I.

Key Concepts of the Torrens System

a. Decree Binds the Land, Sec. 31 PD 1529

CALALANG VS REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY G.R. 76265, April 22, 1992

FACTS:

Amando Clemente owns Lot 671-A as evidenced by a transfer of certificate. He later converted it
into a subdivision named Clemville Subdivision. The petitioners of this case are the buyers and
occupants of portions of the said lot. The other petitioner, Virginia Calalang alleged that she is
the registered owner of a portion of Lot 671-A as evidenced by TCTs. She only came to know of
INKs claim when she a prospective buyer of a portion of the land saw "no trespassing" sign. She
inquired on the status of the land and learned that it has a pending consulta case filed before
the Administrator of the Naitonal Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA).
This consulta case arise when the Register of Deeds found that there are two sets of titles issued
on the same land to different owners. Lot 671-A is actually a part of Lot 671 which is owned by
Iglesia ni Kristo (INK) who claimed to have bought it from Lucia dela Cruz in 1975. INK began
fencing the whole area and placed the sign "NO TRESPASSING IGLESIA NI KRISTO PROPERTY
SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 61969, July 25, 1984." Case 61969 was a case that upheld the
validity of the sale between Lucia dela Cruz and INK.

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the dela Cruz case (Case no 61969) should apply to this case to
determine the validity of the titles of the petitioners.

RULING: YES.
The dela Cruz case was already final when it was decided upon by the Supreme Court on July 25,
1984. That issue of ownership in that case has been resolved already and the principle of res
judicata should be applied. Even if the parties were not the parties in such case, they cannot
claim that they were never notified of that the case was pending. Amando Clemente was never a
registered owner of the land because his predecessors-in-interest have lost their rights over that
land when the lot was sold to Lucia dela Cruz in 1943. The sale to Lucia dela Cruz was valid and
the registration the lot under her name in the Primary Book of the Registry of Deeds was a
constructive notice to the whole world. And even if they claim that Clemente, their predecessor,
has a title, the same cannot be preferred over Lucias since Clementes title was issued in 1951.

ISSUE 2: Whether or not the title of Lucia dela Cruz over the land has become indefeasible and
incontrovertible.

RULING:
YES. INK was issued a Torrens Title over the lot as a result of the sale in 1975. The actions
instituted by the petitioners took place in 1986. Under the Torrens System of registration, the
Torrens Title became indefeasible and incontrovertible one year from its final decree of
registration. A Torrens Title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land
referred to therein. It is, therefore, too late in the day for the petitioners to reopen or question
1

the legality of INK's title over Lot 671 at this time. September 30, 1927
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G.R. No. 76265 April 22, 1992
VIRGINIA CALALANG, petitioner, vs. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, ADMINISTRATOR OF
NATIONAL LAND TITLES AND DEEDS REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATION, LUCIA DE LA CRUZ,
CONSTANCIO SIMANGAN and IGLESIA NI KRISTO, respondents.

G.R. No. 83280 April 22, 1992

AUGUSTO M. DE LEON, JOSE M. DE CASTRO, JOSE A. PANLILEO, FELICIDAD VERGARA VDA. DE
PINEDA, FERNANDO L. VITUG I, FERNANDO M. VITUG II, FERNANDO M. VITUG III, FAUSTINO
TOBIA, ELENA M. OSTREA and FELISA C. CRISTOBAL-GENEROSO, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT
OF APPEALS and BISHOP ERAO MANALO, respondents.

Facts:
The subject of controversy in these two consolidated petitions is a parcel of land Lot 671-A
located in Diliman. The petitioners are individual lot owners who claim to have bought their
respective portions from Amando Clemente in the 1950's. Clemente is alleged to be the
registered owner of said land who converted it into a subdivision known as Clemville
Subdivision.

Lot 671-A is actually part of a bigger parcel known as Lot 671 which is claimed by respondent
Iglesia ni Kristo (INK), which bought said property from Lucia dela Cruz in 1975. Dela Cruz was
adjudged the rightful owner of Lot 671 in the case of dela Cruz v. dela Cruz (130 SCRA 666
[1984]). This previous case of case of dela Cruz v. dela Cruz was an action for reconveyance
founded on breach of trust filed by Augustina dela Cruz, et al. against Lucia dela Cruz and INK. In
this case, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the sale of Lucia to the INK and the title of
INK to the subject realty (Lot 671) was validated as well. This decision spawned the 2
consolidated cases at bar:

In G.R. No. 76265, Calalang alleged that she is the registered owner of a portion of Lot 671-A as
evidenced by TCT Nos. 17556, 17564 and 17562. She allegedly came to know of INK'S claim only
when a prospective buyer inspected the land on August 1986 and saw the "no trespassing" sign
placed by INK.

In G.R. No. 83280, the petitioners alleged that they and/or their predecessors in interest were
issued their corresponding titles to the lots purchased from Amando Clemente in the 1950's.
They alleged that they took physical possession of their lots in Clemville Subdivision by actually
occupying the same, declaring them in their names for tax purposes, fencing or marking them
off and entrusting their care to "katiwalas". From the time they acquired their Torrens Title they
and they alone to the exclusion of INK exercised all acts of undisturbed, peaceful and
uninterrupted ownership and possession including the payment of their realty taxes.

In August 1985, INK started to enclose the entire Clemville Subdivision with sawali fences with
billboards randomly posted with NO TRESPASSING. INK also destroyed the concrete/hollow block
fence surrounding the lot of petitioner de Castro and started the construction of housing
structures therein. At the same time, it commenced the delivery of construction materials to the
2

former premises of petitioner Panlilio to erect permanent structures of strong materials on it.
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Petitioners filed for a petition for injunction with damages. RTC granted it; the judge issued a
restraining order and set the case for hearing the writ of preliminary injunction. Their prayer for
injunction has been denied in both RTC and CA.

Issue:
Whether or not the ruling in the dela Cruz case should also apply to the petitioners.

Ruling:
Consolidated petitions were dismissed for lack of merit.

The petitioners argue that the dela Cruz case could not be applied to them since they were not
parties in that case nor were they ever notified of such case pending between the parties. The
petitioners explained that the de la Cruz case was a case among the heirs of Policarpio de la
Cruz. Since they acquired their properties from an entirely different person, Amando Clemente
and not from any of the heirs of Policarpio de la Cruz, they could not be considered privies to any
of them.
With the Court's ruling promulgated in 1984, petitioners cannot raise anew the question of
ownership of Lucia dela Cruz over Lot 671 which had been determined by the Court of Appeals
and affirmed by the Supreme Court in the dela Cruz case. Well-settled is the rule enunciated in
Church Assistance Program, Inc. v. Sibulo, 171 SCRA 408 [1989] that: When a right or fact has
been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains
unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or
estate.

The Court's ruling has long been final and the issue on ownership of Lot 671 finally disposed of
several years ago. This declaration must be respected and followed in the instant case applying
the principle of res judicata or, otherwise, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment. Inevitably, the
dela Cruz ruling should be applied to the present petitions since the facts on which such decision
was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before us now. Even the petitioners
substantially adopt the same findings of facts in their pleadings. The factual inquiry with regards
to the history of Lot 671 has already been laid to rest and may no longer be disturbed.

Upon reviewing the facts of the dela Cruz case, there is no mention of Amando Clemente. A
closer perusal of the records in G. R. 76265 would, however, reveal that TCT No. 16212 was
issued for Lot 671-A in the name of Amando Clemente on August 9, 1951. Amando Clemente's
TCT No. 16212 emanated from TCT No. 40355 in the name of Eugenia de la Paz and Dorotea dela
Cruz. Thus, Amando Clemente's predecessors-in-interest are Eugenia dela Paz and Dorotea dela
Cruz whom the Court found to have lost their rights over Lot 671 by virtue of the sale made to
Lucia dela Cruz.

It is undisputed that Lot 671 was sold to Lucia dela Cruz by Eugenia dela Paz and Dorotea dela
Cruz as evidenced by Entry No. 258, page 7, Vol. 7, Primary Entry Book of the Registry of Deeds
of Manila. The sale of the land to Lucia dela Cruz and the subsequent registration thereof in the
Primary Book of the Registry of Deeds, Manila constitutes constructive notice to the whole
world. Since it is the act of registration which transfers ownership of the land sold, Lot 671 was
already owned by Lucia dela Cruz as early as 1943. The fact that Amando Clemente possessed a
certificate of title does not necessarily make him the true owner. And not being the owner, he
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cannot transmit any right to nor transfer any title or interest over the land conveyed.
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Moreover, the petition for reconstitution of title by Lucia dela Cruz which the court held to be
valid was a proceeding in rem. It is well established that in rem proceedings such as land
registration constitute constructive notice to the whole world. The petitioners cannot now claim
that they were not notified of the reconstitution proceedings over said lot, hence, the title in the
name of Lucia dela has become indefeasible and incontrovertible. Likewise, the INK was also
issued a Torrens Title over Lot 671 as a result of the sale made to it by the rightful owner, Lucia
dela Cruz in 1975. Under the Torrens System of registration, the Torrens Title became
indefeasible and incontrovertible one year from its final decree. It is, therefore, too late in the
day for the petitioners to reopen or question the legality of INK's title over Lot 671 at this time.

To reopen or to question the legality of INK's title would defeat the purpose of our Torrens
system which seeks to insure stability by quieting titled lands and putting to a stop forever any
question of the legality of the registration in the certificate or questions which may arise
therefrom.

In view of all the foregoing, it would be for the public interest and the maintenance of the
integrity and stability of the Torrens system of land registration that all transfer certificates of
title derived from the reconstituted title of Eugenia dela Paz and Dorotea dela Cruz be annulled
in order to prevent the proliferation of derivative titles which are null and void. The legality or
validity of INK's title over Lot 671 has been settled.
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b. Owners Duplicate Certificate Section 41
REYES VS RAVAL-REYES G.R. No. L-21703, August 31, 1966

MATEO H. REYES and JUAN H. REYES, petitioners and appellants, vs. MATEO RAVAL REYES,
respondent and appellee.

Facts: This case is a direct appeal from CFI Ilocos Norte on pure questions of law in its in its
Cadastral Cases Nos. 31, L. R. C. Rec. No. 1188, and 42, L. R. C. Rec. No. 1994.

Three brothers , Mateo H, Juan H, and Francisco H (all surnamed Reyes) are the registered
owners of several parcels of land covered by OCT Title No. 22161 (Lots Nos. 15891, 15896,
15902 and 15912, of Laoag Cadastre) and OCT Title No. 8066 (Lots Nos. 20481 and 20484, of the
same cadastral cases). These titles, both issued in ROD Ilocos Norte, were issued pursuant to a
decree of registration, dated 31 May 1940.

On 17 July 1962, petitioners Mateo H. Reyes and Juan H. Reyes filed a motion for issuance of
writs of possession over all the lots covered by both Certificates of Title above referred to.

Respondent Mateo Raval Reyes opposed the motion, admitting that he is only in possession of
the lots covered by OCT No. 22161, but denying that he possesses the lots covered by OCT No.
8066; however, he claimed that he has been in, and is entitled to, the possession thereof (i.e.,
Lots Nos. 20481 and 20484), having acquired by way of absolute sale (not recorded) from
petitioners' brother, Francisco H. Reyes, the latter's undivided one-third (1/3) share, interest and
participation to these disputed lots.

On December 20, 1962, the court a quo issued, after due hearing, the writ of possession with
respect to Lot Nos. 15891 and 15896. On January 7, 1963, such writ was amended (upon
petitioners MR) to include all the other lots covered by both titles. Respondent did not appeal.

On January 15, 1963, petitioners commenced, on the same court, an ordinary civil action seeking
to recover the products of the disputed lots, or their value, and moral damages against
respondent Mateo Raval Reyes, as defendant. This case was docketed as its Civil Case No. 3659.

Mateo Raval Reyes answered the complaint and pleaded a counterclaim for partition of all the
disputed lots, alleging the same ground he had heretofore raised in his answer and/or
opposition to the motion for issuance of writ of possession alleging he is their (plaintiffs') co-
owner.

Pending trial of Civil Case No. 3659, petitioners presented, on February 25, 1963, in the cadastral
cases aforementioned, a motion to compel respondent Mateo Raval Reyes to surrender and
deliver to them the owners' duplicates of Original Certificates of Title Nos. 22161 and 8066.

The court a quo denied petitioners' motion, on the ground that the parcels of land covered by
both titles are subjects of litigation in Civil Case No. 3659 and the same has not yet been decided
5

on the merits by it. The motion for consideration was likewise denied, hence, appeal was sought
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directly to SC.
Petitioners contend that since the subject matter of Civil Case No. 3659 are not the lots covered
by the titles in question but their products or value, and moral damages, these lots are not in
litigation in this ordinary civil case; and that since respondent had already raised the issue of
ownership and possession of these lots in his opposition to the petitioners' motion for issuance
of writ of possession and without any appeal being taken, respondent is barred and estopped
from raising the same issue in the ordinary civil case, under the principle of res judicata.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners have a better right to the possession or custody of the
disputed owners' duplicates of certificates of title.

Ruling: The Court sees no valid and plausible reason to justify the withholding from the
registered owners, such as the petitioners-appellants herein, the custody and possession of the
owners' duplicates of certificates of title.

Citing an old jurisprudence (El Director de Terrenos contra Abacahin 72 Phil. 326), the Court has
held that the owner of the land in whose favor and in whose name said land is registered and
inscribed in the certificate of title has a more preferential right to the possession of the owners'
duplicate than one whose name does not appear in the certificate and has yet to establish his
right to the possession thereto.

It being undisputed that respondent had already availed of an independent civil action to
recover his alleged co-owner's share in the disputed lots by filing a counterclaim for partition in
said Civil Case No. 3659, his rights appear to be amply protected; and considering that he may
also avail of, to better protect his rights thereto, the provision on notice of lis pendens under
Section 24, Rule 14, of the Revised Rules of Court, for the purpose of recording the fact that the
lots covered by the titles in question are litigated in said Civil Case No. 3659, we again see no
justifiable reason for respondent to retain the custody of the owners' duplicates of certificates of
titles.

Wherefore, respondent Mateo Raval Reyes was ordered to deliver to petitioners the owners'
duplicates of Original Certificates of Title No. 22161 and 8066.

ABRIGO VS. DE VERA G.R. 154409, June 21, 2004

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Spouses NOEL and JULIE ABRIGO, petitioners, vs. ROMANA DE VERA, respondent.

Facts: On May 27, 1993, Gloria Villafania sold a house and lot located at Banaoang, Mangaldan,
Pangasinan (covered by a Tax Declaration) to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go. The
said sale became a subject of a suit for annulment of documents between the vendor and the
vendees.

On December 7, 1993, the parties enetered into a Compromise Agreement (duly approved by
RTC) that Gloria Villafania was given one year from the date of the Compromise Agreement to
buy back the house and lot, and failure to do so would mean that the previous sale in favor of
Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go shall remain valid and binding and the plaintiff shall
voluntarily vacate the premises without need of any demand. Later on, Gloria Villafania failed to
buy back the house and lot, so the [vendees] declared the lot in their name.

Unknown however to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, Gloria Villafania obtained a
free patent over the parcel of land involved [on March 15, 1988 as evidenced by OCT No. P-
30522]. The said free patent was later on cancelled by TCT No. 212598 on April 11, 1996.

On October 16, 1997, Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, sold the house and lot to the
Petitioner-Spouses Noel and Julie Abrigo.

On October 23, 1997, Gloria Villafania sold the same house and lot to Romana de Vera. Romana
de Vera registered the sale and as a consequence, TCT No. 22515 was issued in her name.

On November 12, 1997, Romana de Vera filed an action for Forcible Entry and Damages
petitioner spouses before the MTC of Mangaldan, Pangasinan. On February 25, 1998, De Vera
and Spouses Abrigo agreed that neither of them can physically take possession of the property in
question until the instant case is terminated. Hence the ejectment case was dismissed.

Thus, on November 21, 1997, Spouses Abrigo filed In RTC Dagugan for the annulment of
documents, injunction, preliminary injunction, restraining order and damages against Gloria
Villafania. After the trial on the merits, the lower court rendered a decision awarding the
properties to Spouses Abrigo as well as damages. Moreover, Gloria Villafania was ordered to pay
Spouses Abrigo and De Vera damages and attorneys fees. Spouses Abrigo and De Vera both
appealed.

The CA dismissed the appeal of Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo and found no sufficient basis to award
them moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

The appeal of De Vera was likewise dismissed. CA held that a void title could not give rise to a
valid one hence, it dismissed the appeal of Romana de Vera. Since Gloria Villafania had already
transferred ownership to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, the subsequent sale to De
Vera was deemed void. Upon MR of De Vera, CA amended its Decision finding Respondent De
Vera to be a purchaser in good faith and for value. The appellate court ruled that she had relied
in good faith on the Torrens title of her vendor and must thus be protected.
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Issue: Whether or not Spouses Abrigo has a better to the property.

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Ruling: Petition has no merit.

The present case involves what in legal contemplation was a double sale. Article 1544 of the Civil
Code provides a double sale of immovables transfers ownership to (1) the first registrant in good
faith; (2) then, the first possessor in good faith; and (3) finally, the buyer who in good faith
presents the oldest title. There is no ambiguity in the application of this law with respect to lands
registered under the Torrens system.
This principle is in full accord with Section 51 of PD 152914 which provides that no deed,
mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument -- except a will -- purporting to convey or affect
registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land until its registration. Thus, if the
sale is not registered, it is binding only between the seller and the buyer but it does not affect
innocent third persons.
In the instant case, both Petitioners Abrigo and respondent registered the sale of the property.
Since neither petitioner spouses nor their predecessors (Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go) knew that
the property was covered by the Torrens system, they registered their respective sales under Act
3344. For her part, respondent registered the transaction under the Torrens system because,
during the sale, Villafania had presented the transfer certificate of title (TCT) covering the
property.

Respondent De Vera contends that her registration under the Torrens system should prevail over
that of petitioners who recorded theirs under Act 3344. De Vera relies on the following insight of
Justice Edgardo L. Paras:

"x x x If the land is registered under the Land Registration Act (and has therefore a Torrens Title),
and it is sold but the subsequent sale is registered not under the Land Registration Act but under
Act 3344, as amended, such sale is not considered REGISTERED, as the term is used under Art.
1544 x x x."

We agree with respondent. It is undisputed that Villafania had been issued a free patent. The
OCT was later cancelled by TCT No. 212598, also in Villafanias name. As a consequence of the
sale, TCT No. 212598 was subsequently cancelled and TCT No. 22515 thereafter issued to
respondent De Vera.

Soriano v. Heirs of Magali held that registration must be done in the proper registry in order to
bind the land. Since the property in dispute in the present case was already registered under the
Torrens system, petitioners registration of the sale under Act 3344 was not effective for
purposes of Article 1544 of the Civil Code. Petitioners cannot validly argue that they were
fraudulently misled into believing that the property was unregistered. A Torrens title, once
registered, serves as a notice to the whole world. All persons must take notice, and no one can
plead ignorance of the registration.
Moreover, the Supreme Court highlighted that Article 1544 requires the second buyer to acquire
the immovable in good faith and to register it in good faith. Mere registration of title is not
enough; good faith must concur with the registration.

Equally important, under Section 44 of PD 1529, every registered owner receiving a certificate of
title pursuant to a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land
8

taking such certificate for value and in good faith shall hold the same free from all
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encumbrances, except those noted and enumerated in the certificate. Following this principle,
this Court has consistently held as regards registered land that a purchaser in good faith acquires
a good title as against all the transferees thereof whose rights are not recorded in the Registry of
Deeds at the time of the sale.

SC agreed with CA that respondent was an innocent purchaser for value. Its factual findings
revealed that respondent is in good faith: In CA decision, it explained that she testified clearly
and positively, without any contrary evidence presented by the [petitioners], that she did not
know anything about the earlier sale and claim of the spouses Abrigo, until after she had bought
the same, and only then when she bought the same, and only then when she brought an
ejectment case with the MTC. To De Vera, the only legal truth upon which she had to rely was
that the land is registered in the name of Gloria Villafania, her vendor, and that her title under
the law, is absolute and indefeasible.

REPUBLIC VS MENDOZA, G.R. 185091, August 8, 2010

This case is about the propriety of filing an ejectment suit against the Government for its failure
to acquire ownership of a privately owned property that it had long used as a school site and to
pay just compensation for it.

The Facts and the Case

Paninsingin Primary School (PPS) is a public school operated by petitioner Republic of the
Philippines (the Republic) through the Department of Education. PPS has been using 1,149
square meters of land in Lipa City, Batangas since 1957 for its school. But the property, a portion
of Lots 1923 and 1925, were registered in the name of respondents Primo and Maria Mendoza
(the Mendozas) under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) T-11410.[1]

On March 27, 1962 the Mendozas caused Lots 1923 and 1925 to be consolidated and subdivided
into four lots, as follows:

Lot 1 292 square meters in favor of Claudia Dimayuga

Lot 2 292 square meters in favor of the Mendozas
Lot 3 543 square meters in favor of Gervacio Ronquillo; and
Lot 4 1,149 square meters in favor of the City Government of Lipa[2]

As a result of subdivision, the Register of Deeds partially cancelled TCT T-11410 and issued new
titles for Lots 1 and 3 in favor of Dimayuga and Ronquillo, respectively. Lot 2 remained in the
name of the Mendozas but no new title was issued in the name of the City Government of Lipa
for Lot 4.[3] Meantime, PPS remained in possession of the property.

The Republic claimed that, while no title was issued in the name of the City Government of Lipa,
9

the Mendozas had relinquished to it their right over the school lot as evidenced by the
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consolidation and subdivision plan. Further, the property had long been tax-declared in the
name of the City Government and PPS built significant, permanent improvements on the same.
These improvements had also been tax-declared.[4]

The Mendozas claim, on the other hand, that although PPS sought permission from them to use
the property as a school site, they never relinquished their right to it. They allowed PPS to
occupy the property since they had no need for it at that time. Thus, it has remained registered
in their name under the original title, TCT T-11410, which had only been partially cancelled.

On November 6, 1998 the Mendozas wrote PPS, demanding that it vacate the disputed property.
[5] When PPS declined to do so, on January 12, 1999 the Mendozas filed a complaint with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Lipa City in Civil Case 0002-99 against PPS for unlawful
detainer with application for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction.[6]

On July 13, 1999 the MTCC rendered a decision, dismissing the complaint on ground of the
Republics immunity from suit.[7] The Mendozas appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Lipa City which ruled that the Republics consent was not necessary since the action before the
MTCC was not against it.[8]
In light of the RTCs decision, the Mendozas filed with the MTCC a motion to render judgment in
the case before it.[9] The MTCC denied the motion, however, saying that jurisdiction over the
case had passed to the RTC upon appeal.[10] Later, the RTC remanded the case back to the
MTCC,[11] which then dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence.[12] Consequently, the
Mendozas once again appealed to the RTC in Civil Case 2001-0236.

On June 27, 2006 the RTC found in favor of the Mendozas and ordered PPS to vacate the
property. It held that the Mendozas had the better right of possession since they were its
registered owners. PPS, on the other hand, could not produce any document to prove the
transfer of ownership of the land in its favor.[13] PPS moved for reconsideration, but the RTC
denied it.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the RTC decision to the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 96604 on the grounds that: (1) the Mendozas were barred by
laches from recovering possession of the school lot; (2) sufficient evidence showed that the
Mendozas relinquished ownership of the subject lot to the City Government of Lipa City for use
as school; and (3) Lot 4, Pcs-5019 has long been declared in the name of the City Government
since 1957 for taxation purposes.[14]

In a decision dated February 26, 2008, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.[15] Upholding the
Torrens system, it emphasized the indefeasibility of the Mendozas registered title and the
imprescriptible nature of their right to eject any person occupying the property. The CA held
that, this being the case, the Republics possession of the property through PPS should be
deemed merely a tolerated one that could not ripen into ownership.

The CA also rejected the Republics claim of ownership since it presented no documentary
evidence to prove the transfer of the property in favor of the government.Moreover, even
10

assuming that the Mendozas relinquished their right to the property in 1957 in the governments
favor, the latter never took steps to have the title to the property issued in its name or have its
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right as owner annotated on the Mendozas title. The CA held that, by its omissions, the Republic
may be held in estoppel to claim that the Mendozaswere barred by laches from bringing its
action.

With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, the Republic has taken recourse to this Court
via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

The Issue Presented

The issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in holding that the Mendozas were entitled
to evict the Republic from the subject property that it had used for a public school.

The Courts Ruling

A decree of registration is conclusive upon all persons, including the Government of the Republic
and all its branches, whether or not mentioned by name in the application for registration or its
notice.[16] Indeed, title to the land, once registered, is imprescriptible.[17] No one may acquire
it from the registered owner by adverse, open, and notorious possession.[18] Thus, to a
registered owner under the Torrens system, the right to recover possession of the registered
property is equally imprescriptible since possession is a mere consequence of ownership.

Here, the existence and genuineness of the Mendozas title over the property has not been
disputed. While the consolidation and subdivision plan of Lots 1923 and 1925 shows that a 1,149
square meter lot had been designated to the City Government, the Republic itself admits that no
new title was issued to it or to any of its subdivisions for the portion that PPS had been
occupying since 1957.[19]

That the City Government of Lipa tax-declared the property and its improvements in its name
cannot defeat the Mendozas title. This Court has allowed tax declarations to stand as proof of
ownership only in the absence of a certificate of title.[20] Otherwise, they have little evidentiary
weight as proof of ownership.[21]

The CA erred, however, in ordering the eviction of PPS from the property that it had held as
government school site for more than 50 years. The evidence on record shows that the
Mendozas intended to cede the property to the City Government of Lipa permanently. In fact,
they allowed the city to declare the property in its name for tax purposes.And when they sought
in 1962 to have the bigger lot subdivided into four, the Mendozas earmarked Lot 4, containing
1,149 square meters, for the City Government of Lipa.Under the circumstances, it may be
assumed that the Mendozas agreed to transfer ownership of the land to the government,
whether to the City Government of Lipa or to the Republic, way back but never got around to do
so and the Republic itself altogether forgot about it. Consequently, the Republic should be
deemed entitled to possession pending the Mendozas formal transfer of ownership to it upon
payment of just compensation.
The Court holds that, where the owner agrees voluntarily to the taking of his property by the
government for public use, he thereby waives his right to the institution of a formal
expropriation proceeding covering such property. Further, as the Court also held in Eusebio v.
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Luis,[22] the failure for a long time of the owner to question the lack of expropriation
proceedings covering a property that the government had taken constitutes a waiver of his right
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 to gain back possession. The Mendozas remedy is an action for the payment of just
compensation, not ejectment.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[23] the Court affirmed the RTCs power to
award just compensation even in the absence of a proper expropriation proceeding. It held that
the RTC can determine just compensation based on the evidence presented before it in an
ordinary civil action for recovery of possession of property or its value and damages. As to the
time when just compensation should be fixed, it is settled that where property was taken
without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and its owner filed an action for recovery of
possession before the commencement of expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the
property at the time of taking that is controlling.[24]

Since the MTCC did not have jurisdiction either to evict the Republic from the land it had taken
for public use or to hear and adjudicate the Mendozas right to just compensation for it, the CA
should have ordered the complaint for unlawful detainer dismissed without prejudice to their
filing a proper action for recovery of such compensation.

WHEREFORE, the Court partially GRANTS the petition, REVERSES the February 26, 2008 decision
and the October 20, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 96604, and ORDERS the
dismissal of respondents Primo and Maria Mendozas action for eviction before the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities of Lipa City in Civil Case 0002-99 without prejudice to their filing an action for
payment of just compensation against the Republic of the Philippines or, when appropriate,
against the City of Lipa.

c. Statement of Personal Circumstances Section 45

12

LITAM VS ESPIRITU G.R. No. L-7644, November 27, 1956

Page
Facts:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CFI of RIzal. On April 24, 1952, Gregorio Dy Tam filed a
petition stating that the petitioner is the son of Rafael Litam and the deceased was survived by 8
children by a marriage celebrated in China in 1911 with Sia Khin, that after the death of Rafael
Litam, petitioner and his co-heirs came to know that the decedent had contracted in the
Philippines another marriage with Marcosa Rivera, that the decedent left as his property among
others 1/2 share in the purported conjugal properties between him and Marcosa Rivera and that
the decedent left neither will nor debt. Petitioner prayed that after appropriate proceedings,
letters of administration be issued to Marcosa Rivera.

Marcosa Rivera filed a counter-petition substantially denying the alleged marriage of the
decedent to Sia Khin as well as the alleged filiation of the persons named in the petition,
asserting that the properties described are her paraphernal properties and praying that her
nephew, Arminio Rivera, be appointed administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased.

The Court granted Marcosa Riveras petition and Arminio assumed as administrator of the
estate. He submitted an inventory of the alleged estate of Rafael Litam and said inventory did
not include the properties mentioned in the petition of Gregorio Dy Tam in April 1952. Gregorio,
on November 1952, filed a motion for the removal of Arminio Rivera as administrator of the
aforementioned estate. Meanwhile, Remedios Espiritu was appointed as guardian of Marcosa
who was declared incompetent. Gregorio Dy Tam filed Civil Case No. 2071 of the same court
against Espirity and Arminio Rivera. He reproduced substatially the allegations made in his
petition in April 1952 stating that the properties in dispute are conjugal and are more than those
specified in the inventory.
The trial court dismissed CivilCase No. 2071. Hence the appeal.

Issue:
Are appellants the legitimate children of Rafael Litam?
Is Marcosa Rivera the exclusive owner of the properties in question or do the same constitute a
common property of her and the decedent?

Ruling:
SC said the appellants failed to prove their alleged status as children of Rafael Litam by marriage
with Sia Khin. It appears from the evidence presented by the defendants that there was no such
marriage between Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and that the plaintiffs named are not children of the
deceased. The various official and public documents executed by Rafael Litam himself
convincingly show that he had not contracted any marriage with any person other than Marcosa
Rivera, and that he had no child. In the marraige certificate, it was clearly stated that he was
single when he married Marcosa Rivera. In the sworn application for alien certificate or
registration, Rafael Litam unequivocably declared under oath that he had no child.

Petitioner did not present in evidence the marriage certificate of Rafael Litam and Sia Khin,
which in the opinion of the Court is the competent and vest evidence of the alleged marriage
between them. No explanation has been given for the non-presentation of said marriage
certificate, nor has there been any showing of its loss.
13

It is therefore the finding of this Court that the Plaintiffs named in Civil Case No. 2071 are not
heirs of the said decedent, his only heir being his surviving wife.
Page
Appellants maintain that Rafael Litam was guilty of the crime of Bigamy, that he had willfully and
maliciously falsified public and official documents and that although appellants and Sia Khin
were living in Manila and Marcosa Rivera, the decedent had succeeded for 30 years in keeping
each party in complete ignorance of the nature of his alleged relations with the other. The Court
said the same cannot be sustained unless the evidence in support thereof is of the strongest
possible kind, not only because it entails the commission by Rafael Lita of grave criminal offenses
which are derogatory to his honor, but also beecause death has sealed his lips, thus depriving
him of the most effective means of defense. The proof for the appellants herein does not satisfy
the requirement.

It has been established by the evidence that the properties in question were bought by Marcosa
Rivera with her separate and exclusive money. Great importance should be given to the
documentary evidence. Rafael declared under oath that the money paid by Marcosa Rivera for
the properties were her exclusive and separate money. It was also acknowledge by Rafael that
he had not given any money to his wife, and that they have actually adopted a system of
separation of property, each of them not having any interest or participation whatsoever in the
property of the other. These declarations and admission of the fact made by Rafael Litam against
his interest are binding upon him, his heirs and successors in interests and third persons as well.

The properties having been bought by Marcosa with her separate and exclusive money is further
strengthened by the fact that, as it is clearly disclosed by the evidence when Marcosa was
married to Rafael in 1922, she was already rich. It also appears that she was born of a rich family.
On the other hand, it appears from the evidence that when Rafael married Marcosa, he was
poor.

Another circumstance which clearly proves that the properties in question belong exclusively to
Marcosa is the established fact that before she became incompetent, she has been
administering said properties to the exclusion of Rafael. In fact, she alone leased the properties
in question and the corresponding lease contract was signed by her as lessor. Furthermore, the
properties in question have been declared in the name or Marcosa Rivera alone, and she alone
pays the real estate taxes due thereon.
Further strong proofs that the properties in question are the paraphernal properties of Marcosa
Rivea , are the very Torrens Title covering said properties. All the said properties are registered in
the name of Marcosa Rivera, married to Rafael Litam. This circumstance indicates that the
properties in question belong to the registered owner, Marcosa Rivera, as her paraphernal
properties, for if they were conjugal, the titles covering the same should have been issued in the
names of Rafael Litam and Marcosa Rivera. The words married to Rafael Litam written after
the name of Marcosa Rivera, in each of the titles are merely descriptive of the civil status of
Marcosa Rivera, the registered owner of the properties covered by the said titles.

The disputable presumption of law that the properties acquired during the marriage are conjugal
properties, upon which legal presumption said Plaintiffs and Petitioner mainly rely has been
decisively overcome by the overwhelming preponderance of evidence adduced in these cases
that the properties in question are the paraphernal properties of Marcosa Rivera.
14

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed.

Page
PARULAN VS GARCIA G.R. 184148, June 9, 2014

Topic: Succession, Successional rights

Principle:
It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of death. Article 777
of the New Civil Code provides that "[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent." In Butte v. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., we proclaimed the
fundamental tenets of succession:

The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's death is basic in our Civil Code,
and is supported by other related articles. Thus, the capacity of the heir is determined as of the
time the decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed as of the same moment (Art.
908), and so is the in officiousness of the donation inter vivas (Art. 771). Similarly, the legacies of
credit and remission are valid only in the amount due and outstanding at the death of the
testator (Art. 935), and the fruits accruing after that instant are deemed to pertain to the legatee
(Art. 948).

Facts:
In a Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of Property, the respondents Rosario
CalalangGarcia, Leonora CalalangSabile, and Carlito S. Calalang asserted their ownership over a
certain parcel of land against the petitioners Nora B. CalalangParulan and Elvira B. Calalang. The
said lot was allegedly acquired by the respondents from their mother Encarnacion Silverio,
through succession as the latters compulsory heirs.
According to the respondents, their father, Pedro Calalang contracted two marriages during his
lifetime. The first marriage was with their mother Encarnacion Silverio. During the subsistence of
this marriage, their parents acquired the abovementioned parcel of land from their maternal
grandmother Francisca Silverio. Despite enjoying continuous possession of the land, however,
their parents failed to register the same. On June 7, 1942, the first marriage was dissolved with
the death of Encarnacion Silverio.
On November 6, 1967, Pedro Calalang entered into a second marriage with Elvira B. Calalang
who then gave birth to Nora B. CalalangParulan and Rolando Calalang. According to the
respondents, it was only during this time that Pedro Calalang filed an application for free patent
over the parcel of land with the Bureau of Lands.
On February 17, 1984, Pedro Calalang sold the said parcel of land to Nora B. CalalangParulan.
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 283321 was issued in the name of Nora B. CalalangParulan.
On December 27, 1989,7 Pedro Calalang died.
The respondents assailed the validity of TCT No. 283321 arguing that the sale of the land was
void because Pedro Calalang failed to obtain the consent of the respondents who were co
owners of the same.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondents were deprived of their respective shares by reason of the sale.

Ruling:
15

No. It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of death. Article
777 of the New Civil Code provides that "[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the
Page
moment of the death of the decedent." In Butte v. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., we proclaimed the
fundamental tenets of succession:
The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's death is basic in our Civil Code,
and is supported by other related articles. Thus, the capacity of the heir is determined as of the
time the decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed as of the same moment (Art.
908), and so is the in officiousness of the donation inter vivas (Art. 771). Similarly, the legacies of
credit and remission are valid only in the amount due and outstanding at the death of the
testator (Art. 935), and the fruits accruing after that instant are deemed to pertain to the legatee
(Art. 948).
Thus, it is only upon the death of Pedro Calalang on December 27, 1989 that his heirs acquired
their respective inheritances, entitling them to their pro indiviso shares to his whole estate. At
the time of the sale of the disputed property, the rights to the succession were not yet bestowed
upon the heirs of Pedro Calalang. And absent clear and convincing evidence that the sale was
fraudulent or not duly supported by valuable consideration (in effect an in officious donation
inter vivas), the respondents have no right to question the sale of the disputed property on the
ground that their father deprived them of their respective shares. Well to remember, fraud must
be established by clear and convincing evidence. Mere preponderance of evidence is not even
adequate to prove fraud.20 The Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of Property
must therefore be dismissed.

BORROMEO VS DESCALLAR G.R. 159310, Feb. 4, 2009

16

FACTS:
Page
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, met respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar. They fell in love and
live together. They bought a house and lot and an Absolute Deed of Sale was issued in their
names. However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for registration, it was refused
on the ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public
domain. Consequently, his name was erased but his signature remained and the property was
issued on the name of the Respondent alone. However their relationship did not last long and
they found new love.

Jambrich met the petitioner who was engaged in business. Jambrich indebted the petitioner for
a sum of money and to pay his debt, he sold some of his properties to the petitioner and a Deed
of Absolute Sale/Assignment was issued in his favor. However, when the Petitioner sought to
register the deed of assignment it found out that said land was registered in the name of
Respondent. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of real property.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Jambrich has no title to the properties in question and may not transfer and
assign any rights and interest in favor of the petitioner?

2. Whether or not the registration of the properties in the name of respondents make his the
owner thereof.

RULINGS:

1. The evidence clearly shows that as between respondent and Jambrich, it was Jambrich who
possesses the financial capacity to acquire the properties in dispute. At the time of the
acquisition of the properties, Jamrich was the source of funds used to purchase the three parcels
of land, and to construct the house. Jambrich was the owner of the properties in question, but
his name was deleted in the Deed of Absolute Sale because of legal constraints. Nevertheless,
his signature remained in the deed of sale where he signed as a buyer. Thus, Jambrich has all
authority to transfer all his rights, interest and participation over the subject properties to
petitioner by virtue of Deed of Assignment. Furthermore, the fact that the disputed properties
were acquired during the couples cohabitation does not help the respondent. The rule of co-
ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage, but otherwise capacitated to marry each other does not apply.
At the case at bar, respondent was still legally married to another when she and Jambrich lived
together. In such an adulterous relationship and no co-ownership exists between the parties. It is
necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of
property in order to able to lay claim to any portion of it.

2. It is settled rule that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of
confirming the existence with notice to the world at large. The mere possession of a title does
not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles
17

of the disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make
her the owner.
Page
 FACTS:
Petitioner appealed the reversal by the CA of the trial courts ruling in his favor which declared
the titles of respondent as null and void.

Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, and respondent fell in love and decided to live together.
Eventually, however, they went their separate ways as respondent found a new boyfriend while
Jambrich began to live with another woman. Jambrich met petitioner who was engaged in the
real estate business and built and repaired speedboats as a hobby. Jambrich purchased an
engine and some accessories for his boat from petitioner, for which he became indebted to the
latter. To pay for his debt, he sold his rights and interests in the Agro-Macro properties to
petitioner as evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment." When petitioner sought to
register the deed of assignment, he discovered that titles to the three lots have been transferred
in the name of respondent, and that the subject property has already been mortgaged.

Petitioner imputes error on the judgment of the CA for holding that Jambrich has no title to the
titles in question and may not therefore transfer and assign any rights or interests in favor of the
petitioner.

ISSUE:
Having found that the true buyer of the disputed house and lots was the Austrian Wilhelm
Jambrich, what now is the effect of registration of the properties in the name of respondent?

HELD:
In the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich,
who is an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed
the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. While the acquisition and the purchase by
Wilhelm Jambrich of the properties under litigation were void ab initio since they were contrary
to the Constitution of the Philippines, the acquisition of these properties by plaintiff who is a
Filipino citizen from him, has cured the flaw in the original transaction and the title of the
transferee is valid. As the property in dispute is already in the hands of a qualified person, a
Filipino citizen, there would be no more public policy to be protected. The objective of the
constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.

VENTURA VS. ABUDA GR 202932, October 23, 2013

18Page

EDILBERTO U. VENTURA JR.,Petitioner,v. SPOUSES PAULINO and EVANGELINE ABUDA,Respondents.

FACTS:

In 1952, Socorro and Crispin were married where they had a son Edilberto Sr. who was married to Leonora.
Edilberto Sr. and Leonora are the parents of herein petitioner Edilberto Jr. (Edilberto). In 1980, Socorro married
Esteban even if she had a subsisting marriage with Crispin. Esteban on the other hand was also married before
but the same was dissolved by virtue of the death of his previous wife. Esteban had a daughter named
Evangeline.

Sometime in 1968, Esteban purchased a portion of lot in Tondo, Manila, while the remaining portion was
purchased by Evangeline on her fathers behalf (Vitas Property). In 1978, Esteban and Evangeline also had small
business establishments located in Delpan st. Tondo (Delpan Property). When Esteban was diagnosed with colon
cancer, he decided to sell the properties to Evangeline.

Esteban passed away on September 1997, while Socorro on July 1999. When Leonora, petitioners mother
discovered the sale sometime in 2000, they filed a petition for annulment of the sale, claiming that petitioner is
entitled to a right or interest over the properties purchased by Esteban. . Respondents, on the other hand,
argued that because of Socorros prior marriage to Crispin, her subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and
void. Thus, neither Socorro nor her heirs can claim any right or interest over the properties purchased by Esteban
and respondents.

RTC ruled in favor of respondents, ruling that Vitas and Delpan properties were not conjugal properties of
Socorro and Esteban. CA affirmed the decision, applying Article 148 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to any right or interest over the subject properties

HELD: No. CA decision sustained

Civil Law -in unions between a man and a woman who are incapacitated to marry each other, the ownership
over the properties acquired during the subsistence of that relationship shall be based on the actual contribution
of the parties
19

It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in
order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not
Page

apply.
This is a reiteration of Article 148 of the Family Code, which the CA applied in the assailed decision:

Art 148. In cases of cohabitation wherein the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and Delpan properties can be considered common property if: (1)
these were acquired during the cohabitation of Esteban and Socorro; and (2) there is evidence that the
properties were acquired through the parties actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry.

Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering the Vitas property shows that the parcel of land is co-owned
by Esteban and Socorro because: (1) the Transfer Certificate of Title was issued on 11 December 1980, or several
months after the parties were married; and (2) title to the land was issued to "Esteban Abletes, of legal age,
married to Socorro Torres."

The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban alone. The phrase "married to Socorro Torres"
is merely descriptive of his civil status, and does not show that Socorro co-owned the property.The evidence on
record also shows that Esteban acquired ownership over the Vitas property prior to his marriage to Socorro,
even if the certificate of title was issued after the celebration of the marriage. Registration under the Torrens title
system merely confirms, and does not vest title.

Edilberto claims that Esteban s actual contribution to the purchase of the Delpan property was not sufficiently
proven since Evangeline shouldered some of the amortizations.Thus, the law presumes that Esteban and Socorro
jointly contributed to the acquisition of the Delpan property.

Civil Law - Art. 1238. Payment made by a third person who does not intend to be reimbursed by the debtor is
deemed to be a donation, which requires the debtor s consent. But the payment is in any case valid as to the
creditor who has accepted it.

Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of her father, and the parties intended that the Delpan property
would be owned by and registered under the name of Esteban.
20 Page
d. Registered Land Not Subject to Prescription Section 47

SUPAPO VS DE JESUS G.R. 198356, April 20, 2015

FACTS:
The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint for accion publiciana against Roberto and Susan de Jesus
with the MeTC of Caloocan City. The complaint sought to compel the respondents to vacate a
piece of land located in Novaliches, Quezon City, and registered under petitioners name. The
land has an assessed value of Php39,980.00. Petitioners did not reside on the lot but made sure
to visit at least twice a year.

During one of their visits, they saw two houses built on the lot without their knowledge and
permission. They learned that respondents occupied both houses. They demanded the
surrender of the lot by bringing the dispute before the appropriate Lupong Tagapamayapa. The
Lupon issued a certificate to file action for failure of the parties to settle amicably.

The Spouses Supapo filed a criminal case against the respondents for violating PD No. 772 (Anti-
Squatting Law). The trial court convicted the respondents. On appeal, the CA dismissed the case
because Congress enacted R.A. No. 8368 repealing the Anti-Squatting Law. Notwithstanding the
dismissal, the Spouses Supapo moved for the execution of the respondents civil liability, praying
that the latter vacate the subject lot. The RTC granted the motion and issued the writ of
execution. Respondents moved to quash it but the RTC denied their motion. They filed with the
CA a petition for certiorari. The CA granted it and ruled that with the repeal of the Anti-Squatting
Law, the criminal and civil liabilities of respondents were extinguished, but it also said that
recourse may be had in court by filing the proper action for recovery of possession. Thus, the
Spouses Supapo filed the complaint for accion publiciana.

After filing their Answer, the respondents moved to set their affirmative defenses for preliminary
hearing and argued that there is another action pending between the same parties, the
complaint is barred by statute of limitations, and the petitioners cause of action is barred by
prior judgment.

The MeTC denied the motion to set the affirmative defenses for preliminary hearing. The RTC
granted the petition for certiorari of respondents because the action has prescribed and accion
publiciana falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. It likewise denied the motion for
reconsideration of petitioners. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision; hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction.
2. Whether or not the cause of action has prescribed.
3. Whether or not the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by res judicata.

HELD:
21

1. YES. Under BP 129, the jurisdiction of the RTC over actions involving title to or possession of
real property is plenary. However, R.A. No. 7691 granted the MeTC, MTC, and MCTC the
Page

exclusive original jurisdiction to hear actions where the assessed value of the property does not
exceed Php20,000 ot Php50,000 if the property is located in Metro Manila. Jurisdiction over
actions involving title to or possession of real property is now determined by its assessed value.
It is its fair market value multiplied by the assessment level.

In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value of the subject lot
located in Metro Manila is Php39,980. Thus, the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the
complaint for accion publiciana.

2. NO. Lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Even it
be supposed that the holders of the Torrens Title were aware of the other persons occupation
of the property, regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to
demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or
merely tolerated.

3. NO. Res judicata is not present in the case because:

a. First, there is no identity of parties. The criminal complaint was prosecuted in the name of the
People of the Philippines. The accion publiciana was filed in the name of the Spouses Supapo.
b. There is no identity of subject matter. The criminal case involves the prosecution of a crime
under the Anti-Squatting Law while the accion publiciana is an action to recover possession of
the subject property.
c. There is no identity of causes of action. The People of the Philippines filed the case to protect
governmental interests, while the spouses filed the accion publiciana to protect their proprietary
interests.
PETITION GRANTED.

CABRERA VS CA, G.R. 108547, 267 SCRA 339, FEB 3, 1997

FACTS:

In 1950, a parcel of unregistered land which was owned in common by Daniel, Albertana and
Felicidad Teokemian, having inherited the same from their late father, Domingo Teokemian, was
sold to Andres Orais wherein Felicidad was not able to sign in the Deed of Sale.

In 1957, Virgilia Orais, daughter of the vendee issued Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title
over the said property.

In 1972, the one-third share of Felicidad Teokemian in her possession was sold to espouses Elano
and Felicidad Cabrera who immediately took possession of it.

In 1988, Virgilia Orais filed a civil case for quieting of title against Felicidad Teokemian and
Felicidad Cabrera.
22

On April 27, 1989, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of defendants against the plaintiff,
ruling that the latter can no longer recover the portion of land occupied by the former due to
Page

laches.
The Court of Appeals reversed such findings upon appeal on the justification that the
defendants action for reconveyance based on an implied trust had already been barred by
prescription and that the action of the plaintiffs is not barred by laches because what was sold to
the Cabreras was a definite portion of the community property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action of the plaintiffs is barred by laches.

HELD: YES.
The argument that laches does not apply because what was sold to the Cabreras was a definite
portion of the community property, and, therefore, void, is untenable.
Under Article 493 of the Civil Code:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and even he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Undisputed is the fact that since the sale of the two-third portion of the subject property to the
plaintiff, the latter had allowed Felicidad Teokemian to occupy that one-third portion allotted to
her. There has, therefore, been a partial partition, where the transferees of an undivided portion
of the land allowed a co-owner of the property to occupy a definite portion thereof and has not
disturbed the same, for a period too long to be ignored--the possessor is in a better condition or
right.

FELICIDAD VDA. DE CABRERA et.al. vs. CA

Facts:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals. Felicidad Vda. de Cabrera and Marykane Cabrera was ordered to vacate the portion of
Lot 2238 occupied by them and surrender possession thereof to plaintiff, as ordered by the CA
adverse from what the RTC had decided which is reconveyance of the said parcel of land to
Felicidad.
These are their prayers:
xxx WHEREFORE, this Honorable Court, after due notice and hearing on the merits of this case;
to issue order or orders;

1. Finding the defendants as the rightful, lawful, and legal owner of that portion which was sold
to them by Felicidad Teokemian and which was included in the title of plaintiff;

2. To find that the plaintiff did not own the said portion and that they have personal knowledge
of the same when the plaintiff filed and secured the title under the Administrative Proceeding;

3. Finding that the plaintiff is only holding the title to that portion only in an implied trust in
23

favor of the real owner;

Page
4. Finding the plaintiff legally obligated to cause the segregation of the portion at their expense
and deliver formally the said portion to the real owners, the defendants.

5. To order the plaintiff to execute, prepare and or make any instrument or document to finally
vest in the Defendants absolute, clear and flawless title or ownership over the portion which the
plaintiff holds title in trust in defendants favor. Xxx

The respondent court held that such a petition has been barred by laches due to inaction for
more than thirty years. An act by Felicidad though as stated: the registration of the plaintiffs
title over the subject property was fraudulent insofar as it involved the one-third interest of
Felicidad Teokemian who did not sign the Deed of Sale in favor of plaintiffs predecessor-in-
interest and, therefore, the latter held that portion as a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit
of Felicidad, pursuant to Art. 1456 of the Civil Code. Needless to state, these conclusions, being
matters of fact, are entitled to our full affirmation, since they are congruent with the findings of
the trial court.

Issue: WON Felicidad could not have recovered the land due to laches.

Held:
The right of the defendants for reconveyance of the subject property arising from an implied
trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code is material to the instant case, such remedy has not yet
lapsed, as erroneously submitted by the plaintiffs, and, is thus, a bar to the plaintiffs action. In
the case of Heirs of Jose Olviga vs. Court of Appeals, we observed that an action for
reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years,
the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of
the certificate of title over the property, but this rule applies onlywhen the plaintiff or the person
enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property, since if a person claiming to be the
owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, as the defendant is in the instant case, the
right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not
prescribe. The reason for this is that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming
to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before
taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession
gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the
nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be
claimed only by one who is in possession.

As it is, before the period of prescription may start, it must be shown that (a) the trustee has
performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; (b)
such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust; and, (c) the
evidence thereon is clear and positive.

In the case at bar, the defendant Felicidad Teokemian, and thereafter, the Cabreras, were in
actual possession of the property since it was left to Felicidad Teokemian by her father in 1941,
which possession had not been interrupted, despite the sale of the two-third portion thereof to
the plaintiff in 1950, and the latters procurement of a Certificate of Title over the subject
24

property in 1957. Until the institution of the present action in 1988, plaintiffs, likewise, have not
displayed any unequivocal act of repudiation, which could be considered as an assertion of
Page

adverse interest from the defendants, which satisfies the above-quoted requisites. Thus, it
 cannot be argued that the right of reconveyance on the part of the defendants, and its use as
defense in the present suit, has been lost by prescription.

Undisputed is the fact that since the sale of the two-third portion of the subject property to the
plaintiff, the latter had allowed Felicidad Teokemian to occupy that one-third portion allotted to
her. There has, therefore, been a partial partition, where the transferees of an undivided portion
of the land allowed a co-owner of the property to occupy a definite portion thereof and has not
disturbed the same, for a period too long to be ignored--the possessor is in a better condition or
right (Potior est conditio possidentis).

Clearly, the plaintiff in this instance is barred from asserting her alleged right over the portion
subject matter in the instant case on the ground that their right has been lost by laches.

TIONGCO VS TIONGCO, G.R. 161360, Oct. 19, 2011

FACTS

Matilde, Jose, Vicente, and Felipe, all surnamed Tiongco, were born to Atanacio and Maria Luis Tiongco. Together
they were known as the Heirs of Maria Luis de Tiongco.

The present dispute involves three parcels of land all located in Iloilo City. The lots were registered in the names
of Matilde, Jose, Vicente, and Felipe, and in the name of Heirs of Maria Luis de Tiongco.

While all of the Heirs of Maria Luis de Tiongco have died, they were survived by their children and descendants.
Among the legitimate children of Jose were petitioner and Carmelo Tiongco, the father of respondent Jose B.
Tiongco.

Sometime in 1965, petitioner built her house on one lot and sustained herself by collecting rentals from the
tenants of the other lots. In 1968, petitioner, as one of the heirs of Jose, filed an adverse claim affecting all the
rights, interest and participation of her deceased father on the disputed lots, but the adverse claim was
annotated only on the certificate of title covering two lots.
25

In 1983, respondent Jose prohibited petitioner from collecting rentals from the tenants. In December 1983,
respondent Jose filed a suit for recovery of possession with preliminary injunction against several tenants
Page

wherein he obtained a judgment in his favor. Respondent Jose also filed a case for unlawful detainer with
damages against petitioner as she was staying on the first lot. While the RTC, Branch 33, of Iloilo City ruled in
respondent Joses favor, the CA reversed the RTCs decision and ruled in favor of petitioner. As such, respondent
Jose never took possession of the properties. However, Jose averred that he has been paying real property taxes
on the said properties for more than ten (10) years and that petitioner collected rentals only because he allowed
her.

In 1988, when petitioner inquired at the Office of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City, she discovered that
respondent Jose had already executed an Affidavit of Adjudication dated April 17, 1974, declaring that he is the
only surviving heir of the registered owners and adjudicating unto himself all three lots. Consequently, the
Register of Deeds of Iloilo City issued transfer certificate of titles all in the name of respondent Jose.

Based on the records with the Register of Deeds, it also appears that on May 10, 1974, the same day when the
TCTs were issued, respondent Jose sold the said lots to Catalino Torre. Certificates of title were also issued in the
name of Catalino Torre. The former then sold the properties to Antonio Doronila, Jr., and back again to Jose.

ISSUE

Whether or not petitioner has a better right over the properties.

RULING

Yes.

The Court agrees with the CAs disquisition that an action for reconveyance can indeed be barred by prescription.
In a long line of cases decided by this Court, we ruled that an action for reconveyance based on implied or
constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten (10) years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the
property.

However, there is an exception to this rule. There is but one instance when prescription cannot be invoked in an
action for reconveyance, that is, when the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed. The exception
was based on the theory that registration proceedings could not be used as a shield for fraud or for enriching a
26

person at the expense of another.

Page
Prescription does not run against the plaintiff in actual possession of the disputed land because such plaintiff has
a right to wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is questioned before initiating an action to vindicate his
right. His undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to determine
the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his title. The Court held that where the plaintiff
in an action for reconveyance remains in possession of the subject land, the action for reconveyance becomes in
effect an action to quiet title to property, which is not subject to prescription.

In this case, petitioners possession was disturbed in 1983 when respondent Jose filed a case for recovery of
possession. The RTC of Iloilo City ruled in respondent Joses favor but the CA on November 28, 1991, during the
pendency of the present controversy with the court a quo, ruled in favor of petitioner. Petitioner never lost
possession of the said properties, and as such, she is in a position to file the complaint with the court a quo to
protect her rights and clear whatever doubts has been cast on her title by the issuance of TCTs in respondent
Joses name.

e. Certificate of Title Not Subject to Collateral Attack Section 48

TAPARUC VS VDA DE MENDE G.R. 152007, 512 SCRA 97, JAN. 22, 2007

Under consideration is this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to nullify
and set aside the following issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 64548, to
wit:

1. Decision[1] dated September 21, 2001, affirming an earlier decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Tagbilaran City, Branch 47, in an action for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of
Sale, Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (8585) T-4767 and all Subsequent
Documents and Damages, thereat commenced by the herein petitioners against the
respondents; and

2. Resolution[2] dated January 23, 2002, denying the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.

The petition embodies an alternative prayer for this Court to remand the case to the trial court
for the presentation of an expert witness.

The facts:

On September 19, 1996, in the RTC of Tagbilaran City, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Deed of Sale, Cancellation of TCT No. (8585) T-4767 and all Subsequent Documents and
27

Damages[3] was filed by the petitioners against respondents Carmelita Loquellano Vda. de
Page

Mende, the Heirs of Evans B. Mende, and the Register of Deeds of the City of Tagbilaran. Thereat
docketed as Civil Case No. 5970 and raffled to Branch 47 of the court, the Complaint alleges that
petitioners Procopio Tapuroc and all the successors-in-interest of deceased co-owner Antonia
Ebe are the co-owners, co-heirs and/or descendants of the original owners of a parcel of land
with an area of 5,795 square meters, more or less, situated in the Barrio (now District) of Booy,
Tagbilaran, Bohol and previously covered by TCT No. 3444; that sometime in 1992, when the
petitioners decided to partition the subject property, they discovered from the Office of the City
Assessor that the title covering the land was already in the name of a certain Evans Mende by
virtue of a Deed of Sale purportedly executed in favor of the latter by their predecessors-in-
interest on December 30, 1967; that said Deed of Sale is a forged document because the alleged
vendors therein, who were Procopio Tapuroc and the predecessors-in-interest of the other
petitioners, did not sign the conveying deed nor receive any consideration therefor; and that one
of the alleged vendors, Antonia Ebe, had already passed away in 1960, or long before the
purported Deed of Sale was said to have been executed in 1967. Petitioners, as plaintiffs, thus
pray for the nullification of the same Deed of Sale, the cancellation of the title issued pursuant
thereto in the name of Evans Mende and the restoration of the previous title in their names, plus
damages.
In their Answer,[4] the respondent Mendes, as defendants, denied the material allegations of
the Complaint and averred that the late Evans Mende, husband of respondent Carmelita
Loquellano Vda. de Mende and father of the herein co-respondents, bought the subject parcel of
land from its previous owners on December 12, 1967 as evidenced by a Deed of Sale duly
notarized by Atty. Rodolfo Yap. They further assert that they had been in open, continuous, and
peaceful possession of the land in question from the time of said sale, and had been religiously
paying the realty taxes due thereon. By way of affirmative defense, the respondents assert that
petitioners cause of action, if any, had already prescribed in view of the unreasonable delay in
filing the suit in court, let alone the fact that their (respondents) title has become indefeasible.

On June 7, 1999, after due proceedings, the trial court came out with its decision[5] finding that
the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs (now petitioners) was insufficient to establish their claim
that the questioned Deed of Sale was a forgery. The court explained that despite the opportunity
given them, the plaintiffs failed to present a handwriting expert to determine whether the said
Deed of Sale was indeed a forged instrument, adding that laches had already set in because of
plaintiffs inaction and neglect in questioning the supposed forged character of the document
after the lapse of more than twenty-nine (29) years from the time of its execution. Accordingly,
the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the Complaint, thus:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint

for lack of merit. No compensation for damages, moral, exemplary and litigation expenses is
awarded for failure of plaintiffs (sic) to prove by preponderance of evidence the existence of
malice or bad faith in filing the instant case.

SO ORDERED.

From the adverse decision of the trial court, the petitioners went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R.
28

CV No. 64548, faulting the court of origin in ruling that they failed to present convincing
evidence to prove the fact of forgery in the execution of the assailed Deed of Sale. They likewise
Page

faulted the lower court in denying their motion to have the original copy of the Deed of Sale in
dispute and their own Special Power of Attorney containing the genuine signatures of their
predecessors-in-interest, be examined by a handwriting expert.

As stated at the outset hereof, the appellate court, in its Decision[6] of September 21, 2001,
dismissed the petitioners appeal and affirmed that of the trial court. Their motion for
reconsideration having been denied by the CA in its Resolution[7] of January 23, 2002, the
petitioners are now with this Court via the instant recourse on their main submission that -

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DISMISSED THE
APPEAL OF THE PETITIONERS DESPITE SUFFICIENCY OF SUPPORTING EVIDENCE TO WARRANT A
FAVORABLE JUDGMENT ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONERS,

and presenting for our resolution the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE DEED OF SALE ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED ON DECEMBER 30, 1967 BETWEEN
THE PETITIONERS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST AND THE RESPONDENTS IS VALID.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS CONTRADICTED ITSELF AND ARRIVED AT A
CONCLUSION CONTRARY TO THE RECORDS, LAW AND THE APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE.

The recourse must fail.

As it is, the petitioners call for a review of the facts of the case. This is evident from the pleadings
they filed with this Court. In their main petition[8] and Memorandum,[9] the petitioners
emphatically state:

The issue in the case at bar boils down to whether or not the signatures of the petitioners
predecessors-in-interest and Procopio Tapuroc (the only surviving vendor to the alleged deed of
sale) were forged; and if they were, is the declaration of nullity of the said deed of sale dated
December 13, 1967 is proper (sic).

Clearly, the foregoing statement calls for a determination of the truth or falsehood of an alleged
fact, a matter not for this Court to resolve. Well-settled is the rule that factual questions may not
be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
is explicit. It reads:

SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
29

judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional
Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a
Page
verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which
must be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis supplied)

Evident it is from the above that the function of the Court in petitions for review on certiorari is
limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts. And, as a
matter of sound practice and procedure, the Court defers and accords finality to the factual
findings of trial courts, more so when, as here, such findings are undisturbed by the appellate
court. This factual determination, as a matter of long and sound appellate practice, deserves
great weight and shall not be disturbed on appeal, save only for the most compelling reasons,
[10] such as when that determination is clearly without evidentiary support or when grave abuse
of discretion has been committed.[11] This is as it should be since the Court, in petitions for
review of CA decisions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, usually limits its inquiry only to
questions of law. Stated otherwise, it is not the function of the Court to analyze and weigh all
over again the evidence or premises supportive of the factual holdings of lower courts.[12] The
Court refrains from further scrutiny of factual findings of trial courts, more so when those
findings are affirmed by the CA, as here. To do otherwise would defeat the very essence of Rule
45 and would convert the Court into a trier of facts, which it is not meant to be.[13]
What is more, it appears undisputed that the assailed Deed of Sale is a public document, having
been duly notarized by a certain Atty. Rodolfo Yap who, unfortunately, had already passed away.
Being a notarial instrument, the deed in question is a public document and as such enjoys the
presumption of regularity in its execution. To overthrow that presumption, sufficient, clear and
convincing evidence is required, otherwise the document should be upheld.[14]

Petitioners maintain, however, that by merely examining the signatures in the questioned Deed
of Sale and the genuine signatures of their predecessors-in-interest in their Special Power of
Attorney, the glaring dissimilarities between the two sets of signatures are immediately evident
to support their claim of forgery.

We are not convinced.

As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed. It must be proved by clear, positive and convincing
evidence. Mere allegation of forgery is not evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party
alleging it.[15] Here, the petitioners failed to discharge their burden.

As it were, the petitioners merely alleged that they filed two motions before the trial court to
have the original copy of the documents in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tagbilaran City
be examined by handwriting experts but their motions were ignored by the trial court. They then
harp on the excuse that they could not be expected to prove forgery if the trial court denied
them the opportunity to do so.

We are not persuaded.

The trial court correctly ruled that the parties themselves dictate the course and flow of the
presentation of evidence, as well as the witnesses for each side. Considering that the case before
it is civil, not criminal, the lower court certainly cannot, on its own, issue an order requiring a
handwriting expert to appear before it and compare the documents presented by the parties. It
30

behooves upon the parties themselves to call forth their own set of witnesses and present their
own evidence to bolster their respective claims. If the petitioners failed to present an expert
Page
witness, only themselves ought to be blamed. For, as the trial court itself pointed out in its
decision:
x x x. Plaintiffs, despite the opportunity given them by this Court, failed to present a handwriting
expert to determine whether there was indeed forgery in the execution of the subject Deed of
Sale. In the absence of the testimony of the handwriting expert, the allegations of forgery by the
plaintiffs is merely self-serving. Unfortunately, this Court is not in the position to assess or
evaluate the differences and similarities in the questioned signatures, much less, categorically
state whether or not forgery exists. Neither could this court rely on the observation of the
plaintiffs as to the alleged glaring differences and dissimilarities of the questioned signatures.
(Underscoring ours)

Moreover, the technical procedure utilized by handwriting experts, while usually helpful in the
examination of forged documents, is not mandatory or indispensable to the examination or
comparison of handwritings.[16]

In Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations of the United Presbyterian

Church in the USA,[17] the Court identified and explained the factors involved in the
examination and comparison of handwritings:

xxx [T]he authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general
characteristics, similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. Dissimilarities as regards
spontaneity, rhythm, pressure of the pen, loops in the strokes, signs of stops, shades, etc., that
may be found between the questioned signatures and the genuine one are not decisive on the
question of the formers authenticity. The result of examinations of questioned handwriting, even
with the benefit of aid of experts and scientific instruments, is, at best, inconclusive. There are
other factors that must be taken into consideration. The position of the writer, the condition of
the surface on which the paper where the questioned signature is written is placed, his state of
mind, feelings and nerves, and the kind of pen and/or paper used, play an important role on the
general appearance of the signature. Unless, therefore, there is, in a given case, absolute
absence, or manifest dearth, of direct or circumstantial competent evidence on the character of
the questioned handwriting, much weight should not be given to characteristic similarities, or
dissimilarities, between that questioned handwriting and an authentic one.

And to determine forgery, the Court in Cesar v. Sandiganbayan[18] (quoting Osborn, The
Problem of Proof) wrote:

The process of identification, therefore, must include the determination of the extent, kind, and
significance of this resemblance as well as of the variation. It then becomes necessary to
determine whether the variation is due to the operation of a different personality, or is only the
expected and inevitable variation found in the genuine writing of the same writer. It is also
necessary to decide whether the resemblance is the result of a more or less skillful imitation, or
is the habitual and characteristic resemblance which naturally appears in a genuine handwriting.
When these two questions are correctly answered the whole problem of identification is solved.
31

In the present case, all that the petitioners had to offer by way of evidence on the issue of
Page

forgery was their bare denial that their predecessors-in-interest signed the subject Deed of Sale.
Such denial will not suffice to overcome the presumption of regularity of notarized documents,
to overthrow which, the countervailing evidence must be clear, convincing and more than
merely preponderant.[19]

Moreover, and as aptly pointed out by the lower court in its decision of June 7, 1999:

However, even if it were true that the signature of Antonia Ebe is forged, it cannot brush aside
the fact that all the heirs of Antonia Ebe, namely: Celedonia Putong, Eufemio Putong, Gregorio
Putong and Mariano Putong all signed in the Deed of Absolute Sale. As earlier discussed their
signatures cannot be said to have been forged as evidence presented to prove the same is found
to be insufficient. Henceforth, all the rightful heirs who could question the subject sale are
themselves signatories of the supposed questionable transaction.

Meanwhile, granting that Procopio Tapurocs signature found on Exh. C is indeed a forgery, he
testified in open court that he discovered the sale and the fact of Mendes possession of the
subject land in 1967 yet and did not do anything about it.

At the other end of the spectrum, the respondents presented sufficient proof of their claim of
ownership over the property in dispute. The respondent Mendes maintain that they had been in
continuous, peaceful and open possession of the property since 1967, the year of the alleged
sale, or for more than thirty (30) years now. No less than the petitioners themselves
acknowledged this in their pleadings[20] before this Court. And beginning the year 1968, the
respondents have been religiously paying the realty taxes due on the same property. Likewise,
when TCT No. 3444 was lost, respondent Carmelita Loquellano Vda. de Mende filed a petition
for judicial reconstitution to secure a second owners copy of the lost title. Said petition went
through the proper procedure and thereafter Carmelita was issued a second owners copy of TCT
No. 3444 which was later changed to TCT No. (8585) T-4767.

All told, we find that the petitioners, who initiated in the court of origin the basic complaint in
this case, have not sufficiently met the burden of proof to sustain their cause. Additionally, we
agree with the CA in ruling that laches had barred the petitioners:

xxx The records show that they [petitioners] did not institute any action against the order of the
then Court of First Instance, 14th Judiciary District. Their inaction and failure to assert any right,
if any, over the disputed lot, bars them from recovering the same as said failure clearly asserts to
laches.

Not to be overlooked is the fact that the petitioners filed their complaint of declaration of nullity
only after twenty-nine (29) years from the execution of the alleged forged deed of sale. In the
meanwhile, title to the property had already been in the name of respondent Mendes since
1967. The Mendes had been in open, continuous and peaceful possession of the subject land,
and had been religiously paying the realty taxes due thereon. These are hard facts that ought not
to be disregarded. The Court, in a long line of cases,[21] has uniformly held in favor of the
32

registered owner who had been in possession of a disputed property for a considerable period
of time. With the Mendes possession in this case having been in the concept of an owner and
Page

the land itself registered in their names for more than thirty (30) years now, their title thereto
had become indefeasible and their possession could no longer be disturbed. The petitioners
failure to take the necessary steps to assert their alleged right for at least twenty-nine (29) years
from date of registration of title is fatal to their cause of action on the ground of laches.

As a final note, we emphasize that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The question
on the validity of a Torrens title, whether fraudulently issued or not, can be raised only in an
action expressly instituted for that purpose. The title represented by the certificate cannot be
changed, altered, modified, enlarged, diminished, or cancelled in a collateral proceeding. The
action for the declaration of nullity of deed of sale commenced by the petitioners in the RTC of
Tagbilaran City is not the direct proceeding required by law to attack a Torrens certificate of title.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.

RODRIGUEZ VS RODRIGUEZ G.R. 175720, 532 SCRA 642. Sept. 11, 2007

This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 91442 dated June 27, 2006, which set aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City, Branch 134, in Civil Case No. 03-517, and reinstated the Decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Makati City, Branch 63, in Civil Case No. 75717, dismissing the
complaint for ejectment; as well as the Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.

Juanito Rodriguez owned a five-door apartment located at San Jose Street, Guadalupe Nuevo,
Makati City, and covered by TCT No. 144865.2 On October 27, 1983, Juanito executed a "Huling
Habilin at Testamento" giving petitioner Cresenciana Tubo Rodriguez, his live-in partner,
apartments D and E, and his children Benjamin Rodriguez (the deceased husband of respondent
Evangeline Rodriguez), apartment A, respondent Buenaventura Rodriguez, apartment B, and
respondent Belen Rodriguez, apartment C.3

However, on June 14, 1984, Juanito executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in favor
of petitioner.4 Thus, TCT No. 144865 was cancelled and a new TCT No. 150431 was issued in the
name of the petitioner.5

The case arose when petitioner filed on September 20, 2001 a complaint for unlawful detainer
against the respondents, alleging that she is the lawful and registered owner of the property;
and that in 1984, she allowed respondents Evangeline, Buenaventura and Belen, out of kindness
and tolerance, to personally occupy units A, B and D, respectively. However, without her
knowledge and consent, respondents separately leased the units to Montano Magpantay, Mel
Navarro and Socorro Escota, who despite repeated demands, failed and refused to vacate the
premises and to pay the rentals thereof.6

In their Answer, respondents claimed ownership over the subject property by succession. They
33

alleged that while petitioner is the registered owner of the property, however, she is not the
lawful owner thereof because the June 14, 1984 Deed of Absolute Sale was simulated and void.
Page

As in Civil Case No. 01-1641 now pending before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 141, which they
filed to assail the validity of the said sale, respondents maintain that petitioner exerted undue
influence over their father, who at that time was seriously ill, to agree to the sale of the property
for only P20,000.00 after knowing that only two apartments were given to her in the Huling
Habilin at Testamento. Further, she had no cause of action against them for being a party to the
August 23, 1990 Partition Agreement wherein they recognized each other as co-owners and
partitioned the property in accordance with the provision of the last will and testament.7

On February 26, 2002, the MTC rendered a judgment in favor of the respondents and held that
the deed of sale was simulated otherwise petitioner would not have entered into the Partition
Agreement, which legally conferred upon each heir exclusive ownership over their respective
shares, thus:

WHEREFORE, the Complaint is DISMISSED. Plaintiff is ordered to pay attorney's fees of

P10,000.00 and the costs of suit in favor of defendants.

SO ORDERED.8

On appeal, the RTC reversed the decision of the MTC. It held that petitioner's certificate of title is
a conclusive evidence of ownership of the land described therein; and that unless and until said
title has been annulled by a court of competent jurisdiction, such title is existing and valid. This is
true also with respect to the deed of sale. The present action, which involves only the issue of
physical or material possession, is not the proper action to challenge it. Further, the MTC erred
when it relied heavily on the "Huling Habilin at Testamento," which was not probated hence has
no effect and no right can be claimed therein. The Partition Agreement which was allegedly
entered into pursuant to the Huling Habilin at Testamento should not also be considered. Thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 63, Makati City, is hereby ordered REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Consequently, judgment is
hereby rendered ordering the defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to vacate
the premises and surrender the possession thereof to the plaintiff. Defendants are likewise
ordered to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff an amount of P5,000.00 a month per unit
beginning 13 August 2001 until they finally vacate the premises and the costs of this suit.

SO ORDERED.9

Aggrieved, respondents filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals which reversed
and set aside the decision of the RTC and reinstated the decision of the MTC. It held that the
MTC correctly received evidence on ownership since the question of possession could not be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership. Further, the Huling Habilin at Testamento
transmitted ownership of the specific apartments not only to the respondents but also to the
petitioner; and pursuant thereto, the parties executed the Partition Agreement in accordance
with the wishes of the testator, thus:

WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court. The decision dated February 26, 2002 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati
34

City in Civil Case No. 75717 dismissing the complaint for ejectment is hereby REINSTATED.
Page

SO ORDERED.10
The motion for reconsideration was denied hence, petitioner filed the present Petition for
Review raising the following errors:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW AND GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
AND REINSTATING THE DECISION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT DISMISSING
PETITIONER'S COMPLAINT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW AND GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN DECLARING THAT THE PROPERTY, A PARCEL OF LAND UPON WHICH A FIVE-UNIT
APARTMENT STANDS, BECAME THE SUBJECT OF JUANITO RODRIGUEZ'S HULING HABILIN AT
TESTAMENTO WHEREIN THE PROPERTY WAS DISTRIBUTED TO HIS HEIRS (HEREIN RESPONDENTS)
INCLUDING THE RESPONDENT (PETITIONER HEREIN).11

Petitioner alleges that as the registered owner of the subject property, she enjoys the right of
possession thereof and that question of ownership cannot be raised in an ejectment case unless
it is intertwined with the issue of possession. While the court may look into the evidence of title
or ownership and possession de jure to determine the nature of possession, it cannot resolve
the issue of ownership because the resolution of said issue would effect an adjudication on
ownership which is not proper in the summary action for unlawful detainer. Petitioner insists
that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Huling Habilin at Testamento transmitted
ownership of the specific apartments disregarding the fact that the same is not probated yet and
that the testator changed or revoked his will by selling the property to petitioner prior to his
death.

Contrarily, respondents pray that the instant Petition for Review be dismissed since the
resolution of the question of ownership by the MTC and the Court of Appeals was provisional
only to resolve the issue of possession. Petitioner can always avail of legal remedies to have the
issue of ownership passed upon by the proper court. Aware of the provisional nature of the
resolution on ownership in ejectment cases, respondents filed Civil Case No. 01-1641 to assail
the validity of the deed of sale of the property and the registration thereof in petitioner's name.

The petition has merit.

An action for unlawful detainer exists when a person unlawfully withholds possession of any
land or building against or from a lessor, vendor, vendee or other persons, after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied.12 The
sole issue to be resolved is the question as to who is entitled to the physical or material
possession of the premises or possession de facto.13 Being a summary proceeding intended to
provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of property,
35

the question of title is not involved14 and should be raised by the affected party in an
appropriate action in the proper court.15
Page
However, when the issue of ownership is raised the court is not ousted of its jurisdiction. Section
16 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC 16. Resolving defense of ownership. - When the defendant raises the defense of ownership
in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.

Thus, all that the trial court can do is to make an initial determination of who is the owner of the
property so that it can resolve who is entitled to its possession absent other evidence to resolve
ownership.16 But this adjudication is only provisional and does not bar or prejudice an action
between the same parties involving title to the property.17

In the case at bar, petitioner's cause of action for unlawful detainer was based on her alleged
ownership of land covered by TCT No. 150431 and that she merely tolerated respondents' stay
thereat. However, when respondents leased the apartments to other persons without her
consent, their possession as well as those persons claiming right under them became unlawful
upon their refusal to vacate the premises and to pay the rent. On the other hand, respondents
assailed petitioner's title by claiming that the deed of sale upon which it was based was
simulated and void. They insisted that they were co-owners thus, they have the right to possess
the said property. To prove their claim, they presented the Huling Habilin at Testamento of
Juanito Rodriguez and the Partition Agreement.

The lower courts considered the following documentary evidence in arriving at their respective
decisions, albeit the RTC decision contradicts that of the MTC and Court of Appeals: 1) Huling
Habilin at Testamento executed by Juanito Rodriguez on October 27, 1983; 2) Deed of Sale of the
property executed by Juanito Rodriguez and the petitioner on June 14, 1984; 3) TCT No. 150431
in the name of the petitioner; and 4) the August 23, 1990 Partition Agreement executed by both
the respondents and the petitioner.

Based on the foregoing documentary evidence, we find that there is preponderance of evidence
in favor of the petitioner's claim. Respondents failed to prove their right of possession, as the
Huling Habilin at Testamento and the Partition Agreement have no legal effect since the will has
not been probated. Before any will can have force or validity it must be probated. This cannot be
dispensed with and is a matter of public policy.18 Article 838 of the Civil Code mandates that
"[n]o will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court." As the will was not probated, the Partition Agreement
which was executed pursuant thereto can not be given effect. Thus, the fact that petitioner was
a party to said agreement becomes immaterial in the determination of the issue of possession.

Moreover, at the time the deed of sale was executed in favor of the petitioner, Juanito Rodriguez
remained the owner thereof since ownership would only pass to his heirs at the time of his
death. Thus, as owner of the property, he had the absolute right to dispose of it during his
lifetime. Now, whether or not the disposition was valid is an issue that can be resolved only in
Civil Case No. 01-1641, an action instituted by the respondents for that purpose.
36

We are, thus, left with the deed of sale and the certificate of title over the property to consider.
Page
We agree with the RTC that a certificate of title is a conclusive evidence of ownership of the land
described therein; the validity of which shall not be subject to a collateral attack, especially in an
ejectment case which is summary in nature.

In Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. v. Ong,19 the Court held that:

The long settled rule is that the issue of ownership cannot be subject of a collateral attack.

In Apostol v. Court of Appeals, this Court had the occasion to clarify this:

. . . Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding for
that purpose in accordance with law. The issue of the validity of the title of the respondents can
only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Whether or not the
petitioners have the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of the court
a quo to determine in an action for unlawful detainer.

Further, in Co v. Militar,20 it was held that:

[T]he Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most
effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility
once the claim of ownership is established and recognized.

It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is indefeasible and binding upon the whole world
unless and until it has been nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction. Under existing
statutory and decisional law, the power to pass upon the validity of such certificate of title at the
first instance properly belongs to the Regional Trial Courts in a direct proceeding for cancellation
of title.rbl r l l lbrr

As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of the property, which is one of
the attributes of ownership. x x x

We emphasize, however, that our ruling on the issue of ownership is only provisional to
determine who between the parties has the better right of possession. It is, therefore, not
conclusive as to the issue of ownership, which is the subject matter of Civil Case No. 01-1641.
Our ruling that petitioner has a better right of possession was arrived at on the basis of evidence
without prejudice to the eventual outcome of the annulment case, where the issue as to who
has title to the property in question is fully threshed out. As the law now stands, in an ejectment
suit, the question of ownership may be provisionally ruled upon for the sole purpose of
determining who is entitled to possession de facto.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
91442 dated June 27, 2006 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 134, in Civil Case No. 03-517, reversing the Decision of the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MTC) of Makati City, Branch 63, in Civil Case No. 75717, is REINSTATED.
37 Page
CORPUZ VS AGUSTIN G.R. 183822, January 18, 2012

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision[1]
dated 08 January 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90645, which affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City and its Resolution[2] dated 15 July 2008
denying the Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction,
affirmed the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Laoag City, which had dismissed the
unlawful detainer case filed by herein petitioner.

The Factual Antecedents

The Court adopts the findings of fact of the CA as follows:
Ruben C. Corpuz (Ruben) filed a complaint for ejectment against Spouses Hilarion and Justa
Agustin on the allegation that he is the registered owner of two parcels of land located in Santa
Joaquina, Laoag City covered by TCT No. 12980 issued on October 29, 1976 by the Laoag City
Register of Deeds and with technical descriptions as follows:

1) A parcel of land (Lot No. 20 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag), with improvements thereon,
situated in the barrio of Santa Joaquina, Municipality of Laoag. Bounded x x x containing an area
of five thousand seven hundred and fifty nine (5,759) square meters more or less x x x.

2) A parcel of land (Lot No. 11711 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag), with the improvements
thereon, situated in the barrio of Santa Joaquina, Municipality of Laoag. Bounded x x x,
containing an area of twenty thousand seven hundred and forty five (20,745) square meters,
more or less x x x.

Aforesaid parcels of land were formerly owned by Elias Duldulao in whose name Original
Certificate of Title No. O-1717 was issued. Duldulao sold said properties on August 27, 1951 to
Francisco D. Corpuz, father of Ruben C. Corpuz. The elder Corpuz allowed spouses Agustin to
occupy subject properties, the latter being relatives.

Despite demand to vacate, the Agustins refused to leave the premises.

Ruben alleged further that he has the better right to possess subject property having acquired
the same from his father, Francisco, who executed a Deed of Quitclaim in his favor on March 15,
1971.

Spouses Agustin, in their Answer, interposed the defense that on June 5, 1971 Francisco Corpuz,
Ruben's father, disposed of subject property by executing a Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor
for a consideration of Eleven Thousand One Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,150.00).

The Municipal Trial Court found for the spouses Agustin and dismissed the complaint.

In sum, considering the evidence of the defendants which shows that they entered into and
38

occupied Lot No. 20 and the 9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 11711 as buyers or owners,
disproving the allegation of the plaintiff that defendants were merely allowed by Francisco
Page

Corpuz to occupy the subject properties, being his relatives, and considering further the length
of time that the defendants have been in possession, as owners, of Lot No. 20 and the 9,657 sq.
m. portion of Lot No. 11711, and have been continuously exercising their rights of ownership
thereon, this court is of the view and holds, in so far as this case is concerned, that the
defendants are the ones entitled to the possession of Lot No. 20 and the 9,657 sq. m. portion of
Lot No. 11711.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case, is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, Branch XVI, Regional Trial Court of Laoag City affirmed said dismissal, the dispositive
portion of said decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
JUDGMENT of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 01, Laoag City is hereby AFFIRMED, with
costs against the plaintiff-appellant.

SO ORDERED.[3]

Petitioner assailed the Decision of the RTC, affirming the earlier dismissal of the case by the
MTC, by instituting an appeal with the CA. On 08 January 2008, the appellate court through its
Fourteenth Division dismissed his appeal.[4] It noted that his father engaged in a double sale
when he conveyed the disputed properties to petitioner and respondents. The Quitclaim
executed by the elder Corpuz in favor of petitioner was dated 15 March 1971, while the Deed of
Sale with respondents was later, on 15 June 1971; both documents were notarized shortly after
their execution.[5] The Quitclaim, which was subsequently inscribed at the back of Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. O-1717 on 29 October 1976,[6] resulted in the issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-12980 in the name of petitioner. The Deed of Sale executed with
respondents was, however, not annotated at the back of OCT No. O-1717 and remained
unregistered.[7]

Based on the above findings, the CA ruled that petitioner had knowledge of the sale of the
disputed real property executed between Francisco Corpuz, petitioner's father, and respondents.
Due to this conveyance by the elder Corpuz to respondents, the latter's possession thereof was
in the nature of ownership. Thus, in the context of an unlawful detainer case instituted by
petitioner against respondents, the appellate court concluded that respondents possession of
the property was not by mere tolerance of its former owner petitioner's father but was in the
exercise of ownership.[8]

The CA noted that petitioner had knowledge of his fathers sale of the properties to respondents
as early as 1973. However, despite knowledge of the sale, petitioner failed to initiate any action
to annul it and oust respondents from the subject properties.[9] The appellate court rejected his
contention that, as registered owner of the disputed properties, he had a better right to
possession thereof, compared to the unregistered Deed of Sale relied upon by respondents in
their defense of the same properties. The CA ruled that the inaction on his part despite
39

knowledge of the sale in 1973 was equivalent to registration of respondents unregistered deed.
[10] In dismissing his appeal, the CA concluded that respondents possession was not ... anchored
Page
on mere tolerance nor on any of the grounds for forcible entry or unlawful detainer; hence the
complaint for ejectment must fail.[11] The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of
Branch XVI, Regional Trial Court of Laoag City in Civil Case No. 13293-16 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[12]
The Issues
Petitioner assigns the following errors in this Petition for Review on Certiorari:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE

LEGAL OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONER ON THE DISPUTED PROPERTY TO CLAIM BETTER RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN THE APPRECIATION OF THE
ALLEGED SALE IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS TO RULE THAT THEY HAVE BETTER RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.

III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE
CASE OF JACINTO CO VS. MILITAR, ET AL. (421 SCRA 455) WHICH IS SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT
CASE.

IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR
REVIEW RAISED BEFORE IT.[13]

Petitioner presents to this Court for resolution the core issue of his Petition: who between the
parties has the right to possession of the disputed properties -- petitioner, who is the registered
owner under TCT No. T-12980; or respondents, who have a notarized yet unregistered Deed of
Absolute Sale over the same properties?

The Court's Ruling

We DENY the Petition.

Although this case does not present a novel question of law, there is a need to discuss the nature
of an ejectment case for the recovery of physical possession in relation to the Torrens system. A
resolution of the issue would be relevant to the determination of who has the better right to
possession in this unlawful detainer case.

One of the three kinds of action for the recovery of possession of real property is accion
interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding ... which may be either that for forcible entry
(detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a summary action for the recovery of
physical possession where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and should
be brought in the proper inferior court.[14] In ejectment proceedings, the courts resolve the
basic question of who is entitled to physical possession of the premises, possession referring to
possession de facto, and not possession de jure.[15]
40

Where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon
Page

that issue to determine who between the parties has the better right to possess the property.
However, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to that of possession, adjudication
of the ownership issue is not final and binding, but only for the purpose of resolving the issue of
possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an
action between the same parties involving title to the property.[16]

In the instant case, the position of respondents is that they are occupying the disputed
properties as owners, having acquired these from petitioner's father through a Deed of Absolute
Sale executed in 1971. Respondents believe that they cannot be dispossessed of the disputed
properties, since they are the owners and are in actual possession thereof up to this date.
Petitioner, however, rebuts this claim of ownership, contending that he has registered the
disputed properties in his name and has been issued a land title under the Torrens system. He
asserts that, having registered the properties in his name, he is the recognized owner and
consequently has the better right to possession.
Indeed, a title issued under the Torrens system is entitled to all the attributes of property
ownership, which necessarily includes possession.[17] Petitioner is correct that as a Torrens title
holder over the subject properties, he is the rightful owner and is entitled to possession thereof.
However, the lower courts and the appellate court consistently found that possession of the
disputed properties by respondents was in the nature of ownership, and not by mere tolerance
of the elder Corpuz. In fact, they have been in continuous, open and notorious possession of the
property for more than 30 years up to this day.

Petitioner cites Jacinto Co v. Rizal Militar, et al.,[18] which has facts and legal issues identical to
those of the instant case. The petitioner therein filed an unlawful detainer case against the
respondents over a disputed property. He had a Torrens title thereto, while the respondents as
actual occupants of the property claimed ownership thereof based on their unregistered Deeds
of Sale. The principal issue was who between the two parties had the better right to possess the
subject property.
This Court resolved the issue by upholding the title holder as the one who had the better right to
possession of the disputed property based on the following justification:
We have, time and again, held that the only issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is
physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership
by any of the party litigants. Moreover, an ejectment suit is summary in nature and is not
susceptible to circumvention by the simple expedient of asserting ownership over the property.

In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the question of
ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding
the issue of ownership, the lower courts and the Court of Appeals, nonetheless, have the
undoubted competence to provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of
determining the issue of Possession.

Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land nor is
conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause
of action involving possession.

In the instant case, the evidence showed that as between the parties, it is the petitioner who has
41

a Torrens Title to the property. Respondents merely showed their unregistered deeds of sale in
support of their claims. The Metropolitan Trial Court correctly relied on the transfer certificate of
Page

title in the name of petitioner.

In Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the Torrens System was adopted in this
country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of
land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and
recognized.

It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is indefeasible and binding upon the whole world
unless and until it has been nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction. Under existing
statutory and decisional law, the power to pass upon the validity of such certificate of title at the
first instance properly belongs to the Regional Trial Courts in a direct proceeding for cancellation
of title.

As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of the property, which is one of
the attributes of his ownership. Respondents' argument that petitioner is not an innocent
purchaser for value and was guilty of bad faith in having the subject land registered in his name
is a collateral attack on the title of petitioner, which is not allowed. A certificate of title cannot be
subject to a collateral attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law. [19]

The pronouncement in Co v. Militar was later reiterated in Spouses Pascual v. Spouses

Coronel[20] and in Spouses Barias v. Heirs of Bartolome Boneo, et al.,[21] wherein we
consistently held the age-old rule that the person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled
to possession thereof.[22]

However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the present petitioner has instituted an unlawful
detainer case against respondents. It is an established fact that for more than three decades, the
latter have been in continuous possession of the subject property, which, as such, is in the
concept of ownership and not by mere tolerance of petitioners father. Under these
circumstances, petitioner cannot simply oust respondents from possession through the
summary procedure of an ejectment proceeding.

Instructive on this matter is Carbonilla v. Abiera,[23] which reads thus:

Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession. However,
the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the
property. To recover possession, he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he
chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to
prosper.

In the present case, petitioner opted to file an ejectment case against respondents. Ejectment
casesforcible entry and unlawful detainerare summary proceedings designed to provide
expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of the property
involved. The only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled
to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the
possession de jure. It does not even matter if a partys title to the property is questionable. For
42

this reason, an ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented
proof of ownership of the subject property. Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular
Page

ejectment case filed must be averred in the complaint and sufficiently proven.
The statements in the complaint that respondents possession of the building was by mere
tolerance of petitioner clearly make out a case for unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer involves
the persons withholding from another of the possession of the real property to which the latter
is entitled, after the expiration or termination of the formers right to hold possession under the
contract, either expressed or implied.

A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is that possession must be
originally lawful, and such possession must have turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the
right to possess. It must be shown that the possession was initially lawful; hence, the basis of
such lawful possession must be established. If, as in this case, the claim is that such possession is
by mere tolerance of the plaintiff, the acts of tolerance must be proved. (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, petitioner has not proven that respondents continued possession of the subject
properties was by mere tolerance of his father, except by a mere allegation thereof. In fact,
petitioner has not established when respondents possession of the properties became unlawful
a requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case.

In Canlas v. Tubil,[24] we enumerated the elements that constitute the sufficiency of a complaint
for unlawful detainer, as follows:
Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action as well as the court which
has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the
complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of
cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The
complaint must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol
evidence.

Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally
withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under
any contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is
originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.

An unlawful detainer proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction of which lies in the proper
municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. The action must be brought within one year
from the date of last demand and the issue in said case is the right to physical possession.
... ... ...
In Cabrera v. Getaruela, the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for
unlawful detainer if it recites the following:

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff;

(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latters right of possession;
43

(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff
of the enjoyment thereof; and
Page
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.
Based on the above, it is obvious that petitioner has not complied with the requirements
sufficient to warrant the success of his unlawful detainer Complaint against respondents. The
lower courts and the CA have consistently upheld the entitlement of respondents to continued
possession of the subject properties, since their possession has been established as one in the
concept of ownership. Thus, the courts correctly dismissed the unlawful detainer case of
petitioner.

We concur in the appellate courts findings that petitioners father engaged in a double sale of the
disputed properties. The records of the case show that it took petitioner more or less five years
from 1971 when he acquired the property from his father to 1976 when petitioner registered
the conveyance and caused the issuance of the land title registered in his name under the
Torrens system. Respondents, on the other hand, continued their possession of the properties,
but without bothering to register them or to initiate any action to fortify their ownership.

We cannot, however, sustain the appellate courts conclusion that petitioner's failure to initiate
any action to annul the sale to respondents and oust them from the disputed properties had the
effect of registration of respondents unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale. We held thus in Ruiz, Sr.
v. Court of Appeals [25]:

(But) where a party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is unregistered at that time
he acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the
effect of registration as to him. Knowledge of an unregistered sale is equivalent to registration.
As held in Fernandez v. Court of Appeals [189 SCRA 780 (1990)],

Section 50 of Act No. 496 (now Sec. 51 of P.D. 1529), provides that the registration of the deed is
the operative act to bind or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned. But where the
party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is unregistered at the time he acquired a
right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of
registration as to him. The Torrens system cannot be used as a shield for the commission of fraud
(Gustillo v. Maravilla, 48 Phil. 442). [Emphasis supplied.]

In this case, the Quitclaim executed by the elder Corpuz in favor of petitioner was executed
ahead of the Deed of Sale of respondents. Thus, the sale of the subject properties by petitioners
father to respondents cannot be considered as a prior interest at the time that petitioner came
to know of the transaction.

We also note that, based on the records, respondents do not dispute the existence of TCT No. T-
12980 registered in the name of petitioner. They allege, though, that the land title issued to him
was an act of fraud [26] on his part. We find this argument to be equivalent to a collateral attack
against the Torrens title of petitioner an attack we cannot allow in the instant unlawful detainer
case.

It is settled in jurisprudence that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be the subject of collateral
44

attack.[27] Such attack must be direct and not by a collateral proceeding.[28] It is a well-
established doctrine that the title represented by the certificate cannot be changed, altered,
Page

modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding.[29] Considering that this is an

unlawful detainer case wherein the sole issue to be decided is possession de facto rather than
possession de jure, a collateral attack by herein respondents on petitioner's title is proscribed.

Our ruling in the present case is only to resolve the issue of who has the better right to
possession in relation to the issue of disputed ownership of the subject properties. Questions as
to the validity of petitioner's Torrens title can be ventilated in a proper suit instituted to directly
attack its validity, an issue that we cannot resolve definitively in this unlawful detainer case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we deny the instant Petition for lack of merit. The
Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90645 (dated January 08, 2008), of the
Regional Trial Court of Laoag City in Civil Case No. 3111-13293-65, as well as of the Municipal
Trial Court of Laoag City in Civil Case No. 3111 -- all dismissing the unlawful detainer case of
petitioner are AFFIRMED.

TUAZON VS ISAGON, G.R. 191432, Sept 2, 2015

The Facts

During their lifetime, spouses Melencio Diaz and Dolores Gulay (Dolores) owned Lot 103 of the
Santa Rosa Estate, Barangay Aplaya, Sta. Rosa, Laguna, consisting of 499 square meters (Lot 103).
They had three daughters named Maria, Paciencia, and Esperanza. Melencio and Maria
predeceased Dolores. On May 28, 1955, Dolores, Paciencia, and Esperanza adjudicated Lot 103
to Dolores through a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement. Maria's children who were still minors at
that time were not included in the settlement.

On March 17, 1956, Dolores sold Lot 103 to Isabel Torres through a Bilihang Tuluyan (Deed of
Absolute Sale). Subsequently, Isabel Torres sold Lot 103 to Teresa on September 29, 1973.

On October 12, 1973, Maria's children, namely Gloria, Angel, Felix, and Flaviano, all surnamed
Isagon, executed a Deed of Conformity. In this instrument, they honored the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement executed by their grandmother and aunts, subject to the condition that
they would get one-sixth of Lot 103 as their share.

Gloria, Felix, and Flaviano also sold their.shares to Teresa. On the other hand, Angel mortgaged
his share to Teresa on October 20, 1975, through a Kasulatan ng Sanglaan. His share consisted of
20.75 square meters which was one-fourth of the one-sixth share in the property. Angel Isagon
thereafter refused and failed to redeem the mortgaged property.

Teresa has been paying the real estate taxes due on Lot 103 since 1974 up to the present. Lot
103 is covered by an undated and reconstituted Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (N.A.) RT-
1925 issued in Teresa's name.

Sometime in 1972, the petitioner's brother, Antonio Tuazon (Antonio), allowed Spouses Angel
45

and Marcosa Isagon (respondents) to build a small hut on a portion of Lot 103 without Teresa's
knowledge. The respondents and their children were then living by the seashore and Antonio
Page

feared that their house could be swept away by the floods during a typhoon.
In 2000, the respondents started to construct a house on the disputed property despite Teresa's
protest. For years, however, Teresa tolerated their possession and use of the contested area.

In 2007, Teresa filed a complaint against the respondents before the Lupon Tagapamayapa of
Barangay Aplaya. The parties failed to reach any amicable settlement.

On January 24, 2007, Teresa sent a final demand letter to respondents to vacate and to pay
rental fees. The respondents did not reply.

On September 11, 2007, Teresa filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the respondents
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), City of Sta. Rosa, Laguna. She prayed that the
respondents be ordered to vacate the subject property and to pay compensation for its use and
occupancy.

In their answer, the respondents alleged that they were occupying the subject property as
owners. They also alleged that Teresa fraudulently obtained TCT No. (N.A.) RT-1925.

The MTCC and RTC Rulings

The MTCC, in its judgment on January 25, 2008, decided in favor of Teresa and ordered the
respondents to vacate the subject property and to pay reasonable rent and attorney's fees. The
MTCC held that Teresa was the owner of the property as shown by TCT No. (N.A.) RT-1925, and
as owner, she was entitled to enjoy the right of possession over the subject property. It added
that a property registered under the Torrens system could not be collaterally attacked in an
action for unlawful retainer.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Bifian, Laguna, affirmed in toto the decision of the
MTCC. The RTC denied the respondents' motion for reconsideration.

The CA Ruling

The respondents appealed the RTC's ruling to the CA.

In its October 28, 2009 Decision, the CA reversed the RTC's ruling. The CA noted that Angel
Isagon executed a real estate mortgage in favor of Teresa over a portion of Lot 103 but had failed
to redeem it. Citing Article 2088 of the Civil Code, the CA concluded that Teresa was a mere
mortgagee and had no right to eject the respondents. Instead of foreclosing the property, Teresa
filed this action for unlawful detainer. The CA added that a mortgage was not an instrument that
transferred ownership; thus, the disputed property still belonged to the respondents.

The Petition

Teresa's present petition for review on certiorari argues that she is the registered owner, not a
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mere mortgagee, of the property as shown by TCT No. (N.A.) RT-1925. Section 51 of Presidential
Decree No. 1929 expressly states that registration is the operative act that conveys registered
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land. Thus, the TCT is the best proof of ownership.

She adds that the only issue in an unlawful detainer case is the physical possession of the
property. As the registered owner, she has the right to enjoy all the rights of an owner under
Articles 428 and 429 of the Civil Code, including actual possession.

Our Ruling

We grant the petition.

The sole issue here is who has the better right of physical possession between the registered
owner as shown in the certificate of title and the mortgagor as shown in the Kasulatan ng
Sanglaan.

While the CA is correct that a mortgage does not transfer ownership, the indefeasibility of a
Torrens title should have been given primary consideration.

An action for unlawful detainer is summary in nature and cannot be delayed by a mere assertion
of ownership as a defense.1 When the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership,
the court may pass upon that issue only if needed to determine who between the parties has a
better right to possess the property.2 Furthermore, the adjudication on the issue of ownership is
only provisional,3 and subject to a separate proceeding that the parties may initiate to settle the
issue of ownership.

A person who possesses a title issued under the Torrens system is entitled to all the attributes of
ownership including possession.4 A certificate of title cannot be subject to a collateral attack in
an action for unlawful detainer. A collateral attack is made when, in an action to obtain a
different relief, the validity of a certificate of title is questioned.5

In the present case, the respondents alleged in their answer that the certificate of title issued in
the name of Teresa was fraudulently obtained. This defense constitutes a collateral attack on the
title and should not therefore be entertained. To directly assail the validity of TCT No. (N.A.) RT-
1925, a direct action for reconveyance must be filed.6

In the present case, based on the certificate of title, Teresa is the owner of the subject property
and is entitled to its physical possession.

WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition for review on certiorari. The Decision dated
October 28, 2009, and the Resolution dated February 11, 2010, of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 107937 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision dated October 15, 2008,
of Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court, Bian, Laguna, in Civil Case No. B-7472, is hereby
REINSTATED.
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