b l e to speak

of emic or etic t h i n g s . Events and e n t i t i e s that

b e l o n g to the empirical w o r l d are simply events and

entities; their on t o l o g i c a l status rem a i n s u n c hanged whe t h e r

they are referred to as "emic" or "etic," bec a u s e emics and

eti c s are first, last, and always e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l

constructs. Whether a pa r t i c u l a r description, analysis,

explanation, or claim to k n o wledge is emic or etic m ust be

 lb
e s t a b l i s h e d solely on e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l grounds. Thus Naroll

(1973:2) is m i s t a k e n w h e n he identi f i e s emics simply as "the

study of con c e p t s peculiar to pa r t i c u l a r cultures" and etics

as "the study of concepts for the study of culture in

g e n eral." As Har r i s (1976:341-42) points out, the fact that

a p a r t icular emic concept h a p p e n e d to occur in all cultures

w o u l d not be suffic i e n t to m ake that concept etic.

Harris (ibid. :330) says that emic operat i o n s are those

"s u itable for d i s c o v e r i n g . . . what goes on inside people's

heads" w h i l e e tic operat i o n s are those "suitable for

d i s c o v e r i n g pat t e r n s in the b e havior stream." He notes

fu r ther that "the que s t i o n of w h e t h e r a construct is e mic or

etic depends on w h e t h e r it d e s cribes events, entities, or

relationships whose physical locus is in the heads of the

social actors or in the stream of behavior" (ibid.:335).

This all sounds fairly simple and s t r a ightforward: emic

c o n s t r u c t s d escribe the thought of participants, known

th r o u gh elicitation, w h i l e etic c o n s t r u c t s describe the

beha v ior of participants, known t h r o u g h observation. But

that is too simple. Emics and etics cannot be equated with

thought and behavior, a l though that m i s t a k e is f r e q uently

made. As H a r r i s (ibid.) explains, both thought and behavior

can be d e s c r i b e d from either an emic or etic perspective.

That is the very reason that emics and etics w ere developed,

in fact: bec a u s e people have their own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s and

e x p l a n a t i o n s of their tho u g h t s and behaviors. Again, emics

ana etics can only be d i s t i n g u i s h e d by epistemological

criteria. But w h a t are those criteria?

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Harris sug g e s t s that emics and etics can be

distinguished in the f o l l o w i n g manner:

Emic o p e r a t i o n s have as their h allmark

the e l e v a t i o n of the native informant to
the status of u l timate judge of the
adequacy of the ob s e r v e r ' s d e s c r i p t i o n s
and analyses. The test of the adequacy
of emic a n a l y s e s is their ability to
generate s t a t ements the native acc e p t s as
real, me a n i n g f u l or appropriate . . .
Etic o p e r a t i o n s have as t h eir h a llmark
the e l e v a t i o n of o b s e r v e r s to the status
of u l t i m a t e judg e s of the catego r i e s and
concepts used in d e s c r i p t i o n and analysis.
The test of the adequacy of etic accounts
is t h eir ability to generate scien t i f i c a l l y
p r o d u c t i v e the o r i e s about the causes of
s o c i ocultural d i f f e r e n c e s and similarities.
(1979:32)

W h i l e emics and etics are epis t e m o l o g i c a l constructs,

then, they are c o n cerned w i t h the st r u c t u r e of inquiry

rather than the m e t h o d of inquiry. In other words, the

critical epistemological test is not how the knowledge

is o b t a i n e d but how it is v a l i d a t e d . It is possible to

frame questions in such a way to obta i n etic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s

from native informants, just as it is possible to obtain

emic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of even t s by the i ndependent

o b s e r v a t i o n of those events. Elicit a t i o n and o b s e r v a t i o n

alone are not suffic i e n t to es t a b l i s h the emic or etic

status of d e s c r i p t i o n s and analyses. Instead, those

d e s c r i p t i o n s and an a l y s e s m u s t be m e a s u r e d against other

s t a n d a r d s namely, the j u d g m e n t of natives (for emics) and

the e v a l uation of s c i e ntists (for etics).

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An i l l u s t r a t i o n may be helpful here. In the course of

f i e l d w o r k on V i r g i n Gorda in the Bri t i s h V i r g i n Islands, I

o b s e r ved local reaction to m e d i a reports of rising crime

rates on nearby islands (particularly Tor t o l a and St.

Thomas). I observed, on rep e a t e d occasions, the stunned,

silent rea c t i o n s of native inhabi t a n t s to radio news stories

d e s c r i b i n g h o m i c i d e s and other crimes of personal violence.

I knew, based upon police r eports and personal observation,

that crimes of personal vi o l e n c e w e r e all but unknown on

V i r g i n Gorda. I knew, too, that Vir g i n G o r d a * s small

population, rural settlement pattern, diffuse social

controls, and ex t e n s i v e kin networks all m i t i g a t e d against

the incidence of local crime. Based upon those

observations, I inferred that V i r g i n G o r d i a n s w o u l d be

likely to exp r e s s confusion and b e w i l d e r m e n t at the thought

of violent crime. In short, I offered an emic de s c r i p t i o n

of nat ive tho u g h t re g a r d i n g crime (Lett 1981). W hat made my

d e s c r i p t i o n emic, however, was not the m e t h o d by which the

k no w l e dge w a s obtained, or the fact that the d e s c r i p t i o n

a p p l i e d to the w o r l d view of the participants, but the fact

that I s u b s e q u e n t l y checked my inferences w i t h my informants

ana c o n f i r m e d that they c o n s i d e r e d my st a t e m e n t s to be real,

appropriate, and ac c u r a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of their attitudes

ana perceptions.

Etic k n o w l e d g e is v a l i d a t e d in an a n a l o g o u s fashion.

For an etic descri p t i o n or an a l y s i s to be re c o g n i z e d as

etic, it must be a ccepted by the sc i e n t i f i c c o m munity as an

appropriate and m e a n i n g f u l account. Harris (1976:3*41) notes

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that "when the d e s c r i p t i o n is r e s p onsive to the observer's

c a t e g ories of time, place, wei g h t s and measure, actor types,

nu mbers of people present, body motion, and enviro n m e n t a l

effect, it is etic." To be etic, terms, categories,

concepts, and units of m e a s u r e m e n t must have a precise,

unambiguous, r e c o gnized (or recognizable) m e a n i n g w i t h i n the

s c i e n tific community. I cannot agree, however, that the

a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of etic acc o u n t s lies in "their ability to

gene r ate scien t i f i c a l l y pr o d u c t i v e t heories about the causes

of so ciocultural d i f f e r e n c e s and s i m i l a r i t i e s . " That

r e s t r i c t i o n w o u l d m e a n that a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l accounts and

explanations could only be etic if they f u r thered the

purposes of one pa r t i c u l a r a n t h r o pological paradigm

add r e s sed to a partic u l a r set of questions. I consider

Harris's criteria for e v a l u a t i n g the val i d i t y of emic

accounts, quoted above, to be entirely approp r i a t e and

sufficient; but his c r iteria for ev a l u a t i n g the v a lidity of

etic a c counts req u i r e modification.

I suggest that anthr o p o l o g i c a l a c counts and

e x p l a n a t i o n s are etic if they satisfy the fo l l o w i n g four

criteria:

1) They must be co n s i d e r e d m e a n i n g f u l and

a p p r o p r i a t e by the w o r l d w i d e community of
sc i e n t i f i c observers.

This is not simply a c r i terion of consensus. It means

that the terms and c o ncep ts employed must satisfy the

s c i e n t ific ideals of precision, reliability, and accuracy.

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(Emic accounts, of course, are validated by c o n s e n s u s the

c o n s e nsus of native i n f o r m a n t s . )

2) They must be v a l i d a t e d (or valida t a b l e )

by independent observers.

T h i s m e a n s that the p r o c e d u r e s emp l o y e d in the

f o r m u l a t i o n of etic d e s c r i p t i o n s must be r e p l i c a b l e by

i ndep endent observers, and that independent o b s ervers must

be able to obt a i n the same test results w h e n a t t e m p t i n g to

v a l i d a t e etic accounts.

3) They must satisfy the canons of s c i e ntific

knowledge and evidence.

This m e a n s that etic accounts, analyses, and

e x p l a n a t i o n s must be f a l s i f i a b l e and that they must not be

contradicted by other available evidence. It m e ans as well

that all a v a ilable e vidence must be consid e r e d in the

f o r m u l a t i o n of etic accounts. (These same c riteria apply

when e v a l u a t i n g the a u t h e n t i c i t y of emic a c c o u n t s that is,

it is ne c e s s a r y to demonstrate, in a f a l s i f i a b l e fashion,

that a given emic account truly enjoys the c o n sensus of

native informants.)

4) They must be a p p l i c a b l e c r o s s - c u l t u r a l l y .

T his is a necessary but not sufficient c o n dition for

etic constructs. It m e ans that etic a c counts must not be

de p e n dent upon particular, local frames of reference; they

must be generalizable. T his c r i terion is i ntended to insure

that scient i s t s will consider w h e t h e r their supposedly

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"etic" c o n s t r u c t s and the tests used to validate those

co n s t r u c t s might be d e p endent upon emic assumptions. For

example, some c o n t e m p o r a r y psychologists subscribe to

"deve lopmental stages the o r y " and offer explan a t i o n s that

re fer to "mid-life crises" r e s u l t i n g from "career

dissatisfaction." Those concepts are not etic unless people

in all cu l t u r e s pass thr o u g h the same d e v elopmental stages

(which is palpable nonsense), or unless developmental stages

a r e shown to be p a r t i c u l a r cultural m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of larger

pa n - c ultural processes (which p s y c h o l o g i s t s have yet to do).

These criteria l e a v e open the p o s s i b i l i t y that native

i n f o r mants may p ossess etic knowledge, as is s o m etimes the

case. The emic or etic status of any p a r t i c u l a r claim to

kn o wledge is not d e p e n d e n t upon the ori g i n of that

knowledge. These c r i t e r i a also preclude the possib i l i t y of

le g i t i m a t e c r i t i c i s m from those w h o claim that

an t h r o p o l o g i c a l etics are no more than the emics of W e s t e r n

culture. Anthropological etics are m o r e v a luable than

na t i v e emics (for c e r t a i n tasks), simply and d e m o n s t r a b l y

b e cause they are m o r e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y responsible. This

does not mean, however, that etic kno w l e d g e is the only

a p p r o priate goal of a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l research. Whether emic

or etic kn o w l e d g e is d e s i r a b l e depends upon the q u e s t i o n at

hand (see Pelto and P e l t o 1978).

Without a r i gorous e m i c/etic distinction, it is

i m p o s s i b l e to tell w h e t h e r the e x p l a n a t i o n s o ffered by

social s c i e ntists are d i f f e r e n t in kind from the

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e x p l a n a t i o n s o ffered by other people. As anthropologists,

our claims to privileged, valid, rel i a b l e e x p l a n a t i o n s rest

upon our pursuit of etic knowledge. While it is possible to

give either scientific or n o n s c i e n t i f i c descriptions,

accounts, and c o m p a r i s o n s in either emic or etic terms,

s c i e n tific e x p l a n a t i o n s must be etic explanations. We can

ana snould des c r i b e emics from a s c i e n t i f i c perspective, and

such d e s c r i p t i o n s are often necessary for scientific

analysis. If we w ish to explain the h u man condition,

however, we must ultimately make re f e r e n c e not to w h a t

p a r t i cular groups of people think and feel about their

experiences, but to the actual, o b j e c t i v e attrib u t e s of the

h u m a n condition.

The fa m i l i a r a r g uments against such an o b j ective

u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the human c o n dition (or any aspect of the

universe) are lit t l e m ore than an excuse for epist e m o l o g i c a l

irresponsibility. Granted, "objective" reality depends upon

the t h eories w h i c h guide its perception, and granted those

t h e o r ies are de p e n d e n t upon a host of factors, including the

at t r i b u t e s of the human sensory ap p a r a t u s and the p r e j udices

of the human investigator. Granted, too, the tests that we

devise to v a l i d a t e our claims to etic k n o w l e d g e are not

always v a lid tests of the claims we hope to establish. But

these are all practical problems, that can, in principle, be

overcome. T h ere i s order and regularity in the world; no

one can reasonably doubt that. The r e is no logical reason

why we cannot ap p r e h e n d the order in h u m a n affairs. By

e s t a b l i s h i n g etic kn o w l e d g e as an ideal, anthropologists

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insist tnat a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l k n o w l e d g e m ust be

self-correcting. Our claims to o b j e c t i v e knowledge about

the h uman c o n d i t i o n are j u s t i f i e d by our continuing,

c u m u l ative e i f o r t s to test every claim to knowledge. We

regard etic kn o w l e d g e as o b j e c t i v e l y valid knowledge

precisely bec a u s e w e regard it as t e n t a t i v e knowledge. If

an a c count claims to be etic (or, for that matter, emic), it

is never immune from relentless scrutiny. As Harris

(Iy79:24) says, a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s are never released from the

o b l i g a t i o n to be intelligent.

Etic knowledge, then, is an ideal, but it is an ideal

against w h i c h all other e x p l a n a t i o n s of the human c o n dition

must be measured. No other st a n d a r d yet d e v eloped for the

a n a l y sis of human affairs incorporates a self-correcting

guard against e t h n o c e n t r i c bias. No other standard yet

d e v e l o ped tak e s account of the i n c o n t r o v e r t i b l e fact that

dif f e r ent c u l t u r e s have different understandings of the

world. In one respect at least, the social

sciences are di f f e r e n t from the natural sciences.

Anthropologists face practical p r oblems that do not concern

a stronomers, geologists, and p h y s i c i s t s unlike stars,

rocks, and atoms, human beings study themselves. All human

beings hold t h e o r i e s about the nat u r e of humanity; the

overwhelming majority of people hold n o t h i n g m o r e than

culturally-specific theories. If we are to scien t i f i c a l l y

i n v e s t igate the h u man condition, therefore, we must

d i s t i n g u i s h bet w e e n those t h eories that w e hold as

e n c u l t u r a t e d i n d i v i d u a l s and those the o r i e s that we hold as

 83

scientists. Any social science that fails to m a k e that

distinction is either not social or it is not scientific.

One last t h ing remains to be said about the

anthropological perspective. T h ere is an u n a v o i d a b l y human

dim e n sion to a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l inquiry, since anthr o p o l o g y is

p r a cticed by anthropologists. As a d istinct subculture, the

di s c i pline of anthr o p o l o g y has a p a r t i c u l a r organ i z a t i o n a l

str u cture and a particular value system. Anthropological

kn owledge and theory should not be e v a l u a t e d apart f rom that

context.

Anthropology and A n t h r o p o l o g i s t s

A peculiar feature of c o n t e m p o r a r y American

anthropology (and, for that matter, of A merican social

science in general), is the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of sodalities.

W h e n Franz Boas help e d f o und the A m e r i c a n A n t h r o p o l o g i c a l

Association in 1902, he could hardly have a n t i c i p a t e d the

tremendous involution (to borrow G o l d e n w e i s e r ' s [1936J

unjus tly f o r g o t t e n term) of a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l associations.

Today there are scores of groups, societies, and

a s s o c i a t i o n s that have been e s t a b l i s h e d for the d i s c i p l i n e

as a whole (like the A m e r i c a n A n t h r o p o l o g i c a l Association),

for each s u b d i s c i p l i n e (like the A m e r i c a n Ethnol o g i c a l

Society), for broad areas of res e a r c h (like the Society for

P s y c h ological Anthr o p o l o g y ) , for na r r o w l y defined topi c s of

rese a rch (like the Society for M e n strual Cycle Research),

and for g e o graphical areas of interest (like the Ca r i b b e a n

S t u d i es A s s o ciation). There are m o r e than twenty

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anthropological j o urnals in the m a i n s t r e a m of the

discipline, and m any times that number of j o urnals in w h i c h

a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s regularly publish. New j ournals appear

every year, and the trend is toward ever m o r e narrow and

esot e ric specializations.

The e l a b o r a t i o n of this pattern is due princi p a l l y to

the s tr u c t u r e of the Ame r i c a n univer s i t y system. Despite

recent cha n g e s in the job market, most anthropologists

continue to w o r k in academia, w h ere recognition, promotion,

and t en u r e are l argely d e p endent upon scholarly production,

me a s u r e d in terms of publications. J o urnals and

associations are intended to further the s c i e ntific

en t e r p r i s e by p r o moting c o m m u n i c a t i o n among scientists, but

the e c o n o m i c facts of a c ademic life have created a syst e m in

w h i c h p u b l i c a t i o n often bec o m e s an end in itself. These

observations are commonplace, but they have a s i g n i f i c a n t

import for the conduct of a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l inquiry, as Robert

Murphy explains:

The lin k e d trends [in c o n t e m p o r a r y Ame r i c a n

anthropology] tow a r d m i n i a t u r i z a t i o n of
problem and q u a n t i f i c a t i o n of data are
co n g r u e n t w i t h the rapid e x p a n s i o n in
n um b e r s of anthropologists, each of whom
must est a b l i s h a claim to a "turf," a
domain of ideas and f i e l d w o r k which,
however small, is his. M o r e than the
unity of a n t h r o p o l o g y is threatened.
(19 8 u :vii-viii)

A m o n g the other threats w h i c h Murphy (ibid.:viii) en v i s i o n s

are the danger of "empirical t r i v i a l i z a t i o n " and the "search

for b r i l l i a n t solutions to squalid q u e s t i o n s . " In practice,

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the a n t h r o pological domain of inquiry is often not defined

by sound theore t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s but by the e x i g e n c i e s of

s ch o l arly l i f e often in concert w i t h c o n t e m p o r a r y fads

ana/or personal values. The current popula r i t y of the study

of "women and d e v e l o p m e n t " is a l a m e n t a b l e example of that

tendency.

The d e f i nitive anthr o p o l o g i c a l study of the subculture

of a n thro p o l o g y has yet to be undertaken (but see Scholte

1972). The di s c i p l i n e has a di s t i n c t i v e o r g a n izational

structure, to w h i c h I have just alluded, and it has a

d i s t i n c t i v e set of v a l u e s as well. Predictably, many of

those values can be seen as a direct e m a n a t i o n of the

structural-functional re q u i s i t e s of d i s ciplinary

organization. For example, professional status among

anthropologists is de p e n d e n t upon the successful completion

of fieldwork, the sine qua non of a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l identity,

or, as Man n e r s and Kap l a n (1968:1) note, a "touchstone of

adequacy, a rite de passage p r e r e q u i s i t e to m e m b e r s h i p in

t he p r o f e s s i o n . " Intensive, lengthy, foreign f i e l d w o r k is

one of the principal d i s t i n g u i s h i n g f e a t u r e s of

a n t h r opology; it is one of the m e a n s used to v a l i d a t e the

discipline's claim to a n i che w i t h i n the un i v e r s i t y system.

F i e l d research, obviously, is an i n d i s p e n s a b l e part of

a n t hropology, and it could hardly be otherwise. One of the

chief merits of anthropology, in contrast w i t h other social

sciences, is that a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l k n o wledge is based upon

the f i r s t - h a n d o b s e r v a t i o n of human b e havior in its natural

setting.
 For the most part, however, a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s do not

re g a r d f i e l d w o r k as a m e r e scientific tool. In the

anthropological value system, the f i e l d w o r k ex p e r i e n c e is

imbued w i t h a special significance and sanctity. Eric W o l f

(iyb4:89) o bserves that "there is a sense in which, in the

private ran k i n g sys t e m s of A m erican anthropologists, the

f i r s t - c l a s s recorder of e t h n o g r a p h i c detail ranks more

hig h l y than the most gifted theorist." Much has been

w r i t t e n about f i e l d w o r k its techniques, its difficulties,

and its r e w a r d s but m u c h m ore remains to be said about the

est e e m w h ich a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s hold for the f i e l d w o r k

experience. (For a list of works dea l i n g s p e c i f i c a l l y with

anthropological fieldwork, see Lawless, Sutlive, and Zam o r a

1 98 ^.)

Nor do a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s regard the obj e c t s of their

field r e search dispassionately. At the core of the

anthropological value system is an a f finity and affection

for the v ariety and diversity of cultures in the world. In

a s e n sitive and elegant ethnography of the Tapirape Indians,

Charles Wag l e y ex p r e s s e s this peculiarly a n thropological

viewpoint:

Each human culture, in its own way, has a

view of the w o r l d in its own terms and
each has m u c h to offer. And each of
these small s o c ieties [like the Tapirape]
repres e n t s a solution by an or g a n i z e d
h uman society and culture to the fundamental
problems of m a n human reproduction,
u n d e r s t a n d i n g the real and imaginary forces
of the universe, and ac h i e v i n g some
m e a s u r e of human well-being. (1977:304)
 87

Whether any particular society has "much to off e r " to the

s o l u t ion of universal human problems is surely a n empirical

q u e s t i o n and surely it i s ' p o s s i b l e that some society

s o m e w n e r e in the w o r l d and time has or has had l i t t l e to

c o n t r i b u t e to that end. But I t h i n k Wagley and most

anthropologists believe that the w o r t h of particular

c ult u res is not lim i t e d to the appro p r i a t e n e s s o f their

s o l u t i o n s to the qu a n d a r y of human existence. Most

a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s hold that d i f f e r e n t cultures are valuable

simply bec a u s e they are different. That may w e l l be an

entir ely d e f e nsible value position, but it is a value

p o s i t ion nonetheless. It is a v a l u e further r e f l e c t e d in

the " P r i n c i p l e s of Profes s i o n a l R esponsibility" a d o p t e d by

the A m e r i c a n A n t h r o p o l o g i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n in 1971 (reprinted

in R y n k i e w i c h and Sp r a d l e y 1976:183-86), which affi r m that

an a n t h r o p o l o g i s t ' s primary ethical respo n s i b i l i t y is to the

people h e or she studies. A n t h r o p o l o g i s t s are n o less

members of the i r own s u b c u l t u r e t han are other people.

Further, the a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l subculture is n o less

d i s t i n c t i v e than any other. L a w y e r s may wear d i s t i n c t i v e

clothing, hold d i s t i n c t i v e po l i t i c a l beliefs, and m a intain

d i s t i n c t i v e levels of consumption, but so too do

ant h r opologists. Any a n t h r o p o l o g i s t who has ever attended

an annual m e e t i n g of the A m e r i c a n A n t h r o p o l o g i c a l

A s s o c i a t i o n knows w h a t Ant h o n y W a l l a c e (1966; m e a n s by a

rite of social intensification.

In summary, I have argued in this chapter t h a t the

d i s c i p l i n e of anthro p o l o g y has a d i s t i n c t i v e w o r l d view,

c o m p rised or pa r t i c u l a r ontolo g i c a l a s s u m p t i o n s and

particular epistemological principles, and a d i s t i n c t i v e

ethos, c o m p r i s e d of p a r t i c u l a r values and attitudes. Any

a n a l ysis of a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l theory must take acc o u n t of all

these factors.

In Chapter One, I argued that s c i e n t i f i c inquiry is

p a r a d i g m a t i c inquiry. In Chapter Two, I have argu e d that

anthropological inquiry is scientific. It follows that

anthropological inquiry must be paradigmatic. C hapter Three

e x p l o r e s the i m p l i c a t i o n s of that conclusion.

 CHAPTER THREE
CONTEMPORARY ANTHROPOLOGICAL PARADIGMS

E c l e c t i c i s m is s e l f - d e f e a t i n g not because
there is only one d i r e c t i o n in w h i c h it is
useful to move, but because there are so
many: it is n e c essary to choose.
C l ifford Geertz,
Uifi I p.kerpr.stat ipn o l Cultures

All anthropological r e search is n e c e s s a r i l y c o n ducted

under the a u spices of some pa r t i c u l a r paradigm.

Nonparadigmatic research is a c o n t r a d i c t i o n in terms, since

the activity of res e a r c h necess a r i l y involves the de f i n i t i o n

of a re s e a r c h problem and the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of an

a p p r o p r i a t e m e ans of solving that problem. Not all research

is e x p l i c i t l y paradigmatic, however. In the conduct of

sc i e n t ific inquiry, sc i e n t i s t s are freque n t l y vague about

the s o urces of their t h eories and inspirations. Conscious

d e l i b e r a t i o n does not always guide the se l e c t i o n of

paradigms. Incons i s t e n c y often c h a r a c t e r i z e s the m a n n e r in

w h i c h v arious p a r adigms are applied to various problems.

And, of course, p a r adigms t h e m s e l v e s range from the

89
 90

a m o r p n u u s to the precise. The initial test of a pa r a d i g m ' s

s c i e n t i f i c utility, however, should be its clarity, or the

degree to whi c h its e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l and theoretical

p r i n c i p l e s and a s s u m p t i o n s are made explicit.

Anthropologists are faced w i t h the task of b u i l d i n g a

s c i e n t i f i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the h u man experience that is

c o m p r e h e n s i v e and progressive. That task has two parts:

first, the c o n s t r u c t i o n of me a n i n g f u l and productive

pa r a d i g m s capable of e x p l a i n i n g s i g n i f i c a n t human phenomena,

and second, the r e f i n e m e n t of those p a r adigms based upon

critical and c o m p a r a t i v e analysis. The c o m p arison of

p a r a d i g m s inevitably leads to the se l e c t i o n of paradigms, as

some p a r adigms will, unavoidably, be replaced by other m ore

a t t r a c t i v e paradigms. Ultimately, the goal of the

anthropological en t e r p r i s e is to dev e l o p ever m o r e precise

ana p arsi m o n i o u s pa r a d i g m s that acc o u n t for the human

co n d i t i o n in an ever m o r e cogent fashion. There can never

be an ultimately best paradigm, however; at most, any

para d igm can only be better than its extant rivals, since no

para d igm could ever add r e s s all p ossible questions.

T h e r e are a number of p a r a d i g m a t i c a l t e r n a t i v e s in

contemporary anthropology; the c h a llenge of the mom e n t is to

carry out the c o m p a r a t i v e e v a l u a t i o n of the extant choices.

In C u l t u r a l M a t e r i a l i s m , the most comprehensive

critique of contemporary research st r a t e g i e s yet off e r e d by

an anthropologist, M a r v i n Harris (1979) identifies eight

cu r r e ntly popular paradigms: cultural materialism,

s o ciobiology, dialectical materialism, structuralism,

 st r u c tural Marxism, psych o l o g i c a l and cognitive idealism,

eclecticism, and obscurantism. Of course, i nnumerable

d i s t i n c t i v e v a riants of each of these paradigms could be

readily identified. T h e r e may be as many paradi g m a t i c

v a r i e t i e s in a n t h r o p o l o g y as there are anthropologists.

Such fine d i s t i n c t i o n s w o u l d o b s c u r e rather than aid our

u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l enterprise, however.

The list of eight pa r a d i g m s s u g gested by Harris p r ovides a

useiul s t arting point for the ana l y s i s of contemporary

anthropological theory.

W h i c h of the ext a n t p a r adigms is better than its

r i vals? W h i c h p a r a d i g m s are most popular among c o ntemporary

anthropologists? Is p a r a d i g m a t i c c o m m itment n e c essary or

desirable? These are the central q u e s t i o n s Harris a d d resses

in his ana l y s i s of c o n t e m p o r a r y r e search strategies, and

these are the q u e s t i o n s I propose to re c o n s i d e r in this

chapter. For the most part, my focus h ere is re s t r i c t e d to

tho s e areas w h e r e my a n a l y s i s differs from that p r e sented

in Cultural M a t e r i a l i s m . I fully agree, for example,

that sociobiology, dialec tical m a t erialism, structural

Marxism, and o b s c u r a n t i s m are i n a p p r o p r i a t e r e s p o n s e s to the

c h a l l e n g e of anthropology, and I will, accordingly, have

lit t l e m o r e to say about those p a r t icular paradigms.

If there is a predom i n a n t p a r a d i g m in contemporary

a n thropology, it is e l u s i v e and d i f f i c u l t to identify. Some

w e l l - r e c o g n i z e d paradigms, like diffusionism, historical

pa r t i cularism, functionalism, and s t r u c t u r a l - f u n c t i o n a l i s m

have all but completely lost their influence and retain only
 an h i stor i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e w i t h i n the discipline. Others,

such as cultural materialism, structuralism, dialectical

materialism, and c o g n i t i v e a n t h r o p o l o g y are undeniably

influential but can hardly be said to c h a r a c t e r i z e the

majority of c o ntemporary a n thropological research. Still

others, like sociobiology, structural Marxism, and

o b s c u r a n t i s m are d i s t inctly marginal and decidedly u n popula

among most profe s s i o n a l anthropologists. But if not

cultural ecologists, ethnoscientists, or classical

evolutionists, w h a t then are most contemporary

an t h r o p o l o g i s t s ?

In Cultural M a t e r i a l i s m , Harris a n s w e r s that the

ma j o r i t y of his c o l l e a g u e s are "eclectics." Eclecticism,

a c c o r d i n g to Harris (1979:289), is " s t r ategic agnost i c i s m "

a r e search strategy that assiduously avoids c o m m itment to

any p a r t i c u l a r set of e p istemological or theoretical

principles. Few ec l e c t i c s call t h e m s e l v e s eclectics,

perhaps because H a r r i s has consistently used the term in a

d e r o g atory sense. In l h & .fif A n t h r o p o l o g i c a l

T h e o r y , for example, he described the self- c o n s c i o u s

e c l e c t i c i s m of c o n t e m p o r a r y e t h n o l o g i c a l theorists as

"little m ore than a euphemism for c o n f usion" (Harris

19btt:285).

There are two essential asp e c t s to Ha r r i s ' s d e f i n i t i o n

of eclecticism. First, to be e clectic is to concede "that

all s t r ategic [i.e., paradigmatic] options m i g h t be equally

pro b a ble" (Harris 1979:289). To be an eclectic

a n t h r opologist, then, is to preclude the p ossibility of

 93
d e v e l o p i n g an interrelated, coherent, and p a r s i m o n i o u s

u n d e r s t a n d i n g of human social life. Second, to be eclectic

is to allow that "all sectors of socio c u l t u r a l

sy s t e ms m i g h t be equally d e t e r m i n a t i v e " (ibid.). It is this

indeterminate d e t e r m i n i s m w h i c h most di s t u r b s Harris. "From

the cultural m a t e r i a l i s t viewpoint, the chief vice of

eclecticism is that it d i s c o u r a g e s r e s e a r c h e r s w h o e n c ounter

the least bit of d i f f iculty from pe r s i s t i n g in the attempt

to i d e n t i f y plausible infr a s t r u c t u r a l determinants"

(ibid. :304).

There is a cer t a i n plausi b i l i t y to H a r r i s ' s analysis of

contemporary anthr o p o l o g i c a l research and the paradigm of

eclecticism. Harris is certainly correct that to avoid

deliberate commitment to any r e c o g n i z a b l e pa r a d i g m or

p a r a d igms is its e l f a co m m i t m e n t to a p a r t i c u l a r research

strategy. Again, there is no such thing as n o n p a r a d i g m a t i c

research. It is obvious, too, that m ost anthropologists

make use, at v arious times, of the t h e o r e t i c a l principles

(or at least the theories) of various paradigms. (Few

A m e r i c a n a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s are structuralists, tho u g h many

have made use of s t r u c t u r a l i s t a nalyses and

i n t e r pretations.) Perhaps m o s t importantly, Harris is also

c o r r e ct in his o b s e r v a t i o n t hat c o n t e m p o r a r y anthropology is

r e p l e t e w i t h m i d d l e - r a n g e the o r i e s that are u n r e l a t e d to one

a n o t h e r by any o v e r a r c h i n g set of clear and w e l l - f o r m u l a t e d

theoretical principles. It is true that most

a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s are not e xplicit about their paradigmatic

 94

commitment. The re s u l t i n g l ack of coherence and parsimony

is a l t o g e t h e r real.

But is e c l e c t i c i s m an e ntirely apt c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n

of the par a d i g m pursued by most anthropologists? I think

not. Very few a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s could be convinced that "it

cannot be f o r e t o l d w h i c h s t r a t e g i e s will be m ost p r o d uctive

in any given case" (ibid.rx), nor w o u l d many grant even that

"all p a r a d i g m s m i g h t be equally probable." It must be

r e m e m b e r e d that p a r adigms define their own problems. Before

considering whether all p a r adigms mig h t be equally probable,

an essential q u e s t i o n must be asked: equally pr o b a b l e for

the s o lution of w hat problem? G i v e n different paradigms

that define d i f ferent problems for i n v e s t i g a t i o n and specify

dif f e rent m e a n s of solution, it is m e a n i n g l e s s to say that

any one p aradigm is "more probable" than any other. A given

p a r a d igm can be m o r e or less pro b a b l e than its competitor

only if the two paradigms in q u e s t i o n agree about the nature

lL _Ui p roblem i o solved.

T h e r e is not h i n g i n c o n s i s t e n t or improper about

a f f i r m i n g that two paradigms m i g h t be "equally probable" for

the s o l u t i o n of their stated p r o b l e m s if one pa r a d i g m is

c o n c e r ned w i t h i d e n t i f y i n g the cau s e s of s o c i ocultural

s i m i l a r i t i e s and d i f f e r e n c e s and the other paradigm is

c o n c e r ned w i t h i d e n t i f y i n g the l o g i c u n d e r l y i n g partic u l a r

emic typologies. All anthropologists, indeed all

scientists, are ec l e c t i c in the sense that they apply

dif f e r ent p a r adigms to d i f ferent problems. Harris, though,

seems to imply that "eclectics" apply different p a r adigms to

 95
similar problems. Most a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s are usually innocent

of that p a r t icular indiscretion.

For example, consider sociobiology, dialectical

m a t e rialism, and cultural materialism, all of which, in the

broadest terms, can be said to be co n c e r n e d w i t h the same

problem, namely the d e t e r m i n a n t s of cultural be h a v i o r and

social institutions. S h a r i n g a common problem, these

par a d igms are, in Kuhn's sense, c o m m e n s u r a b l e , and the

efficacy of their v arious e x p l a n a t i o n s can t h e r e f o r e be

directly compared. Do most a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s concede that the

pr i n c i p l e s of biological reductionism, H e g e l i a n dialectics,

ana d e m o - t e c h n o - e c o n o - e n v i r o n m e n t a l d e t e r m i n i s m mig h t be

equally p robable g u i d e l i n e s for e x p l a i n i n g the form and

f u n c t ion of human social s ystems? If not, then most

anthropologists cannot be called " e c l e c t i c s . 1'

T h e second aspect of Har r i s ' s d e f i n i t i o n of

"eclecticism" p r esents sim i l a r difficulties. Des p i t e their

l a c k of p a r a d i g m a t i c precision, most contemporary

anthropologists do not concede that "all sectors of

so c i o c u l t u r a l systems m i g h t be equally determinative."

Re l a t i vely few a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s are c o n s i s t e n t l y confused

about the nature of cultural causality. A great many

anthropologists, though, simply fail to be s y s t e m a t i c a l l y

c o n c e r ned w i t h the q u e s t i o n of cultural causality. When the

q u e s t i o n of the causes of s o c i o c u l t u r a l d i f f e r e n c e s and

s i m i l a r i t i e s is squarely addressed, materialist rather than

idea l i st e x p l a n a t i o n s are m ost fr e q u e n t l y adduced, simply

be c ause it is m a t e r i a l i s t s w h o most fr e q u e n t l y address

 96

q u e s t i o n s of causality. (An i l l u s t r a t i o n of the fai l u r e of

n o n m a t e r i a l i s t s to re c o g n i z e and address q u e s t i o n s of

cau s a lity will be presented in Chapter Four.) T h ere may

well be a few "eclectics " a m ong contemporary

a n t h r opologists, but there do not seem to be very many of

them.

Cultural Determi nism

So w e return to our original question. W hat kind of

p a r a d i g m a t i c r e s e a r c h do m ost anthropologists pursue? It is

apparent, as Har r i s notes, that m ost anthropologists avoid

e x p l i c i t p a r a d i g m a t i c commitments. Inevitably, that m e ans

that most a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s o p e r a t e w i t h i n the u n s p e c i f i e d

f r a m e w o r k of some largely implicit paradigm. Like Arno

Penzias, the Nobel Lau r e a t e q u o t e d in "The Gold e n

M a r s n a l l t o w n , " Kent F l a n n e r y ' s (1982:265) amu s i n g and

i n s t r u c t i v e p arable about c o n t e m p o r a r y archeology, most

a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s are "happily too busy doing science to have

time to w o r r y about p h i l o s o p h i z i n g about it." Many

anthropologists, I w o u l d suggest, share the i n t uitive

suspicion that "doing science" and " p h i l o s o p h i z i n g about it"

are d istin c t l y different, and perhaps even antithetical,

activities. Flannery's parable is a clever and c o n v enient

i l l u s t r a t i o n of that viewpoint.

"The G o l d e n M a r s h a l l t o w n " t e lls the tale of an a i rborne

e nc o u nter bet w e e n four a r c h e o l o g i s t s returning h o m e from an

annual m e e t i n g of the Society for Am e r i c a n Archeology. Its

author is a p a r t i c i p a n t - o b s e r v e r in a w i tty dialogue about

the nature and purpose of c o n temporary archeology. His

three compan i o n s are the Born Again Philosopher, the Child

of the Seventies, and the Old Timer.

The B orn Again Philos o p h e r had begun his career as a

working archeologist i n t e r e s t e d in S o u t h w e s t e r n prehistory,

but had a b a ndoned that pursuit in favor of o f f i c e - b o u n d

s p e c u l a t i o n s in the "Philosophy of Science" w hen his

i n c o m p etence in the field began to catch up w i t h h i m

"after a few years of dusty holes in hot, dreary valleys .

. he'd m i s s e d m ore floors than the elevator in the W o rld

Trade Center."

The Child of the S e v e n t i e s is an unoriginal product of

the "me genera t i o n . " S e l f - c e n t e r e d and ambitious, his goal

are simple: "to be famous, to be well paid, to be stroked,

and to receive immediate grat i f i c a t i o n . " The Child of the

S e v e n t ies has mas t e r e d the a c a d e m i c i a n ' s game. He has

de v ised a way to have his doctoral d i s s e r t a t i o n published

and r e p u b l i s h e d in var i o u s guises, and he is m a k i n g h i m s e l f

rich and famous by editing c o m p i l a t i o n s of his colleagues'

work.

The hero of the story, though, is the Old Timer. The

Old Timer has spent his career in the field patiently and

professionally r e c o n s t r u c t i n g the culture h i s t o r i e s of

p r e h i s t o r i c societies. The goal of archeology, he believes

is to teach the w o r l d s o m e t h i n g about its past. After all,

he notes, the w o r l d couldn't care less about e p i s t e m o l o g y .

The Old Timer has been forced into early retire m e n t for the
unl'asnionable sin of "b e l i e v i n g in culture as the central

para d igm in a r c h e o l o g y . " He is c o n v i n c e d t h a t "culture,"

and not "psychological encounters" or " s t r a t e g i e s of

econ o mic ch o i c e , " provides the b est e x p l a n a t i o n of human

behavior. The Old T i m e r is not i n t e r e s t e d in paradi g m a t i c

d e b a t es about the best way to conduct science. He prefers

i n stead to remain firmly on the g r o u n d or, as it were, in

the p i t and to specialize in the archeology of a

"particular region or time period."

In the discussion that ensues in t h e cocktail lounge of

the 747, the B orn A g ain P hilosopher says that he w o u l d like

to e s t a b l i s h a dialogue between a r c h e o l o g y a n d philosophy.

His u l t i m a t e goal is t o make a contribution t o philosophy,

for he w o r k s on "a hig h e r level of a b s t r a c t i o n " t h a n most of

his c olleagues. The O l d Timer, on the other hand, hopes

simply to m a k e some c o n t r i b u t i o n to a r c h e o l o g y (the Child of

the S e v e n t i e s w a nts o n l y to make some c o n t r i b u t i o n to his

own career). The Old Timer c ompares the Born Again

Philosopher to the g a r rulous television a n n o u n c e r s who sit

high above the field a n d pass harsh judgment o n the football

p l ayers below. The a n n o u n c e r s in the booth, like the

professional "philosophers of science," offer intricate and

highly abstract a n a l y s e s of the act i v i t y on t h e ground, but,

a c c o r d i n g to the Old Timer, those ana l y s e s h a v e no

theoretical or st r a t e g i c impact on the game, w h e t h e r the

game is foo t b a l l or archeology. The real contributions, he

observes, are made by the players and t h e coaches w h o are

directly i nvolved in t h e field of play.

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Most anthropologists, I suspect, w o u l d be inclined to

identify themselves w i t h the Old Timer. F i e l d w o r k is the

h a l l m a r k of p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m among cultural anthropologists

just as it is among arche o l o g i s t s . An a n t h r o p o l o g i s t ' s

c o m m a n d of the e t h n o g r a p h i c l i t e r a t u r e d e a l i n g w i t h some

particular culture area is, in large part, r e garded as a

m e a s u r e of his or her professional competence. Most

contemporary a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s w o u l d be m o r e likely to define

themselves as C a r i b b e a n i s t s or A f r i c a n i s t s or Latin

A m e r i c a n i s t s than as c u l t u r a l m a t e r i a l i s t s or struc t u r a l i s t s

or s y m b o l i c anthropologists, and m o r e likely still to define

themselves simply as a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s . As Har r i s (1968:284)

o b serves, "most anthropologists simply w ant to be left in

peace to pursue the study of their 'people.'" And, like the

Old Timer, most a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s rely heavily upon the

c o n c e p t of "culture" a s an e x p l a n a t o r y mechanism.

Flannery's parable s u ggests that the pa r a d i g m of choice

a m o n g most anthropologists is one that m i g h t be called

" c u ltural determinism." T h e fundamental que s t i o n posed by

the p a r a d i g m of cultural determinism is this: "why do human

be i n g s behave in different w a y s and h old di f f e r e n t beliefs?"

(That is a very different q u e s t i o n than the one posed by

c u l t u ral materialism, which asks instead "why are there

different systems of b e h a v i o r and bel i e f s in the world?")

Cultural determinism assumes that human beings have the

capacity to adopt a w i d e range of bel i e f s and behaviors.

The b a s i c theoretical p r i n c i p l e of the p a r a d i g m states that

p a t t e r n s of individual thought and b ehavior are m o l d e d by

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the influence or culture. (Of course, "patterns of thought

ana b e h avior" and "culture" are one and the same thing, but

all p a r a d i g m s are c h a r a c t e r i z e d by similar sorts of

circularity. Barbara Price [1982:712-7131 o b s e r v e s that any

p a r a d igm must argue in a c i rcular fas h i o n "to the extent

that its task is to define certain problems as i m p ortant and

to direct the s t r a t e g i e s by which such problems may be most

p r o f i tably addressed.")

In the pursuit of normal science, cultural determinists

seek to identify the range and d i v ersity of human thought

and behavior, and to explain that range and d i v e r s i t y by

r e ference to the d e t e r m i n a t i v e influence of culture. The

r e l a t i o n s h i p s b etween c ulture and var i o u s facets of human

e x p e r i e n c e such as language, personality, medicine,

religion, w o rld view, and the l i k e make up the principal

pu z z l es w h i c h c onfront cultural determinists.

Cultural determinism is not, however, a

well-articulated paradigm. It i n c o r p o r a t e s a number of

general theore t i c a l assumptions, but it i n cludes few precise

t h e o r etical principles. (The d i f f e r e n c e between

" p r i n ciples" and "assum p t i o n s " is that p r i n c i p l e s inspire

the f o r m u l a t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r the o r i e s w h i c h in turn lead to

the c r eation of t e stable hypotheses, whe r e a s t heoretical

a s s u m p t i o n s are the basic o n t o l o g i c a l p r emises t hat u n derlie

t h e o r etical p r i n ciples themselves. Theoretical assump t i o n s

may have e x p l a n a t o r y power in their own right, but, for the

most part, they do not give rise to a w ide range of more

precise theories.) The concept of culture is the central

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theor etical a s s u m p t i o n of cultural determinism, just as it

is the central theore t i c a l as s u m p t i o n of all a n t h r o pological

paradigms. V i r tually all a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s are cultural

determinists in the sense that all a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s reject

bi o l o g i c a l determinism. The paradigm of cultural

determinism, however, does not m ove beyond the premise that

c u l t u re determines behavior. If a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s wish to

invoke m ore precise or m o r e p a r t i c u l a r premises, they must

ge nerally appeal to m o r e pa r t i c u l a r a n t h r o pological

paradigms.

Admittedly, cultural determinism and H a r r i s ' s

" e c l e c t i c i s m " have m u c h in common. Like eclecticism,

cultural determinism is vague and ill-defined. Its the o r i e s

are often unrelated and o c c a s i o n a l l y contradictory. Though

cultural d e t e r m i n i s t s usually restrict the ap p l i c a t i o n of

their the o r i e s to the broad but a m o rphous p roblems defined

by their paradigm, they do not invariably do so. Moreover,

the t heore t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s of cultural d e t e r m i n i s m are not

su f f i c i e n t l y precise or elegant to provide a general

f r a m e w o r k c apable of p a r s i m o n i o u s l y i n t e g r a t i n g a large

number of theories. Cultural determinism is compar a t i v e and

nomothetic (or a ttempts to be), but its v a r i o u s theories

l a c k sy s t e m a t i c and c o herent integration.

Is there any real difference, then, bet w e e n cultural

d e t e r m i n i s m and e c l e c t i c i s m ? I think there is, and I think

the r e are far more cultural d e t e r m i n i s t s t han e c l ectics in

contemporary anthropology. The e x p l a n a t i o n s offered by

cultural d e t e r m i n i s t s can generally be reduced to the

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formula " culture determines behavior and belief;" for the

most part, cultural determinists ignore the q u e s t i o n "what

d e t e r m i n e s culture?" I g noring that question, though, is not

the same as a f f i r m i n g as ec l e c t i c s pu r p o r t e d l y do that

m a t e r i a l i s m and idealism might be equally probable

e x p l a n a t i o n s of "what d e t e rmines culture." Rather than

bei n g strat e g i c a l l y agnostic, m ost a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s are

gen e r a lly (albeit implicitly and u n r e f l e c t i v e l y ) committed

to the strategy of cultural determinism. Genuine

eclecticism, or the u n s y s t e m a t i c a p p l i cation

of c o m m e n s u r a b l e paradigms to similar problems, is the

ex c e p t i o n rather than the rule among contem p o r a r y

an t h r opologists.

By way of example, George F o s t e r ' s "image of limited

good" and Oscar Lewis* "culture of poverty" are both

de s c r i b e d by Har r i s (1979:287-314) as ecl e c t i c concepts, yet

both are a ctually products of r esearch pursued under the

ausp i c es of cultural determinism. Cultural m a t e r i a l i s t s

reject the i m p l i c a t i o n (which they draw) that "emic and

m ental s u p e r s t r u c t u r e s " such as the "image of limited good"

and the " c ulture of p overty" cause rural and urban poverty.

Foster and Lewis, however, did not imply that rural and

urban poverty are "caused" by any particular w o r l d view.

The tasK they set for the mse l v e s was to identify and

desc r i be the d i s t i n c t i v e p a tterns of thought and behavior

c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of partic u l a r subcultures, not to identify

and e x plain the operative p r o c e s s e s w h i c h brought those

p atterns of thought and behavior into being.

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Cultural d e t e r m i n i s m and cultural materialism, in fact,

rarely c o n t radict one another, for the simple reason that

they rarely address one a n o t h e r ' s problems. Foster and

L e w i s did not assert the primacy of s u p e r s tructural

c o m p o n e n t s over infr a s t r u c t u r a l components, although, of

course, neither did they admit the primacy of the

i n f r a s t r u c t u r e over the superstructure. Instead, they

a v o i d ed the q u e s t i o n of cultural causality altogether. The

c o n t e n t i o n that the "image of l i m i t e d good" and the "culture

of poverty" are p r e d i c t a b l e res p o n s e s to certain conditions

of e c onomic d e p r i v a t i o n is e ntirely c o n s istent w i t h the

p r i n c iples of cultural materialism. Foster and Lewis

n e g l e c t e d to e x p l icitly address that contention, but their

anal y s es did not preclude it. The p a r a d i g m a t i c co n f u s i o n

s u r r o u n d i n g the debate over the image of l i m i t e d good will

be d i s c u s s e d in detail in Chapter Four.

Cultural d e t e r m i n i s m may or may not be especially

enlightening; it may or may not be less i n t r i g u i n g than

st r u c t uralism; and it may or may not be less i m p ortant or

si g n i f i c a n t than cultural materi a l i s m : but these are all

d i f f e r ent questions. To the q u e s t i o n at h a n d w h e t h e r the

"image of lim i t e d good," the "c u l t u r e of p o v erty," and a

host of similar "middle range" c o n c e p t s are products of

e c l e c t i c i s m or cultural d e t e r m i n i s m the answer must be that

they are derived from the pe r v a s i v e p aradigm of cultural

determinism.

The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of cultural determinism as the

p r e d o m inant research strategy in a n t h r o p o l o g y somewhat

c o m p l i c a t e s the a n alysis of c o n temporary anthropological

paradigms. C o m p a r i n g and e v a l u a t i n g the rel a t i v e merits of

cultural d e t e r m i n i s m and cultural materialism, for example,

is a m o r e di f f i c u l t e xercise than a s s e s s i n g the relative

m e r i t s of e c l e c t i c i s m and cultural materialism. While

c ultural d e t e r m i n i s m and cultural m a t e r i a l i s m are largely

incommensurable, e c l e c t i c i s m and cultural m a t e r i a l i s m are

g e n e r ally commensurable. Thus it is a fairly simple m a t t e r

to d e m o n strate that the theories of cultural m a t e r i a l i s m are

more eificacious than those of e c l e c t i c i s m (if, indeed, an

e c l e c t i c theory can be identified). The e v a l u a t i o n of

cultural m a t e r i a l i s m and cultural d e t e r m i n i s m cannot be

b a sed upon a direct c o m p arison of their r e s p e c t i v e theories,

however. That c o m p a r i s o n m u s t instead address the r e lative

c o n e r e n c e and p a r simony of the two pa r a d i g m s and the

relative "importance" of their r e s p e c t i v e problems. From

the d i s c u s s i o n to this point, however, it can be inferred

that the inadequacy of cultural d e t e r m i n i s m can be readily

d e m o n s t r a t e d even on those grounds. W i t h o u t the essential

c o n cept of culture, anthropology w o u l d be just another

m y o p i c social science. It seems unlikely, though, that the

imprecise, inelegant, and imp l i c i t par a d i g m of cultural

d e t e r m i n i s m will lead to further s c i e n t i f i c p rogress w i t h i n

anthropology.

I w o u l d suggest, then, that a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s w o u l d do

well to abandon the paradigm of cultural dfeterminism. No

paradigm, though, no matter how i n c o herent and

unparsimonious its theore t i c a l pr i n c i p l e s or how un i m p o r t a n t

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its problems, can be r e jected or abandoned except in favor

of some s uperior alternative. Paradigms can only be

displaced by other paradigms. Three c o n t e m p o r a r y

anthropological pa r a d i g m s deserve careful c o n s i d e r a t i o n as

p oss i b le a l t e r n a t i v e s to cultural determinism: cultural

mat e r i alism, structuralism, and sym b o l i c anthropology.

T hese three p a r a d i g m s are i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e because they

identify different problems for i n v e s t i g a t i o n and specify

d i f f e r ent m e a n s of solution. As e x p lained in Chapter One,

the e v a l u a t i o n of i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e paradigms must be based

upon a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of each p a r a d i g m ' s in t r i n s i c m e r i t and

a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of each pa r a d i g m ' s relative value. Does the

parad i gm address w e l l - d e f i n e d q u e s t i o n s in a c o n s istent and

conerent f a shion? Are its t h e o r i e s t e s t a b l e and

falsifiable? Does the p a r a d i g m produce "true" e x p l a n a t i o n s ?

Which pa r a d i g m a d d resses and sol v e s the most " important"

pr o b l e m s ? In the a n a l y s i s t h a t follows, I will first

consider the i n t rinsic m e r i t s of cultural materialism,

st r u c turalism, and s ymbol ic a n t h r o p o l o g y in turn. After

r e v i e w ing t h e i r e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l and theore t i c a l principles,

I will then be in a position to co n s i d e r the rel a t i v e value

or s i g n i f i c a n c e of the q u e s t i o n s ad d r e s s e d by each paradigm.

Cultural M a t e r i a l i s e

The p a radigm of cultural m a t e r i a l i s m is centrally

con c e r ned w i t h the q u e s t i o n of cultural causality. "The aim

of c u l tural materialism in pa r t i c u l a r is to acc o u n t for the

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origin, maintenance, and change of the global inventory of

sociocultural d i f f e r e n c e s and s i m i l a r i t i e s " (Harris

1979:271. For most cultural materialists, the goals of

cultural m a t e r i a l i s m and a n t h r o p o l o g y are one and the same.

A c c o r d i n g to Harr i s (ibid.:170), the "'final aim of

anthropology' . . . is the a c h i e v e m e n t of a s c i e n t i f i c

knowledge 01 the causes of the divergent and c o n v ergent

evolutionary t r a j e c t o r i e s of socio c u l t u r a l systems."

The e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l principles of cultural materialism

are e xplicitly scientific. As f o r m u l a t e d by Harris

(ibid.:2YJ, cultural m a t e r i a l i s m "seeks to restrict fields

of inquiry to events, entities, and r e l a t i o n s h i p s that are

k n o w a b l e by m e ans of explicit, logico-empirical,

i n d u c t i v e -deductive, q u a n t i f i a b l e public p r o c e d u r e s or

'operations' subject to r e p l i c a t i o n by indepe n d e n t

observers." B a s i c to the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l v i e wpoint of

cultural m a t e r i a l i s m is the r e c o g n i t i o n of "the consum m a t e

i m p o r tance of the d i f f erence between emic and etic

kn o w l e d g e " (ibid.:32). Since the study of the human

experience n ecessarily involves the study of both thought

and b e h a v i o r or the study, on the one hand, of the internal

and u n o b s e r v a b l e activity of the mind, and, on the other, of

the external and o b s e r v a b l e activity of the b o d y cultural

m a t e r i a l i s t s conclude that t h e r e are both emic and etic w a y s

of s t u d y i n g both thought and behavior. The result,

a c c o r d i n g to Harris (ibid.:38), is the e x i stence of four

d i s t i n ct w a y s of knowing about human social life (i.e.,

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the emic-mental, the e m i c - b e h a v i o r a i , the etic-mental, and

the e t i c - b e h a v i o r a i ).

The t heoretical p r i n ciples of cultural m a t e r i a l i s m are

f o u n d ed upon four a s s u m p t i o n s about the b i o - p s y c h o l o g i c a l

nature of human beings. Harris d e s cribes those four

" p a n - human b i o - p s y c h o l o g i c a l drives and p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s " as

follows:

11 Peop l e need to eat and will generally choose

diets that offer m o r e rather than fewer
c alories and p r o t e i n s and other nutrients.

2) People cannot be totally inactive, but w hen

co n f r o n t e d w i t h a given task, they prefer
to carry it out by ex p e n d i n g less rather
than m o r e energy.

3) People are highly sexed and generally find

r e i n f o r c i n g p l e a s u r e from sexual i n t e r c o u r s e
m o r e often from h e t e r o s e x u a l intercourse.

4) Peop l e need love and af f e c t i o n in order to

feel secure and happy, and other things
be ing equal, they will act to i n crease the
love and a f f e c t i o n w h i c h others give them.
( i b i d . :62 631

Bas e d upon this brief list of b i o - p s y c h o l o g i c a l

constants, cultural materialists infer the ex i s t e n c e of a

universal pat t e r n of s o c i o c u l t u r a l systems. Although

fr e q u e n t l y m i s r e p r e s e n t e d as a t r i p a r t i t e structure, that

universal pattern actually has four c o m p onents

(i b i d . : 5 2 - 5 4 ) . The first of these is the etic behavi o r a l

i n f r a s t r u c t u r e co n s i s t i n g of the m o d e s of pr o d u c t i o n and

r e p r o d u c t i o n or "the technology and the practices emp l o y e d

for e x p a n d i n g or l i m i t i n g basic s u b s i s t e n c e pr o d u c t i o n . . .

[and] for expanding, limiting, and m a i n t a i n i n g po p u l a t i o n

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s i z e . 11 The second component of the universal pattern is

the etic be h a v i o r a l structure co n s i s t i n g of the domestic and

political e c o n o m i e s or the struct u r e s r e s p o n s i b l e for "the

o r g a n i z a t i o n of r e p r o d u c t i o n and basic production, exchange,

and c o n s u m p t i o n w i t h i n camps, houses, apartments, or other

dome s tic settings . . . [and] w i t h i n and between bands,

villages, chiefdoms, states, and empires." The third is

the etic b e h a v i o r a l s u p e r s t r u c t u r e c o n s i s t i n g of u niversally

recurrent " p r o d u c t i v e behavior that leads to . . .

recreational, sportive, and a e s t h e t i c p roducts and services"

inc l u ding art, ritual, sports, and science. The fourth and

final component is the emis mental superstructure "running

roughly parallel to the etic be h a v i o r a l c omponents" and

c o n s i sting of "the conscious and u n c o n s c i o u s cognitive

goals, categories, rules, plans, values, philosophies, and

b e liefs about behavior" i n c luding magic, religion, taboos,

symbols, and ideologies.

The f u n d a m e n t a l theoretical p r i nciple of cultural

ma t e r i a l i s m is the principle of infra s t r u c t u r a l determinism.

Harris (ibid. :55-5b) states the pr i n c i p l e this way: "the

etic behavioral modes of p r o d u c t i o n and repro d u c t i o n

probabilistically d e t ermine the etic be h a v i o r a l domestic and

political economy, w h i c h in turn p r o b a b i l i s t i c a l l y determine

the b ehavioral and mental emic s u p e r s t r u c t u r e s . " The

determinative influence of the i n f r a s t r u c t u r e stems from the

fact that h u m a n beings are subject to i m m u t a b l e natural laws

g o v e r n ing the ac q u i s i t i o n of l i f e - s u s t a i n i n g energy. The

pr i n c i ple of infr a s t r u c t u r a l determinism, according to

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Harris, merely provides a set of str a t e g i c priori t i e s in the

sea r c h for causal factors; cultural materialists do "not

deny the possibility that emic, mental, s u p e r s t r u c t u r a l , and

structural components m a y achieve a deg r e e of autonomy from

the etic behavioral infr a s t r u c t u r e " (ibid.:56). Instead,

cultural m a t e r i a l i s t s c o n c e n t r a t e t h eir search for causal

factors w i t h i n the etic behavioral i n frastructure, in the

be l i e f that, in most cases, the crucial causal factors will

usually be found there.

The first apparent virtue of cultural materialism is

th e admirably e xplicit nat u r e of its e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l and

theoretical principles. Harris id e n t i f i e d one of the

primary challenges of c o n temporary a n t h r o p o l o g y when he

not e d that "the time is ripe . . . to rep l a c e the inchoate

and u n c o n s c i o u s p a r a d i g m s under w h ose a u s p i c e s m ost

anthropologists conduct their research w i t h explicit

d e s c r i p t i o n s of basic objectives, rules, and a s sumptions"

(ibid.:261. No contem p o r a r y paradigm has m e t t hat challenge

as well as cultural m a t erialism. In addition, few other

p a r a d i gms are as f o r t h r i g h t in their r e s p o n s e to the

c h a l l e nge of knowledge. The e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l principles of

cultural m a t e r i a l i s m l e a v e no room for the p ossibility of

ep i s t e m i c relativity. The theories, predictions, and

r e t r o o i c t i o n s of cultural materialism are falsifiable; the

knowledge gained under the auspices of cultural m a t e r i a l i s m

is s e l f - c o r r e c t i n g to a significant degree.

A second major v i r t u e of the par a d i g m lies, as Harris

argues, in "the cogency of its s u b s t a n t i v e theories"

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(ibid.:77). The m a j o r theoretical pr i n c i p l e of cultural

materialism is p a r s i m o n i o u s almost to a fault, yet that

p r i n c iple g e n e r a t e s a broad range of specific, testable

t h e o r i e s that are ap p l i c a b l e to a wide variety of problems.

The e x p l a n a t i o n s proposed by cultural m a t e r i a l i s m are

cone r ent and interrelated. Cultural m a t e r i a l i s t s have

demonstrated incontrovertibly that s o c i ocultural systems

adjust tn e m s e l v e s in patterned and p r e d i c t a b l e w ays to

ecological and d e m o g r a p h i c constraints. The intell e c t u a l

and moral i m p l i c a t i o n s of that k n o w l e d g e are far-reaching.

Moreover, cultural m a t e r i a l i s m is the best p a radigm yet

d e v e l oped by a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s to e x p l a i n the "causes" of

sociocultural phenomena. Any e x p l a n a t i o n of causality

raises the p r o b l e m of infinite regression. Having e x p l a i n e d

"what de t e r m i n e s culture," cultural m a t e r i a l i s t s are hard

pr e s s ed to e x p l a i n "what d e t e rmines w h a t e v e r determines

c u l t u r e " though the fault lies not w i t h cultural

materialists but w i t h the i n t r a c t a b i l i t y of causality. From

a pragmatic perspective, it is s u f f i c i e n t for causal

e x p l a nations that they be t e m p orally prior to the effect

w h i c h they su p p o s e d l y engendered a n d t h a t they be di f f e r e n t

in kind from the eff e c t produced. W i t h o u t this second

criterion, there is the problem of h a v i n g effects cause

re l ated eifects, l e a v i n g u n a n swered the q u estion of w hat

caused tne o r iginal effects. In other words, any

expla nation of socio c u l t u r a l causality must refer to

extra-cultural factors, and this is precisely what cultural

m a t e r i a l i s m does by p ointing to the deter m i n a t i v e in f l u e n c e

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of e n e r g e t i c and other m a terial constraints. Cultural

materialist e x p l a n a t i o n s of cultural causality are

c o n s i d e r a b l y m o r e s a t i s f y i n g than those w h i c h assert that

c u l t u re is d e t e r m i n e d by tradition.

However, cultural materialism is not cap a b l e of

e x p l a i n i n g the causes of all sociocultural phenomena, as

cultural m a t e r i a l i s t s recognize. Cultural m a t e r i a l i s m

cannot explain many of the p a r t i c u l a r i t i e s of emic mental

superstructures, such as, for example, "the rule that boy

ba b i e s get blue blankets and girl babi e s get pink blankets"

(Harris 1982:142). Nor are there any i n f r a s t ructural

d e t e r m i n a n t s of the principal f e atures of the pho n e m i c and

gr a m m a t i c a l st r u c t u r e s of p a r t i c u l a r l a n g u a g e s (Harris

1979:55). In addition, cultural m a t e r i a l i s m is c o n cerned

p r i m a rily with the general q u e s t i o n of cultural causality

(i.e., which sociocultural system component is

d e t e r m i native), and not the pa r t i c u l a r q u e s t i o n of dynamic

processes (e.g., the " i nnovative" pr o c e s s e s i d e n t i f i e d by

Barnett [19533). Instead, cultural m a t e r i a l i s m offers

causai e x p l a n a t i o n s for those s o c iocultural p h e nomena that

either benefit or detract from the pr o d u c t i v e and

r e p r o d u c t i v e efforts of p a r t i c u l a r s o c i ocultural systems.

In effect, the p r i nciple of infra s t r u c t u r a l d e t e r m i n i s m is

only capable of a c c o u n t i n g for those c o m p onents of

s o c i o c ultural s ystems that are af f e c t e d by infr a s t r u c t u r a l

d e terminants. That c i r c u l a r i t y is hardly a cr i t i c i s m of the

paradigm, however. The kinds of answers o b t a i n e d depend

upon the kinds of q u e s t i o n s asked. Granted, there are many

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i n t e r e s t i n g and important q u e s t i o n s about the human

e x p e r ience that are not a d d r e s s e d by cultural materialism.

What is remarkable, though, is how w ell (that is, how

pars i moniously, coherently, and cogently) cultural

m a t e r i a l i s m answers the q u e s t i o n s that it does address.

No contem p o r a r y p a r a d i g m m a kes as rigorous an

epistemological d i s t i n c t i o n between emic and etic types of

kno w l edge as cultural materialism, and that d i s t i n c t i o n is

one of the great strengths of the m a t e r i a l i s t r e search

strategy. As presented in Cultural M a t e r ialis.nl>

though, that d i s t i n c t i o n is not w h o l l y unambiguous. Harris

(1979:38) argues that "if the terms e m i c and 'etic* are

not redundant w i t h respect to the terms 'mental' and

'behavioral,' there should be four o b j e c t i v e o p e r a t i o n a l l y

d e f i n able dom a i n s in the socio c u l t u r a l field of inquiry."

In fact, however, the terms "emic" and "etic"

are o p e r a t i o n a l l y redundant w i t h respect to the terms

"mental" and " b e havioral." The four "domains of i n q u i r y "

the emic-mental, the e m i c - b e h a v i o r a l , the etic-mental, and

the e t i c - b e h a v i o r a i include two o p e r a t i o n a l l y unrealizable

domains, namely the e m i c - b e h a v i o r a i and the etic-mental.

A n a l y s e s of the emics of b e havior necess a r i l y consider

the c o g nitive context of behavior. As those a nalyses are

con c e r ned w i t h the way in w h i c h behavior is perceived and

interpreted, they are u n a v o i d a b l y c o n cerned w i t h the emics

of mental life. Similarly, analyses of the etics of thought

necessarily involve in f e r e n c e s from the o b s e r v a t i o n s of

behavior, and are a c c o r dingly c o n cerned w i t h the etics of

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behavior. The issue, after all, is e p i s t e m o l o g y . More

specifically, the issue here is operationalism, or

the m e t h o d of inquiry. The emics of behavior can only be

known thr o u g h the emics of thought, while the etics of

th o u g ht can only be known through the etics of behavior.

In certain respects, this co n c l u s i o n may seem

co u n t er- i n t u i t i v e . G i ve n the un d o u b t e d fact t hat human

e x p e r i e n c e is co m p r i s e d of two d istinct realms, thought and

behavior, and the unarguable fact that two distinct forms of

cultural analysis are possible, the emic and the etic, it

w o u l d seem, on the surface, to be e m i nently re a s o n a b l e to

as s u m e via a simple m a t h e m a t i c a l p e r m u t a t i o n that four

dist i nct domains of inquiry exist. But consider, for

example, the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l c o n s e q u e n c e s of i n v e s t i g a t i o n s

c o n d u c t e d in the etic-mental domain. The "thought" w h i c h is

etic a lly d e s c r i b e d either is or is not in the m i n d s of the

people for w h o m the d e s c r i p t i o n is offered. If that thought

is absent, then it is merely an etic construct inferred from

behavior, and as such does not m e r i t the a p p e l l a t i o n

"m ental." If that tho u g h t is present, then there should be

some mea n s of e l i c i t i n g it t hrough the e x p l o r a t i o n of the

e m i c - mental domain.

One way arou n d this difficulty, of course, is to claim

that the thought is present but u n e l i c i t a b l e because it

is u n c o n s c i o u s . That claim, however, rests upon an

a s s u m p t i o n that is nei t h e r empiri c a l l y testable nor

logically falsifiable. If the informant never "admits" to

h a v i n g the thought, the only way to d emonstrate its

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e x i s t ence is by referenc e to its behavioral

m a n i f e s t a t i o n but that, obviously, is not h i n g m o r e than the

etics of behavior. If the informant does "admit" to hav i n g

the thought, then his or her a d m ission thus b elongs to the

em i c - m e n t a l domain.

I w a n t to be certain, though, that the thrust of my

c r i t i c i s m of cultural m a t e r i a l i s m ' s epis t e m o l o g i c a l

p r i n c iples is clear. St atem e n t s d e s c r i b i n g the emics of

b e h a v ior are different, in form and content, from statements

d e s c r i b i n g the emics of mental life. In the same way,

a n a l y ses of the etics of thought are couched in terms that

ar e f oreign to ana l y s e s of the etics of behavior. The four

d ist i nct "domains of inquiry" w h i c h Harris infers must

exist iiQ exist as four distinct domains of d e s c r i p t i o n and

analysis. But they are not distinct operational

d o m a i ns of inquiry. W h i l e d i f ferent qu e s t i o n s are

posed to i n f o r m a n t s in the effort to obtain answers that may

be classed, alternately, as the emics of b e havior or the

emics of thought, in both cases the m e t h o d for v e r i f y i n g

k n o w l edge is the same, namely e l i c i t a t i o n of the in f o r m a n t ' s

w o r l d view. Etic knowledge, on the other hand, can only be

v a l i d a t e d by the o b s e r v a t i o n of behavior, whe t h e r it is etic

k n o w l edge or thought or behavior that is being sought. What

is going on in the mind of an informant can only be known by

the i nform a n t ' s report. Some "psychics" claim to be able to

directly perceive other people's states of mind, but those

c laims have hardly been s u fficiently w e l l - s u b stantiated.

Operationally speaking, the emics of behavior and the etics

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of thought do not exist. (Indeed, the " e m i c - b e h a v i o r a l 11 and

the "etic-mental" c o m p onents are properly absent f rom the

u niversal pattern de s c r i b e d by c u ltural materialists.)

Cultural m a t e r i a l i s m has been c r i t i c i z e d for being

overly " d e t e r m i n i s t i c ; " for a d v o c a t i n g "single factor"

c ausality; and for b e ing " a n t i-human." None of these

c r i t i cisms are warranted. Cultural m a t e r i a l i s m can hardly

be faulted for f a i l i n g to contribute to exclusively

" humanistic" or "aesthetic" a n a l y s e s of the human

experience, because cultural m a t e r i a l i s m is m a n i f e s t l y

u n c o n cerned w i t h such analyses. When cultural m a t e r i a l i s m

is charged w i t h h a v i n g omitted t h e "human" element from its

d e s c r iption of s o c iocultural systems, those charges are

usually vague and dev o i d of propos i t i o n a l meaning. Most

such charges are m e r e l y emotive r e a f f i r m a t i o n s of the value

of research pursued u n der n o n m a t e r i a l i s t paradigms, and, as

such, can hardly be considered s u b s t a n t i v e c r i t i q u e s of

cultural materialism. There is, however, one m e a n i n g f u l

sense in w h i c h cultural m a t e r i a l i s m n e g l e c t s the "human"

element. But to d i s c o v e r that sense, we have to l o o k not at

cultural materialism's incommensurable competitors, but at

the c onsistency and coherency of cultural m a t e r i a l i s m ' s

t h eoretical assumptions.

The universal pat t e r n postulated by cultural

m a t e r i a l i s m is based upon four u n i v e r s a l human

characteristics, as m e n t i o n e d earlier: the need for

nutrition, the pr e f e r e n c e for the least possible e x p e n d i t u r e

of energy, the m o t i v a t i o n for h e t e r o s e x u a l intercourse, and

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the desire for sociab i l i t y and affect. As Harris (1979:631

observes, e x c e p t i o n s to each of these pan-human dri v e s and

predispositions can be readily adduced. Nevertheless, each

of tnese c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s is u n q u e s t i o n a b l y true about the

great ma j o r i t y of human beings t h r o u g h o u t time and space.

The most p r o b l e m a t i c a s s u m p t i o n is the premise of least

effort, but t nat too seems w e l l establ i s h e d

c r o s s - c u l t u r a l l y , especially if the as s u m p t i o n is generally

restricted to the efforts to obtain l i f e - s u s t a i n i n g energy.

As Ha rris also observes, the val u e d parsimony of c u ltural

materialism's theoretical p r i n c i p l e s is due in part to the

brevity of tne p a r a d i g m ' s list of b i o - p s y c h o l o g i c a l traits.

Harris o f f e r s another j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the l i s t ' s

brevity, however, w h ich poses some difficulties. The

validity and g e n e r a l i t y of those four assumptions, he

argues, "is g u a r a n t e e d by the ex i s t e n c e of similar

bio-psychological p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s a m o n g most m e m b e r s of the

primate order." R e s t r i c t i n g the list to four m o r e - o r - l e s s

pa n-primate predispositions insures t hat we will not be

t e mpted to r e d u c e "every recurrent cultural trait to the

status of a b i o l o g i c a l given" (ibid.:63). The q u e s t i o n that

then presents itself, however, is w h y the human s pecies

should have d e v e l o p e d s o c i ocultural systems at all. If most

primates share these same c h a racteristics, why do not m ost

primates have socio c u l t u r a l systems as w e l l ? W hat is it

that makes the h u m a n species d i f f e r e n t ?

In short, cultural m a t e r i a l i s m ' s list of

bio-psychological univer s a l s omits the one universal

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predisposition which is q u i n t e s s e n t i a l l y human, namely the

fact that human beings are mean i n g - s e e k i n g , symbol-using

animals. Given cultural m a t e r i a l i s m ' s four

bio-psychological a s s u m p t i o n s the pa n - h u m a n need for

nutrition, the preierence for low energy expenditures, the

m o t i v a t i o n for sexual intercourse, and the desire for

s o c i a b i l i t y the u n i versal existence of etic be h a v i o r a l

m o des of p r o d u c t i o n and r e p r o d u c t i o n and the u b i q u i t o u s

occurrence of etic behavioral domestic and political

e c o n o m i e s are entirely u n d e r s t a n d a b l e and predictable. But

why s hou l d all socioc u l t u r a l systems include an etic

b e h a v ioral superstructure? Even m ore to the point, why

should all sociocultural s y s t e m s have an emic mental

superstructure? Not h i n g in the list of universal human

p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s suggested by cultural materialism explains

the r e l i a b l e recurrence of superstructures.

I would suggest, then, that cultural m a t e r i a l i s m could

be i m p r o v e d by adding a s i n g l e as s u m p t i o n about the

bio-psychological characteristics of the h u m a n species,

namely that:

5) People w i l l assign m e a n i n g to t h eir activities

and e x p e r i e n c e s and will invest c o n s i d e r a b l e
intell e c t u a l a n d emotional currency in the
development, expression, and p r e s e r v a t i o n
of those meanings.

It shou l d be quickly n o ted that the s i g n i f i c a n c e of

this u n i v e r s a l human p r e d i s p o s i t i o n is far from entirely

lost on cultural materialists. Cultural materialism insists

upon the import a n c e of the em i c - e t i c d i s t i n c t i o n precisely

b e c ause of the universal existence of e l i c i t a b l e meanings.

Indeed, Harr i s affirms that the universal recurr e n c e of the

etic b e h a vioral s u p e r s t r u c t u r e is based upon "the prominence

of human speech acts and the importance of s ymbolic

p r o c e s s e s for the human psyche" (ibid.:52). Elsewhere, he

w r i t e s that "the most important part of human nat u r e is the

s y m b o l - m e d i a t e d faculty for culture and c r e a t i v e activity"

(Harris 198ub:520j. That assumption, though, is too

fundamental and too critical to be omi t t e d from any list of

e s sential human traits. Cultural m a t e r i a l i s m fails to

stress that a s s u m p t i o n bec a u s e cultural m a t e r i a l i s m is

l a r g e ly unconcerned with d i s c o v e r i n g and e x p l a i n i n g the

n a t u r e of s ymbolic p r o c e s s e s per se (although cultural

materialists do r e c o g n i z e that "communication . . . serves a

vital i n strumental role in c o o r d i n a t i n g infrastructural,

structural, and s u p e r s t r u c t u r a l activi t i e s " [Harris

1979:54]). In the i n t erests of consistency and coherency,

however, cultural m a t e r i a l i s m w o u l d do well to i ncorporate

that a s s u m p t i o n at its core. Of course, that additional

premise opens up e ntirely new fields of investigation.

S t r u c t u r a l i s m and sym b o l i c anthropology, as w e shall see,

are primarily c o n cerned w i t h ex p l o r i n g the i m p l i c a t i o n s of

the fact that human beings are pre-e m i n e n t l y m e a n i n g - s e e k i n g

animals.

One final c r i ticism w h i c h has been m ade of cultural

m a t e r i a l i s m deserves consideration, and that is M a g n a r e l l a ' s

(1982) o b s e r v a t i o n that t h ere is an apparent discre p a n c y

b e tween the paradi g m ' s stated logic and its l o g i c in use,

 p a r t i c u l a r l y with respect to cultural materialism's

theoretical p r i n ciples and their a p p l i c a t i o n in empirical

research. In the stated logic of cultural materialism, the

p r i n c iple of i n f r a s t ructural determinism is carefully

qualified. Harris (1979:56) claims that "cultural

materialists give hig h e s t priority to the effort to

f o r m u l a t e and test the o r i e s in w h i c h infrastructural

v a r i a bles are the primary causal factors . . . [while]

t h e o r i e s that bestow causal primacy upon the mental and emic

s u p e r s t r u c t u r e are to be f o r m ulated and tested only as an

u l t i m a t e recourse w h e n no t estable etic behavioral t h eories

can be formulated or w h e n all that have been fo r m u l a t e d have

been decisively discredited." As M a g n a r e l l a notes, cultural

m a t e r i a l i s m s l o g i c in use is a d i f ferent matter, since

r e s e a r c h pursued under the auspices of cultural materialism

rarely if ever fails to identify infrastructural

d e terminants. If cultural materialists can always d i scover

infrastructural determinants, then how can cultural

materialism claim to be falsif i a b l e ? Do infrastructural

determinants "really" exist, or are they merely

" t h e o retical" c o n s t r u c t s of the p a r adigm? A related problem

(which Ma g n a r e l l a also notes) is the difficulty involved in

identifying which infra s t r u c t u r a l var i a b l e is most

d e t e r m i n a t i v e in any given instance. How do we choose

b e t w e e n two a l t e r n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s t explanations, when, for

example, one of them implicates an aspect of the mode of

p r o d u c t i o n and the other implicates an aspect of the mode of

r e p r o d u c t i o n as being c ausally determinative?

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Neither of these p r o b l e m s are fatal for cultural

m aterialism, however. In the first place, w h ile the

theoretical p r i nciple of i n frastructural d e t e r m i n i s m is not

i t s e l f faisifiable, the p a r t i c u l a r theories to w n i c h that

th e o r e t i c a l p r i nciple gives rise are falsifiable. As Harr i s

(iy82:145) notes in his reply to Magnarella, the p redictions

made by cultural m a t e r i a l i s t s such as "the prediction that

the d e c l i n i n g U.S. fertility rate is not a temporary

a b e r r a t i o n " are e m i nently falsifiable. Moreover, cases of

superstructural d e t e r m i n i s m lie exist and are recognized by

cultural materialists (Harris m e n t i o n s the Ira n i a n Islamic

and C hinese cultural revolutions), although cultural

materialists predict that such changes will usually not

persist if they are at odds w i t h i n f r a s t ructural conditions.

That claim, too, is falsifiable. It could be falsified

simply by ad d u c i n g a substa n t i a l (i.e., m o r e than unusual)

n u m b e r of cases in w h i c h s u p e r s t ructural d e t e r m i n i s m has

in s p i r e d long term changes in the face of i n f r a s t ructural

opposition. (Cultural materialists, of course, can point to

a l a rge number of cases in w h i c h i nfrastructural d e t e r minism

has inspired long term cha n g e s despite super s t r u c t u r a l

opposition.)

In the second place, the problem of i d e n t i f y i n g

crit i cal infrastructural d e t e r m i n a n t s is an empirical

problem, not a logical one. C o m peting cultural m a t e r i a l i s t

th e o r i e s or e x p l a n a t i o n s w o u l d obviously be commensurable;

e v a l u a t i n g the relative efficacy of c o m p e t i n g m a t e r i a l i s t

claims w o u l d th e r e f o r e be a l o g ically s i m p l e even if

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em p i r i c a l l y difficult--task. The fai l u r e to a c c o mplish that

t a s K w o u l d in v a l i d a t e the w o r k of the in d i v i d u a l cultural

mat e r ialist, not the paradigm itself. One of the challenges

of s c i e n t i f i c theory is to apply the theory properly (that

is, rigorously, systematically, consistently, and

accurately).

Sfcr_uis.fc.uralism
The paradigm of s t r u c t u r a l i s m is u l t i m a t e l y concerned

with the st r u c t u r e of the h u man m i n d not the neurological

structure of the brain, but the logical s t r u c t u r e of human

t h o u g h t processes. S t r u c t u r a l i s m seeks to unc o v e r the

h i d d e n nature of thought, and to show how p a n -human thought

processes are m a n i f e s t e d in culturally diverse situations.

A c c o r d i n g to Claude L e v i - S t r a u s s (1963:274), s t r u c t u r a l i s m s

f o u n d e r and chief advocate, "the structural m e t h o d consists

in p e r c e i v i n g i n v ariant forms w i t h i n d i f f e r e n t contexts."

Following a l i n g u i s t i c analogy, structuralism concerns

i t s e l f w i t h the "deep s t r u cture" u n d e r l y i n g cultural

phenomena. Structuralists are much less co n c e r n e d w i t h the

a p p a r ent reality of surface f e atures than they are w i t h the

fundamental reality of submerged features. "When we

c o n s i der some system of belief . . . or some form of social

organization . . . the q u e s t i o n we ask is 'What does it all

mean? To answer it, we att e m p t to t r a nslate into our

language rules originally co n c e i v e d in a n o t h e r language"

( L e v i -Strauss 1976:10). Elsewhere, L e v i - S t r a u s s has

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c h a r a c t e r i z e d his s t r u c t u r a l i s t e n d eavors in these terms:

"I have always a i med at dra w i n g up an inventory of mental

patterns, to reduce apparently arbitrary data to some kind

of order, and to attain a level at w h i c h a kind of necessity

b e comes apparent, u n d e r l y i n g the illusions of liberty"

(lyoyb:10).

The central problem ad d r e s s e d by the p a radigm of

s tructuralism, as L e a c h (1970:36) percep t i v e l y notes, is

simply this: "what is Man?" To answer that question,

structuralists point to the invariant face of human thought

l yi n g behind the m a n y m a s k s of culture. This "problem of

inva r iance," w r i t e s L e v i - S t r a u s s (1976:24), is the problem

of "the u n i v e r s a l i t y of human n a ture." Structuralists

affirm, implicitly, that h u man beings are q u i n t e s s e n t i a l l y

m e a n i n g - s e e k i n g animals. S t r u c t u r a l i s m aims to discover the

universal c o g nitive p r o cesses by which human beings assign

m e a n i n g to and d e r i v e m e a n i n g from their experiences. As

Harris (1979:166; observes, "structuralism is a set of

p r i n c i ples for s t udying the mental superstructure."

T he specific goal of structuralism, ac c o r d i n g to

Levi-Strauss (19 6 9 b : 1), is "to prove that there is a kind of

logic in t a ngible qualities, and to d e m o n s t r a t e the

o p e r a tion of that log i c and reveal its laws." Like cultural

materialists, s t r u c t u r a l i s t s regard the goals of

a n t h r opology as e s s e n t i a l l y congruent w i t h the aims of their

paradigm. Thus L e v i - S t r a u s s (1976:9-10) conceives

anthropology to be "the bona fide occupant of that domain of

semiology w h i c h l i n g u i s t i c s has not already claimed for its

 123

o w n." "The final aim of anthr o p o l o g y , " he asserts on

an o t h e r occasion, "is to contribute to a better k n o w l e d g e of

o b j e c t i f i e d t h o u g h t and its m e c h a n i s m s " (Levi-Strauss

lyoyb:13). So far, the realms of " o b j e c t i f i e d t h ought"

a n a l y z e d by s t r u c t u r a l i s t s have inc l u d e d such diverse

p h e n o mena as kinship, totemism, mythology, cuisine, t a ble

manners, and stoplights.

The e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l principles of s t r u c t u r a l i s m der i v e

f r o m the p a r a d i g m s o ntological assumptions. The subject

matter of s t r u c t u r a l i s m is an unseen, hid d e n reality t h a t

l i e s behind the e m p irical world. As such, structuralists

can hardly res t r i c t t h e m selves to measur a b l e , quantifiable,

"obje ctive" e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l procedures, as do cultural

m a t erialists. Instead, structural an a l y s i s depends u pon the

i n t u i t i v e i m a g i n a t i o n of the analyst. There is m e t h o d t o

th e s t r u c t u r a l i s t ' s m a d n e s s (Levi- S t r a u s s 196 3 J but it i ;

not a method t h a t is easily and e xactly replicated. For

Levi-Strauss (ibid.:23), the a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s "goal is t o

grasp, beyond t h e conscious and always s h i f t i n g images w h i c h

men hold, the c o m p l e t e range of u n c o n s c i o u s possibilities."

T h a t range, of course, is limited, and the theoretical

p r i n c i p l e s of s t r u c t u r a l i s m are in t e n d e d to define its scope

an d properties. But if the a n t h r o p o l o g i s t "applies his

a n a l y s i s primarily to the u n c o n scious e l e m e n t s of social

life" (ibid.), then anth r o p o l o g i c a l ana l y s i s is

fundamentally c o n c e r n e d w i t h the etics of t h o u g h t . As

d i s c u s s e d earlier, knowledge of the "etic mental" dom a i n can

o n l y be o b tained by inference. For the m ost part,

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structuralists derive those inferences from their analyses

of emic mental domains.

The t heoretical pri nciples of s t r u c t u r a l i s m attempt to

a c c o u n t for the m o d e s of human thought. Levi-Strauss

(1yo3:21) ex p r e s s e s the p a r a digm's raison d* etre in this

fash i on: "If . . . the uncons c i o u s activity of the m ind

consists in i m p o s i n g forms upon content, and if these forms

are f u n d a m e n t a l l y the same for all minds . . . it is

necessary and s u f f i c i e n t to grasp the u n c o n s c i o u s st r u c t u r e

u n d e r l y i n g each i n s t i t u t i o n and each custom, in order to

obtain a p r i nciple or i n t e r p r e t a t i o n valid for other

i n s t i t u t i o n s and other customs." T h e struct u r a l i s t

" p r i n c i p l e or i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " holds that an un c o n s c i o u s

d i a l e c t i c of binary oppositions und e r l i e s all " o bjectified

thoughts." This d i c h o t o m o u s pattern of tho u g h t is presumed

to be a universal human characteristic, as is the search for

t h ird e l e m e n t s w h i c h m e d i a t e the oppositions.

Structuralists claim to have d e m o n s t r a t e d that people

cross-culturally are p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h the same binary

opp o s i tions, the principal one of w h i c h is the op p o s i t i o n

between "culture" and "nature." A c c o r d i n g to the

structuralist argument, the m a i n t e n a n c e of human identity is

a c c o m p l i s h e d by the m a i n t e n a n c e of the c u l t u r e - n a t u r e

dichotomy. Other common o p p o s i t i o n s include self and other,

m a l e and female, life and death, and sacred and profane.

Structuralism, though, is not e x p l i c i t l y "idealist" in

t h a t it m a i n t a i n s that s t r u c t u r e s of thought determine

culture. Instead, as Mal e f i j t (1974:325) has noted,

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structuralists re c o g n i z e that p a tterns of thought "operate

w i t n i n a cultural context." For Levi-Strauss, culture is a

product not of the mind but of the i n t e r a c t i o n that goes on

b e tween the m i n d and human activity (Murphy 198u:1b5; Rossi

1974:9b). S t r u c t u r a l i s t s are aware that there are

pa r t i c u l a r historical, economic, and e n v i ronmental

d e t e r m i n a n t s of p a r t icular cultural forms, but they are not

i n t e r e s t e d in i d e n t i f y i n g or a n a lyzing those d e t e r m i n a t i v e

factors. Rather, s t r u c t u r a l i s t s are intere s t e d in

i d e n t i f y i n g and a n a l y z i n g the common u n c o n s c i o u s st r u c t u r e s

that u n derlie diverse cultural forms. For structuralists,

the more things change, the m o r e they stay the same. (Of

course, the same is true in one sense for cultural

materialists: amid the temporal and spatial d i v ersity of

cultural forms stands the i n v ariant fact that socioc u l t u r a l

systems s y s t e m a t i c a l l y adjust t h e m s e l v e s to m a terial

constraints.) But, for structuralists, change is not the

issue.

A n o t a b l e deficiency of structuralism, in sharp

contrast to cultural m a terialism, is the i m p r e c i s i o n of its

epistemological and theore t i c a l principles. True,

Levi-Strauss does offer general guidel i n e s for the conduct

of structural analysis. He declares, for example, that the

" p r i n ciples w h i c h serve as a basis for any kind of

structural a nalysis [are] eco n o m y of explanation, unity of

solution, and [the] ability to re c o n s t r u c t the w h o l e from a

fr a g m e n t " (1963:211;. But how is structural a n alysis to be

a r r i v ed at the first place? Is there any g u a rantee that

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inde p endent s t r u c t u r a l i s t s will adduce the same structural

explanation in any given instance? L e v i - S t r a u s s does not

offer satisfactory answers to these questions. In the final

analysis, the "correct" or "true" structural a nalysis is the

one w h i c h app e a l s most forcefully, in some in t u i t i v e way, to

the intellect and imagination. As W e r n e r (1973:295) has

noted, the w o r k or L e v i - S t r a u s s contains few s u m maries of

either theory or method. Though s t r u c t u r a l i s m is a paradigm

d e s i g ned to i n v e s t i g a t e the s t r u c t u r e of the human mind, it

is a pa r a d i g m that has p r oduced re m a r k a b l y few th e o r i e s

about human t h o u g h t processes. As M a l e f i j t (1974:331) has

observed, "so far, he [Levi-Strauss] does not say much more

about the h u m a n m i n d than that it i s structured, and that

its tendency is to think in binary patterns."

I have said that s t r u c t u r a l i s m is a v owedly u n c o n c e r n e d

with change, but I have also noted that s t r u c t u r a l i s m is

primarily c o n c e r n e d w i t h e x p l a i n i n g the nature of the mental

superstructure. It is an u n a v o i d a b l e fact that change is a

salient c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the m e n t a l superstructure. All

mental s u p e r s t r u c t u r e s are ch a n g i n g all the time, and that

p resents a p r o b l e m for structuralism. Granted,

structuralism is not concerned w i t h ex p l a i n i n g the causes of

s u p e r s tructural change, and to f a ult the paradigm for its

f a i l u r e to do so w o u l d be to beg the m a t e r i a l i s t question.

Still, though, it is difficult to be completely s a t i s f i e d by

structuralist e x p l a n a t i o n s w h e n those e x p l a n a t i o n s fail

utterly to acc o u n t for an obvious f e a t u r e of the doma i n to

w h i c h tney are applied. S t r u c t u r a l i s t s assume perpetual

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"surface" change to be a given, and they are content to

d e m o n s t r a t e that the same fundamental p a t t e r n s of thought

u n d e r l i e ail such changes. But why is it t h a t human beings

show so little l o y a l t y to particular " o b j e c t i f i e d thoughts"

that are "good to think"? If it is s a t i s f y i n g to arrange

p a r t i cular thoughts in a d i c h o t o m o u s pattern, why are the

s a t i s factions d e r i v e d from those particular a r rangements so

ephemeral? Is it t hat h u man beings are simply inclined to

assign mea n i n g in a d i c h o t o m o u s pattern and are wholly

u n c o n c e r n e d w ith the particular content of the mea n i n g

assigned? If so, w h y ? The failure to add r e s s these

q u e s t i o n s is another deficiency of the s t r u cturalist

paradigm.

In addition, t h ere is a s ignificant d i s c r epancy between

structuralism's stated l o g i c and its l o gic in use. Despite

the fact that s t r u c t u r a l i s t s recognize that patterns of

t h o u g ht "operate w i t h i n a pa r t i c u l a r c o n t e x t " and that there

are e x t r a - c u l t u r a l d e t e r m i n a n t s of cultural forms, and

d e s p i te Levi-Strauss' stated belief in the "undoubted

primacy of the i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , " many p a r t i c u l a r

s t r u c turalist a r g u m e n t s closely resemble b r i e f s for

superstructural determinism. In The S a v a g e M i n d , for

example, Levi-S t r a u s s surveys the e x t ensive floral and

faunai knowledge held by p r i m i t i v e s aro u n d the w o rld and

s u g g e sts that "one m a y readily conclude that animals and

plants are not known as the result of their usefulness; they

are deemed to be useful or i nteresting b e c a u s e they are

first of all known" (1966:9)* It might be arg u e d in this

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i n s t a nce that the d i s c r e p a n c y between s t r u c t u r a l i s m ' s stated

logic ana its log i c in use is m o r e ap p a r e n t than real.

Af ter all, not all superstructural c o m p o n e n t s have

infrastructural d e t erminants; m any are i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l l y

neutral. As L e v i - S t r a u s s has argued in a n o t h e r context, "to

say that a society f u n c t i o n s is a truism; to say that

e v e r y t h i n g in a society f u n ctions is an a b s u r d i t y "

(lyo3:13). L e v i - S t r a u s s may simply be s u g g e s t i n g that the

ex t e n t and co m p l e x i t y of floral and faunai knowledge in

various c u ltures is due in part to the h u man p r e d i l e c t i o n to

cr e a t e worlds of meaning. But there are other i n s tances in

w h i c h Levi-Strauss* superstructural determinism is m ore

blatant.

The status of the coyote in native A m e r i c a n m y t h o l o g y

is an example of one such puzzle. Levi-Strauss poses the

problem in this way: "Why is it that t h r o u g h o u t North

A m e r i c a his [the trickster's] role is a s s i g n e d practi c a l l y

e v e r y w h e r e to eit h e r coyote or raven?" (1963:224). Thus

phrased, the q u e s t i o n is one of cultural causality. What

a c c o u n t s for this p a r t i c u l a r cross-cultural simila r i t y ?

L e v i - S t r a u s s claims that the ans w e r lies in the fact that

"mythical thought a l w a y s p r o g r e s s e s from the a w a r e n e s s of

o p p o s i t i o n s toward t h e i r r e s o l u t i o n " (ibid.). The coyote is

a t r i c k s t e r because, as a c a r r i o n - e a t e r , it is an anomalous

animal, m e d i a t i n g b e t w e e n p l a n t - e a t i n g a n i m a l s and beasts of

prey. P l a n t - e a t i n g a n i m a l s and beasts of prey are

a s s o c i ated, respectively, w i t h a g r i c u l t u r e and hunting.

A g r i c u l t u r e and hunting, in turn, suggest the o p p o s i t i o n

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b e t w een life and death. Hence the coyote is a n o malous

cross-culturally because all c ultures r e c o g n i z e the

o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n l ife and death.

In this case, Levi-Strauss seems to be saying that

un i v ersal dichotomous p a tterns of tho u g h t h a v e determined

the recurr e n c e of a pa r t i c u l a r cultural feature. Harris

(1979:200-01) obj e c t s that Levi-Strauss* account is far too

a rcane and s u g g e s t s instead a m u c h m o r e m u n d a n e explanation:

the coyote enj o y s the status of a tr i c k s t e r because it is an

intelligent, o p p o r t u n i s t i c animal. Of course, the problem

here may be m e r e l y one of e x p o sitory style. Perhaps w h a t

Levi-Strauss is real l y saying is that all cultures c o n struct

sets of binary o p p o s i t i o n s and t h eir m e d i a t o r s after the

fact that is, having recognized a wily animal, they

con s truct an emic t ypology whi c h will render that animal

anomalous. ( " H e r b i v o r e " and "carn i v o r e , " after all, are

c a t e gories d e v e l o p e d by human beings, not inalie n a b l e

a s pects of the "real" world.)

To escape the charge of s u p e r s t r u c t u r a l determinism,

s t r u c t u r a l i s t s often have to reso r t to just such fancy

footwork. The f a i l u r e to rule out a r g u m e n t s that appeal to

superstructural determinism is yet another deficiency of

structuralism. In its stated logic, h o w e v e r and often in

its logic in u s e s t r u c t u r a l i s m does not add r e s s q u e s t i o n s

of cultural causality. In order to e v a l u a t e the paradigm,

therefore, it is n e c essa ry to cri t i q u e structuralism's

o c c a s ional r e f e r e n c e s to s u p e r s t r u c t u r a l determinism, but it

is not suffic i e n t to do so.

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The most signif i c a n t and fundamental cr i t i c i s m which

has been made of s t r u c t u r a l i s m is that structural analyses

simply are not true. One of the most fr e q u e n t l y quoted of

all structuralist statements is Levi-Strauss' (1963:279)

d e c l a r a t i o n that "the term 'social structure' has nothing to

do w i t h empirical reality but w i t h m o d e l s w h i c h are built up

after it." As M a l e f i j t (1974:331; has observed, the

im p l i c a t i o n that "stru c t u r a l i s m seems to have no relevance

to the empirical world" is especially d i s t u r b i n g to a great

many anthropologists. Are the u n c o n s c i o u s s t r u ctures

id e n t i f i e d by structural analysis really there at ail?

Ha r r i s (1979:167) s u ggests that "there is a distinct

p o s s i bility that s t r u c t u r a l i s t s t r u c t u r e s exist only in the

i m a g i n a t i o n s of the s t r u c t u r a l i s t s t h e m s e l v e s . " Jen k i n s

(1979) argues that structural analyses are inherently unreal

ana that s t r u c t u r a l i s m is hopele s s l y unscientific. Diamond

(1974:325) claims that the w o r k of L e v i - S t r a u s s "represents

a t r i umph of i n a u t h e n t i c i t y . " Werner (1973:295-99) insists

that structuralism is unsystematic; that structural analysis

fails to account for all of the co n s t i t u e n t el e m e n t s w i t h i n

its domain of inquiry; and that struct u r a l i s t claims are

neither t estable nor falsifiable. These are all serious

charges, which, if substantiated, might be ex p e c t e d to

entail the demise of s t r u c t u r a l i s m as a l e g i t i m a t e paradigm.

It is i m p ortant t h e r e f o r e to un d e r s t a n d the import of

Levi-Strauss' sta r t l i n g response to these attacks.

Rather than insist that structural ana l y s e s are

falsifiable, Levi-Strauss claims instead that struc t u r a l i s m

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is not to be faulted for fai l i n g to produce falsif i a b l e

p r o p o sitions: "The most f a s h i o n a b l e o b j e c t i o n to structural

anthropology is that its h y p o t h e s e s cannot be falsified.*

Yet, this cr i t e r i o n can only be applied to fully established

sciences. Anthropology has not yet a t t a i n e d this stage"

(iy76:viii). That is a very strange c l a i m to make, for

there are, unarguably, a great many falsifiable propositions

that have come out of anthropology. Levi-Strauss is able to

make that claim, though, because he has a fairly peculiar

sense of w h a t " a n t h r o p o l o g y " is all about:

It may be said that the [structural analysis

p r e sented here] . . . takes e t h n o g r a p h i c
res e a r c h in the di r e c t i o n of psychology,
logic, and philosophy, where it has no
right to venture. Am I not h e l p i n g to
deflect e t h n o g r a p h y from its real task,
w h ich should be the study of nat i v e
c o m m u n i t i e s and the examination, from the
social, political, and e c o n o m i c points of
view, of p r oblems posed by the relations
among i n d i v i d u a l s and groups w i t h i n a
given co m m u n i t y ? Such m i s g i v i n g s . . . seem
to me to arise from a total m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g
of what I am trying to do. (1969b:9)

But w h a t then is L e v i - S t r a u s s t r y i n g to do? If his

claims are not verifiable, how is it that they promise to

increase our u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the w o r l d ? What co n s t i t u t e s a

v a l i d e x p l a n a t i o n in struc t u r a l i s t ter m s ? Levi-Strauss

o f f e r s this answer:

For [structural analysis] to be worthwhile,

it is not necessary in my view that it
should be assumed to embody the truth for
years to come and w i t h regard to the
tiniest detail. I shall be s a t i s f i e d if
it is credited w i t h the mode s t a c h i e v e m e n t
of having left a d i f ficult p r o b l e m in a
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rather less u n s a t i s f a c t o r y state than it

was before. Nor must we forget that in
science there are no final truths. The
sc i e n t i f i c m i n d does not so m u c h provide
the right answers as ask the right questions.
(1969b:7)

In other words, emp irical c r i t icisms of structural

a n a l y ses carry little if any weight. Structural analyses

are to be e v a l u a t e d a c c o r d i n g to other criteria (including

economy of explanation, coherency, and comp r e h e n s i v e n e s s )

ana can only be suppla n t e d by other structural

i n t e r pretations. "Instead of proving an y t h i n g about

cultural phenom e n a , " says Ino Rossi, "the s t r ucturalist is

c o n c e rned w i t h u n d e r s t a n d i n g them" (Rossi 1974:93; emphasis

added). Scholte (1973:687) argues that "by t r a n s c e n d i n g the

p h e n o menally given w h i l e still retaining a con c r e t e basis,

[structural] anthro p o l o g y can aspire to bec o m e a truly

crea t ive and s c i e ntific e n t e r p r i s e . " But e m p i r i c i s t s find

it e x t remely f r u s t r a t i n g to be told that their

d e m o n s t r a t i o n s of the un r e a l i t y of structural analyses are

irrelevant. Edmund L e a c h s structural i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of

stoplights, for example, is, ac c o r d i n g to the standards by

w h ich s t r u c t u r a l i s t s de t e r m i n e e xplanatory validity, capable

of s u r viving the most abrupt and u n s e t t l i n g c o n f r o n t a t i o n

with empirical reality.

Leach (1970:21-25) e x p l a i n s that the colors red and

green have been selected as tra f f i c light i n d i cators for

"stop" and "go" because red and green occur at opposite ends

of the color spectrum. Yellow signifies caution because

yellow, o c c u r r i n g in the m i d d l e of the color spectrum,

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m e d i a t e s between red and green. Like many s t r u cturalist

explanations, this one has the virtue of being clever. But,

at least a c c o r d i n g to F r e d e r i c k Gamst (198u), it lacks the

virtue of being correct. In an historical critique of

L e a c h s argument, Gamst d e m o n s t r a t e s that the se l e c t i o n of

red and green as st o p l i g h t indica t o r s f o llowed a period of

e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n in w h i c h several different colors (including

red, green, blue, orange, and white) were used in various

combinations and c o ntexts to embody various meanings. The

final red-yellow-green product, according to Gamst, "is the

result of n u merous r e a ctions to practical c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of

i n t e r r e l a t e d mat e r i a l elements" (1980:382).

By s t r u c t u r a l i s t standards, it m a t t e r s not that the

people w h o d e v e l o p e d t r a f f i c lights failed to h ave a

r e d - g r e e n o p p o s i t i o n in mind. Empirical attacks like the

one l au n c h e d by Gamst make little im p r e s s i o n upon

stru c turalists, for L e v i - S t r a u s s has already a n t i c i p a t e d and

d i s m i s s e d ail such criticisms:

Let me say again that all the s o l utions put

forward are not presented as b e ing of
equal value, since I m y s e l f have made a
point of e m p h a s i z i n g the u n c e r t a i n t y of
some of them; however, it w o u l d be
h y p o c r i t i c a l not to carry my t hought to
its logical conclusion. I t h e r e f o r e say
in advance to possible critics: w h a t does
this m a t t e r ? For if the final aim of
a n thropology is to contri b u t e to a better
kn o wledge of o bjectified thought and its
mechanisms, it is in the last resort
immaterial whe t h e r in this book the thought
pr o cesses of the South A m erican Indians
take shape through the m e d i u m of my
thoughts, or w h e t h e r mine take shape
through the m e d i u m of theirs. W h a t mat t e r s
is that the human mind, regardless of the
 134

identity of those who happen to be g i v i n g

it expression, should display an
i n creasingly i n t e l l i g i b l e structure as a
r es u l t of the dou b l y re f l e x i v e thought
m o v e m e n t of two t h o u g h t processes a c t i n g
one upon the other, either of w h ich can
in turn provide t h e spark or tinder w h o s e
conjun c t i o n w ill shed l i ght on both. (19&9b:13)

It does not matter that the particular s t r u ctural

analysis adv a n c e d may be sli g h t l y off the mark, for the mere

fact that a structural an a l y s i s could be p e r f o r m e d at all

d e m o n s t r a t e s that binary tho u g h t processes are at work.

Having d e m o n s t r a t e d that fact, structuralists have reached

the goal they set out to attain. Or so, a pparently, runs

L e v i - S t r a u s s 1 argument. He m a i n t a i n s that "structuralism

uncovers a unity and a co h e r e n c e wit h i n things w h i c h could

not be r e v e a l e d by a simple d e s c r i p t i o n of the facts"

(Levi-Strauss 1 9 7 6 : i x ). For structuralists, as Honigmann

(lyy6:322) notes, "soundness [of explanation] m e a n s logical,

not empirical, validity." I f a given s t r u c t u r a l i s t

interpretation appeals f o r c e f u l l y to the mind, and it is not

s u p p l a n t e d by other more a p p e a l i n g s t r u c t u r a l i s t

i n t e r pret a t i o n s , then it is sound. Structuralist claims to

validity might be better s u b s t a n t i a t e d if s t r u c t u r a l i s t s

could p e r s u a d e their i n f o r m a n t s t o admit that they too found

structural inter p r e t a t i o n s a p p e a l i n g and compelling. If

South A m e r i c a n Indians, for example, w o uld e x p l a i n that the

pa r t i c u l a r binary o p p o s i t i o n s described by the structural

analyst w e r e n o t the ones t h e y had in m i n d but t hat they

derived c o n s i d e r a b l e c o g n i t i v e s a t i s f a c t i o n from
 135

c o n t e m p l a t i n g the s t r u c t u r a l i s t ' s account, we m i g h t be more

i n c l i n e d to b e l i e v e that d i c h o t o m o u s p a tterns of tho u g h t are

truly and d e m o n s t r a b l y universal. Of course, such an

ex e r c i s e w o u l d hardly c o n s titute a f a l s i f i a b l e test of

structuralism, since it w o u l d not n e c e s s a r i l y demonstrate

a n y t h i n g beyond the p e r s u a s i v e n e s s of the structural

analyst. The i n e s c a p a b l e c o n c l u s i o n is that s t r u c t u r a l i s m

is neither f a l s i f i a b l e nor scientific.

Are structural e x p l a n a t i o n s in any way sa t i s f y i n g ? The

answer, as H o n i g m a n n ( i b i d . :329) observes, "depends partly

on the kind or u n d e r s t a n d i n g being s ought." Levi-Strauss is

i n t e r e s t e d only in the kind of u n d e r s t a n d i n g that structural

a n a l y sis yields. The u n d e r s t a n d i n g gained from other

paradigms, in his view, cannot i n v a lidate struc t u r a l i s t

knowledge: "in the h u m a n sciences . . . a h y p o t h e s i s only

p o s s e sses a r e l a t i v e value, granted if it succeeds in

a c c o u n t i n g for m o r e f a cts than those h y p o t h e s e s it replaces;

t hat is, until such times as another one m a k e s a new step in

the same d i r e c t i o n " (Levi-Strauss 1976:ix; e m phasis

added). Elvin H a t c h (1973:336-37) draws a distin c t i o n

be t w e e n i n t e r p r e t i v e or meanin g f u l forms of e x p l a n a t i o n and

"s c i e ntific" explanations. He observes that s c i e ntific

e x p l a n a t i o n s account for a pa r t i c u l a r event or entity by

re f e r ence to some general covering law, while interpretive

e x p l a n a t i o n s attempt to make a phenomenon i n t e l l i g i b l e by

s e t t i ng that p h e n o m e n o n w i t h i n some m e a n i n g f u l context.

H a t c h does not a ddress the q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r interpretive

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e x p l a n a t i o n s m i g h t also appeal to general c overing laws and

t h e r e by be scientific. The d i s t i n c t i o n he is m a k i n g is

actu a lly between inductive-statistical e x p l a n a t i o n s and

deductive-nomological explanations. As d i s cussed in Chapter

One, it is p o ssible for both forms of e x p l a n a t i o n to be

scientific. Nevertheless, structuralist

e x p l a n a t i o n s are i n t e r p r e t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n s in the sense that

Hatch i n t e n d s that is, structuralist e x p l a n a t i o n s are

unscientific. Structuralist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are not

sa t i s f y i n g if the s t a ndards for satisfactory explanations

in c l u de the ability to m ake r e liable empirical predictions,

but s t r u c t u r a l i s t s w o u l d have their i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s judged

by d i f f e r e n t standards.

Judged by s c i e n t i f i c s t a n d a r d s to include,

principally, the c r i t e r i o n of f a l s i f i a b i l i t y the p aradigm

of s t r u c t u r a l i s m has little to offer to the sy s t e m a t i c study

of human tho u g h t and behavior. Yet I w o u l d be r e l u c t a n t to

say that s t r u c t u r a l i s m is devoid of any m e r i t whatsoever.

The s c i e n t i f i c en t e r p r i s e is an ex c e l l e n t and i n d i s p e n s a b l e

source of insight about the human condition, but it is not

the only one. (Among the others I have in m ind are

p h i l o sophy and l i t erature.) Structuralism, in fact, has

e n j o y e d a w ide influence outside anthropology (see Kurzweii

1 9 8 u ;. Leach (1970:117-18) remarks that "the genuinely

v a l u a b l e part of L e v i - S t r a u s s 1 c o n t r i b u t i o n . . . [is] the

truly poetic range of a s s o c i a t i o n s w h i c h he brings to bear

in the course of his a n a l ysis." L e a c h o b serves as w e l l that

structuralism serves to remind us that "such practical

 137

e c o n o mic m a t t e r s as hun t i n g and a g r i c u l t u r e are i n e x t r i c a b l y

e n t a n g l e d w ith a t t itudes towards cosmology, sanctity, food,

women, life ana death," and so on (i b i d . : 119). St r u c t u r a l

a n a l y s i s d e m o n s t r a t e s the richness and complexity of

s y m b o lic realms. T h a t point is ce r t a i n l y of u n d oubted value

to the s c i e n t i f i c study of the h u m a n experience.

And there may be others that are as well.

S t r u c t u r a l i s m o f f e r s a useful tool for the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n

and c o m p arison of myths. In addition, s t r u c t u r a l i s m has the

vi r t u e of a d d r e s s i n g q u e stions t h a t are otherwise

u n a d d r e s s e d in sc i e n t i f i c inquiry. Why is it, for example,

that rites of pas s a g e have the same t r i p a r t i t e str u c t u r e

cross-culturaily? Structuralism at least makes

i n t e l l i g i b i l e the fact that the o p p o s i n g stages of

s e p a r a t i o n and i n c o r p o r a t i o n are invariably m e d i a t e d by a

thi r d stage of transition. Why is it t hat the incest taboo

is found in all c u l tures? Edward Tylor and Les l i e W h i t e

h a v e e x p lained the taboo's f u n c tional cause, but

Levi-Strauss offers an e x p l a n a t i o n of why that one

p a r t i c u l a r device (the incest taboo) should have b een chosen

to fulfill the p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n s that it does f ulfill

( i n c l u d i n g i n t e r - g r o u p alliance). (The incest taboo,

a c c o r d i n g to Levi-Strauss, is the m e a n s by which humans

d i s t i n g u i s h t h e m s e l v e s from the rest of nature.) In the

absence of a l t e r n a t i v e explanations, the s t r u cturalist

account at least partially releases the tension that

p r o v o k e d the question.
 138

In the end, though, all struc t u r a l i s t accounts suffer

from a crisis of confidence. No m a t t e r how clever or

a p p e a l i n g they may be, they fail to off e r the c o n v i c t i o n of

sufficient certainty. D e s p i t e its attractions,

s t r u c t u r a l i s m does not c o n s t i t u t e an e ntirely r e s p o nsible

form of inquiry. Ultimately, all structural explan a t i o n s

are based upon an i n t uitive e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l foundation.

Hence kn o w l e d g e obtained by s t r u c t u r a l i s m is not

s e l f - c o r r e c t i n g and it is subject to too few external

sources of verification. These are problems, however, that

the p a r a d i g m of symbolic a n t h r o p o l o g y a t tempts to solve.

S ymbo lic A n t h r o p o l o g y

The p a radigm of symbolic anthropology is e ssentially

c o n c e rned w i t h the s i g n i f i c a n c e of m e a n i n g for human life.

Symbolic anthropology is pr e d i c a t e d upon the notion that

human beings are first and f o r e m o s t mean i n g - s e e k i n g ,

s y m b o l - u s i n g animals. Broadly speaking, s ymbolic

a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s address two fu n d a m e n t a l questions: first,

w hat is the s i gnificance of m e a n i n g for h u m a n identity, and

second, what is the signif i c a n c e of m e a n i n g for the

o p e r a t i o n of human social s ystems? (In this context, the

term "meaning" refers to shared p atterns of interpretation

and perspective, embodied in symbols, by m e a n s of which

people d e v e l o p and c o m m u n i c a t e their k n o w l e d g e about and

a t t i t u d e s toward life. That d e f i n i t i o n is a paraphrase of

one o ffered by symbolic a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s for "culture," about

 139

w h i c h I will have m ore to say shortly.) E ach of the

p a r a d i g m ' s two f undamental q u e s t i o n s has b oth emic and etic

dimensions. As w e shall see, s ymbolic a n t hropology has

d e v o t ed most of its a t t e n t i o n to the emic aspects of human

identity and sy m b o l i c process. The etic v ariety of that

s e c o n d q u e s t i o n is also addressed, though s omewhat less

deliberately and w i t h different emphasis, by other

paradigms, in c l u d i n g cultural materialism.

S ymbolic anthropology, according to a recent text w h i c h

h e l p e d p o p u l a r i z e the paradigm's name, "is the study of the

b a sic terms w i t h w h i c h we view o u r s e l v e s as people and as

m e m b e r s of society, and of how these bas i c terms are used by

people to build for t h e m s e l v e s a m ode of life" (Dolgin,

K emniuzer, and Sc h n e i d e r 1977:3). By "b u i l d i n g a mode of

l i f e , " s y m b o l i c a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s do not intend to describe

the w a y s in w h i c h people develop m o d e s of pr o d u c t i o n and

r e production, nor are they i mplying that people construct

d o m e s tic and political economies out of a desire to impose

m e a n i n g upon t h eir experiences. Instead, symbolic

a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s are r e f e r r i n g to the perceptual context of

e x perience; to the w a y s in w h ich people build their

c o g n i tive o r i e n t a t i o n s to life, or to the m e a n s by w h i c h

people, as social animals, acquire k n o wledge and values

about th e m s e l v e s and their world.

S y mbolic a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s place a p r o n o u n c e d e mphasis

upon the co l l e c t i o n of emic data for its own sake.

A c c o r d i n g to Dolgin, Kemnitzer, and S c h n e i d e r (ibid.:34),

" f u n damental to the study of symbolic a n t h r o p o l o g y is the

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c o n c e r n w i t h how people formulate t h eir r e a lity." Comparing

e mic ana etic "r e a l i t i e s " is not the m i s s i o n of symbolic

a n t h r opology: "our c o n c e r n is not w i t h w h e t h e r or not the

v i e w s a people hold are a c curate in any 'scientific' sense

of the term; . . . in social action, that w h i c h is thought

to be real is t r e a t e d as real" (ibid.:5). Clifford Geertz,

one of the principal a r c h i t e c t s of s y m b o l i c anthropology,

says that "the es s e n t i a l v ocation of interpretive [i.e.,

symbolic] anthropology is not to answer our deepest

questions, but to m ake a v a i l a b l e to us ans w e r s that others .

. . have given, and thus to include them in the consul t a b l e

r e c o r d of w nat man has said" (1973:30).

The principal aim of symbolic anthro p o l o g y , then, is to

e l i c i t answers about certain fundamental p roblems of human

e x i s t e n c e including the n a t u r e and m e a n i n g of life as well

as the w a y s in w h i c h h u m an identity is def i n e d and

m a i n t a i n e d and then to t r a nslate those ans w e r s into terms

u n d e r s t a n d a b l e to the questioner. Thus, ac c o r d i n g to Geertz

( i b i d . :14), the "aim of anthropology is the e nlargement of

the u niverse of h u man d i s c o u r s e . " T o a c c o m p l i s h that aim,

symbolic anthropologists seek answers to a particular set of

questions in the conduct of cultural analysis: "What are

the c o n d itions of e x i s t e n c e ? How is life de f i n e d ? What

k in d s of units are s p e c i f i e d and d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a c c o r d i n g to

what a s s u m p t i o n s or p r e m i s e s about the n a t u r e of the

universe? How are these formulated, and how are they

expressed?" (Dolgin, Kemnitzer, and S c h n e i d e r 1977:20).

 U1

There is m o r e to the p a radigm than just the co l l e c t i o n

of emic data, however. Bey o n d the emic p a r t i c u l a r s of a

t h o u s a n d w o r l d views, symbolic a n t h r o p o l o g y s earches for the

etic u n i v e r s a l s of human natu r e and cultural process. "Our

d o u b l e task," w r i t e s Geertz, "is to uncover the conceptual

s t r u c t u r e s that inform our subjects' acts . . . and to

c o n s t ruct a system of analysis in w h ose terms w h a t is

g e n e r ic to those structures, what belongs to them because

they are w hat they are, will stand out against the other

d e t e r m i n a n t s of human behavior" (1973:27; e m phasis added).

" E n l a r g i n g the u n iverse of human discou r s e " is a w o r t h w h i l e

goal, but the sc i e n t i f i c m e r i t of s ymbolic a n t h r o p o l o g y will

ultimately depend upon how well the pa r a d i g m is able to

carry out the second half of its "double task." At this

stage, the prelim i n a r y results are promising, but final

j u d g m e n t must be reserved. Sy m b o l i c a n t h r o p o l o g y has so far

p rod u ced d i s a p p o i n t i n g l y few t h e o r e t i c a l pr i n c i p l e s to

e x p l a i n the universal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of human nat u r e and

s y m b o l ic processes.

The e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l pr i n c i p l e s of s ymbolic a n t h r o p o l o g y

differ sharply from those of structuralism. Both paradigms,

ultimately, offer analyses of the "etics of t h o u g h t " that

is, both offer i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s in their own terms of w h a t is

g o ing on inside the heads of their informants, and both

p a r a d i g m s begin their an a l y s e s w i t h the e x a m i n a t i o n of emic

me n t a l domains. But symbolic anthropologists, unlike

s t ructuralists, insist that the consis t e n c y and co h e r e n c y of

the i r etic mental i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are to be tested against

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emic mental and etic be h a v i o r a l data. Both structuralists

and s y mbolic a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s offer i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of

d o m a i ns of meaning, but, as Ho n i g m a n n (1976:330) notes,

structural "meaning" is an artifact of the m e t h o d employed,

w h e r e a s sym b o l i c a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l "meaning" is an artifact of

the c ulture under study.

S y mbolic a n t h r o p o l o g y ' s e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l pr i n c i p l e s are

nat u r ally d e p endent upon its ontolo g i c a l premises.

A c c o r d i n g to G e e r t z (1973:12), m e a n i n g is public because

c u l t u r e is public. Hence o b s e r v a t i o n and inquiry are the

f u n d a mental epistemological p r o c edures of symbolic

anthropology. In an i m p licit criticism of structuralism,

Geertz (ibid.:30) rem a r k s that "nothing w ill d i s credit a

s e m i o t i c a p p r o a c h to cul t u r e m o r e q u i c k l y than all o w i n g it

to drift into . . . i n t u i t i o n i s m . . . no m a t t e r how

ele g a ntly the i n t u i t i o n s are ex p r e s s e d . " S ymbolic

anthropology is allied w i t h cultural m a t e r i a l i s m in the

" g e n e r a l i z e d a t t a c k on privacy t h eories of m e aning"

(ibid.:12). Undeniably, symbolic a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s know what

they know by i m a g i n a t i v e i n s i g h t e t h n o g r a p h i c analysis,

says Geertz (ibid.:9), con s i s t s of "sorting out the

s t r u c tures of s i g n i f i c a t i o n " but the i m a g i n a t i v e i nsight of

symb o lic a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s is always v u l n e r a b l e to empirical

criticism. "Whatever, or wherever, symbolic systems . . .

may be, we gain empirical access to them by inspecting

e v ents" ( i b i d . :17).

In a m e m o r a b l e phrase, Geertz c h a r a c t e r i z e s the w o r k of

s y m b o lic a n t h r o p o l o g y as "thick d e s c r i p t i o n . " F a ced w i t h

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the "multi p l i c i t y of complex conceptual struc t u r e s , " the

s y m b o lic a n t h r o p o l o g i s t a t t e m p t s "first to grasp [the

m e a n i n g of those structures] and then to render [that

meaning in t e r m s u n d e r s t a n d a b l e to the observer]"

(ibid. :10). Sym b o l i c a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s m a i n t a i n that all etic

d e s c r i p t i o n s of m e a n i n g m ust be demonstrably g rounded in

emic r eality and either el i c i t a b l e or i d e n t i f i a b l e as part

of the emic domain. The d a t a - c o l l e c t i n g a c t i v i t i e s of

symbo lic a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s " i n t e r v i e w i n g informants,

o b s e r v i n g rituals, el i c i t i n g kin terms, tra c i n g property

lines, c e n s u s i n g h o u s e h o l d s , " and so on ( i b i d . :10) are the

same as those pursued by cultural materialists. In

principle, then, symbolic a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l a nalyses are

r e p l i c a b l e and self-correcting.

The theore t i c a l pr i n c i p l e s of symbolic a n t h r o p o l o g y

are, by the a d m i s s i o n of sym b o l i c a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s

themselves, somewhat vague. "A r e p e rtoire of very general,

made-in-the-academy concepts and systems of

concepts 'integration,' 'rationalization,' 'symbol,'

'ideology,' 'ethos,' 'revolution,' 'identity,' 'metaphor,'

'structure,' 'ritual,' 'world view,' 'actor,' 'function,'

'sacred,' and, of course, 'culture' itself is w o v e n into

the body of t h i c k - d e s c r i p t i o n e t h n o g r a p h y in the hope of

r e n d e ring m e r e o c c u r r e n c e s s c i e n t i f i c a l l y eloquent"

(ibid.:28). Geertz (ibid.:20) declares that "cultural

a n a l y sis is . . . guessing at the meanings, as s e s s i n g the

guesses, and dra w i n g e x p l a n a t o r y c onclusions from the better

g ue s s es." B e y o n d a few "very general concepts," though,

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s y m b o lic a n t h r o p o l o g y does not specify what p r i n ciples to

employ when s e a rching for e xplanatory conclusions.

The most important of those general concepts is the

c o ncept of culture. F o l l o w i n g Geertz, symbolic

a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s have adopted a d e f i n i t i o n of "culture" that

is less e n c o m p a s s i n g than T y l o r s "complex w h o l e : " culture

re i e r s to "an h i s t o r i c a l l y transm i t t e d p attern of me a n i n g s

e m b o d i e d in symbols, a system of inherited concep t i o n s

e x p r e s s e d in s ymbolic forms by m e a n s of w h i c h men

communicate, perpetuate, and develop t h e i r k n o wledge about

and a t t i t u d e s towa r d life" (Geertz ibid.:89). It is to this

domain that s y mbolic a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n s and

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are applied.

D e s p i t e the i m p r e c i s i o n and r e l a t i v e paucity of its

t h e o r etical principles, symbolic a n t h r o p o l o g y does offer a

well-defined and w e l l - d e v e l o p e d set of theoretical

assumptions. Symbolic a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s share w ith all social

scientists "the premise that social action tends to be

orderly, to be, in some degree, p r e d i c t a b l e or

u n d e r s t a n d a b l e by both p a r t i c i p a n t s and observ e r s " (Dolgin,

Kemnitzer, and S c h n e i d e r 1977:4). In addition, symbolic

a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s assume that "life must have m e a n i n g [that

is, people must assign m e a n i n g to it] . . . and that entails

a system of signs or symbols in w h i c h this m e a n i n g is

e m b o d i e d and expres s e d " (ibid.:33). That "system of signs

or symbols," of course, is w h a t sym b o l i c a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s

m e a n by "culture." Sy m b o l i c a n t h r o p o l o g y derives its raison

d* etre from the as s u m p t i o n that "shared, or culturally

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constituted, m e a n i n g ent a i l s sym b o l s whi c h stand for

s o m e t h i n g in some respect" (Dolgin, Kemnitzer, and S c h n e i d e r

1977:10). T hus the fu n d a m e n t a l as s u m p t i o n of s y m b o l i c

anthropology is that "cu l t u r e c onsists of s ocially

e s t a b l i s h e d s t r u ctures of m e a n i n g " (Geertz 1973:12), and the

fu n d a m e n t a l t a s k of symbolic a n t h r o p o l o g y is to d i s c o v e r how

s y m b o ls are created, structured, and used.

T h e r e are other a s s u m p t i o n s and con c e p t s a s s o c i a t e d

with symbolic anthro p o l o g y as well. One is V i c t o r T u r n e r s

(I9by) notion of the " m u l t i v o c a l i c " character of symbols, or

the c a pacity of symbols to r e p r e s e n t several different

meanings at once. Ano t h e r is the concept, also p r o m i n e n t in

the w o r k of Turner, of the processual character of social

systems. Symbolic a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s assume that s y m b o l s play

a critical role in s o c i o c u l t u r a l process. Turner, for

example, arg u e s that "even in the simplest societies, the

d i s t i n c t i o n bet w e e n st r u c t u r e [the hierarchical order of

social, political, and e c o n o m i c s t a t u s e s and roles] and

communitas [the direct, unmediated, and u n s t r u c t u r e d

co m m u n i o n of individual p e rsons] e x i s t s and o b t a i n s s y m b o l i c

e x p r e s s i o n in the cultural a t t r i b u t e s of liminality,

m a r g i n a l l t y , and inferi o r i t y " and that, taken together,

s t r u c ture and communitas " c o n s t i t u t e the human condition,'

as r e g a r d s m a n ' s relations w i t h his fellow man" (1969:130).

For s y m b o l i c a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s l ike Turner, all s o c i e t i e s are

o n g o i n g p r o c e s s e s of the d i a l e c t i c between s t r u c t u r e and

communitas ( i b i d . :139). Even a m ong those sy m b o l i c

a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s who do not s u b s c r i b e to a processual model

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of society, there is general agreement that "sociocultural

sy stems depend not only for their m e a n i n g but also for their

e x i s t ence upon the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of co n s c i o u s human agents"

(Turner 197^:17).

The first thing to be noted about the e x p l a n a t i o n s

o f f e r e d by symbolic a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s is that they are

ex p l i c i t l y interpretive. For Geertz (1973:5), the a n alysis

of c u l t u r e is "not an experi m e n t a l science in search of law

but an i n t e r p r e t i v e one in search of m e a n i n g . " G r a s p i n g and

r e n d e r i n g emic r e a l i t i e s is n ecessarily an i n t e r p r e t i v e

exercise. A c c o r d i n g to G e e r t z (1977:492;, "understanding

the form and pr e s s u r e of . . . natives' inner lives is m o r e

like gra s p i n g a proverb, c a tching an illusion, [or] see i n g a

j oke." In that sense, s y mbolic a n t h r o p o l o g y is s imilar to

s t r u c turalism, wnich also offers i n t e r p r e t i v e explanations,

ano d i stinct from cultural materialism, w h i c h offers causal

explanations.

The r e l a t i v e c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y or i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y of

cultural materialism, structuralism, and s y mbolic

anthropology requires a further comment. I have said that

p a r a d i g m s are c o m m e n s u r a b l e to the extent t hat they share a

c ommon pro b l e m and specify a similar m e ans of solution. By

that measure, cultural m a t e r i a l i s m is o b v i o u s l y

i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e w i t h both s t r u c t u r a l i s m and s ymbolic

anthropology (see Sch o l t e 1966;. Obviously, too,

s t r u c t u r a l i s m and sym b o l i c a n t h r o p o l o g y are m o r e closely

related. A l t h o u g h one is c o n cerned w i t h the st r u c t u r e of

the human m ind and the other is concerned w i t h the

ps y c h o l o g i c a l and s o c i o c u l t u r a l s i g nificance of meaning,

both pa r a d i g m s touch u l t i mately upon the common problem of

hum a n nature. S t u c t u r a l i s m and symbolic anthropology,

however, specify d i f ferent m e ans of solution and have

r a d i c a lly d i f ferent ontolo g i c a l and e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l

a s s u m p t i o n s and principles. Paradigmatic commensurability

is a r elative matter. S t r u c t u r a l i s m and s ymbolic

anthropology are r e l a t i v e l y incommensurable. Whereas

structuralism aims to d iscover the universal cognitive

p r o c e s ses by w h ich human beings assign m e a n i n g to and derive

m e a n i n g from their experiences, symbolic a n t h r o p o l o g y

a t t e m p ts to d iscover the universal cultural p r o cesses by

w h i c h they do so. W h i l e s t r u c t u r a l i s m and sy m b o l i c

anthropology are both c o n cerned w i t h the problem of meaning,

they approach that pro b l e m from d i f ferent tacks. From

a scientific viewpoint, s y mbolic a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are p r e f e r a b l e to s t r u c t u r a l i s t

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s b ecause the former make appeal to external

f a ctors for verification.

S ym b o l i c a n t h r o p o l o g y and cultural materialism, on the

other hand, are i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e but not n e c e s s a r i l y

incompatible. The causal explanations offered by cultural

m a t e r i a l i s m and the i n t e r p r e t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n s offered by

s y m b o l ic a n t h r o p o l o g y do not necessarily (and, in fact, do

not usually) contradict one another, although cultural

materialism and other v a r i e t i e s of "cognitive

anthropology" are often contradictory. Sy m b o l i c

anthropology and e t h n o s c i e n c e are not the same, however.

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A c c o r d i n g to Harris (1979:265), "cognitivism . . . is a

strategy for describing in the most e f f ective and emically

a u t h e n t i c f a s h i o n the rules or other mental p r o g r a m s that

al l e a g e d l y account for be h a v i o r . " S ymbolic a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s

are allied w i t h cultural m a t e r i a l i s t s in r e j e c t i n g that

theoretical approach. Geertz (1973:18) a ffirms that "code

does not d e t ermine conduct," and he re c o g n i z e s the

" c o g n i t i v e f a llacy" that cul t u r e consists simply of the

rules one needs to know to behave as a native (ibid. : 11-12).

A c c o r d i n g to Geertz ( i b i d .:14), "culture is not a [causal]

power . . . it is a context." Harris's (1979:258-86)

criti que of "cogni t i v e idealism" is w e l l - c o n c e i v e d , but he

m a k e s only very brief reference to symbolic a n t h r o p o l o g y

( i b i d . : 2 d 1 - 8 2 ) , and then only to note s y mbolic

anthropology's "intense commit m e n t to cultural idealist

principles." But an interest in the study of ideational

domains, as I have a t t empted to demonstrate, is not

necessarily a commitment to idealist determinism. Symbolic

anthropology is not co g n i t i v e idealism.

Nor can symbolic a n t h r o p o l o g y be d i s missed as

" u n s c i e n t i f i c " simply be cause its e x p l a n a t i o n s are

interpretive rather than causal. Structuralism is

unscientific not because its e x p l a n a t i o n s are i n t e r p r e t i v e

but b ecause its e x p l a n a t i o n s are i n v u l n e r a b l e to empirical

criticism. Science e x p l a i n s phenomena by su b s u m i n g them

under some general co v e r i n g law, but that does not m ean that

science necessarily adduces causal explanations. To equate

science w i t h causal explanations is to c onfuse a m e t h o d of

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inquiry w ith a variety of explanation. There are other

s c i e n t i f i c l aws besides laws of causality, including laws of

covariance. As di s c u s s e d in Chapter One, unremitting

c r i t i c i s m and empirical vulnerability are the essential

at t r i b u t e s or the s c i e n t i f i c approach. Whi l e the validity

of an i n t e r p r e t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n is generally a s s o ciated w ith

its capacity to compel assent, there is no reason that

interpretive explanations cannot appeal to sc i e n t i f i c

s t a n d ards of verification. As long as i n t e r p r e t i v e

e x p l a n a t i o n s are systematic, consistent, coherent,

replicable, and f a l s i f i a b l e , they are scientific. What

Ge e r t z means by "inte r p r e t i v e " explanations, Hempel would

call " i n o u c t i v e - s t a t i s t i c a l " explanations. The i n t e r p r e t i v e

e x p l a n a t i o n s off e r e d by s y mbolic a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s appeal,

even if implicitly, to inductive cov e r i n g laws. Symbolic

anthropology needs only to make its epist e m o l o g i c a l

pr i n c i p l e s slightly m ore ex p l i c i t and u n c o m p r o m i s i n g in

order to d e f i n i t i v e l y preclude i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s w h i c h fail to

m e e t the cri t e r i a of science.

The essential w e a k n e s s of symbolic a n t h r o p o l o g y

is not that it fails to account for the causes of human

t h o u g h t and b e havior (although, as Harris [ibid.:2y8]

argues, the "crux of the c o n flict" between " c o g n i t i v i s m " and

cultural materialism is the for m e r ' s fai l u r e to do so).

Instead, the m ost significant deficiency of symbolic

anthropology is its l a c k of explicit t heoretical and

methodological guidelines, to w h i c h I have already alluded.

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T h ere are two aspects to this problem of theoretical and

methodological imprecision.

First, there is the problem of verification, which

s y m b o lic a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s recognize. Geertz (1973:24)

c o r r e ctly o bserves that "the b e s etting sin of interpretive

approaches . . . is that they tend to resist, or to be

p e r m i t t e d to resist, conceptual a r t i c u l a t i o n and thus to

escape sy s t e m a t i c m o d e s of assessment." Structuralism is

guilty of this sin, and, as a result, its e x p l a n a t i o n s are

p r e s e nted as self-validating. Geertz recognizes, however,

that "there is no reason why the conceptual s t r u c t u r e of a

cultural interpretation . . . [should not be] s u s c e p t i b l e to

explicit canons of apprai s a l " (ibid.). Geertz argues

further, however, that the unique nature of cultural

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n limi t s the a n t h r o p o l o g i s t ' s ability to

specify such standards of appraisal. He sug g e s t s that

c ultural u n d e r s t a n d i n g is incremental and de p e n d e n t upon

s u c c e s s i v e l y more "incisive" interpretations, but that the

s t a ndards of " i n c i s i v e n e s s " defy e x plicit formulation.

S u p e r i or interpretations, he maintains, are c h a r a c t e r i z e d

simply by "greater p r e c i s i o n and broader r elevance."

G e e r t z ' s argument is less than compelling. There is no

i n n e r e nt quality in the interp r e t i v e an a l y s i s of culture

that n ecessarily pr e c l u d e s the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of rigorous

s t a n d a rds of authenticity. A given i n t e r p r e t i v e analysis

should be consistent w i t h the "facts" of the world, and it

should be consistent as w e l l with the common body of theory

upon w h i c h all related i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are based. Ass u m i n g

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that a given i n t e r p r e t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n is f a l s i f i a b l e and

u nfaisified, it can be consid e r e d true if it e xplains the

phenomenon in q u e s t i o n m ore comprehensively, coherently, and

c o g e n t l y than any of its competitors. It is incumbent upon

s y m b o l i c a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s to construct an explicit and

c o n e r e n t body of explan a t o r y pr i n c i p l e s capable of

g e n e r a t i n g such explanations.

The second aspect of this problem of theoretical

insufficiency is the looming s pecter of arch-inductivism.

S y m b o l i c a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s frequently and e rroneously assume

that the mere a c c u m u l a t i o n of emic data w ill eventually

reveal signif i c a n t theor e t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s that explain

cross-cultural commonalities. The "double task" of symbolic

a n t h r o p o l o g y a n a l y z i n g the s y mbolic p r o p e r t i e s of emic

s e m a n t i c dom a i n s and c o n s t r u c t i n g a n a l y t i c p r i n c i p l e s to

explain etic c ultural pr o c e s s e s will forever remain

haf-fimsned until explicit t h e o r i e s are fo r m u l a t e d and

te s t e d to e x p l a i n those etic processes. Symbolic

a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s have not c o m pleted t hat task, but, in all

fairness, it is a t ask they have begun and begun well.

The great st r e n g t h of symbolic anthropology, in fact,

l i e s in the cogency of the p a r a digm's etic g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s

a n a explanations. S y m b o l i c a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s have c o n t r i b u t e d

valuable insights about the nature and s i g nificance of

s y m b o l i c realms. A m o n g the c o m p e l l i n g c oncepts e m a n a t i n g

f r o m symbolic a n t h r o p o l o g y is the d i s t i n c t i o n between "world

v i e w " and "ethos." Gee r t z (1973:126-41) defines "world

v i e w " as the "assumed structure of reality," or the

 culturally-specific set or existential assumptions, and

"ethos" as the "approved style of life," or the

socially-established set of no r m a t i v e precepts. In all

cultures, Geertz argues, people draw no r m a t i v e conclu s i o n s

from factual p remises and vice-versa. He s u ggests that

religion, a r e c o gnized cultural universal, invariably fuses

w o r l d view ana ethos and der i v e s its cultural l e g i timacy

from the aura of authe n t i c i t y en g e n d e r e d by that fusion.

Gee r t z c o n c l u d e s that "the tendency to s y n t h e s i z e w o r l d view

ana e t hos at some level, if not l o g i c a l l y necessary, is at

l e ast empirically coercive; if it is not p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y

justified, it is at least pragmatically universal"

( i b i d . :127). (The universal fusion of w o r l d v iew and ethos

is an e x a m p l e of a w e l l - s u b s t a n t i a t e d inductive-statistical

c o v e r i n g law.) C r o s s - c u l t u r a l l y , the fusion of w o r l d view

ana e t hos is usually a c c o m p l i s h e d w ith lit t l e rega r d for

l o g i c al c o n s i s t e n c y a lthough logical incon s i s t e n c y does not

seem to ham p e r the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of that fusion. The ethos

of Catholicism, for example, has u n d ergone e n ormous changes

in the past 500 years w h i l e the Ca t h o l i c w o r l d view has

r e m a i n e d re l a t i v e l y unchanged, yet C a t h o l i c i s m co n t i n u e s to

play an im p o r t a n t role in n u m e r o u s socio c u l t u r a l systems

t h r o u g h o u t the world. G e e r t z 1s ana l y s i s of the r elation

b e t w e e n w o r l d view and e t hos i l l u s t r a t e s the promise of

s y m b o l i c anthropology, for it is an ana l y s i s that reveals

s o m e t h i n g pro f o u n d and fundam e n t a l about human n a t u r e w h ile

at the same time re v e a l i n g an u n s u s p e c t e d and s i g n i f i c a n t

as p e c t of s o c i ocultural process (namely that w h i l e

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superstructural compon e n t s explain, rationalize, and abet

infrastructural conditions, they do not do so in any

logically consistent or rational way). The notion of the

multivocanty of symbols is a similarly seminal concept.

Geertz o b s e r v e s that "the role of such a special science as

anthropology in the an a l y s i s of values is not to replace

philosophical investigation, but to make it relevant"

( i b i d . : 141). If s y mbolic a n t h r o p o l o g y does n o t h i n g but

f u l fill that role, it can lay claim to a signif i c a n t

s c i e n t i f i c contribution.

The Q u e s t i o n of Value

Until such time as s cience is p r a cticed by sometning

other than human scientists, it will never be totally

dispa ssionate. As d i s c u s s e d in Chapter One, that fact

ha r d l y i n v a l i d a t e s the s c i e n t i f i c way of knowing. Science

r e m a i ns our best hope for d i s c o v e r i n g "objective" truth

about the empirical world. But it does m e a n t hat the role

of values in the conduct of science should be explicitly

examined. The choice b e t w e e n cultural materialism,

structuralism, and s y m b o l i c a n t h r o p o l o g y must be m ade not

only w i t h c o n s i d e r a t i o n of each pa r a d i g m ' s int r i n s i c merit,

but w i t h due regard for the q u e s t i o n of value as well. By

the s e l e c t i o n or a paradigm, s c i e ntists i n dicate w h i c h

q u e s t i o n s they find m o s t important, significant, timely,

convenient, useful, politic, or simply attractive. As

Levi-Strauss (iy76:ix) aptly notes, "what is i n t e r e s t i n g in

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man is not subject to scient i f i c d ecision but results and

a l w a y s w ill result from a choice w h i c h is ultima t e l y of a

philosophical order."

Cultural materialism, structuralism, and s ymbolic

anthropology are each a s s o ciated w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r set of

values. Cultural materialism, a c c o r d i n g to Harris

(1y y y :158), "inevitably c o n t r i b u t e s to a radical critique of

the status quo." From the cultural m a t e r i a l i s t viewpoint,

rivai pa r a d i g m s should be e v a l u a t e d a c c o r d i n g to their

" r e s p e c t i v e ability to solve puzzles pe r t a i n i n g to socially

significant i s s u e s " ( i b i d . :75; em p h a s i s added). By

" s o cially significant issues," cultural m a t e r i a l i s t s m ean

such things as poverty, underdeve l o p m e n t , imperialism, the

p o p u l a t i o n explosion, ethnic and class conflict,

e x ploitation, political repression, crime, war, and the like

(ibid.:285). For cultural materialists, the anthr o p o l o g i c a l

i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the human e x p e rience should n e c e s s a r i l y

center upon such issues. A c c o r d i n g to the v a l u e s w h i c h

u n d e r l i e cultural materialism, the f a i l u r e to a ddress these

im p o r tant q u e s t i o n s w o u l d be ta n t a m o u n t to an a b r o g a t i o n of

moral responsibility.

S t ructuralists, in contrast, regard a n t h r o p o l o g y as an

essentially intros p e c t i v e activity. Levi-Strauss (1976:i x )

says tnat "the subject of the human sciences is man, yet the

m a n w h o studies h i m s e l f as he practices the h u man sciences

w i l l alwa y s allow his p r e f e r e n c e s to int e r f e r e in the way he

d e fines h i m s e l f to himself." Self-knowledge is thus the

u l t i m ate result and the final goal of structural analysis.

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S t r u c t u r a l i s t s are not interested in m a k i n g scient i f i c

c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the " b e t t e r m e n t " of the world, whatever

that m i g h t mean: "It m a y be objected that this kind of

science can scarcely be of m u c h practical effect. The

answer to this is that its m a i n purpose is not a practical

one. It mee t s intellectual r e q uirements rather than or

i n s tead of satisfying ne ed s " (Levi-Strauss 1966:9).

A c c o r d i n g to L e v i - S t r a u s s (ibid.), "class i f y i n g . . . has a

value of its own." S t r u c t u r a l i s t s place pr e - e m i n e n t value

upon the intellectual s a t i s f a c t i o n s derived from rational

inquiry.

S y m b o l i c a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s are attracted to and

f a s c i n a t e d by the intric a t e l y developed s e m a n t i c sys t e m s of

human cultures. That is to say, symbolic a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s

t y p i c a l l y have "humanistic" interests, as the term is

p o p ularly used. Turner (1969:3) observes that "man's

'imaginative' and 'emotional' life is always and e v e r ywhere

rich and complex." T h a t p r o p o s i t i o n is s c arcely d e b atable

and w o u l d be readily e m b r a c e d by virtually every other

anthropological paradigm. For symbolic a n t hropologists,

though, ae s t h e t i c a nalyses of "man's i m a g i n a t i v e and

e m otional life" have the i r own s a t i s f a c t i o n s and are their

own justification. Other anth r o p o l o g i c a l paradigms are less

con c e rned w i t h such a e s t h e t i c perspectives, to the dismay of

symbo lic a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s like Turner:

I w o u l d plead w i t h my collea g u e s to acquire

the h u m a n i s t i c skills that w o u l d enable
them to live more c omfortably in those
territories w h e r e the mas t e r s of human
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thought and art have long been dwelling.

This must be done if a unified science of
man, an a u t h e n t i c anthropology, is ever
to b e c o m e possible. (Turner 197^:17)

An a b iding respect and a f f e c t i o n for the i n v e n t i v e n e s s ana

imagination 01 the h u m a n species u n d e r l i e all of symbolic

a n t h r o p o l o g y s s t a t e m e n t s and premises. Turner, for

example, says he reg a r d s "mankind as one in essence though

manifold in expression, c r eative and not mer e l y adaptive in

h i s m a m f o l d n e s s (ibid.; e m phasis added). In a criticism

of cultural m a t e r i a l i s m that carries m o r e emotive than

p r o p o sitional force, Dolgin, Kemnitzer, and Schneider

(19Y7:7) argue that H a r r i s ' s "notion of a n t hropology loses

the critical edge w h i c h an inquiry into belief, ideology,

ana f reedom could h a v e . "

W h i c h of these p a r a d i g m s is a s s o ciated w i t h the most

d e f e n s i b l e value position? Should a n t h r o p o l o g y be a source

of social criticism, a m i r r o r for personal reflection, or a

v e h i c l e for ae s t h e t i c a n a l y s i s ? Each a n t h r o p o l o g i s t must

answer that q u e s t i o n on a personal basis, but I for one

w o u l d not object to a n t h r o p o l o g y ' s being all three. These

p a r t i c u l a r sets of v a l u e s are not n e c e s s a r i l y contradictory,

except as the a d o p t i o n of one may preclude the a d o p t i o n of

the others, but, from the p e r s p e c t i v e of the d i s c i p l i n e as a

whole, there is no r e a s o n why these three d i f ferent values

should not exist in c o m p l e m e n t a r y distribution. Certainly

it is important for a n t h r o p o l o g y to offer i n formed c r i tiques

of the world. If it did not do so, a n t h r o p o l o g y would be

m o r e an instrument of political propaganda than a science of

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the human condition. But it is equally certain that

anthropology should be concerned w i t h the problem of human

nature. The quest for s elf- k n o w l e d g e demands an

anthropological contribution. I am not p e r suaded that the

i n v e s t i g a t i o n of "intellectual" pro b l e m s should await the

solu t ion of " practical" problems. The w o r l d is unlikely

ever to be saved.

I w o u l d q u i b b l e w i t h partic u l a r a spects of each

p a r a digm's set of values (it i s important, for example, to

eventually d i s t i n g u i s h between emic and etic realities,

contra symbolic a n t h r o p o l o g y ' s co n t e n t i o n that it is

heuristically sufficient to treat emic r e a l i t i e s as "real"),

but I cannot r e c o m m e n d or reject c o m m itment to any of these

three pa r a d i g m s solely on the basis of value. All three

pa r a d igms a d d r e s s v a l u a b l e questions. Two of them, cultural

materialism and s y mbolic anthropology, do so in a reason a b l y

conerent and a u t h e n t i c fashion. The third, structuralism,

has u n d e n i a b l e intell e c t u a l appeal a lthough its scient i f i c

m e r i t is dubious. W h ich p a radigm to choose ultimately

b e comes a q u e s t i o n of w h i c h problem to address. In the

final analysis, it is a q u e s t i o n of r e search design.

The Q u estion of P a r a d i g m atic Commit m e n t

Cultural materialism, structuralism, and s ymbolic

anthropology each consider the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of their

re s p e ctive sets of p r oblems to be the essential task of

anthropology. Each is mistaken. The essential task of

ant h r opology is not simply to explain the causes of

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sociocultural s i m i l a r i t i e s and differences, or to discover

the s t r u c t u r e of human tho u g h t processes, or to ana l y z e the

significance of m e a n i n g in and for human life, but to

c o m p r e h e n d the h u man experience. As e x p l a i n e d in Chapter

Two, anthr o p o l o g y must account for the two f undamental

r e q u i r e m e n t s of human existence: the m a i n t e n a n c e of human

l i f e and the m a i n t e n a n c e of human identity. These problems,

assuredly, are interrelated, but anthro p o l o g y has yet to

p r oduce a single i n t e g r a t i v e p a radigm that treats both

p r o b l ems in a fully s a t i s f a c t o r y manner. Invariably,

anthropological p a r a d i g m s have tended to focus upon aspects

and i m p l i c a t i o n s of one problem or the other. Cultural

m ate r i alism, structuralism, and s ymbolic a n t h r o p o l o g y are no

exception. Levi-Strauss (1966:3) says that "the u niverse is

an object of thought at least as m uch as it is a m e a n s of

s a t i s f y i n g needs," but structuralism, along w i t h symbolic

a n t h r opology, treats the universe primarily as an object of

thought, and largely ignores the universe as a m e a n s of

s a t i s f y i n g needs. Cultural materialism is less r e s t r i c t i v e

of the problems t hat fall w i t h i n its domain of inquiry, but

cultural materialists c e r tainly do not give equal a t t ention

to these two problems. Cultural materialism's "socially

significant issues" a r e raised by peoples' efforts to

satisfy their physical needs.

T he co n c l u s i o n to w h i c h this a nalysis has been b u ilding

is that cultural m a t e r i a l i s m is the best p a radigm yet

d e v e l o p e d to address the problems a s s o ciated w i t h the

maintenance of human life, w h ile s ymbolic a n t h r o p o l o g y is

the best p aradigm yet developed to a ddress the problems

associated with the m a i n t e n a n c e of human identity.

( S t r u c t u r a l i s m may well contain v a l u a b l e i n sights about

h um a n nature, but those insights bel o n g m o r e properly to

p hilosophy or l i t e r a t u r e than they do to a science of

h umanity.) One of the most s i g n i ficant of the c h a l lenges

facing contemporary anthro p o l o g y is the c h a llenge to address

appropriate questions with ap p r o p r i a t e theories. The

m a i n t e n a n c e of human life and the m a i n t e n a n c e of human

identify are i n t e r r e l a t e d problems; if cultural m a t e r i a l i s m

and symbolic a n t h r o p o l o g y are to offer c o m p lementary

explanations, it is esse ntial that they do not advance

conflicting explanations in the areas w h e r e those two

p rob l ems overlap. To avoid that pitfall, anthropologists

m ust be u n e q u i v o c a l l y clear and precise about the d e f i n i t i o n

of problems and the a p p l i c a t i o n of paradigms.

U nfortunately, that sort of clarity and p r e cision is

not a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of c o n t e m p o r a r y anthropology. Sym b o l i c

anthropologists and cultural m a t e r i a l i s t s alike frequently

fail to r e c o g n i z e the i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y of their re s p e c t i v e

approaches. S y m b o l i c a n t hropologists, for example, have

claimed that "there is nothing m o r e 'down to earth' or

'basic' about kinsnip, economics, or status changes than

there is about rituals [since] all occur only in societies

a nd are first and foremost s o c i ocultural activities"

(Dolgin, Kemnitzer, and S c h n e i d e r 1977:36). It is critical,

however, to be clear about the m e a n i n g of such terms as

"down to earth" and "basic." If we are c o n s i d e r i n g peoples'

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p e r c e ptions 01 the socio c u l t u r a l world, then rel i g i o n and

eco n o mics may be equally "down to earth." But if we are

t a l k i ng about cultural causality, then i n f r a s t ructural

c o m p o nents are unarguably m ore "basic" than super s t r u c t u r a l

ones. P a r a d i g m a t i c comparisons, whether implicit or

explicit, are ail too often m o r e emo t i v e than p r o p o s i t i o n a l .

Dolgin, Kemnitzer, and Sc h n e i d e r (ibid.:6) are simply

confused and c o n f u s i n g w h e n they say "we feel the influence

of any kind or 'external* facts on human actions is easily

overemphasized." Cultural materialists are similarly

conf u sed w h e n they equate ideational studies w i t h ideational

determinism.

It m i g h t be ob j e c t e d that anthro p o l o g y w o uld be better

served by a single p aradigm that i n t e grated the p r oblems of

human life and human identity, and, indeed, I w o u l d agree in

pri n c iple w i t h that objection. Sc i e n t i f i c p r o g r e s s will

u n d o u btedly result w n e n some i n n o vative theorist is able to

address both problems from a single compr e h e n s i v e

t h eoretical perspective. In the meantime, anthropology is

no m o r e h a n d i c a p p e d by the c oexistence of two complementary

p a radigms than c o n t e m p o r a r y physics is h a n d i c a p p e d by its

f a i l u re to int e g r a t e nuclear, electromagnetic, and

gr a v i tational forces in a unified field theory. Developing

an analogous "unified field theory" for the domain of human

e x p e r i ence is one of the fut u r e c h a l lenges of anthropology.

The a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l ch a l l e n g e of the moment, though, is to

re f i n e and extend cultural m a t e r i a l i s m and s y m b o l i c

a n t hropology, to e x p l o r e the lim i t s of each p a r a digm's

explanatory power, and to e v aluate the cogency of these two

p a r a d igms w i t h respect to their competitors. That last task

is m a d e e s p e cially dif f i c u l t by the p a r a d i g m a t i c i m p r e c i s i o n

of m u c h a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l research, analysis, and discussion.

As w e snail see in the next chapter, c o ntemporary

a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s so m e t i m e s sail into p a r a d i g m a t i c debates

w i t h little u n d e r s t a n d i n g of what their opponents are trying

to say. P a r a d i g m a t i c c l a s h e s in a n t h r o p o l o g y are often

noisy affairs, but all too often they have all the

significance or ships that pass in the night.

 CHAPTER FOUR
THE CLASH OF PARADIGMS

To the extent . . . that two s c i e n t i f i c schools

disagree about w hat is a problem and w h a t
a solution, they will i n e v itably talk through
e a c h other w h e n debating the r e l a t i v e merits
of their r e s p e c t i v e paradigms.
T h o m a s Kuhn,
Xlie St r u c t u r e S c i e n t i f i c Revolutions

I have s a i d t h a t the unique v a l u e of the scientific

a p p r o a c h stems in large part from t h e fact that science is

p r a c t i c e d by a critical community of scientists. The e r r o r s

of o b s e r vation or i n t e r p r e t a t i o n m a d e by individual

sc i e n t ists are, ideally, corrected by t h eir colleagues in an

unrel e nting p r o c e s s of scrutiny and review. T hat is why it

is crucially im p o r t a n t for sc i e n t i s t s to u n d e r s t a n d the

nature of p a r a d i g m a t i c inquiry. Any pa r t i c u l a r observ a t i o n

or e x p lan a t i o n is t n e product of a p a r t i c u l a r paradigm, and

it must be c r i t i q u e d as such. Sc i e n t i s t s un f a m i l i a r with

the notion of p a r a d i g m a t i c i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y w ill be u n a b l e

to evaluate s c i e n t i f i c a c c o u n t s pr o d u c e d u n der the auspices

of paradigms t o w h i c h they t h e m s e l v e s are not committed.

162
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Inevitably, such sc i e n t i s t s will compare and e v a l u a t e all

rival theories as though those the o r i e s had been p r o d u c e d by

p ar a d igms commensurable with their own research strategies.

As I have explained, incommensurable paradigms m ust be

compared and e v a l u a t e d in a m a n n e r different from that

e m p l o yed to e valuate commensurable paradigms. The f a i l u r e

of many c o n t e m p o r a r y a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s to r e c ognize that fact

is a major s h o r t c o m i n g of the discipline, and one that

t h r e a tens to u n d ermine the s c i e n t i f i c v alidity of

anthropology.

I t h ink I can i l l u s t r a t e the d angers a s s o c i a t e d w ith

the f ailure to r e c o g n i z e the occasi o n a l incommensurability

of p a r a d i g m s by reference to a h y p o t h e t i c a l example.

Imagine, if you will, two a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s who intend to

study the ritual behavior of a pa r t i c u l a r culture. The

first is a visual anthr o p o l o g i s t ; he w a n t s to study

d e c o r ative motifs, spatial relations, l ighting techniques,

patterns of movement, and similar p h e nomena w h e n he o bserves

the ritual in question. The second is an aural

anth r opologist; she w a n t s to study liturgical chants,

musical effects, oratory styles, extran e o u s conversation,

and the like w h e n she arrives on the scene.

The visual anthropologist c onducts his r e s e a r c h under

the a u spices of a pa r a d i g m w h i c h involves the use of a

camera. He d eclares that the res e a r c h problem in w h i c h he

is i n t e r e s t e d is the m a k i n g of a c omplete photographic

record of the ritual. His re s e a r c h strategy is to take as

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many d i f ferent pictures from as many d i f ferent angles as

possible.

The aural anthropologist pursues her r esearch under the

a u s p i c e s of a paradigm w h i c h involves the use of a tape

recorder. She d e clares that the research problem she wants

to t a c k l e is the m a k i n g of a c o mplete audio record of the

event. Her r esearch strategy is to make as many different

r e c o r d i n g s of as many d i f ferent sounds as possible.

W hen the visual and aural a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s confront one

a n o t h er in the j o urnals of their discipline, they fail to

r e c o g n i z e the i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y of their p a r a d i g m a t i c

approaches. The visual anthropologist ins i s t s that his

camera takes better p ictures than his riv a l ' s tape recorder;

the aural anthropologist a d a m a n t l y m a i n t a i n s that her tape

r e c o r d e r m a k e s far better sound recordings than her

competitor's camera. The visual anthropologist steadfastly

de f e n ds his paradigm; his 35 mm, single lens reflex, fully

a u t o m a t i c camera re p r e s e n t s a considerable im p r o v e m e n t over

the i n s t a m a t i c cameras used by f i e l d w o r k e r s in y e ars gone

by. Moreover, the visual anthropologist d esigned the

c a m e r a's shoulder strap himself, and he cites the art i c l e in

w h i c h he first claimed that innovation. The aural

anthropologist is u n impressed; after all, her m i n i a t u r i z e d

cassette recorder not only has a built-in tape counter but

is c a p a b l e of re c o r d i n g w i t h or w i t h o u t a h a n d - h e l d

mi c r o p h o n e . Furthermore, she d e v eloped the system of

l a b e l i n g c assette tapes w h i c h has been adopted by virtually

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every a n t h r o p o l o g i s t w o r k i n g in Micronesia, and she cites

the article w h i c h e s t a b l i s h e s that fact.

And so it goes. The visual a n t h r o p o l o g i s t faults the

aural anthropologist because she has totally n e g l e c t e d to

a n a l y z e the p r o x e m i c s of the ritual, w h ile the aural

anthropologist ch a s t i s e s the visual anthr o p o l o g i s t because

he failed to not i c e the highly s i g n i ficant tonal differences

in the u t t e r a n c e s of the priests and the communicants. The

two a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s t alk past one another. They fail to

critically evaluate each other's claims in a responsible,

s c i e n t i f i c f a s h i o n because they fail to un d e r s t a n d w h a t

c laims each is making. Their ap p r o a c h e s are completely

inc o m mensurable: they specify d i f ferent problems for

investigation (one w a n t s to make a photog r a p h i c record, the

other an audio record), and they specify different m e a n s of

solut ion (one a d v o c a t e s the use of a camera, the other calls

for the use of a tape recorder).

To pursue this analogy briefly, imagine that the two

a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s remain loyal to their preferred m e t h o d s of

s olu t ion but now specify a common problem: each d e clares

that he or she w a n t s to make as com p l e t e a record as

poss i ble of the e n t i r e ritual activity. Now they have some

common ground for discussion. The visual anthropologist can

argue that his pic t u r e s capture the most s ignificant aspects

of the event, and the aural anthropologist can argue that

her r ecordings e n c a p s u l a t e the essence of the activity.

Both, in other words, can claim to solve the problem more

e fficaciously. In this case, their two a p p r o a c h e s are only

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relatively incommens u r a b l e ; they can be directly

c o m p a red i the two a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s can reach some agreement

r e g a r d i n g the real importance or s i g n i f i c a n c e of ritual

activity. Both, of course, are v u l n e r a b l e to the in n o v a t i v e

theo r i st who will suggest that a vi d e o t a p e recorder be used

to solve the problem.

The visual anthropologist and the aural

anthropologist can evaluate each other's work, even if they

specify completely different r e search problems. In fact,

they must do so if they wish to be scientists. But to say

that a camera takes better p i ctures than a tape r e corder is

a patent a b s urdity unworthy of rational consideration, let

alone scient i f i c discourse. Instead, the visual

a n t h r o p o l o g i s t must argue that the aural anthropologist does

not solve the p roblems she defined for herself; or that her

m e t h o d of sol u t i o n is unscientific, unfalsifiable, or

falsif ied; or that it is m o r e important, for some

de m o n s t r a b l e or a r g u a b l e reason, to have photog r a p h i c

records of rit u a l s rather than a u dio records.

This h y p o t h e t i c a l example is a d m i t t e d l y a caricature,

but p a r a d i g m a t i c debate in a n t h r o p o l o g y is often nearly this

comical. T h ere is n o t h i n g humorous, however, about the

d i s s e r vice done to the practice of science by uncritical and

un i n f o r m e d p a r a d i g m a t i c debate. In this chapter, I intend

to s u b s t a n t i a t e these points by closely exa m i n i n g two actual

p a r a d i gmatic deb a t e s in c o ntemporary anthropology. Both of

the debates to be consid e r e d involve clashes between

cultural determ i n i s t s and cultural materialists. Neither of

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these two paradigms will emerge blameless from the analysis

that follows.

For a variety of reasons, c o n temporary paradigmatic

cl ashes often involve cultural materialists, who tend to be

most explic i t l y con c e r n e d w i t h issues of p a r a d i g m a t i c

commitment. Cultural m a t e r i a l i s t s frequently c ompare their

para d igm w i t h its competitors, but, like the visual

a n t h r o p o l o g i s t who i nsisted that no other p a radigm produced

p i c t u r es as good as those pro d u c e d by his camera, cultural

m a t e r i a l i s t s frequently beg the q u e s t i o n w h e n m a k i n g a case

for t h eir paradigm. Ross (1980), for example, argues that

no other paradigm e x p l a i n s the causes of sociocultural

d i f f e r e n c e s and s i m i l a r i t i e s as well as cultural

mate r i alism. Harris (1979:296-97) cr i t i c i z e s "the eclectic

s t r a t e gy" for being "a highly inefficient way to study the

causes of s o c i ocultural d i f f e r e n c e s and simil a r i t i e s . "

Price (1982:735) observes, correctly, that "theoretical

p r o p o s i t i o n s must be tested against each other as well as

a g ainst data and e v a l u a t e d on m e t a t h e o r e t i c a l as well as

em p irical grounds," but she offers that o b s e r v a t i o n after

h a v i n g tes t e d cultural m a t e r i a l i s m ' s rivals "in the analysis

of c e r t a i n problems of s i m i larity and difference, stability

and change in cultural systems" (ibid.). Many of cultural

materialism's competitors, however, do not address

t h e m s e l v e s to those problems, as I e x p lained in Chapter

Three. Cultural m a t e r i a l i s m ' s rivals cannot be faulted

simply because they are not cultural materialism.

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To be fair, though, it should be noted that cultural

materialism's detractors frequently fault cultural

m a t e r i a l i s m simply for being cultural materialism. Muriel

Dimen-Schein (1977:xv), for example, says that she reb e l l e d

against the "quite rigid, materialist, determinist view of

culture and h u m a n evolution" w h i c h she w a s taught in

graduate school because that view "cannot account for or

explain how c ultural ideology, through individual

c o n s c i o u s n e s s or subjectivity, results in the individual

action." If there is a p r o p ositional c r i t i q u e of cultural

m a t e r i a l i s m in that, I am unable to detect it. Manners and

Kaplan (1968:10) note that a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l theories

s o m e t imes "function as ideologies, and the reaction to them

is often in ter m s of their ideological rather than their

scientific implications."

The two p a r a d i g m a t i c debates to be discussed h ere

involve issues that are f a miliar to most contemporary

anthropologists: the w o r l d view of peasants and the

sanctity of I n d i a ' s cattle. These two issues have been the

center of r e m a rkably contentious discussion, and,

unfortunately, most a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s who have p a rticipated in

the debates h a v e failed to re c o g n i z e the incommensurability

of the p a r a d i g m s involved.

C u ltural Determinism. Cultural. M a t e r i a l i s m ,

and the Image of L i m i t e d - G o o d

The deb a t e s u r r o u n d i n g the nature of the world view of

peasants--like that surrou n d i n g the sanctity of cattle in

I n d i a is a d e b a t e between cultural d e t e r m i n i s t s and

c u l t u ral materialists. In Chapter Three, I noted that

cult u ral determinism seeks to explain the reasons people

t h i n k and b e h a v e the w a y they do, while cultural m a t e r i a l i s m

tri e s to explain how d i f f e r e n t systems of thought and

b e h a v i o r come into being. The basic t h e o r e t i c a l p r i nciple

of cultural determinism holds that in d i v i d u a l behavior is

d e t e r mined by cultural influence; the f u n d a m e n t a l

theoretical p r i n c i p l e of cultural m a t e r i a l i s m m a i n t a i n s that

c u l t u ral p a tterns of beli e f and b e h a v i o r are de t e r m i n e d by

i n f r a s tructural variables. One p a r a d i g m asks "what

determines behavior?" and answers "c u l t u r e ; " the other asks

"what de t e r m i n e s c u l t u r e ? " and answers "infrastructure." It

will be important to k e e p in mind the d i f f e r e n c e s between

cultural d e t e r m i n i s m and cultural m a t e r i a l i s m and the fact

that cultural determinism and cultural m a t e r i a l i s m are

incommensurable p a r a d i g m s in the d i s c u s s i o n that follows.

George F o s t e r (1979; o r i g inally 1967) devised the

c o n c e p t of the Ima g e of L imited G o o d to c h a r a c t e r i z e the

w o r l d view of p e asants in the Mexican v i l l a g e of

Tzintzuntzan, al t h o u g h he argued that t h e concept applied as

well to peasants t h r o u g h o u t the world. A c c o r d i n g to Foster,

p e a s a n ts are envious, suspicious, and f atalistic, and they

a s s u m e the s t r u c t u r e of reality to be such as to preclude

h a p p i n e s s and s a t i s f a c t i o n for all but a very few people:

By I m a g e of L i m i t e d Good I m e a n t hat behavior

. . . is p a t t e r n e d in such a f a s h i o n as to
sug g e s t that T z i n t z u n t z e n o s see their
social, economic, and natural u n i v e r s e s
 170

their total e n v i r o n m e n t as one in w h ich

almost all desired things in life such as
land, other forms of wealth, health,
friendship, love, manliness, honor, respect,
power, influence, security, and safety
exist i n absolute Q u a n t i t i e s i n sufficient
i n H i l l n x e n minimal needs n v il l a g e r s .
Not only do good t h i n g s exist in strictly
l imited quantities, but in add i t i o n there
I s D l Q w.ay. direct ly W i t h i n the T z i n t z u n t z e n o 1 s
-P-g.Mei: i n iae.r-ea.se iiie available .sup.p.lies
. . . " G o o d , like land, is seen as so m e t h i n g
i nherent in nature, there to be divided
and r e d i v i d e d if necessary, to be passed
around, but not to be augmented. ( i b i d . :123-24)

In effect, Fost e r offers an emic account of the w o r l d

view of T z i n t z u n t z e n o s as a p a r t i c u l a r i l l u s t r a t i o n of the

etic g e n e r a l i z a t i o n that tho u g h t and behavior are de t e r m i n e d

by culture. Foster is a q u i n t e s s e n t i a l cultural

determinist. He does not concern himself, except

t a n g e n t i a l l y , w ith the factors that bro u g h t the

T z i n t z u n t z e n o w o r l d view into being. Fo s t e r ' s a nalysis is

aimed at the n a t u r e of the peasant w o r l d view, not

the cause of that w o r l d view:

In t r e a t i n g of the way in w h i c h people

l o o k at the world, two l e v e l s of analysis
are involved. On the one hand we are
c o n c e r n e d w i t h d e s c r i p t i o n , for by
o b s e r v i n g how people act a c o g nitive
o r i e n t a t i o n can be l e a r n e d . . . On the
other h and w e are co n c e r n e d w i t h the
pro b l e m of an economical r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
of this co g n i t i v e o r i e n t a t i o n by means
of m o d e l s or other dev i c e s w h i c h account
for o b s e r v e d behavior and w h i c h permit
p r e d i c t i o n of b e havior as yet unnoted or
u nperformed. (i b i d . :122-23)

W hen Fos t e r says that the Image of Limited G ood

"accounts for o b s e r v e d behavi o r , " he m e a n s individual

 171
behavior, not systems of behavior. He is not c laiming that

the peasants' w o r l d view d e t e r m i n e s the nature of the

peasant economy; instead, he is e x p l a i n i n g how and why

i ndividual Tzintzuntzenos perceive the w o r l d the way they

do. For Foster, individual be h a v i o r is the product of

cultural influence, and the Image of Limited G ood is one

co m p o nent of M e x i c a n peasant culture. When Foster does

t o uch upon the q u e s t i o n of the causes of the Image of

L i m i t e d G o o d as he does occasionally, a lthough always in

p a s s i n g he invariably points to the existence of material

constraints:

For the underlying, fundamental truth is

that in an economy like Tzintzuntzan's,
hard w o r k and thrift are moral qu a l i t i e s
of only the s l i ghtest functional value.
B ecause of the l i m i t a t i o n s on land and
technology, additional hard w o r k does
not produce a signif i c a n t increment in
income. It is p o i ntless to t a l k of
thrift in a s u b s i stence economy, because
usually there is no surplus w i t h w h ich
to be thrifty. Foresight, with careful
p l anning for the future, is also a virtue
of dubious value in a w o r l d in w h i c h the
best l aid plans must rest on a founda t i o n
of chance and capriciousness. (i b i d .:150)

In short, there is n o t h i n g in Fo s t e r ' s concept of the

Image of L i m i t e d G o o d w h i c h c o n t r a d i c t s the theoretical

p r i n c iples of cultural materialism. Nothing about F o ster's

concept, of course, explicitly furthers the develo p m e n t or

a r t i c u l a t i o n of cultural materialism, and cultural

m a t e r i a l i s t s may well be able to argue, with some

j u s t i f ication, that cultural determinist e x p l a n a t i o n s are

fa i r l y unenlightening. But cultural m a t e r i a l i s t s have

 172

consistently misinterpreted Foster, and they have insisted,

consistently and i n a ppropriately, that F o ster's arguments

are c o n t r a d i c t e d by cultural m a t e r i a l i s t principles.

James A c h e s o n (1972) l aunched the first of the cultural

materialist attacks against the Image of Lim i t e d G o o d in an

a r t i c l e entitled " L imited G ood or Lim i t e d G o o d s ? Response to

Economic Opportunity in a T a r a s c a n Pueblo." The article

presents a very curious argument that can only be u n d e r s t o o d

if one realizes that Ach e s o n w a s unfami l i a r w i t h the notion

of p a r a d i g m a t i c i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y and, consequently, unable

to properly eva l u a t e i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e approaches. Acheson

(i b i d .:1152) maintains "that blocks to develo p m e n t are

pri m a rily e c onomic in nature, not cultural or c o g nitive

(e.g., 'limited good') as has been claimed by othe r s w o r k i n g

in the area." Acheson (ibid.) goes on to claim that "Foster

a s c r i bes this i n a bility to change primarily to the cognitive

o r i e n t a t i o n of the peo p l e of the Tar a s c a n area, w h i c h he

sums up w i t h the concept of 'limited good.'" This is simply

not true. Foster does not ascribe the inability to change

pr i m a rily to c o g n i t i v e factors; in fact, Foster only deals

with change t a n g e n t i a l l y (it w a s never central to his

cultural determinist thesis), and then he points to a

c o m b i n a t i o n of "psychological, social, cultural, economic,

and t e c h n o l o g i c a l f a ctors" that promote and reta r d change

(Foster 1979:250).

However, Foster fails to u n d e r s t a n d w h a t A c h e s o n m e ans

by d e t e r m i n a t i v e causal factors or "primary responsibility"

for change, because Foster does not unders t a n d A c h e s o n ' s

paradigm. Thus Foster must bear part of the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y

for the confusion, because he too is unable to properly

eval u ate i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e approaches. In a reply to Acheson,

Foster (1974:54) a d m i t t e d that "it is true that I have found

a good deal of the inability of T z i n t z u n t z e n o s to take

a d v a n t a g e of new o p p o r t u n i t i e s to be rooted in p ersonality

and social factors." But that is "true" only in a cultural

d e t e r minist sense: Foster m e a n s that individual be h a v i o r is

de t e r mined by c u ltural influence. If individuals persist in

m a i n t a i n i n g the same cognitive orientations, he argues, they

will be unable to take adv a n t a g e of new opportunities.

F o s t e r ' s apparent adm i s s i o n of the "primacy" of p ersonality

fa c tors is not "true" in A c h e s o n ' s cultural m a t e r i a l i s t

sense: ask Foster w h a t must h a p p e n in order to change the

c o g n i t i v e o r i e n t a t i o n which in effect is what Acheson

d o e s and Foster w i l l invariably answer that the m aterial

c o n d i t i o n s of life m ust first change. In other words, when

new o p p o r t u n i t i e s present themselves, most indivi d u a l s

will not mai n t a i n t h eir old c o g n i t i v e o r i e n t a t i o n s (Foster

e m p h a s i z e s that t h ose w h o do take advantage of the new

opportunities will change their outlooks). In that sense,

Fos t e r r e c o g n i z e s t hat the i n a b i l i t y of T z i n t z u n t z e n o s to

c hange is rooted in material factors. Even innova t i v e

people, Foster (1979:251) declares, will be unable to

im p l e ment their innova t i o n s w i t h o u t a "fully de v e l o p e d

i n f r a s t r u c t u r e to train them and support them in their

efforts." Es t a b l i s h such an infrastructure, Foster

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suggests, and i n n o v a t i v e people w ill appear. So w hat is the

argument about?

The a r gument is about paradigms. Acheson thinks Foster

is guilty of cultural idealism, and he wan t s Foster to be a

c o n s i stent cultural materialist. Foster thinks A c h e s o n is

guilty of eco n o m i c reductionism, and he w a n t s A c h e s o n to be

a h o l istic cultural determinist. In his reply to Acheson,

Fo s t e r (1974) insists that the Image of Limited Good is a

true and a c c u r a t e d e s c r i p t i o n of the w o r l d view of Mex i c a n

peas a nts (or at least that it was acc u r a t e between 1945 and

1965.). But Acheson never q u i b b l e d w i t h that point. In his

reply to Foster, Ach e s o n (1974:59) said that he was not

q u e s t i o n i n g whe t h e r Mexican p e asants w e r e s u s p i c i o u s just

"the degree to w h i c h s u s picion h i n d e r s d e v e l o p m e n t . " But

Fo s t e r never argued that c o g nitive o r i e n t a t i o n s w ere m ore

s i g n i ficant in h i b i t o r s of develo p m e n t than material

conditions. Foster and Ach e s o n failed c o m p letely to

u n d e r s t a n d one a n o t h e r ' s p a r a d i g m a t i c assumptions, and as a

re s u l t s u c ceeded only in t alking past one another.

In his original critique of Foster, Ach e s o n (1972:1153)

wrote that w h i l e "a certain amount of data on technical and

e c o n o mic l i m i t a t i o n s " appears in F o s t e r ' s work, "such

f a c t o r s h ave not r e ceived their proper w e i g h t in this

discussion." In other words, Fos t e r ' s chief sin is that he

has not invest i g a t e d the problems in w h i c h A cheson is

interested. It i s p o ssible to a t t a c k an i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e

parad i gm on the grounds that its p r oblems are unimportant,

but such an att a c k m ust d e m o n s t r a t e whv those p r oblems are

 175

insig nificant. It is p o i n t l e s s to argue that a paradigm is

inadequate simply because it fails to a d d r e s s its

incommensurable rival's problems. A c h e s o n made that m i s t a k e

b e c a u s e he w a s not even a w are that Foster was conducting

r e s e a r c h under the aus p i c e s of a di f f e r e n t paradigm. As a

result, A c h e s o n i n t e r p r e t e d all of F o s t e r ' s statements as

t h o u g h they had been m a d e by a wayward c u l t u r a l materialist.

"It is one thing to say that Tarascans are suspicious,

d i s t r ustful, and u n c o o p e r a t i v e , " Ach e s o n (ibid.:1165)

argues, but "it is a n o t h e r to assume that this lack of

cooperation precludes all possibility for positive e c onomic

c h a n g e." Foster never said it precluded that possibility,

and w h e n Foster (1974) a t t e m p t e d to make that clear to

Acheson, Acheson (1974:58) dec i d e d that Foster had signaled

"a m a j o r change in his own t h i n k i n g c o n c e r n i n g d e v e lopment."

Foster, however, was guilty of similarly myopic

int e r pretations. F a i l i n g to realize that A c h e s o n was

working with a different set of p a r a d i g m a t i c premises,

Foster i n t e r p r e t e d all of A c h e s o n ' s s t a t e m e n t s as though

they had been m ade by a w a y w a r d cultural determinist.

Foster's basic working h y p o t h e s i s is that b ehavior is

d e t e r m i n e d by culture, and he imagines t h a t Ach e s o n is

a t t e m p t i n g to reduce c u l t u r e to mere eco n o m i c factors:

Our "existing body of theory" to explain

these changes c e r tainly needs m o d i f i c a t i o n
and e x t ension w h i c h will come not from
simplistic e c o n o m i c e x p l a n a t i o n s ,alP.H,
but from careful, cautious, and broadly
based a n a l y s e s of all the economic,
 176

political, historical, social and

p s y c h o l o g i c a l factors that are at play in
m o d e r n Mexico. (Foster 1974:57; emp h a s i s added)

As we shall see in the context of the sacred cow

controversy, cultural d e t e r m i n i s t s f r e q uently respond w ith

em o t i ve calls for "more fieldwork" w h e n t h eir t heoretical

pos i t ions are challenged.

The debate over the Image of Lim i t e d Good did not end

with the A c h e s o n - F o s t e r exchange, however. Harris

(1979:297-300) argues that Fo s t e r ' s d e s c r i p t i o n and defense

of the Image of L i m i t e d G o o d is r eplete w i t h internal

co n tradictions. He quotes Foster (1979:349) to the effect

that "all n o r m a t i v e group b e havior . . . is a fun c t i o n of a

p a r t i cular u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the condit i o n s that d elimit and

d e t e r mine lif e , " and argues that Foster should accord i n g l y

be r e garded as a "cultural idealist" (Harris 1979:298).

Foster, however, does not mai n t a i n that the "conditions that

d e l i m i t and de t e r m i n e life" are caused by patterns of

thought; instead, he argues that i n d i v i d u a l s behave in

a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of those condit i o n s that

they hold as a result of their shared e n c u l t u r a t i v e

experiences. T h e r e f o r e Foster is not a cultural idealist.

His p o sition on cultural causality is clear in his statement

that the "key factor" i n f l u e n c i n g change in T z i n t z u n t z a n is

to be found in "the v i l l a g e ' s inherent eco n o m i c potential,

its natural resources, its geographical location, the

national and i n t e rnational demand for its present and

potential products, and its popula t i o n growth" (Foster

 177

1979:351). Harr i s (1979:298) cites this statement of

F o s t e r ' s as e vidence of F o s t e r ' s inconsistency. Fo s t e r ' s

statements would be i n c o n s i s t e n t if Foster w e r e a cultural

idealist, but Foster is a cultural determinist, and his

s t a t e m e n t s are t h e r e f o r e perfectly consistent. There is

nothing inconsistent about asserting, on the one hand, that

c u l t u re d e t e r m i n e s behavior, and then affirming, on the

other, that m a terial factors de t e r m i n e culture.

"Why then has Foster d evoted the entire book to the

study of the i m a g e ," H a r r i s (ibid.) asks, if Foster

r e c o g n i z e s that the "key factor" behind s o c iocultural change

l ies in m a t e r i a l constraints? The answer is simple:

b e c a u s e Foster w a s w o r k i n g w i t h a p a radigm w h i c h was not

c o n c e rned w i t h i d e n t i f y i n g the key f actors behind eco n o m i c

development or s o c i o c u l t u r a l change. Foster admits that

political, economic, and e n v i r o n m e n t a l c o n d itions d e t ermine

e c o n o m ic opportunity, but he does so as an a f t e r t h o u g h t or

an aside. As a cultural determinist, his real concern is

w i t h how people per c e i v e and r e c o g n i z e eco n o m i c o p p o r t u n i t y

(Foster 1974:55-56). Harris (198ub:374) says that "if

opportunities present themselves, some i n d i v i d u a l s w i l l

always take a d v antage of them, regard l e s s of the image of

l i m i t e d good." F o s t e r w o u l d agree. Granted, he argues that

the Image of Lim i t e d G o o d must be changed before ec o n o m i c

development can take place, but Fost e r also argues t hat the

Image will change w h e n the eco n o m i c c o n d itions change:

"change c o g nitive o r i e n t a t i o n t h r o u g h c h anging access to

o p p o r t u n i t y , and the peasant will do very well indeed"

 178
(Foster 19b5:310; emp h a s i s added). Foster offers these

comme nts on the w o r l d view of T z i n t z u n t z e n o s in 1979:

A L i m i t e d G ood mentality, although still

found a m o n g m a n y of the older people,
is no longer a s ignificant brake on
change, as it certainly was in 1945.
Genuine and s i g n i ficant in c r e a s e s in
ec o n o m i c and social opportunities,
coupled w ith the villagers' realiz a t i o n s
that these o p p o r t u n i t i e s are a v a ilable
to them, u nderlie these d r a m a t i c developments.
(1979:371)

It is the "villagers' reali z a t i o n s " that Foster w a n t s

to study; the Image of Limited G o o d is n o t h i n g m ore than a

c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of the typical villagers' realizations

b e tween 1945 and 1965.

In the wake of all this brouhaha, Foster (1979:384-85)

a t t e m p t e d to defend his concept of the Image of Limited G o o d

in an ad d e n d u m to his original monograph. In an "Epilogue"

to T z i n t z u n t z a n , Foster admits that the Image is no

l o n g e r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of c o n temporary Tzintzuntzenos, but he

m a i n t a i n s that it was a true and a c c u r a t e description of the

w o r l d view of Mex i c a n p e asants bef o r e 1965. W hat Foster

f a ils to u n d e r s t a n d is that the debate w a s never concerned

with substantive issues. The co n t r o v e r s y surrounding the

Image of Limited G o o d has nothing to do w i t h whether the

theory fits the data; it is simply and purely a paradigmatic

de b a t e between i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e p a r adigms conducted as t h o u g h

the p a radigms had been commensurable.

In sum, the debate over the Image of Limited Good w a s

i n i t i a ted by cultural m a t e r i a l i s t s w h o failed to r e c ognize

the i n c o m m e n s u r a b l i t y of cultural determinism and

p e r p e t u a t e d by cultural d e t e r m i n i s t s w h o failed to r e c o g n i z e

the i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y of cultural materialism. The a t t a c k

was i ll-advised; the d efense was ill-conceived; and the

en t i r e episode has been an e m b a r r a s s m e n t to a d i s c ipline

that w o u l d be a science. Ironically, the paradigm of

c ultural d e t e r m i n i s m is highly v u l n e r a b l e to attack, if

c ultural m a t e r i a l i s t s and o t h e r s w o u l d only e v aluate

cultural d e t e r m i n i s m on its own terms. F oster's

e x p l a n a t i o n s have very little pr e d i c t i v e power. The Image

of L i m i t e d G o o d is simply an economical d e s c r i p t i o n of the

w o r l d view of peasants; in effect, Foster explains that

peasants view the w o r l d the way they do because they view

the w o r l d the way they do. Cultural d e t e r m i n i s t s and

cultural m a t e r i a l i s t s are currently involved in another

debate w h i c h is even m o r e imprecise, m o r e v i t r i o l i c and

m o r e embarrassing. It is a debate in i t i a t e d this time by

cultural determinists, and it c o ncerns the sacred cow of

India.

Cultural Determinism. C u l t u ral M a t e r i a l i s m ,

and the Sacred Cow C o n t r oversy

The sacred cow c ontroversy began nearly twenty years

ago and presently shows few signs of abating.

A n t h r opologists, geographers, economists, agronomists,

ecologists, veterinarians, Indian specialists, government

officials, and many others have all joined in the d e b a t e

 180
conducted, for the most part, in the pages of Current

A n t h r o p o l o g y but the basic issues rema i n unresolved

and are, if anything, even m ore mud d l e d than they w ere at

the outset of the controversy. These facts alone should

make it clear that the sacred cow c o n t r o v e r s y is not a

s u b s t antive debate. If data alone could r esolve the issue,

the c ontroversy w o u l d h ave died out long ago. The sacred

cow c o n t r o v e r s y will remain alive as long as there are

cultural d e t e r m i n i s t s and cultural m a t e r i a l i s t s w h o fail to

u n d e r s t a n d the notion of p a r a d i g m a t i c i n c o m m e nsurability.

I w ant to review the essential outline of the

contr oversy as it has de v e l o p e d over the past eighteen or so

y e a r s since the p u b l i c a t i o n of Har r i s ' s (1965) original

argument for the a d a p t i v e utility of India's sacred cow

complex. I inte n d to d e m o n s t r a t e that the controversy is

cent e red upon a p a r a d i g m a t i c clash bet w e e n cultural

d e t e r m i n i s m and cultural materialism. W h i l e most of the

ar g u m e n t s off e r e d in the debate can be c h a r a c t e r i z e d as

either cultural d e t e r m i n i s t i c or cultural materialistic,

there are other p a r a d i g m s involved. Chief among those other

par a d igms is di a l e c t i c a l materialism, w h i c h surfaces in the

sacred cow c o n t r o v e r s y in the c o n t r i b u t i o n s of Diener (1979;

1980; 1981), Diener, Nonini, and Robkin (1978), Nonini

(1980; 1981; 1982), and Robkin (1979; 1981; 1982). The

d iale ctical mater i a l i s t s , however, have m a d e very little

im p r e s s i o n upon either the cultural d e t e r m i n i s t s or the

cultural materi a l i s t s ; in the p a r a d i g m a t i c clash over the

status of India's cattle, the dialec t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s t s have

 181
participated in m i n o r sk i r m i s h e s only. ...The real battle,

with ail its noise and commotion, is fou g h t elsewhere.

Acc o r dingly, the a r g u m e n t s of the d ialectical materialists

will be omi t t e d f rom the f o l l o w i n g discussion. Robkin*s

(1979:486) contention that "knowledge [i.e., etic knowledge]

that a t t e m p t s to be 'culture free' w o u l d be, by its nature,

inhuman and a n t i - s c i e n t i f i c " is c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the

d iale ctical materialist position, and I w o u l d only note that

I find that c o n t e n t i o n to be l i t t l e short of obfuscation.

The sacred cow c o n t r oversy began in earnest w i t h the

appearance of H a r r i s ' s (1966) article entitled "The Cultural

Ecology of I n d i a ' s Sacred C attle." In that article, Harris

(ibid.:50) a r g u e d that "the e x p l a n a t i o n of [beef-eating]

t aboos . . . [should] be sought in 'positiv e - f u n c t i o n e d ' and

p robably 'adaptive' p r o cesses of the e c o l ogical system."

N o t i n g that the H i n d u doctrine of ahimsa (nonviolence and

r e spect for all forms of life) had o f t e n been cited as an

e x a m p l e of the e c o n o m i c irrationality of belief systems, he

m a i n t a i n e d that h u m a n s and bovines in India exist in a

sy m b i otic relat i o n s h i p . A c c o r d i n g to Harris, the sanctity

of India's cattle h e lps to protect and p reserve that

relationship. Har r i s obs e r v e d that I n d i a n cattle provide

small alt h o u g h not insignificant sup p l i e s of milk, but that

the chief pos i t i v e contributions pro v i d e d by the cattle w e r e

the fuel and f e r t i l i z e r obt a i n e d from their dung. H a rris's

analysis was explicitly c o n ducted u n der the au s p i c e s of

c ultural materialism. He sought to i d entify the

d e t e r m i n a n t s of cer t a i n aspects of the Hindu bel i e f system,

 182
and he found those d e t e r m i n a n t s in the functional utility of

I n dia's cattle.

The initial reaction to Ha r r i s ' s argument was largely

favorable. Bose (1966), Klass (1966), Mencher (1966), Oberg

(1966), Opler (1966), and S uttles (1966) all found

t h e m s e l v e s in essential agreement w i t h Harris, although each

had some r e s e r v a t i o n s and/or q u a l i f i c a t i o n s to note. Opler,

for example, o b jected to the use of the term "cultural

ec o logy," and Sut t l e s (ibid. :63) was careful to point out

that H a r r i s ' s arg u m e n t could not be l a b e l e d "environmental

or e c onomic determinism" since the "doctrine arose, as all

do, out of human speculation." That q u a l i f i c a t i o n was

ha r d l y necessary, since H a r r i s ' s a r gument obviously presumed

that the d octrine was a product of the human im a g i n a t i o n (no

one has yet s u g gested that the cattle devised the notion of

their own sanctity). Harris simply w i s h e d to show why the

h u m a n i m a g i n a t i o n had taken the pa r t i c u l a r turn it took in

India.

The origin of the sacred cow controversy, however, can

be found among that same set of initial c omments on Har r i s ' s

article. Andrew Vayda (1966:63) o b s e r v e d that Harris w a s

"at pains to dismiss the influence of ahimsa instead of

inq u i ring w h e t h e r the d o ctrine itself has a daptive value."

Vayda (ibid.) argued t hat "it is, at the very least, a

r e a s o n a b l e h y p o t h e s i s that part of the s e l ective process in

h u m a n ev o l u t i o n is the e m e rgence of bel i e f s and moral

v a l u a t i o n s c o n ducive to b e havior that helps po p u l a t i o n s to

survive." Xefc Xa.y d a..' s c omments were made In r e ference ike .an
 183

ar.fc.ig.le Which C l e a r l y argued .fcMfc the H i ndu belief sygfcem

.engimr_a&ad e n d su p p o r t e d .be.iifi.y.iar that facilitated iiie
.sno-iy.al n f iiie I n dian -papu l a t i o n. Why then did Vayda

say what he said?

T h ere are only two possibilities. Either Vayda is

st u p i d or m a l i c i o u s or perverse or ot h e r w i s e d isinclined

toward scientific di s c o u r s e for w h a t e v e r personal reason, or

V a yda is o f f e r i n g his c omments in another p a r a d i g m a t i c vein.

The second a l t e r n a t i v e seems o v e r w h e l m i n g l y probable, not

only for the l a c k of other evidence to doubt V a y d a 1s

integrity, but bec a u s e his m i s t a k e has been repeated by

dozens of other sch o l a r s w i t h reference to this very issue.

So m e t h i n g s y s t e m a t i c is going on here, and it is s o m ething

that poses a serious danger to the science of anthropology.

The only way to m ake sense of V a y d a * s comments is to

as s u m e that V a yda is s p e a k i n g from a set of cultural

de t e r m i n i s t principles. W hen Vayda says that Harris is at

pains to dismiss the influence of ahimsa, he can only mean

that Harris is at pains to dismiss the influence of ahimsa

on i n dividual behavior. Like Foster w h o accused

A c h e s o n of e c o n o m i c reductionism, Vayda i m agines that Harris

has reduced c u l t u r e to m e r e ec o n o m i c v a r i a b l e s w hen it is

patently obvious to V a y d a that r e l igious s e n timent will

affect the way Ind i a n s regard and behave toward their

cattle. Thus the debate is b etween p r o p o n e n t s of two

i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e p a r a d i g m a t i c approaches, one of w h o m wis h e s

to identify the d e t e r m i n a n t s of beh a v i o r and the other of

whom is try i n g to identify the d e t e r m i n a n t s of culture.

 184

In his reply to Vayda, Harris (1966) listed five

specific w a y s in w h i c h the Hindu doctrine of ahimsa

c o n t r i buted to the p ositive e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the Indian

cultural e c o l ogical system. The damage had been done,

however, and cultural d e t e r m i n i s t s to this day persist in

i n s i s t i n g that re l i g i o n does have an influence in India.

In a s u b s e q u e n t issue of Current A n t h r o p o l o g y ,

Bennett (1967:251) acc u s e d Harris of a "classic

functionalist reification." The Indian eco-system, Bennett

argued, does not operate at a peak of efficiency (Harris,

incidentally, never cla i m e d that it did), and Bennett

d e voted the b u l k of his critique to a call for a change in

the Indian e c o - s ystem; specifically, he w a n t s to e s t a b l i s h a

greater m a r k e t v a lue for the cattle. Here, then, is y e t

another i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e paradigm, namely applied

a n thropology, which, in B e n n e t t ' s formulation, co n s i d e r s any

analysis that fails to promote e c o n o m i c de v e l o p m e n t to be an

e r r o n e o u s analysis. Bennett (ibid.:252) also revealed his

cultural determinist bent, however, in m a i n t a i n i n g that

" religious b e l i e f s . . . cannot be w r i t t e n off completely,

no m a t t e r w h a t Har r i s says." N o t h i n g that Harris had

w r i t t e n or has w r i t t e n since can r e a s o n a b l y be interp r e t e d

as a "writing off" of religious beliefs.

The next m a j o r c o n t r i b u t i o n to the sacred cow

c ontr o versy was m ade by an economist, Alan Heston. Heston

(1971) argued that if the sla u g h t e r of cattle w e r e allowed,

the Indian c a t t l e p o p u l a t i o n w o u l d diminish, the eco n o m i c

output of the r e m a i n i n g cattle w o u l d increase, and land

w o u l d be freed for crop production. Hes t o n ' s a r g uments may

or may not have m e r i t it is difficult to imagine how Indian

f a r m e r s w o u l d benefit from m o r e acreage w i t h o u t the draught

a n i m a l s to plow the land. But these, at least, are

em p i r ical claims, and can be tested and debated as such.

Heston ( i b i d . : 192), however, made other claims in supposed

rebuttal to H a r r i s ' s position: "I also show that the

present Indian cattle complex appears to be definitely

i n f l u enced by the . . . Hindu reverence for the cow." Here

Heston compounded the error made by Vayda and Bennett. "If

w e are w i l l i n g to foll o w Harr i s and ignore the sanctity of

the cow," H e s t o n (ibid. : 197) argued, we will be doomed to

t o l e r a t e the i n e f f i c i e n c i e s of the Indian economic system.

Far from ignoring the sanctity of the cow, Harris had been

c o n c e r ned w i t h ex p l a i n i n g t h e reasons for the ap o t h e o s i s of

the cow as w ell as w i t h i d e n t i f y i n g the adaptive

c o n s e q u e n c e s .& the Hindu v e n e r a t i o n of cattle.

B ennett (1971:197) agreed w i t h Heston that "Harris's

w a y of pr e s e n t i n g his arg u m e n t is not parti c u l a r l y conducive

to . . . dialogue" between a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s and other social

scientists. H arris's (1966) original p r e s e n t a t i o n included

a critique of the c o n v e n t i o n a l w i s d o m that the sanctity of

I n d i a n cattle resulted in e x c l u s i v e l y n e g a t i v e e c onomic and

ec o l o g ical effects, but beyond that it is di f f i c u l t to

i m a gine w h a t B e n n e t t and H e s t o n m e a n w h e n they say that

H a r r i s ' s style of p r e s e n t a t i o n is not co n d u c i v e to dialogue.

Th e essence of the s c i e ntific m e t h o d is the persistent

c r i t i q ue of arguments. Harris's a rgument w a s presented in

 186

p r o p o sitional fashion, and t h a t is all that can be demanded

of s c ient i f i c critiques. O t her reviewers, i n c luding

Hamilton (1971) and Mencher (1971), drew a t t e n t i o n to the

ways in w h i c h H e s t o n had m i s r e p r e s e n t e d H a r r i s ' s position.

Harris (1971) h i m s e l f r e i t erated that his p o s i t i o n was and

a l w a y s had been that religion does play a part in the Indian

cultural e c o l ogical system.

The sacred cow co n t r o v e r s y intens i f i e d f o l l o w i n g the

c o n t r i b u t i o n of a geographer, F r e d e r i c k Simoons. Simoons

(1979:476) e c h o e d the cultural determinists' fear of

e con o mic r e d u c t i o n i s m in his s t a t e d i n t ention "to avoid the

oversimplification and error that seems inherent in Harris's

technoenvironmentalism." A c c o r d i n g to S i m o o n s (ibid.:475),

"it is u n f o r t u n a t e . . . that H a r r i s fails to stress

sufficiently the negative impact of the sacred cow concept."

A m o n g the ne g a t i v e impacts i d e n t i f i e d by Simoons w e r e

i n e f f i c i e n t b r e e d i n g of cattle and the w a s t i n g of available

beef. (Harris, of course, n e v e r argued that the effects of

the sacred cow concept w ere e x c l u s i v e l y positive.) But

Simoons ( i b i d . :473) also c o n c l u d e d that the "analysis of the

a v a i l a b l e data sug g e s t s that t h e numbers, distribution, and

c o m p o s i t i o n of Ind i a ' s cattle po p u l a t i o n are m a i n l y

d e t e r m i n e d not by r e ligion but by geogra p h i c and eco n o m i c

f a c t o r s." That is precisely w h a t Harris had con t e n d e d in

his original a r t i c l e and, by this time, in two books

(Harris 1974; 1 9 7 7 ) yet S i m o o n s off e r e d his st a t e m e n t as a

rebuttal to Harris.
 187
Incredibly, several c o m m e n t a t o r s join e d S i m o o n s in the

chorus against "Harris's t e c h n o e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s m . " B a tra

(1979:476), for example, agreed w i t h S imoons "that the

sanc t ity of the cow in India is i n f l uenced by the

sociopolitical system and that eco n o m i c m a t e r i a l i s m is

insufficient to explain it." Ferro-Luzzi (1979:478)

"who l ly" agre e d w i t h S i m o o n s "that cattle m a n a g e m e n t in

India cannot be ex p l a i n e d only in terms of r ationality and

a d a p t i v e utility, as H a r r i s claims." Hoffpauir (1979:482)

c o m m e n t e d that Sim o o n s had c o r rectly pointed out the

w e a k n e s s e s of H a rris's "narrow-minded technoenvironmental

determinism." Lodrick (1979:483) faulted Harr i s for his

" r e l u ctance to accept that re l i g i o u s beliefs can influence

b e h a v ior w i t h o u t some u n d e r l y i n g functi o n a l rationale."

Mishra (1979:484) c o n c l u d e d that "the record is

overwhelmingly against H a r r i s ' s thesis," and argued that the

cow " s i m u l t a n e o u s l y belongs to the e c o n o m i c basis and the

id e o l o g i c a l edifice of the social order" (ibid.:485).

A s s u m i n g that that last s t a tement has any propositional

content, who d i d or w o u l d ever argue o t h e rwise?

For p a r a d i g m a t i c confusion, however, no comment on

Simoons' article rivaled that of S.L. Malik:

The basic a s s u m p t i o n in the h y p o t h e s i s of

both Harris and S i m o o n s that the cow
in India is m e r e l y an eco n o m i c e n t i t y
falls short of reality. Systematic
ana l y s i s of the concept of the sacred
cow in India w o u l d have provided
evi d e n c e that the cow is e s t e e m e d in
Hindu c ulture apart from its e c onomic
a d v a n t a g e s (as d e l i n e a t e d by Harris)
and/or d i s a d v a n t a g e s (as shown by
 188

Simoons). Whe t h e r or not cows should

be s l a u g h t e r e d t h e r e f o r e depends not on
their ec o n o m i c importance, but on their
sacredness. (1979:484)

Harris never su g g e s t e d that the cow is e s t e e m e d in India for

its e c o n o m i c a d v a n t a g e s the cow is e s t e e m e d because the cow

is c o n s i d e r e d to be sacred. The q u e s t i o n Harris ad d r e s s e s

is w h v the cow is c o n s i d e r e d sacred. H a r r i s ' s basic

a s s u m p t i o n is not that the cow is mer e l y an e c o n o m i c entity,

but that the sa c r e d n e s s of the cow pr e s e r v e s and p r otects

the cow's ec o n o m i c utility. Malik's c o n t e n t i o n that the

q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r to sl a u g h t e r a cow dep e n d s upon the

s a c r e d n e s s of the cow rather than its e c o n o m i c importance

b e t r a y s a gross m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of p a r a d i g m a t i c issues as

w ell as a m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of H a r r i s ' s position. If Malik

m e a n s that individual Hindus are c onsciously m o t i v a t e d by

r e l i g ious beliefs, then he is m a k i n g a s e l f - e v i d e n t

sta t e m ent that has n o t h i n g w h a t s o e v e r to do w i t h H a r r i s ' s

analysis. But if M a l i k m e a n s that sacred cows are not

s l a u g h t e r e d bec a u s e they are sacred, then he is m a k i n g a

vacuous s t a tement w h i c h e x p l a i n s not h i n g at all.

A particularly st r i k i n g f e a t u r e of the sacred cow

c o n t r o v e r s y at this stage is the d e v e l o p m e n t of a

v i t u p e r a t i v e and strongly personal element in the debate.

C o m m e n t i n g upon Simoons' article, Palmieri (1979:485)

r e f e r r e d to Har r i s as "one of the most forceful c o n t e nders"

in the debate and charged that "Harris has t r a n s f o r m e d the

c o ntest into a . . . crusade for p o s i t i v e - f u n c t i o n e d

technoenvironmentalism." Schwartzberg (1979:489) commented

that "Harris's h o rse ought to be dead, but he r e f u s e s to let

it die." N o t i n g that Ha rris "reveals a r e m a rkable

unwillingness to learn from others m o r e k n o w l e d g e a b l e than

h i m s e lf," S c h w a r t z b e r g (ibid.) o b s e r v e d that "if anything,

Harri s's a r g u m e n t s get w o r s e w i t h the passage of time." In

his reply to his reviewers, Simoons (1979:490) cha r g e d that

H a r r i s p r events "a d i s p a s s i o n a t e exc h a n g e of ideas;" he

r e m a r ked that "many view the w r i t i n g s of a single

i nvestigator, Mar v i n Harris, as primarily r e sponsible" for

k e eping the issue clo u d e d and unresolved. One p e r c e p t i v e

reviewer, Calvin Sch w a b e (1979:488), noted the

"unnecessarily polemical pedantry of much of the d i s c u s s i o n "

and w o n d e r e d if the c ontroversy was about sacred cows or

M a r v i n Harris.

To date, the h e i g h t of folly in the sacred cow

c o n t r oversy has been reached not by ec o n o m i s t s or

g e o g r a p h e r s but by two a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s w h o have c o n ducted

e t h n o g r a p h i c f i eld re s e a r c h in India: Stanley Freed and

Ruth Freed. F r eed and Freed (1981) fo l l o w e d Simoons'

confused and m i s l e a d i n g article w i t h an emo t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n

of their own e n t i t l e d "Sacred Cows and W a t e r B u f f a l o in

India: The Uses of E t h n o g r a p h y . " Fre e d and Freed

(ibid.:489) r e v e a l e d t h e i r p a r a d i g m a t i c c o m m itment w h e n they

asked "why was the h y p o t h e s i s that rel i g i o u s se n t i m e n t is

unimportant in a f f e c t i n g behavior ever taken s e r i o u s l y ? " As

un c r i tical cultural determinists, F r eed and Freed w e r e

unable even to u n d e r s t a n d the cultural m a t e r i a l i s t ar g u m e n t

 190

about I n d i a s sacred cattle, let alone critique that

argu m e nt in a re s p o n s i b l e and p r o p ositional fashion:

The original and still principal point at

issue is whe t h e r the compos i t i o n of the
Indian cattle p o p u lation is d e t e r m i n e d
solely by t e c h n o e n v i r o n m e n t a l factors or
w h e t h e r the H i ndu belief in the sacredness
of the zebu cow is a significant independent
variable. ( i b i d . :48 3)

As Harr i s (198la:492) appropriately stated in his

c omm e n ts on the Freed and F r eed article, "this is false and

misleading." The original issue w a s w h e t h e r the taboo on

the slaughter and c o n s u m p t i o n of cattle had positive effects

for the o p e r a t i o n of the Indian cultural ecological system.

No one, least of all Harris, had ever s u g gested that the

c o m p o s i t i o n of the Indian cat t l e po p u l a t i o n w a s d e t e rmined

solely by t e c h n o e n v i r o n m e n t a l factors. Harris (ibid.)

a t t e m p t e d to make that clear to Freed and Freed, stating

that they had co m p l e t e l y m i s u n d e r s t o o d and m i s r e p r e s e n t e d

his position. In reply, Freed and Freed (1981:501) declared

that "their u n d e r s t a n d i n g of Har r i s ' s po s i t i o n is in accord

w i t h those of other w r i t e r s on the sacred cow c o n troversy."

T hat r e m a r k is whol l y u n conscionable. As scientists, Freed

and Freed h ave an o b l i g a t i o n to a ssiduously avoid appeal

to c o n sensus g e n t i u m as a source of knowledge.

After reading H a r r i s ' s comments, Freed and Freed still

did not u n d e r s t a n d the extent of their error, but they

real i z ed at least that H a r r i s o b jected to their

c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of his position. They concluded,

 191

therefore, that the diff erence must be due to some change in

H a r r i s s thinking:

If Harris now b e lieves that the position

he has s t e a d f a s t l y m a i n t a i n e d for many
y e ars is untenable, it b e hooves h i m to
present the evidence that h a s caused him
to change his m ind and accept the
in f luence of r e l igious sentiment on
cattle demography. (ibid.:501)

M o r e than f ifteen y e a r s after the deb a t e began, Freed and

F r e e d are still una w a r e that the sacred cow controversy is a

p a r a d i g m a t i c controversy. They imagine that "evidence" will

be s u fficient to sway the debate's p a r t i c i p a n t s from their

original positions. The article by F r e e d and Freed c o n t a i n s

more misrepresentations, misinter p r e t a t i o n s , distortions,

and simple mud d l e d t h i n k i n g than nearly any other

c o n t r i b u t i o n to the sacred cow controversy, yet Freed and

Freed (i b i d . :501) charge that "Harris has sown a good deal

of c o n f u s i o n c o n c e r n i n g Indian cattle."

Freed and Freed (ibid.:489) lamented the "decline in

h o l i s t i c e t h n o g r a p h y " and called for the pur s u i t of

in t ensive e t h n o g r a p h i c f i e l d w o r k to sol v e the sacred cow

controversy. "More fieldw o r k " is a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c r a l l y i n g

cry of beleag u e r e d cultural determinists. Freed and Fre e d ' s

" h o listic e t h n o g r a p h y " is an emotive symbol largely devoid

of p r o p ositional content. Predictably, the call for "more

f i e l d w o r k " strikes a re s p o n s i v e chord a m ong anthropologists,

and Freed and Freed w e r e rewarded for h a v i n g sounded the

trumpet. Bal l a r d (1981:490) ex p r e s s e d his a p p r e c i a t i o n to

F r e e d and Freed for h a v i n g been reminded that "real-life

 192

behavior is alwa y s m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l and that it is dangerous

to a t tempt any ana l y s i s or i n t e r p r e t a t i o n in the absence of

detai led e t h n o g r a p h i c information."

F r e e d and Fre e d ' s cultural determinist interpretation

of the sac r e d cow complex also re c e i v e d support. Ferreira

(1981:492) c o n c l u d e d that "the sacredness of the cow is as

imp o r tant in India as t e c h n o e n v i r o n m e n t a l factors." Mis h r a

(1981:495) d e s c r i b e d Freed and F r e e d ' s article as "yet

another blow to the cultural s y m b i o t i c or

techno-environmental do c t r i n e . " Fuller (1981:492) wrote

that "I h ave never been able to u n d e r s t a n d how anyone w h o

had s tudied in India could s e r i o u s l y hold on to the position

that H i n d u v e n e r a t i o n of the cow has no effect on Hin d u ' s

treatment, in the w i d e s t sense, of their cattle."

Several m o n t h s after the a p p e a r a n c e of Freed and

F r eed's article, S r i v astava and M a l i k (1982) suggested that

ho l i s t i c e t h n o g r a p h y might not be a p p r o p r i a t e l y applied to

the study of complex industrial societies. They argued that

the issue at stake in the sacred cow controversy was

unimportant, but they u n d e r s t o o d t hat issue to be the

d e t e r m i n a t i o n of "whether the signif i c a n c e of cattle is

econ o mic or re l i g i o u s " (ibid.:223). In reply, Freed and

Freed (1982a) substituted Srivastava and M a l i k ' s error w i t h

one of their own. The real question, according to F r eed and

Freed (ibid.:223), is "whether this r e l igious bel i e f affects

th e way that Hindus mana g e t h eir cattle." Further, they

argued, "the most effective re s p o n s e to the

technoenvironmental position is to d e m o n s t r a t e that r e ligion

 193

does have an effect upon the m a n a g e m e n t of Indian cattle"

(ibid.). The "technoenvironmental po s i t i o n " to w h i c h Freed

and F reed refer is a product of their own imaginations, and

they are guilty of havin g a b r ogated t h eir r e s p o n s i b i l i t y as

s c i e n t i s t s in c r e a t i n g it.

The latest instal l m e n t in the o n g o i n g saga of the

s acred cow c o n t r o v e r s y has been an a r t i c l e c o a u thored by

H arris (Vaidyanathan, Nair, and Harris 1982). In that

article, the authors a t t e m p t e d to d e m o n s t r a t e that regional

v a r i a t i o n s in the age, sex, and species ratios of Indian

b o v i n es (cattle and w a t e r buffalo) are primarily determined

by demographic, economic, technological, and e n v i r o n m e n t a l

factors. Vaidyanathan, Nair, and Harr i s (ibid.:365) were

careful to ass e r t that their argument "does not m ean that

r e l i g i o n has had 'no effect* . . . on the m a n a g e m e n t of

India's bovine resources." As a consequence, Freed and

F r eed (19 8 2 b : 376^ c o n c l u d e d that "Harris [now] a ppears to

h ave ac c e p t e d the fact that the Hindu belief in the sanctity

of the zebu cow does have an effect upon the m a n a g e m e n t of

c attle in Ind i a . " Obviously, not h i n g short of an

a p p r e c i a t i o n of the notion of p a r a d i g m a t i c

i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y will suffice to e n l i g h t e n Freed and

Freed. T h r o u g h o u t the course of the sacred cow controversy,

Ha r r i s has c o n s i s t e n t l y co r r e c t e d the errors of the cultural

d e t e r m i n i s t s each time those errors h ave been m a d e and each

time his eff o r t s have been to no avail. W hat Harris has

f a i l e d to do is to a p p r e c i a t e w h v his d e t r a c t o r s make the

e rrors of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n that they make. Harris made the

 194

same errors in his ana l y s i s of F o s t e r ' s concept of the Image

of L i m i t e d Good, and he did so for the same reasons.

Nevertheless, a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s should a p p r e c i a t e the

very real c o n t r i b u t i o n s that Marvin Harris and other

cultural materialists have made to our u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the

ca t t l e complex in I n d i a and to our u n d e r s t a n d i n g of food

t a b o o s in general. My remarks in this section should not be

i n t e r p r e t e d as a d e n i g r a t i o n of the r e search efforts of

c ultural m a t e rialists. The sacred cow controversy has

p rov i d ed a m ple i l l u s t r a t i o n of the m e r i t of the cultural

materialist paradigm. Harris de s e r v e s credit for hav i n g

d e m o n s t r a t e d the ada p t i v e utility of the cattle complex, for

h a v i n g id e n t i f i e d a pla u s i b l e sc e n a r i o for the origin of

that complex, and for havi n g e x p l a i n e d the reasons for the

regional variations in age and sex ratios among India's

bovines. W hat I have tried to d e m o n s t r a t e in this section,

however, is that the debate s u r r o u n d i n g India's sacred cow

has been e m o t i v e and i n e f f e c t i v e des p i t e (and, partially,

b e c ause of) the best eff o r t s of the cultural materialists.

The Sound and the Furv

If p a r a d i g m a t i c debate in a n t h r o p o l o g y is to signify

anything, a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s must lea r n how to compare and

e v a l u a te i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e paradigms. The charges and

c o u n t e r - c h a r g e s that abound in the lim i t e d good and sacred

cow d e bates m a k e no r e f erence to p a r a d i g m a t i c i s s u e s yet,

in these two debates, there are very few s u b s t a n t i v e points

 195

of contention. For the most part, the a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s who

i n i t i a t e d the debates did so merely for the op p o r t u n i t y to

p r o p a g a n d i z e on behalf of their chosen paradigms. There is

a p r o n o u n c e d l ack of propositional st a t e m e n t s in the

controversies. In each case, those w h o initiated the

d e b a t es did so w i t h o u t a complete u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the

p o s i t ion they w e r e attacking; and in each case those who

d e f e n d e d their p o s itions did so w i t h o u t reference to the

crucial concept of p a r a d i g m a t i c i n commensurability. If

a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s w i s h to consider th e m s e l v e s m e m b e r s of a

s c i e n t i f i c community, they must debate issues in a

pr o p o sitional fashion. If the issues in que s t i o n involve

incommensurable p a r a d i g m a t i c approaches, anthropologists

must conduct the debate accordingly.

Unfortunately, the style of debate c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of

the l i m i t e d good and sacred cow c o n t r o v e r s i e s is not

u n c o m m o n in c o n t e m p o r a r y anthropology. All too often,

a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s reject out of hand a n a l y s e s that have been

p r o d u c e d under the auspices of p a r adigms other than their

own. A n t h r o p o l o g i s t s h a v e personal and professional

i n v e s tments in p a r t i c u l a r research s t r a t e g i e s and p a r t icular

p att e rns of interpretation. The cr i t i c i s m s w h i c h

a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s m ake of rival p e r s p e c t i v e s often carry a

primarily emotive meaning, despite the fact that those

c r i t i c i s m s are usually ex p r e s s e d in w h a t w o u l d appear to be

p r o p o sitional form. W hat a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s really mean, very

often, is that their graduate tra i n i n g w a s worthwhile, or

that the problems they find i n t e r e s t i n g and

 196

meaningful are i n t e r e s t i n g and meaningful, or that their

c a reers have been si g n i f i c a n t and productive. I suggest,

for example, that F r e e d and F r e e d ' s c omments in the sacred

cow c ontroversy can be unders t o o d as s i g n i f y i n g little else.

Cultural determinism and cultural m a t e r i a l i s m should be

c o m p a red and evaluated, but the c o n t r o v e r s i e s s u r r o u n d i n g

the Image of L i m i t e d G ood and the sacred cow of India should

never have developed. If there is a si g n i f i c a n t research

problem in the w o r l d view of peasants, it concerns the ways

in w h i c h peasants per c e i v e and i n t erpret the w o rld and the

ways in w h ich those p e r c e p t i o n s and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s

i n fluence and d e t e r m i n e the personal id e n t i t i e s of peasants.

As such, it is a pro b l e m w h i c h could be most profitably

in v e s t i g a t e d by sym b o l i c anthropology. If anthr o p o l o g i s t s

w i s h to consider the a d a p t i v e signi f i c a n c e of India's cattle

complex, that obv i o u s l y is a p roblem w h i c h could be most

profitably a d d ressed by cultural materialism. Obviously,

too, there are asp e c t s of the w o r l d view of peasants w h i c h

could be invest i g a t e d by cultural materialists (e.g., the

external d e t e r m i n a n t s of that w o r l d view), just as there are

a s p e c t s of the Indian cattle complex w h i c h could be

i n v e s t i g a t e d by s y m b o l i c a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s (e.g., the

s i g n i ficance of the H i ndu v e n e r a t i o n of cattle for Indian

identity). In either case, however, cultural d e t e r m i n i s m

w o u l d have little to contribute. The initial que s t i o n to be

a d d r e s s e d is w h e t h e r the res e a r c h problem at hand c oncerns

the m a i n t e n a n c e of hum a n l ife or the m a i n t e n a n c e of human

 197

identity. Once that qu e s t i o n has been answered, the

appropriate p a r a d i g m can be b r o u g h t to bear.

The m a i n point of this chapter, however, has been that

science cannot be s u ccessfully p r a cticed if s c i e n t i s t s fail

to p a r t i c i p a t e in the p r o positional critique of sc i e n t i f i c

arguments. It is p a rticularly important for a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s

to fulfill their scientific obligations, because the

discipline of a n thropology has a special respo n s i b i l i t y

among the social sciences. Any scientific app r o a c h to the

h u man c o n d i t i o n must dis tin g u i s h between emic and etic

knowledge, as d i s cussed in Chapter Two. Yet a n t h r o p o l o g y is

the only social science to m ake a systematic d i s t i n c t i o n

b e t w e en t h ose two e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l perspectives.

C o nsequently, anthro p o l o g y is the only social science w h i c h

can lay c l aim to an adequate u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the h u man

condition. Since a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l accounts and e x p l a n a t i o n s

often c o nflict w i t h those of other social sciences,

a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s have an o b l i g a t i o n to critique those

c o m p e ting claims.
 EPILOGUE

How has it been possible to b e l e i v e in

the am o r a l i t y of life?
Jose Ortega y Gasset,
The Revolt JUie Masses

By way of brief summary, I have a t t e m p t e d to es t a b l i s h

four basic points in the four p r e ceding chapters: first,

that science alone a m o n g the v arious w a y s of o b t aining

kn o w l d e g e about the empirical w o r l d c o n s i s t e n t l y appeals to

responsible epistemological foundations; second, that

anthropology alone a m o n g the var i o u s social sciences

i n c o r p o r a t e s the ontological, epistemological, and

t h e o r e tical a s s u m p t i o n s necessary for an ad e q u a t e

i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the h u man condition; third, that the

co m p l e m e n t a r y p a r a d i g m s of cultural materialism and s y m b o l i c

anthropology co n s t i t u t e the best r e s e a r c h strategies

a v a i l a b l e to c o n temporary a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s for the ana l y s i s

of the human experience; and fourth, that a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l

198
 199

inquiry is o c c a s i o n a l l y conducted in an i r r e s p o n s i b l e

fashion.

I had o r i g i n a l l y intended to include two a d d i tional

c h a p t ers in an a ttempt to es t a b l i s h two additi o n a l points.

One of tnose chapters, e n titled "The Mask of S c i ence,"

d e s c r i b e d the i n t e l l e c t u a l and moral bankruptcy of popular

p s y c h ological theory; the other, en t i t l e d "The Plague of

De l u s ion," d i s c u s s e d the i n tellectual p r o s t i t u t i o n and moral

c u l p a bility of c o n t e m p o r a r y pseudoscience (e.g.,

"scientific" c r e a t i o n i s m ) . On the good advice of my

supe r visory committee, I d ecided that those c hapters w o u l d

be m o re a p p r o p r i a t e l y included in a nother book a d d r e s s e d to

a d i f ferent audience.

In the final analysis, however, I have a t t e m p t e d to

m a k e but one e s s ential point, namely that kno w l e d g e about

the human c o n d i t i o n can be sought either responsibly or

irresponsibly. As scientists, a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s h ave a

responsibility to f o r m u l a t e empiri c a l l y falsifiable

accounts, descriptions, and an a l y s e s of the human condition.

As citizens, a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s have a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to

consi d er the social and moral i m p l i c a t i o n s of their

c o n c l u sions about hum a n behavior. Other social sc i e n t i s t s

and those who pretend to be social s c i e n t i s t s share these

same responsib i l i t i e s . But the o b l i g a t i o n to seek k n o w l e d g e

about the h u man c o n d i t i o n in a r e s p o n s i b l e manner is not

r e s t r i c t e d to those who make their careers e x p l a i n i n g h u m a n

life.
 200

Everyone e v e r y w h e r e has always w a n t e d to understand

h u m a n life, and e v eryone e v e r y w h e r e has alwa y s made some

a t t e m pt to do so. The sad co n c l u s i o n of anthr o p o l o g i c a l

research is that nearly everyone does so irresponsibly.

Pe o p l e e v e r y w h e r e are content w i t h s i m p l i s t i c answers;

pe o p l e ev e r y w h e r e hold i ncons i s t e n t beliefs; people

e v e r y w h e r e regard e m o t i v e u t t e rances as propositional

statements; people e v e r y w h e r e embrace the kn o w l e d g e o b tained

by faith and revelation, even though their daily lives

p r ovide abundant e v idence to d i s c o n f i r m their beliefs.

Hum a n beings are m e a n i n g - s e e k i n g animals, but human beings .

ev i d e n c e very little concern for the source or validity of

the m e a n i n g s that they find. Cross-culturally and

panhistorically, epistemological responsibility is a rarity.

The dangers posed by e p i s t e mological irre s p o n s i b i l i t y

are not simply a c a d e m i c or intellectual. Ethos and w o r l d

view are i n terdependent: w e can only decide w h a t ought to

be the case if w e truly know w hat i s the case. An

u n r e l i a b l e w o r l d view m a kes an uns t a b l e f o u n d a t i o n for a

d e f e n s i b l e ethos. Without some shared ontolo g i c a l

a s s u m p t i o n s wit h o u t some common point of r e f e r e n c e there

can be no morality. All s o - called " m o r a l 11 issues are

actu a l ly epist e m o l o g i c a l debates. The c o ntemporary

co n t r o v e r s y over the "morality" of abo r t i o n in U.S. society,

for example, can be red u c e d first to an o n t o l ogical qu e s t i o n

"what is a human b e i n g ? " and then to an epis t e m o l o g i c a l

d i l e m m a "how can w e know?" W h a t we know about the w o r l d

depends upon how we know it.

 201

In this book, I have been explic i t l y c o n cerned w ith the

cha l l e nge of t h e o r y or, as I have called it in other

contexts, the c h a llenge of e p i s t e m o l o g y , or the challenge of

philosophy, or the c h a llenge of science. All of these, in

the end, are simply aspects of the c h a llenge of life. To my

mind, the truly v a l u a b l e people are those w h o are

reflective, discerning, discriminating, skeptical, and

self-honest. Life may be an in s o l u b l e puzzle, but if we are

to make any claims to dignity, nobility, courage, or

integrity, we must make a responsible attempt to solve that

puzzle. I hold the u n s t a r t l i n g and unoriginal yet profound

c o n v i c t i o n that human beings are re s p o n s i b l e for their

actions, and I hold m u c h of c o n temporary social science

r e s p o n s i b l e for havi n g implied otherwise.

One final word. The a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l app r o a c h is not

the be all and end all of r e s p o n s i b l e inquiry. Anthro p o l o g y

is not the key to the puzzle of life, and I w o u l d not want

to be u n d e r s t o o d as hav i n g su g g e s t e d that it was. My

co n cern in this book has been simply to de m o n s t r a t e that the

anthropological app r o a c h is uniquely and p r e - e m i n e n t l y

valuable among all of the social s c i e ntific and

p s e u d o s c i e n t i f i c alternatives. Sound a n t h r o pological

i n v e s t igation may be a su ffic i e n t c o n dition for insight into

the human condition, but it is hardly a necessary condition.

Science is progressive; even the best a n t h r o p ological

d e s c r i p t i o n s and an a l y s e s are likely to be eventually

su p p l a nted by more incisive accounts. For that reason, I

su s pect that good philosophy and good l i t e r a t u r e will last

far lo nger than good anthropology.

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 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Mr. Lett w a s born of A m e r i c a n parents a b r o a d in

AugSDurg, Germany, in 1955. He traveled e x t e n s i v e l y

t h r o u g h o u t his childhood, l i v i n g overseas for over four

years (in France and Pakistan). He r e c e i v e d a Bac h e l o r of

A r t s in anthropology from t h e College of W i l l i a m and Mary in

Virginia in 1977 > and a Mast e r of Arts in a n t h r o p o l o g y from

the U niversity of Florida in 1980. He has conducted

anthropological re s e a r c h in the British V i r g i n Islands and

the Bahamas.

221
 I certify that I have read this study and that in my
o p inion it con f o r m s to a c c e p t a b l e standards of scholarly
p r e s e n t a t i o n and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as
a d i s s e r t a t i o n for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

T h e r o n N u n e z , cfi air man

A s s o c i a t e Professor of/
Anthropology v

I certify that I have read this study and that in my

o p inion it con f o r m s to a c c e p t a b l e standards of scholarly
p r e s e n t a t i o n and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as
a d i s s e r t a t i o n for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Charles W a g l e y </
G r a d u a t e Re s e a r c h Professor
of A n t h r o p o l o g y

I certify that I have read this study and that in my

o p i nion it c o nforms to a c c e p t a b l e standards of scholarly
p r e s e n t a t i o n and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as
a d i s s e r t a t i o n for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

M a r v i n Harris "
G r a d u a t e Res e a r c h Professor
of A n thropology
 I certify that I have read this study and that in my
o p i n i o n it conforms to a c c e p t a b l e standards of scholarly
p r e s e n t a t i o n and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as
a d i s s e r t a t i o n for the degree

Ro'be/#'lawless
As s o c i a t e P r o fessor of
An t h r o p o l o g y

I certify that I have read this study and that in my

o p i n i on it c o nforms to ac c e p t a b l e standards of scholarly
p r e s e n t a t i o n and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as
a d i s s e r t a t i o n for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Y y McCoy *
A s s o c i a t e P r o f e s s o r of
Latin Ame r i c a n Studies

T his d i s s e r t a t i o n was su b m i t t e d to the G r a d u a t e Faculty of

the D e p a r t m e n t of A n t h r o p o l o g y in the College of Liberal
Arts and S c i e n c e s and to the G r a d u a t e Council, and was
a c c e p ted as partial f u l f i llment of the r e q u i r e m e n t s for the
d egree of Doctor of Philosophy.

April 1983 Dean for G r a d u a t e Studies

and R esearch