Consti II

[No. 21049.
December 22, 1923]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and appellee, vs. ISAAC
PEREZ, defendant and appellant.
1. 1.CRIMINAL LAW; ARTICLE 256 OF THE PENAL CODE, WHETHER IN FORCE;

EFFECT OF LIBEL LAW ON ARTICLE 256.So much of article 256 of the Penal
Code as does not relate to ministers of the Crown or to writings coming under the
Libel Law, is in force. (U. S. vs. Helbig [1920], R. G. No. 14705, not reported;
People vs. Perfecto [1922], 43 Phil., 887, opinion of six members of the Supreme
Court.)
1. 2.ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF TREASON AND SEDITION LAW ON ARTICLE 256 OF THE
PENAL CODE AND ON THE LIBEL LAW.Seditious words, speeches, or libels,
constitute a violation of Act No. 292, the Treason and Sedition Law, and to this
extent, both the Penal Code and the Libel Law are modified.
1. 3.ID.; THE TREASON AND SEDITION LAW APPLIED; SEDITION DEFINED.

Sedition is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. It is a revolt
against legitimate authority. Though the ultimate object of sedition is a violation of
the public peace or at least such a course of measures as evidently engenders it, yet
it does not aim at direct and open violence against the laws, or the subversion of the
Constitution.
1. 4.ID.; ID.; FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY.The provisions

of Act No. 292 must not be interpreted so as to abridge the freedom of speech and the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of
grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of
Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and
the Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect
be seditious.
600
600 PHILIPPINE REPORTS
ANNOTATED
People vs. Perez
1. 5.ID.; ID.; SECTION 8 OF THE TREASON AND SEDITION LAW CONSTRUED;

FACTS OF CASE AT BAR.One P said of Governor-General Wood: "The Filipinos,
like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for having recommended a
bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our independence." Held: That P has
uttered seditious words and that he is guilty of a violation of section 8 as amended,
of the Treason and Sedition Law, Act No. 292.
1. 6.ID.; SUFFICIENCY OF INFORMATION OR, COMPLAINT.The designation of

the crime by the fiscal is not conclusive. The crime of which the defendant stands
charged is that described by the facts stated in the information.
1. 7.ID.; ID.An accused may be found guilty and convicted of a graver offense than that
designated in the information, if such graver offense is included or described in the
body of the information, and is afterwards' justified by the proof presented during
the trial. (Guevara's Code of Criminal Procedure, p. 9; De Joya's Code of Criminal
Procedure, p. 9.)
1. 8.GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; NATURE OF

PosiTION.The Governor-General is an executive official appointed by the
President of the United States by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of
the United States, and holds his office at the pleasure of the President. The Organic
Act vests supreme executive power in the Governor-General to be exercised in
accordance with law.
1. 9.ID.; ID.; SEDITIOUS ATTACK ON THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.The Gover-

nor-General is the representative of executive civil authority in the Philippines and
of the sovereign power. A seditious attack on the Governor-General is an attack on
the rights of the Filipino people and on American sovereignty.
APPEAL from a judgment of Court of First Instance of Sorsogon. Flordeliza, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Mario Guaria for appellant.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and Fortunato Lodovice, a
citizen of that municipality, happening to meet on the morning of April 1, 1922, in
the presidencia of Pilar, they became engaged in a discussion
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VOL. 45, DECEMBER 22, 1923 601
People vs. Perez
regarding the administration of Governor-General Wood, which resulted in Perez
shouting a number of times: "The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off
Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed
our independence." Charged in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon with a
violation of article 256 of the Penal Code having to do with contempt of ministers of
the Crown or other persons in authority, and convicted thereof, Perez has appealed
the case to this court. The question presented for decision is, What crime, if any, did
the accused commit?
A logical point of departure is the inf ormation presented in this case. It reads in
translation as follows:
"That on or about April 1, 1922, in the municipality of Pilar, Province of Sorsogon, Philippine
Islands, the said accused, Isaac Perez, while holding a discussion with several persons on
political matters, did criminally, unlawfully and wilfully and with knowledge that Honorable
Leonard Wood was the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and in the discharge of
his functions as such authority, insult by word, without his presence, said Governor-General,
uttering in a loud voice and in the presence of many persons, and in a public place, the
following phrases: 'Asin an manga filipinos na caparejo co, maninigong gumamit nin
sundang asin haleon an payo ni Wood huli can saiyang recomendacin sa pag raot can
Filipinas/ which in English, is as follows: 'And the Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for
cutting off Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for the Philippines.'
"Contrary to article 256 of the Penal Code."
At the trial of the case, two witnesses were called on behalf of the prosecution and
three witnesses on behalf of the defense. According to the first witness for the
Government, Juan Lumbao, the municipal president of Pilar, what Perez said on the
occasion in question was this: "The Filipinos, like myself, should get a bolo and cut
off the head of Governor-General Wood, because he has recom-
602
602 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Perez
mended a bad administration in these Islands and has not made a good
recommendation; on the contrary, he has assassinated the independence of the
Philippines and for this reason, we have not obtained independence and the head of
that Governor-General must be cut off." Higinio J. Angustia, justice of the peace of
Pilar, in a written statement, and Gregorio Cresencio, another witness for the
prosecution, corroborated the testimony of the first witness. Cresencio understood
that Perez invited the Filipinos including himself to get their bolos and cut off the
head of Governor-General Wood and throw it into.the sea.
The witnesses for the defense did not deny that an altercation took place on the
morning of April 1, 1922, in which the accused participated. But they endeavored to
explain that the discussion was between Perez and one Severo Madrid, the latter
maintaining that the fault was due to the Nacionalista Party, while Perez argued
that the GovernorGeneral was to blame. The accused testified that the discussion was
held in a peaceful manner, and that what he wished to say was that the Governor-
General should be removed and substituted by another. On the witness stand, he
stated that his words were the following: "We are but blaming the Nacionalista Party
which is in power but do not take into account that above the representatives there
is Governor-General Wood who controls everything, and I told him that the day on
which the Democratas may kill that Governor-General, then we, the Filipinos, will
install the government we like whether you Democratas want to pay or not to pay
taxes."
The trial Judge found as a f act, and we think with abundant reason, that it had
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused made use of the language
stated in the beginning of this decision and set out in the information. The question
of fact thus settled, the question of law recurs as to the crime of which the accused
should be convicted.
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VOL. 45, DECEMBER 22, 1923 603
People vs. Perez
It should be recalled that the fiscal named, in the information, article 256 of the Penal
Code as having been infringed and the trial Judge so found in his decision. The first
error assigned by counsel for the appellant is addressed to this conclusion of the lower
court and is to the effect that article 256 of the Penal Code is no longer in force.
In the case of United States vs. Helbig ([1920], R. G. No. 14705 ), the accused was
1
charged with having uttered the following language: "To hell with the President of
the United States and his proclamation!" Mr. Helbig was prosecuted under article
256, and though the case was eventually sent back to the court of origin for a new
trial, the appellate court by majority vote held as a question of law that article 256 is
still in force.
In the case of People vs. Perfecto ([1922], 43 Phil., 887), the accused was charged
with having published an article reflecting on the Philippine Senate and its members
in violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. In this court, Mr. Perfecto was acquitted
by unanimous vote, with three members of the court holding that article 256 was
abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the
Philippines, and with six members holding that the Libel Law had the effect of
repealing so much of article 256 as relates to written defamation, abuse, or insult,
and that under the information and the facts, the defendant was neither guilty of a
violation of article 256 of the Penal Code nor of the Libel Law. In the course of the
main opinion in the Perfecto case, is found this significant sentence: "Act No. 292 of
the Philippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law, may also have affected
article 256, but as to this point, it is not necessary to make a pronouncement."
It may therefore be taken as settled doctrine, to which those of us who retain a
contrary opinion must bow with as good grace as we can muster, that until otherwise
decided
______________
1March 16, not reported.

604
People vs. Perez
by higher authority, so much of article 256 of the Penal Code as does not relate to
ministers of the Crown or to writings coming under the Libel Law, exists and must
be enforced. To which proposition, can properly be appended a corollary, namely:
Seditious words, speeches, or libels, constitute a violation of Act No. 292, the Treason
and Sedition Law, and to this extent, both the Penal Code and the Libel Law are
modified.
Accepting the above statements relative to the continuance and status of article
256 of the Penal Code, it is our opinion that the law infringed in this instance is not
this article but rather a portion of the Treason and Sedition Law. In other words, as
will later appear, we think that the words of the accused did not so much tend to
defame, abuse, or insult, a person in authority, as they did to raise a disturbance in
the community.
In criminal law, there are a variety of offenses which are not directed primarily
against individuals, but rather against the existence of the State, the authority of the
Government, or the general public peace. The offenses created and defined in Act No.
292 are distinctly of this character. Among them is sedition, which is the raising of
commotions or disturbances in the State. It is a revolt against legitimate authority.
Though the ultimate object of sedition is a violation of the public peace or at least
such a course of measures as evidently engenders it, yet it does not aim at direct and
open violence against the laws, or the subversion of the Constitution. (2 Bouvier's
Law Dictionary, 974; U. S. vs. Abad [1902], 1 Phil.,
437; People vs. Cabrera [1922], 43 Phil., 64.)
It is of course fundamentally true that the provisions of Act No. 292 must not be
interpreted so as to abridge the freedom of speech and the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances.
Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the
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VOL. 45, DECEMBER 22, 1923 605
People vs. Perez
foundations of Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the
Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech, unless the
intention and effect be seditious. But when the intention and effect of the act is
seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of
assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the
prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and
the existence of the State. (III Wharton's Criminal Law, pp. 2127 et seq.; U.
S. vs. Apurado [1907], 7 Phil., 422; People vs. Perfecto, supra.) Here, the person
maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands. His official
position, like the Presidency of the United States and other high offices, under a
democratic form of government, instead of affording immunity from promiscuous
comment, seems rather to invite abusive attacks. But in this instance, the attack on
the Governor-General passes the furthest bounds of free speech and common decency.
More than a figure of speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words
used, which could easily produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling
incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to
the laws.
The Governor-General is an executive official appointed by the President of the
United States by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States,
and holds his office at the pleasure of the President. The Organic Act vests supreme
executive power in the Governor-General to be exercised in accordance with law. The
Governor-General is the representative of executive civil authority in the Philippines
and of the sovereign power. A seditious attack on the Governor-General is an attack
on the rights of the Filipino people and on American sovereignty.
(Concepcion vs. Paredes [1921], 42 Phil., 599; U. S. vs. Dorr [1903], 2 Phil., 332.)
606
People vs. Perez
Section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, as amended by Act No. 1692,
appears to have been placed on the statute books exactly to meet such a situation.
This section reads as follows:
"Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, or who shall write,
publish or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or
against the Government of the Philippine Islands, or who shall print, write, publish,
utter or make any statement, or speech, or do any act which tends to disturb or
obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office or in performing his duty, or which
tends to instigate others to cabal or meet together f or unlawful purposes, or which
suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or which tends to stir up the people against
the lawful authorities, or which tends to disturb the peace of the community or the
safety or order of the Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil practices
from the constituted authorities, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two
thousand dollars United States currency or by imprisonment not exceeding two years,
or both, in the discretion of the court."
In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a
statement and done an act which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet together
for unlawful purposes. He has made a statement and done an act which suggested
and incited rebellious conspiracies. He has made a statement and done an act which
tended to stir up the people against the lawful authorities. He has made a statement
and done an act which tended to disturb the peace of the community and the safety
or order of the Government. All of these various tendencies can be ascribed to the
action of Perez and may be characterized as penalized by section 8 of Act No. 292 as
amended.
A judgment and sentence convicting the accused of a violation of section 8 of Act
No. 292 as amended, is, in effect, responsive to, and based upon, the offense with
which the defendant is charged. The designation of the crime by
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VOL. 45, DECEMBER 22, 1923 607
People vs. Perez
the fiscal is not conclusive. The crime of which the defendant stands charged is that
described by the facts stated in the information. In accordance with our settled rule,
an accused may be found guilty and convicted of a graver offense than that designated
in the information, if such graver offense is included or described in the body of the
information, and is afterwards justified by the proof presented during the trial.
(Guevara's Code of Criminal Procedure, p. 9; De Joya's Code of Criminal Procedure,
p. 9.)
The penalty meted out by the trial court falls within the limits provided by the
Treason and Sedition Law, and will, we think, sufficiently punish the accused.
That we have given more attention to this case than it deserves, may be possible.
Our course is justified when it is recalled that only last year, Mr. Chief Justice Taft
of the United States Supreme Court, in speaking of an outrageous libel on the
Governor of Porto Rico, observed: "A reading of the two articles removes the slightest
doubt that they go far beyond the 'exuberant expressions of meridional speech/ to use
the expression of this court in a similar case in Gandia vs. Pettingill (222 U. S., 452,
456). Indeed they are so excessive and outrageous in their character that they suggest
the query whether their superlative vilification has not overleapt itself and become
unconsciously humorous." (Balzac vs. Porto Rico [1922], 258 U. S., 298.) While our
own sense of humor is not entirely blunted, we nevertheless entertain the conviction
that the courts should be the first to stamp out the embers of insurrection. The
fugitive flame of disloyalty, lighted by an irresponsible individual, must be dealt with
firmly before it endangers the general public peace.
The result is to agree with the trial Judge in his findings of fact, and on these facts
to convict the accused of a violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended. With the
modification thus indicated, judgment is affirmed, it being understood that, in
accordance with the sentence of the lower court, the defendant and appellant shall
suffer 2
608
People vs. Perez
months and 1 day's imprisonment and pay the costs. So ordered.
Street, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
VILLAMOR, J., with whom concurs AVANCEA, J., concurring and

dissenting:
I agree in that the accused should be sentenced to suffer two months and one day
of arresto mayor with costs, as imposed by the court a quo, under the provisions of
article 256 of the Penal Code, but not under section 8 of Act No. 292. The accused, in
my opinion, should not be convicted of the crime of sedition because there is no
allegation in the complaint nor proof in the record, showing that when the accused
uttered the words that gave rise to these proceedings, he had the intention of inciting
others to gather for an illicit purpose, or to incite any conspiracy or rebellion, or to
disturb the peace of the community or the safety and order of the Government, which
are the acts penalized by section 8 of Act No. 292. On the contrary, having due regard
to the place and time when the discussion arose between Lodovice and the accused,
the political rivalry between them and the difference of opinion that they entertained
regarding the administration of the Governor-General, the Honorable Leonard Wood,
it would appear evident that the accused expressed himself in biting and poignant
language, unbecoming and improper of a lawabiding citizen and highly detrimental
and insulting to the authority of the Governor-General which is the thing prohibited
and punished by article 256 of the Penal Code.
JOHNSON, J., concurring with the concurring and dissenting opinion of

VILLAMOR, J.:
I agree with the opinion of Mr. Justice Villamor. I cannot give assent to a doctrine
which permits a complaint to be presented upon one theory and the trial to be carried
through upon that theory and then to condemn the def endant upon a theory which
he nor the prosecution ever dreamed of.
Judgment modified.
609
VOL. 45, DECEMBER 22, 1923 609
Dionisio vs. Dionisio
Copyright 2017 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Eastern Broadcasting Corporation (DYRE) vs.
Dans, Jr.
No. L-59329. July 19, 1985. *
EASTERN BROADCASTING CORPORATION (DYRE) petitioner, vs. THE HON.

JOSE P. DANS, JR., MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION & COMMUNICATIONS,
THE HON. CEFERINO S. CARREON, COMMISSIONER, NATIONAL TELECOM.,
COMMISSION, ET AL., respondents.
Constitutional Law; Due Process; Radio and Television; Due process must be followed
before a radio station may be ordered closed.The cardinal primary requirements in
administrative proceedings laid down by this Court in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations (69 Phil. 635) should be followed before a broadcast station may be closed or its
operations curtailed. It is necessary to reiterate that while there is no controlling and precise
definition of due process, it furnishes an unavoidable standard to which government action
must conform in order that any deprivation of life, liberty, or property, in each appropriate
case, may be valid (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor, 20
SCRA 849).
Same; Same; Same; All forms of media are protected by the speech freedom clause under
a reasonable application of the clear and present danger test.All forms of media, whether
print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and
expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear
and present danger rulethat words are
________________
*EN BANC.
629
VOL. 137, JULY 19, 1985 629
Dans, Jr.
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to
prevent. The clear and present danger test, however, does not lend itself to a simplistic and
all embracing interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums.
Same; Same; Same; The protection given to T.V. and radio broadcasts is somewhat less
in scope than that accorded to print media.The broadcast media have also established a
uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos. Newspapers and current books are
found only in metropolitan areas and in the poblaciones of municipalities accessible to fast
and regular transportation. Even here, there are low income masses who find the cost of
books, newspapers, and magazines beyond their humble means. Basic needs like food and
shelter perforce enjoy high priorities.
Same; Same; Same; Same.On the other hand, the transistor radio is found
everywhere. The television set is also becoming universal. Their message may be
simultaneously received by a national or regional audience of listeners including the
indifferent or unwilling who happen to be within reach of a blaring radio or television set.
The materials broadcast over the airwaves reach every person of every age, persons of
varying susceptibilities to persuasion, persons of different I.Q.s and mental capabilities,
persons whose reactions to inflammatory or offensive speech would be difficult to monitor or
predict. The impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and immediate. Unlike readers of the
printed work, the radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate, analyze, and reject the
utterance.
Same; Same; Same; Police Powers; Government has the right to protect itself against
broadcast media.The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which
incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. Radio and television may not be used to organize
a rebellion or to signal the start of widespread uprising. At the same time, the people have a
right to be informed. Radio and television would have little reason for existence if broadcasts
are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining utterances. Since they are the
most convenient and popular means of disseminating varying views on public issues, they
also deserve special protection.
Same; Same; Same; Broadcast stations deserve special protection.Broadcast stations
deserve the special protection given
630
ANNOTATED
Dans, Jr.
to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of the
Constitution.
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
Moot and Academic; Judgment; A decision may be made even on a moot and academic
case.As may be gleaned from the voting of the Justices, the majority favors the view that
even if a case were moot and academic, a statement of the governing principle is appropriate
in the resolution of dismissal for the guidance not only of the parties but of others similarly
situated. There are three Justices, however, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr. and de la Fuente, who
would strictly adhere to the concept that the case being moot and academic, the appropriate
disposition is that of simply dismissing the action. That is to abide by the teaching of orthodox
learning. The Philippines, however, has deviated from such a strict view. Nor is this approach
of recent vintage. As early as Alejandrino v. Quezon decided in 1924, this Court,
notwithstanding the absence of jurisdiction, expressed through Justice Malcolm what
principle of law should govern.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
Supreme Court; Moot and Academic; Judgments; The withdrawal of a case should not
preclude the Supreme Court from laying down guiding precepts to educate the Bench.While
withdrawal of the petition for loss of interest on petitioners part may be granted, still the
Court should unequivocably set forth the guiding and controlling precepts or doctrines in
pursuance of its symbolic function of educating bench and bar as in Salonga on the protection
and preservation of basic constitutional rights. As stated in my separate concurring
opinion, infra, public respondents summary closure of petitioners radio station failed to
observe the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of
press and media clauses of the Constitution, as well as the basic clear and present danger
test. As stated by the now Chief Justice in De la Camara vs. Enage, the fact that the case has
become moot should not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in language clear and
unmistakable . . . for the guidance of lower court judges [and other public officers] the
controlling and authoritative doctrines that should be observed, so that full respect may be
accorded to basic constitutional rights.
631
VOL. 137, JULY 19, 1985 631
Dans, Jr.
Constitutional Law; Radio and Television; Due Process; Public officials do not have the
power to summarily close down broadcast stations.The same ponente has now likewise
obtained the Courts near-unanimous approval of the decision at bar, which restates basic
and established constitutional principles under the Rule of Law that public officials do not
possess absolute power to summarily close down a broadcasting station nor to arbitrarily
deny its application for renewal of license; that their broad and peremptory regulatory powers
must be exercised with punctilious regard for the due process clause which in the words of
the Chief Justice signifies free-dom from arbitrariness [and] is the embodiment of the
sporting idea of fair play; that radio and television which would have little reason for
existence if broadcasts are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining
utterances deserve the special protection of the preferred right of free press and speech; that
comment on and criticism of public officials in the conduct of public affairs is not to be taken
as inciting to sedition or subversive actsthat to curb or punish the exercise of such
preferred right of comment and criticism there must exist the clear and present danger of a
substantive and grave evil that the State has a clear right to prevent, and hence, there must
be a clear showing to this effect of the words used and when and how they were used; that
since the 1918 case of U.S. vs. Bustos, the Court has taught that the interest of society and
the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs, Complete
liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The
sharp incision of its probe relieves the abcesses of officialdom; that the guarantee of free
speech is a safety valve allowing parties the opportunity to give vent to their views, even if
contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion which is grounded on faith in the power of an
appeal to reason by all the peaceful means for gaining access to the mind and serves to
avert force and explosions due to restrictions upon rational modes of communication; and
that through the rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, the citizens can
participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage
but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public
officers and that since the threat of sanctions may deter the exercise [of these delicate and
vulnerable . . . and supremely precious freedoms] almost as potently as the actual application
of sanctions, they need breathingspace to survive permitting government regulation only
with narrow specificity.
Same; Same; Same; Same.The Courts decision makes short shrift of respondents
procedural arguments that non-renewal of peti-
632
ANNOTATED
Dans, Jr.
tioners license has made the petition moot and academic (brushed aside as an
afterthought or substitute for the respondents original position that the closure was due to
national security) and that mandamus would not lie to compel the reopening of the radio
station brought about by their inaction on petitioners timely application for renewal of the
license. It serves notice that in the exercise of the judicial power vested in it by the
Constitution, it will issue the equitable writs of certiorari and mandamus to do substantial
justice and restore the status quo. In this case, the summary closure of petitioners radio
station in 1980 having been declared null and void and no valid ground for non-renewal of its
license having been shown, it is as if the said license has been duly extended up to the end of
the current term or year. It is expected that respondents will forthwith return the crystal of
the transmitter and place no further obstacle to the prompt reopening of the radio station so
that petitioner may pick up the broken pieces and rightfully resume its operations (after
almost five years of closure) in accordance with the judgment at bar.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
Constitutional Law; Due Process; Radio and Television; The closure of the radio station
at bar without hearing deserves to be condemned.The closure of the petitioners radio
station on grounds of national security without elaboration of the grounds and without
hearing deserves to be condemned in no uncertain terms for it is manifest that due process
was not observed. If there is an idea which should be impressed in the minds of those who
wield power it is that power must be used in a reasonable manner. Arbitrariness must be
eschewed. The main opinion, that of Justice Teehankee and the case of Ang Tibay vs. Court
of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 [1940], should be made required reading materials for
public officials who huff and puff with power making themselves not merely obnoxious but
dangerous as well.
RESOLUTION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition was filed to compel the respondents to allow the reopening of Radio
Station DYRE which had been summarily closed on grounds of national security.
633
VOL. 137, JULY 19, 1985 633
Dans, Jr.
The petitioner contended that it was denied due process when it was closed on the
mere allegation that the radio station was used to incite people to sedition. It alleged
that no hearing was held and not a bit of proof was submitted to establish a factual
basis for the closure. The petitioner was not informed beforehand why administrative
action which closed the radio station was taken against it. No action was taken by
the respondents to entertain a motion seeking the reconsideration of the closure
action.
The petitioner also raised the issue of freedom of speech. It appears from the
records that the respondents general charge of inciting people to commit acts of
sedition arose from the petitioners shift towards what it stated was the coverage of
public events and the airing of programs geared towards public affairs.
On March 25, 1985, before the Court could promulgate a decision squarely passing
upon all the issues raised, the petitioner through its president, Mr. Rene G. Espina
suddenly filed a motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition.
The petitioner alleged:
1. 1.Petitioner Eastern Broadcasting Corporation has already sold its radio

broadcasting station in favor of Manuel B. Pastrana as well as its rights and
interest in the radio station DYRE in Cebu including its right to operate and
its equipment;
2. 2.Respondent National Telecommunications Commission has expressed its
willingness to grant to the said new owner Manuel B. Pastrana the requisite
license and franchise to operate the said radio station and to approve the sale
of the radio transmitter of said station DYRE;
3. 3.In view of the foregoing, petitioner has no longer any interest in said case,
and the new owner, Manuel B. Pastrana is likewise not interested in pursuing
the case any further.
The case, therefore, has become moot and academic. However, for the guidance of
inferior courts and administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions, the
Court issues the following guidelines:
(1) The cardinal primary requirements in administrative proceedings laid down by
this Court in Ang Tibay v. Court of
634
ANNOTATED
Dans, Jr.
Industrial Relations (69 Phil. 635) should be followed before a broadcast station may
be closed or its operations curtailed.1
(2) It is necessary to reiterate that while there is no controlling and precise

definition of due process, it furnishes an unavoidable standard to which government
action must conform in order that any deprivation of life, liberty, or property, in each
appropriate case, may be valid (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Association v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849).
(3) All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad
protection of the freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for limitations on
freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present danger rulethat words
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the lawmaker
has a right to prevent. In his Constitution of the Philippines (2nd Edition, pp. 569-
570) Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando cites at least nine of our decisions which
apply the test(Primicias v. Fugoso [80 Phil. 71], American Bible Society v. City of
Manila [101 Phil. 386], Cabansag v. Fernandez [102 Phil. 152], Vera v. Arca [28
SCRA 351], Navarro v. Villegas [31 SCRA 931], Imbong v. Ferrer [35 SCRA
28], Badoy v. Commission on Elec-tions [35 SCRA 285], People v. Ferrer [48 SCRA
382], and the Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philip-
________________
1 The requirements are: (1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and
submit evidence in support thereof; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision
must have something to support itself; (4) the evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence means
such reasonable evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; (5) the
decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected; (6) the tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate; (7) the board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision
rendered.
635
VOL. 137, JULY 19, 1985 635
Dans, Jr.
pine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. [51 SCRA 189]. More recently, the clear and present
danger test was applied in J.B.L. Reyes in behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition v.
Bagatsing [125 SCRA 553].
(4) The clear and present danger test, however, does not lend itself to a simplistic
and all embracing interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums.
Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated among
qualified users. A broadcast corporation cannot simply appropriate a certain
frequency without regard for government regulation or for the rights of others.
All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of
expression clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of television and radio
broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper
and print media.
The American Court in Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica
Foundation (438 U.S. 726), confronted with a patently offensive and indecent regular
radio program, explained why radio broadcasting, more than other forms of
communications, receives the most limited protection from the free expression clause.
First, broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of
all citizens. Material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in
public, but in the privacy of his home. Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to
children. Bookstores and motion picture theaters may be prohibited from making
certain material available to children, but the same selectivity cannot be done in radio
or television, where the listener or viewer is constantly tuning in and out.
Similar considerations apply in the area of national security.
The broadcast media have also established a uniquely pervasive presence in the
lives of all Filipinos. Newspapers and current books are found only in metropolitan
areas and in the poblaciones of municipalities accessible to fast and regular
transportation. Even here, there are low income masses who find the cost of books,
newspapers, and magazines beyond their humble means. Basic needs like food and
shelter perforce enjoy high priorities.
636
ANNOTATED
Dans, Jr.
On the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere. The television set is also
becoming universal. Their message may be simultaneously received by a national or
regional audience of listeners including the indifferent or unwilling who happen to be
within reach of a blaring radio or television set. The materials broadcast over the
airwaves reach every person of every age, persons of varying susceptibilities to
persuasion, persons of different I.Q.s and mental capabilities, persons whose
reactions to inflammatory or offensive speech would be difficult to monitor or predict.
The impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and immediate. Unlike readers of the
printed work, the radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate, analyze, and
reject the utterance.
(5) The clear and present danger test, therefore, must take the particular
circumstances of broadcast media into account. The supervision of radio stations
whether by government or through self-regulation by the industry itself calls for
thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated handling.
The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the
listeners to violently overthrow it. Radio and television may not be used to organize
a rebellion or to signal the start of widespread uprising. At the same time, the people
have a right to be informed. Radio and television would have little reason for
existence if broadcasts are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining
utterances. Since they are the most convenient and popular means of disseminating
varying views on public issues, they also deserve special protection.
(6) The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a
representative democracy. In the 1918 case of United States v. Bustos (37 Phil. 731)
this Court was already stressing that.
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of
public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the
case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men
in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged
with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with
reference
637
VOL. 137, JULY 19, 1985 637
Dans, Jr.
to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual
be exalted.
(7) Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by
the due process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the case having become moot and academic, the petitioners
motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J., concurs and submits a brief statement.
Teehankee, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
Makasiar, J., I concur only in the dispositive portionfor dismissal as moot
and academic.
Aquino, J., no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., for dismissal being moot and academic.
Abad Santos, J., see concurring opinion.
De la Fuente, J., In the dismissal, as prayed for by petitioner per its motion to
dismiss.
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
I concur in the ponencia of Justice Gutierrez, Jr., notable for its reiteration of the
clear and present danger principle as the standard of limitation on free speech and
press, as decided by a unanimous court in J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing. 1
As may be gleaned from the voting of the Justices, the majority favors the view
that even if a case were moot and academic, a statement of the governing principle is
appropriate in the resolution of dismissal for the guidance not only of the parties but
of others similarly situated. There are three Justices, however, Makasiar,
Concepcion, Jr. and de la
________________
1G.R. No. 65366, November 9, 1983, 125 SCRA 553.

638
ANNOTATED
Dans, Jr.
Fuente, who would strictly adhere to the concept that the case being moot and
academic, the appropriate disposition is that of simply dismissing the action. That is
to abide by the teaching of orthodox learning. The Philippines, however, has deviated
from such a strict view. Nor is this approach of recent vintage. As early as Alejandrino
v. Quezon decided in 1924, this Court, notwithstanding the absence of jurisdiction,
2
expressed through Justice Malcolm what principle of law should govern. Similarly
in Osmea, Jr. v. Pendatun, notwithstanding well-founded doubts as to jurisdiction
3
and a finding that the case should be dismissed for being moot and academic, this
Court, through the then Justice, later Chief Justice Bengzon, passed upon the legal
question raised. In that sense, the Philippines has followed an approach distinct from
that of the United States, notwithstanding the influence of American Constitutional
law on our legal system.
Also let me state for the record that the original opinion prepared by Justice
Gutierrez, Jr. could not have been released in April after the petitioner on March 25,
1985 filed a motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition. After that date, some
members of the Court wanted the matter discussed anew as to its appropriate
disposition. That is the explanation why such an opinion was never sent to the Office
of the Chief Justice. Nor is it to be forgotten that even if a decision signed by all the
other members were thus submitted, the practice traditionally followed is for whoever
is Chief Justice to take a few days for the expression of his viewsif minded to do so.
Prefatory Statement: As stated in the resolution penned by Mr. Justice Gutierrez, the
release in early April of this year of the Courts decision declaring null and void
respondent commissions challenged summary order for closure of petitioners radio
station (definitely attended by complete absence of any hearing before or after the
closure itself) and granting the petition for issuance of a writ of mandatory
injunction for the
________________
246 Phil. 83.

3109 Phil. 863 (1960).
639
VOL. 137, JULY 19, 1985 639
Dans, Jr.
reopening of the station, was overtaken by petitioners suddenly filed motion to
withdraw or dismiss the petition.
Initially, Mr. Justice Gutierrez was for applying the Salonga formula and a
releasing nevertheless his sixteen-page extended opinion and decision on the merits.
He was of the view, fully shared by me, that (T)he need for guiding principles on
b
constitutionalism is particularly keen in critical times and in periods of transition.

There is then a tendency to be impulsive in the exercise of power. The use of illegal
shortcuts and the breakdown of traditional restraints and discipline, unfortunately,
is most pronounced in troubled times. It becomes necessary for the Court to
emphasize the importance of adherence to the mandates of the Constitution. The
efforts, no matter how well meaning, to quell a rebellion or to stave off economic
disaster cannot succeed if they transgress basic rights and, therefore, alienate our
people. But since such approach did not gain the concurrence of the majority, he has
replaced his original ponencia with the abbreviated Resolution (of a little over four
pages) now released, which carries the required majority and issues guidelines for
the guidance of inferior courts and administrative tribunals exercising quasi-
________________
a In Salonga vs. Pao, G.R. No. 59524, February 18, 1985, while the prosecutors had secured the
dismissal by the trial court of the questioned criminal charges against petitioner Jovito Salonga before our
decision ordering such dismissal could be promulgated, the Court nevertheless issued the decision ruling
squarely on the merits cognizant of the need to educate prosecutors and judges that they must be zealously
concerned for the rights of the accused before a criminal prosecution is initiated.
b See my separate opinions in Caete, G.R. No. 63776, promulgated August 16, 1984,
and Sarmiento, G.R. No. 62119, promulgated August 27, 1984, where on the issue of the effect of a decision
of acquittal upon a PCO, I dissented from the perfunctory majority resolution dismissing the case as moot
because the acquitted defendants were finally released several agonizing months after their acquittal, on
the ground that such decisive and fundamental issue of public interest and importance affecting the very
liberties of the people . . . demands to be resolved, rather than emasculated with a dismissal of the case as
moot, for the guidance of public respondents and all concerned.
640
ANNOTATED
Dans, Jr.
judicial functions.
While withdrawal of the petition for loss of interest on petitioners part may be
granted, still the Court should unequivocally set forth the guiding and controlling
precepts or doctrines in pursuance of its symbolic function of educating bench and bar
as in Salonga on the protection and preservation of basic constitutional rights. As
stated in my separate concurring opinion, infra, public respondents summary closure
of petitioners radio station failed to observe the special protection given to all forms
of media by the due process and freedom of press and media clauses of the
Constitution, as well as the basic clear and present danger test. As stated by the now
Chief Justice in De la Camara vs. Enage, the fact that the case has become moot
c
should not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in language clear and
unmistakable . . . for the guidance of lower court judges [and other public officers] the
controlling and authoritative doctrines that should be observed, so that full respect
may be accorded to basic constitutional rights.
My separate concurring opinion which follows hereinafter was prepared and
scheduled for promulgation on or about April 9, 1985 upon its return on said date to
the ponente, Mr. Justice Gutierrez, for transmittal to the Office of the Chief Justice
for the purpose. But this was overtaken by the filing of petitioners motion for
withdrawal or dismissal of the petition. Hence, my said concurring opinion should be
read in such time context (in the same manner as in the 1974 martial law cases
of Aquino, Jr. and Diokno vs. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 309, September 17, 1974, wherein
the promulgation of the decision and separate opinions originally schedule for
September 12, 1974 was deferred to the following week with the intervening release
from detention of Senator Jose W. Diokno).
xxx xxx xxx
________________
41 SCRA 1, 4 (1971); see also PACU vs. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil. 806; Gonzales vs. Marcos, 65
c
SCRA 624; and Aquino vs. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183.

641
VOL. 137, JULY 19, 1985 641
Dans, Jr.
The main opinion reaffirms in language unmistakable that broadcast media (radio
and television) while subject to government licensing (for allocation of the use of
airwaves and frequencies) and regulation (considering their pervasive presence and
instant impact) are equally protected by the preferred freedoms of speech and of the
press and by the rudimentary requirements of due process against arbitrary
deprivation of life, liberty and property; that the basic standard for restricting or
punishing the exercise of these preferred freedoms is the clear and present danger
testdanger of a serious and imminent evil sought to be prevented; that the
summary closure in October, 1980 of petitioners radio station (definitely attended
by complete absence of any hearing before or after the closure itself) violated its
constitutional rights and must therefore be declared null and void, and consequently,
the writ of mandatory injunction for the reopening of the station, as prayed for, must
issue.
Congratulations are due the ponente Justice Hugo Gutierrez, Jr. who secured the
Courts near-unanimous concurrence in the recent case of Salonga vs. Pao which 1
went back to the fundamentals and stressed, in discharge of the Courts symbolic
function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional
guarantees that (I)nfinitely more important than conventional adherence to general
rules of criminal procedure is respect for the citizens right to be free not only from
arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious
prosecution. The integrity of a democratic society is corrupted if a person is carelessly
included in the trial of around forty persons when on the very face of the record no
evidence linking him to the alleged conspiracy exists, that x x x if there is any
principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any
other it is the principle of free thoughtnot free thought for those who agree with us
but freedom for the thought that we hate; that freedom of expression is a preferred
right and
________________
1 G.R. No. 59524, Feb. 18, 1985. Eleven members concurred with abstentions of Justices Aquino, De la
Fuente and Alampay.

642
ANNOTATED
Dans, Jr.
therefore stands on a higher level than substantive economic or other liberties, that
this must be so because the lessons of history, both political and legal, illustrate that
freedom of thought and speech is the indispensable condition of nearly every other
form of freedom. Protection is especially mandated for political discussions. This
Court is particularly concerned when allegations are made that restraints have been
imposed upon mere criticisms of government and public officials. Political discussion
is essential to the ascertainment of political truth. It cannot be the basis of criminal
indictments; that there must be tolerance of political hyperbole since debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open and it may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials, that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do
not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action; that political discussion even
among those opposed to the present administration is within the protective clause of
freedom of speech and expression. The same cannot be construed as subversive
activities per se or as evidence of membership in a subversive organization in the
absence of proof that such discussion was in furtherance of any plan to overthrow
the government through illegal means; that respondent court should have taken
these factors into consideration before concluding that a prima facie case exists
against the petitioner. Evidence must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances; and that
judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some
credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant
violation of a basic right which the courts are created to uphold. It bears repeating
that the judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating
constitutional rights. So it has been before. It should continue to be so.
643
VOL. 137, JULY 19, 1985 643
Dans, Jr.
The same ponente has now likewise obtained the Courts near-unanimous approval
of the decision at bar, which restates basic and established constitutional principles
2
under the Rule of Law that public officials do not possess absolute power to
summarily close down a broadcasting station nor to arbitrarily deny its application
for renewal of license; that their broad and peremptory regulatory powers must be
exercised with punctilious regard for the due process clause which in the words of
the Chief Justice signifies freedom from arbitrariness [and] is the embodiment of the
sporting idea of fair play; that radio and television which would have little reason
3
for existence if broadcasts are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining

utterances deserve the special protection of the preferred right of free press and
speech; that comment on and criticism of public officials in the conduct of public
affairs is not to be taken as inciting to sedition or subversive actsthat to curb or
punish the exercise of such preferred right of comment and criticism there must exist
the clear and present danger of a substantive and grave evil that the State has a clear
right to prevent, and hence, there must be a clear showing to this effect of the words
used and when and how they were used; that since the 1918 case of U.S. vs.
Bustos, the Court has taught that the interest of society and the maintenance of good
4
government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment

on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision
of its probe relieves the abcesses of officialdom; that the guarantee of free speech is
a safety valve allowing parties the opportunity to give vent to their views, even if
contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion which is grounded on faith in the power
of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful means for gaining access to the mind and
serves to avert force and explosions due to restrictions upon
________________
2 Twelve members concurred, with abstentions of Justices Aquino and Concepcion, Jr.
3 Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Assn. vs. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849.
4 37 Phil. 731.
644
ANNOTATED
Dans, Jr.
rational modes of communication; and that through the rights of free expression,
5
free assembly and petition, the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic
establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the
administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers
and that since the threat of sanctions may deter the exercise [of these delicate and
vulnerable . . . and supremely precious freedoms] almost as potently as the actual
application of sanctions, they need breathing space to survive permitting
government regulation only with narrow specificity. 6
The late Justice Jose Abad Santos, martyr of the Japanese occupation, left us over
half a century ago the legacy of his dissent against what he deemed were unjustified
invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctities of a mans
home and the privacies of life in People vs. Rubio that the commendable zeal (of
7
internal revenue agents) if allowed to override constitutional limitations would

become obnoxious to fundamental principles of liberty. And if we are to be saved
from the sad experiences of some countries which have constitutions only in name,
we must insist that governmental authority be exercised within constitutional limits;
for, after all, what matters is not so much what the people write in their constitutions
as the spirit in which they observe their provisions.
In the same vein, the late Chief Justice Ricardo Paras in the landmark case
of Primicias vs. Fugoso enjoined all to abide by the teaching of the 1907 sedition case
8
of U.S. vs. Apurado that instances of disorderly conduct by individual members of

9
a crowd [be not seized] as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and
tumultuous rising against the authorities, for if the prosecution be permitted to
seize upon every in-
________________
5 J.B.L. Reyes vs. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 (1983), per Fernando, C.J.
6 PBM Employees Organization vs. PBM Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 189, per Makasiar, J.
7 57 Phil. 384 (1932).
8 80 Phil. 71 (1948).
9 7 Phil. 422, 426, per Carson, J.
645
VOL. 137, JULY 19, 1985 645
Dans, Jr.
stance of such disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd as an excuse to
characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultous rising against the authorities,
then the right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances would become a
delusion and snare and the attempt to exercise it on the most righteous occasion and
in the most peaceable manner would expose all those who took part therein to the
severest and most unmerited punishment, if the purposes which they sought to attain
did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. If instances of disorderly
conduct occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and
punished therefor.
Indeed, as I stressed in my dissenting opinion in the recent case of German vs.
Barangan, to require the citizen at every step to assert his rights and to go to court
10
is to render illusory his rights. All concerned, the governors as well as the governed,
must observe what they have written in their constitution in their very spirit and
intent, so that as written by Justice Makasiar in the PBM case the Bill of Rights
11
[might not turn out to be] a useless attempt to limit the power of government and
cease to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the
influential and powerful, and of oligarchspolitical, economic or otherwise.
The Courts decision makes short shrift of respondents procedural arguments that
non-renewal of petitioners license has made the petition moot and academic
(brushed aside as an afterthought or substitute for the respondents original position
that the closure was due to national security) and that mandamus would not lie to
compel the reopening of the radio station brought about by their inaction on
petitioners timely application for renewal of the license. It serves notice that in the
exercise of the judicial power vested in it by the Constitution, it will issue the
equitable writs of certiorari and mandamus to do substantial justice and restore
the status quo. In this case, the summary closure of petitioners radio station in 1980
having been declared null and void and no valid ground
________________
G.R. No. 68828, prom. march 27, 1985.

10
Supra, see fn. 6.

11
646
ANNOTATED
Dans, Jr.
for non-renewal of its license having been shown, it is as if the said license has been
duly extended up to the end of the current term or year. It is expected that
respondents will forthwith return the crystal of the transmitter and place no further
obstacle to the prompt reopening of the radio station so that petitioner may pick up
the broken pieces and rightfully resume its operations (after almost five years of
closure) in accordance with the judgment at bar.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
The petitioner has filed a motion to withdraw its petition for the reasons stated in its
motion. The Court has granted the motion but this circumstance should not deter the
Court from educating those who wield power which if exercised arbitrarily will make
a mockery of the Bill of Rights.
The closure of the petitioners radio station on grounds of national security without
elaboration of the grounds and without hearing deserves to be condemned in no
uncertain terms for it is manifest that due process was not observed. If there is an
idea which should be impressed in the minds of those who wield power it is that power
must be used in a reasonable manner. Arbitrariness must be eschewed. The main
opinion, that of Justice Teehankee and the case of Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, 69 Phil. 635 [1940], should be made required reading materials for public
officials who huff and puff with power making themselves not merely obnoxious but
dangerous as well.
Motion granted.
Notes.The respondent judge did not abuse its discretion in granting the
injunction as MECO has the unquestionable right to be heard on the NPC-GMC
direct service contract and was not accorded such right by the NPC. (National Power
Corp. vs. Jacinto, 134 SCRA 431).
Petitioners and oppositors to the PLDT application were accorded due process by
NTC. (Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. vs. National Telecommunication
Commission, 131 SCRA 200).
647
VOL. 137, JULY 19, 1985 647
Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile
In the interplay between the due process clause of the Constitution and the exercise
of police power, especially where restriction on property use is concerned, the latter
is accorded much leeway. (Bautista vs. Juinio, 127 SCRA 329).
No violation of due process is committed even where no hearing was conducted
where the parties were given a chance to explain their side. (Tajonera vs.
Lamaroza, 110 SCRA 438).
o0o

VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973 189
Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization
vs. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.
No. L-31195. June 5, 1973.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION, NICANOR
TOLENTINO,FLORENCIO PADRIGANO,RUFINO, ROXAS,MARIANO DE
LEON,ASENCION PACIENTE,BONIFACIO VACUNA,BENJAMIN PAGCU and
RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners, vs.PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO.,
INC.and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
190
ANNOTATED
Political and Constitutional Law; Basic concepts and principles underlying a
democracy.In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of
the human personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our
civilization. The inviolable character of man as an individual must be "protected to the largest
possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person."
Same; Purpose of Bill of Rights.The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of
liberty, equality and security "against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the
passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who
have no patience with general principles." The purpose of the Bill of Rights is to "withdraw
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts..."
Same; Same.The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to
petition are included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the
rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than
the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority who want to
talk, but also to benefit the majority who refuse to listen. And as Justice Douglas cogently
stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are not safe
unless the liberties of all are protected.
Same; Same.The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only
civil rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness
and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not
merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the
administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The
citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers
or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on
erring public officers and employees.
Same; Same; Human rights supreme to property rights.While the Bill of Rights also
protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized.
Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our
society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise
191
VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973 191
Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization vs. Philippine Blooming Mills Co.,
Inc.
almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to
survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and
property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human
rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to
limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of
officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchspolitical, economic
or otherwise.
Same; Same; Same; Freedom of assembly and expression occupy a preferred position.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a
preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and
political institutions; and such "priority gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction
not permitting dubious intrusions."
Same; Same; Same; Why human civil liberties more superior than property rights
disclosed.The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact
that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its
object or purposethat the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive
would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. On the other hand,
a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion,
namely, existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has
the right to prevent. So it has been stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando
in Gonzales vs. Comelec and reiterated by the writer of the opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer. It
should be noted that Mr. Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs. Comelec, like Justices Douglas,
Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs. Sullivan, believes that the freedoms of speech and
of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are
absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to
choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed," even as Mr. Justice Castro relies
on the balancing-of-interest test. Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable danger
rule formulated by Chief Judge Learned Hand, viz.whether the gravity of the evil,
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free expression as is necessary to
avoid the danger.
Same; Same; Same; Labor Law; Workers who joined a demonstration against police
abuses did not violate CBA "no-strike no-lockout" provision.Tested against the foregoing
principles, the
192
ANNOTATED
Organization vs. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc
conclusion of the Court of Industrial Relations that the petitioners by their "concerted
act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of Work," are guilty of bargaining in bad faith
and hence violated the collective bargaining agreement cannot be sustained. The
demonstration held by petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacanang was against alleged
abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent firm.
Said demonstration was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom of expression in
general and of their right of assembly and of petition for redress of grievances in particular
before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, against the police officers of
the municipality of Pasig.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the duty of employer to protect employees against police
abuses.As a matter of fact, it was the duty of herein respondent firm to protect herein
petitioner Union and its members from the harassment of local police officers. It was to the
interest of herein respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and to take up the cudgels for,
its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as
a consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks to enhance its productivity as
well as profits.
Same; Same; Same; Demonstration against police abuses not a violation of collective
bargaining agreement.As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rightsfreedom of
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievancesover property
rights has been sustained. Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boonat once
the shield and armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-consuming
ideal of our enlightened civilizationbecomes Our Duty, if freedom and social justice have
any meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods that can
generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against
the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the
collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the
demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining
agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as
mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and
of petition.
Same; Demonstration against police abuses could not have been enjoined by any court.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been
legally enjoined by
193
VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973 193
Inc.
any court, for such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom of expression of
the workers, even if it legally appears to be an illegal picketing or strike.
Same; Labor Law; All employees of a firm and not merely those belonging to a particular
shift may join demonstration.The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its
employees to participate in the demonstration and that they suggested to the Union that only
the first and regular shift from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. should report for work in order that loss or
damage to the firm will be averted. This stand failed to appreciate the sine qua non of an
effective demonstration especially by a labor union, namely, the complete unity of the Union
members as well as their total presence at the demonstration site in order to generate the
maximum persuasive force that will gain for them not only public sympathy for the validity
of their cause but also immediate action on the part of the corresponding government
agencies with jurisdiction over the issues they raised against the local police. Circulation is
one of the aspects of freedom of expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then
by that much the circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished. ... At
any rate, the Union notified the company two days in advance of their projected
demonstration and the company could have made arrangements to counteract or prevent
whatever losses it might sustain by reason of the absence of its workers for one day, especially
in this case when the Union requested it to excuse only the day shift employees who will join
the demonstration. ... There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part
of the firm in rejecting the request... And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass
demonstration held against the Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness
on the part of the employer, which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Employer who refuses its employees to join demonstration against police
abuse guilty of unfair labor practice.Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm
to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged police
abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight petitioners from the service constituted
an unconstitutional restraint on their freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and
freedom of petition for redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor
practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of R.A. No. 875, otherwise known as
the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of R.A. 875 guarantees to the employees the right "to
engage in concerted activities for xxx mutual
194
ANNOTATED
Inc.
aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed in Section Three." xxx The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the
workers for the morning and regular shifts should not participate in the mass demonstration,
under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore state, "a potent means of inhibiting speech."
Evidence; Lack of finding the company did not suffer any loss means not such loss was
sustained.While the respondent Court found that the demonstration "paralyzed to a large
extent the operations of the complainant company," the said court did not make any finding
as to the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. This significant circumstance can only
means that the firm did not sustain any loss or damage.
Constitutional and Political Law; Labor Law; Dismissal from work of leaders of
demonstration against police abuses constitutes denial of social justice. Section 5 of Article
II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice to insure the
well-being and economic security of all of the people," which guarantee is emphasized by the
other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall afford
protection to labor xxx". Respondent Court as an agency of the State is under obligation at
all times to give meaning and substance to these constitutional guarantees in favor of the
working man; for otherwise these constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of
"meaningless constitutional patter." Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial
Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial
unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees of their right to self-
organization for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of their moral,
social and economic well-being." It is most unfortunate that said court failed to implement
this policy.xxx
Same; When a court acts against the Constitution, its judgments and orders become null
and void.Having violated the basic human rights of the laborers, the Court of Industrial
Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued in the instant case
are a nullity.
Same; CIR rules against late filing of a motion for reconsideration cannot prevail over
basic constitutional rights.Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed
two days late defeat the rights of the petitioning employees for their
195
VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973 195
Inc.
reinstatement? The answer should be obvious in the light of the aforecited cases. To
accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial Relations over basic human
rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic tenet of
constitutional government that the Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate
rules and regulations, but also does violence to natural reason and logic. The dominance and
superiority of the constitutional right over the aforesaid court procedural rule of necessity
should be affirmed.
Same.It is thus seen that a procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives
way to a constitutional right. In the instant case, the procedural rule of the Court of
Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the constitutional rights
invoked by herein petitioners even before the institution of the unfair labor practice charged
against them and in their defense to the said charge. In the case at bar, enforcement of the
basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most compelling reason to
deny application of a CIR rule which impinges on such human rights.
Same; Civil Procedure; Court may suspend its own rules.It is an accepted principle
that the Supreme Court has inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to except a particular
case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice requires." Mr. Justice Barredo in
his concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo reiterated this principle and added that
"Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cope with all situations without concerning
itself about procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do justice..." If we can
disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience to the Constitution renders more
imperative the suspension of a CIR rule that classes with the human rights sanctioned and
shielded with resolute concern by the specific guarantees outlined in the organic law.
Same; Same; Suspension of CIR rules authorized by C.A. 103.The suspension of the
application of Section 15 of the CIR rules with reference to the case at bar, is also authorized
by Section 20 of C.A. 103, the CIR charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to
"act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms."
PETITION FOR REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Industrial Relations.
196
ANNOTATED
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
L.S. Osorio & P. B. Castillon and J. C. Espinas & Associates for petitioners.
Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter referred to as

PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino
Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo
Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage
a mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses
of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2
P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from
8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of their
proposed demonstration.
The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador
of the respondent Court reproduced the following stipulation of facts of the parties
1. "3.That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass

demonstration at Malacanang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police
Department to be participated by the first shift (6:00 AM - 2:00 PM) workers as well
as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM)
in the morning of March 4, 1969;
2. "4.That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M.
at the Company's canteen, and those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthus
L. Ang, (2) Atty. Cesareo S. de Leon, Jr., (3) and all department and section heads.
For the
197
VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973 197
1. PBMEO: (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion
Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
2. "5.That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected mass
demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO, thru Benjamin Pagcu who
acted as spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned demonstration and
stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already
been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration
has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute
with Management;
3. "6.That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed
PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by
the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter
should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. For which reason,
the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, warned the PBMEO representatives that
workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of
absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers present who are the
organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following
morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the
existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike;
4. "7.That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked.
Company represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of:
Nicanor Tolentino, Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano. In
this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, Company reiterated and appealed to the
PBMEO representatives that while all workers may join the Malacanang
demonstration, the workers for the first and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be
excused from joining the demonstration and should report for work; and thus utilize
the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to violate the provisions of the
CBA, particularly Article XXIV: 'NO LOCKOUT - NO STRIKE'. All those who will
not follow this warning of the Company shall be dismissed; De Leon reiterated the
Company's warning that the officers shall be primarily liable being the organizers of
the mass demonstration. The union panel countered that it was rather too late to
change their plans inasmuch as the Malacanang demonstration will be held the
following morning; and
198
ANNOTATED
1. "8.That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the
Company which was received 9.50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as
follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING
DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.' " (Pars. 3-8, Annex "F", pp. 42-43, rec)
.
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the
demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift
workers should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the
workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from
6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, respondent Company filed on March 4, 1969, with
the respondent Court, a charge against petitioners and other employees who
composed the first shift, charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation
to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the
CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec). The
charge was accompanied by the joint affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon,
Jr. (Annex "B", pp. 21-24, rec). Thereafter, a corresponding complaint was filed, dated
April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and Acting Prosecutor
Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C", pp. 25-30, rec.).
In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did not
violate the existing CBA because they gave the respondent Company prior notice of
the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said mass demonstration was a
valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of
some Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration of
strike because it was not directed against the respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34,
rec.).
After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties,
Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an order dated September 15, 1969, found herein
petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein petitioners Florencio
Padrigano, Rufino Roxas Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna,
Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor
199
VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973 199
Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair
labor practice and were, as a consequence, considered to have lost their status as
employees of the respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.).
Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the aforesaid
order (p. 11, rec.); and that they filed on September 29, 1969, because September 28,
1969 fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a motion for reconsideration of said order dated
September 15, 1969, on the ground that it is contrary to law and the evidence, as well
as asked for ten (10) days within which to file their arguments pursuant to Sections
15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the CIR, as amended (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec.).
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63, rec.),
respondent Company averred that herein petitioners received on September 22, 1969,
the order dated September 17 (should be September 15), 1969; that under Section 15
of the amended Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, herein petitioners had five
(5) days from September 22, 1969 or until September 27, 1969, within which to file
their motion for reconsideration; and that because their motion for reconsideration
was two (2) days late, it should be accordingly dismissed, invoking Bien vs.
Castillo, which held among others, that a motion for extension of the five-day period
1
for the filing of a motion for reconsideration should be filed before the said five-day
period elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.).
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written arguments
dated October 11, 1969, in support of their motion for reconsideration (Annex "I", pp.
65-73, rec.).
In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent Court en banc dismissed the
motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners for being pro forma as it was filed
beyond the reglementary period prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.),
which herein petitioners received on October 28, 1969 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).
________________
1L-7428, May 24, 1955.

200
ANNOTATED
At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which was released on
October 24, 1969 and addressed to the counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear
the requirements of Sections 15, 16 and 17, as amended, of the Rules of the Court of
Industrial Relations, that a motion for reconsideration shall be filed within five (5)
days from receipt of its decision or order and that an appeal from the decision,
resolution or order of the C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be perfected within ten (10)
days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.).
On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court a petition
for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, on the ground that their failure to file
their motion for reconsideration on time was due to excusable negligence and honest
mistake committed by the president of the petitioner Union and of the office clerk of
their counsel, attaching thereto the affidavits of the said president and clerk
(Annexes "K", "K-1" and "K-2", rec.).
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the order dated
October 9, 1969, herein petitioners filed on November 3, 1969, with the Supreme
Court, a notice of appeal (Annex "L", pp. 88-89, rec.).
I
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which underlie the
issues posed by the case at bar.
1. (1)In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth
of the human personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of
faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of man as an individual must
be "protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs
as the citadel of his person." 2
2. (2)The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and
security "against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing
hour, the erosion of
_______________
2American Com. vs. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 421.

201
VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973 201
1. small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience
with general principles." 3
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights
is to withdraw "certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the courts. One's rights to life, liberty and property, to free
speech, or free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights
may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections." Laski 4
proclaimed that "the happiness of the individual, not the well-being of the State, was
the criterion by which its behaviour was to be judged. His interests, not its power, set
the limits to the authority it was entitled to exercise." 5
1. (3)The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition

are included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the
rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or
hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to
protect the minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the majority who
refuse to listen. And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of
6
one are the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are not safe unless the
liberties of all are protected. 7
2. (4)The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil
rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his
happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the
citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the
_______________
3 Justice Cardoso, Nature of Judicial Process, 90-93; Taada and Fernando, Constitution of the
Philippines, 1952 ed., 71.

4 West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638, italics supplied.
5 Laski, The State in Theory and Practice, 35-36.
6 See Chafee on Freedom of Speech and Press, 1955, pp. 13-14.
7 Justice Douglas, A Living Bill of Rights (1961), p. 64, cited by Justice Castro in Chavez v. Court of
Appeals, 24 SCRA, 663, 692.

202
ANNOTATED
1. government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public

affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is
accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental
officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of
the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees.
2. (5)While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human
rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are
8
"delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and

the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the
actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive,"
permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." 9
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the
Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be
an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential
and powerful, and of oligarchspolitical, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly
occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of
our civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the
10
sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." 11
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact
that a mere reasonable or rational
_______________
8 Marsh vs. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509; Tucker vs. Texas, 326 U.S. 517, 519-520.
9 NACCP vs. Button (Jan. 14, 1963) 371 U.S. 415, 433, 9 L.Ed. 2nd 405, 418.
10 Terminiello vs. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1.
11 Thomas vs. Collins (1945), 323 U.S., 516, 530, cited by Mr. Justice Castro in his concurring opinion
in Gonzales vs. Comelec, April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA 835, 895.

203
VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973 203
relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purposethat the
law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressivewould suffice to validate
a law which restricts or impairs property rights. On the other hand, a constitutional
12
or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely

existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has
the right to prevent. So it has been stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice
Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and reiterated by the writer of the opinion
in Imbong vs. Ferrer. It should be added that Mr. Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs.
13
Comelec, supra, like Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs.
Sullivan, believes that the freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful
14
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against
public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and
women by whom we shall be governed," even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the
15
balancing-of-interests test. Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable danger

16
rule formulated by Chief Judge Learned Hand, viz.whether the gravity of the evil,
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free expression as is
necessary to avoid the danger. 17
II
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass
demonstration was not a declaration of strike,
_________________
12 Edu vs. Ericta, L-32096, Oct. 24, 1970, 35 SCRA 481, 489; Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155, 1165-
66, 1175.
13 L-27833, April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA 835; L-32432, Sept. 11, 1970, 35 SCRA 28; Ignacio vs. Ela (1965), 99
Phil. 346; Primicias vs. Fugoso (1948), 80 Phil 71; Terminiello vs. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1; Virginia State Board
of Education vs. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639; 87 Law. Ed. 1628, 1638.
14 March 9, 1964, 376 U.S. 254, 270; Greenbelt, etc. vs. Bresler (May 18, 1970), 398 U.S. 6, 20; see also
Justice Fernando, Bill of Rights, 1970 Ed., pp. 78-81, 96-113.

15 Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra.
16 Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra.
17 Dennis vs. U.S. (1951), 341 U.S. 494.
204
ANNOTATED
concluded that by their "concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of
work," herein petitioners are guilty of bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the
collective bargaining agreement with private respondent Philippine Blooming Mills
Co., Inc. Set against and tested by the foregoing principles governing a democratic
society, such a conclusion cannot be sustained. The demonstration held by petitioners
on March 4, 1969 before Malacaang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig
policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent firm, said
demonstration was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom of expression
in general and of their right of assembly and of petition for redress of grievances in
particular before the appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, against
the police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They exercised their civil and political
rights for their mutual aid and protection from what they believe were police
excesses. As a matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm to
protect herein petitioner Union and its members from the harassment of local police
officers. It was to the interest of herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense
of, and to take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free
from harassment, vexation or peril and as a consequence perform more efficiently
their respective tasks to enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein
respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local
police. Was it securing peace for itself at the expense of its workers? Was it also
intimidated by the local police or did it encourage the local police to terrorize or vex
its workers? Its failure to defend its own employees all the more weakened the
position of its laborers vis-a-vis the alleged oppressive police, who might have been
all the more emboldened thereby to subject its lowly employees to further indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression as well as their right of
assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the
employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very
survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitutionthe
untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their
employer that it would
205
VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973 205
suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the
morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their
property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell the difference
between the life and death of the firm or its owners or its management. The
employees' pathetic situation was a stark realityabused, harassed and persecuted
as they believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As above
intimated, the condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local
police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence
as well as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately
compensated. The debasement of the human beingbroken in morale and brutalized
in spiritcan never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and the
scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish for
retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rightsfreedom of expression, of
peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievancesover property rights has
been sustained. Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boonat once
18
the shield and armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-
consuming ideal of our enlightened civilizationbecomes Our duty, if freedom and
social justice have any meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can produce
economic goods that can generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration
against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective
bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause
for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly
the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting
speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional
guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. 19
_______________
Marsh vs. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501; Tucker vs. Texas, 326 U.S. 517.
18
Pickering vs. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968).

19
206
ANNOTATED
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees,
according to the respondent Court of Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the
workers the "duty x x x to observe regular working hours." The strained construction
of the Court of Industrial Relations that such stipulated working shifts deny the
workers the right to stage a mass demonstration against police abuses during
working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life of the workers
and deserves severe condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom should not be
predicated on such a slender ground.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have
been legally enjoined by any court, for such an injunction would be trenching upon
the freedom of expression of the workers, even if it legally appears to be an illegal
picketing or strike. The respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the case at bar
20
concedes that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as the same
is not rooted in any industrial dispute although there is a concerted act and the
occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.).
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to
participate in the demonstration and that they suggested to the Union that only the
first and regular shift from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in order that loss
or damage to the firm will be averted. This stand failed to appreciate the sine qua
non of an effective demonstration especially by a labor union, namely the complete
unity of the Union members as well as their total presence at the demonstration site
in order to generate the maximum sympathy for the validity of their cause but also
immediate action on the part of the corresponding government agencies
_______________
20 Security Bank Employees Union-NATU vs. Security Bank and Trust Co., April 30, 1968, 23 SCRA 503-
515; Caltex vs. Lucero, April 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 1196, 1198-99; Malayang Manggagawa sa ESSO vs. ESSO,
July 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 801, 806, 807; De Leon vs. National Labor Union, 100 Phil., 792; PAFLU vs.
Barot, 99 Phil. 1008; Continental Manufacturing Employees Assoc., et al. vs. C.I.R., et al., L-26849, Sept.
30, 1970, 35 SCRA 204.
207
VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973 207
with jurisdiction over the issues they raised against the local police. Circulation is
one of the aspects of freedom of expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-
21
third, then by that much the circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is
diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the
purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be
regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate
their position and abet continued alleged police persecution. At any rate, the Union
notified the company two days in advance of their projected demonstration and the
company could have made arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever losses it
might sustain by reason of the absence of its workers for one day, especially in this
case when the Union requested it to excuse only the day-shift employees who will join
the demonstration on March 4, 1969 which request the Union reiterated in their
telegram received by the company at 9:50 in the morning of March 4, 1969, the day
of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There was a lack of human understanding
or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the request of the Union for excuse
from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration. And to
regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the Pasig
police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer,
which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
III
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal
on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the
mass demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of
the eight (8) petitioners from the
______________
21 Sotto vs. Ruiz, 41 Phil. 468; Shuttleworth vs. Birmingham (1969), 394 U.S. 147; Largent vs. Texas, 318
U.S. (1943) 418; Jamison vs. Texas, (1943) 318 U.S. 413; Lovell vs. Griffin (1938) 303 U.S. 444; Grosjean vs.
American Press Co. (1936) 297 U.S. 233; Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil., 383; Justice Fernando, Bill of Rights,
1970 Ed., pp. 90-93.
208
ANNOTATED
service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on their freedom of expression,
freedom of assembly and freedom to petition for redress of grievances, the respondent
firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section
3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 875 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in concerted
activities for x x x mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair
labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of their rights guraranteed in Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the
workers of the respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was for their mutual aid and
protection against alleged police abuses, denial of which was interference with or
restraint on the right of the employees to engage in such a common action to better
shield themselves against such alleged police indignities. The insistence on the part
of the respondent firm that the workers for the morning and regular shifts should not
participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore
stated, "a potent means of inhibiting speech." 22
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection, deserves at least
equal protection as the concerted action of employees in giving publicity to a letter
complaint charging a bank president with immorality, nepotism, favoritism and
discrimination in the appointment and promotion of bank employees. We further 23
ruled in the Republic Savings Bank case, supra, that for the employees to come within
the protective mantle of Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1) of Republic Act No. 875,
"it is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be
contemplated," as long as the concerted activity is for the furtherance of their
interests. 24
_______________
22 Pickering vs. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 574, 20 L.Ed. 2nd, 811, 820.
23 Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R., et al., Sept. 27, 1967, 21 SCRA 226, 232, 233, 661, 662, 663-664.
24 21 SCRA 233.
209
VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973 209
As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned order of
respondent Court dated September 15, 1969, the company, "while expressly
acknowledging, that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the Union
guaranteed by the Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that "any demonstration
for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company"
and "warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and
regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company,
particularly the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who
shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed,
because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be
amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's brief). Such threat of dismissal
tended to coerce the employees from joining the mass demonstration. However, the
issues that the employees raised against the local police, were more important to
them because they had the courage to proceed with the demonstration, despite such
threat of dismissal. The most that could happen to them was to lose a day's wage by
reason of their absence from work on the day of the demonstration. One day's pay
means much to a laborer, more especially if he has a family to support. Yet, they were
willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that their demonstration would bring
about the desired relief from police abuses. But management was adamant in
refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their right of free speech, free
assembly and the right to petition for redress.
Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to demand
from the workers proof of the truth of the alleged abuses inflicted on them by the local
police, it thereby concedes that the evidence of such abuses should properly be
submitted to the corresponding authorities having jurisdiction over their complaint
and to whom such complaint may be referred by the President of the Philippines for
proper investigation and action with a view to disciplining the local police officers
involved.
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations found that
the demonstration "paralyzed to a large
210
ANNOTATED
extent the operations of the complainant company," the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations did not make any finding as to the fact of loss actually sustained
by the firm. This significant circumstance can only mean that the firm did not sustain
any loss or damage. It did not present evidence as to whether it lost expected profits
for failure to comply with purchase orders on that day; or that penalties were exacted
from it by customers whose orders could not be filled that day of the demonstration;
or that purchase orders were cancelled by the customers by reason of its failure to
deliver the materials ordered; or that its own equipment or materials or products
were damaged due to absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the contrary, the
company saved a sizable amount in the form of wages for its hundreds of workers,
cost of fuel, water and electric consumption that day. Such savings could have amply
compensated for unrealized profits or damages it might have sustained by reason of
the absence of its workers for only one day.
IV
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as
well as the right to petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal
of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with the demonstration and
consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise
assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of
the Constitution imposes upon the State "the pomotion of social justice to insure the
well-being and economic security of all of the people," which guarantee is emphasized
by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State
shall afford protection to labor x x x". Respondent Court of Industrial Relations as an
agency of the State is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to
these constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man; for otherwise these
constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless constitutional
patter." Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined
to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by
encouraging and protecting the exercise by
211
VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973 211
employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining
and for the promotion of their moral, social and economic well-being." It is most
unfortunate in the case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the very
governmental agency designed therefor, failed to implement this policy and failed to
keep faith with its avowed missionits raison d'etreas ordained and directed by
the Constitution.
V
It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the
court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment is null and void and confers
no rights. Relief from a criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional
liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the
finality of the judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of
an individual, who is convicted by final judgment through a forced confession, which
violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination; or who is denied the right
25
to present evidence in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty without due process
of law, even after the accused has already served sentence for twenty-two years.
26 27
Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon
these constitutional immunities of petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to
such rights and aggravated the inhumanity to which the aggrieved workers claimed
they had been subjected by the municipal police. Having violated these basic human
rights of the laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction
and the questioned orders it issued in the instant case are a nullity. Recognition and
protection of such freedoms are imperative on all public offices including
_______________
25 Justice Sanchez in Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, 692, Aug. 19, 1968; see also concurring
opinion of Justice Castro; Camasura vs. Provost Marshall, 78 Phil. 131.

26 Abriol vs. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525, 1949.
27 Fay vs. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
212
ANNOTATED
the courts as well as private citizens and corporations, the exercise and enjoyment
28
of which must not be nullified by a mere procedural rule promulgated by the Court of
Industrial Relations exercising a purely delegated legislative power, when even a law
enacted by Congress must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of these human
rights. There is no time limit to the exercise of these freedoms. The right to enjoy
them is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the printing of one article or the
staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing immunity, to be invoked and
exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to be rectified,
abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise, these guarantees
in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by a rule on procedure prescribing the period
for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for time. And in such a contest
between an employer and its laborer, the latter eventually loses because he cannot
employ the best and dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the required
diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with which to pay for
competent legal services. 28-a
VI
The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that a motion for reconsideration of
its order or writ should be filed within five (5) days from notice thereof and that the
arguments in support of said motion shall be filed within ten (10) days from the date
of filing of such motion for reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above intimated, these rules
of procedure were promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations pursuant to a
legislative delegation. 29
The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days
from notice on September 22, 1969 of the order dated September 15, 1969 or two (2)
days late.
_____________
28 West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette, supra.

28-aVictorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. W.C.C., L-25665, May 22, 1969, 28 SCRA 285-298.
29 Sec. 20, Com. Act No. 103, as amended.
213
VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973 213
Petitioners claim that they could have filed it on September 28, 1969, but it was a
Sunday.
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days late
defeat the rights of the petitioning employees? Or more directly and concretely, does
the inadvertent omission to comply with a mere Court of Industrial Relations
procedural rule governing the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or appeal
in labor cases, promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail over
constitutional rights? The answer should be obvious in the light of the aforecited
cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial Relations
over basic human rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not only incompatible with
the basic tenet of constitutional government that the Constitution is superior to any
statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but also does violence to natural reason
and logic. The dominance and superiority of the constitutional right over the aforesaid
Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed. Such a
Court of Industrial Relations rule as applied in this case does not implement or
reinforce or strengthen the constitutional rights affected, but instead constrict the
same to the point of nullifying the enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees.
Said Court of Industrial Relations rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere
legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is beyond the authority granted
by the Constitution and the law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a motion
for reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved workers, who usually do
not have the ready funds to meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court
of Appeals and the Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the
filing of the motion for re hearing or reconsideration (Sec. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule
52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for
reconsideration could have been only one day if September 28, 1969 was not a
Sunday. This fact accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial
Relations rule insofar as circumstances of the instant case
214
ANNOTATED
are concerned.
It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated September 27,
1969, is based on the ground that the order sought to be reconsidered "is not in
accordance with law, evidence and facts adduced during the hearing," and likewise
prays for an extension of ten (10) days within which to file arguments pursuant to
Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations (Annex "G",
pp. 57-60, rec.); although the arguments were actually filed by the herein petitioners
on October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73, rec.), long after the 10-day period required
for the filing of such supporting arguments counted from the filing of the motion for
reconsideration. Herein petitioners received only on October 28, 1969 the resolution
dated October 9, 1969 dismissing the motion for reconsideration for being pro
forma since it was filed beyond the reglementary period (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)
It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to reconsider is filed
out of time, or where the arguments in support of such motion are filed beyond the
10 day reglementary period provided for by the Court of Industrial Relations rules,
the order or decision subject of reconsideration becomes final and unappealable. But 29-a
in all these cases, the constitutional rights of free expression, free assembly and
petition were not involved.
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses presently
available must be specifically raised in the complaint or answer; so that any cause of
action or defense not raised in such pleadings, is deemed waived.
______________
29-a Elizalde & Co., Inc. vs. C.I.R., et al., September 23, 1968, 25 SCRA 58, 61-63; Bien vs. Castillo, 97
Phil. 956; Pangasinan Employees, etc. vs. Martinez, May 20, 1960, 108 Phil. 89; Local 7, etc. vs. Tabigne,
Nov. 29, 1960, 110 Phil. 276; Luzon Stevedoring vs. C.I.R., July 26, 1963, 8 SCRA, 447; Manila Metal, etc.
vs. C.I.R., July 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 552.
215
VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973 215
However, a constitutional issue can be raised any time, even for the first time on
appeal, if it appears that the determination of the constitutional issue is necessary to
a decision of the case, the very lis mota of the case without the resolution of which no
final and complete determination of the dispute can be made. It is thus seen that a
30
procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional

right. In the instant case, the procedural rule of the Court of Industrial Relations, a
creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the constitutional rights invoked by
herein petitioners even before the institution of the unfair labor practice charged
against them and in their defense to the said charge.
In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by
the organic law, is a most compelling reason to deny application of a Court of
Industrial Relations rule which impinges on such human rights. 30-a
It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to
"suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the
purposes of justice require." Mr. Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion
30-b
in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo reiterated this principle and added that
30-c
"Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cope with all situations without concerning
itself about procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do justice, in any case,
without further loss of time, provided that the right of the parties to a full day in court is not
substantially impaired. Thus, this Court may treat an appeal as a certiorari and vice-versa.
In other words, when all the material facts are spread in the records before Us, and all the
parties have been duly heard, it matters little that the error of the court a quo is of judgment
or of jurisdiction, We can then and there render
_______________
30 People vs, Vera, 65 Phil. 56. 82; Mercado vs. Bio O.G. 5360
30-a See Workmen's Ins. Co., Inc. vs. Augusto, L-31060, July 29, 1971, 40 SCRA 123, 127.
30-b Ronquillo vs. Marasigan, L-11621, May 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 304, 312-312; Ordoveza vs. Raymundo, 63 Phil.
275.
30-c L-30570, July 29, 1969, 28 SCRA 890, 933-34.
216
ANNOTATED
the appropriate judgment. It is within the contemplation of this doctrine that as it is perfectly
legal and within the power of this Court to strike down in an appeal acts without or in excess
of jurisdiction or committed with grave abuse of discretion, it cannot be beyond the ambit of
its authority, in appropriate cases, to reverse in a certain proceeding any error of judgment of
a court a quo which cannot be exactly categorized as a flaw of jurisdiction. If there can be any
doubt, which I do not entertain, on whether or not the errors this Court has found in the
decision of the Court of Appeals are short of being jurisdictional nullities or excesses, this
Court would still be on firm legal grounds should it choose to reverse said decision here and
now even if such errors can be considered as mere mistakes of judgment or only as faults in
the exercise of jurisdiction, so as to avoid the unnecessary return of this case to the lower
courts for the sole purpose of pursuing the ordinary course of an appeal." (Italics supplied.) - 30 d
Insistence on the application of the questioned Court of Industrial Relations rule in

this particular case at bar would be an unreasoning adherence to "procedural
niceties," which denies justice to the herein laborers, whose basic human freedoms,
including the right to survive, must be accorded supremacy over the property rights
of their employer firm, which has been given a full hearing on this case, especially
when, as in the case at bar, no actual material damage has been demonstrated as
having been inflicted on its property rights.
If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience to the
Constitution renders more imperative the suspension of a Court of Industrial
Relations rule that clashes with the human rights sanctioned and shielded with
resolute concern by the specific guarantees outlined in the organic law. It should be
stressed that the application in the instant case of Section 15 of the Court of
Industrial Relations rules relied upon by herein respondent firm, is unreasonable and
therefore such application becomes unconstitutional as it subverts the human rights
of petitioning labor union and workers in the light of the peculiar facts and
circumstances revealed by the record.
The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations
rules with reference to the case at bar,
____________
28 SCRA 933-934.
30-d
217
VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973 217
is also authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the C.I.R. charter,
which enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to "act according to justice and equity
and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms x
x."
On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was re-stated by Mr.
Justice Barredo, speaking for the Court, in the 1970 case of Kapisanan, etc. vs.
Hamilton, etc., et al., thus:
30-e
"As to the point that the evidence being offered by the petitioners in the motion for new trial
is not 'newly discovered,' as such term is understood in the rules of procedure for the ordinary
courts, We hold that such criterion is not binding upon the Court of Industrial Relations.
Under Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, 'The Court of Industrial Relations shall
adopt its rules or procedure and shall have such other powers as generally pertain to a court
of justice: Provided, however, That in the hearing, investigation and determination of any
question or controversy and in exercising any duties and power under this Act, the Court
shall act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence
but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.' By this provision,
the industrial court is disengaged from the rigidity of the technicalities applicable to ordinary
courts. Said court is not even restricted to the specific relief demanded by the parties but may
issue such orders as may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the
dispute or dispelling any doubts that may give rise to future disputes. (Ang Tibay v.
C.I.R., G.R., No. 46496, Feb. 17, 1940; Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71 Phil.
124.) For these reasons, We believe that this provision is ample enough to have enabled the
respondent court to consider whether or not its previous ruling that petitioners constitute a
minority was founded on fact, without regard to the technical meaning of newly discovered
evidence.x x x x (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua Kiong v. Whitaker, 46 Phil. 578)."
(italics supplied.)
To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with "pedantic rigor" in
the instant case is to rule in effect
______________
L-23714, June 13, 1970, 33 SCRA 887, 907-908.

30-e
218
ANNOTATED
that the poor workers, who can ill-afford an alert and competent lawyer, can no longer
seek the sanctuary of the human freedoms secured to them by the fundamental law,
simply because their counselerroneously believing that he received a copy of the
decision on September 23, 1969, instead of September 22, 1969filed his motion for
reconsideration on September 29, 1969, which practically is only one day late,
considering that September 28, 1969 was a Sunday.
Many a time, this Court deviated from procedural technicalities when they ceased
to be instruments of justice, for the attainment of which such rules have been devised.
Summarizing the jurisprudence on this score, Mr. Justice Fernando, speaking for a
unanimous Court in Palma vs. Oreta, stated: 30-f
"As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil. 315 [1910].
The Villamor decision was cited with approval in Register of Deeds v. Phil. Nat. Bank, 84
Phil. 600 [1949]; Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156 [1958] and Uy v. Uy, L-14243,
June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 675.), decided as far back as 1910, 'technicality, when it deserts its
proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves
scant consideration from courts.' (Ibid., p, 322.) To that norm, this Court has remained
committed. The late Justice Recto in Blanco v. Bernabe, (63 Phil. 124 [1936]) was of a similar
mind. For him the interpretation of procedural rule should never 'sacrifice the ends of justice.'
While 'procedural laws are no other than technicalities' to view them in their entirety, 'they
were adopted not as ends in themselves for the compliance with which courts have been
organized and function, but as means conducive to the realization of the administration of
the law and of justice. (Ibid., p. 128). We have remained steadfastly opposed, in the highly
rhetorical language of Justice Felix, to 'a sacrifice of substantial rights of a litigant in the
altar of sophisticated technicalities with impairment of the sacred principles of justice.'
(Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As succinctly put by Justice
Makalintal, they 'should give way to the realities of the situation.' (Urbayan v. Caltex, L-
15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 1016, 1019). In the latest decision in point, promulgated in
1968, (Udan v. Amon, L-24288, 1968, 23 SCRA 837 citing McEntee v. Manotok, L-14968, Oct.
27, 1961, 3 SCRA 272.) Justice Zaldivar was partial to an earlier formulation of Justice
______________
30-f L-27807, Aug. 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 738, 742-3.

219
VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973 219
Labrador that rules of procedure 'are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense'; but
are intended 'to help secure substantial justice.' (Ibid., p. 843).xx"
30-g
Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule were to be given
effect, the dismissal or termination of the employment of the petitioning eight (8)
leaders of the Union is harsh for a one-day absence from work. The respondent Court
itself recognized the severity of such a sanction when it did not include the dismissal
of the other 393 employees who are members of the same Union and who participated
in the demonstration against the Pasig police. As a matter of fact, upon the
intercession of the Secretary of Labor, the Union members who are not officers, were
not dismissed, and only the Union itself and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically
named as respondents in the unfair labor practice charge filed against them by the
firm (pp. 16-20, respondent's Brief; Annexes "A", "B" and "C", pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel
for respondent firm insinuates that not all the 400 or so employees participated in
the demonstration, for which reason only the Union and its thirteen (13) officers were
specifically named in the unfair labor practice charge (p. 20, respondent's brief). If
that were so, then many, if not all, of the morning and regular shifts reported for
work on March 4, 1969 and that, as a consequence, the firm continued in operation
that day and did not sustain any damage.
The appropriate penaltyif it deserves any penalty at allshould have been
simply to charge said one-day absence against their vacation or sick leave. But to
dismiss the eight (8) leaders of the petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty, since as
aforestated the Union leaders depend on their wages for their daily sustenance as
well as that of their respective families aside from the fact that it is a lethal blow to
unionism, while at the same time strengthening the oppressive hand of the petty
tyrants in the localities.
Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:
"The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those
_______________
34 SCRA 742-743.
30-g
220
ANNOTATED
who consciously seek to destroy our system of government, but from men of goodwill
good men who allow their proper concerns to blind them to the fact that what they
propose to accomplish involves an impairment of liberty.
"x x The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we must remember, however, is
that preservation of liberties does not depend on motives. A suppression of liberty has the same
effect whether the suppressor be a reformer or an outlaw. The only protection against
misguided zeal is constant alertness of the infractions of the guarantees of liberty contained
in our Constitution. Each surrender of liberty to the demands of the moment makes easier
another, larger surrender. The battle over the Bill of Rights is a never ending one.
"x x The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.
"x x In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected.
"x x But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we feel secure because
we belong to a group that is important and respected, we must recognize that our Bill of Rights
is a code of fair play for the less fortunate that we in all honor and good conscience must be
observe. 31
The case at bar is worse.

Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a complete
lack of sympathetic understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim that they
are being subjected to indignities by the local police. It was more expedient for the
firm to conserve its income or profits than to assist its employees in their fight for
their freedoms and security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers.
This is sheer opportunism. Such opportunism and expediency resorted to by the
respondent company assaulted the immunities and welfare of its employees. It was
pure and simple selfishness, if not greed.
Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank
_____________
A Living Bill of Rights (1961), pp. 61, 62, 64; 24 SCRA, 690-692; italics supplied.
31
221
VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973 221
vs. C.I.R., where the petitioner Bank dismissed eight (8) employees for having
32
written and published "a patently libelous letter x x x to the Bank president
demanding his resignation on the grounds of immorality, nepotism in the
appointment and favoritism as well as discrimination in the promotion of bank
employees." Therein, thru Mr. Justice Castro, We ruled:
"It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents. Assuming that
the latter acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the letter-charge they were
nonetheless protected for they were engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise of their
right of self organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection,
(Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act x x x). This is the view of some members of this Court.
For, as has been aptly stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of
employees, if in furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted activity protected by the
Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective
bargaining be contemplated. (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]).
XX XX XX XX XX
"Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to air their
grievances.
xx xx xx xx xx
"The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls the
respondents' libel in giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure, the right of self-
organization of employees is not unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp. vs. NLRB, 324 U.S.
793 [1945]), as the right of the employer to discharge for cause (Philippine Education Co. v.
Union of Phil. Educ. Employees, L-13773, April 29, 1960) is undenied. The Industrial Peace
Act does not touch the normal exercise of the right of the employer to select his employees or
to discharge them. It is directed solely against the abuse of that right by interfering with the
countervailing right of self organization (Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 [1941]).
XX XX
_______________
32 21 SCRA 226-241, Sept. 27, 1967.

222
ANNOTATED
xx xx xx xx xx
"In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's conduct,
identified as an interference with the employees' right of self-organization, or as a retaliatory
action, and/or as a refusal to bargain collectively, constituted an unfair labor practice within
the meaning and intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act." (Italics supplied.) 33
If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism
in the Republic Savings case, supra, where the complaint assailed the morality and
integrity of the bank president no less, such recognition and protection for free
speech, free assembly and right to petition are rendered all the more justifiable and
more imperative in the case at bar, where the mass demonstration was not against
the company nor any of its officers.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. (1)setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations dated September 15 and October 9, 1969; and
2. (2)directing the reinstatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back
pay from the date of their separation from the service until reinstated, minus
one day's pay and whatever earnings they might have realized from other
sources during their separation from the service.
With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company, Inc.

Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, C.J., took no part.
Teehankee, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
Barredo, J., dissents.
______________
21 SCRA 232-237.
33
223
VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973 223
Inc.
Antonio, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion.
BARREDO, J.: Dissenting
I bow in respectful and sincere admiration, but my sense of duty compels me to

dissent.
The background of this case may be found principally in the stipulation of facts
upon which the decision under review is based. It is as follows:
1. "1.That complainant Philippine Blooming Mills, Company, Inc., is a

corporation existing and operating under and by virtue of the laws of the
Philippines with corporate address at 666 Muelle de Binondo, Manila, which
is the employer of respondent;
2. "2.That Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization, PBMEO for short,
is a legitimate labor organization, and the respondents herein are either
officers of respondent PBMEO or members thereof;
3. "3.That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass
demonstration at Malacaang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig
Police Department to be participated by the first shift (6:00 AM - 2:00 PM)
workers as well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM
and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning of March 4, 1969;
4. "4.That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00
A.M. at the Company's canteen, and those present were: for the Company: (1)
Mr. Arthur L. Ang, (2) Atty. Cesareo S. de Leon, Jr. (3) and all department
and section heads. For the PBMEO: (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas,
(3) Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6)
Benjamin Pagcu.
5. "5.That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected
mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO, thru
Benjamin Pagcu who acted as the spokesman of the union panel, confirmed
the planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot
be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu
explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company
because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management;
224
ANNOTATED
1. "6.That Management, thru Atty. C. S. de Leon, Company personnel manager,

informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal
operation of the Company. For which reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de
Leon, warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the
first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by
the Company, particularly the officers present who are the organizers of the
demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March
4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing
CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike;
2. "7.That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked.
Company represented by Atty. C. S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was
composed of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodulfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and
Florencio Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, Company
reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while all workers
may join the Malacaang demonstration, the workers for the first and regular
shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from joining the demonstration and
should report for work; and thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts
in order not to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV:
"NO LOCKOUT - NO STRIKE". All those who will not follow this warning of
the Company shall be dismissed; De Leon reiterated the Company's warning
that the officers shall be primarily liable being the organizers of the mass
demonstration. The union panel countered that it was rather too late to
change their plans inasmuch as the Malacaang demonstration will be held
the following morning; and
3. "8.That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to
the Company which was received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of
which are as follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT
EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.' "
Additionally, the trial court found that "the projected demonstration did in fact occur
and in the process paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the complainant
company".(p. 5, Annex F).
Upon these facts the Prosecution Division of the Court of
225
VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973 225
Industrial Relations filed with said court a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice
against petitioners charging that:
1. "3.That on March 4, 1969, respondents (petitioners herein) particularly those

in the first shift, in violation of the existing collective bargaining agreement
and without filing the necessary notice as provided for by law, failed to report
for work, amounting to a declaration of strike;
2. "4.That the above acts are in violation of Section 4(a) sub-paragraph 6, in
relation to Sections 13, 14 and 15 of Republic Act No. 875, and of the collective
bargaining agreement." (Pars. 3 and 4, Annex C.)
After due hearing, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive part of which reads:
"IN VIEW HEREOF, the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization is
found guilty of bargaining in bad faith and is hereby ordered to cease and desist from further
committing the same and its representatives namely: respondent Florencio Padrigano,
Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu,
Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod who are directly responsible for perpetrating this
unfair labor practice act, are hereby considered to have lost their status as employees of the
Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc." (p. 8, Annex F.)
Although it is alleged in the petition herein that petitioners were notified of this
decision on September 23, 1969, there seems to be no serious question that they were
actually served therewith on September 22, 1969. In fact, petitioners admitted this
date of notice in paragraph 2 of their Petition for Relief dated October 30, 1969 and
filed with the industrial court on the following day. (See Annex K.)
It is not controverted that it was only on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days
after they were notified of the court's decision, that petitioners filed their motion for
reconsideration with the industrial court; as it is also not disputed that they filed
their "Arguments in Support of the Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration" only on
October 14, 1969. (See Annex I.) In other words, petitioners' motion for
reconsideration was filed
226
ANNOTATED
two (2) days after the lapse of the five (5) day period provided for the filing thereof in
the rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, whereas the "Arguments" were filed
five (5) days after the expiration of the period therefor also specified in the same rules.
Accordingly, the first issue that confronts the Court is the one raised by respondent
private firm, namely, that in view of the failure of petitioners to file not only their
motion for reconsideration but also their arguments in support thereof within the
periods respectively fixed in the rules therefor, the Court of Industrial Relations acted
correctly and within the law in rendering and issuing its impugned order of October
9, 1969 dismissing petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Respondent's contention presents no problem. Squarely applicable to the facts
hereof is the decision of this Court in Elizalde & Co. Inc. vs. Court of Industrial
Relations wherein it was ruled that:
1
"August 6, 1963. Petitioner received a copy of the decision of the then Associate Judge Arsenio
I. Martinez, the dispositive part of which was set forth earlier in this opinion.
"August 12, 1963. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. No arguments were
advanced in support thereof.
"August 21, 1963. Petitioner moved for additional time to file its arguments in support of
its motion to reconsider.
"August 27, 1963. Petitioner filed its arguments in support of its aforesaid motion seeking
reconsideration.
"September 16, 1963. CIR en banc resolved to dismiss the motion for reconsideration.
Ground therefor was that the arguments were 'filed out of time'.
"October 3, 1963. Petitioner filed its notice of appeal and at the same time lodged the
present petition with this Court.
"Upon respondent Perlado's return and petitioner's brief
______________
1 25 SCRA 58.
227
VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973 227
(respondents did not file their brief), the case is now before us for resolution.
1. "1.That the judgment appealed from is a final judgmentnot merely an interlocutory

orderthere is no doubt. The fact that there is need for computation of respondent
Perlado's overtime pay would not render the decision incomplete. This in effect is the
holding of the Court in Pan American World Airways System (Philippines) vs. Pan
American Employees Association, which runs thus: 'It is next contended that in
ordering the Chief of the Examining Division or his representative to compute the
compensation due, the Industrial Court unduly delegated its judicial functions and
thereby rendered an incomplete decision. We do not believe so. Computation of the
overtime pay involves a mechanical function, at most. And the report would still have
to be submitted to the Industrial Court for its approval, by the very terms of the
order itself. That there was no specification of the amount of overtime pay in the
decision did not make it incomplete, since this matter would necessarily be made
clear enough in the implementation of the decision (see Malate Taxicab & Garage,
Inc. vs. CIR, et al., L-8718, May 11, 1956).'
2. "2.But has that judgment reached the stage of finality in the sense that it can no
longer be disturbed?
"CIR Rules of Procedure, as amended, and the jurisprudence of this Court both answer
the question in the affirmative.
"Section 15 of the CIR Rules requires that one who seeks to reconsider the judgment of
the trial judge must do so within five (5) days from the date on which he received notice of
the decision, subject of the motion. Next follows Section 16 which says that the motion must
be submitted with arguments supporting the same. But if said arguments could not be
submitted simultaneously with the motion, the same section commands that 'the movant
shall file the same within ten (10) days from the date of the filing of his motion for
reconsideration'. Section 17 of the same rules admonishes a movant that '(f)ailure to observe
the above-specified periods shall be sufficient cause for dismissal of the motion for
reconsideration or striking out of the answer and/or the supporting arguments, as the case
may be'.
"Not that the foregoing rules stand alone. Jurisprudence has since stabilized the
enforceability thereof. Thus, in Bien vs. Castillo,
228
ANNOTATED
(97 Phil. 956) we ruled that where a pro forma motion for reconsideration was filed out of
time its denial is in order pursuant to CIR rules, regardless of whether the arguments in
support of said motion were or were not filed on time. Pangasinan Employees Laborers &
Tenants Association (PELTA) vs. Martinez, (L-13846, May 20, 1960) pronounced that where
a motion to reconsider is filed out of time, the order or decision subject of reconsideration
becomes final. And so also, where the arguments in support of the motion for reconsideration
are filed beyond the ten-day reglementary period, the pro forma motion for reconsideration
although seasonably filed must nevertheless be denied. This in essence is our ruling in Local
7, Press & Printing Free Workers (FFW) vs. Tabigne. The teaching in Luzon Stevedoring Co.,
Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, is that where the motion for reconsideration is denied
upon the ground that the arguments in support thereof were filed out of time, the order or
decision subject of the motion becomes 'final and unappealable'.
"We find no difficulty in applying the foregoing rules and pronouncements of this Court in
the case before us. On August 6, petitioner received a copy of the judgment of Judge Arsenio
I. Martinez aforesaid. Petitioner's motion to reconsiderwithout arguments in support
thereofof August 12 was filed on time. For, August 11, the end of the five-day reglementary
period to file a motion for reconsideration, was a Sunday. But, actually, the written
arguments in support of the said motion were submitted to the court on August 27. The period
from August 12 to August 27, is a space of fifteen (15) days. Surely enough, said arguments
were filed out of timefive (5) days late. And the judgment had become final.
"3. There is, of course, petitioner's motion of August 21, 1963 seeking extension of time
within which to present its arguments in support of its motion. Counsel in his petition before
this Court pleads that the foregoing motion was grounded on the 'extremely busy and difficult
schedule of counsel' which would not enable him to do so within the stated ten-day
reglementary period. The arguments were only filed on August 27five (5) days late, as
aforesaid.
"The foregoing circumstances will not avail petitioner any. It is to be noted that the motion
for expansion of time was filed only on August 21, that is, one day before the due date which
is August 22. It was petitioner's duty to see to it that the court act on this motion forthwith
or at least inquire as to the fate thereof not later than the 22nd of August. It did not. It merely
filed its arguments on the 27th.
"To be underscored at this point is that 'obviously to speed up
229
VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973 229
the disposition of cases', CIR 'has a standing rule against the extension of the ten-day period
for filing supporting arguments'. That no-extension policy should have placed petitioner on
guard. It should not have simply folded its arms, sit by supinely, and relied on the court's
generosity. To compound petitioner's neglect, it filed the arguments only on August 27, 1953,
knowing full well that by that time the reglementary period had expired.
"Petitioner cannot complain against CIR's ruling of September 16, 1963 dismissing the
motion for reconsideration on the ground that the supporting arguments were filed out of
time. That ruling in effect denied the motion for extension.
"We rule that CIR's judgment has become final and unappealable. We may not review the
same."
Notwithstanding this unequivocal and unmistakable precedent, which has not been
in any way modified, much less revoked or reversed by this Court, the main opinion
has chosen not only to go into the merits of petitioners' pose that the respondent court
erred in holding them guilty of bargaining in bad faith but also to ultimately uphold
petitioners' claim for reinstatement on constitutional grounds.
Precisely because the conclusions of the main opinion are predicated on an
exposition of the constitutional guarantees of freedoms of speech and peaceful
assembly for redress of grievances, so scholarly and masterful that it is bound to
overwhelm Us unless We note carefully the real issues in this case, I am constrained,
over and above my sincere admiration for the eloquence and zeal of Mr. Justice
Makasiar's brilliant dissertation, to dutifully state that as presented by petitioners
themselves and in the light of its attendant circumstances, this case does not call for
the resolution of any constitutional issue. Admittedly, the invocation of any
constitutional guarantee, particularly when it directly affects individual freedoms
enshrined in the bill of rights, deserves the closest attention of this Court. It is my
understanding of constitutional law and judicial practices related thereto, however,
that even the most valuable of our constitutional rights may be protected by the
courts only when their jurisdiction over the subject matter is unquestionably
established and the applicable rules of
230
ANNOTATED
procedure consistent with substantive and procedural due process are observed. No
doubt no constitutional right can be sacrificed in the altar of procedural technicalities,
very often fittingly downgraded as niceties, but as far as I know, this principle is
applied to annul or set aside final judgments only in cases wherein there is a possible
denial of due process. I have not come across any instance, and none is mentioned or
cited in the well-documented main opinion, wherein a final and executory judgment
has been invalidated and set aside upon the ground that the same has the effect of
sanctioning the violation of a constitutional right, unless such violation amounts to a
denial of due process.
Without support from any provision of the constitution or any law or from any
judicial precedent or reason of principle, the main opinion nudely and unqualifiedly
asserts, as if it were universally established and accepted as an absolute rule, that "a
violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a
consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights". Chavez vs. Court of
Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, which is mentioned almost in passing, does uphold the
proposition that "relief from a criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of
constitutional liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even
after the finality of the judgment". And, of course, Chavez is correct; as is also Abriol
vs. Homeres, which, in principle, served as its precedent, for the very simple reason
2
that in both of those cases, the accused were denied due process. In Chavez, the
accused was compelled to testify against himself as a witness for the prosecution; in
Abriol, the accused was denied his request to be allowed to present evidence to
establish his defense after his demurrer to the People's evidence was denied.
As may be seen, however, the constitutional issues involved in those cases are a
far cry from the one now before Us. Here, petitioners do not claim they were denied
due process. Nor do they pretend that in denying their motion for reconsideration,
"the respondent Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon any of
their constitutional immunities . . .,"
______________
286 Phil. 525.

231
VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973 231
contrary to the statement to such effect in the main opinion. Indeed, neither in the
petition herein nor in any of the other pleading of petitioners can any direct or indirect
assertion be found assailing the impugned decision of the respondent court as being
null and void because it sanctioned a denial of a valued constitutional liberty.
In their petition, petitioners state the issue for Our resolution as follows:
"Petitioners herein humbly submit that the issue to be resolved is whether or not the
respondent Court en banc under the facts and circumstances, should consider the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by your petitioners.
"Petitioners, therefore, in filing this petition for a writ of certiorari, humbly beg this
Honorable Court to treat this petition under Rule 43 and 65 of the Rules of Court."
"x x x x x.
"The basic issue therefore is the application by the Court en banc of the strict and narrow
technical rules of procedure without taking into account justice, equity and substantial
merits of the case."
On the other hand, the complete argument submitted by petitioners on this point in their
brief runs thus:
"III
ISSUES
"1. Does the refusal to heed a warning in the exercise of a fundamental right to peaceably
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances constitute bargaining in bad
faith? and,
"Do the facts found by the court below justify the declaration and conclusion that the union
was guilty of bargaining in bad faith meriting the dismissal of the persons allegedly
responsible therefor?
"2. Was there grave abuse of discretion when the respondent court refused to act one way
or another on the petition for relief from
232
ANNOTATED
the resolution of October 9, 1969?
IV
ARGUMENT
The respondent Court erred in finding the petitioner union guilty of bargaining in bad faith
and consequently dismissing the persons allegedly responsible therefor, because such
conclusion is contrary to the evidence on record; that the dismissal of leaders was
discriminatory.
"As a result of exercising the constitutional rights of freedom to assemble and petition the
duly constituted authorities for redress of their grievances, the petitioners were charged and
then condemned of bargaining in bad faith.
"The findings that petitioners were guilty of bargaining in bad faith were not borne out by
the records. It was not even alleged nor proven by evidence. What has been alleged and which
the respondent company tried to prove was that the demonstration amounted to a strike and
hence, a violation of the provisions of the 'no-lockoutno strike' clause of the collective
bargaining agreement. However, this allegation and proof submitted by the respondent
company were practically resolved when the respondent court in the same decision stated
categorically:
'The company alleges that the walkout because of the demonstration is tantamount to a declaration of
a strike. We do not think so, as the same is not rooted in any industrial dispute although there is a
concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work.' (Italics supplied, p. 4, 5th paragraph,
Decision.)
"The respondent court's findings that the petitioner union bargained in bad faith is not
tenable because:
"First, it has not been alleged nor proven by the respondent company;
"Second, before the demonstration, the petitioner union and the respondent company
convened twice in a meeting to thresh out the matter of demonstration. Petitioners requested
that the employees and workers be excused but the respondent company instead of granting
the request or even settling the matter so that the hours of
233
VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973 233
work will not be disrupted, immediately threatened the employees of mass dismissal;
"Third, the refusal of the petitioner union to grant the request of the company that the
first shift shall be excluded in the demonstration is not tantamount to bargaining in bad faith
because the company knew that the officers of the union belonged to the first shift, and that
the union cannot go and lead the demonstration without their officers. It must be stated that
the company intends to prohibit its officers to lead and join the demonstration because most
of them belonged to the first shift; and
"Fourth, the findings of the respondent court that the demonstration if allowed will
practically give the union the right to change the working conditions agreed in the CBA is a
conclusion of facts, opinionated and not borne by any evidence on record. The demonstration
did not practically change the terms or conditions of employment because it was only for one
(1) day and the company knew about it before it went through. We can even say that it was
the company who bargained in bad faith, when upon representation of the Bureau of Labor
not to dismiss the employees demonstrating, the company tacitly approved the same and yet
while the demonstration was in progress, the company filed a ULP Charge and consequently
dismissed those who participated.
"Records of the case show that more or less 400 members of the union participated in the
demonstration and yet, the respondent court selected the eight officers to be dismissed from
the union thus losing their status as employees of the respondent company. The respondent
court should have taken into account that the company's action in allowing the return of more
or less three hundred ninety two (392) employees/members of the union is an act of
condonation and the dismissal of the eight (8) officers is an act of discrimination (Phil. Air
Lines Inc., vs. Phil. Air Lines Employees Association, G.R. No. L-8197, Oct. 31, 1958).
Seemingly, from the opinion stated in the decision by the court, while there is a collective
bargaining agreement, the union cannot go on demonstration or go on strike because it will
change the terms and conditions of employment agreed in the CBA. It follows that the CBA
is over and above the constitutional rights of a man to demonstrate and the statutory rights
of a union to strike as provided for in Republic Act 875. This creates a bad precedent because
it will appear that the rights of the union is solely dependent upon the CBA.
"One of the cardinal primary rights which must be respected in
234
ANNOTATED
proceedings before the Court of Industrial Relations is that 'the decision must be rendered
on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to
the parties affected.' (Interstate Commerce Commission vs. L & N R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S.
Ct. 185, 57 Law ed. 431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence
disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their rights to know and meet the case
against them. (Ang Tibay vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-45496, February 27, 1940.)
"The petitioners respectfully and humbly submit that there is no scintilla of evidence to
support the findings of the respondent court that the petitioner union bargained in bad faith.
Corollary therefore, the dismissal of the individual petitioners is without basis either in fact
or in law."
Additionally, in their reply they also argued that:
1. "1)That respondent court's finding that petitioners have been guilty of

bargaining in bad faith and consequently lost their status as employees of the
respondent company did not meet the meaning and comprehension of
'substantial merits of the case.' Bargaining in bad faith has not been alleged
in the complaint (Annex "C", Petition) nor proven during the hearing of the
case. The important and substantial merit of the case is whether under the
facts and circumstances alleged in respondent company's pleadings, the
demonstration done by the petitioners amounted to on 'illegal strike' and
therefore in violation of the 'no strikeno lock out' clause of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement. Petitioners respectfully reiterate and humbly submit,
that the respondent court had altogether opined and decided that such
demonstration does not amount to a strike. Hence, with that findings,
petitioners should have been absolved of the charges against them.
Nevertheless, the same respondent court disregarding, its own findings, went
out of bounds by declaring the petitioners as having 'bargained in faith.' The
stand of the respondent court is fallacious, as it follows the principle in logic
as 'non-siquitor';
2. "2)That again respondents wanted to impress that the freedom to assemble
peaceably to air grievances against the duly constituted authorities as
guaranteed in our Constitution is subject to the limitation of the agreement
in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The fundamental rights of the
petitioners to free speech and assembly is paramount to the provision in the
Collective Bargaining Agreement and such attempt to override the
constitutional provision
235
VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973 235
would be null and void. These fundamental rights of the petitioners were not taken into
consideration in the deliberation of the case by the respondent court;"
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing contentions that petitioners are not raising any
issue of due process. They do not posit that the decision of the industrial court is null
and void on that constitutional ground. True it is that they fault the respondent court
for having priced the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement herein
involved over and above their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition
for redress of their grievances against the abuses of the Pasig police, but in no sense
at all do they allege or contend that such action affects its jurisdiction in a manner
that renders the proceedings a nullity. In other words, petitioners themselves
consider the alleged flaw in the court's action as a mere error of judgment rather than
that of jurisdiction which the main opinion projects. For this Court to roundly and
indignantly condemn private respondent now for the grievous violation of the
fundamental law the main opinion sees in its refusal to allow all its workers to join
the demonstration in question, when that specific issue has not been duly presented
to Us and properly argued, is to my mind unfair and unjust, for the simple reason
that the manner this case was brought to Us does not afford it the opportunity to be
heard in regard to such supposed constitutional transgression.
To be sure, petitioners do maintain, that respondent court committed an error of
jurisdiction by finding petitioners guilty of bargaining in bad faith when the charge
against them alleged in the complaint was for having conducted a mass
demonstration, which "amounted to a strike", in violation of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, but definitely, this jurisdictional question has no constitutional color.
Indeed, We can even assume for the sake of argument, that the trial judge did err in
not giving preferential importance to the fundamental freedoms invoked by the
petitioners over the management and proprietary attributes claimed by the
respondent private firmstill, We cannot rightly hold that such disregard of
petitioners' priceless liberties divested His Honor of jurisdiction in the premises. The
unbending doctrine
236
ANNOTATED
Philippine Blooming Mills Employee Organization
of this Court is that "decisions, erroneous or not, become final after the period fixed
by law; litigations would be endless; no questions would be finally settled; and titles
to property would become precarious if the losing party were allowed to reopen them
at any time in the future". 3
I only have to add to this that the fact that the error is in the interpretation,
construction or application of a constitutional precept, not constituting a denial of due
process, should not make any difference. Juridically, a party cannot be less injured
by an overlooked or erroneously sanctioned violation of an ordinary statute than by
a misconstrued or misapplied constitutional injunction affecting his individual
freedoms. In both instances, there is injustice which should be intolerable were it not
for the more paramount considerations that inform the principle of immutability of
final judgments. I dare say this must be the reason why, as I have already noted, the
main opinion does not cite any constitutional provision, law or rule or any judicial
doctrine or principle supporting its basic holding that infringement of constitutional
guarantees, other than denial of due process, divests courts of jurisdiction to render
valid judgments.
In this connection, it must be recalled that the teaching of Philippine Association
of Colleges and Universities vs. Secretary of Education, following Santiago vs. Far
4
Eastern Broadcasting, is that "it is one of our (the Supreme Court's) decisional
5
practices that unless a constitutional point is specifically raised, insisted upon and
adequately argued, the court will not consider it". In the case at bar, the petitioners
have not raised, they are not insisting upon, much less have they adequately argued
the constitutional issues so extendedly and ably discussed in the main opinion.
Indeed, it does not seem wise and sound for the Supreme Court to hold that the
erroneous resolution by a court of a
_______________
3 Daquis vs. Bustos, 94 Phil. 913, reiterated in Maramba vs. Lozano,20 SCRA 474. See also Vicente vs.
Lucas, 95 Phil. 716

4 97 Phil. 806, at p. 816.
5 73 Phil. 408.
237
VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973 237
constitutional issue not amounting to a denial of due process renders its judgment or
decision null and void, and, therefore, subject to attack even after said judgment or
decision has become final and executory. I have actually tried to bring myself into
agreement with the views of the distinguished and learned writer of the main opinion,
if only to avoid dissenting from his well prepared thesis, but its obvious incongruity
with settled jurisprudence always comes to the fore to stifle my effort.
As a matter of fact, for a moment, it appeared to me as if I could go along with
petitioners under the authority of our constitutionally irreducible appellate
jurisdiction under Section 2(5) of Article VII of the 1935 Constitution of the
Philippines (reenacted practically ipssisimis verbis in Section 5(2) (e) of the 1973
6
Constitution), only to realize upon further reflection that the very power granted to
Us to review decisions of lower courts involving questions of law (and these include
constitutional issues not affecting the validity of statutes, treaty, executive
agreement, etc.) is not unqualified but has to be exercised only in the manner
provided in the law or the Rules of Court. In other words, before We can exercise
appellate jurisdiction over constitutional issues, no matter how important they may
be, there must first be a showing of compliance with the applicable procedural law or
rules, among them, those governing appeals from the Court of Industrial Relations
involved herein. Consequently, if by law or rule, a judgment of the industrial court is
already final and executory, this Court would be devoid of power and authority to
review, much less alter or modify the same, absent any denial of due process or fatal
defect of jurisdiction. It must be borne in mind that the situation confronting Us now
is not merely whether or not We should pass upon a question or issue not specifically
raised by the party concerned, which, to be sure, could be enough reason to dissuade
Us from taking pains in resolving the same; rather, the real problem here is whether
or not We have jurisdiction to entertain it. And, in this regard, as already stated
earlier, no less than Justice Conrado Sanchez, the writer of Chavez, supra., which is
being relied upon by the main
_______________
6Under which this case was filed.

238
ANNOTATED
opinion, already laid down the precedent in Elizalde vs. Court, supra, which for its
four-square applicability to the facts of this case, We have no choice but to follow, that
is, that in view of the failure of the petitioners to file not only their motion for
reconsideration but even their argument supporting the same within the prescribed
period, "the judgment (against them) has become final, beyond recall".
Indeed, when I consider that courts would be useless if the finality and
enforceability of their judgments are made contingent on the correctness thereof from
the constitutional standpoint, and that in truth, whether or not they are correct is
something that is always dependent upon combined opinion of the members of the
Supreme Court, which in turn is naturally as changeable as the members themselves
are changed, I cannot conceive of anything more pernicious and destructive to a
trustful administration of justice than the idea that, even without any showing of
denial of due process or want of jurisdiction of the court, a final and executory
judgment of such court may still be set aside or reopened in instances other than
those expressly allowed by Rule 38 and that of extrinsic fraud under Article 1146(1)
of the Civil Code. And just to emphasize the policy of the law of respecting judgments
7
once they have become final, even as this Court has ruled that final decisions are
mute in the presence of fraud which the law abhors, it is only when the fraud is
8
extrinsic and not intrinsic that final and executory judgments may be set aside, and 9
this only when the remedy is sought within the prescriptive period. 10
Apropos here is the following passage in Li Kim Tho vs. Go Sin Kaw, 82 Phil. 776:
"Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential
to an effective and efficient administration of
_____________
7 Mauricio vs. Villanueva, 106 Phil. 1159, cited by Moran in Vol. II, p. 246 (1970 ed.).
8 Garchitorena vs. Sotelo, 74 Phil. 25.
9 Amuran vs. Aquino, 38 Phil. 29; Javier vs. Paredes, 52 Phil. 910; Domingo vs. David, 68 Phil. 134.
10 Quion v. Claridad, 74 Phil. 100.
239
VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973 239
justice that once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a
mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard
against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to
put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them."
Likewise the stern admonition of Justice George Malcolm in Dy Cay v.
Crossfield, 38 Phil. 521, thus:
"x x x. Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors,
judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. The very object
for which courts were instituted was to put an end to controversies. To fulfill this purpose
and to do so speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on
the slothful. 'If a vacillating, irresolute judge were allowed to thus keep causes ever within
his power, to determine and redetermine them term after term, to bandy his judgments about
from one party to the other, and to change his conclusions as freely and as capriciously as a
chamelon may change its hues, then litigation might become more intolerable than the
wrongs it is intended to redress.' (See Arnedo vs. Llorente and Liongson (1911), 18 Phil.,
257.)."
My disagreement with the dissenters in Republic vs. Judge de los Angeles, L-26112,
October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 422, was not as to the unalterability and invulnerability of
final judgments but rather on the correct interpretation of the contents of the
judgment in question therein. Relevantly to this case at bar, I said then:
"The point of res adjudicata discussed in the dissents has not escaped my attention. Neither
am I overlooking the point of the Chief Justice regarding the dangerous and inimical
implications of a ruling that would authorize the revision, amendment or alteration of a final
and executory judgment. I want to emphasize that my position in this opinion does not detract
a whit from the soundness, authority and binding force of existing doctrines enjoining any
such modifications. The public policy of maintaining faith and respect in judicial decisions,
which inform said doctrines, is admittedly of the highest order. I am not advocating any
departure from them. Nor am I trying to put forth for execution a decision that I believe
should have been rather than what it is. All I am doing is to view not the judgment of Judge
Tengco but the decision of this Court in G.R. No.
240
ANNOTATED
L-20950, as it is and not as I believe it should have been, and, by this opinion, I would like to
guide the court a quo as to what, in my honest view, is the true and correct meaning and
implications of the decision of this Court, not that of Judge Tengco's."
The main opinion calls attention to many instances, precisely involving cases in the
industrial court, wherein this Court refused to be constrained by technical rules of
procedure in its determination to accord substantial justice to the parties. I still
believe in those decisions, some of which were penned by me. I am certain, however,
that in none of those precedents did this Court disturb a judgment already final and
executory. It is too obvious to require extended elucidation or even reference to any
precedent or authority that the principle of immutability of final judgments is not a
mere technicality, and if it may be considered to be in a sense a procedural rule, it is
one that is founded on public policy and cannot, therefore, yield to the ordinary plea
that it must give priority to substantial justice.
Apparently bent on looking for a constitutional point of due process to hold on, the
main opinion goes far as to maintain that the long existing and constantly applied
rule governing the filing of motions for reconsideration in the Court of Industrial
Relations, "as applied in this case does not implement or reinforce or strengthen the
constitutional rights affected, but instead constricts the same to the point of
nullifying the enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of
Industrial Relations Rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative
delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is beyond the authority granted by the
Constitution and the law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for
reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved workers, who usually do not
have the ready funds to meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the
filing of the motion for re-hearing or reconsideration (Sec. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule
52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for
reconsideration could have been only one day if September 28, 1969 was not a
Sunday. This fact accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial
Relations Rule insofar as circumstances of the instant case are concerned."
241
VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973 241
I am afraid the zeal and passion of these arguments do not justify the conclusion
suggested. Viewed objectively, it can readily be seen that there can hardly be any
factual or logical basis for such a critical view of the rule in question. Said rule
provides:
"MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION
"Sec. 15. The movant shall file the motion, in six copies, within five (5) days from the date on
which he receives notice of the order or decision, object of the motion for reconsideration, the
same to be verified under oath with respect to the correctness of the allegations of fact, and
serving a copy thereof, personally or by registered mail, on the adverse party. The latter may
file an answer, in six (6) copies, duly verified under oath.
"Sec. 16. Both the motion and the answer shall be submitted with arguments supporting
the same. If the arguments can not be submitted simultaneously with said motions, upon
notice to the Court, the movant shall file same within ten (10) days from the date of the filing
of his motion for reconsideration. The adverse party shall also file his answer within ten (10)
days from the receipt by him of a copy of the arguments submitted by the movant.
"Sec. 17. After an answer to the motion is registered, or after ten (10) days from the receipt
of the arguments in support of said motion having been filed, the motion shall be deemed
submitted for resolution of the Court in banc, unless it is considered necessary to hear oral
arguments, in which case the Court shall issue the corresponding order or notice to that
effect.
"Failure to observe the above-specified periods shall be sufficient cause for dismissal of
the motion for reconsideration or striking out of the answer and/or the supporting arguments,
as the case may be. (As amended April 20, 1951, Court of Industrial Relations.)."
As implemented and enforced in actual practice, this rule, as everyone acquainted
with proceedings in the industrial court well knows, precisely permits the party
aggrieved by a judgment to file no more than a pro-forma motion for reconsideration
without any argument or lengthy discussion and with barely a brief statement of the
fundamental ground or grounds therefor, without prejudice to supplementing the
242
ANNOTATED
same by making the necessary exposition, with citations of laws and authorities, in
the written arguments to be filed ten (10) days later. In truth, such a pro-forma
motion has the effect of just advising the court and the other party that the movant
does not agree with the judgment due to fundamental defects stated in brief and
general terms. Evidently, the purpose of this requirement is to apprise everyone
concerned within the shortest possible time that a reconsideration is to be sought,
and thereby enable the parties concerned to make whatever adjustments may be
warranted by the situation, in the meanwhile that the litigation is prolonged. It must
be borne in mind that cases in the industrial court may involve or affect the operation
of vital industries in which labor-management problems might require day-to-day
solutions and it is to the best interests of justice and all concerned that the attitude
of each party at every important juncture of the case be known to the other so that
other avenues for earlier settlement may, if possible, be explored.
There can be no reason at all to complain that the time fixed by the rule is short
or inadequate. In fact, the motion filed by petitioners was no more than the following:
"MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
"COME NOW movant respondents, through counsel, to this Honorable Court most
respectfully moves for the RECONSIDERATION of the Order of this Honorable Court dated
September 17, 1969 on the ground that the same is not in accordance with law, evidence and
facts adduced during the hearing of the above-entitled case.
"Movant-respondents most respectfully move for leave to file their respective arguments
within ten (10) days pursuant to Sections 15, 16 & 17 as amended of the Rules of Court.
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this Motion for Reconsideration be
admitted.
"Manila, September 27, 1969."
To say that five (5) days is an unreasonable period for the filing of such a motion is to
me simply incomprehensible. What is
243
VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973 243
worse in this case is that petitioners have not even taken the trouble of giving an
explanation of their inability to comply with the rule. Not only that, petitioners were
also late five (5) days in filing their written arguments in support of their motion,
and, the only excuse offered for such delay is that both the President of the Union
and the office clerk who took charge of the matter forgot to do what they were
instructed to do by counsel, which, according to this Court, as I shall explain anon,
"is the most hackneyed and habitual subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to
observe the procedural requirements prescribed by the Rules of Court". (Philippine
Airlines, Inc. vs. Arca, infra). And yet, very indignantly, the main opinion would want
the Court to overlook such nonchalance and indifference.
In this connection, I might add that in my considered opinion, the rules fixing
periods for the finality of judgments are in a sense more substantive than procedural
in their real nature, for in their operation they have the effect of either creating or
terminating rights pursuant to the terms of the particular judgment concerned. And
the fact that the court that rendered such final judgment is deprived of jurisdiction
or authority to alter or modify the same enhances such substantive character.
Moreover, because they have the effect of terminating rights and the enforcement
thereof, it may be said that said rules partake of the nature also of rules of
prescription, which again are substantive. Now, the twin predicates of prescription
are inaction or abandonment and the passage of time or a prescribed period. On the
other hand, procrastination or failure to act on time is unquestionably a form of
abandonment, particularly when it is not or cannot be sufficiently explained. The
most valuable right of a party may be lost by prescription, and he has no reason to
complain because public policy demands that rights must be asserted in time, as
otherwise they can be deemed waived.
I see no justification whatsoever for not applying these self-evident principles to
the case of petitioners. Hence, I feel disinclined to adopt the suggestion that the Court
suspend, for the purposes of this case the rules aforequoted of the Court of Industrial
Relations. Besides, I have grave doubts as to
244
ANNOTATED
whether we can suspend rules of other courts, particularly one that is not under our
supervisory jurisdiction, being an administrative agency under the Executive
Department. Withal, if, in order to hasten the administration of substantial justice,
this Court did exercise in some instances its reserve power to amend its rules, I am
positively certain, it has never done it for the purpose of reviving a case in which the
judgment has already become final and executory.
Before closing, it may be mentioned here, that as averred in their petition, in a
belated effort to salvage their cause, petitioners filed in the industrial court on
October 31, 1969 a petition for relief alleging that their failure to file their
"Arguments in Support of their Motion for Reconsideration" within the reglementary
period or five (5), if not seven (7), days late "was due to excusable negligence and
honest mistake committed by the President of the respondent Union and of the office
clerk of the counsel for respondents as shown and attested in their respective
affidavits", (See Annexes K, K-1, and K-2) which in brief, consisted allegedly of the
said President's having forgotten his appointment with his lawyer "despite previous
instructions" and of the said office employee having also coincidentally forgotten "to
do the work as instructed (sic) to (him) by Atty. Osorio" because he "was too busy with
clerical jobs". No sympathy at all can be evoked by these allegations, for, under
probably more justifying circumstances, this Court ruled out a similar explanation in
a previous case this wise:
"We find merit in PAL's petition. The excuse offered by respondent Santos as reason for his
fail ure to perfect in due time his appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court, that
counsel's clerk forgot to hand him the court notice, is the most hackneyed and habitual
subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to observe the procedural requirements prescribed
by the Rules of Court. The uncritical acceptance of this kind of commonplace excuses, in the
face of the Supreme Court's repeated rulings that they are neither credible nor constitutive
of excusable negligence (Gaerlan vs. Bernal, L 4039, 29 January 1952; Mercado vs. Judge
Domingo, L-19457, 17 December 1966) is certainly such whimsical exercise of judgment as to
be a grave abuse of discretion." (Philippine Air Lines, Inc. vs. Arca, 19 SCRA 300.)
245
VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973 245
For the reason, therefore, that the judgment of the industrial court sought to be
reviewed in the present case has already become final and executory, nay, not without
the fault of the petitioners, hence, no matter how erroneous from the constitutional
viewpoint it may be, it is already beyond recall, I vote to dismiss this case, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SEPARATE OPINION
TEEHANKEE,J., concurring:
For having carried out a mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969 in

protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police department, upon two days' prior
notice to respondent employer company, as against the latter's insistence that the
first shift should not participate but instead report for work, under pain of dismissal,
1
the industrial court ordered the dismissal from employment of the eight individual
petitioners as union officers and organizers of the mass demonstration.
Respondent court's order finding petitioner union guilty on respondent's complaint
of bargaining in bad faith and unfair labor practice for having so carried out the mass
demonstration, notwithstanding that it concededly was not a declaration of strike nor
directed in any manner against respondent employer, and ordering the dismissal of
the union officers, manifestly constituted grave abuse of discretion in fact and in law.
There could not be, in fact, bargaining in bad faith nor unfair labor practice since
respondent firm conceded that "the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union
guaranteed by the Constitution" and the union up to the day of the demonstration
pleaded by cablegram to the company to excuse the first shift and allow it to join the
demonstration in accordance with their previous requests.
_____________
1 The first shift comprised the workers from 6 A. M. to 2 P.M. Respondent company had no objection to
the two regular shifts workers (7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and 8 A.M. to 5 P.M.) being excused from work for the mass
demonstration.
246
ANNOTATED
Neither could there be, in law, a willful violation of the collective bargaining
agreement's "no-strike" clause as would warrant the union leaders' dismissal, since
as found by respondent court itself the mass demonstration was not a declaration of
a strike, there being no industrial dispute between the protagonists, but merely "the
occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work" to enable the workers to exercise their
constitutional rights of free expression, peaceable assembly and petition for redress
of grievance against alleged police excesses.
Respondent court's en banc resolution dismissing petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for having been filed two days late, after expiration of the
reglementary five-day period fixed by its rules, due to the negligence of petitioners'
counsel and/or the union president should likewise be set aside as a manifest act of
grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners' petition for relief from the normal adverse
consequences of the late filing of their motion for reconsideration due to such
negligencewhich was not acted upon by respondent courtshould have been
granted, considering the monstrous injustice that would otherwise be caused the
petitioners through their summary dismissal from employment, simply because they
sought in good faith to exercise basic human rights guaranteed them by the
Constitution. It should be noted further that no proof of actual loss from the oneday
stoppage of work was shown by respondent company, providing basis to the main
opinion's premise that its insistence on dismissal of the union leaders for having
included the first shift workers in the mass demonstration against its wishes was but
an act of arbitrary vindictiveness.
Only thus could the basic constitutional rights of the individual petitioners and
the constitutional injunction to afford protection to labor be given true substance and
meaning. No person may be deprived of such basic rights without due processwhich
is but "responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.
Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided . . . Due process is
thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has
been identified as freedom
247
VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973 247
from arbitrariness." 2
Accordingly, I vote for the setting aside of the appealed orders of the respondent
court and concur in the judgment for petitioners as set forth in the main opinion.
Judgment set aside and directing the re-instatement of the herein eight (8)
petitioners.
Notes.The rule is that the law forms part of, and is read into, every contract,
unless clearly excluded therefrom in those cases where such exclusion is allowed
(Liberation Steamship Co., Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, L-25389, June 27,
1968, 23 SCRA 1105; National Development Company vs. Unlicensed Crew Members
of Three Doa Vessels (PMIU), L-25390, June 27, 1968, 23 SCRA 1105).
It has also been held that as a matter of principle the provisions of the Industrial
Peace Act granting freedom to employees to organize themselves and select their
representatives for entering into bargaining agreements, should be subordinated to
the constitutional provision protecting the sanctity of contracts. (Victorias Milling
Co., Inc. vs. Victorias Manapla Workers Organization PAFLU, L-18467, Sept. 30,
1963, 9 SCRA 154).
LEGAL RESEARCH SERVICE
See SCRA Quick Index-Digest, volume 1, page 375 on Constitutional Law.

See also SCRA Quick Index-Digest, volume 2, page 1167 on Labor Laws.
Fernando, E.M., The Bill of Rights, 1972 Edition with 1973 Supplement.
Carlos, G.R., and Fernando, E.M., Labor and Social
______________
2Ermita-Malate Hotel Operators Ass'n. vs. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849 (1967), per Fernando, J.
248
ANNOTATED
Burca vs. Republic
Legislation in the Philippines, 1964 Edition.
CBSI Editorial Staff, Compilation of Labor and Social Legislation.
Fernandez, P.V. and Quiason, C.P., Labor and Social Legislation, 1964-71 Edition.
--------------o0o---------------

ANNOTATED
Navarro vs. Villegas
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
February 26, 1970
731
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 731
GENTLEMEN :
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court of even date:
In Case G.R. No. L-31687 (Navarro vs. Villegas), the Court, after considering the
pleadings and arguments of the parties, issued the following Resolution:
Without prejudice to a more extended opinion and taking into account the
following considerations:
That respondent Mayor has not denied nor absolutely refused the permit sought
by petitioner;
That as stated in Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 75, respondent Mayor possesses
reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used
for the assembly in order to secure convenient use thereof by others and provide
adequate and proper policing to minimize the risks of disorder and maintain public
safety and order;
That respondent Mayor has expressly stated his willingness to grant permits for
peaceful assemblies at Plaza Miranda during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays when
they would not cause unnecessarily great disruption of the normal activities of the
community and has further offered Sunken Gardens as an alternative to Plaza
Miranda as the site of the demonstration sought to be held this after* noon;
That experiences in connection with present assemblies and demonstrations do
not warrant the Courts disbelieving respondent Mayors appraisal that a public rally
at Plaza Miranda, as compared to one at the Sunken Gardens as he suggested, poses
a clearer and more imminent danger of public disorders, breaches of the peace,
criminal acto, and even bloodshed as an aftermath of such assemblies, and petitioner
has manifested that it has no means of preventing such disorders;
That, consequently, every time that such assemblies are announced, the
community is placed in such a state of fear and tension that offices are closed early
and employees dismissed, storefronts boarded up, classes suspended, and
732
ANNOTATED
transportation disrupted, to the general detriment of the public;
That civil rights and liberties can exist and be preserved only in an ordered society;
That petitioner has failed to show a clear specific legal duty on the part of
respondent Mayor to grant their application for permit unconditionally;
The Court resolved to DENY the writ prayed for and to dismiss the petition.
Villamor, J., concurs separately.
Castro and Fernando, JJ., dissent.
VlLAAMOR, J., concurring:
The right to freedom of assembly is not denied; but this right is neither unlimited nor
absolute. It is not correct to say that the Mayor has refused to grant the permit
applied for; he offered an alternative which, in my opinion, is not unreasonable. There
being no arbitrary refusal to grant permit, petitioner is riot entitled to the writ.
CASTRO and FERNANDO, JJ., dissenting:
Two members of the Court, Castro and Fernando, find themselves unable to concur
with their brethren and would vote to grant the petition. The right to freedom of
assembly while not unlimited is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and
respect. If respondent Mayor premised his refusal to grant the permit as sought by
petitioner on a clear showing that he was so empowered under the criteria supplied
by Primicias v. Fugoso, then this petition should not prosper as petitioner himself did
invoke such authority. The grounds for Ms refusal are however, set forth thus in his
letter of February 24, 1970 addressed to petitioner: In the greater interest of the
general public, and in order not to unduly disturb the life of the community, this
Office, guided by a lesson gained
733
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 733
from the events of the past few weeks, has temporarily adopted the policy of not
issuing any permit for the use of Plaza Miranda for rallies or demonstrations during
week days. They do not, in the opinion of the above two justices, meet the standard
1
of the Primicias ruling. Under the circumstances, the effect is one of prior restraint
of a constitutional right. This is not allowable. An excerpt from a 1969 American
Supreme Court decision is persuasive. Thus: For in deciding whether or not to
withhold a permit, the members of the Commission were to be guided only by their
own ideas of public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good order, morals or
convenience. This ordinance as it was written, therefore, fell squarely within the
ambit of the many decisions of this Court over the last 30 years, holding that a law
subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a
license, without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing
authority, is unconstitutional. This is without prejudice to a more extended opinion
2
being written later.

Very truly yours,
CELSO L. MAGSINO
Clerk of Court
Mr. E. Voltaire Garcia II
(x)
403 Manhattan Building,
Nueva, Manila
Mr. Edcel C. Lagman (x)
110-C Heroes del 96
Caloocan City D-706
City Mayor Antonio J.
Villegas (x)
Maharnilad, Manila
_______________
1Annex B, Petition.
2Shuttleworth v. Birmingham, 22 L. Ed. 2d 162,167 (1969).
734
VOL. 129, MAY 21, 1984 359
Malabanan vs. Ramento
No. L-62270. May 21, 1984. *
CRISPIN MALABANAN, EVELIO JALOS, BEN LUTHER LUCAS, SOTERO

LEONERO, and JUNE LEE, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE ANASTACIO D.
RAMENTO, in his capacity as the Director of the National Capital Region of the
Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, THE GREGORIO ARANETA
UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION; CESAR MIJARES, in his capacity as the President of
the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, GONZALO DEL ROSARIO, in his
capacity as the Director for Academic Affairs of the Gregorio Araneta University
Foundation; TOMAS B. MESINA, in his capacity as the Dean of Student Affairs of
the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation; ATTY. LEONAR-DO PADILLA, in his
capacity as Chief Legal Counsel & Security Supervisor of the Gregorio Araneta
University Foundation; ATTY. FABLITA AMMAY, ROSENDO GALVANTE and
EUGENIA TAYAO, in their capacities as members of the Ad Hoc Committee of the
Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, respondents.
Moot and Academic; Constitutional Law; While the instant petition may have become
academic, there is need to resolve it on the merits in view of the constitutional issue raised.
This petition may be considered moot and academic if viewed solely from the fact that by
virtue of the temporary restraining order issued by this Court petitioners were allowed to
enroll in the ensuing semester, with three of them doing so and with the other two equally
entitled to do so. Moreover, there is the added circumstance of more than a year having
passed since October 20, 1982 when respondent Ramento issued the challenged decision
suspending them for one year. Nonetheless, with its validity having been put in issue, for
being violative of the constitutional rights of freedom of peaceable assembly and free speech,
there is need to pass squarely on the question raised.
Constitutional Law; Suspension for one academic year of students who staged a rally
within University premises but outside the place indicated in the permit given and for a longer
period than
______________
*EN BANC.
360
ANNOTATED
allowed, too severe a penalty.This Court accordingly rules that respect for the
constitutional rights of peaceable assembly and free speech calls for the setting aside of the
decision of respondent Ramento, the penalty imposed being unduly severe. It is true that
petitioners held the rally at a place other than that specified in the permit and continued it
longer than the time allowed. Undeniably too, they did disturb the classes and caused the
work of the non-academic personnel to be left undone. Such undesirable consequence could
have been avoided by their holding the assembly in the basketball court as indicated in the
permit. Nonetheless, suspending them for one year is out of proportion to their misdeed. The
petition must be granted and the decision of respondent Ramento nullified, a much lesser
penalty being appropriate.
Same; Schools and Universities; Authority of school officials over the conduct of their
students cannot go so far as to be violative of the right to free speech and assembly.
Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. They are entitled to do
so. They enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express their views and
communicate their thoughts to those disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in this
case. They do not, to borrow from the opinion of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines
Community School District, shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate. While, therefore, the authority of educational
institutions over the conduct of students must be recognized, it cannot go so far as to be
violative of constitutional safeguards. On a more specific level, there is persuasive force to
this formulation in the Fortas opinion: The principal use to which the schools are dedicated
is to accommodate students during prescribed hours for the purpose of certain types of
activities. Among those activities is personal intercommunication among the students. This
is not only an inevitable part of the process of attending school; it is also an important part
of the educational process. A students rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom
hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the
authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict
in Vietnam, if he does so without materially and substantially interfering] with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school and without colliding
with the rights of others. * * * But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any
reasonwhether it stems from time, place, or type of behaviourmaterially disrupts
classwork or involves substantial disorder or
361
VOL. 129, MAY 21, 1984 361
invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech.
Same; Same; It is quite understandable for student leaders to let loose extremely critical
and, at times, vitriolic language against school authorities during a student rally.If in the
course of such demonstration, with an enthusiastic audience goading them on, utterances,
extremely critical, at times even vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite understandable.
Student leaders are hardly the timid, diffident types. They are likely to be assertive and
dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious
language of the academe. At any rate, even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to accord
full credence to their fiery exhortations. They take into account the excitement of the
occasion, the propensity of speakers to exaggerate, the exuberance of youth. They may give
the speakers the benefit of their applause, but with the activity taking place in the school
premises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public disorder is
discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct, which,
to borrow from Tinker, materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of others.
Same; Same; A one-year suspension is too severe a penalty on student rallyists even if the
rally was held beyond the time permitted and went on to other portions of the University
Compound thus disrupting some classes. Censure or reprimanded or one-week suspension
reasonable.It does not follow, however, that petitioners can be totally absolved for the
events that transpired. Admittedly, there was a violation of the terms of the permit. The rally
was held at a place other than that specified, in the second floor lobby, rather than the
basketball court, of the VMAS building of the University. Moreover, it was continued longer
than the period allowed. According to the decision of respondent Ramento, the concerted
activity [referring to such assembly] went on until 5:30 p.m. Private respondents could thus,
take disciplinary action. On those facts, however, an admonition, even a censurecertainly
not a suspensioncould be the appropriate penalty. Private respondents could and did take
umbrage at the fact that in view of such infractionconsidering the places where and the
time when the demonstration took placethere was a disruption of the classes and stoppage
of work of the non-academic personnel. They would not be unjustified then if they did take a
much more serious view of the
362
ANNOTATED
matter. Even then a one-year period of suspension is much too severe. While the
discretion of both respondent University and respondent Ramento is recognized, the rule of
reason, the dictate of fairness calls for a much lesser penalty. If the concept of proportionality
between the offense committed and the sanction imposed is not followed, an element of
arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise to a due process question. To avoid this
constitutional objection, it is the holding of this Court that a one-week suspension would be
punishment enough.
Same; Administrative Law; Administrative remedies need not be exhausted where issue
is purely a legal and constitutional one.The objection was raised that petitioners failed to
exhaust administrative remedies. That is true, but hardly decisive. Here, a purely legal
question is presented. Such being the case, especially so where a decision on a question of
law is imperatively called for, and time being of the essence, this Court has invariably viewed
the issue as ripe for adjudication. What cannot be too sufficiently stressed is that the
constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are invoked by petitioners.
Moreover, there was, and very likely there will continue to be in the future, militancy and
assertiveness of students on issues that they consider of great importance, whether
concerning their welfare or the general public. That they have a right to do as citizens entitled
to all the protection in the Bill of Rights.
Same; Guidelines for holding student rallies within the campus.The rights to
peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational institutions.
Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public
interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there
be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the state has a right to
present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards
displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however,
by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired
being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in
school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the
power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may
be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or
stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its
terms, the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.
363
VOL. 129, MAY 21, 1984 363
PETITION to review the decision of the Director of the National Capital Region of
the Ministry of Education.

Honesto N. Salcedo for petitioners.
The Solicitor General and Leonardo G. Padilla & Pablita G. Ammay for
respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The failure to accord respect to the constitutional rights of freedom of peaceable

assembly and free speech is the grievance alleged by petitioners, students of the
Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, in this certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus proceeding. The principal respondents are Anastacio D. Ramento,
Director of the National Capital Region of the Ministry of Education, Culture and
Sports and the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation. The nullification of the
1
decision of respondent Ramento affirming the action taken by respondent Gregorio

Araneta University Foundation finding petitioners guilty of illegal assembly and
suspending them is sought in this petition.
The facts are not open to dispute. Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student
Council of respondent University. They sought and were granted by the school
authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M. on August 27,
1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general
assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court (VMAS),
the
________________
1 The other respondents named are Cesar Mijares, in his capacity as the President of the Gregorio
Araneta University Foundation; Gonzalo del Rosario, in his capacity as the Director for Academic Affairs of
the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation; Tomas B. Mesina, in his capacity as the Dean of Student
Affairs of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation; Atty. Leonardo Padilla, in his capacity as Chief
Legal Counsel and Security Supervisor of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation; Atty. Fablita
Ammay, Rosendo Galvante and Eugenio Tayao, in their capacities as members of the Ad Hoc Committee of
the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation.
364
ANNOTATED
place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated but at
the second floor lobby. At such gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous
language their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science
with the Institute of Agriculture. At 10:30 A.M., the same day, they marched toward
the Life Science Building and continued their rally. It was outside the area covered
by their permit. They continued their demonstration, giving utterance to language
severely critical of the University authorities and using megaphones in the process.
There was, as a result, disturbance of the classes being held. Also, the non-academic
employees, within hearing distance, stopped their work because of the noise created.
They were asked to explain on the same day why they should not be held liable for
holding an illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed through
a memorandum that they were under preventive suspension for their failure to
explain the holding of an illegal assembly in front of the Life Science Building. The
validity thereof was challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First Instance
of Rizal in a petition for mandamus with damages against private respondents and 2
before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports. On October 20, 1982,
respondent Ramento, as Director of the National Capital Region, found petitioners
guilty of the charge of having violated par. 146(c) of the Manual for Private Schools
more specifically their holding of an illegal assembly which was characterized by the
violation of the permit granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral
defamation. The penalty was suspension for one academic year. Hence this petition.
On November 16, 1982, this Court issued the following resolution: Acting on the
urgent ex-parte motion for the immediate issuance of a temporary mandatory order
filed by counsel for petitioners, dated November 12, 1982, the Court Resolved to
ISSUE A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER enjoining all respondents or any
person or persons
________________
2 After obtaining an order to allow petitioners to lift temporarily the suspension and allow their
attendance at classes, no further information as to what subsequently transpired was furnished this Court.
365
VOL. 129, MAY 21, 1984 365
acting in their place or stead from enforcing the order of the Ministry of Education
and Culture dated October 20, 1982 finding the petitioners guilty of the charges
against them and suspending them for one (1) academic year with a stern warning
that a commission of the same or another offense will be dealt with utmost severity,
effective as of this date and continuing until otherwise ordered by this Court, thus
allowing them to enroll, if so minded. 3
Both public and private respondents submitted their comments. Private

respondents prayed for the dismissal of the petition for lack of factual and legal basis
and likewise [prayed] for the lifting of the temporary restraining order dated
November 16, 1982. Public respondent Ramento, on the other hand, through the
4
Office of the Solicitor General, prayed for the dismissal of the petition based on the
following conclusion: Consequently, it is respectfully submitted that respondent
Director of the MECS did not commit any error, much less abused his discretion,
when he affirmed the decision of respondent University finding petitioners guilty of
violations of the provisions of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools and the
Revised Students Code of Discipline and ordering their suspension for one (1)
academic school year. However, since said suspension has not been enforced except
only briefly, thereby enabling petitioners Leonero, Jr., Lucas and Malabanan to finish
their courses, and allowing petitioners Lee and Jalos to continue their schooling, if
they so desire, this proceeding is now moot and academic. 5
With the submission of such comments considered as the answers of public and
private respondents, the case was ready for decision.
This petition may be considered moot and academic if viewed solely from the fact
that by virtue of the temporary restraining order issued by this Court petitioners
were allowed to enroll in the ensuing semester, with three of them doing so and with
the other two equally entitled to do so. Moreover,
______________
3 Resolution of this Court dated November 16, 1982.

4 Comment of Private Respondents, 18.
5 Comment of Public Respondent, 9-10.
366
ANNOTATED
there is the added circumstance of more than a year having passed since October 20,
1982 when respondent Ramento issued the challenged decision suspending them for
one year. Nonetheless, with its validity having been put in issue, for being violative
of the constitutional rights of freedom of peaceable assembly and free speech, there
is need to pass squarely on the question raised.
This Court accordingly rules that respect for the constitutional rights of peaceable
assembly and free speech calls for the setting aside of the decision of respondent
Ramento, the penalty imposed being unduly severe. It is true that petitioners held
the rally at a place other than that specified in the permit and continued it longer
than the time allowed. Undeniably too, they did disturb the classes and caused the
work of the non-academic personnel to be left undone. Such undesirable consequence
could have been avoided by their holding the assembly in the basketball court as
indicated in the permit. Nonetheless, suspending them for one year is out of
proportion to their misdeed. The petition must be granted and the decision of
respondent Ramento nullified, a much lesser penalty being appropriate.
1. As is quite clear from the opinion in Reyes v. Bagatsing, the invocation of the
6
right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right
to free speech has likewise been disregarded. Both are embraced in the concept of
freedom of expression, which is identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully, any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment and which
is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing * * * of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. 7
2. In the above case, a permit was sought to hold a peaceful march and rally from
the Luneta public park to the gates of the United States Embassy, hardly two blocks
away, where in an open space of public property, a short program
_______________
6G.R. No. 65366, November 9, 1983, 125 SCRA 553.

7Ibid, 561. Cf. Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, L-27833, April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA 835, 856-857.
367
VOL. 129, MAY 21, 1984 367
would be held. Necessarily then, the question of the use of a public park and of the
streets leading to the United States Embassy was before this Court. We held that
streets and parks have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and
have been used for purposes of assembly to communicate thoughts between citizens
and to discuss public issues. 8
3. The situation here is different. The assembly was to be held not in a public place
but in private premises, property of respondent University. There is in the Reyes
opinion as part of the summary this relevant excerpt: The applicants for a permit to
hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public
place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the
consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is
required. Petitioners did seek such consent. It was granted. According to the
9
petition: On August 27, 1982, by virtue of a permit granted to them by the school
administration, the Supreme Student Council where your petitioners are among the
officers, held a General Assembly at the VMAS basketball court of the respondent
University. There was an express admission in the Comment of private respondent
10
University as to a permit having been granted for petitioners to hold a student

assembly. The specific question to be resolved then is whether on the facts as
11
disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action and the penalty imposed, there was an
infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech.
4. Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. They are
entitled to do so. They enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express their
views and communicate their thoughts to those disposed to listen in
________________
8 Ibid, 563-564. Reference was made to Municipality of Roxas v. Cavite, 30 Phil. 602 (1915) and Primicias
v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71 (1948). The above formulation of the immemorial use of public parks comes from the
plurality opinion in Hague vs. CIO, 307 US 495 (1937).
9 Ibid, 569.
10 Petition, par. 2, Annex A.
11 Comment of Private Respondents, par. 2.
368
ANNOTATED
gatherings such as was held in this case. They do not, to borrow from the opinion of
Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, shed their 12
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse

gate. While, therefore, the authority of educational institutions over the conduct of
13
students must be recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative of constitutional

safeguards. On a more specific level, there is persuasive force to this formulation in
the Fortas opinion: The principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to
accommodate students during prescribed hours for the purpose of certain types of
activities. Among those activities is personal intercommunication among the
students. This is not only an inevitable part of the process of attending school; it is
also an important part of the educational process. A students rights, therefore, do
not embrace merely the classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the
playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his
opinions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so
without materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school and without colliding with the
rights of others. * * * But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any
reasonwhether it stems from time, place, or type of behaviormaterially disrupts
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of
course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech. 14
5. As tested by such a standard, what is the verdict on the complaint of petitioners

that there was a disregard of their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and
free speech. It must be in their favor, but subject to qualification, in view of their
continuing their demonstration in a place other than that specified in the permit for
a longer period and their making use of megaphones therein, resulting in the
disruption of classes
________________
12 393 US 503 (1969).

13 Ibid, 507.
14 Ibid, 513-514.
369
VOL. 129, MAY 21, 1984 369
and the stoppage of work by the non-academic personnel in the vicinity of such
assembly.
6. Objection is made by private respondents to the tenor of the speeches by the
student leaders. That there would be a vigorous presentation of views opposed to the
proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture
was to be expected. There was no concealment of the fact that they were against such
a move as it confronted them with a serious problem (isang malaking
suliranin.) They believed that such a merger would result in the increase in tuition
15
fees, an additional headache for their parents (isa na naman sakit sa ulo ng ating
mga magulang.). If in the course of such demonstration, with an enthusiastic
16
audience goading them on, utterances, extremely critical, at times even vitriolic, were
let loose, that is quite understandable. Student leaders are hardly the timid, diffident
types. They are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if
during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. At
any rate, even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to accord full credence to their
fiery exhortations. They take into account the excitement of the occasion, the
propensity of speakers to exaggerate, the exuberance of youth. They may give the
speakers the benefit of their applause, but with the activity taking place in the school
premises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public disorder is
discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct,
which, to borrow from Tinker, materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others.
7. Nor is this a novel approach to the issue raised by petitioners that they were
denied the right to peaceable assembly. In a 1907 decision, United States v.
Apurado, the facts disclosed that shortly before the municipal council of San Carlos,
17
Occidental Negros, started its session, some five hundred residents of the
municipality assembled near the municipal building, and, upon the opening of the
session, a
_______________
15 Comment of Private Respondents, Annex M.

16 Ibid.
17 7 Phil. 422.
370
ANNOTATED
substantial number of such persons barged into the council chamber, demanding that
the municipal treasurer, the municipal secretary, and the chief of police be dismissed,
submitting at the same time the proposed substitutes. The municipal council gave its
conformity. Such individuals were wholly unarmed except that a few carried canes;
the crowd was fairly orderly and well-behaved except in so far as their pressing into
the council chamber during a session of that body could be called disorder and
misbehavior. It turned out that the movement had its origin in religious differences.
The defendant Filomeno Apurado and many other participants were indicted and
convicted of sedition in that they allegedly prevented the municipal government from
freely exercising its duties. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. Justice Carson,
who penned the opinion, correctly pointed out that if the prosecution be permitted to
seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by individual members of a
crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising
against the authorities, then the right to assemble and to petition for redress of
grievances would become a delusion and a snare and the attempt to exercise it on the
most righteous occasion and in the most peaceable manner would expose all those
who took part therein to the severest form of punishment, if the purposes which they
sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. The 18
principle to be followed is enunciated thus: If instances of disorderly conduct occur

on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefor,
but the utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line
between disorderly and seditious conduct and between an essentially peaceable
assembly and a tumultuous uprising. A careful reading of this decision is in order
19
before private respondents attach, as they did in their comments, a subversive

character to the rally held by the students under the leadership of petitioners.
8. It does not follow, however, that petitioners can be totally absolved for the events
that transpired. Admittedly,
_______________
Ibid. 426.
18
Ibid.
19
371
VOL. 129, MAY 21, 1984 371
there was a violation of the terms of the permit. The rally was held at a place other
than that specified, in the second floor lobby, rather than the basketball court, of the
VMAS building of the University. Moreover, it was continued longer than the period
allowed. According to the decision of respondent Ramento, the concerted activity
[referring to such assembly] went on until 5:30 p.m. Private respondents could thus,
20
take disciplinary action. On those facts, however, an admonition, even a censure

certainly not a suspensioncould be the appropriate penalty. Private respondents
could and did take umbrage at the fact that in view of such infraction-considering the
places where and the time when the demonstration took placethere was a
disruption of the classes and stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. They
would not be unjustified then if they did take a much more serious view of the matter.
Even then a one-year period of suspension is much too severe. While the discretion of
both respondent University and respondent Ramento is recognized, the rule of
reason, the dictate of fairness calls for a much lesser penalty. If the concept of
proportionality between the offense committed and the sanction imposed is not
followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise to a due process
question. To avoid this constitutional objection, it is the holding of this Court that a
one-week suspension would be punishment enough.
9. One last matter. The objection was raised that petitioners failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. That is true, but hardly decisive. Here, a purely legal
question is presented. Such being the case, especially so where a decision on a
question of law is imperatively called for, and time being of the essence, this Court
has invariably viewed the issue as ripe for adjudication. What cannot be too
sufficiently stressed is that the constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free
speech are invoked by petitioners. Moreover, there was, and very likely there will
continue to be in the future, militancy and assertiveness of students on issues that
they consider of great importance, whether concerning their welfare or the general
______________
Petition, Annex J.
20
372
ANNOTATED
public. That they have a right to do as citizens entitled to all the protection in the Bill
of Rights.
10. It would be most appropriate then, as was done in the case of Reyes v.
Bagatsing, for this Court to lay down the principles for the guidance of school
21
authorities and students alike. The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are
guaranteed students of educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss
matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be subjected to
previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and
present danger to a substantive evil that the state has a right to present. As a
corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards
displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost,
however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances
that may be aired being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the
assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school
authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or
unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and
place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-
academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty
incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision dated October 20, 1982 of
respondent Ramento imposing a one-year suspension is nullified and set aside. The
temporary restraining order issued by this Court in the resolution of November 18,
1982 is made permanent. As of that date, petitioners had been suspended for more
than a week. In that sense, the one-week penalty had been served. No costs.
Teehankee, Makasiar, Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-
Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.
Aquino, Concepcion, Jr. and De castro JJ., took no part.
________________
Cf. Reyes v. Bagatsing, G.R. No. 65366, November 9, 1983 125 SCRA 553.
21
373
VOL. 129, MAY 21, 1984 373
La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. vs. Fernandez
Petition granted. Decision nullified and set aside.
Notes.At the very least, the speech and free press may be identified with the
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without
censorship or punishment. (Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections,27 SCRA 835.)
Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 875 recognized freedom of association.
(Anuncension vs. National Labor Union, 80 SCRA 350.)
To prevent dilution of the constitutional right to free speech and free press, every
libel prosecution should be tested on the rigorous and exacting standard of whether
or not it could be violative of such fundamental guarantee. (Bacobo vs. Estanislao, 78
SCRA 520.)
o0o

VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 835
Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections
No. L-27833. April 18, 1969.
IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF RE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT 4880. ARSENIO GONZALES and
FELICISIMO R. CABIGAO, petitioners, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondent.
Elections; Words and phrases; Candidate, election campaign and partisan political
activity, definedThe terms candidate and election campaign or partisan political
activity are likewise defined. The former according to Act No. 4880 refers to any person
aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, regardless of whether or not said person has
already filed his certificate of candidacy or has been nominated by any political party as its
candidate. Election campaign or
_______________
fifty per cent or to increase by not more than five times the rates of import duty expressly fixed by statute
(including any necessary change in classification) when in his judgment such modification in the rates of import
duty Is necessary in the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national defense.
6 Civil Code, Art. 2; Rev. Adm. Code, sec. 11; cf. Victorias Milling Co. vs. Social Security Commission, L-
16704, March 17, 1962- Philippine Blooming Mills Co. v. Social Security System, L-21223. Aug. 31, 1966, 17 SCRA
1077; People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 (1964).
836
ANNOTATED
partisan political activity refer to acts designed to have a candidate elected or not or
promote the candidacy of a person or persons to a public office. There the acts were specified.
There is a proviso that simple expression of opinion and .thoughts concerning the election
shall not be considered as part of an election campaign. There is the further proviso that
nothing stated in the Act shall be understood to prevent any person from expressing his
views on current political problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of the candidates
for public office whom he supports. (Sec. 2 of Act 4880 further amends Sec. 133 of the Revised
Election Code to include the two new above sections among the serious election offenses.)
Constitutional law; Supreme Court; Constitutional question raised in the Supreme
Court; When can it be entertained.A constitutional question taking into consideration the
importance it assumed and that to prevent multiplicity of suits, may be entertained by the
Supreme Court. In the case at bar, the constitutional issue being of exceptional character,
involving public interest, and the undeniable necessity for a ruling because the national
elections is just a matter of months, the Supreme Court decided to resolve the constitutional
issues raised before it.
Same; Party; Taxpayer can bring action to restrain expenditure of public funds.A
taxpayer can bring an action to restrain the expenditure of public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional legislative measure, (Philconsa vs. Mathay, L-
25554, Oct. 4, 1966, citing Philconsa vs. Gimenez. L-23326, Dec. 18, 1965;
Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works, L-10405, Dec. 29, 1960; Pelaez vs. Auditor General,
L-2S8259 Dec. 24, 1965; Iloilo Palay & Com Planters Association vs. Feli ciano, L-24022,
March 3, 1965. See also Lidasan vs. Commission on Elections, L-28080, Oct 25, 1967.)
Same; Freedom of speech and of press; Liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any
matter of public interest without censorship or punishmentAt the very least, the speech and
free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of
public interest without censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous restraint
an the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for
sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and present
danger of substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent
Same; Same; Freedom of expression not absolute.From the language of the specific
constitutional provision, it would appear that the right is not susceptible of any limitation.
No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. The realities of life
in a complex society preclude however a literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not
an absolute. It would be too much ,to insist that at all times and under all circumstances it
should remain unfettered and un-
837
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 837
restrained. There are other social values that press for recognition.
Same; Same; Clear and present danger and dangerous tendency, rules; Nature and
concept.In Cabansag vs. Fernandez (102 Phil. 151, 161) ,the Supreme Court spoke of two
tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for permissible restriction. Thus: These are
the clear and present danger rule and the dangerous tendency rule. The f irst, as
interpreted In a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or
utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of Imminence extremely high before the
utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the substantive evil sought
to be prevented. It has the advantage of establishing according to the above decision a
definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be
published. The Cabansag case likewise referred to the other test the dangerous tendency
rule explained it thus: If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has
a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or
immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfullness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts
be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably
calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfullness. It is sufficient if the
natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil
which the legislative body seeks to prevent.
Same; Same; Same; Test to determine limitation of freedom of expression.The test as a
limitation on freedom of expression is justified by the danger or evil of a substantive character
that the state has a right to prevent. Unlike the dangerous tendency doctrine, the danger
must not only be clear but also present. The term clear seems to point to a causal connection
with .the danger of the substantive evil arising from the utterance questioned. Present refers
to the time element. It used to be identified with imminent and immediate danger. The
danger must not only be probable but very likely inevitable.
Same; Same; Freedom of assembly; When freedom of expression may be limited.The
Bill of Rights prohibits abridgment by law of freedom of speech or of the press. It likewise
extends the same protection to the right of the people peaceably to assemble. As emphatically
put In ,the leading case of United States vs, Cruikshank (92 U.S. 542), the very idea of a
government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably
for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for redress of grievances. As in
the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on
a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to
prevent.
838
ANNOTATED
Same; Same; Freedom of association; Effect of non-existence.The stress on ,the f
reedom of association should be on its political significance. If such a right were non-existent,
the likelihood of a one-party government is more than a possibility. Authoritarianism may
become unavoidable. Political opposition will simply cease to exist; minority groups may be
outlawed, constitutional democracy as intended by the Constitution may well become a thing
of the past.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Effect on political parties.Political parties which, as is
ordinarily the case, assume the role alternately of being in the majority or in the minority as
the will of the electorate dictates, will lose their constitutional protection. It is undeniable,
therefore, that the utmost scope should be afforded this freedom of association.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Favorable effects.It is indispensable not only for its
enhancing the respect that should be accorded a human personality but equally so for its
assurance that the wishes of any group to oppose whatever f or the moment is the party in
power and with the help of the electorate to set up its own program of government would not
be nullified or frustrated.
Same; Same; Same; When it may be limited.The Constitution limits this particular
freedom in the sense that there could be an abridgment of the right to form associations or
societies when their purposes are contrary to law. How should the limitation for purposes
not contrary to law be interpreted? It is submitted that it is another way of expressing the
clear and present danger rule for unless an association or society could be shown to create an
imminent danger to public safety, there is no justification for abridging the right to form
associations or societies. (Cf. Thomas vs. Collins, 323 U.S. 516) As was so aptly stated: There
is no other course consistent with the Free Society envisioned by the First Amendment. For
the views a citizen entertains, the beliefs he harbors, the utterances he makes, the ideology
he embraces, and the people he associates with are no concern to governmentuntil and
unless he moves into action. That article of faith marks indeed the main difference between
the Free Society which we espouse and the dictatorships both on the left and on the right.
(Douglas, op. cit., p. 1376).
Same; Statutes; Republic Act 4880; Statute held valid.The case at bar raised the
validity of the prohibition in Republic Act No. 4880 of the too early nomination of candidates
and limitation found therein on the period of election campaign or partisan political activity
alleged by petitioners to offend against the rights of free speech, free press, freedom of
assembly and freedom of association. The prohibition of too early nomination of candidates
presents a question that is not too formidable in character. According to the act: It shall be
unlawful for
839
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 839
any political party, political committee, or political group to nominate candidates for any
elective public office voted for at large earlier than one hundred and fifty days immediately
preceding an election, and for any other elective public office earlier than ninety days
immediately preceding an election. The right of association is affected. Political parties have
less freedom as to the time during which they may nominate candidates; the curtailment is
not such, however, as to render meaningless such a basic right. Their scope of legitimate
activities, save this one, is not unduly narrowed. Neither is there an infringement of their
freedom to assemble. They can do so, but not for such purpose.
Same; Same; Same; A fatal constitutional infirmity of vagueness may be stricken
down.It is a well-settled principle that stricter standards of permissible statutory
vagueness may be applied to a statute having inhibiting ef fect on speech; a man may the
less be required to act at his peril here, because the free dissemination of ideas may be the
loser. Where the statutory provision then operates .16 inhibit the exercise of individual
freedom affirmatively protected by the Constitution, the imputation of vagueness sufficient
to invalidate the statute is inescapable
Same;: Same; Same; Objection raised as to vagueness minimized in case at bar.It
cannot be denied that evils substantial in character taint .the purity of the electoral process.
There can be under the circumstances then no outright condemnation of the statute. It could
not be said to be unwarranted, much less arbitrary. There is need for refraining from the
outright assumption that the constitutional infirmity is apparent from a mere reading
thereof. For under circumstances that manifest abuses of the gravest character, remedies
much more drastic than what ordinarily would suffice would indeed be called for. The
justification alleged by the proponents of the measures weighs heavily with the members of
the Court, though in varying degrees, in the appraisal of the aforesaid restrictions to which
such precious freedoms are subjected. They are not aware of the clear and present danger
that calls for measures that may bear heavily on the exercise of the cherished rights of
expression, of assembly, and of association. This is not to say that once such a situation is.
found to exist, there is no limit to the allowable limitations on such constitutional rights. The
clear and present danger doctrine rightly viewed requires that only should there be
an occasion for the imposition of such restrictions but also that they be limited
in scope. There are still constitutional questions of a serious character then to be aced. The
practices which ,the act identifies with election campaign or partisan political activity must
be such that they are free from the taint of being violative of free speech, free press, freedom
of assembly and freedom of association. What removes the sting
840
ANNOTATED
from constitutional objection of vagueness is the enumeration of the acts deemed
included in the terms election campaign or partisan political activity. They are: "(a)
Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the
purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a
party or candidate; (b) holding political conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies,
parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking
any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate or party, (c) making speeches,
announcements or commentaries or holding interviews for or against the election of any party
or candidate for public office; (d) publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials;
(e) directly or indirectly soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for
or against any candidate or party; (f) giving, soliciting, or receiving contributions for election
compaign purposes, either directly or indirectly. As thus limited, the objection that may be
raised as to vagueness has been minimized, if not totally set at rest.
Same; Same; Same; Prohibition against giving, soliciting, or receiving contribution for
election purposes free from constitutional infirmity.The Supreme Court is of the view that
no unconstitutional infringement exists insofar as the formation of organizations,
associations, clubs, committees, or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes
or undertaking any campaign or propaganda or both for or against a candidate or party is
restricted and that the prohibition against giving, soliciting, or receiving contribution for
election purposes, either directly or indirectly, is equally free from constitutional infirmity.
The other acts, likewise deemed included in election campaign or partisan political
activity tax to the utmost the judicial predisposition to view with sympathy legislative efforts
to regulate election practices deemed inimical, because of their collision with the preferred
right of freedom of expression. From the outset, such provisions did occasion divergence of
views among the members of the Supreme Court. Originally only a minority was for their
being adjudged as invalid. It is not so any more. This is merely to emphasize that the scope
of the curtailment to which freedom of expression may be subjected is not foreclosed by the
recognition of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, the
debasement of the electoral process. The majority of the Supreme Court is thus of the belief
that the solicitation or undertaking of any campaign or propaganda, whether directly or
indirectly, by an individual, the making of speeches, announcements or commentaries or
holding interview for or against the election for any party or candidate for public of f ice, or
the publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, suffer from the corrosion
of invalidity.
841
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 841
Same; Same; Same; Reason for enactment, Congress was called upon to seek remedial
measures for the for-fromsatisfactory condition arising from the too-early nomination of
candidates and the necessarily prolonged political campaigns. The direful consequences and
the harmful effects on .the public interest with the vital affairs of the country sacrificed many
a time to purely partisan pursuits were known to all. Moreover, it is no exaggeration to state
that violence and even death did f requently occur because of the heat engendered by such
political activities. Then, too, the opportunity for dishonesty and corruption, with the right
to suffrage being bartered, was further magnified.
Same; Same; Same; Congress; Police power; Congress under exercise of police power
imposed the restrictions under the Act.Under the police power then, with its concern for the
general welfare and with the commendable aim of safeguarding the right of suffrage, the
legislative body must have felt impelled to impose the foregoing restrictions. It is
understandable for Con-gress to believe that without the limitations thus set forth in the
challenged legislation, the laudable purpose of Republic Act No. 4880 would be frustrated
and nullified,
SANCHEZ, J., concurring and dissenting:
Constitutional law; Statutes; Republic Act 4880; Congress;Act a police power legislation;
Its purpose.R.A. 4880 is a police power legislation. It is enacted by virtue of the inherent
power of Congress to legislate on matters affecting public interest and welfare, as well as in
pursuance of the constitutional policy of insuring a free, honest and orderly election.
Basically, the undefined scope of that power extends as far as the frontiers of public interest
would advance. Fittingly, legislative determination of the breadth of public interest should
command respect. For, Congress is the constitutional body vested with the power to enact
laws. Its representative composition induces judgment culled from the diverse regions of the
country. Normally, this should assure that a piece of police legislation is a reflection of what
public Interest contemporaneously encompasses.
Same; Same; Same; Subsections (a), (b) and (f) of Section 50-B constitutional; Reason.
Section 50-B of the Act constitutional, and its subsections (a), (b) and (f). There is no serious
evil with .their enforcement. They do not offend the constitutionally protected speech and
press freedoms, and rights of peaceable assembly and association. The latter must yield. The
prescriptions set forth in all of them are clear-cut, not open to reasonable doubt, nor easily
susceptible to unreasonable interpretation. Public interest and welfare authorize their
incorporation into the statute books.
Same; Same; Supreme Court; Congress determines necessity
842
ANNOTATED
of law; Supreme Court its validity.Congress has put upon untried measure to solve the
problematic situation, Deduction then is the only avenue open: for Congress, to determine
the necessity for the law; for the Court its validity. The possibility of of its ineff icaciousness
is not remote. But so long as a remedy adopted by Congress, as far as can logically be
assumed, measures up to the standard of validity, it stands.
Same; Same; Same; Criterion for validity.The pecuIiarity of discussion, be It oral or
printed, is that it carries with it vary-ing degrees of enthusiasm and inclination ,to
persuade, de-pending upon the listener or reader. It f alls short of a partisan political activity
when it is devoid of partisan interest in the sense that it is not made in ,the interest of a
candidate or party, This is the only criterion for validity. But who is to decide this? And how?
The law does not even inquire that there be an operation or a series of operations in order to
measure up to an election campaign as it is commonly understood. In this way, the law may
well become an instrument of harassment. Worse, it could lull the potential defendant into A
false sense of security. lt then becomes a dragnet that may trap anyone who attempts to
express a simple opinion on political issues.
Same; Same; Effect of vagueness of law.Because of the indefiniteness created in
subsections c, d and e of section 50(B), they readily lend themselves to harsh application.
Vagueness of the law opens a wide latitude to law enforcers. Arbitrary enforcement of the
letter of the law by an expansive definition of election campaign or partisan political activity
should not be branded as improbable. For, political rivalries, spawn persecution. The law
then becomes an unwitting tool. Discussion may be given a prima facie label as against the
harrased. This is not altogether remote. To be sure, harassment and persecution are not
unknown to the unscrupulous.
Same; Same; Foregoing question of constitutionality.Those who favor validity find
comfort in the theory that it is better for the meantime to leave .the statute well enough
alone. They say that it is pref erable that courts of justice be allowed to hammer out the
contours of the statute case by case. This may not, however, be entirely acceptable. To forego
the question of consstitutionality for now and take risks may not be wiser move. As well
advocated elsewhere a series of court prosecutions will touch only portions of a statute, still
leaving uncertain other portions thereof. And then, in deciding whether or not an
offendingvague can be salvaged, one must not hedge and assume that when it is enforced in
the courts, ambiguities will be resolved in favor of upholding the speech and press.
CASTRO, J., separate opinion:

Constitutional law; Statute; Republic Act 4880; Freedom
843
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 843
Gonzales vs. Commmision on Elections
of peaceful assembly and of association; Case at bar.The regulation of the time within
which nominations of candidates by political parties may take place, under Section 50-A, and
fixing a time limit for holding political conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies,
parades, or other similar assemblies for campaign purposes, under paragraph (b) of Section
50-B, curtails the freedom of peaceful assembly. And finally, the right to form associations
for purposes not contrary to law is impinged upon by the provision of paragraph (a) of Section
50-B regulating the forming of Organizations, Associations, Clubs, Committees or other
groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a party or candidate/' It is f airly accurate to say the legislations
imposing restrictions upon the right of the expression, and and upon the right of assembly
and of political association indispensable to the full exercise of free expression, have
commonly been subjected to more searching and exacting judicial scrutiny than statutes
directed at other personal activities.
Same; Same; Same; Freedom of speech and of the press; Does not confer absolute right to
speak or publish.It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of speech
and of the press which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an absolute right to
speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or unrestricted or
unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the
punishment of those who abuse this freedom. (People vs. Nabong, 57 Phil. 455; see also
People vs. Feleo, 57 Phil. 451; People vs. Feleo, 58 Phil. 573.)
Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; Duty of the Supreme Court where there is conflict
between an assertion of .state authority and the exercise of free speech and assembly.ln every
case where there arises a clash between an assertion of State authority and the exercise of
free speech and assembly, it is ultimately the high function and duty of the Supreme Court
to locate the point of accommodation and equilibrium and draw the line between permissible
regulation and forbidden restraint. It is now conventional wisdom that this function of
delimitation and adjustment cannot meaningfully be carried out through the iteration of
abstract generalizations. The restriction that is assailed as unconstitutional must be judged
in the context of which it is part taking into account the nature and substantiality of the
community interest sought to be protected or promoted by the legislation under assay, in
relation to the nature and importance of the freedom restricted and the character and extent
of the restriction sought to be imposed.
Same; Same; Same; Doctrines of dangerous tendency and dear and present danger,
distinguished.The dangerous tendency and dear and present danger doctrines, it should
not escape notice, were f ashioned in the course of testing legislation
844
844 SUPREME REPORTS
ANNOTATED
of a particular typelegislation speech expected to have deleterious consequences .on
the security and public order of the community. The essential difference between the two
doctrines related .to the degree of proximity of the apprehended danger which justified the
restriction upon speech. The dangerous tendency doctrine permitted the application of
restrictions once a rational connection between the speech restrained and the danger
apprehendedthe tendency of one to create the otherwas shown. The clear and present
danger rule, in contrast, required the Government to defer application of restrictions until
the apprehended danger was much more visible, until its realization was imminent and nigh
at hand, The latter rule was thus considerably more permissive of speech than the
former, in contexts for the testing of which they mere originally designed.
Same; Same; Same; Factors to be considered in restricting individuals freedom, and the
social importance:and value of the freedom so restricted.Although the urgency the public
Interest sought to be secured by Congressional power restricting the individuals freedom,
and the social importance and value of the freedom so restricted, are to he judged in the
concrete, not on the basis of abstractions, a wide range of factors are necessarily relevant in
ascertaining the point or line of equilibrium. Among these are (a) the social value and
importance of the specific aspect of the particular freedom restricted by the legislation; (b)
the specific trust of the restriction, i.e., whether the restriction is direct or indirect, whether
or not the persons affected are few; (c) the value and importance of the public interest sought
to be secured by the legislationthe reference here is to the nature and gravity of the evil
which Congress seeks to prevent; (4) whether the specific restriction decreed by Congress is
reasonably appropriate and necessary for the protection of such public interest; and (e)
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved by some
other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Same; Same; Same; Balancing-of-interest test, When, applied.In actual application
of the ''balancing-of-interest test, the crucial question is: how much deference should
be given to the legislative judgment? It does not seem to me enough to saf that the Supreme
Court should not concern itself with the wisdom of a particular legislative measure but with
the question of constitutional power, I believe that we cannot avoid addressing ourselves to
the question whether the point of viable equilibrium represented by the legistetive judgment
emobodied in R.A. 4880 is an appropriate and reasonable one, in the light of both the historic
purpose of the constitutional safeguards of speech and assembly and the general conditions
obtaining in the community.
845
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1989 845
Same; Same; Same; Nomination of candidate has speech and assembly aspects.The act
of nominating a candidate has speech and assembly aspects, the restrictive effect of Section
50-A would appear negligible. The reach of the statute is itself limited: it applies only to
political parties, political committees or political groups, leaving everyone else free from
restraint. The thrust of Section 50-A is also limited; it does not prohibit political parties from
holding nominating conventions or from doing any lawful .thing during such conventions;
what it controls is the schedule of the nominating conventions. While control of the
scheduling of conventions of course involves delimitation of the time periods which the
formally revealed candidates have to convince the electorate of their respective merits, those
periods150 days and 90 daysdo not appear unreasonably short, at least not in this age of
instantaneous and mass media.
Same; Same; Same; Limiting period of election campaigns is for public interest.The
rational connection between the pro-hibition of Section 50-A and its object, the indirect and
modest scope of its restriction on the rights of speech and assembly, and the embracing public
interest which Congress has found in the moderation of partisan political activity, lead us to
the conclusion that the statute may stand consistently with and does not offend against the
Constitution. The interest of the community in limiting the period of election campaigns, on
balance, far outweighs the social value of the kind of speech and assembly that is involved in
the formal nomination of candidates for public office.
Same; Same; Same; Effect of Section 50-B.With respect to Section 50-B, the restraint
on the freedom of expression, assembly and association is direct. Except within the open
season of 120 and 90 days preceding the election, the statute prevents and punishesby
heavy criminal sanctionspeeches, writings, assemblies and association intended to promote
or oppose the candidacy of any person aspiring for an elective public office, or which may be
deemed a direct or an indirect campaign or as propaganda for or against a political party.
The prohibition reaches not only a relative handful of persons/' it applies to any
person whether or not a voter or candidate, and to any group of persons whether or not a
political party or political committee. The effect of the law, therefore, is to impose a
comprehensive and prolonged prohibition of speech of a particular content, except during the
120 or 90 days, respectively, immediately preceding an election.
Same; Same; Interest of state secured by Section 50-B is legitimate.The interest of .the
state in regulating partisan political activity, which is sought to be secured by Section 50-B
no less than by Section 50-A, is a legitimate one and its protection aim for reasonable exercise
of the public power. I think, how-
846
ANNOTATED
ever, that interest, important as it is, does not offset the restrictions which Section 50-B
imposes with indiscriminate sweep upon the even more fundamental community interests
embodied in the constitutional guarantees of speech, assembly and association.
Same; Same; Paragraph (f) of Section 50-B tautological and question-begging.Under
these circumstances, the contraposition in Section 50-B between expressions of opinion, on
the one hand, and solicitation and campaign or propaganda. on the other, as too uncertain
and shifting a line of distinction to be of any practical utility either to the citizen or official
who must speak at his own peril or to .the prosecutors and the courts who must enforce and
apply the distinction. Paragraph (f) of Section 50-B is tautological and question-begging. It
defines election campaign as giving, soliciting, or receiving contributions for election
campaign purposes, either directly or indirectly. Insof ar, therefore, as the phrase election
campaign purposes in paragraph (f) depends for its meaning on the preceding paragraphs
(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e), paragraph (f) likewise suffers from constitutional infirmity. Upon the
other hand, if the meaning of paragraph (f) be that ,the act of soliciting, giving or receiving
contributions for the purpose of advancing the candidacy of a person or party is campaigning
", then it is just as much a curtailment of the freedom of thought ,that the Constitution
vouchsafes to every citizen.
BARREDO, J.: concurring and dissenting.
Constitutional law; Supreme Court; Where court should take cognizance of a

constitutional issue.The Supreme Court can take up a constitutional question when it
involves a real and genuine situation causing direct substantial injury to specific persons, as
contradistinguished f rom mere speculative fears of possible general hardship or mere
inconvenience. The Supreme Court should adhered strictly to the above requirement and
threw out cases of the nature of the present one, if only out of the traditional respect the
Supreme Court owes the two other coordinate and co-equal departments of the government.
In the petition at bar, there are no allegations of specific acts of the respondent Commission
on Elections or even only threatened to be committed by it, pursuant to the challenged
legislation, which they claim impairs, impedes, or negates any rights of theirs considered to
be constitutionally protected against such impairment, impeding or negation. It is very clear
that the Supreme Courts jurisdiction has not been properly invoked. Considering how multif
aceted the law in question is, one is completely at a loss as to how petitioners request for a
blanket prohibition and injunction can be considered, in the light of existing prinbles that
strictly limit the power- of the Supreme Court to
847
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 847
take cognizance of constitutional cases only to those that can pass the test mentioned
above.
Same; Same; Where constitutional issue has become moot, case should be dismissed.If
the Supreme Court and even inferior court dismiss ordinary cases which have become moot
and academic, with much more reason should such action be taken, in cases wherein the
unconstitutionality of a law or executive order is raised.
Same; Political parties; Concomitant to democratic government.It is unquestionable
that the formation of an ordinary political party cannot be for purposes contrary to law. On
the contrary, .the organization of political parties not dedicated to the violent overthrow of
the government is an indispensable concomitant of any truly democratic government.
Partyless governments are travesties of the genuine concept of democracy.
Same; Same; Effect of prohibition on organization of new political party.To prohibit
the organization of new political party is but a short step away from implanting here the
totalitarian practice of a one-ticket election. Absolute freedom of choice of the parties and
men by whom we shall be governed, even if only among varying evils, is of the very essence
in the concept of democracy consecrated in the fundamental law of our land.
Same; Freedoms of speech, press, and peaceful assembly;When exercised in relation to
suffrage, are absolute and timelessWhen the freedoms of speech, press and peaceful
assembly and redress of grievances are being exercised in relation to suffrage or as a means
to enjoy the inalienable right of the qualified citizen to vote, they are absolute and timeless.
Same; Statutes; Republic Act 4880; Candidates for nomination by their own parties not
comprehended by the prohibition.Under the def inition of the terms candidate and
election campaign or partisan political activity contained in Rep. Act 4880, it is clear that
what the statute contemplates are candidates for public offices. Accordingly, candidates for
nomination by their respective political parties do not appear to be comprehended within the
prohibition; so, as long as a person campaigns, even publicly, only for nomination by his party,
he is free to expose himself in any way and to correspondingly criticize and denounce all his
rivals. The fact that the law permits in section 50-A the holding of political conventions and
the nominations of official candidates one month before the start of ,the period of the
prohibitions in section 50-B, lends strength to this conclusion.
Same; Same; Same; Candidates tend to spend more where period to campaign is
shortened.In the matter of reducing the cost of elections by limiting the period of
campaigns, current events have clearly proven that instead of lessening their expenditures,
candidates have spent more than they would have
848
ANNOTATED
done without such limitation. Because of the shortness of the period provided f or the
calling of conventions f or the nomination of official candidates by political parties and the
more abbreviated period that the candidate who would be ultimately nominated and the
parties themselves will have to campaign to win in the election, these parties have resorted
to other means of having, at least, even a semi-official candidate, without calling him so. And
this, as everybody knows means money, money and money.
Same; Same; Same; Four-month period too short; Consequential effects.The truth
known to all who have political experience is that no candidate for a position voted at large
nationally can entertain any hopes of winning after a campaign of only four months, It took
at least a year for Presidents Magsaysay, Macapagal, and Marcos to win the presidency. None
of the senators we have and have had can boast of having campaigned only for four months.
In view of the abbreviated period of campaign fixed in this law, necessarily, the candidates
have to redouble their efforts, try to cover more area in less time, see more people every
moment, distribute more propaganda, etc., etc., and all these mean money, more money and
more money. In this set up, so neatly produced by this law, it is regretably evident that the
poor candidates have no chance. How can a poor candidate cover the more than 7,000 islands
of our archipelago in four months? If it was impossible to do so when there was no limitation
of the period for campaigns, what can such a poor candidate have now? Thus, it can be seen
that this law has not only made candidates spend more than they used to do before, it has
effectively reduced the chances and practically killed the hopes of poor candidates. Under
this law, it may truthfully be said that the right to be elected to a public office is denied by
reason of poverty.
ORIGINAL ACT ION in the Supreme Court. Declaratory relief with preliminary
injunction.
F.R. Cabigao in his own behalf as petitioner.
B.F. Advincula for petitioner Arsenio Gonzales,
Ramon Barrios for respondent Commission on Elections.
Sen. Lorenzo Taada as amicus curiae.
FERNANDO, J.:
A statute designed to maintain the purity and integrity of the electoral process by
Congress calling a halt to the undesirable practice of prolonged political campaigns.
849
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 849
bringing in their wake serious evils not the least of which is the ever-increasing cost
of seeking public office, is challenged on constitutional grounds. More precisely, the
basic liberties of free speech and free press, freedom of assembly and freedom of
association are invoked to nullify the act. Thus the question confronting this Court is
one of transcendental signifance.
It is faced with the reconciliation of two values esteemed highly and cherished
dearly in a constitutional democracy. One is the freedom of belief and of expression
availed of by an individual whether by himself alone or in association with others of
similar persuasion, a goal that occupies a place second to none in the legal hierarchy.
The other is the safeguarding of the equally vital right of suffrage by a prohibition of
the early nomination of can,-didates and the limitation of the period of election
campaign or partisan political activity, with the hope that the time-consuming efforts,
entailing huge expenditures of funds and involving the risk of bitter rivalries that
may end in violence, to paraphrase the explanatory note of the challenged legislation,
could be devoted to more fruitful endeavors.
The task is not easy, but it is unavoidable. That is of the very essence of judicial
duty. To paraphrase a landmark opinion, when we act in these matters we do so not
1
on the assumption that to us is granted the requisite knowledge to set matters right,
but by virtue of the responsibility we cannot escape under the Constitution, one that
history authenticates, to pass upon every assertion of an alleged infringement of
liberty, when our competence is appropriately invoked.
This then is the crucial question: Is there an infringement of liberty? Petitioners
so alleged in his action, which they entitled Declaratory Relief with Preliminary
Injunction, filed on July 22, 1967, a proceeding that should have been started in the
Court of First Instance, but treated by this Court as one of prohibition in view of the
_______________
1West Education State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 US 624, 640 (1943).
850
ANNOTATED
seriousness and the urgency of the constitutional issue raised. Petitioners challenged
the validity of two new sections now included in the Revised Election Code, under
Republic Act No. 4880, which was approved and took effect on June 17, 1967,
prohibiting the too early nomina-tion of candidates and limiting the period of election
2
campaign or partisan political activity. 3
The terms candidate and election campaign or partisan political activity are
likewise defined. The former according to Act No. 41880 refers to any person aspiring
for or seeking an elective public office, regardless of whether or not said person has
already filed his certificate of candidacy or has been nominated by any political party
as its candidate. Election campaign or partisan political activity refers to acts
designed to have a candidate elected or not or promote the candidacy of a person or
persons to a public office. Then the acts were specified. There is a proviso that simple
expression of opinion and thoughts concerning the election shall not be considered as
part of an election campaign. There is the further proviso that nothing stated in the
Act shall be understood to prevent any person from expressing his views on current
political problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of the candidates for
public office whom he supports." 4
Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing of the petition, an incumbent
councilor in the 4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate
for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently elected on November 11,
1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a private individual, a registered
voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner. It is their claim
that the enforcement of said Republic Act No. 4880 in question [would] prejudice
[their] basic rights
_______________
2 Sec. 50-A, Revised Election Code.

3 Sec. 50-B, Revised Election Code.
4 Sec. 2 of Act 4880 f urther amends Sec. 133 of the Revised Election Code to include the two new above
sections among the serious election offenses.

851
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 851
x x x, such as their freedom of speech, their freedom of assembly and their right to
form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law, guaranteed under the
Philippine Constitution, and that therefore said act is unconstitutional.
After invoking anew the fundamental rights to free speech, free press, freedom of
association and freedom of assembly with a citation of two American Supreme Court
decisions, they asserted that there is nothing in the spirit or intention of the law
5
that would legally justify its passage and [enforcement] whether for reasons of public
policy, public order or morality, and that therefore the enactment of Republic Act
[No.] 4880 under the guise of regulation is but a dear and simple abridgment of the
constitutional rights of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and the right to form
associations and societies for purposes not contrary to law, x x x. There was the
further allegation that the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of period of
election campaign are matters of political expediency and convenience which only
political parties can regulate or curtail by and among themselves through self-
restraint or mutual understanding or agreement and that the regulation and
limitation of these political matters invoking the police power, in the absence of clear
and present danger to the state, would render the constitutional rights of petitioners
meaningless and without effect.
To the plea of petitioners that after hearing, Republic Act No; 4880 be declared
unconstitutional, null and void respondent Commission on Elections, in its answer
filed on August 1, 1967, after denying the allegations as to the validity of the act for
being mere conclusions of law, erroneous at that/' and setting forth special
affirmativel defenses, procedural and substantive character, would have this Court
dismiss the petition.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on August 3, 1967. On the same date a
resolution was passed by us
_______________
5Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 US 217 (1885) and Termiv. City of Chicago, 337 US 1 (1951).
852
ANNOTATED
to the following effect: At the hearing of case L-27833 (Arsenio Gonzales, et al. vs.
Commission on Elections), Atty. F. Reyes Cabigao appeared for the petitioners and
Atty. Ramon Barrios appeared for the respondents, and they were given a period of
four days from today within which to submit, simultaneously, their respective
memoranda in lieu of oral argument.
On August 9, 1967, another resolution, self-explanatory in character, came from
this Court. Thus: In case G.R. No. L-27833 (Arsenia Gonzales, et al. vs. Commission
on Elections), the Court, with eight (8) Justices present, having deliberated on the
issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 4880; and a divergence of views
having developed among the Justices as to the constitutionality of section 50-B, pars.
(c), (d) and (e) of the Revised Election Code: considering the Constitutional provision
that no treaty or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of
two-thirds of all the members of the (Supreme) Court (sec. 10, Art. VII), the Court
[resolved] to defer final voting on the issue until after the return of the Justices now
on official leave.
The case was then reset for oral argument. At such hearing, one of the co-
petitioners, now Vice-Mayor Felicisimo Cabigao of the City of Manila, acting as
counsel, assailed the validity of the challenged legislation, relying primarily on
American Supreme Court opinions that warn against curtailment in whatever guise
or form of the cherished freedoms of expression, of assembly, and of association, all
embraced in the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Respondent
Commission on Elections was duly represented by Atty. Ramon Barrios.
Senator Larenzo M. Taada was asked to appear as amicus curiae. That he did,
arguing most impressively with a persuasive exposition of the existence of undeniable
conditions that imperatively called for regulation of the electoral process and with
full recognition that Act No. 4880 could indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the
preferred rights of speech and press, of assembly and of association, He did justify its
enactment however under
853
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 853
Gonzales vs. Commission on .Elections
the clear and present danger doctrine, there being the substantive evil of elections,
whether for national or local officials, being debased and degraded by unrestricted
campaigning, excess of partisanship, and undue concentration in politics, with the
loss not only of eff iciency in government but of lives as well.
The matter was then discussed in conference, but no final action was taken. The
divergence of views with reference to the paragraphs above mentioned having
continued, on Oct. 10, 1968, this Court, by resolution, invited certain entities to
submit memoranda as amici curiae on the question of the validity of R.A. Act No.
4880. The Philippine Bar Association, the Civil Liberties Union, the U.P. Law Center
and the U.P. Women Lawyers Circle were included among them. They did file their
respective memoranda with this Court and aided it in the consideration of the
constitutional issues involved.
1. In the course of the deliberations, a serious procedural objection was raised by
five members of the Court. It is their view that respondent Commission on Elections
6
not being sought to be restrained from performing any specific act, this suit cannot
be characterized as other than a mere request for an advisory opinion. Such a view, f
rom the remedial law standpoint, has much to recommend it. Nonetheless, a majority
would affirm the original stand that under the circumstances, it could still rightfully
be treated as a petition for prohibition.
The language of Justice Laurel fits the case: All await the decision of this Court
on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the
instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public
policy demand that [its] constitutionality x x x be now resolved." It may likewise be
7
added that the exceptional character of the situation that confronts us, the
paramount public interest, and the undeniable nec-
_______________
6Chief Justice Concepcion and Justices Reyes, Makalintal, Teehankee and Barredo.
765 Phil. 56, 94 (1937) Cf. Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385 (1926), 271 US 500; 70 Law ed., 1059.
854
ANNOTATED
essity for a ruling, the national elections being barely six months away, reinforce our
stand.
It would appear undeniable, therefore, that before us is an appropriate invocation
of our jurisdiction to prevent the enforcement of an alleged unconstitutional statute.
We are left with no choice then; we must act on the matter.
There is another procedural obstacle raised by respondent to be hurdled. It is not
insuperable. It is true that ordinarily, a party who impugns the validity of a statute
or ordinance must have a substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained,
or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Respondent cannot see
8
such interest as being possessed by petitioners, It may indicate the clarity of vision
being dimmed, considering that one of the petitioners was a candidate for an elective
position. Even if such were the case, however, the objection is not necessarily fatal.
In this jurisdiction, the rule has been suf ficiently relaxed to allow a taxpayer to bring
an action to restrain the expenditure of public f unds through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional legislative measure. 9
2. In the answer of the respondent as well as its memorandum, stress was laid on
Republic Act No. 4880 as an exercise of the police power of the state, designed to
insure a f ree, orderly and honest election by regulating conduct which Congress has
determined harmful because if unrestrained and carried for a long period before
elections it necessarily entails huge expenditures of funds on the part of the
candidates, precipitates violence and even deaths, results in the corruption of the
electorate, and inf licts direful consequences upon public interest as the vital affairs
_______________
8 People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937). Manila Race Horse Trainers Asso. v. De la Fuente, 88 Phil.
60 (1951); Bautista v. Mun. Council, 98 Phil. 409 (1956).

9 Philconsa v. Mathay, L-25554, Oct. 4, 1966, citing Philconsa v Gimenez, L-23326, Dec. 18,
1965; Pascual v. Sec. of public Works, L-10405, Dec. 29, 1960; Pelaez v. Auditor General L-23825, Dec. 24,
1965; Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters Asso. v. Feliciano, L-24022, March 3, 1965. See also Lidasan v.
Commission on Elections, L-80899, Oct. 25, 1967.
855
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 855
of the country are sacrificed to purely partisan pursuits. Evidently for respondent
that would suffice to meet the constitutional questions raised as to the alleged
infringement of free speech, free press, freedom of assembly and freedom of
association. Would it were as simple as that?
An eloquent excerpt from a leading American decision admonishes though
10
against such a cavalier approach. The case confronts us again with the duty our
system places on this Court to say where the individuals freedom ends the States
power begins. Choice on that border, now as always delicate, is perhaps more so
where the usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced by the preferred
place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms
secured by the First Amendment. x x x. That priority gives these liberties a sanctity
and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions. And it is the character of the right,
not of the limitation, which determines what standard governs the choice. x x x.
Even a leading American State court decision on a regulatory measure dealing
with elections, cited in the answer of respondent, militates against a stand
minimizing the importance and significance of the alleged violation of individual
rights: As so construed by us, it has not been made to appear that section 8189,
Comp. Gen. Laws, section 5925, Rev. Gen. St., is on its face violative of any provision
of either the state or Federal Constitution on the subject of free speech or liberty of
the press, nor that its operation is in any wise subversive of any ones constitutional
liberty." Another leading State decision is much more emphatic: Broad as the power
11
of the legislature is with respect to regulation of elections, that power is not wholly
without limitation. Under the guise of regulating elections, the legislature may not
deprive a citizen of the right of trial by jury. A person charged with its violation may
not be compelled to give evidence against himself. If it destroys the right of free
speech, it is to
________________
Thomas v. Collins, 323 US 516, 529530 (1945).

10
Ex parte Hawthorne, 96 ALR 572, 580 (1934).

11
856
ANNOTATED
that extent void." 12
The question then of the alleged violation of constitutional rights most be squarely
met.
3. Now as to the merits. A brief resume of the basic rights on which petitioners
premise their stand that the act is unconstitutional may prove illuminating. The
primacy, the high estate accorded freedom of expression is of course a fundamental
postulate of our constitutional system. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom
of speech or of the press x x x. What does it embrace? At the very least, free speech
13
and free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully
any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment. There is to be then 14
no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether

in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action
15 16
________________
12 La Follette v. Kohler, 69 ALR 348, 371. Cf. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 US 536 (1927); Nixon v. Condon, 286
US 73 (1932); Smith v. Allwright, 321 US 649 (1944).
13 Art. III, Sec. 1(8) Constitution of the Philippines.
14 Cf. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 US 88 (1940). Justice Malcolm identified freedom of expression with the
right to a full discussion of public affairs. (U.S. v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731, 740 [1918]). Justice Laurel was
partial to the ringing words of John Milton, the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to
conscience, above all liberties. (Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil. 61, 81 [1939]). Justice Johnson spoke of freedom of
expression in terms of a full and free discussion of all affairs of public interest. Far him then, free speech
includes complete liberty to comment upon the administration of Government as well as the conduct of
public men. (U.S, v. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 58, 62 [1922]). When it is remembered further that time has upset
many fighting faiths there is likely to be a more widespread acceptance for the view of Justice Holmes that
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas,that the best test of truth is the power
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market; and that truth is the only ground upon
which .their wishes safely can be carried out. (Abrams v. United States, 250 US 616, 630 [1919]).
15 U.S. v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 (1918); Quisumbing v. Lopez, 98 Phil. 510 (1955).
16 U.S. v. Perfecto, 43 Phil 68 (1922),
857
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 857
for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of
17 18
substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.

The vital need in a constitutional democracy for freedom of expression is
undeniable whether as a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment, of attaining
the truth, of securing participation by the people in social including political decision-
making, and of maintaining the balance between stability and change. The trend as 19
reflected in Philippine and American decisions is to recognize the broadest scope and
assure the widest latitude to this constitutional guaranty. It represents a profound
commitment to the principle that debate of public issue should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open. It is not going too far, according to another American decision, to
20
view the function of free speech as inviting dispute. It may indeed best serve its high
purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions
as they are, or even stirs people to anger." 21
Freedom of speech and of the press thus means something more than the right to
approve existing political beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend support to official
measures, to take refuge in the existing climate of opinion on any matter of public
consequence. So atrophied, the right becomes meaningless. The right belongs as well,
if not more, for those who question, who do not conform, who differ. To paraphrase
Justice Holmes, it is freedom for the thought that we hate, no less than for the
thought
_______________
17 Yap v. Boltron, 100 Phil. 324 (1956).

18 People v. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 265 (1939); Teehankee v. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 756 (1946); In re
Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 (1949); Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 152 (1957); People v. Castelo H. Abaya, L-
11816, April 23, 1962; Bridges v. California, 314 US 252 (1941); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 US
331 (1946); Craig v. Harney, 331 US 367 (1947) ; Woods v. Geor-gia, 370 US 375 (1962).
19 Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment (1966).
20 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US 254, 270 (1964).
21 Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 US 1, 4 (1949).
858
ANNOTATED
that agrees with us. 22
So with Emerson one may conclude that the theory of freedom of expression
involves more than a technique for arriving at better social judgments through
democratic procedures. It comprehends a vision of society, a faith and a whole way of
life. The theory grew out of an age that was awakened and invigorated by the idea of
a new society in which mans mind was free, his fate determined by his own powers
of reason, and his prospects of creating a rational and enlightened civilization
virtually unlimited. It is put forward as a prescription for attaining a creative,
progressive, exciting and intellectually robust community. It contemplates a mode of
life that, through encouraging toleration, skepticism, reason and initiative, will allow
man to realize his full. potentialities. It spurns the alternative of a society that is
tyrannical, conformist, irrational and stagnant." 23
From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that
the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the
freedom of speech and of the press. The realities of life in a complex society preclude
however a literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It would
be too much to insist that at all times and under all circumstances it should remain
unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for
recognition. How is it to be limited then?
This Court spoke, in Cabansag v. Fernandez, of two tests that may supply an
24
acceptable criterion for permissible restriction. Thus: These are the clear and
present danger rule and the dangerous tendency rule. The first, as interpreted in a
number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must
be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before the
utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the substantive evil
sought to be pre-
________________
22 U.S. v. Schwimmer, 279 US 644; 655 (1929),

23 Emerson, op. cit., 14.
24 102 Phil. 152, 161 (1957).
859
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1961 859
vented. It has the advantage of establishing according to the above decision a
definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be
published.
The Cabansag case likewise referred to the other test, the dangerous tendency
rule and explained it thus: If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which
the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary
that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated.
It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that
the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence,
or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the
utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to
prevent.
We posed the issue thus: Has the letter of Cabansag created a sufficient danger
to a fair administration of justice? Did its remittance to the PCAC create a danger
sufficiently imminent to come under the two rules mentioned above? The choice of
this Court was manifest and indisputable. It adopted the clear and present danger
test. As a matter of fact, in an earlier decision, Primicias v. Fugoso, there was
25
likewise an implicit acceptance of the clear and present danger doctrine.

Why repression is permissible only when the danger of substantive evil is present
is explained by Justice Brandeis thus: x x x the evil apprehended is so imminent that
it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence." For him
26
the apprehended evil must be relatively serious. For "[prohibition] of free speech
and assembly is a measure so stringent that it would be. inappropriate as the means
for averting a relatively trivial
________________
80 Phil. 71 (1948).
25
Whitney v. California, 274 US 357, 377 (1927).

26
860
ANNOTATED
harm to society Justice Black would go further, He would require that the
substantive evil be extremely serious." Only thus may there be a realization of the
27
ideal envisioned by Cardozo: There shall be no compromise of the freedom to think

ones thoughts and speak them, except at those extreme borders where thought
merges into action." It received its original formulation from Holmes. Thus: The
28
question in every case is whether the words used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about; the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of promixity
and degree." 29
This test then as a limitation on freedom of expression is justified by the danger

or evil of a substantive character that the state has a right to prevent. Unlike
the dangerous tendency doctrine, the danger must not only be clear but also present.
The term clear seems to point; to a causal connection with the danger of the
substantive evil arising from the utterance questioned. Present refers
________________
27 Bridges v. California, 314 US 252 (1941).

28 Cardozo, Mr. Justice Holmes, 44 Harv. Law Rev. 682, (1931). Also: Neither has the fundamental case
of the clearand-present-danger rulethat is, the traditional distinction between thought and actionbeen
successfully challenged. Shapiro, Freedom of Speech, 71 (1966).
29 Schenck v. United States, 249 US 47, 52 (1919). This is not to say that the clear and present danger
test has always elicited unqualified approval. Prof. Freund entertains what for him are well-founded doubts.
Thus: Even where it is appropriate, the clear-and-present-danger test is an oversimplified judgment unless
it takes account also of a number of other factors: the relative seriousness of the danger in comparison with
the value of the occasion for speech or political activity; .the availability of more moderate controls than -
those the state has imposed; and perhaps the specific intent with which the speech or activity is launched.
No matter how rapidly we utter the phrase clear and present danger/ or how closely we hyphenate the
words, they are not a substitute for the weighing of values. They tend to convey a delusion of certitude when
what is most certain is the complexity of ,the strands in the web of freedoms which the judge must
disentangle. The Supreme Court of the United States, p. 44 (1961).
861
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 861
to the time element. It used to be identified with imminent and immediate
danger. The danger must not only be probable but very likely inevitable.
4. How about freedom of assembly? The Bill of Rights as thus noted prohibits
abridgment by law of freedom of speech or of the press. It likewise extends the same
protection to the right of the people peaceably to assemble. As was pointed out by
Justice Malcolm In the case of United States v. Bustos, this right is a necessary
30
consequence of our republican institution and complements the right of free speech.
Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in
respect to public affairs. From the same Bustos opinion: Pub!ic policy, the welfare of
society, and orderly administration of government have protection for public opinion.
To paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rufledge, speaking for the majority in Thomas
v. Collins, it not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and
31
of the press were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the people peaceably
to assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. All these rights
while not identical. are inseparable. They are cognate rights and the assurance
afforded by the clause of this section of the Bill of Rights wherein they are contained,
applies to all. As emphatically put in the leading case of United States v.
Cruikshank, the very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on
32
the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs
and to petition for redress of grievances. As in the case of freedom of expression, this
right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent
5. Our Constitution likewise the freedom to form association for purposes not
contrary to law. With 33
_______________
30 37 Phil. 731 (1818).
31 323 US 516 (1945).
32 92 US 542 (1876).
33 Article 3, Section 1, Paragraph 6, Constitution.
862
ANNOTATED
or without a constitutional provision of this character, it may be assumed that the
freedom to organize or to be a member of any group or society exists. With this explicit
provision, whatever doubts there may be on the matter are dispelled. Unlike the cases
of other guarantees, which are mostly American in origin, this particular freedom has
an indigenous cast. It can trace its origin to the Malolos Constitution.
In the United States, in the absence of an explicit provision of such character, it is
the view of Justice Douglas that it is primarily the first amendment of her
Constitution, which safeguards freedom of speech and of the press, of assembly and
of petition that provides [associations] with the protection they need if they are to
remain viable and continue to contribute to our Free Society." He adopted the view
34
of De Tocqueville on the importance and the significance of the freedom to associate.

Thus: The most natural privilege of man, next to the right of acting for himself, is
that of combining his exertions with those of his fellow creatures and of acting in
common with them. The right of association therefore appears to me almost as
inalienable in its nature as the right of personal liberty. No legislator can attack it
without impairing the foundation of society." 35
There can be no dispute as to the soundness of the above observation of De

Tocqueville. Since man lives in society, it would be a barren existence if he could not
freely associate with others of kindred persuasion or of congenial frame of mind. As
a matter of fact, the more common form of associations may be likely to be fraternal,
cultural, social or religious. Thereby, for almost everybody, save for those -exceptional
few who glory in aloofness and isolation, life is enriched and becomes more
meaningful.
In a sense, however, the stress on this freedom of association should be on its
political significance. If such a right were non-existent, then the likelihood of a one-
party
_______________
Douglas, The Right of Association, 63 Col. Law Rev. 1362 (1963).

34
Ibid, 1363.
35
863
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 863
government is more than a possibility. Authoritarianism may become unavoidable.
Political opposition will simply cease to exist; minority groups may be outlawed,
constitutional democracy as intended by the Constitution may well become a thing of
the past.
Political parties which, as is originally the case, assume the role alternately of
being in the majority or in the minority as the will of the electorate dictates, will lose
their constitutional protection. It is undeniable, therefore, that the utmost scope
should be afforded this freedom of association.
It is indispensable not only for its enhancing the respect should be accorded a
human personality but equally so for its assurance that the wishes of any group to
opwhatever for the moment is the party in power the help of the electorate to set up
its own program of government would not be nullified or frustrated. To quote from
Douglas anew:. Justice Frankfurter thought that political and academic affiliations
have a preferred position under the due process version of the First AmendBut the
associational rights protected by the First Amendment are in my view much broader
and cover the entire spectrum in political ideology as well as in art, in journalism, in
teaching, and in religion. In my view, government can neither legislate with respect
to nor probe the intimacies of political, spiritual, or Intellectual relationships in the
myriad of lawful societies and groups, whether popular or unpopular, that exist in
this country." 36
Nonetheless, the Constitution limits this particular freedom in the sense that
there could be an abridgment of the right to form associations or societies when their
purposes are contrary to law. How should the limitation for purposes not contrary
to law be interpreted? It is submitted that it is another way of expressing the clear
and present danger rule f or unless an association or society could be shown to create
an imminent danger to public safety, there is no justification for abridging the right
_______________
Ibid, pp. 13741375.

36
864
ANNOTATED
to form associations or societies. As was so aptly stated: There is no other course
37
consistent with the Free Society envisioned by the First Amendment. For the views
a citizen entertains, the beliefs he harbors, the utterances he makes, the ideology he
embraces, and the people he associates with are no concern to governmentuntil and
unless he moves into action. That article of faith marks indeed the main dif f erence
between the Free Society which we espouse and the dictatorships both on the Left
and on the Right." 38
6. With the above principles in mind, we now consider the validity of the
prohibition in Republic Act No. 4880 of the too early nomination of candidates and
the limitation found therein on the period of election campaign or partisan political
activity alleged by petitioners to offend against the rights of free speech, free press,
freedom of assembly and freedom of association. In effect what we are asked to do is
to declare the act void on its face, no evidence having been introduced as to its actual
operation. There is respectable authority for the court having the power to so act.
Such fundamental liberties are accorded so high a place in our constitutional scheme
that any alleged infringement manifest in the wording of statute cannot be allowed
to pass unnoticed. 39
In considering whether it is violative of any of the above rights, we cannot ignore

of course the legislative declaration that its enactment was in response to a serious
substantive evil affecting the electoral process, not merely in danger of happening,
but actually in existence, and likely to continue unless curbed or remedied. To assert
other-
________________
37 Cf. Thomas v. Collins, 323 US 516 (1945)

38 Douglas, op. cit., p. 1376.
39 Near v. Minnesota, 283 US 697 (1931) ; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 US 444 (1938); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
US 88 (1940); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 US 105 (1943) ; Saia v. New York, 334 US 558 (1948); Kunz v.
New York, 340 US 290 (1951); Staub v. Boxley, 355 US 313 (1958); Smith v. California, 361 US
147 (1959); Talley v. California, 362 US 60 (1960); Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 US
278 (1961); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 US 360 (1964); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 US 500 (1964).
865
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 865
wise would be to close ones eyes to the realities of the situation. Nor can we ignore
the express legislative purpose apparent in the proviso that simple expressions of
opinion and thoughts concerning the election shall not be considered as part of an
election campaign, and in the other proviso that nothing herein stated shall be
understood to prevent any person from expressing his views on current political
problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of the candidates for public office
whom he supports. Such limitations qualify the entire provision restricting the
period of an election campaign or partisan political activity.
The prohibition of too early nomination of candidates presents a question that is
not too f ormidable in character. According to the act: It shall be unlawful for any
political party, political committee, or political group to nominate candidates for any
elective public office voted for at large earlier than one hundred and fifty days
immediately preceding an election, and for any other elective public office earlier than
ninety days immediately preceding an election." 40
The right of association is affected. Political parties have less freedom as to the
time during which they may nominate candidates; the curtailment is not such,
however, as to render meaningless such a basic right. Their scope of legitimate
activities, save this one, is not unduly narrowed. Neither is there infringement of
their freedom to assemble. They can do so, but not for such a purpose. We sustain its
validity. We do so unanimously.
The limitation on the period of election campaign or partisan political activity
calls for a more intensive scrutiny. According to Republic Act No. 4880: It is unlawful
for any person whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any group or association of
persons, whether or not a political party or political committee, to in an election
campaign or partisan political activity except during the period of one hundred
twenty days immediately preceding an election involving a public office voted for at
________________
Section 50-A, Republic Act No. 4880.
40
866
ANNOTATED
large and ninety days immediately preceding an election for any other elective public
office. The term candidate refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an elective
public office, regardless of whether or not said person has already filed his certif icate
of candidacy or has been nominated by any political party as its candidate. The term
election campaign or partisan political activity refers to acts designed to have a
candidate elected or not or promote the candidacy of a person or persons to a public
office x x x.
If that is all there is to that provision, it suffers from the fatal constitutional
infirmity of vagueness and may be stricken down. What other conclusion can there
be extending as it does to so wide and all-encompassing a front that what is valid,
being a legitimate exercise of press freedom as well as freedom of assembly, becomes
prohibited? That cannot be done; such an undesirable eventuality, this Court cannot
allow to pass.
It is a well-settled principle that stricter standards of permissible statutory
vagueness may be applied to a statute having inhibiting effect on speech; a man may
the less be required to act at his peril here, because the free dissemination of ideas
may be the loser. Where the statutory provision then operates to inhibit the exercise
41
of individual freedom affirmatively protected by the Constitution, the Imputation of

vagueness sufficient to invalidate the statute is inescapable. The language of Justice
42
Douglas, both appropriate and vigorous, comes to mind: Words which are vague and
fluid x x x may be as much of a trap for the innocent as the ancient laws of
Caligula." Nor is the reason difficult to discern: These freedoms are delicate and
43
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society. The threat of sanctions may
deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions." 44
________________
41 Smith v. California, 361 US 147, 151 (1959).

42 Cf. Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 US 278 (1961).
43 United States v. Cardiff, 344 US 174, 176 (1952)
44 NAACP v. Button, 371 US 415, 433 (1963).
867
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 867
7. The constitutional objections are thus formidable. It cannot be denied that the
limitations thus imposed on the constitutional rights of free speech and press, of
assembly, and of association cut deeply into their substance. This on the one hand.
On the other, it cannot be denied either that evils substantial in character taint
the purity of the electoral process. There can be under the circumstances then no
outright condemnation of the statute. It could not be said to be unwarranted, much
less arbitrary. There is need for refraining from the outright assumption that the
constitutional infirmity is apparent from a mere reading thereof.
For under circumstances that manifest abuses of the gravest character, remedies
much more drastic than what ordinarily would suffice would indeed be called for. The
justification alleged by the proponents of the measures weighs heavily with the
members of the Court, though in varying degrees, in the appraisal of the aforesaid
restrictions to which such precious freedoms are subjected. They are not unaware of
the clear and present danger that calls for measures that may bear heavily on the
exercise of the cherished rights of expression, of assembly, and of association,
This is not to say that once such a situation is found to exist, there is no limit to
the allowable limitations on such constitutional rights. The clear and present danger
doctrine rightly viewed- requires that not only should there be an occasion for the
imposition of such restrictions but also that they be limited in scope.
There are still constitutional questions of a serious character then to be faced, The
practices which the act identifies with election campaign or partisan political
activity must be such that they are free from the taint of being violative of free
speech, free press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of association. What removes
the sting from constitutional objection of vagueness is the enumeration of the acts
deemed included in the terms election campaign or partisan political activity.
868
ANNOTATED.
Gonzales vs, Commission on Elections
They are: "(a) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups
of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a party or candidate; (b) holding political conventions,
caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the
purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or
against a candidate or party; (c) making speeches, announcements or commentaries
or holding interviews f or or against the election of any party or candidate for public
office; (d) publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials; (e) directly or
indirectly soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or
against any candidate or party; (f) giving, soliciting, or receiving contributions for
election campaign purposes, either directly or indirectly." As thus limited, the
45
objection that may be raised as to vagueness has been minimized, if not totally set at
rest. 46
8. This Court, with the aforementioned five Justices unable to agree, is of the view
that no unconstitutional infringement exists insofar as the formation of
organizations, associations, clubs, committees, or other groups of persons for the
purpose of soliciting votes or undertaking any campaign or propaganda or both for or
against a candidate or party is restricted and that the prohibition against giving,
47
soliciting, or receiving contribution for election purposes, either directly or indirectly,

is equally free from constitutional infirmity. 48
The restriction on freedom of assembly as confined to holding political conventions,

caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades or other similar assemblies for the
purpose of soliciting votes or undertaking any campaign
_______________
45 Section 50-B, Republic Act No. 4880.
46 Justices Dizon, Zaldivar, Castro, Capistrano, and Barredo are not in conformity, Section 50-B for them
being in its entirety unconstitutional. Justice Makalintal, who would dismiss the petition on the procedural
ground previously set forth did not express an opinion.
47 Paragraph (a), Section 50-B.
48 Paragraph (f), Section 50-B.
869
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 869
or propaganda or both f or or against a candidate or party, leaving untouched all
49
other legitimate exercise of such poses a more difficult question. Nevertheless, after
a thorough consideration, and with the same Justices entertaining the opposite
conviction, we reject the contention that it should be annulled. Candor compels the
admission that the writer of this opinion suffers from the gravest doubts. For him,
such statutory prescription could very well be within the outermost limits of validity,
beyond which lies the abyss of unconstitutionality.
The other acts, likewise deemed included in election campaign or partisan
political activity tax to the utmost the judicial predisposition to view with sympathy
legislative efforts to regulate election practices deemed inimical, because of their
collision with the preferred right of freedom of expression. From the outset, such
provisions did occasion divergence of views among the members of the Court.
Originally only a minority was f or their being adjudged as invalid. It is not so any
more. This is merely to emphasize that the scope of the curtailment to which freedom
50
of expression may be subjected is not foreclosed by the recognition of the existence of

a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, the debasement of the -electoral
process.
The majority of the Court is thus of the belief that the solicitation or undertaking
of any campaign or propaganda, whether directly or indirectly, by an individual, the 51
making of speeches, announcements or commentaries or holding interview f or or

against the election f or any party or candidate for public office. or the publication or
52
distribution of campaign literature or materials, suffer from the

53
_______________
49 Paragraph (b), Section 50-B.

50 The votes of the five-named Justices are reinforced by that of Justices Sanchez and Fernando.
51 Paragraph (e), Section 50-B. Such conduct if through organizations, associations, clubs, or
communities or through political conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies or parades, is
provided for earlier in paragraphs (a) and (b).
52 Paragraph (c), Section 50-B.
53 Paragraph (d), Section 50-B.
870
ANNOTATED
corrosion of invalidity. It lacks however one more affirmative vote to call for a
declaration of unconstitutionality.
This is not to deny that Congress was indeed called upon to seek remedial
measures for the far-from-satisfactory condition arising from the too-early
nomination of candidates and the necessarily prolonged political campaigns. The
direful consequences and the harmful effects on the public interest with the vital
affairs of the country sacrif iced many a time to purely partisan pursuits were known
to all. Moreover, it is no exaggeration to state that violence and even death did
frequently occur because of the heat engendered by such political activities. Then,
too, the opportunity for dishonesty and corruption, with the right to suffrage being
bartered, was further magnified.
Under the police power then, with its concern for the general welfare and with the
commendable aim of safeguarding the right of suffrage, the legislative body must
have felt impelled to impose the foregoing restrictions. It is understandable for
Congress to believe that without the limitations thus set f orth in the challenged
legislation, the laudable purpose of Republic Act No. 4880 would be frustrated and
nullified. Whatever persuasive force such approach may command failed to elicit the
assent of a majority of the Court This is not to say that the conclusion reached by the
minority that the above portions of the statute now assailed has passed the
constitutional test is devoid of merit.
It only indicates that for the majority, the prohibition of any speeches,
announcements or commentaries, or the holding of interviews for or against the
election of any party or candidate for public office and the prohibition of the
publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, against the
solicitation of votes whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any
campaign or .propaganda for or against any candidate or party, is repugnant to a
constitutional command. To that extent, the challenged statute prohibits what under
the Constitution cannot by any law be abridged.
More specifically, in terms of the permissible scope of
871
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 871
legislation that otherwise could be justified under the clear and present danger
doctrine, it is the consideration opinion of the majority, though lacking the necessary
vote for an adjudication of invalidity, that the challenged statute could have been
more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited precisely delineated to satisfy the
constitutional as to a valid limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine.
In a 1988 opinion, the American Supreme Court made clear that the absence of
such reasonable and definite standards in a legislation of its character is
fatal. Where, as in the case of the above paragraphs, the majority of the Court could
54
discern an overbreadth that makes possible oppressive or capricious application" of

55
the statutory provisions, the line dividing the valid from the constitutionally infirm
has crossed. Such provisions offend the constitutional principle that a governmental
purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation
may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
Invade the area of protected freedoms." It is undeniable, therefore, that even though
56
the governpurposes be legitimate and substantial, they cannot be pursued by means

that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achived. For precision of regulation is the touchstone in an area so closely related to
57
our most precious doms. 58
Under the circumstances then, a majority of the Court

_______________
54 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 20 L ed 2d 225 (1968).

55 Whitehill v. Elkins, 19 L ed 2d 228 (1967).
56 NAACP v. Alabama, 377 US 288 (1964), Cited in Zwickler v. Koota, 19 L ed 2d 444, 451 (1967), which
refers to Schneider v. State, 308 US 147 (1939) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut. 310 US 298 (1940); Martin v. City
of Struthers, 319 US 141 (1943) ; Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 US 232 (1957); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 US 479 (1960); Louisiana v. NAACP, 366 US 293 (1961) ; NAACP v. Button, 371 US
415 (1963); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 US 500 (1964).
57 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 US 479, 488. Cited in Keyishian v. Board of Regents. 385 US 589 (1966).
58 NAACP v. Button. 371 US 415 (1963).
872
ANNOTATED
feels compelled to view the statutory provisions in question as unconstitutional on
their face inasmuch as they appear to range too widely and indiscriminately across
the fundamental liberties associated with freedom of the mind. 59
Such a conclusion does not find favor with the other members of the Court. For
this minority group, no judgment of nullity insofar as the challenged sections are
concerned is called for. It cannot accept the conclusion that the limitations thus
imposed on freedom of expression vitiated by their latitudinarian scope, for Congress
was not at all insensible to the problem that an all-encompassing coverage of the
practices sought to be restrained would seriously pose.
Such an approach finds support in the exposition made by the author of the
measure, Senator Lorenzo M. Taada, appearing before us as amicus curiae. He did
clearly explain that such provisions were deemed by the legislative body to be part
and parcel of the necessary and appropriate response not merely to a clear and
present danger but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive
partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late has invariably
marred election campaigns and partisan political activities in this country. He did
invite our attention likewise to the well-settled doctrine that in the choice of remedies
for an admitted malady requiring governmental action, on the legislature primarily
rests the responsibility. Nor should the cure prescribed by it, unless clearly repugnant
to fundamental rights, be ignored or disregarded.
More than that, he would stress the two provisos already mentioned, precisely
placed in the statute as a manifestation of the undeniable legislative determination
not to transgress the preferred freedom of speech, of press, of assembly and of
association. It is thus provided: That simple expressions or opinion and thoughts
concerning the election shall not be considered as part of an election campaign [and
that nothing in the Act] shall be understood to prevent any person from expressing
his views on cur-
_______________
Cf. United States v. Robell, 19 L ed 2d 508 (1967).
59
873
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 873
rent political problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of the candidates for
public office whom he supports." If properly implemented then, as it ought to, the
60
barrier to free expression becomes minimal and far from unwarranted.

For the minority of the Court, all of the above arguments possess sufficient
persuasive force to blunt whatever cutting edge may be ascribed to the fears
entertained that Congress f ailed to abide by what the Constitution commands as far
as freedom of the mind and of association are concerned. It is its opinion that it would
be premature, to say the least, for a judgment of nullity of any provision found in
Republic Act No. 4880. The need for adjudication arises only if in the implementation
of the Act, there is in fact an unconstitutional application of its provisions. Nor are
we called upon, under this approach, to anticipate each and every problem that may
arise. It is time enough to consider it when there is in fact an actual, concrete case
that requires an exercise of judicial power.
9. To recapitulate, we give due recognition to the legislative concern to cleanse,
and, if possible, render spotless, the electoral process. There is full acceptance by the
Court of the power of Congress, under narrowly drawn legislation to impose the
necessary restrictions to what otherwise would be liberties traditionally accorded the
widest scope and the utmost deference, freedom of speech and of the press, of
assembly, and of association. We cannot, however, be recreant to the trust reposed on
us; we are called upon to safeguard individual rights. ln the language of Justice
Laurel: This Court is perhaps the last bulwark of constitutional government. It shall
not obstruct the popular will as manifested through proper organs. x x x But, in the
same way that it cannot renounce the life breathed into it by the Constitution, so it
not forego Its obligation, in proper cases, to apply the necessary corrective,, x x x." 61
_______________
60Paragraph (f). Section 50-B.

61Zandueta v. De !a Costa, 66 Phil. 615, 625626 (1988). Laurel, J., concurring. To the same effect, this
excerpt from a recent opinion of Warren, C.J.: We are concerned solely with
874
ANNOTATED
We recognize the wide discretion accorded Congress to protect vital interests.
Considering the responsibility incumbent on the judiciary, it is not always possible,
even with the utmost sympathy shown for the legislative choice of means to cure an
admitted evil, that the legislative judgment arrived at, with its possible curtailment
of the preferred freedoms, be accepted uncritically. There may be times, and this is
one of them, with the majority, with all due respect to a coordinate branch, unable to
extend their approval to the aforesaid specific provisions of one of the sections of the
challenged statute. The necessary twothird vote, however, not being obtained, there
is no occasion for the power to annul statutes to come into play.
Such being the case, it is the judgment of this Court that Republic Act No. 4880
cannot be declared unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed and the writ of prohibition prayed for
denied. Without costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal and Teehankee, JJ., concur in the
result.
Dizon and Zaldivar, JJ., concur with the separate opinion of Justice Fred
Ruiz Castro.
Capistrano, J., concurs in part and concurs in the separate opinion of Justice
Castro.
Sanchez, Castro and Barredo, JJ., concur and dissent in a separate opinion.
SANCHEZ, J., concurring and dissenting:
Petitioners in the present case aim at striking down as

________________
determining whether the statute before us has exceeded the bounds imposed by the Constitution when
First Amendment rights are at stake. The task of writing legislation which will stay within those bounds
has been committed to Congress. Our decision today simply recognizes that, when legitimate legislative
concerns are expressed in a statute which imposes a substantial burden on protected First Amendment
activities, Congress must achieve its goal by means which have a less drastic Impact on the continued
vitality of First Amendment freedoms. x x x The Constitution and the basic position of First Amendment
rights in our democratic fabric demand nothing less. United States v. Robel, 19 L ed 2d 508, 515516 (1967).
875
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 875
violative of constitutional guarantees, Republic Act 4880, the principal features of
which are contained in its Section 1, inserting Sections 50-A and 50-B between
Sections 50 and 51 of the Revised Election Code, reproduced herein as follows: 1
SECTION 1. Republic Act Numbered One hundred and eighty, as amended, is hereby
further amended by inserting new sections to be known as Sections 50-A and 50-B, between
Sections 50 and 51 thereof, which shall read as follows:
SEC. 50-A. Prohibition of too early nomination of Candidates.It shall be unlawf ul f or
any political party, Political Committee, or Political group to nominate candidates for any
elective public office voted for at large earlier than one hundred and fifty days immediately
preceding an election, and for any other elective public off ice earlier than ninety days
immediately preceding an election.
SEC. 50-B. Limitation upon the period of Election Campaign or Partisan Political
Activity.It is unlawful for any person whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any group
or association of persons, whether or not a political party or political committee, to engage in
an election campaign or partisan political activity except during the period of one hundred
twenty days immediately preceding an election involving a public office voted for at large and
ninety days immediately preceding an election for any other elective public office.
The term Candidate refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office,
regardless of whether or not said person has already filed his certificate of candidacy or has
been nominated by any political party as its candidate.
The term Election Campaign or Partisan Political Activity refers to acts designed to
have a candidate elected or not or promote the candidacy of a person or persons to a public
office which shall include:
1. '('a)Forming Organizations, Associations, Clubs, Committees or other groups of

persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a party or candidate;
2. '(b)Holding political conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or
other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting- votes and/or undertaking any
campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate or party;
3. '(c)Making speeches, announcements or commentaries or holding interviews for or
against the election of any party or candidate for public office;
4. '(d)Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials;
_______________
1As published in 63 O.G. No. 44, pp. 98869888.

876
ANNOTATED
1. '(e)Directly or indirectly soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or

propaganda for or against any candidate or party;
2. '(f)Giving, soliciting, or receiving contributions for election campaign purposes,
either directly or indirectly: Provided, That simple expressions or opinion and
2
thoughts concerning the election shall not be considered as part of an election

campaign: Provided, further, That nothing herein stated -shall be understood
to prevent any person from expressing his views on current political problems
or issues, or from mentioning the names of the candidates f or public office
whom he supports.'"
Appropriately to be stated right at the start is that violation of the above provisions
is considered a serious election offense. The penalty is imprisonment of not less than
one (1) year and one (1) day but not more than five (5) years with accompanying
disqualification to hold a public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage for not
less than one (1) year but more than nine (9) years and payment of costs. 3
1. The issue of constitutionality of R.A. 4880 again brings to the fore the eternally-
warring concepts of individual liberty and state authority.
Invalidity is pressed on the ground that the statute violates the rights of free
speech and press, of peaceable assembly, and of association. This Court is asked to
4
rule that in the context of the ill-effects to be cured, the legislative remedy
adopted, vis-a-vis the rights affected, does not meet what petitioners claim to be the
rational basis test; that, on the contrary, the relief prescribed would more likely
produce the very evils sought to be prevented. This necessitates a circumspect
discussion of the issue.
_______________
2 Should be of, The bills and the congressional debates attest to this.
3 Section 185, Revised Election Code.
4No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances/' Sec. 8, Art. III, Philippine
Constitution.
The right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Sec.
6, Art. III, Philippine Constitution,
877
VOL, 27, APRIL 18, 1969 877
In proceeding the working assumption is that individual liberty is not absolute.
Neither is state authority, inspite of its sweep, illimitable. Fixed formulas and ready-
made rules that seek to balance these two concepts could well redeem one from the
unnerving task of deciding which ought to prevail.
It is at this point that we call to mind the principle that the relation between
remedy and evil should be of such proximity that unless prohibited, conduct affecting
these rights would create a clear and present danger that will bring about
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent" 5
Withal doctrines which conceal behind the cloak of authoritative origin a tendency
to muff le the demands of society, must pass the glaring light of contemporaneity.
For, in the consideration of questions on constitutionality, one should remain
receptive to the implication of John Marshalls resonant words that it is a
constitution we are expounding." 6
________________
5 The earliest enunciation of this doctrine is in Schenk vs. United States (1919), 249 U.S. 47, 52, 63 L.
ed. 470, 473474, and adopted in subsequent cases: Whitney vs. California (1927), 274 U.S. 357, 373, 71 L.
ed. 1095, 1105; Bridges vs. California (1941), 314 U.S. 252, 262, 86 L. ed. 192, 202203; West Virginia State
Bd. of Education vs. Barnette (1943), 319 U.S. 624, 639; Thomas vs. Collins (1944), 323 U.S. 516,
530; Dennis vs. United States (1950), 341 U.S. 494, 510, 95 L. ed. 1137, 1153; Terminiello vs.
Chicago (1957), 337 U.S. 1, 5; Edwards vs. So. Carolina (1963), 372 U.S. 229, 237, 9 L. ed. 2d. 697,
703. See:American Bible Society vs. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386, 398. See also: Primicias vs. Fugoso, 80
Phil. 71, 8788, which quoted with approval the Whitney case.
6 McCulIoch vs. Maryland (1819), 17 U.S. 316, 407, 4 L. ed. 579, 602.
The pole-star for constitutional adjudications is John Marshalls greatest judicial utterance that it is
a constitution we are expounding/ McCulloch v. Maryland (US), 4 Wheat 316, 407, 4 L ed 579, 602. That
requires both a spacious view in applying an instrument of government made for an undefined and
expanding future, Hurtado v. California, 110 US 516, 530, 28 L ed 232, 237, 4 S Ct 111, 292, and as narrow
a delimitation of the constitutional issues as the circumstances permit. Not the least characteristic of great
statesmanship which the Framers
878
ANNOTATED
State authority here manifests itself in legislation intended as an answer to the
strong public sentiment that politics is growing into a way of life, that political
campaigns are becoming longer and more bitter. It is a result of legislative appraisal
that protracted election campaign is the root of undesirable conditions. Bitter
rivalries precipitate violence and deaths. Huge expenditures of funds give deserving
but poor candidates slim chances of winning. They constitute an inducement to graft
to winning candidates already in office in order to recoup campaign expenses.
Handouts doled out by and expected from candidates corrupt the electorate. Official
duties and affairs of state are neglected by incumbent officials desiring to run for
reelection. The life and health of candidates and their followers are endangered,
Peoples energies are dissipated in political bickerings and long drawn-out
campaigns. 7
Indeed, a drawn-out political campaign taxes the reservoir of patience and

undermines respect of the electorate for democratic processes. Sustained and bilious
political contests eat away even the veneer of civility among candidates and their
followers and transplant brute force into the arena.
Such legislative appraisal, such ill-effects, then must constitute a principal lever
by which one concept could win mastery over the other.
R.A. 4880 is a police power legislation. It was enacted by virtue of the inherent
power of Congress to legislate on matters affecting public interest and welfare, as 8
well as in pursuance of the constitutional policy of insuring a free, honest and orderly
election. Basically, the unde-
9
________________
manifested was the extent to which they did not attempt to bind the future. It is no less incumbent upon
this Court to avoid putting letters upon the future by needless pronouncements today. Concurring Opinion
of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. vs. Sawyer (1951), 343 U.S. 579, 596597, 96
L. ed. 1153, 1172.
7 Explanatory Notes to Senate Bill 209 and House Bill 2475, which eventually became Republic Act 4880.
8 Ichong vs. Hernandez (1957), 101 Phil. 1155, 11631164.
9 Sec. 2, Art. X, Philippine Constitution.
879
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 879
fined scope of that power extends as far as the frontiers of public interest would
advance. Fittingly, legislative determination of the breadth of public interest should
command respect. For, Congress is the constitutional body vested with the power to
enact laws. Its representative composition induces judgment culled from the diverse
regions of the country. Normally, this should assure that a piece of police legislation
is a reflection of what public interest contemporaneously encompasses.
2. It is, however, postulated that the right of peaceable assembly is violated by the
prohibition on holding political assemblies f or a period lasting more than one year;
that the right to form associations is contravened by forbidding, for the same period,
the formation of political groups; that, finally, freedom of speech and of the press is
unduly restricted by a legislative fiat against speeches, announcements,
commentaries or interviews favorable or unfavorable to the election of any party or
candidate, publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials, and directly
or indirectly soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda f or or
against any candidate or party, except during a number of days immediately
preceding the election.
What has repeatedly been urged is the view that the underlying historic
importance of the foregoing specific rights in democratic societies requires that the
posture of defense against their invasion be firmer and more uncompromising than
what may be exhibited under the general due process protection. The absolute terms 10
by which these specific rights are recognized in the Constitution justifies this
conclusion. 11
_______________
10 West Virginia Bd. of Education vs. Barnette (1943), 319 US. 624, 639, 87 L. ed. 1638; Thomas vs.
Collins (1944), 323 J.S. 516, 530, 89 L. ed. 430, 440; Saia vs. New York (1948), 334 U.S. 558, 561, 92 L. ed.
1574, 1577.
11 The case confronts us again with the duty our system places on this Court to say where the
individuals freedom ends and the States power begins. Choice on that border, now as always delicate, is
perhaps more so where the usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced by the preferred place
given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic free
880
ANNOTATED
And yet, sight should not be lost of the fact that Congress has made a determination
that certain specific evils are traceable directly to protracted election activities.
Congress has found a solution to minimize, if not prevent, those evils by limiting the
period of engaging in such activities. The proponents of validity would rely upon
experience to deduce the connection between the cited evils and prolonged political
campaign. By limiting the period of campaign, so they say, it is expected that the
undesirable effects will be wiped out, at least, relieved to a substantial degree.
This, of course, is largely an assumption. Congress, we must stress, has put up an
untried measure to solve the problematic situation. Deduction then is the only avenue
open: for Congress, to determine the necessity for the law; for the Court, its validity.
The possibility of its inefficaciousness is not remote. But so long as a remedy adopted
by Congress, as far as can logically be assumed, measures up to the standard of
validity, it stands.
_______________
doms secured by .the First Amendment. Cf. Schneider v. Irvington, 308 US 147, 84 L. ed. 155, 60 S. Ct.
146; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 US 296, 84 L. ed. 1213, 60 S. Ct. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1352; Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 US 158, 88 L ed 645, 64 S. Ct. 438. That priority gives these liberties a sanctity and a
sanction not permitting dubious intrusions. And it is the character of the right, not of the limitation, which
determines what standard governs the choice. Compare United Sates v. Carolene Products Co., 304 US
144, 152, 153, 82 L. ed. 1234, 1241, 58 S. Ct. 778. [But see concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter
in Kovacs v. Cooper (1949), 336 U.S. 77, 90, 93 L. ed. 513, 524, that the preferred position of freedom of
speech does not imply that any law touching communication is infected with presumptive invalidity."].
For these reasons any attempt to restrict those liberties must be justified by clear public interest,
threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and present danger. The rational connection between
the remedy provided and the evil to be curbed, which in other contexts might support legislation against
attack on due process grounds, will not suffice. These rights rest on firmer foundation. Accordingly,
whatever occasion would restrain orderly discussion and persuasion, at appropriate time and place, must
have clear support in public danger, actual or impending. Opinion of Mr. Justice Rutledge in Thomas vs.
Collins, supra. at 529530.
881
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 881
We give our imprimatur to Section 50-A. We may not tag as unconstitutional 50-B,
and its subsections (a), (b) and (f). We fear no serious evil with their enforcement.
They do not offend the constitutionally protected speech and press freedoms, and
rights of peaceable assembly and association. The latter must yield. The proscriptions
set forth in all of them are clear-cut, not open to reasonable doubt, nor easily
susceptible to unreasonable interpretation. Public interest and welfare authorize
their incorporation into the statute books.
3. To this writer, however, the center of controversy is to be found in subsections
(c), (d) and (e) of Section 50-B.
Those who espouse validity assert that no undue restriction results because, by
jurisprudence, solicitation and campaign are outside the ambit of protected
speech. But this rule, it would seem to us, has relevance only to commercial
12
solicitation and campaign. There is no point here in delving into the desirability of
equating, in social importance, political campaign with advertisements of gadgets
and other commercial propaganda or solicitation. For, the statute under 13
consideration goes well beyond matters commonly regarded as solicitation and

campaign. Suffice it to say that jurisprudence tends to incline liberally towards
freedom of expression in any form when placed in juxtaposition with the regulatory
power of the State. 14
________________
12 Respondents Memorandum, pp. 1011, citing authorities.

13 See: New York Times Co. vs. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265, 11 L. ed. 2d. 686, 698 (1964).
14 De Jonge vs. Oregon (1936), 299 U.S. 353, 365, 81 L. ed. 278, 284. Also NAACP vs. Button (1963), 371
U.S. 415, 429, 9 L. ed. 2d. 405, 415416: We meet at the outset the contention that solicitation is wholly
outside the area of freedoms protected by the First Amendment. To this contention there are two answers.
The f irst is that a State cannot f oreclose the exercise of constitutional rights by mere labels. The second is
that abstract discussion is not the only species of communication which the Constitution protects; the First
Amendment also protects vigorous advocacy, certainly of lawful ends, against governmental
intrusion, Thomas vs. Collins, 323 US 516, 537, 89 L ed 430, 444, 65 S. Ct. 315; Herndon vs. Lowry, 301 US
242, 259264 81 L. ed. 1066, 10751078, 57 S. Ct. 732. Cf. Cantwell vs. Con
882
ANNOTATED
Legislative history of the statute now before us indicates that what Congress intends
to regulate are partisan activities and active campaigning.
Campaigning, as defined by the sponsor of Senate Bill 209 in the Senate, is
a series of operations. This, evidently, must have been adopted from the dictionary
meaning of campaign: a connected series of operations to bring about some desired
result.
The term partisan political activity has somehow acquired a more or less definite
signification. It is not a new feature in Philippine political law. It has been regulated
to stem dangers to specific state interests. The Constitution itself contains an
injunction against civil service officers and employees from engaging directly or
indirectly in partisan political activity or taking part in any election except to
vote. The civil service law and the Revised Election Code echo this absolute
15 16 17
prohibition which is obviously aimed at the possible neglect of public service and its
prostitution with partisan interests. The following are cited in the Civil Service Rules
as examples of partisan political activity: candidacy for elective office; being a
delegate to any political convention or member of any political committee or officer of
any political club or other similar political organization; making speeches, canvassing
or soliciting votes or political support in the interest of any party or candidate;
soliciting or receiving contributions for political purposes either directly or indirectly;
and becoming prominently identified with the success or failure of any candidate or
candidates for election to public office. 18
________________
necticut, 310 US 296, 84 L. ed. 1213, 60 S. Ct. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1352; Stromberg vs. California, 283 US
359, 369, 75 L ed 1117, 1123, 51 S. Ct. 532, 73 A.L.R. 1484; Terminiello vs. Chicago, 337 US 1, 4, 93 L ed
1131, 1134, 69 S. Ct. 894."
15 Sec. 2, Article XII, Philippine Constitution.
16 Section 29, R.A. 2260, Civil Service Act of 1959.
17 Section 54, Revised Election Code.
18 Sec. 8, Rule 13, Rules and Regulations of the Civil Service Commission.
883
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 883
In the context in which the terms partisan political activity and election campaign
are taken together with the statutory purpose, the following from Justice Holmes
would be particularly instructive: Wherever the law draws a line there will be cases
very near each other on opposite sides. The precise course of the line may be
uncertain, but no one can come near it without knowing that he does so, if he thinks,
and if he does so it is familiar to the criminal law to make him take the risk." 19
4. Perhaps if the phrases election campaign or partisan political activity were

left to be explained by the general terms of the law as solely referring to
acts designed to have a candidate elected or not or promote the candidacy of a person
or persons to a public office, it would be difficult to say that such prohibition is
offensive to speech or press freedoms. But then the law itself sought to expand its
meaning to include an area of prohibited acts relating to candidates and political
parties, wider than an ordinary person would otherwise define them.
Specifically, discussionoral or printedis included among the prohibited
conduct when done in the following manner (Section 50-B):
1. "(c)Making speeches, announcements or commentaries or holding interviews

for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office:
2. (d)Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials;
3. (e)Directly or indirectly soliciting votes and/or under-taking any campaign or
propaganda for or against any candidate or party.
Defined only as lawful discussion is the following:

Provided. That simple expressions of opinion and thoughts concerning the election shall not
be considered as part of an election campaign: Provided, further, That nothing herein stated
shall be understood to prevent any person from expressing his views on current political
problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of the candidates for public office whom
be supports
_______________
19 United States vs. Wurzbach (1980), 280 U.S. 396, 399, 74 L. ed. 508, 510, In referring to the term any
political purpose whatever.

884
ANNOTATED
The conduct involved in the discussion as to make it 11legal is not clearly defined at
all. The implication then is that what is prohibited is discussion which in the view of
another may mean political campaign or partisan political activity, The speaker or
writer becomes captive under the vigilant but whimsical senses of each listener or
reader. His words acquire varying shades of forcefulness, persuasion and meaning to
suit the convenience of those interpreting them. A proposition becomes solicitation.
As admonition becomes a campaign or propaganda. As worded in R.A. 4880,
prohibited discussion could cover the entire spectrum of expression relating to
candidates and political parties. No discussion is safe. Every political discussion
becomes suspect, No one can draw an indisputable dividing line between lawful and
unlawful discussion. More so that statutory restraint falls upon any person whether
or not a voter or candidate.
Candidacy is not enjoined during the proscriptive period. A person may thus make
public his intention to run for public office. So may an incumbent official profess his
desire to run for reelection. The law therefore leaves open, especially to the electorate,
the occasion if not the temptation for making statements relating to a candidacy. The
natural course is to comment upon or to discuss the merits of a candidate, his
disqualifications, his opponents for public office, his accomplishments, his official or
private conduct. For, it can hardly be denied that candidacy for public office is a
matter of great public concern and interest.
Yet, this normal reaction to discuss or comment is muzzled by an unqualified
prohibition on announcements or commentaries or interviews for or against the
election of any party or candidate, on publishing campaign literature, and an indirect
solicitation and campaign or propafor or against any party or candidate, Even
incumbent officials are stopped. Every appearance before the public, every solicitous
act for the public welfare may become tainted.
885
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 885
5. Nor does the proviso offer any corresponding protection against uncertainty.
Simple expressions of opinion and thoughts concerning the election and expression
of views on current political problems or issues leave the reader to conjecture, to
guesswork, upon the extent of protection offered, be it as to the nature of the
utterance (simple expressions of opinion and thoughts) or the subject of the
utterance (current political problems or issues"). The line drawn to distinguish
unauthorized political activity or election campaignspecifically, a speech
designed to promote the candidacy of a personfrom a simple expression of opinion
on current political problems is so tenuous as to be indistinguishable. If we are to 20
paraphrase Mr. Justice Holmes, then the thought should run something like this: The
only difference between expression of an opinion and the endorsement of a candidate
is the speakers enthusiasm for the result." 21
Only one area is certain. A person may only mention the candidate whom he
supports. Beyond mentioning the name, it is no longer safe. But is it not unduly
constricting the freedom of rational-minded persons to back up their statements of
support with reasons?
The peculiarity of discussion, be it oral or printed, is that it carries with it varying
degrees of enthusiasm and inclination to persuade", depending upon the listener or
22
reader. It falls short of a partisan political activity when it is devoid of partisan

interest in the sense that it is not made in the interest of a candidate or party. This
is the only criterion for validity. But who is to decide this? And how? The law does
not even require that there be an operation or a series of operations in order to
measure up to an election campaign as it is commonly under-
_______________
20 During the deliberations of Senate Bill No. 209, Senator Gerardo M. Roxas, referring .to the terms
mere expression of opinion and solicitation of votes, remarked that it is difficult to distinguish one from
the other. (Session of February 20, 1967)
21 See: Dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes in Gitlow vs. New York (1925), 69 L. ed. 1138, 1149;
emphasis supplied.
22 See: Thomas vs. Collins, supra.
886
ANNOTATED
stood. In this way, the law may well become an instrument of harassment. Worse, it
could lull the potential defendant into a false sense of security. It then becomes a
dragnet that may trap anyone who attempts to express a simple opinion on political
issues.
6. More than this, the threat of punishment will continually hound a speaker who
expounds his views on political issues. Because of its punitive provisions, the statute
surely tends to restrict what one might say lest his utterance be misunderstood as
designed to promote the candidacy of a person. A person would be kept guessing at
the precise limits of the permissible simple expression. To play safe, he would be
compelled to put reins on his words for fear that they may stray beyond the protected
area of simple expression. The offshoot could only be a continuous and pervasive
restraint on all forms of discussion which might come within the purview of the
statute, This thought is not new. It is underscored in NAACP vs. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 9 L. ed. 405, in language expressive, thus.
The objectionable quality of vagueness and overbreadth does not depend upon absence of
fair notice to a criminally accused or upon unchanneled delegation of legislative powers, but
upon the danger of tolerating, in the area of first amendment freedoms, the existence of a
penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application. x x x These f reedoms are
delicate and vulnerable as well as supremely precious in our society. The threat of sanctions
may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of the sanctions. Because
the first amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in
the area only with narrow specificity." 23
It is thus in the self-imposed restraint that works in the minds of ordinary, law-
abiding citizens that a vague statute becomes unjust.
Because of the indefiniteness created in subsections (c), (d) and (e) of Section 50-
B, they readily lend themselves to harsh application. Vagueness of the law opens a
wide latitude to law enforcers. Arbitrary enforcement of the of the law by an
expansive definition of election
_______________
Emphasis supplied. See also: Dombrowski vs. Pfister, infra.

23
887
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1989 887
campaign or partisan political activity, should not be branded as improbable. For,
political rivalries spawn persecution. The law then becomes an unwitting tool.
Discussion may be given a prima facie label as against the harassed. This is not
altogether remote. To be sure, harassment and persecution are not unknown to the
unscrupulous.
7. Those who favor validity find comfort in the theory that it is better for the
meantime to leave the statute well enough alone. They say that it is preferable that
courts of justice be allowed to hammer out the contours of the statute case by case.
This may not, however, be entirely acceptable. To f orego the question of
constitutionality for now and take risks may not be the wiser move. As well advocated
elsewhere, a series of court prosecutions will touch only portions of a statute, still
24
leaving uncertain other portions thereof. And then, in deciding whether or not an
offending vague statute can be salvaged, one must not hedge and assume that when
it is enforced in the courts, ambiguities will be resolved in favor of upholding free
speech and press.
More important, there is the heavy penalty prescribed. A candidate, or any person
for that matter, can unreasonably be saddled by court suits. Even if the accused were
later to be declared innocent, thoroughly unnecessary is the burden of lawyers fees,
bail bonds and other expenses, not to say of energy to be consumed, effort to be
expended, time to be spent, and the anxieties attendant in litigation.
It cannot really be said that the courage to speak out, barring all risks, is an
ordinary human trait. Timorous men should not grow in number. And yet, it would
appear that this is the effect of the enforcement of the law. The constant guide should
be the warning of Justice Brandeis that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope.
and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate
menaces stable government;
________________
Dombrowski vs. Pfister (1965), 380 U.S. 479, 490491, 14 L. ed. 2d. 22, 30,
24
888
ANNOTATED
that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances
and proposed remedies." 25
As we analyze the import of the law, we come to the conclusion that subsections
(c), (d) and (e) of Section 50-B inserted into the Revised Election Code by Republic Act
4880, heretofore transcribed, run smack against the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of speech and of the press.
Hence, this concurrence and dissent.
SEPARATE OPINION
CASTRO, J.:
Presented for consideration and decision is the constitutionality of Section 50-A and
50-B of the Revised Election Code, which were inserted as amendatory provisions by
Republic Act 4880. These sections read in full as follows:
1
SEC. 50-A. Prohibition of too early nomination of Candidates.It shall be unlawful for any
political party, Political Committee or Political group to nominate candidates for any elective
public office voted for at large earlier than one hundred and fifty days immediately preceding
an election, and for any other elective public office earlier than ninety days immediately
preceding an election.
SEC. 50-B. Limitation upon the period of Election Campaign or Partisan Political
Activity.It is unlawful for any person whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any group
or association of persons, whether or not a political party or political committee, to engage in
an election campaign or partisan political activity except during the period of one hundred
twenty days immediately preceding an election involving a public office voted for at large and
ninety days immediately preceding an election for any other elective public office.
The term Candidate refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public officer,
regardless of whether or
_______________
25Concurring in Whitney vs. California (1927), 274 U.S. 357, 375, 71 L. ed. 1095, 1106,
1An Act to Amend Republic Act Numbered One Hundred and Eighty. Otherwise Known as. The Revised
Election Code, by Limiting the Period of Election Campaign, Inserting for this Purpose New Sections
Therein to be Known as Sections 50-A and 50-B and Amending Section One Hundred EightyThree of the
Same Code. Approved June 17, 1967,
889
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 889
not said person has already filed his certificate of candidacy or has been nominated by any
political party as its candidate.
The term Election Campaign or Partisan Political Activity refers to acts designed to have
a candidate elected or not or promote the candidacy of a person or persons to a public office
which shall include:
1. "(a)Forming Organizations, Associations, Clubs, Committees or other groups of

persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a party or candidate;
2. "(b)Holding political conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or
other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any
campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate or party;
3. "(c)Making speeches, announcements or commentaries or holding interviews for or
against the election of any party or candidate for public office;
4. "(d)Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials;
5. "(e)Directly or indirectly soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
6. "(f)Giving, soliciting, or receiving contributions for election campaign purposes, either
directly or indirectly. Provided, That simple expressions of opinion and thoughts
concerning the election shall not be considered as part of an election
campaign; Provided, further. That nothing herein stated shall be understood to
prevent any person from expressing his views on current political problems or issues,
or from mentioning the names of the candidates for public office whom he supports.
Violations of these two sections are classified as serious election offenses under
Section 183 of the Revised Election Code, as amended R.A. 4880, punishable with
imprisonment of not less than one year and one day but not more than five years
and disqualification to hold a public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage for
not less than one year but not more than nine years," 2
The basic purpose of R.A. 4880 is easily discernible. Congress felt the need of
curtailing excessive and extravagant partisan political activities, especially during
an election year, and, to this end, sought to impose limita-
_______________
2Sec. 185, Revised Election Code.

890
ANNOTATED
tions upon the times during which such activities may be lawfully pursued. The
legislative concern over excessive political activities was expressed in the following
terms in the explanatory note of Senate Bill 209, which f inally became R.A. 4880:
There is nothing basically wrong in engaging in an election campaign. Election campaign is
indispensable part of election just as election is one of the most important fundamental
requirements of popular government.
It is also during election campaign that the stands of prospective political parties on vital
national and local issues are made known to the public, thereby guiding .the enfranchised
citizenry in the proper and appropriate expression of its sovereign will.
Past experience, however, has brought to light some very disturbing consequences of
protracted election campaigns. Because of prolonged exposure of both candidates and the
people to political tension, what starts out at f irst as gentlemanly competition ends up into
bitter rivalries precipitating violence and even deaths. Prolonged election campaigns
necessarily entail huge expenditures of funds on the part of the candidates. Now, no matter
how deserving and worthy he is, a poor man has a very slim chance of winning an election.
Prolonged election campaigns indeed carry with it not only the spectre of violence and death,
not only the objectionable dominion of the rich in the political arena, but also the corruption
of our electorateWe must adapt our democratic processes to the needs of the times.
The prohibitions introduced by R.A. 4880 purport to reach two types of activities,
namely, (a) -early nomination of candidates for elective public offices (Sec. 50-A), and
(b) early election campaigns or partisan political activities (See. 50-B). The first
prohibition is specifically directed against political parties, committees, and groups;
the second prohibition is much more comprehensive in its intended reach, for it
operates upon any person whether or not a voter or a candidate and any group or
association of persons, whether or not a political party or political committee.
Section 50-B brings within the ambit of its proscription a wide range of activities.
The catalogue of activi-
891
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 891
ties covered by the prohibition against early election campaigning embraces two
distinguishable types of acts; (a) giving, soliciting or receiving contributions for
election campaign purposes, either directly or indirectly; and (b) directly or indirectly
soliciting votes or under-taking any campaign or propaganda for or against any
candidate or party, whether by means of speech, publication, formation of
organizations, or by holding conventions, caucuses, meetings or other similar
assemblies. The term candidate is itself broadly defined to include any person
aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, whether or not such person has been
formally nominated.
The sweeping character of the prohibitions in Section 50-B is sought to be
mitigated and delimited by the provisos exempting from their operation (a) simple
expressions of opinion and thoughts concerning the election, (b) expression of views
on current political problems or issues, and (c) mentioning the names of the
candidates for public office whom one supports.
Before assaying the constitutional quality of Sections 50-A and 50-B, it is relevant
to point out that these two section are not wholly consistent with each other, and that
considerable practical difficulties may be expected by those who would comply with
the requirements of both. Under Section 50-A, political parties are allowed to
nominate their official candidates for offices voted for at large within 150 days
immediately preceding the election. At the very least, this section would seem to
permit a political party to hold a nominating convention within the 150-day period.
Section 50-B, however, makes it unlawful to promote or oppose the candidacy of any
person seeking such office, whether or not such person has-been nominated by any
political party, and to engage in an election campaign for and against a candidate
or party, except within the period of 120 days immediately preceding the election. I
find it difficult to see how a political party can stage a nominating convention 150
days before an election if, at such time, neither any person nor group within such
party may seek & nomination by campaigning among
892
ANNOTATED
the delegates to the convention. By its very nature, a nominating convention is
intrinsically a forum for intensely partisan political activity. It is at the nominating
convention that contending candidates obtain the formal endorsement and active
support of their party the ultimate purpose of victory at the polls. A nominating
convention, at which activity promoting or opposing the candidacies of particular
persons seeking nominations is forbidden, is a practical impossibility. Thus, the very
broadness of the prohibitions contained in Section 50-B has the effect of reducing, as
a practical matter, the time period specified in Section 50-A for nomination of
candidates for national offices from 150 to 120 days before an election.
II
We torn to the central issue of constitutionality. That the legislature has, in broad
principle, compentence to enact laws relative to the conduct of elections is conceded.
Congress may not only regulate and control the place, time and manner in which
elections shall be held, but may also provide for the manner by which candidates shall
be chosen. In the exercise of the police power, Congress may regulate the conduct of
election campaigns and activities by political parties and candidates, and prescribe
meansures reasonably appropriate to insure the integrity and purity of the electoral
process. Thus, it has not been seriously contested that Congress may establish
restraints on expenditures of money In political campaigns, prohibit solicitation of
3
votes for a consideration, and penalize unlawful expenditures relative to the

4
nominations of candidates. Laws of this kind He fairly within the area of permissible
5
regulation, and I think that, in shaping specif ic regulations, Congressional discretion

may be exercised within a wide range without remonstrance from the courts.
_______________
3 Sec. 48, Rev. Election Code; see State of Wisconsin v. Kohler, 228 N.W. 895, 89 A.L.R. 348.
4 Sec. 49, Id.; see 26 Am. Jur. 2d 189.
5 Sec, 49, Id.
893
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 893
If no more were at stake in Sections 50-A and 50-B than the political or personal
convenience of a candidate, faction or political group, we could with the least
hesitation resolve the issue of constitutionality in favor of the legislative intendment
But infinitely- more is at stake, for, in enacting the prohibitions of Sections 50-A and
50-B. Congress has placed undeniable burdens upon the exercise of fundamental
political and personal freedoms encased in the Bill of Rights from legislative
intrusion. There is, firstly, a manifest restriction on the free exercise of the rights of
speech and of the press in the provisions of Section 50-B Imposing a limitation of time
on the following activities:
1. "(c)Making speeches, announcements or commentaries or holding interviews

for or against the election of any party or candidate or party;
2. (d)Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materiaIs;
3. "(e)Directly or indirectly soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against any candidate or party.
Likewise, the regulation of the time within which nominations of candidates by

political parties may take place, under Section 50-A, and fixing a time limit for
holding political conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or
other similar assemblies for campaign purposes, under paragraph (b) of Section 50-
B, curtails the freedom of peaceful assembly. And finally, the right to form
associations for purposes not contrary to law is impinged upon by the provision of
paragraph (a) of Section 50-B regulating the forming of Organizations, Associations,
Clubs, Committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or
undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a party or candidate.
It is fairly accurate to say that legislations imposing restrictions upon the right of
free expression, and upon the right of assembly and of political association
indispensable to the full exercise of free expression, have commonly been subjected
to more searching and exacting judicial
894
ANNOTATED
scrutiny than statutes directed at other personal activities. As aptly said by the
United States Supreme Court in Schneider v. Irvington: 6
In every case, x x x where legislative abridgment of the rights is asserted, the courts should
be astute to examine the effect of the challenged legislation. Mere legislative preference or
belief respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other
personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes are exercise of rights so
vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.
Thomas v. Collins exemplifies the same approach: The rational connection between
7
the remedy provided and the evil to be curbed, which in other contexts might support
legislation against attack on other grounds, will not suffice. These rights [of
expression and assembly] rest on firmed foundations.
The belief that more exacting constitutional tests are appropriately applied upon
statutes having an actual or potential inhibiting effect on the right of speech, and the
cognate rights of assembly and association, flows from recognition of the nature and
function of these rights in a free democratic society. Historically the guarantees of
free expression were intended to provide some assurance that government would
remain responsive to the will of the people, in line with the constitutional principle
that sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them. The viability of a truly representative government depends upon the effective
8
protection and exercise of the rights of the people to freely think, to freely discuss and
to freely assemble for redress of their grievances; for these underlie the mechanisms
of peaceful change in a democratic polity. There is ample authority in history for the
belief that those who value freedom, but are frustrated in Its exercise, will tend to
resort to force and violent opposition to obtain release from their repression.
_______________
6 308 U.S. 147, 84 L. Ed. 155, 165

7 323 U.S. 516, 89 L. Ed. 430, 440,
8 See. 1, Art. II, Constitution.
895
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 895
So essential are these freedoms to the preservation and vitality of democratic
institutions that courts have on numerous occasions categorized them as occupying a
preferred position in the hierarchy of civil liberties. That priority, intoned the
9
court in Thomas v. Collins, supra, gives these liberties a sanctity and a sanction not
per mitting dubious instrusions.
This is not to say that the rights of free expression and of peaceful assembly may
not be constitutionally restricted by legislative action. No one has seriously doubted
that these rights do not accord immunity to every possible use of language or to every
form of assembly. Circumstances may arise in which the safety, perhaps the very
survival of our society, would demand deterrence and com-pel punishment of
whomsoever would abuse these freedoms as well as whomsoever would exercise them
to subvert the very public order upon the stability of. which these freedoms depend.
x x x It is a fundamental principle, long establisbed, that the f reedom of speech and of the
press which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an absolute right to speak or
publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or unrestricted or unbridled
license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment
of those who abuse this freedom." 10
The right to freedom of speech, and to peaceful assembly and petition the government for
redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and
guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. But it is a settled principle growing
out of the nature of well ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute
for it may be so regulated that it shall not be Injurious to the equal enjoyment of others
having .equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to
regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police
power, which is the power to prescribe regulations, to
________________
9 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 US 105, 87 L ed. 1292; Prince v. Massachussetts, 321 US 158, 88 L ed.
645, 651; Follett v. McCormick, 321 US 573, 88 L ed. 938, 940; Marsh v. Alabama, 326 US 501, 90 L ed. 430.
440.
10 People v. Nabong, 57 Phil. 455; 46061. See also People v. Feleo, 57 Phil. 451, 454; People v. Feleo, 58
Phil. 573, 575.
896
ANNOTATED
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the
people." 11
But in every case where there arises a clash between an assertion of State authority
and the exercise of f ree speech and assembly, it is ultimately the high function and
duty of this Court to locate the point of accommodation and equilibrium and draw the
line between permissible regulation and forbidden restraint.
It is now conventional wisdom that this function of delimitation and adjustment
cannot meaningfully be carried out through the iteration of abstract generalizations.
The restriction that is assailed as unconstitutional must be judged in the context of
which it is part, taking into account the nature and substantiality of the community
interest sought to be protected or promoted by the legislation under assay, in relation
to the nature and importance of the freedom restricted and the character and extent
of the restriction sought to be imposed.
III
Various standards have been evolved for the testing of the validity of a rule or
regulation curtailing the rights of free speech, free press, and peaceful assembly. At
the earlier stages in the development of jurisprudence on the matter, it was said that
the State has the power to proscribe and punish speech which creates a dangerous
tendency which the State has the right to prevent." The dangerous tendency rule,
12
as this formulation has been called, found favor in many decisions of this Court. 13
In the United States, the dangerous tendency doctrine was early abandoned, and
superseded by the clear and present danger rule. By the year 1919, the majority of
the members of the United States Supreme Court got
_______________
11 Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71, 7576; Gallego v People, L-18247, Aug. 31, 1963.
12 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 69 L. Ed. 1138.
13 See, e.g., People v. Evangelista, 57 Phil. 354; People v. Nabong, supra; People v.
Feleo, supra; Espuelas v. People, L2990, Dec. 17, 1951; Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 152.
897
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 897
around to accepting Justice Holmes view that the question in every case is whether
the words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress
has a right to prevent." To sustain legislation imposing limitations upon freedom of
14
speech or of assembly, a court must find that the evil sought to be avoided by the
legislative restriction is both serious and imminent in high degree. As stated
in Bridges v. California: 15
x x x the likelihood, however great, that a substantive evil will result cannot alone justify a
restriction upon freedom of the speech or the press. The evil itself must be substantial x x x;
it must be serious x x x,
What clearly emerges from the clear and present danger cases is a working principle
that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high before utterances can be punished x x x.
The clear and present danger rule has been cited with approval, in at least two
decisions of this Court. The dangerous tendency and clear and present danger
16
doctrines, it should not escape notice, were fashioned in the course of testing
legislation of a particular typelegislation limiting speech expected to have
deleterious consequences on the security and public order of the community. The
essential difference between the two doctrines related to the degree of proximity of
the apprehended danger which justified the restriction upon speech. The dangerous
tendency doctrine permitted the application of restrictions once a rational connection
between the speech restrained and the danger apprehendedthe tendency of one
to create the otherwas shown, The clear and present danger rule, in contrast,
required the Government to defer application of restrictions until the
_______________
14 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 63 L. Ed. 470, 47374.

15 314 U.S. 252, 86 L. Ed. 192, 203.
16 See Primicias v. Fugoso, supra; Cabansag v. Fernandez, supra. The latter decision contains an
extensive discussion of the constitutional development of both the dangerous tendency and clear and
present danger doctrines.
898
ANNOTATED
apprehended danger was much more visible, until its realization was imminent and
nigh at hand. The latter rule was thus considerably more permissive of speech than
the former, in contexts for the testing of which they were originally designed.
In other types of contexts, however, where the substantive evil which Congress
seeks to avoid or mitigate does not relate to the maintenance of public order in society,
the adequacy or perhaps even the relevancy of these doctrines cannot be casually
assumed. It would appear to me that one of these contexts would be that where the
legislation under constitutional attack interferes with the freedom of speech and
assembly in a more generalized way and where the effect of speech and assembly in
terms of the probability of realization of a specific danger is not susceptible even of
impressionistic calculation. I believe that Sections 50-A and 50-B come within such
context. Congress enacted these provisions not because it feared that speeches and
assemblies in the course of election campaigns would, probably or imminently, result
in a direct breach of public order or threaten national security. Sections 50-A and 50-
B explicitly recognize that such speech and assembly are lawful while seeking to limit
them in point of time.
However useful the clear and present danger formulation was in the appraisal
of a specific type of situation, there is fairly extensive recognition that it is not a rule
of universal applicability and validity, not an automatic mechanism that relieves a
court of the need for careful scrunity of the features of a given situation and
evaluation of the competing interests involved.
In American Communications Assn v. Douds, the United States Supreme Court
17
unequivocally said that in suggesting that the substantive evil must be serious and
substantial, it was never the intention of this Court to lay down an absolutist test
measured in terms of danger to the Nation. Rejecting the criterion of clear and
present danger as applicable to a statute requiring labor union officers to subscribe
to a non-Communist affidavit before
_______________
339 U.S. 383, 94 L. Ed. 925, 943.

17
899
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 899
the union may avail of the benefits of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947,
the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Vinson, said:
When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order, and the regulation
results in an indirect, conditional, partial abridgment of speech, the duty of the courts is to
determine which of the two conflicting interests demands the greater prote tion under the
particular circumstances presented. x x x We must, therefore, undertake the delicate and
difficult task x x x to weigh he circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons
advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of rights. x x x" 18
In enunciating a standard premised on a judicial balancing of the conflicting social

values and individual interests competing for ascendancy in legislation which
restricts expression, the court in Douds laid the basis for what has been called the
balancing-of-interests test which has found application in more recent decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court. Briefly stated, the balancing test requires a court to take
19
conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given

situation or type of situation. 20
In the actual application of the balancing-of-interests test, the crucial question

is: how much deference should
_______________
18 At 94 L. Ed. 944.
19 See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449; Barenblatt v. U.S., 360 U.S. 169, 3 L. Ed. 2d
116: Konigsberg v. State Bar, 360 U.S. 36.
20 Kauper, Civil Liberties and the Constitution, p. 113 (Ann Arbor, 1966) provides a useful summary
statement: The theory of balance of interests represents a wholly pragmatic approach to the problem of
First Amendment freedom, indeed, to the whole problem of constitutional interpretation. It rests on the
theory that it is the Courts function in the case before it when it finds public interests served by legislation
on the one hand, and First Amendment freedoms affected by it on the other, to balance the one against the
other and to arrive at a judgment where the greater weight shall be placed. If on balance it appears that
the public interest served by restrictive legislation of of such a character that it outweighs the abridgment
of freedom then the Court will find the legislation valid. In short, the balance-of-interests theory rests on
the basis that constitutional freedoms are not absolute, not even those stated the the First Amendment.
and that they may be abridged to some extent to serve appropriate and important public interests.
900
ANNOTATED
be given to the legislative judgment? It does not seem to me enough to say that this
Court should not concern itself with the wisdom of a particular legislative measure
but with the question of constitutional power. I believe that we cannot avoid
addressing ourselves to the question whether the point of viable equilibrium
represented by the legislative judgment emobodied in R.A. 4880 is an appropriate
and reasonable one, in the light of both the historic purpose of the constitutional
safeguards of speech and press and assembly and the general conditions obtaining in
the community.
Although the urgency of the public interest sought to be secured by Congressional
power restricting the individuals freedom, and the social importance and value of the
freedom so restricted, are to be judged in the concrete, not on the basis of
abstractions," a wide range of factors are necessarily relevant in ascertaining the
21
point or line of equilibrium. Among these are (a) the social value and importance of
the specific aspect of the particular freedom restricted by the legislation; (b) the
specific thrust of the restriction, i.e., whether the restriction is direct or indirect,
whether or not the persons affected are few; (c) the value and importance of the public
interest sought to be secured by the legislationthe reference here is to the nature
and gravity of the evil which Congress seeks to prevent; (d) whether the specific
restriction decreed by Congress is reasonably appropriate and necessary for the
protection of such public interest; and (e) whether the necessary safeguarding of the
public interest involved may be achieved by some other measure less restrictive of
the protected freedom. 22
In my view, the balancing-of-interests approach is more appropriately used in

determining the constitutionality of Sections 50-A and 50-B. Both the dangerous
tendency and clear and present danger criteria have mini-
_______________
21Barenblatt v. U.S., supra, at L. Ed. 2d 1121.

22For a very thoughtful and searching study on the subject, marked by a heavy preference for freedom
of expression and the social values it imports, see Emerson, Towards a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE LAW JOURNAL 877 (1963).
901
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 901
mum relevancy to our task of appraising these provisions,. Under these two tests, the
statute is to be assayed by considering the degree of probability and imminence with
which ''prolonged election campaigns would increase the incidence of violence and
deaths, dominion of the rich in the political arena and corruption of the
electorate. This kind of constitutional testing would involve. both speculation and
prophecy of a sort for which this Court, I am afraid, has neither the inclination nor
any special competence.
IV
Applying the balancing-of-interests test or approach outlined above, I am persuaded
that Congress did not exceed constitutional limits in enacting Section 50-A. This
Section, it will be recalled, makes it unlawful for any political party or group to
nominate a candidate for an elective public office earlier than the period of 150 or 90
days, as the case may be, immediately preceding the election. No political party or
group can claim a constitutional right to nominate a candidate for public office at any
time that such party or group pleases. The party nomination process is a convenient
method devised by political parties and groups, as a means of securing unity of
political action. As a device designed for expediency of candidates and of political
23
parties, the process of nominationor at least the time aspect thereofmust yield to
the requirements of reasonable regulations imposed by the State. It may be well to
note that in many jurisdictions in the United States, the nomination of candidates for
public office is regulated and controlled in many aspects by statutes. While the act -
24
of nominating a candidate has speech and assembly aspects, the restrictive effect of
Section 50. A would appear negligible. The reach of the statute is itself limited: it
applies only to political parties,. political committees or political groups, leaving
everyone else free
________________
23 Winston v. Moore. 244 Pa. 447, 91 A. 520.

24 See Field v. Hall, 201 Ark. 77, 143 S.W. 2d 567; People v. Kramer, 328 111., 512, 160 N E. 60; Dupre
v. St. Jacques, 51. R.I. 189, 153 A. 240.
902
ANNOTATED
from restraint. The thrust of Section 50-A is also limited: it does not prohibit political
parties f rom holding nominating conventions or from doing any lawful thing during
such conventions; what it controls is the scheduling of the nominating conventions.
While control of the scheduling of conventions of course involves delimitation of the
time periods which the formally revealed candidates have to convince the electorate
of their respective merits, those periods150 days and 90 daysdo not appear
unreasonably short, at least not in this age of instantaneous and mass media.
On the other hand, the legitimacy and importance of the public interest sought to
be promoted by Section 50-A must be conceded. Congress has determined that
inordinately early nominations by political parties or groups have the tendency of
dissipating the energies of the people by exposing them prematurely to the absorbing
excitement of election compaigns as we know them, and detracting from the attention
that ought to be given to the pursuit of the main task of a developing society like ours,
which is the achievement of increasing levels of economic development and social
welfare.
The rational connection between the prohibition of Section 50-A and its object, the
indirect and modest scope of its restriction on the rights of speech and assembly, and
the embracing public interest which Congress has found in the moderation of partisan
political activity, lead us to the conclusion that the statute may stand consistently
with and does not offend against the Constitution. The interest of the community in
limiting the period of election campaigns, on balance, far outweighs the social value
of the kind of speech and assembly that is involved in the formal nomination of
candidates for public office.
I reach a different conclusion with respect to Section 50-B. Here, the restraint on the
freedoms of expression, assembly and association is direct. Except within the open
season of 120 and 90 days preceding the election, the statute prevents and
punishesby heavy criminal sanctionspeeches, writings, assemblies and
associations
903
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 903
intended to promote or oppose the candidacy of any person aspiring for an elective
public office, or which may be deemed a direct or an indirect campaign or as
propaganda for or against a political party. The prohibition reaches not only a
relative handful of persons;" it applies to any person whether or not a voter or
25
candidate, and to any group of persons whether or not a political party or political
committee. The effect of the law, therefore, is to impose a comprehensive and
prolonged prohibition of speech of a particular content, except during the 120 or 80
days, respectively, immediately preceding an election.
Thus, the moment any person announces his intention of seeking an elective public
office. regardless of whether or not said person has already filed his certificate of
candidacy or has been nominated by any political party as its candidate, Section 50-
B would become immediately operative. Should the aspirant make known his
intention, say, one year before the election, the law forthwith steps in to impose a
blackout, as it were, of all manner of discussion in support of or in opposition to his
candidacy. The lips of the candidate himself are by the threat of penal sanction sealed,
and he may not make a speech, announcement, commentary, or hold an interview to
explain his claim to public office or his credentials for leadership until the
commencement of the period allowed for an election campaign. Neither may any
person, before that period, speak out in open support or criticism of his candidacy, for
that would constitute a prohibited commentary for or against the election of [a]
candidate [albeit not a formally nominated candidate] for public office/' within the
purview of paragraph (c) of Section 50-B. In practical effect, Section 50-B would stifle
comment or criticism, no matter how fair-minded, in respect of a given political party
(whether in our out of power) and prospective candidates for office (whether avowed
or merely intending), and would abide all the citizens to hold their tongues in the
meantime.
________________
American Communications Assn v. Douds, supra, at L-Ed. 947.

25
904
ANNOTATED
What of the social value and importance of the freedoms impaired by Section 50-B?
The legislation strikes at the most basic political right of the citizens in a republican
system, which is the right actively to participate in the establishment or
administration of government. This right finds expression in multiple forms but it
certainly embraces that right to influence the shape of policy and law directly by the
use of ballot. It has been said so many times it scarcely needs to be said again, that
the realization of the democratic ideal of self-government depends upon an informed
and committed electorate. This can be accomplished only by allowing the fullest
measure of freedom in the public discussion of candidates and the issues behind
which they rally; to this end, all avenues of persuasionspeech, press, assembly,
organizationmust be kept always open. It is in the context of the electoral process
that these fundamental rights secured by the Constitution assume the highest social
importance. 26
_______________
26 A passage from Judge Cooley ably expresses the historic value of free political discussion, where he
states that the purpose of the First Amendment of the U S. Constitution is rooted in the needx x x to
protect parties in the free publication of matters of public concern, to secure their right to a free discussion
of public events and public measures, and to enable every citizen at any time to bring the government and
any person in authority to the bar of public opinion by any just criticism upon their conduct in the exercise
of the authority which the people have conferred upon them. 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed.
1927) 885. Similar statements are found in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1498; Stromberg
v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 75 L. Ed. 1117.
The opinion of Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the U.S. Supreme Court in Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S.
214, 16 L. ed 2d. 484 at 488, is apropos: Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First
Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of the Amendment was to
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs, This of course includes discussions of candidates,
structures and forms of government, the manner in which government is operated or should be operated,
and all such matters relating to political processes. The Constitution specifically selected the press, which
includes not only newspapers, books, magazines, but also humble leaflets and circulars, see Lovell v.
Griffin, 303 US 444, 82 L. ed. 949, 58 S. Ct. 666, to play an important role in the discussion of public affairs.
Thus the press serves and was designed to serve
905
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 905
As to the formation of organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups
of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a party or candidate," this is a right which, like freedom
27
of expression and peaceable assembly, lies at the foundation of a libertarian and

democratic society. As Professor Kauper has explained, with characteristic lucidity:
28
When we speak of freedom of association we may have reference to it in a variety of

contexts. Probably the highest form of freedom of association, at least as many would see it, is
the freedom to associate for political purposes by means of organization of a political party
and participation in its activities. The effective functioning of a democratic society depends on
the formation of political parties and the use of parties as vehicles for the formulation and
expression of opinions and policies. The minority party or parties become vehicles for
registering opposition and dissent. The political party is the indispensable agency both for
effective participation in political affairs by the individual citizen and for registering the
diversity of views in a pluralistic society. Indeed, under some other constitutional systems
political parties are viewed as orgrans of government and have a high constitutional status." 29
We turn to the other end of the scales. As I have herein before observed, the interest
of the state in regulating partisan political activity, which is sought to be secured by
Section 50-B no less than by Section 50-A, is a legiti-
_______________
as a powerful antidote to any abuses of, power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen
means for keeping officials elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they were selected to
serve. Suppression of the right of the press to praise of criticize governmental agents and the clamor and
contend for or against change, which is all that this editorial did, muzzles one of the very agencies of the
Framers of our Constitution thoughtfully and deliberately selected to improve our society and keep it free.
The Alabama Corrupt Practices Act by providing criminal penalties for publishing editorials such as the
one here silences the press at a time when it can be most effective. It is difficult to conceive of a more obvious
and flagrant abridgment of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press.
27 Par (a), Section 50-B.
28 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 5 L. Ed. 2d 231, 236.
29 Emphasis supplied; Kauper, Civil Liberties and the Constitution (Ann Arbor 1966) 99.
906
ANNOTATED
mate one and its protection a proper aim for reasonable exercise of the public power.
I think, however, that that interest, important as it is, does not offset the restrictions
which Section 50-B imposes .with indiscriminate sweep upon the even more
fundamental community interests embodied in the constitutional guarantees of
speech, assembly and association. I have adverted to Mills v. Alabama where the
United States Supreme Court struck down the Alabama Corrupt Practices Act to the
extent that it prohibited, under penal sanctions, comments and criticism by the press
on election day. The statutory provision there in question, not unlike Section 50-B
here, was sought to be sustained in the interest of preserving the purity and integrity
of the electoral process. The restriction. which the Alabama statute imposed upon
freedom of speech and assembly would seem an inconsequential onea restriction
imposed for one day, only one day, election day; nevertheless, the United States
Supreme Court regarded such restriction as sufficient to outweigh the concededly
legitimate purpose of the statute. We can do no less in respect of restrictions of such
reach, scope and magnitude as to make the limitation of the Alabama statute appear,
in comparison, as an altogether trifling incovenience.
Indeed, if a choice is to be made between licentious election campaigns, which
Section 50-B Leeks to curtail, and the muzzling, as it were, of public discussion of
political issues and candidates, which the provision would effectuate, I have no
hesitancy in opting for the former. It is the only choice consistent with the democratic
process. Fortunately, there is no need to choose between one and the other; the
dichotomy need not be a real one. I am not to be understood as holding that Congress
may not, in appropriate instances, forbid the abusive exercise of speech in election
campaigns. There is, no constitutional immunity for a defamatory attack on a public
candidate. Neither is there protection for slander of public officials. It has been held
30
to be within the power of the legislature to penalize specifically the making, in bad
faith, of false charges of wrongdoing against a candidate for nomina-
_______________
See, e.g., U.S. v. Contreras, 23 Phil. 513.

30
907
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 907
tion or election to public office, and to prohibit the publication or circulation of
31
charges against such candidate without serving him a copy of such charges several
days before the election. Statutes of this kind have been sustained against broad
32
claims of impairment of freedom of speech and of the press. But it is an entirely

33
different matter when the State, instead of prosecuting [offenders] for such offenses,
seizes upon mere participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful public discussion
as a basis for criminal charge. 34
That remedies less destructive of the basic rights enshrined in the Constitution
are not available, has not been shown. The applicable principle here has been
formulated in the following terms:
x x x even though the governmental purposes be legitimate and substantial, that purpose
cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end
can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the
light of less drastic means for achieving the same purpose." 35
Section 50-B, as it would casually lump together the activities of citizens exercising
their constitutional rights and those of politicians seeking the privilege of an elective
office, is to broadly drawn to satisfy the constitutional test. The more pernicious
aspects of our national preoccupation with politics do not arise from the exercise,
even the abuse, by the electorate of the freedoms of speech and of the press; I find it
difficult to suppose that these can be met by curtailing expression, assembly and
association. The great majority of our people are too preoccupied with demands upon
their time imposed by our generally marginal or submarginal standards of living.
Politics, as I see the contemporary scene, is a dominant pre-occupation of only a
handful of personsthe politicians, the professional partymen. If the people at large
_______________
31 Hawley v. Wallace, 137 Minn. 183, 163 N.W. 127.

32 Ex Parte Hawthrone, 156 So. 619.
33 Anno: 96 A.L.R. 58284.
34 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 812 Ed. 278, 284.
35 Shelton v. Tucker, supra, at L. Ed. 2d 329 (italics supplied).
908
ANNOTATED
become involved in the heat and clamor of an election campaign, it is ordinarily
because they are unduly provoked or frenetically induced to such involvement by the
politicians themselves. As it is, the great masses of our people do not speak loud
enoughand, when they do, only infrequentlyabout our government. The effect of
the ban on speech would serve only to further chill constitutionally protected conduct
on their part which, instead of being suppressed, should on the contrary be
encouraged.
It is not amiss to observe here that the making of politically oriented speeches and
the dissemination of similar literature, while they may divert the energies of those
who make or write them and their audiences, would appear to me to be among the
less pernicious aspects of our national preoccupation with politics. The more
dangerous aspects of our national preoccupation probably occur in privacy or secrecy
and may be beyond the reach of measures like Section 50-B.
It is argued in defense of the statute, nonetheless, that under the two provisos of
Section 50-B, simple expressions of opinion and thoughts concerning the election
and expression of views on current political problems or issues, including
mentioning the names of candidates for public offices whom one supports, are not
prohibited; hence, freedom of expression is not unconstitutionally abridged by Section
50-B.
This argument is gravely flawed by the assumption that simple expressions of
opinion and views on current political problems cover the whole reach of the
relevant constitutional guarantees. What about the rights of assembly and lawful
association? As to freedom of expression, that cannot be confined to the realm of
abstract political discussions. It comprehends expression which advocates action, no
less than that which merely presents an academic viewpoint. Indeed, the value of
speech in a democratic society lies, in large measure, in its role as an instrument of
persuasion, of consensual action, and for this reason it must seek to move to action
by advocacy, no less than by mere exposition of views. It is not mere coincidence that
the farmers of our Constitution, in protecting freedom of speech and of the press
against legisla-
909
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 909
tive abridgment, coupled that freedom with a guarantee of the right of the people to
peaceably assemble and petition the government for the redress of grievances. The
right of peaceful assembly for the redress of grievances would be meaningless and
hollow if it authorized merely the public expression of political views, but not the
advocacy of political reformseven changes in the composition of the elective
officialdom of the administration.
There is another, equally basic, difficulty that vitiates the avowed constitutional
utility of the provisos appended to Section 50-B. Under the first
proviso, simple expressions of opinion and thoughts concerning the election shall not
be considered as part of an election campaign. From the precise use of the word
simple may be rationally drawn an inference that non-simple expressions fall
within the proscription of election campaigns. But the law conspicuously fails to lay
dawn a standard by which permissible electioneering. How simple is simple? In the
absence of such a standard, every speaker or writer wishing to make publicly known
his views concerning the election and his preferences among the candidates, must
speak at his own peril. He could carefully choose his words with the intention of
remaining within the area of speech left permissible by Section 50-B. But, in the
nature of things, what and who can provide him assurance that his words, simple
expressions of opinion and thoughts concerning the election as they may be, will not
be understood by his audience or at least by some of them, or by the prosecuting
officers of the Government, or by the courts even, as a speech or commentary for
or against the election of x x x a candidate for public office, or at least an indirect
solicitation of votes?
It is pertinent to advert to the Texas statute involved in Thomas v. Collins,
supra, as illustrative of the vice of vagueness that we find in Section 50-B. The Texas
statute required all labor union organizers to first obtain organizers cards from the
Secretary of State before soliciting any members f or his organization, and
authorized the courts to compel compliance by the issuance of court processes.
Thomas, the president of a nationwide labor union, came to Houston to address a
mass meeting of em-
910
ANNOTATED
ployees of an oil plant which was undergoing unionization; but six hours before he
was scheduled to speak, he was served with a court order restraining him from
soliciting members for the local union which was affiliated with his organization,
without first obtaining an organizers card. For disobeying the restraining order, he
was found in contempt of court. The U.S. Supreme Court, reversing his conviction,
found the registration requirement an invalid restraint upon free speech and free
assembly, thus:
That there was restriction upon Thomas right to speak and the rights of the workers to hear
what he had to say, there can be no doubt. The threat of the restraining order, backed by the
power of contempt, and of arrest for crime, hung over every word. A speaker in such
circumstances could avoid the words solicit/ invite/ join. It would be impossible to avoid the
idea. The statute requires no specific formula. It is not contended that only the use of the
word solicit would violate the prohibition. Without such a limitation, the statute forbids any
language which conveys, or reasonably could be found to convey, the meaning of invitation.
That Thomas chose to meet the issue squarely, not to hide in ambiguous phrasing, does not
counteract this fact. General words create different and often particular impressions on
different minds. No speaker, however careful, can convey exactly his meaning, or the same
meaning, to the different members of an audience. How one might land unionism/ as the
State and the State Supreme Court concedes Thomas was free to do, yet in these
circumstances not imply an invitation, is hard to conceive. This is the nub of the case, which
the State fails to meet because it cannot do so, Workingmen to do lack capacity for making
rational connections. They would understand, or some would, that the president of U.A.W.
and vice president of C.I.O., addressing an organization meeting, was not urging merely a
philosophic attachment to abstract principles of unionism, disconnected from the business
immediately at hand. The feat would be incredible for a national leader, addressing such a
meeting, lauding unions and their principles, urging adherence to union philosophy, not also
and thereby to suggest attachment to the union by becoming a member.
Furthermore, whether words intended and designed to fall short of invitation would miss
that mark is a question of intent and of effect. No speaker, in such circumstances, safely could
assume that anything he might say upon the general subject would not be understood by
some as an invitation. In short, the supposedly clear-cut distinction between discussion,
laudation, general advocacy, and solicitation puts the speaker in these circumstances wholly
at the mercy of the varied understanding of his hearers
911
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 911
and consequently of whatever inference may be drawn as to his intent and meaning.
Such a distinction offers no security for free discussion. In these conditions it blankets
with uncertainty whatever may be said. It compels the speaker to hedge and trim. He must
take care in every word to create no impression that he means, in advocating unionisms most
central principle, namely, that workingmen should unite for collective bargaining, to urge
those present to do so. The vice is not merely that invitation, in the circumstances shown here,
is speech. It is also that its prohibition forbids or restrains discussion which is not or may not
be invitation. The sharp line cannot be drawn surely or securely. The effort to observe it could
not be free speech, free press, or free assembly, in any sense of free advocacy of principle or
cause. The restrictions effect, as applied, in a very practical sense was to prohibit Thomas
not only to solicit members and memberships, but also to speak in advocacy of the cause or
trade unionism in Texas, without having first procured the card. Thomas knew this and faced
the alternatives it presented. When served with the order he had three choices: (1) to stand on
his right and speak freely; (2) to quit, refusing entirely to speak; (3) to trim, and even thus to
risk the penalty. He chose the first alternative. We think he was within his rights in doing so."36
The realism of the approach and reasoning employed in Thomas v. Collins commends
itself; I think this kind of realism should be applied to the task of appraising Section
50-B. Section 50-B forbids directly or indirectly soliciting votes and/or undertaking
any campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate or party, including any
language for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office, except
within the specified periods preceding the election.
If a minority political party were to hold a mass rally at Plaza Miranda within the
prohibited period of an election year, for the purpose of publicly expressing their
criticism of the party in power, it is unthinkable that the public speeches delivered
during the occasion will not be understood, by many if not by all, as a direct or an
indirect campaign or propaganda against a political party, as well as a direct or an
indirect solicitation of votes. The audience will certainly understand the occasion, not
as a forum for indulging in criticism for criticisms sake, nor
_______________
At L. Ed. 44243 (italics supplied).

36
912
ANNOTATED
as a simple discussion of political philosophy, but as an invitation to unseat the
party in power at the next election.
If, upon the other hand, the minority party should control one or both Houses of
Congress and, for selfish partisan motives, oppose all or a major portion of the
significant measures sponsored by the Administration, regardless of their merits, for
the purpose of obtaining political partisan advantage, the Chief Executive would,
during the restricted period, find himself hampered in vigorously placing blame
squarely on such minority party. The Administration (and this includes the Chief
Executive himself) would be hard put to appeal to public opinion to exert pressure on
the legislature to gain support for what it may honestly believe to be constructive
measures sorely needed to promote the countrys progress. The right of any party or
politician to appeal to public opinion cannot be assailed; yet, when would such an
appeal, in which the opposition may have to be severely criticized, not constitute a
violation of Section 50-B? Actual pre-war and postwar experience has shown that in
a number of instances, the Chief Executive and leaders of his administration had to
mobilize public opinion (largely expressed through the press) to frustrate what they
regarded as a calculated scheme of the opposition party of unreasonably interposing
obstacles to a major part of essential legislation. It would indeed be most difficult to
determine with exactitude what utterances of the Administration leaders, including
the Chief Executive himself, would or would not constitute propaganda for or against
a political party
Under these circumstances, I find the contraposition in Section 50-B between
expressions of opinion, on the one hand, and solicitation and campaign or
propaganda, on the other, as too uncertain and shifting a line of distinction to be of
any practical utility either to the citizen or official who must speak at his own peril
or to the prosecutors and the courts who must enforce and apply the distinction.
Paragraph (f) of Section 50-B is tautological and question-begging. It defines
election campaign as giving, soliciting, or receiving contributions for election
campaign purposes, either directly or indirectly. Insofar, therefore.
913
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 913
as the phrase election compaign purposes in paragraph (f) depends for its meaning
on the preceding paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e), paragraph (f) likewise suffers
from constitutional infirmity. Upon the other hand, if the meaning of paragraph (f)
be that the act of soliciting, giving or receiving contributions for the purpose of
advancing the candidacy of a person or party is campaigning, then it is just as must
a curtailment of the freedom of thought that the Constitution vouchsafes to every
citizen.
The foregoing disquisition could be compressed into the compelling perspective of
this simple admonition: that speech concerning public affairs is more than self-
expression; it is the essence of self-government."37
In sum and substance, it is my considered view that Section 50-B of the Revised
Election Code constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of the freedoms of speech,
of the press, of peaceful assembly, and of lawful association.
I vote for its total excision from the statute books.
Capistrano, Zaldivar and Dizon, JJ., concur.
BARREDO, J.: concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the resulting dismissal of this case, but I cannot give my assent to so much
of the opinion, brilliantly written for the Court by Mr. Justice Fernando, as would
give the imprimatur of constitutionality to any portion of Section 50-B of the statute
before Us. Hereunder are my humble but sincere observations.
I am of the firms conviction that this case should be dismissed. In fact, it is not
clear to me why the petition herein was ever given due course at all No matter how I
scan its allegations, I cannot find anything in them more than a petition for relief
which is definitely outside the original jurisdiction of this Court. Petitioners
themselves have expressly brought it as a petition for relief; it is the majority that
has decided to pull the chestnuts out of the fire by holding that it should be treated
by this Court as one of prohibition in view of the seriousness and the urgency of the
constitutional issue raised. Frank-
_______________
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).

37
914
ANNOTATED
ly, I consider this relaxation rather uncalled for; it could border on overeagerness on
the part of the Supreme Court, which is not only taboo in constitutional cases but also
certainly not bef itting the role of this Tribunal in the tripartite scheme of government
We have in this Republic of ours, I am afraid the majority is unnecessarily opening
wide the gate for a flood of cases hardly worthy of our attention, because the parties
concerned in many cases that will come to Us may not see as clearly as We do the real
reasons of public interest which will move Us when We choose in the future to either
entertain or refuse to take cognizance of cases of constitutionality. Withal, We cannot
entirely escape the suspicion that We discriminate.
Since after all, the majority admits that when We act in these matters, We do not
do so on the assumption that to Us is granted the requisite knowledge to set matters
right, but by virtue of the responsibility We cannot escape under the Constitution,
one that history authenticates, to pass upon every assertion of an alleged
infringement of liberty, when our competence is appropriately
invoked, (underscoring mine) and, further, no one can deny that it is now firmly
established that among the indispensable requirements before this Court can take
up a constitutional question is that We can do it only when it involves a real and
genuine situation causing direct substantial injury to specific persons, as
contradistinguished from mere speculative fears of possible general hardship or mere
inconvenience, I feel it would be much safer for Us, and our position would be more
in accord with the rule of law, if We adhered strictly to the above requirement and
threw out cases of the nature of the present one, if only out of the traditional respect
this Tribunal owes the two other coordinate and co-equal departments of our
government. In the petition at bar, there are no allegations of specific acts of the
respondent Commission on Elections or even only threatened to be committed by it,
pursuant to the challenged legislation, which they claim impairs, impedes, or negates
any rights of theirs considered to be constitutionally protected against such
impairment, impeding or negation. It is very clear to me that in this case, our juris-
915
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 915
diction as not been properly invoked. Considering how multified d the law in
question is, one is completely at a loss as to how petitioners request for a blanket
prohibition and injunction can be considered, in the light of existing principles that
strictly limit our power to take cognizance of constitutional cases only to those that
can pass the test I have mentioned above.
What is more, I regret to have to say that what the majority is doing by taking
further cognizance of and deciding this case is to brush aside the stark reality that
the interest in this case of petitioners Cabigao and Gonzales, the first, as candidate,
and the second, as his leader, related only to the elections of 1967 wherein, in fact,
Cabigao was elected Vice-Mayor of Manila. Accordingly, this case has already become
entirely academic even as a prohibition, because neither Cabigao nor his leader,
Gonzales, can conceivably have any further imaginable interest in these proceedings.
How can we proceed then, when petitioners interest no longer exists and whatever
decision We may make will no longer affect any situation involving said petitioners.
Clearly to me, what the majority has done is to motu proprio convert the action of
petitioners into a taxpayers suit, which may not be proper because there is no specific
expenditure of public funds involved here. Besides, if petitioners have not come with
a supplemental petition still complaining, why are We going to assume that they are
still complaining or, for that matter, that there are other persons who are minded to
complain, such that We have to give or deny to them here and now the reason to do
so?
Again, I say, the Court seems to be trying to bite more than it can chew, since cases
of this nature will surely come in great numbers and We will have to accommodate
1
them all, otherwise the exercise of our discretion in rejecting any of them can be
questioned and may at times be really questionable. My basic principle is that the
rule of law avoids creating areas of discretionary powers, and the fact that it is the
Supreme Court that exercises the discre-
_______________
1Cases in the nature of petitions for declaratory relief or advisory opinion.

916
ANNOTATED
tion does not make it tolerable in any degree, for such an eventuality can be worse
because no other authority can check Us and the people would be helpless, since We
cannot be changed, unlike the President and the Members of Congress who can, in
effect, be recalled in the elections. Of course, I have faith in the individual and
collective wisdom and integrity of each and every one of my fellow members of this
Court, but I still prefer that We exercise discretion only when it is clearly granted to
Us, rather than for Us to create by our own fiat the basis for its exercise.
The other question assailing my mind now, is this: Is there any precedent, whether
here or in any other jurisdiction where the Supreme Court has the power to declare
legislative or executive acts unconstitutional, wherein any supreme court had
insisted on deciding grave constitutional questions af ter the case had become
completely moot and academic because the interest of the actors alleged in their
pleading had ceased to exist? I dont believe there has been any, which is as it should
be, because if this Court and even inferior court dismiss ordinary cases which have
become moot and academic, with much more reason should such action be taken, in
cases wherein the unconstitutionality of a law or executive order is raised, precisely,
for the reasons of principle already stated and fully discussed in other constitutional
cases so well known that they need not be cited here anymore.
It is for these considerations that I join the majority in dismissing this case. And I
want to acknowledge that I am heartened in any stand by the fact that in the
deliberations, at least, Mr. Justice Makalintal expressed similar views as mine, so
much so that, in his particular case, he did not even care to discuss the constitutional
questions herein involved precisely because they are not appropriately berofe this
Court. On the other hand, if the majoritys position is correct that this Court may
1a
properly consider this case as one of prohibition and that it should be decided
________________
Chief Justice Concepcion and Justices Reyes and Teehankee also support our view.
1a
917
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 917
despite its having become clearly academic, I would definitely cast my vote with Mr.
Justice Castro to declare unconstitutional Section 50-B of the legislative enactment
in question, Republic Act 4880, more popularly known as the Taada-Singson Law.
Unlike him, however, I shall not indulge in a complete discussion of my stand on the
constitutional questions herein involved, since the opportunity to voice fully my views
will come anyway when the proper case is filed with Us. It is only because some
members of the Court feel that we should make known what are, more or less, our
personal opinions, so that the parties concerned may somehow be guided in what they
propose to do or are doing in relation to the coming election, that I shall state
somehow my fundamental observations, without prejudice to their needed
enlargement if and when the appropriate opportunity comes. Indeed, in my humble
view, what the Court is rendering here is in the nature of an advisory opinion and I
am sure all the members of the Court will agree with me that in doing this we are
departing from the invariable posture this Court has always taken heretofore. In
other words, we are just advancing now, individually and collectively, what our votes
and judgment will be should an appropriate case come, unless, of course, as some of
our colleagues have wisely observed in other cases where I have made similar
observations, We change our mind after hearing the real parties in interest.
Coming now to the constitutional problems posed by the pleadings, I have these to
say, for the time being:
1. The first specific act defined by the statute in question as election campaign
or partisan political activity proscribed by it within the stipulated limited period of
one hundred twenty days prior to an election at large and ninety days in the case of
any other election is to form(ing) organizations, associations, clubs, committees or
other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/ or undertaking any
campaign or propaganda f or or against a party or candidate. No law more effective,
if less disguised, could have been conceived to render practically impossible the
organization of new political parties in this country. If for this reason alone, I consider
this pro-
918
ANNOTATED
vision to be deserving of the severest condemnation as an unparalleled assault on the
most sacred and fundamental political rights of our citizenry. In the light of the recent
political experience of the strong of heart and idealists amongst us, this measure
appears to me as a perfect or, at least, a near-perfect scheme for the perpetuation of
the status quo and the entrenchment of the presently existing political parties,
particularly, the two major ones, whether or not we share the cynical reference to
them by the discerning as nothing but twin peas in the same pod. This is not to say
that such was what motivated its authors, particularly Senator Taada, for whom I
have always had the highest regard for his never-questioned sincerity of purpose,
patriotism and libertarian principles, which opinion of mine is undoubtedly shared
by all the members of this Court. I must insist, however, that such is what appears
to me to be unmistakably the evident effect of the prohibition under discussion. It is
most probable that in its passion to remedy as early as possible the evils it feels exist,
Congress has overlooked unwittingly some of the possible implications of this
particular measure.
It is one thing to prohibit a political party from actively campaigning outside a
certain period of time and it is entirely another thing to prohibit citizens who are not
contented with the existing political parties to organize, outside the same period, any
new political party which they feel will better serve the public weal. Before it is
1b
contended that this provision does allow the organization of new political parties
within the abovementioned periods of one hundred twenty and ninety days preceding
each respective election referred to, I hasten to add that the said periods are so
obviously insufficient that to some it would appear as if the reference to such brief
periods of free organization in the provision was just inserted into it to camouflage
its real but unmentionable intentions and/or
________________
1b I disagree with the view that the organization of political parties is not included in the prohibition.
Can there be an organization more intended to solicit votes and to undertake campaigns or propaganda
for or against a party or candidate than a political party?
919
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 919
Gonzalez vs. Commission on Election
to blunt any challenge of unconstitutionality.
All our people have been witnesses to events of contemporary history which have
clearly demonstrated the futility of organizing a new political party or even just a
front or alliance within such a short time. To name the gallant national figures who
have met frustration in such endeavor even with much more time at their disposal is
to prove that the task is simply next to impossible, no matter if it were undertaken
by men of the best reputation in integrity and nobility of ideals. It is surely of common
knowledge that the work of organization alone of a party, not to speak of the actual
participation and influence such party is intended to effectuate in the ensuing
election, can hardly be accomplished, within the four months provided by the statute,
with sufficient success to be of any consequence, specially, on a national level, which
is what is needed most, because while local issues seem to arouse more interest
among the electors, national issues have a profound effect on the lives and liberties
of all the people. It must be borne in mind, in this connection, that our country is
made up of more than 7,000 islands scattered throughout the length and breadth of
the archipelago. Those who have taken part in one way or another in an electoral
campaign of national dimension know only too well that one can hardly cover a
majority of these islands, not to speak of all of them, within such an abbreviated
period.
Moreover, in the light of contemporary trends of political thinking and action, very
much more than the present condition of things about which there is. to be sure. so
much hypocritical hue and cry, particularly, among those whom the present-day
Robin Hoods. in and out of the government have not attended to, to engender a
general feeling of dissatisfaction and need for change in such widespread proportions
as to readily galvanize enough elements to rise in peaceful revolution against the
existing political parties and bring about the formation within the short span of four
months of a new political party 01 adequate or at least appreciable strength and
effectiveness in the national arena. Even the obviously sincere efforts of the
undaunted who keep on trying their luck, pitted
920
ANNOTATED
against the marked complacency and indifference of the present and passing
generations, if not their incomprehensible inability to overcome the inertia that
seems to be holding them from pushing the scattered protests here and there, more
or less valid and urgent, to their logical conclusion, generate but very little hope that
the expected reaction can materialize during our time.
Needless to say, no matter if one looks at the current scenes thru the most rosy
spectacles, a ban against the formation of new political parties is definitely out of the
question. A total expressed ban is, of course, repugnant to any decent sense of
freedom. Indeed, a disguised ban, even if only partial, is even more intolerable in this
country that does not pretend to have but does truly have democratic bearings deeply
rooted in the history of centuries of heroic uprisings which logically culminated in the
first successful revolution of a small nation against despotism and colonialism in this
part of the world.
It is to be conceded that the adequacy or inadequacy of the means adopted by
Congress in the pursuit of a legislative recognized objective is generally irrelevant to
the courts in the determination of the constitutionality of a congressional action. I
must be quick to add, however, that this rule can be salutary only if the adequacy is
controversial, but when the inadequacy of the means adopted is palpable and can
reasonably be assumed to be known or ought to be known generally by the people,
such that it is a foregone conclusion that what is left licit by the law can only be
nothing more than futile gestures of empty uselessness, I have no doubt that the
judiciary can rightfully expose the legislative act for what it isan odious infraction
of the charter of our liberties. Otherwise, the principle of respect for coordinate and
co-equal authority can be a tyranny forbidding the courts from striking down what is
not constitutionally permissible. I am ready to agree that the judiciary should give
allowances for errors of appreciation and evaluation of the circumstances causing the
passage of a law, but if it is true, .as it is indeed true, that the Supreme Court is the
guardian next only to the people themselves of the integrity of the Constitution and
921
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 921
consider it an unpardonable abdication of our peculiar constitutionally-destined role,
if We closed Our eyes and folded Our arms when a more or less complete ban against
the organization of new political parties in this country is being attempted to be
passed before Us as a legitimate exercise of police power.
At this point, it is best to make it clear that the particular constitutional precept
with which the statutory provision in question is inconsistent and to which, therefore,
it must yield is Paragraph 6, Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution which ordains:
The right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged.
Incidentally, the indigenous cast of this provision is seemingly emphasized by Mr.
Justice Fernando by his reference to its origin in the Malolos Constitution of
1896. Indeed, there it was provided:
2
Article 19
No Filipino in the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights shall be hindered in the free
exercise thereof.
Article 20
Neither shall any Filipino be deprived of:
1. 1.x x
2. 2.The right of joining any associations for all objects of human life which may not be
contrary to public morals; x x x
It is to be observed that in the light of its text and origin, the statutory provision
under scrutiny forbids the abridgement of the right of inhabitants of this country to
form associations and societies of all kinds, including and most of all, for the citizens,
political parties, the sole exception being when the association or society is formed for
purposes contrary to law. It is unquestionable that
________________
2 According to Dr. Jose Aruego, the semi-official chronicler of the Constitutional Convention of 1934, the
provision was taken not only from the Malolos Constitution but also from the Constitution of the Republic
of Spain. (The Framing of the Philippine Constitution by Aruego, Vol. 1, p. 163.)
922
ANNOTATED
the formation of an ordinary political party cannot be for purposes contrary to law.
On the contrary, the organization of political parties not dedicated to the violent
overthrow of the government is an indispensable concomitant of any truly democratic
government. Partyless governments are travesties of the genuine concept of
democracy. The immediate repulsion that fated straws in the wind thrown in favor of
such an anachronistic proposal here in the Philippines is still fresh in the memory of
many of our countrymen. Our people are firmly set on the inseparability of political
parties from a democratic way of life. To ban political parties here is to kill democracy
itself.
And now comes this legislation banning the formation of political parties except
within certain limited periods of time, so short, as I have already demonstrated, that,
in effect, the ban is a total one. Can there be a more flagrant violation of the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of association? Besides, since it is undeniable
that the evils Congress seeks to remedy cannot be said to have all been brought about
by the formation of new political parties. but rather by the anomalous, irregular,
corrupt and illegal practices of the existing political parties, why does the legislature
have to direct its wrath against new political parties, which, for all we know, can yet
be the ones that will produce the much needed innovations in the political thinking
and actions of our electorate which will precisely do away with the defects of the
present political system? As I see it, therefore, the remedy embodied in the disputed
provision is so clearly misdirected that it cannot, under any concept of constitutional
law, be tolerated and considered constitutionally flawless, on the theory that it is just
a case of error in the choice of means, on the part of Congress, to attain the objective
it has in mind, hence beyond the pale of judicial review.
To be sure, the phrase for purposes not contrary to law in the constitutional
provision above quoted did not pass unnoticed during the debates in the
constitutional convention. To some delegates, it appeared that said phrase renders
nugatory the freedom it guarantees, for the simple reason that with said phrase the
lawmakers are prac-
923
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 923
tically given the attribute to determine what specific associations may be allowed or
not allowed, by the simple expedient of outlawing their purposesprophetic vision,
indeed! No less than Delegate Jose P. Laurel, who later became an honored member
of this Court, had to explain that the phrase was inserted just to show that the right
of association guaranteed in the Constitution was subject to the dominating police
power of the state. (Aruego, id.)
To my mind, this explanation of Delegate Laurel renders the prohibition in the law
in question more vulnerable to the charge of unconstitutionality. It is to me simply
inconceivable that the state can ever forbid the formation of political parties in the
assertion of its dominating police power. I reiterate that political parties are an
absolute necessity in a democracy like ours. As a matter of fact, I dare say police
power would be inexistent unless the political parties that give life to the government
which exercises police power are allowed to exist. That is not to say that political
parties are above the state. All that I mean is that without political parties, a
democratic stale Cannot exist; what we will have instead is a police state.
No more than momentary reflection is needed to realize that much as our
Constitution projects, it would appear, the desirability of the two-party system of
government, there is nothing in it that even r motely suggests that the present
political parties are the ones precisely that should be perpetuated to the prejudice of
any other. Less reflection is needed for one to be thoroughly convinced that to prohibit
the organization of any new political party is but a short step away from implanting
here the totalitarian practice of a one-ticket election which We all abhor. Absolute
freedom of choice of the parties and men by whom we shall be governed, even if only
among varying evils, is of the very essence in the concept of democracy consecrated
in the fundamental law of our land.
So much, for the time being. for the prohibition against new political parties. Let
us go now to the other freedoms unconstitutionally impinged by the legislation at bar.
2. If I vehemently decry the attempt in this law to cur-
924
ANNOTATED
tail our freedom to organize political parties whenever it may please us to do so for
being not only violative of the letter of the constitution but contrary also to the
democratic traditions of our people and likewise a patent disregard of the very
essence of a democratic form of government, 1 cannot have less repugnance and
abhorence for the further attempt in this law to do away with the freedoms of speech
and the press and peaceful assembly. Lest I be misunderstood, however, as being an
ultra-activist, it should be clear at the outset that in holding that the above
prohibitions contained in the statute in question are violative of the Constitution, my
stand is limited to my fun-damental conviction that the freedoms of speech, of the
press and of peaceful assembly and redress of grievances are absolute when they are
being exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we
shalI be governed. I hold neither candle nor brief for licentious speech and press, but
I recognize no power that can pre-censor, much less forbid, any speech or writing, and
peaceful assembly and petition for the redress of grievances, the purpose of which is
no more than to express ones belief regarding the qualifications or lack of them, the
merits and the demerits of persons who are candidates for public office or of political
parties vying for power, as well as the principles and programs of government and
public service they advocate, to the end that when voting time comes the right of
suffrage may be intelligently and knowingly, even if not always wisely, exercised. If,
in the process, there should be in any manner any baseless attacks on the character
and private life of any candidate or party or some form of inciting to public disorder
or sedition, the offender can be rightfully haled to court for libel or the violation of
the penal provisions on public order and national security, as the facts may warrant,
but never can anyone, much less the state, have the power to priorly forbid him to
say his piece.
Paragraphs (b), (c), (d) and (e) of Section 1 of the challenged legislation cover
practically a common subject matter. They all define as election campaign or
partisan political activity forbidden to be exercised within the
925
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 925
aforementioned periods the following liberties:
The term Election Campaign or Partisan Political Activity refers to acts designed to have a
candidate elected or not or promote the candidacy of a person or persons to a public office
which shall include:
1. (a)x x x
2. (b)Holding political conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or
other similar assemblies, for the purposes of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any
campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate or party;
3. (c)Making speeches, announcements or commentaries or holding interviews for or
agaisnt the election of any party or candidate for public office;
4. (d)Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials;
5. (e)Directly or indirectly soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
Naturally, it is my uncompromising view, that by these provisions, the act directly
violates the plain injunction of the Constitution to the effect that:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. (Par.
[8], Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution)
My colleagues are impressed by the objectives of the legislative measure before Us.
Mr. Justice Fernando voices the feeling of some of them in the opening paragraph of
the Courts opinion thus: A statute designed to maintain the purity and integrity of
the electoral process by Congress calling a halt to the undesirable practice of
prolonged political campaigns, bringing in their wake serious evils not the least of
which is the everincreasing cost of seeking public office, is challenged on
constitutional grounds. Mr. Justice Castro proclaims said objectives as practically
self-evident and heartily endorses, by quoting in toto, the purposes avowed in the
explanatory note of Senate Bill 209 which finally became the subject statute. Mr.
Justice Sanchez is a little more factual as he opines:
State authority here manifests itself in legislation intended as an answer to the strong public
sentiment that politics is growing into a way of life, that political campaigns are becoming
longer and more bitter. It is a result of a legislative appraisal
926
ANNOTATED
that protracted election campaign is the root of undesirable conditions. Bitter rivalries
precipitate violence and deaths. Huge expenditures of funds give deserving but poor
candidates slim chances of winning. They constitute an inducement to graft to winning
candidates already in office in order to recoup campaign expenses. Handouts doled out by
and expected from candidates corrupt the electorate. Official duties and affairs of state are
neglected by incumbent officials desiring to run for reelection. The life and health of
candidates and their followers are endangered. Peoples energies are dissipated in political
bickerings and long drawn-out campaigns. (2nd par., p. 4, concurring & dissenting opinion
of Mr. Justice Sanchez)
I hope I will be forgiven for having to view things differently. Indeed, I would like to
ask the optimists in and out of Congress to silence the trumpets they have sounded
to herald the approval of this law. I agree that generally no court and no member of
this Tribunal has the right to quarrel with Congress in its choice of means to combat
the evils in a legislatively recognized situation, but are We, as the Supreme Court, to
seal our lips even when we can plainly see that a congressional measure purported
allegedly to do away with certain evils does, on the contrary, promote those very same
evils it is supposed to remedy, on top of impinging on our sacred constitutional
freedoms, and at that, with the aggravating element of giving undue advantage to
the incumbents in office and to the existing political parties?
A closer look at the way the prohibitions contained in the section of the law in
dispute will work will reveal how detrimental they are to the basic public interest,
nay, to the right of suffrage itself. I like to reiterate over and over, for it seems this is
the fundamental point others miss, that genuine democracy thrives only where the
power and right of the people to elect the men to whom they would entrust the
privilege to run the affairs of the state exist. In the language of the declaration of
principles of our Constitution, The Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. (Section 1,
Article II) Translating this declaration into actuality, the Philippines is a republic
because and solely because the people in it
927
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 927
can be governed only by officials whom they themselves have placed in office by their
votes. And it is on this cornerstone that I hold it to be self-evident that when the
freedoms of speech, press and peaceful assembly and redress of grievances are being
exercised in relation to suffrage or as a means to enjoy the inalienable right of the
qualified citizen to vote, they are absolute and timeless. If our democracy and
republicanism are to be worthwhile, the conduct of public affairs by our officials must
be allowed to suffer incessant and unabating scrutiny, favorable or unfavorable.
everyday and at all times. Every holder of power in our government must be ready to
undergo exposure any moment of the day or night, from January to December every
year, as it is only in this way that he can rightfully gain the confidence of the people.
1 have no patience for those who would regard public dissection of the establishment
as an attribute to be indulged by the people only at certain periods of time. I consider
the freedoms of speech, press and peaceful assembly and redress of grievances, when
exercised in the name of suffrage, as the very means by which the right itself to vote
can only be properly enjoyed. It stands to reason, therefore, that suffrage itself would
be next to useless if these liberties cannot be untrammelled whether as to degree or
time.
It must be noted that the proscription contained in this law is against the use
altogether of the freedom of speech, press and peaceful assembly in relation to the
candidacy of a person for public office, not against the use of such freedoms in order
to damage the character of any particular person or to endanger the security of the
state. No matter how I view, it I cannot see how using said freedoms in the interest
of someones candidacy beyond the prescribed abbreviated period can do any harm to
the common weal. I regret I came too late to this Court to be able to hear what I have
been made to understand was Senator Taadas very informative arguments. With
all due respect to what might have been shown by the distinguished Senator, I
personally feel the present measure premature and misdirected. The incidence and
reincidence
928
ANNOTATED
of bloody occurences directly or indirectly caused by electoral rivalries cannot be
denied, but unless shown convincing and reliable statistical data, I have a strong
feeling that those who entertain these apprehensions are influenced by unwarranted
generalizations of isolated cases. Not even the residents of such allegedly troublous
areas as Ilocos Sur, the Lanao provinces, Cavite, Cebu and Nueva Vizcaya will admit
that the situation in those places is so beyond control as to necessitate, at any time,
the complete suppression of expression of views, oral and in writing for or against
person handling public affairs or aspiring to do so.
As the above-quoted provisions stand, every imaginable form of political activity,
whether done individually or singly, by a person, or collectively, by a number of
persons, is covered by their prohibitions. Under the said provisions, during twenty
months in every two years, there are only three things Filipinos can do in relation to
the conduct of public affairs by those they have voted into power and the relative
capacity or incapacity of others to take their places, namely: (1) simple expressions of
opinion and thought concerning the election; (2) expression of views on current
political problems and issues; and (3) mention the candidates whom one supports.
If these exceptions in the statute are not absurd, little comfort can be found
beneath their umbrage. As to the first exception, Mr. Justice Castro very aptly asks,
how simple is simple? I would like to add to the impeccable strictures of my esteemed
colleague, if I may be permitted, the humble observation that the phrase concerning.-
the election is to me too equivocal, if it is not incomprehensible, to be part of a penal
statute such as this law is, with the heavy penalty of imprisonment from one year to
five years, disqualification to hold public office for not less than one year nor more
than nine years and deprivation of the right to vote for a like period that it imposes.
To express an opinion as regards elections in general is something that is indubitably
outside the area of any possible legislative proscription and to do so in relation to a
forthcoming specific election without any
929
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 929
discernible hue of an appeal for support for one protagonist or another is to say
nothing worthwile, that is, if it is possible to conceive of anyone referring to an actual
impending election with complete impartiality. On the other hand, to express ones
views regarding an actual election with mention of the qualifications or
disqualifications of the candidates and the political parties involved, cannot escape
the coverage of the prohibition in question.
As to the second exception, what views on current political problems and issues
can be -expressed without necessarily carrying with them undercurrents of
conformity or non-conformity with the present state of things and, directly or
indirectly, with the ways of the incumbents in office? And as to the last exception,
who can be these candidates whose names would possibly be mentioned by any
sympathizer, when candidates are not allowed by this law to be nominated earlier
than practically the same period as the prohibitions against campaigns?
I can well understand the predicament of Congress. It has attempted to define the
indefinable. Any intent to circumscribe the areas of basic liberties cannot end but in
absurdity. To insist on drawing artificial boundaries for their enjoyment must
necessarily result in confusion and consequent protracted controversy and debate
which can only give occasion for the inordinate exercise of power for powers sake. A
definition that comprehends substantially what should not be included is no
definition at all. The right of our people to speak and write freely at all times about
our government and those who govern us, only because we have elected them, cannot
be subjected to any degree of limitation without virtual loss of the right itself. The
moment it becomes impossible for the inhabitants of this country to express approval
or disapproval of the acts of the government and its officials without imperilling their
personal liberty, their right to hold office and to vote, and such appears to be the
natural consequence of the injunctions of this law, we cannot be far away from the
day when our Constitution will be hardly worth the paper on which it is written.
930
ANNOTATED
I find it difficult to dissociate the prohibition in this law from the obvious advantages
they give to those presently holding office by election and to the existing political
parties.
Under the definition of the terms candidate and election campaign or partisan
political activity contained in the section we are assaying, it is clear that what the
statute contemplates are candidates for public offices. Accordingly, candidates for
nomination by their respective political parties do not appear to be comprehended
within the prohibition; so, as long as a person campaigns, even publicly, only for
nomination by his party, he is free to expose himself in any way and to
correspondingly criticize and denounce all his rivals. The fact that the law permits in
Section 50-A the holding of political conventions and the nominations of official
candidates one month before the start of the period of the prohibitions in Section 50-
B, lends strength to this conclusion. 3
Such being the case, the undue advantage of the aspirants for nomination within
the existing political parties over independent candidates becomes evident. The legal
period fixed by the law will start in July, and yet, we have long been witnesses already
to all sorts of campaigns, complete to the last detailwhat with the newspaper and
radio and television campaign matters being published and broadcast as widely as
possible, the campaigners armed or endowed with either experience, money or
pulchritude, or what may pass for it, welcoming wave after wave of party delegates
arriving at the airports and the piers, the billeting of these delegates in luxurious and
costly hotels, at the cost of the candidates and with pocket money to boot, the
sumptuous banquets and parties, etc., etc. And to top it all, a well publicized
marathon consensus which has reportedly cost the candidates millions of pesos! In
other words, in the actual operation of this law, it is only the independent candidate,
the candidate
_______________
3 Incidentally, the political conventions, referred to is Par. (b) of Section 50-B must be campaign
conventions and not conventions for the nominations of official candidates.

931
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 931
who does not belong to the existing political parties and who is prohibited to organize
a new one, who must keep his ambitions and aspirations all to himself and say nary
a word, lest he jeopardize his liberty and his rights to hold office and to vote, while
those who belong to the said parties merrily go about freely gaining as much exposure
as possible before the public. I need not refer to the tremendous advantages that
accrue to the party in power and to all incumbents, irrespective of political party color,
from the operation of this law. They should be obvious to any observer of current
events.
Under these circumstances, can it be successfully maintained that such disparity
of opportunities for those who legitimately want to offer their services to the people
by getting elected to public office, resulting from a congressional act approved by
those who would benefit from it, is constitutionally flawless? When it is considered
that this law impinges on the freedoms of speech, press, assembly and redress of
grievances and that its only justification is that it is intended to remedy existing evil
practices and undesirable conditions and occurrences related to the frequency of
elections and the extended campaigns in connection therewith, and it is f urther
considered that, as demonstrated above, this law, in its actual operation impairs and
defeats its avowed purposes because, in effect, it deprives the independent candidates
or those who do not belong to the established political parties of equal opportunity to
expose themselves to the public and make their personal qualifications, principles
and programs of public service known to the electorate, to the decided advantage of
the incumbents or, at least, those who are members of the existing political parties,
it can be easily seen that the curtailment of freedom involved in this measure cannot
be permitted in the name of police power. T am certain none can agree that resort to
police power may be sanctioned when under the guise of regulating allegedly existing
evils, a law is passed that will result in graver evil than that purported to be avoided.
As far as I can understand the commitment of our people to the principles of
democracy and republicanism, we would rather have the
932
ANNOTATED
bloodshed, corruption and other alleged irregularities that come with protracted
electoral campaigns and partisan political activity, than suffer the continued mockery
of their right to vote by limiting, as this legislation does, their right of choice only to
those whom the existing political parties might care to present as off icial candidates
before them. If this would be all that the right of suffrage would amount to, the death
of Hitler and Mussolini might just as well be considered as the most lamentable
tragedies in the history of freemen and we should welcome with open arms the
importation into this country of the kind of elections held in Russia and Red China.
A few considerations more should make those who believe in the efficacy and
constitutionality of this law take a second hard look at it. Then, they will realize how
mistaken they must be. I have said earlier that this act defeats its own avowed
purposes. Well, all that have to be considered for anyone to see my point is that in
the matter of reducing the cost of elections by limiting the period of campaigns,
current events have clearly proven that instead of lessening their expenditures,
candidates have spent more than they would have done without such limitation.
Because of the shortness of the period provided for the calling of conventions for the
nomination of official candidates by political parties and the more abbreviated period
that the candidate who would be ultimately nominated and the parties themselves
will have to campaign to win in the election, these parties have resorted to other
means of having, at least, even a semi-official candidate, without calling him so. And
this, as everybody knows means money, money and money.
The truth known to all who have political experience is that no candidate for a
position voted at large nationally can entertain any hopes of winning after a
campaign of only four months. It took at least a year for Presidents Magsaysay,
Macapagal and Marcos to win the presidency. None of the senators we have and have
had can boast of having campaigned only for four months. In view of the abbreviated
period of campaign fixed in this law, neces-
933
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 933
Gonzales vs. Commission on Election
sarily, the candidates have to redouble their efforts, try to cover more area in less
time, see more people every moment, distribute more propaganda, etc., etc., and all
these mean money, more money and more money. In this set up, so neatly produced
by this law, it is regretably evident that the poor candidates have no chance. How can
a poor candidate cover the more than 7,000 islands of our archipelago in four months?
If it was impossible to do so when there was no limitation of the period for campaigns,
what chance can such a poor candidate have now? Thus, it can be seen that this law
has not only made candidates spend more than they used to do before, it has
effectively reduced the chances and practically killed the hopes of poor candidates.
Under this law, it may truthfully be said that the right to be elected to a public office
is denied by reason of poverty.
My brethren view the problem before Us as one calling for the reconciliation of two
values in our chosen way of lifeindividual freedom, on the one hand, and public
welfare, on the other. I do not see it that way. To my mind, if the freedoms of speech,
press, peaceful assembly and redress of grievances in regard to the right to vote can
be impinged, if not stifled, by standards and limitations fixed by those who are
temporarily in power, I would regard those freedoms as no freedoms at all, but more
concessions of the establishment which can be reduced or enlarged as its convenience
may dictate. Of what use can such kind of freedom be?
Taking all circumstances into account, it is entirely beyond my comprehension,
how anyone could have conceived the idea of limiting the period of electoral
campaigns in this country, when what we need precisely is more intelligent voting by
the greater portion of our people. I do not believe our mass media have reached the
degree of efficiency in the dissemination of information needed to enable the voters
to make their choices conscientiously and with adequate knowledge of the bases of
their decisions, I am not convinced that at this stage of our national life we are
already prepared to enjoy the luxury of abbreviated electoral campaigns, unless we
are inclined to fore-
934
ANNOTATED
statistical improbabilities and politico-economic blocs and even politico-religious
control which we have in varying degrees these days and which will naturally
continue as long as our people are not better informed about the individual worth of
the candidates for or against whom they vote. I dare say that there is enough reason
to hold that if mistakes have been committed by our people in the selection of their
elective officials, it is because the information needed to serve as basis for intelligent
voting have not fully reached all segments of the population. Inadequacy of reliable
information among the voters, regarding the qualification of the candidates and the
relevant circumstances of the election they are taking part in can be the greatest bane
of popular suffrage.
Modesty aside, it is quite well known that it has been my lot to have handled, alone
or with others, some of the most important political cases in this country since the
end of the second world war. To be able to do so, I had to study our -election laws
assiduously perhaps as any other Filipino has. From what I have thus learned, I can
safely say that the present laws are reasonably adequate to prevent lavish and
excessive expenditures for electoral purposes. The real cause for regret is the lack of
proper implementation of these laws. I dare say that even the courts, not excluding
this Supreme Court, and specially the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the
House of Representatives have been rather liberal in interpreting them, so much so,
that the unscrupulous have succeeded in practically openly violating them with a
cynical sense of impunity. The recent case of the ouster of Senators Manglapus,
Kalaw and Antonino was a singular one, wherein the spirit of the law triumphed,
even as it brought to the fore the necessity of making more realistic the ceilings of
allowable expenditures at the time when the cost of everything has multipled several
times compared to that when the existing limitations were established. Indeed, these
unrealistic limitations, as to the amounts of expenditures candidates may make, has
somehow compelled the corresponding authorities to overlook
935
VOL. 27, APRIL 18, 1969 935
or even condone violations of these laws, and somehow also, this attitude has given
courage to practically everybody to pay little heed to the statutory limitations, thus
giving cause to the excessive overspending the authors of the law now in question are
seeking to stop or, at least, minimize. I say again, Congress does not have to sacrifice
or even just risk the loss or diminution only of any of our sacred liberties to accomplish
such a laudable objective. All that has to be done, in my considered opinion, is to have
more sincerity, mental honesty and firm determination in the implementation of the
limitations fixed in the Election Law, after they have been made more realistic, and
real devotion and integrity in the officials charged with said implementation. If few
may agree with me, I still entertain the trustful feeling that it is not entirely hoping
against hope to expect our national leaders to regain their moral bearings and, in a
bold effort to sweep away the darkening clouds of despair that envelope a great many
of our countrymen, with well recognized intellectuals and non-politicians among
them, to take active measures to exert their moral leadership, to the end that our
nation may regenerate by revising our peoples sense of political values and thus, as
much as possible, put exactly where they belong the vote-buyers the political
terrorist, the opportunists and the unprincipled who have sprung in this era of moral
decadence that seem to have come naturally in the wake of the havoc and devastation
resulting from the extension of the area of the last world war to our shores. If -even
this hope cannot linger in our hearts, I dread to imagine how the Filipinos who will
come after us will enjoy their lives, when in the exercise of their right of suffrage they
would be able to use their freedoms of speech, press, peaceful assembly and redress
of grievances only in measured doses to be administered to them by those in power in
the legislature.
Frankly, I am not aware of any similar legislation in other democracies of the
world. The defenders of the law in question have not cited any. If perhaps the cases
of some countries I hear may be mentioned, I loathe to follow
936
ANNOTATED
their example because I hold it is illogical for us to legislate f or our people, who have
been reared in the principles of democracy, in the light of what is being done by people
who from time immemorial have been disciplined under more or less dictatorial and
totalitarian governments. Before I close, I like to add, in the interest of truth, that
even stripped of the ornaments of foreign wisdom expressed in embellished language
that adorn the opinions of our learned colleagues, Justices Sanchez, Castro and
Fernando, their own views so exquisitely articulated by them in their respective
singular styles which have been the object of admiration and respect by all, are in
themselves not only gems of forensic literatures but are also indubitable evidence of
judicial sagacity and learning. I am making it a point to separate their own personal
views from their quotations of alien authorities, because as a matter of national pride
and dignity, I would like it known that when it comes to constitutional matters
particularly, civil liberties and the other individual freedoms, the members of this
Tribunal are not without their own native geniuses and individual modes of
expression that can stand on their own worth without any reinforcement from
imported wisdom and language.
May I say in closing that, if my above analysis and perspectives, if these views and
conclusions of mine regarding the constitutional questions herein involved are not
exactly factual and valid, I would still reiterate them, if only to serve as a feeble voice
of alarm that somehow our basic liberties may be in jeopardy and it is best that we
resolve early to man the outposts and steady our guard, least we awaken one dawn
with nothing left to us but repentance, for having failed to act when we could, amidst
the ashes of the freedoms we did not know how to defend and protect. That eternal,
incessant and unyielding vigilance is the price of liberty is still and will ever be true
at all times and in all lands.
Petition dismissed; writ of prohibition denied.
937
VOL. 181, JANUARY 30, 1990 529
Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 90878. January 29, 1990. *
PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

respondent.
Election Law; Political Law; Police Power; Prohibition regarding certain forms of
election propaganda is a valid exercise of police power of the state to prevent perversion and
prostitution of the electoral process.In the case of Badoy, Jr. v. Comelec, L-32546, Oct. 16,
1970, where the constitutionality of the prohibition of certain forms of election propaganda
was assailed, We ruled therein that the prohibition is a valid exercise of the police power of
the state to prevent the perversion and prostitution of the electoral apparatus and of the
denial of equal protection of the laws. The evil sought to be prevented in an election which
led to Our ruling in that case does not obtain in a plebiscite. In a plebiscite, votes are taken
in an area on some special political matter unlike in an election where votes are cast in favor
of specific persons for some office. In other words, the electorate is asked to vote for or against
issues, not candidates in a plebiscite.
Same; Sec. 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 prohibiting columnists, commentators or
announcers from using their columns to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues is a
restriction of freedom of expression.Anent Respondent Comelecs argument that Section 19
of Comelec Resolution 2167 does not absolutely bar petitioner-columnist from expressing his
views and/or from campaigning for or against the organic act because he may do so through
the Comelec space and/ or Comelec radio/television time, the same is not meritorious. While
the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioners freedom of expression, it is still a restriction
on his choice of the forum where he may
_____________
*EN BANC.
530
ANNOTATED
express his view. No reason was advanced by respondent to justify such abridgement.
We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioners freedom of
expression for no justifiable reason.
Same; Same; Sec. 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is void and unconstitutional.
Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The peoples right to be
informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by
access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, including the forum. The people affected by
the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the
forum where the right to expression may be exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio
time may provide a forum for expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of
information to the public concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in
newspapers or to specific radio or television times. Accordingly, the instant petition is
GRANTED. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and void and
unconstitutional.
PETITION for certiorari to review the resolution of the Commission on Elections.

MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec

Resolution No. 2167 on the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantees of
the freedom of expression and of the press.
On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitiled AN ACT PROVIDING FOR
AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION was
enacted into law. Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras which
consist of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-
Apayao, all comprising the Cordillera Autonomous Region, shall take part in a
plebiscite for the ratification of said Organic Act originally scheduled last December
27, 1989 which was, however, reset to January 30, 1990 by virtue of Comelec
Resolution No. 2226 dated December 27, 1989.
The Commission on Elections, by virtue of the power vested
531
VOL. 181, JANUARY 30, 1990 531
by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), said R.A. 6766 and
other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to govern the
conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous
Region.
In a petition dated November 20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who
claims to be a newspaper columnist of the OVERVIEW for the BAGUIO MIDLAND
COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras,
assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which
provides:
Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers.During the plebiscite
campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to
campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.
It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional because it
violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press
enshrined in the Constitution.
Unlike a regular newsreporter or news correspondent who merely reports the
news, petitioner maintains that as a columnist, his column obviously and necessarily
contains and reflects his opinions, views and beliefs on any issue or subject about
which he writes. Petitioner believes that said provision of COMELEC Resolution No.
2167 constitutes a prior restraint on his constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of the
press and further imposes subsequent punishment for those who may violate it
because it contains a penal provision, as follows:
Article XIII, Section 122, Election Offenses and Banned Acts or Activities.Except to the
extent that the same may not be applicable to a plebiscite, the banned acts/activities and
offenses defined in and penalized by the Omnibus Election Code (Sections 261, 262, 263 and
264, Article XXII, B.P. Blg. 881) and the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 6646 shall be
applicable to the plebiscite governed by this Resolution.
Petitioner likewise maintains that if media practitioners were allowed to express
their views, beliefs and opinions on the issue
532
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 532
ANNOTATED
submitted to a plebiscite, it would in fact help in the government drive and desire to
disseminate information, and hear, as well as ventilate, all sides of the issue.
On November 28, 1989, We issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondent Commission on Elections from enforcing and implementing Section 19 of
Resolution No. 2167. We also required the respondent to comment on the petition.
On January 9, 1990, respondent Commission on Elections, through the Office of
the Solicitor General filed its Comment.
Respondent Comelec maintains that the questioned provision of Comelec
Resolution No. 2167 is not violative of the constitutional guarantees of the freedom
of expression and of the press. Rather, it is a valid implementation of the power of
the Comelec to supervise and regulate media during election or plebiscite periods as
enunciated in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines.
It is stated further by respondent that Resolution 2167 does not absolutely bar
petitioner from expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or against the
Organic Act. He may still express his views or campaign for or against the act through
the Comelec space and airtime. This is provided under Sections 90 and 92 of BP 881:
Section 90. Comelec Space.The Commission shall procure space in at least one newspaper
of general circulation in every province or city: Provided, however, That in the absence of said
newspaper, publication shall be done in any other magazine or periodical in said province or
city, which shall be known as Comelec Space wherein candidates can announce their
candidacy. Said space shall be allocated, free of charge, equally and impartially within the
area in which the newspaper is circulated.
Section 92. Comelec Time.The Commission shall procure radio and television time to
be known as Comelec Time which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the
candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose,
the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to
provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of the campaign.
Respondent Comelec has relied much on Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 11 of R.A. 6646 as the basis for
533
VOL. 181, JANUARY 30, 1990 533
the promulgation of the questioned Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167.
Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public
utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or
regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply,
including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums
among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful
and credible elections.
Similarly, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 (The Electoral Reform Law of 1987)
likewise provides:
Prohibited forms of election Propaganda.In addition to the forms of election propaganda
prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful: x x x
(b) for any newspaper, radio, broadcasting or television station, or other mass media, or
any person making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space or air
time for campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission as provided under
Sections 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist, commentator,
announcer, or personality who is a candidate for any elective office shall take a leave of
absence from his work as such during the campaign period. (Emphasis ours)
However, it is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to
the Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment
of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or
other public utilities, media of communication or information to the end that equal
opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates
therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are
ensured. The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a
franchise holder may favor or give any undue
534
ANNOTATED
advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television time.
This is also the reason why a columnist, commentator, announcer or
personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is required to take a leave of
absence from his work during the campaign period (2nd par. Section 11(b) R.A. 6646).
It cannot be gainsaid that a columnist or commentator who is also a candidate would
be more exposed to the voters to the prejudice of other candidates unless required to
take a leave of absence.
However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11(b), 2nd par. of
R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right
to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right
to expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom
of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the
candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore,
Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis.
In the case of Badoy, Jr. v. Comelec, L-32546, Oct. 16, 1970, where the
constitutionality of the prohibition of certain forms of election propaganda was
assailed, We ruled therein that the prohibition is a valid exercise of the police power
of the state to prevent the perversion and prostitution of the electoral apparatus and
of the denial of equal protection of the laws. The evil sought to be prevented in an
election which led to Our ruling in that case does not obtain in a plebiscite. In a
plebiscite, votes are taken in an area on some special political matter unlike in an
election where votes are cast in favor of specific persons for some office. In other
words, the electorate is asked to vote for or against issues, not candidates in a
plebiscite.
Anent respondent Comelecs argument that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167
does not absolutely bar petitioner-columnist from expressing his views and/or from
campaigning for or against the organic act because he may do so through the Comelec
space and/or Comelec radio/television time, the same is not meritorious. While the
limitation does not absolutely bar petitioners freedom of expression, it is still a
restriction on his choice of the forum where he may express his view. No reason was
advanced by respondent to justify such abridgement. We
535
VOL. 181, JANUARY 30, 1990 535
hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioners freedom
of expression for no justifiable reason.
Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The peoples right
to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be
better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, including the forum.
The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly
burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised.
Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but they
do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the public concerned because
they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or
television times.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is GRANTED. Section 19 of Comelec
Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and void and unconstitutional. The restraining
order herein issued is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez,
Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Corts, Grio-
Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Petition granted.
Note.45-day period of campaign under Sec. 4 of the 1978 Election Code is not
violative of Sec. 6 of Art. XII of the New Constitution. (Occena vs. COMELEC, 95
SCRA 755).
o0o
536
G.R. No. 102653. March 5, 1992. *
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

respondent.
G.R. No. 102925. March 5, 1992. *
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE represented by ZOILO DEJARESCO, JR., as its

Past Chairman and President, and FRAULIN A. PEASALES as its Corporate
Secretary, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by HON.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, its Chairman; HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE and HON.
ROSALINA S. CAJUCOM, respondents.
G.R. No. 102983. March 5, 1992. *
KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTERS SA PILIPINAS; MAKATI

BROADCASTING NETWORK; MOLAVE BROADCASTING NETWORK;
MASBATE COMMUNITY BROADCASTING CO., INC., RADIO MINDANAO
NETWORK, INC.; ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORP.; FILIPINAS BROAD
_______________
*EN BANC.
2
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
National Press Club vs. Commission on Elections
NETWORK, INC.; EAGLE BROADCASTING CORP.; MAGILIW COMMUNITY
BROADCASTING CO., INC.; for themselves and in behalf of the mass media owners
as a class; ANDRE S. KHAN; ARCADIO M. CARANDANG, JR.; MALOU ESPINOSA
MANALASTAS; MIGUEL C. ENRIQUEZ; JOSE ANTONIO K. VELOSO; DIANA G.
DE GUZMAN; JOSE E. ESCANER, JR.; RAY G. PEDROCHE; PETER A. LAGUSAY;
ROBERT ESTRELLA; ROLANDO RAMIREZ; for themselves as voters and in behalf
of the Philippine electorate as a class; ORLANDO S. MERCADO and ALEJANDRO
de G. RODRIGUEZ; for themselves as prospective candidates and in behalf of all
candidates in the May 1992 election as a class, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Freedom of Speech; The Constitution has expressly
authorized the Comelec to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the franchises
or permits for the operation of media of communication and information.The Comelec has
thus been expressly authorized by the Constitution to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication and
information. The fundamental purpose of such supervision or regulation has been spelled
out in the Constitution as the ensuring of equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right
to reply, as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media
facilities, in connection with public information campaigns and forums among candidates.
Same; Same; Same; Rule applicable is that a statute is presumed to be constitutional and
that a party asserting its unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of clearly and
convincingly proving that assertion.The technical effect of Article IX (C) (4) of the
Constitution may be seen to be that no presumption of invalidity arises in respect of exercises
of supervisory or regulatory authority on the part of the Comelec for the purpose of securing
equal opportunity among candidates for political office, although such supervision or
regulation may result in some limitation of the rights of free speech and free press. For
supervision or regulation of the operations of media enterprises is scarcely conceivable
without such accompanying limitation. Thus, the applicable rule is the general, time-honored
onethat a statute is presumed to be constitutional and that the party asserting its
unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of clearly and convincingly proving that
assertion.
3
VOL. 207, MARCH 5, 1992 3
National Press Club vs. Commission on
Elections
Same; Same; Same; Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and
enforceability.Firstly, Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and
enforceability. By virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11
(b) is limited in its applicability in time to election periods. By its Resolution No. 2328 dated
2 January 1992, the Comelec, acting under another specific grant of authority by the
Constitution (Article IX [C] [9]), has defined the period from 12 January 1992 until 10 June
1992 as the relevant election period.
Same; Same; Same; Section 11 (b) does limit the right of free speech and of access to mass
media of the candidates themselves.Section 11 (b) does, of course, limit the right of free
speech and of access to mass media of the candidates themselves. The limitation, however,
bears a clear and reasonable connection with the constitutional objective set out in Article IX
(C) (4) and Article II (26) of the Constitution. For it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of
print space and radio and television time that the resources of the financially affluent
candidates are likely to make a crucial difference.
DAVIDE, JR., J., Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Freedom of Speech; Freedom of speech and of the press
or of expression which the Bill of Rights guarantees is not an absolute right now settled.It
is now settled that the freedom of speech and of the press, or of expression, which the Bill of
Rights guarantees, is not an absolute right.
Same; Same; Same; Section 11 (b) neither constitutes prescribed abridgment of the
freedom of expression nor prohibits free speech, it merely provides the rules as to the manner,
time and place for its exercise during a very limited period.This provision, understood in
the light of Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution, is a reasonable regulation enacted to
accomplish the desired objectives and purposes earlier mentioned. It neither constitutes
proscribed abridgment of the freedom of expression nor prohibits free speech; it merely
provides the rules as to the manner, time and place for its exercise during a very limited
period. It makes reference to Sections 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 on COMELEC
time and COMELEC space.
Same; Same; Same; Statute.Even granting for the sake of argument that a doubt
exists as to the constitutionality of the challenged provision, the doubt must be resolved in
favor of its validity.
4
ANNOTATED
Elections
Same; Same; Same; Same; An act of legislative approved by the executive is presumed to
be within constitutional bounds.The reason for this is that an act of the legislature
approved by the executive is presumed to be within constitutional bounds. The responsibility
of upholding the Constitution rests not only on the courts, but also on the legislature and the
executive as well.
PADILLA, J., Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Freedom of Speech; Police Power; It is fundamental

that these freedoms are not immune to regulation by the State in the legitimate exercise of its
police power.But it is fundamental that these freedoms are not immune to regulation by
the State in the legitimate exercise of its police power.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Police power rests upon public necessity and upon the right of
the State and of the public to self-protection.Police power rests upon public necessity and
upon the right of the State and of the public to self-protection. For this reason, it is co-
extensive with the necessities of the case and the safeguards of public interests.
Same; Same; Same; Same.In short, the law in question (Sec. 11, Rep. Act No. 6646)
has been enacted for a legitimate public purpose and the means it employs to achieve such
purpose are reasonable and even timely.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Freedom of Speech.Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 6646
will certainly achieve one resultkeep the voters ignorant of who the candidates are and
what they stand for.
CRUZ, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Freedom of Speech; The most important objection to
Section 11 (b) is that it constitutes prior restraint on the dissemination of ideas.But the most
important objection to Section 11(b) is that it constitutes prior restraint on the dissemination
of ideas. In a word, it is censorship. It is that officious functionary of the repressive
government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more and
no less than what he is permitted to say on pain of punishment should he be so rash as to
disobey.
5
VOL. 207, MARCH 5, 1992 5
Elections
Same; Same; Same; Same; What Section 11(b) does is prohibit the advertisement or
commercial itself in what is unmistakably an act of censorship that finds no justification in
the circumstances presented.What is challenged in the case at bar is not that law but
Section 11(b), which does not merely require mention of the candidates rivals in the paid
advertisement or commercial, an innocuous enough requirement, to be sure. What Section
11(b) does is prohibit the advertisement or commercial itself in what is unmistakably an act
of censorship that finds no justification in the circumstances here presented. Surely, that
blanket and absolute prohibition to use the mass media as a vehicle for the articulation of
ideas cannot, by the standards of Badoy, be considered too insignificant to create any
appreciable dent on the individuals liberty of expression.
Same; Same; Same; Same; All the channels of communication should be kept open to
ensure the widest dissemination of information bearing on the forthcoming elections.I
submit that all the channels of communication should be kept open to insure the widest
dissemination of information bearing on the forthcoming elections. An uninformed electorate
is not likely to be circumspect in the choice of the officials who will represent them in the
councils of government. That they may exercise their suffrages wisely, it is important that
they be apprised of the election issues, including the credentials, if any, of the various
aspirants for public office. This is especially necessary now in view of the dismaying number
of mediocrities who, by an incredible aberration of ego, are relying on their money, or their
tinsel popularity, or their private armies, to give them the plume of victory.
PARAS, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Freedom of Speech; The freedom to advertise ones
political candidacy in the various forms of media is clearly a significant part of our freedom
of expression and of our right of access to information.The freedom to advertise ones
political candidacy in the various forms of media is clearly a significant part of our freedom
of expression and of our right of access to information. Freedom of expression in turn includes
among other things, freedom of speech and freedom of the press. Restrict these freedoms
without rhyme or reason, and you violate the most valuable feature of the democratic way of
life.
PETITIONS to review the decision of the Commission on Elections.

6
Ricardo C. Valmonte, Erico B. Aumentado, Resurrecion S. Salvilla, Perfecto B.
Fernandez, Jose P. Fernandez, Fernando Ma. Alberto and Cristobal P. Fernandez for
petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
In the three (3) consolidated Petitions before us, the common question raised by
petitioners is the constitutionality of Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646.
Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are
prevented from selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; two
(2) individuals who are candidates for office (one for national and the other for
provincial office) in the coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who
claim that their right to be informed of election issues and of credentials of the
candidates is being curtailed.
It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646
invades and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression.
Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to
censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with
criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based
election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that
the prohibition is in derogation of medias role, function and duty to provide adequate
channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election issues. Further,
petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates,
and that the suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except
those appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio
and television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity
or volume of information concerning candidates and issues in the election thereby
curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.
The statutory text that petitioners ask us to strike down as unconstitutional is
that of Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646, known as the Electoral Reforms Law
of 1987: SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
7
VOL. 207, MARCH 5, 1992 7
"Sec. 11 Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda.In addition to the forms of election
propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful;
xxx xxx xxx
b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, other mass media, or any
person making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space or air time
for campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission as provided under Sections
90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist, commentator, announcer
or personality who is a candidate for any elective public office shall take a leave of absence
from his work as such during the campaign period. (Italics supplied)
Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 should be taken together with Sections 90 and
92 of B.P. Blg. 881, known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, which
provide respectively as follows:
Sec. 90. Comelec space.The Commission shall procure space in at least one newspaper of
general circulation in every province or city: Provided, however, That in the absence of said
candidacy. Said space shall be allocated, free of charge, equally and impartially by the
Commission among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper is circulated.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 92. Comelec time.The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be
known as Comelec Time which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the
provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of the campaign. (Italics
supplied)
The objective which animates Section 11 (b) is the equalizing, as far as practicable,
the situations of rich and poor candidates by preventing the former from enjoying the
undue advantage offered by huge campaign war chests. Section 11 (b) prohibits the
sale or donation of print space and air time for campaign or other political purposes
except to the Commission on Elections (Comelec). Upon the other hand, Sections 90
and 92 of the
8
Omnibus Election Code require the Comelec to procure "Comelec space in
newspapers of general circulation in every province or city and Comelec time on
radio and television stations. Further, the Comelec is statutorily commanded to
allocate Comelec space and Comelec time on a free of charge, equal and impartial
basis among all candidates within the area served by the newspaper or radio and
television station involved.
No one seriously disputes the legitimacy or the importance of the objective sought
to be secured by Section 11 (b) (of Republic Act No. 6646) in relation to Sections 90
and 92 (of the Omnibus Election Code). That objective is of special importance and
urgency in a country which, like ours, is characterized by extreme disparity in income
distribution between the economic elite and the rest of society, and by the prevalence
of poverty, with the bulk of our population falling below the poverty line. It is
supremely important, however, to note that that objective is not only a concededly
legitimate one; it has also been given constitutional status by the terms of Article IX
(C) (4) of the 1987 Constitution which provides as follows:
Sec. 4. The Commission [on Elections] may, during the election period, supervise or regulate
the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and
other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges,
or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary.
Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and
the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information
campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. (Italics supplied)
The Comelec has thus been expressly authorized by the Constitution to supervise or
regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation of
media of communication and information. The fundamental purpose of such
supervision or regulation has been spelled out in the Constitution as the ensuring
of equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, as well as uniform and
reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities, in connection with
9
VOL. 207, MARCH 5, 199 9
public information campaigns and forums among candidates. 1
It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which
enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the press (Article
III [4], Constitution) has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may
be seen to be a special provision applicable during a specific limited periodi.e.,
during the election period. It is difficult to overemphasize the special importance of
the rights of freedom of speech and freedom of the press in a democratic polity, in
particular when they relate to the purity and integrity of the electoral process itself,
the process by which the people identify those who shall have governance over them.
Thus, it is frequently said that these rights are accorded a preferred status in our
constitutional hierarchy. Withal, the rights of free speech and free press are not
unlimited rights for they are not the only important and relevant values even in the
most democratic of polities. In our own society, equality of opportunity to proffer
oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources that one
may have at ones disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the basic state
policies given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the
egalitarian demand that the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for
public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law. 2
The technical effect of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution may be seen to be that
no presumption of invalidity arises in respect of exercises of supervisory or regulatory
authority on the part of the Comelec for the purpose of securing equal opportunity
among candidates for political office, although such supervision or regulation may
result in some limitation of the rights of free speech and free press. For supervision
or regulation of the operations of media enterprises is scarcely conceiv-
_______________
1 See the discussion on Article IX (C) (4) in the Constitutional Commission in Records of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, pp. 624, 631-2, 662-3.
2 The goal of equalizing access to opportunities for public office (both elective and appointive) for greater
numbers of people, was stressed in the discussions in the Constitutional Commission; Records of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 4, pp. 945, 955-6.
10
able without such accompanying limitation. Thus, the applicable rule is the general,
time-honored onethat a statute is presumed to be constitutional and that the party
asserting its unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of clearly and
convincingly proving that assertion. 3
Put in slightly different terms, there appears no present necessity to fall back upon
basic principles relating to the police power of the State and the requisites for
constitutionally valid exercise of that power. The essential question is whether or not
the assailed legislative or administrative provisions constitute a permissible exercise
of the power of supervision or regulation of the operations of communication and
information enterprises during an election period, or whether such act has gone
beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media operations so as to constitute
unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The Court
considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of
supervision or regulation of media operations during election periods.
In the constitutional assaying of legislative provisions like Section 11 (b), the
character and extent of the limitations resulting from the particular measure being
assayed upon freedom of speech and freedom of the press are essential considerations.
It is important to note that the restrictive impact upon freedom of speech and freedom
of the press of Section 11 (b) is circumscribed by certain important limitations.
Firstly, Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and
enforceability. By virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution,
Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time to election periods. By its
Resolution No. 2328 dated 2 January 1992, the Comelec, acting under another
specific grant of authority by the Constitution (Article IX [C] [9]), has defined the
period from 12 January 1992 until 10 June 1992 as the relevant election period.
Secondly, and more importantly, Section 11 (b) is limited in its
________________
3 E.g., Abbas v. Commission on Elections, 179 SCRA 287 (1989); People v. Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA
90 (1989); Heirs of Ordona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 320 (1983); Peralta v. Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA
30 (1978); Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734 (1970).
11
VOL. 207, MARCH 5, 1992 11
scope of application. Analysis of Section 11 (b) shows that it purports to apply only to
the purchase and sale, including purchase and sale disguised as a donation, of print 4
space and air time for campaign or other political purposes. Section 11 (b)
does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or
television stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their
qualifications, political parties and programs of government. Moreover, Section 11 (b)
does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or
broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their
qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least as such comments, opinions
and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for.
In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary or other
coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political office.
We read Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political advertisements of
particular candidates.
The above limitation in scope of application of Section 11 (b)that it does not
restrict either the reporting of or the expression of belief or opinion or comment upon
the qualifications and programs and activities of any and all candidates for office
constitutes the critical distinction which must be made between the instant case and
that of Sanidad v. Commission on Elections. In Sanidad, the Court declared
5
unconstitutional Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 which provided as

follows:
Sec. 19. Prohibition on Columnists, Commentators or AnnouncersDuring the plebiscite
commentator, an-
_______________
4 Because of the financial implications involved, true donations by media enterprises of print space and air
time for political advertisements are not likely to be substantial in number or in peso volume. The principal effect
of the phrase or to give free of charge is thus to catch purchases and sales disguised as donations either given
directly by media enterprises, or indirectly through an intervening purchaserdonor.
5 181 SCRA 529 (1990).
12
nouncer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or
against the plebiscite issues.
Resolution No. 2167 had been promulgated by the Comelec in connection with the
plebiscite mandated by R.A. No. 6766 on the ratification or adoption of the Organic
Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The Court held that Resolution No. 2167
constituted a restriction of the freedom of expression of petitioner Sanidad, a
newspaper columnist of the Baguio Midland Courier, for no justifiable reason. The
Court, through Medialdea, J., said:
x x x [N]either Article, IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11[b], 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can
be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and
regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during
plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite
periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates
involved in the plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2176 has no
statutory basis. (Italicized partly in the original and partly supplied)
6
There is a third limitation upon the scope of application of Section 11 (b). Section 11
(b) exempts from its prohibition the purchase by or donation to the Comelec of print
space or air time, which space and time Comelec is then affirmatively required to
allocate on a fair and equal basis, free of charge, among the individual candidates for
elective public offices in the province or city served by the newspaper or radio or
television station. Some of the petitioners are apparently apprehensive that Comelec
might not allocate Comelec time or Comelec space on a fair and equal basis among
the several candidates. Should such apprehensions materialize, candidates who are
in fact prejudiced by unequal or unfair allocations effected by Comelec will have
appropriate judicial remedies available, so long at least as this Court sits. Until such
time, however, the Comelec is entitled to the benefit of the presumption that official
duty will be or is being regularly carried out. It seems appropriate here to recall
________________
6181 SCRA at 534.

13
VOL. 207, MARCH 5, 1992 13
what Justice Laurel taught in Angara v. Electoral Commission that the possibility of 7
abuse is no argument against the concession of the power or authority involved, for
there is no power or authority in human society that is not susceptible of being
abused. Should it be objected that the Comelec might refrain from procuring Comelec
time and Comelec space, much the same considerations should be borne in mind.
As earlier noted, the Comelec is commanded by statute to buy or procure Comelec
time and Comelec space in mass media, and it must be presumed that Comelec will
carry out that statutory command. There is no indication, so far as the record here
would show, that Comelec would not in fact carry out its statutory duty in this
connection, and if it does fail to do so, once again, the candidate or candidates who
feel aggrieved have judicial remedies at their disposal.
The points that may appropriately be underscored are that Section 11 (b)
does not cut off the flow of media reporting, opinion or commentary about candidates,
their qualifications and platforms and promises. Newspaper, radio broadcasting and
television stations remain quite free to carry out their regular and normal
information and communication operations. Section 11 (b) does not authorize any
intervention and much less control on the part of Comelec in respect of the content of
the normal operations of media, nor in respect of the content of political
advertisements which the individual candidates are quite free to present within their
respective allocated Comelec time and Comelec space. There is here no officious
functionary of [a] repressive government dictating what events or ideas reporters,
broadcasters, editors or commentators may talk or write about or display on TV
screens. There is here no censorship, whether disguised or otherwise. What Section
11 (b), viewed in context, in fact does is to limit paid partisan political
advertisements to fora other than modern mass media, and to Comelec time and
Comelec space in such mass media.
Section 11 (b) does, of course, limit the right of free speech and of access to mass
media of the candidates themselves. The limitation, however, bears a clear and
reasonable connection
________________
763 Phil. 139, 177 (1936).

14
with the constitutional objective set out in Article IX (C) (4) and Article II (26) of the
Constitution. For it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio
and television time that the resources of the financially affluent candidates are likely
to make a crucial difference. Here lies the core problem of equalization of the
situations of the candidates with deep pockets and the candidates with shallow or
empty pockets that Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution and Section 11 (b) seek to
address. That the statutory mechanism which Section 11 (b) brings into operation is
designed and may be expected to bring about or promote equal opportunity, and equal
time and space, for political candidates to inform all and sundry about themselves,
cannot be gainsaid.
My learned brother in the Court Cruz, J. remonstrates, however, that [t]he
financial disparity among the candidates is a fact of life that cannot be corrected by
legislation except only by the limitation of their respective expenses to a common
maximum. The flaw in the prohibition under challenge is that while the rich
candidate is barred from buying mass media coverage, it nevertheless allows him to
spend his funds on other campaign activities also inaccessible to his straitened
rival. True enough Section 11 (b) does not, by itself or in conjunction with Sections
90 and 92 of the Omnibus Election Code, place political candidates on complete and
perfect equality inter se without regard to their financial affluence or lack thereof.
But a regulatory measure that is less than perfectly comprehensive or which does not
completely obliterate the evil sought to be remedied, is not for that reason alone
constitutionally infirm. The Constitution does not, as it cannot, exact perfection in
governmental regulation. All it requires, in accepted doctrine, is that the regulatory
measure under challenge bear a reasonable nexus with the constitutionally
sanctioned objective. That the supervision or regulation of communication and
information media is not, in itself, a forbidden modality is made clear by the
Constitution itself in Article IX (C) (4).
It is believed that, when so viewed, the limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the
right to free speech of the candidates themselves may be seen to be not unduly
repressive or unreasonable. For, once again, there is nothing in Section 11 (b) to
prevent media reporting of and commentary on pronounce-
15
VOL. 207, MARCH 5, 1992 15
ments, activities, written statements of the candidates themselves. All
other fora remain accessible to candidates, even for political advertisements. The
requisites of fairness and equal opportunity are, after all, designed to benefit the
candidates themselves.
Finally, the nature and characteristics of modern mass media, especially electronic
media, cannot be totally disregarded. Realistically, the only limitation upon the free
speech of candidates imposed is on the right of candidates to bombard the helpless
electorate with paid advertisements commonly repeated in the mass media ad
nauseam. Frequently, such repetitive political commercials when fed into the
electronic media themselves constitute invasions of the privacy of the general
electorate. It might be supposed that it is easy enough for a person at home simply to
flick off his radio or television set. But it is rarely that simple. For the candidates
with deep pockets may purchase radio or television time in many, if not all, the major
stations or channels. Or they may directly or indirectly own or control the stations or
channels themselves. The contemporary reality in the Philippines is that, in a very
real sense, listeners and viewers constitute a captive audience. 8
_______________
8 In noting the phenomenon of the captive audience, the Supreme Court of the United States in Columbia
Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee (412 US 94, 36 L Ed 2d 772 [1973]), said:
x x x. The captive nature of the broadcasting audience was recognized as early as 1924, when Commerce Secretary
Hoover remarked at the Fourth National Radio Conference that the radio listener does not have the same option that
the reader of publications hasto ignore advertising in which he is not interestedand he may resent its invasion of
his set. As the broadcast media became more pervasive in our society, the problem has become more acute. In a recent
decision upholding the Commissions power to promulgate rules regarding cigarette advertising, Judge Bazelon, writing
for a unanimous Court of Appeals, noted some of the effects of the ubiquitous commercial:
Written messages are not communicated unless they are read, and reading requires an affirmative act. Broadcast messages, in contrast,
are in the air. In an age of
16
The paid political advertisements introjected into the electronic media and repeated
with mind-deadening frequency, are commonly intended and crafted, not so much to
inform and educate as to condition and manipulate, not so much to provoke rational
and objective appraisal of candidates qualifications or programs as to appeal to the
non-intellective faculties of the captive and passive audience. The right of the general
listening and viewing public to be free from such intrusions and their subliminal
effects is at least as important as the right of candidates to advertise themselves
through modern electronic media and the right of media enterprises to maximize
their revenues from the marketing of packaged candidates.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions should be, as they are hereby, DISMISSED for lack
of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Melencio-Herrera, Bidin, Grio-
Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, and Paras, JJ., Please see dissent.
Padilla, Davide, Jr., JJ., See Concurring Opinion.
Bellosillo, J., Did not take part in the deliberation.
CONCURRING OPINION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
I fully concur with the majority opinion. I wish, however, to express my thoughts on
some material points.
_______________
omnipresent radio, there scarcely breathes a citizen who does not know some part of a leading cigarette jingle by heart.
Similarly, an ordinary habitual television watcher can avoid these commercials only by frequently leav` Banzhaf v. FCC,
132 US App DC 14, 32-33, 405 F2d 1082, 1100-1101 (1968), cert denied 396 US 842, 24 L Ed 2d 93, 90 S Ct 50 (1969).
It is no answer to say that because we tolerate pervasive commercial advertisements we can also live
with its political counterparts. (36 L. ed 2d at 798; italics supplied)
17
VOL. 207, MARCH 5, 1992 17
The constitutional issue raised in these cases must be decided in the light of the
provisions of our own Constitution and not on orthodox principles or classical
definitions of certain rights which have, in the course of time and as a result of the
interplay of societal forces requiring the balancing of interests and values, been
unchained from their absolutist moorings.
It is now settled that the freedom of speech and of the press, or of expression, which
the Bill of Rights guarantees, is not an absolute right.
Indeed, even in American jurisprudence, the overwhelming weight of authority
maintains that the right or privilege of free speech and publication, guaranteed by
the Constitutions of the United States and of the several states, has its limitations;
the right is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances, although
limitations are recognized only in exceptional cases. Freedom of speech does not
comprehend the right to speak whenever, however, and wherever one pleases, and
the manner, and place, or time of public discussion can be constitutionally
controlled. 1
The foregoing rule proceeds from the principle that every right or freedom carries
with it the correlative duty to exercise it responsibly and with due regard for the
rights and freedoms of others. In short, freedom is not freedom from responsibility,
but with responsibility.
I respectfully submit that there can be no higher form of limitation to a right than
what the Constitution itself authorizes. On this, both the lettered and the unlettered
cannot quarrel. In respect to freedom of speech or expression and of the press vis-a-
vis the electoral process, the present Constitution lays downs certain principles
authorizing allowable restraints thereon. I refer to the following provisions of the
1987 Constitution, to wit:
(1) Section 26 of Article II. (Declaration of Principles and other Policies) which reads:
The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined
_______________
1 16A Am. Jur. 2d, 341-342.

18
by law. (italics supplied)
(2) Section 1 of Article XIII (Social Justice and Human rights) which reads:
The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the
right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove
cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good. (italics
supplied)
(3) Section 4 of Article IX-C which provides:
The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of
all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of
communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the government
or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity,
time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public
information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. (italics supplied)
There can be no doubt that the first two (2) provisions contemplate measures that
would bridge the gap between the rich and the poor in our society. In the past, the
equilibrium sought to be achieved was only in the economic and social fields. Thus,
before the advent of the 1987 Constitution, social justice was defined as:
Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social
justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government
of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society,
through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of
the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally
justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence
of
19
VOL. 207, MARCH 5, 1992 19
all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should
be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic
life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the
health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the
greatest number. 2
Aware of the lamentable fact that in the Philippines, no gap between these two
unavoidable extremes of society is more pronounced than that in the field of politics,
and ever mindful of the dire consequences thereof, the framers of the present
Constitution saw it fit to diffuse political power in the social justice provisions. Ours
has been a politics of the elite, the rich, the powerful and the pedigreed. The victory
of a poor candidate in an election is almost always an exception. Arrayed against the
vast resources of a wealthy opponent, the former, even if he is the most qualified and
competent, does not stand a fighting chance. Of course, there have been isolated
instancesbut yet so few and far betweenwhen poor candidates made it.
Forgetting first the evil use of gold, guns and goons which only the rich have access
to, and focussing strictly on the legitimate aspect of the electoral struggle,
propaganda, through the various forms of media, provides the most sophisticated and
effective means of reaching the electorate and convincing voters to vote for a
particular candidate. It is in this area, particularly in the use of television, radio and
newspaper, that a poor candidate will not be able to compete with his opulent
opponents who have all the resources to buy prime television and radio time and full
pages of leading newspapers. With radio and television propaganda, the wealthy
candidates, even as they leisurely relax in their homes, offices or hotel suites, can
reach every nook and cranny of their municipality, city, province, district or even the
entire Philippines and be seen or heard at any time of the day and night. During the
contracted hours, their paid hacks can concentrate on dishonoring the poor and
hapless opponent by
_______________
2Calalang vs. Williams, et al., 70 Phil. 726.

20
hurling innuendoes of defects or vice. With newspaper advertisements, the wealthy
candidates can reach thousands of readers daily. A worse scenario obtains where the
rich candidates themselves fully or substantially own or operate a television or radio
station, or publish newspapers. On the other hand, to a poor candidate, the campaign
period would sadly prove to be insufficient for him to campaign in every barangay,
even if he is running for a municipal position. Thus, not only would he already be at
a disadvantage insofar as visibility and presentation of his issues or program of
government are concerned, he would have no opportunity to rebut whatever lies his
opponents may spread nor the chance to clear himself of false accusations.
Accordingly, in response to the urgent mandate of Section 1 of Article XIII
aforequoted, Congress passed a measure, R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, introducing additional reforms to the electoral
3
system which, inter alia, not only seeks to enhance the purity of the electoral process,
but also aspires to ensure even just an approximation of equality among all
candidates in their use of media for propaganda purposes. The latter is best evidenced
by the provision challenged in this case, Section 11 (b), which reads:
Section 11. Prohibited forms of election propaganda.In addition to the forms of propaganda
prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful:
xxx
(b) for any newspaper, radio broadcasting or television station, or other mass media, or any person
making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space or air time for campaign or
other political purposes except to the Commission as provided under Sections 90 and 92 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality who is a
candidate for any elective public office shall take a leave of absence from his work as such during the
campaign period.
This provision, understood in the light of Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution,
is a reasonable regulation enacted to accomplish the desired objectives and purposes
earlier men-
_______________
3Approved on 5 January 1988.

21
VOL. 207, MARCH 5, 1992 21
tioned. It neither constitutes proscribed abridgment of the freedom of expression nor
prohibits free speech; it merely provides the rules as to the manner, time and place
for its exercise during a very limited period. It makes reference to Sections 90 and 92
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 on COMELEC time and COMELEC space. Said
sections read in full as follows:
SEC. 90. Comelec space.The Commission shall procure space in at least one newspaper of
general circulation in every province or city: Provided, however, That in the absence of said
candidacy. Said space shall be allocated, free of charge, equally and impartially by the
Commission among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper is circulated. (Sec.
45, 1978 EC)
xxx
SEC. 92. Comelec time.ZThe Commission shall procure radio and television time to be
known as Comelec Time which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the
provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of the campaign. (Sec. 46,
1978 EC)
Obviously then, the airing and printing of a candidates political advertisements can
be doneand is even encouraged to be doneduring the COMELEC time and
within the COMELEC space. This authority of the COMELEC is no longer purely
statutory. It is now constitutional pursuant to the clear mandate of Section 4 of
Article IX-C, which is quoted above. This constitutional grant removes whatever
doubt one may have on the split verdict of this Court in Badoy vs. Ferrer, et
al.,4 Interpreting a related provision, Section 12(f) of R.A. No. 6132, reading:
The Commission on Elections shall endeavor to obtain free space from newspapers,
magazines and periodicals which shall be known as
________________
4 35 SCRA 285.
22
Comelec space, and shall allocate this space equally and impartially among all candidates
within the area in which the newspapers are circulated. Outside of said Comelec space, it
shall be unlawful to print or publish, or cause to be printed or published, any advertisement,
paid comment or paid article in furtherance of or in opposition to the candidacy of any person
for delegate, or mentioning the name of any candidate and the fact of his candidacy, unless
all the names of all other candidates in the district in which the candidate is running are also
mentioned with equal prominence.
this Court ruled:
Against the background of such facilities accorded by the law for all candidates, rich and
poor alike, and the prohibitions as well as penal sanctions to insure the sanctity of the ballot
against desecration and the equality of chances among the candidates, the restriction on the
freedom of expression of the candidate or any other individual prescribed in par. F of Sec. 12
is so narrow as not to affect the substance and vitality of his freedom of expression itself.
xxx
Hence, consistent with our opinion expressed in the cases of Imbong vs.
Comelec and Gonzales vs. Comelec [35 SCRA 28], this slight limitation of the freedom of
expression of the individual, whether candidate or not, as expressed in par. F of Sec. 12, is
only one of the many devices employed by the law to prevent a clear and present danger of
the perversion or prostitution of the electoral apparatus and of the denial of the equal
protection of the laws.
The fears and apprehensions of petitioner concerning his liberty or expression in these
two cases, applying the less stringent balancing-of-interests criterion, are far outweighed by
the all important substantive interests of the State to preserve the purity of the ballot and to
render more meaningful and real the guarantee of the equal protection of the laws.
In the fairly recent case of Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections, this Court 5
sustained, in effect, the validity of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 6646. Thus:
However, it is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the
Comelec was the power to supervise and
_______________
5 181 SCRA 529 (29 January 1990).

23
VOL. 207, MARCH 5, 1992 23
regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation
of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or information to the end
that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal
rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured.
The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder
may favor or give any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio
or television time. This is also the reason why a columnist, commentator, announcer or
personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is required to take a leave of absence
from his work during the campaign period (2nd par. Section 11(b) R.A. 6646). It cannot be
gainsaid that a columnist or commentator who is also a candidate would be more exposed to
the voters to the prejudice of other candidates unless required to take a leave of absence.
However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11(b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646
can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and
regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during
plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during
plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no
candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has
no statutory basis.
In the case of Badoy, Jr. v. Comelec, L-32546, Oct. 16, 1970, where the constitutionality
of the prohibition of certain forms of election propaganda was assailed, We ruled therein that
the prohibition is a valid exercise of the police power of the state to prevent the perversion
and prostitution of the electoral apparatus and of the denial of equal protection of the laws.
The evil sought to be prevented in an election which led to Our ruling in that case does not
obtain in a plebiscite. In a plebiscite, votes are taken in an area on some special political
matter unlike in an election where votes are cast in favor of specific persons for some office.
In other words, the electorate is asked to vote for or against issues, not candidates in a
plebiscite.
Even granting for the sake of argument that a doubt exists as to the constitutionality
of the challenged provision, the doubt must be resolved in favor of its validity. As this
Court stated in Paredes, et al. vs. Executive Secretary, et al.: 6
_______________
6128 SCRA 6.
24
x x x it is in accordance with the settled doctrine that between two possible constructions,
one avoiding a finding of unconstitutionality and the other yielding such a result, the former
is to be preferred. That which will save, not that which will destroy, commends itself for
acceptance. After all, the basic presumption all these years is one of validity. The onerous
task of proving otherwise is on the party seeking to nullify a statute. It must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence that there is an infringement of a constitutional provision, save
in those cases where the challenged act is void on its face. Absent such a showing, there can
be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice. Justice
Malcolms aphorism is apropos: To doubt is to sustain. 7
The reason for this is that an act of the legislature approved by the executive is
presumed to be within constitutional bounds. The responsibility of upholding the
Constitution rests not only on the courts, but also on the legislature and the executive
as well.
For the Court to strike out their acts as unconstitutional, nothing less than clear
and convincing evidence of such breach of the Constitution must be shown.
Petitioners have not acquitted themselves of that duty. The petitions then must be
dismissed for lack of merit.
CONCURRING OPINION
PADILLA, J.:
I will state in language as simple as I can muster why I believe the challenged law is
constitutional.
Sec. 11 of Republic Act No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law
of 1987, challenged in these petitions, states that:
SEC. 11. Prohibited Forms of Election PropagandaIn addition to the forms of election
propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful:
xxx
_______________
7In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385.

25
VOL. 207, MARCH 5, 1992 25
(b) for any newspaper, radio broadcasting or television station, or other mass media, or any
person making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space or air time
for campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission as provided under Sections
90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist, commentator,
announcement (sic) or personality who is a candidate for any elective public office shall take
a leave of absence from his work as such during the campaign period.
Petitioners contend that the provision is void because it is violative of the freedoms
of the press, speech and expression as guaranteed by Article III, Section 4 of the
Constitution.
But it is fundamental that these freedoms are not immune to regulation by the
State in the legitimate exercise of its police power.
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the
state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare. As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint
upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good.
xxx
It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is
rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government
limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual
citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary
measures calculated to ensure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.
Significantly, the Bill of rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual
rights and liberties. Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license
to act according to ones will. It is subject to the far more overriding demands and
requirements of the greater number. 1
Police power rests upon public necessity and upon the right of the State and of the
public to self-protection. For this reason, it is co-extensive with the necessities of the
case and the safeguards of public interest. 2
_______________
1 Philippine Association of Service Exporters Inc. vs. Hon. Franklin M. Drilon, et al., G.R. No. 81958,
June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 386.
2 PCGG vs. Pea, G.R. No. 77663, April 12, 1988, 159 SCRA 556.
26
In Section 11 of R.A. No. 6646, the legislature aims to uphold the States policy of
guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service. Opportunity to hold a
3
public office for public service, particularly elective public offices must be equally
accessible to qualified and deserving citizens. Corollary to this, the legislature also
recognizes the power of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to supervise or
regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of
media of communication or information granted by the government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof. Such supervision or regulation shall
aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including
reasonable, equal rates therefore, for public information campaigns and forums
among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections. 4
In Pablito V. Sanidad vs. The Commission on Elections, we held that the evil
5
sought to be prevented by Art. IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution is the possibility

that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantage to a candidate in terms
of advertising space or radio or television time.
In line with the objective of providing equal opportunity to all candidates, the
questioned provision is intended to act as an equalizer between the rich and poor
candidates. As it is, the moneyed candidate has the funds to engage in a myriad of
campaign activities. To allow the rich candidates to have free reign over the use of
media for their campaign would result in an unfair advantage over the poor
candidates who have no funds or have meager funds to secure print space and air
time, and yet, they may be equally qualified and deserving candidates. In Anacleto
D. Badoy, Jr. vs. Jaime N. Ferrer, et al., G.R. No. L-32546, October 17, 1970 35 SCRA
285, this Court declared Section 12(F) of R.A. No. 6132 valid and constitutional,
recognizing that the purpose of the limitation, on the freedom of the candidate or his
sympathizer to spend his own money for his
_______________
3 Art. II, Section 26, 1987 Constitution.

4 Art. IX-C, Section 4, 1987 Constitution.
5 G.R. No. 90878, January 29, 1990, 181 SCRA 529.
27
VOL. 207, MARCH 5, 1992 27
candidacy alone and not for the furtherance of the candidacy of his opponents, is to
give the poor candidates a fighting chance in the election. In the same manner, Sec.
11 of R.A. No. 6646 aims to maximize, if not approximate, equality of chances among
the various candidates for elective public office.
Petitioners aver that by restoring to the print and broadcast media industry the
right to sell print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes, access to
print space and air time would be given equally to all candidates. Nevertheless, as
opined by the COMELEC, the means to gain access to said time and space would be
unequal among all candidates. Hence, there would be in the final analysis, inequality.
Furthermore, to tolerate even indirectly over-spending in print space or air time
for campaign purposes will open the floodgates to corruption in public office because
a winning candidate who overspends during the election period must necessarily
recover his campaign expenses by hook or crook. Section 11 of R.A. No. 6646 would
indirectly constitute a positive and effective measure against corruption in public
office.
Petitioners also contend that the challenged provision is violative of the peoples
right to information particularly about the conduct of public officials including the
character and qualifications of candidates seeking public office.
I do not adhere to the proposition that the electorate will not have the opportunity
for quality decision in expressing its mandateno sufficient fora to detect and decide
for themselves who, among the candidates truly deserve their votes. 6
Aside from Sec. 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 providing for Comelec space and Comelec
time, Sections 9 and 10 of the same law afford a candidate several venues by which
he can fully exercise his freedom of expression, including freedom of assembly. The
electorate, in turn, are given opportunities to know the candidates and be informed
of their qualifications and platforms.
As provided in Section 9 of R.A. No. 6646, the COMELEC shall encourage non-
political, non-partisan private or civic organizations to initiate and hold in every city
and municipality, public fora at which all registered candidates for the same office
may
_______________
6Comment of the Solicitor General, p. 11.

28
simultaneously and personally participate to present, explain, and/or debate on their
campaign platforms and programs and other like issues. Section 10, on the other
hand, allows the candidates the use of the designated common poster areas to post,
display and exhibit election propaganda to announce or further their candidacy; not
to mention the right to hold political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies,
parades, or other assemblies for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking
any campaign or propaganda for a candidate; publishing or distributing campaign
literature or materials designed to support the election of any candidate; and directly
or indirectly solicit votes, pledges or support for a candidate.
7
In short, the law in question (Sec. 11, Rep. Act No. 6646) has been enacted for a
legitimate public purpose and the means it employs to achieve such purpose are
reasonable and even timely.
Based on all the foregoing considerations, I vote to sustain the validity and
constitutionality of Section 11 of R.A. No. 6646.
DISSENTING OPINION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
I am saddened by the readiness with which Congress, Comelec, and the members of
this Court are willing to sacrifice not only that most precious clause of the Bill of
Rightsfreedom of speech and of the pressbut also the right of every citizen to be
informed in every way possible about the qualifications and programs of those
running for public office.
Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 will certainly achieve one resultkeep the voters
ignorant of who the candidates are and what they stand for.
With elections fast approaching, the surveys show that almost half of the nations
voters are undecided as to the Presidency. Certainly, they do not know who are
running for the Senate.
The implementation of Section 11(b) will result in gross inequality. A cabinet
member, an incumbent official, a movie
________________
7Article X, Section 79, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

29
VOL. 207, MARCH 5, 1992 29
star, a basketball player, or a conspicuous clown enjoys an unfair advantage over a
candidate many times better qualified but lesser known.
I am shocked to find out that even the most knowledgeable people do not know
that Antonio Carpio, former NBI Director; Estelito P. Mendoza, former Solicitor
General and Governor; and Florangel Rosario Braid, member of the Constitutional
Commission and distinguished mass communication personality (to name only three)
are also running for the Senate. We owe it to the masses to open all forms of
communication to them during this limited campaign period. A candidate to whom
columnists and radio-television commentators owe past favors or who share their
personal biases and convictions will get an undue amount of publicity. Those who
incur the ire of opinion makers cannot counteract negative reporting by buying his
own newspaper space or airtime for the airing of his refutations.
Comelec is already overburdened with the conduct of elections. Only recently it
proved unequal to the task of keeping registration lists clean and had to repeat the
exercise in critical areas. It should now husband its resources for its real function
insuring the integrity of the voting process and safeguarding the true results of the
elections.
Why Comelec should also supervise the publicity campaigns of almost 100,000
candidates running for 17,000 national and local positions is beyond my poor power
to comprehend.
I reject the idea that canned publicity in a so-called Comelec hour or Comelec
corner can replace the fresh, imaginative, and personal appeal of advertisements
espousing a cause or reaching a particular audience.
Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 is censorship pure and simple. It is particularly
reprehensible because it is imposed during the limited period of the election campaign
when information is most needed. Moreover, the mere thought that published
materials are supervised by a government office is enough to turn the reader off. Only
faithful followers who already know for whom they are voting will bother to read the
statements of their chosen candidate in the Comelec corner of the newspapers.
The existing restrictions are more than sufficient. Political campaigns are allowed
only within a limited period. The amount which a political party or candidate may
spend is restricted.
30
Added to the confines of the limited period and restricted expenses, the law now
imposes a violation of the candidates freedom of speech and the voters freedom to
know.
I concur fully in the views expressed by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz in his usual
eloquently brilliant style. We should not allow the basic freedom of expression to be
sacrificed at the altar of infinitely lesser fears and concerns. Under the clear and
present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present
but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over
ones mouth or, a writing instrument to be stilled.
In the precedent setting case of Gonzales v. Comelec (27 SCRA 835 [1969]), seven
(7) Justices (one short of the 2/3 majority needed to invalidate the law) deemed a less
restrictive statute as unconstitutional. The four (4) Justices who allowed the law to
remain did so only because there were various safeguards and provisos. Section 11(b)
of R.A. No. 6646 now removes one of those safeguards.
The then Justice Fred Ruiz Castro stated:
What of the social value and importance of the freedoms impaired by Section 50-B? The
legislation strikes at the most basic political right of the citizens in a republican system,
which is the right actively to participate in the establishment or administration of
government. This right finds expression in multiple forms but it certainly embraces that right
to influence the shape of policy and law directly by the use of ballot. It has been said so many
times it scarcely needs to be said again, that the realization of the democratic ideal of self-
government depends upon an informed and committed electorate. This can be accomplished
only by allowing the fullest measure of freedom in the public discussion of candidates and the
issues behind which they rally; to this end, all avenues of persuasionspeech, press, assembly,
organizationmust be kept always open. It is in the context of the electoral process that
these fundamental rights secured by the Constitution assume the highest social importance.
(at page 904; Emphasis supplied)
I, therefore, vote for the right to have the widest possible expression of ideas
preparatory to the choice of the nations leaders. I vote to declare the challenged
legislation unconstitutional.
31
VOL. 207, MARCH 5, 1992 31
CRUZ, J., Dissenting:
It has become increasingly clear that the grandiose description of this Court as the
bulwark of individual liberty is nothing more than an ironic euphemism. In the
decision it makes today, the majority has exalted authority over liberty in another
obeisance to the police state, which we so despised during the days of martial law. I
cannot share in the excuses of the Court because I firmly believe that the highest
function of authority is to insure liberty.
In sustaining the challenged law, the majority invokes the legislative goal, about
which there can be no cavil. My quarrel is with the way the objective is being pursued
for I find the method a most indefensible repression. It does little good, I should think,
to invoke the regulatory authority of the Commission on Elections, for that power is
not a license to violate the Bill of Rights. The respondent, no less than the legislature
that enacted Section 11(b), is subject to the requirements of the police power which
the ponencia seems to disdain.
It is true that a declaration of constitutionality must be reached only after the most
careful deliberation as the challenged at is presumed to be valid in deference to the
political departments. But notZand this represents a singular exceptionwhere
the act is claimed to violate individual liberty, most importantly the freedom of
expression. In such a vital and exceptional case, as in the case now before us, I
respectfully submit that the presumption must be reversed in favor of the challenge.
Milton defined freedom of speech as the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue
freely according to conscience, above all liberties. In this context, the definition is
understood to embrace all the other cognate rights involved in the communication of
ideas and falling under the more comprehensive concept of freedom of expression.
These rights include the equally important freedom of the press, the right of assembly
and petition, the right to information on matters of public concern, the freedom of
religion insofar as it affects the right to proselytize and profess ones faith or lack of
it, and the right to form associations as an instrument for the ventilation of views
bearing on the public welfare.
32
Wendell Philips offered his own reverence for freedom of expression when he called
it at once the instrument and the guaranty and the bright consummate flower of all
liberty. Like Milton, he was according it an honored place in the hierarchy of
fundamental liberties recognized in the Bill of Rights. And well they might, for this
is truly the most cherished and vital of all individual liberties in the democratic
milieu. It is no happenstance that it is this freedom that is first curtailed when the
free society falls under a repressive regime, as demonstrated by the government take-
over of the press, radio and television when martial law was declared in this country
on that tragic day of September 21, 1972. The reason for this precaution is that
freedom of expression is the sharpest and handiest weapon to blunt the edge of
oppression. No less significantly, it may be wielded by every citizen in the land, be he
peasant or poetand, regrettably, including the demagogue and the doltwho has
the will and the heart to use it.
As an individual particle of sovereignty, to use Justice Laurels words, every citizen
has a right to offer his opinion and suggestions in the discussion of the problems
confronting the community or the nation. This is not only a right but a duty. From
the mass of various and disparate ideas proposed, the people can, in their collective
wisdom and after full deliberation, choose what they may consider the best remedies
to the difficulties they face. These may not turn out to be the best solutions, as we
have learned often enough from past bitter experience. But the scope alone of the
options, let alone the latitude with which they are considered, can insure a far better
choice than that made by the heedless dictator in the narrow confine of his mind and
the loneliness of his pinnacle of power.
The citizen can articulate his views, for whatever they may be worth, through the
many methods by which ideas are communicated from mind to mind. Thus, he may
speak or write or sing or dance, for all these are forms of expression protected by the
Constitution. So is silence, which persuades when speaking fails. Symbolisms can
also signify meanings without words, like the open hand of friendship or the clenched
fist of defiance or the red flag of belligerence. The individual can convey his message
in a poem or a novel or a tract or in a public speech or through a moving picture or a
stage play. In such diverse ways
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VOL. 207, MARCH 5, 1992 33
may he be heard. There is of course no guaranty that he will be heeded, for
acceptability will depend on the quality of his thoughts and of his persona, as well as
the mood and motivation of his audience. But whatever form he employs, he is
entitled to the protection of the Constitution against any attempt to muzzle his
thoughts.
There is one especially significant way by which the citizen can express his views,
and that is through the ballot. By the votes he casts, he is able to participate in the
selection of the persons who shall serve as his representatives in the various elective
offices in the government, from the highest position of President of the Philippines to
that of the lowly member of the Sangguniang Barangay. In the exercise of this right,
he is free to choose whoever appeals to his intelligence (or lack of it), whether it be a
professional comedian or a pretentious moron or an unrepentant thief or any other
candidate with no known distinction except the presumptuousness to seek elective
office. Fortunately, there are also other candidates deserving of the support of the
circumspect and thinking citizens who will use their suffrages conscientiously with
only the public interest as their criterion and guide.
It is for the purpose of properly informing the electorate of the credentials and
platforms of the candidates that they are allowed to campaign during the election
period. Such campaign includes their personally visiting the voters in house-to-house
sorties, calling on the telephone for their support, sending them letters of appeal,
distributing self-serving leaflets extolling their virtues, giving away buttons and
stickers and sample ballots and other campaign materials, and holding caucuses,
rallies, parades, public meetings and similar gatherings. All these they are allowed
to do in the specified places and at the proper time provided only that they do not
exceed the maximum limit of election expenses prescribed by the Election Code at the
rate of P1.50 for every voter currently registered in the constituency where they filed
their certificate of candidacy. 1
It is curious, however, that such allowable campaign activities do not include the
use of the mass media because of the
_______________
1Sec. 100, Omnibus Election Code.

34
prohibition in Section 11(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646. The candidate may employ letters
or leaflets or billboards or placards or posters or meetings to reach the electorate,
incurring for this purpose a not inconsiderable amount of his or his supporters
money. But he may not utilize for the same purpose periodicals, radio, television or
other forms of mass communication, even for free. Employment of these facilities is
allowed only through the respondent Commission on Elections, which is directed by
the Election Code to procure newspaper space and radio and television time to be
distributed among the thousands of candidates vying throughout the land for the
thousands of public offices to be filled in the coming elections.
There are some students of the Constitution who believe that unlike the other
liberties guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, the freedom of speech and of the press is
absolute and not subject to any kind of regulation whatsoever. Their reason is the
language of Article III, Section 4, of the Constitution, which provides without
qualification:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.
This Court does not accept this extreme theory for the liberty we recognize is not
liberty untamed but liberty regulated by law. The concept of absolute rights must be
approached with utmost caution if not rejected outright. The better policy is to
assume that every right, including even the freedom of expression, must be exercised
in accordance with law and with due regard for the rights of others.
In fact, laws punishing crimes like slander and libel and inciting to sedition have
never been seriously or successfully questioned. Contemptuous language is not
allowed in judicial proceedings. Obscenity is proscribed, as so are acts that wound
religious sensibilities. This Court has regulated the exercise of the right to hold rallies
and meetings, limiting them to certain places and hours and under specified
conditions, in the interest of peace and security, public convenience, and in one case,
even
35
VOL. 207, MARCH 5, 1992 35
to prevent disturbance of the rites in a nearby church. Under the Public Assembly
2
Act, a permit from the mayor shall be necessary for the holding of a public meeting
except where the gathering is to be held in a private place or the campus of a
government-owned or controlled educational institution or a freedom park.
All this is not meant to suggest that every government regulation is a valid
regulation. On the contrary, any attempt to restrict the exercise of a right must be
tested by the strict requisites of the valid exercise of the police power as established
by this Court in a long line of decisions. These requisites are: 1) the interests of the
public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class require the exercise
of the police power; and 2) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the
accomplishment of the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. In simpler terms, the police measure, to be valid, must have a lawful
3
objective and a lawful method of achieving it.

The lawful objective of Section 11(b) may be readily conceded. The announced
purpose of the law is to prevent disparity between the rich and the poor candidates
by denying both of them access to the mass media and thus preventing the former
from enjoying an undue advantage over the latter. There is no question that this is a
laudable goal. Equality among the candidates in this regard should be assiduously
pursued by the government if the aspirant with limited resources is to have any
chance at all against an opulent opponent who will not hesitate to use his wealth to
make up for his lack of competence.
But in constitutional law, the end does not justify the means.
_______________
2 Navarro v. Villegas, 31 SCRA 731; Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 533; Taada v. Bagatsing, G.R. No.
68273, August 18, 1984; Aquino v. Bagatsing, G.R. No. 68318, August 18, 1984; De la Cruz v. Ela, 99 Phil.
346.
3 U.S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85; Fabie v. City of Manila, 21 Phil. 486; Case v. Board of Health, 24 Phil.
250; Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila v. Board of Transportation, 119 SCRA 596; Bautista v. Juinio, 127
SCRA 329; Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323; Lorenzo v. Director of Health, 50 Phil. 595; People v.
Chan, 65 Phil. 611; Department of Education v. San Diego, 180 SCRA 533; Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659.
36
To pursue a lawful objective, only a lawful method may be employed even if it may
not be the best among the suggested options. In my own view, the method here
applied falls far short of the constitutional criterion. I believe that the necessary
reasonable link between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved
has not been proved and that the method employed is unduly oppressive.
The financial disparity among the candidates is a fact of life that cannot be
corrected by legislation except only by the limitation of their respective expenses to a
common maximum. The flaw in the prohibition under challenge is that while the rich
candidate is barred from buying mass media coverage, it nevertheless allows him to
spend his funds on other campaign activities also inaccessible to his straitened rival.
Thus, the rich candidate may hold as many rallies and meetings as he may desire or
can afford, using for the purpose the funds he would have spent for the prohibited
mass media time and space. The number of these rallies and meetings, which also
require tremendous expense, cannot be matched by the poor candidate, but the
advantage of the rich candidate in this case is not similarly prohibited. By the same
token, the rich candidate may visit more houses, send more letters, make more
telephone appeals, distribute more campaign materials, incurring for all these more
expenses than the poor candidate can afford. But these advantages are allowed by
the law because they do not involve the use of mass media space and time.
And what if the rich candidate pays P25,000 from his own funds to buy media
advertising and the same amount is raised for the same purpose by 250 supporters of
the poor candidate contributing P100 each? Both transactions would be prohibited
under the law although the rich candidate clearly has in this case no advantage over
his adversary.
And what if a candidate is endorsed not in a paid advertisement or commercial but
by a columnist or a radio commentator who is apparently expressing his own opinion
without financial consideration or inducement? This is not prohibited by Section 11(b)
simply because the endorsement does not appear to have been purchased by the
candidate or given to him for free.
The proposed distribution of COMELEC time and space is hardly workable,
considering the tremendous number of candi-
37
VOL. 207, MARCH 5, 1992 37
dates running all over the country for the offices of President of the Philippines, Vice-
President, senators, representatives, provincial governors, vice-governors, provincial
board members, city mayors, vice-mayors and councilors, and municipal mayors, vice-
mayors and councilors. Allocation of equal time and space among the candidates
would involve administrative work of unmanageable proportions, and the possibility
as well of unequal distribution, whether deliberate or unintentional, that might
create more serious problems than the problem at hand.
It is indeed the settled rule that questions regarding the necessity or wisdom of
the law are for the legislature to resolve and its resolution may not be reviewed by
the courts of justice. In the case of the police power, however, it is required that there
be a plausible nexus between the method employed and the purpose sought to be
achieved, and determination of this link involves a judicial inquiry into the
reasonableness of the challenged measure. It is true, as remarked by Justice Holmes,
that a law has done all it can if it has done all it should, but this is on the assumption
that what the law has done was valid to begin with. The trouble with the challenged
law is that it has exceeded what it should have done, thereby becoming both
inefficacious and arbitrary. As such, it must be slain.
But the most important objection to Section 11(b) is that it constitutes prior
restraint on the dissemination of ideas. In a word, it is censorship. It is that officious
functionary of the repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak only
if allowed to do so, and no more and no less than what he is permitted to say on pain
of punishment should he be so rash as to disobey. In his Appeal for the Liberty of
Unlicensed Printing, Milton deplored the impossibility of finding a man base enough
to accept the office of censor and at the same time good enough to perform its duties.
Yet a pretender to that meddler is in our midst today, smugly brandishing the threat
of this miserable law.
One could perhaps concede some permissible instances of censorship, as where
private mail is screened during wartime to prevent deliberate or unwitting disclosure
of sensitive or classified matters that might prejudice the national security or where,
to take a famous example, a person is prohibited from shouting Fire! in a crowded
theater. But these exceptions
38
merely make and bolster the rule that there should be no prior restraint upon a
persons right to express his ideas on any subject of public interest. The rule applies
whether the censorship be in the form of outright prohibition, as in the cases before
us, or in more subtle forms like the imposition of a tax upon periodicals exceeding a
prescribed maximum number of copies per issue or allowing the circulation of books
4
only if they are judged to be fit for minors, thus reducing the reading tastes of adults
to the level of juvenile morality.
5
I remind the Court of the doctrine announced in Bantam Books v. Sullivan that 6
any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy
presumption against its validity. That presumption has not been refuted in the
cases sub judice. On the contrary, the challenged provision appears quite clearly to
be invalid on its face because of its undisguised attempt at censorship. The feeble
effort to justify it in the name of social justice and clean elections cannot prevail over
the self-evident fact that what we have here is an illegal intent to suppress free speech
by denying access to the mass media as the most convenient instruments for the
molding of public opinion. And it does not matter that the use of these facilities may
involved financial transactions, for the element of the commercial does not remove
them from the protection of the Constitution. 7
The law is no less oppressive on the candidates themselves who want and have the
right to address the greatest number of voters through the modern facilities of the
press, radio and television. Equally injured are the ordinary citizens, who are also
entitled to be informed, through these mass media, of the qualifications and platforms
of the various candidates aspiring for public office, that they may be guided in the
choice they must
_______________
4 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233.

5 Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380.
6 372 U.S. 58.
7 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254; Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809; Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748.
39
VOL. 207, MARCH 5, 1992 39
make when they cast their ballots. 8
I am as deeply concerned as the rest of the nation over the unabated if not
aggravated influence of material persuasions on the choice of our elective officials. It
is truly alarming that elections in a growing number of cases have become no more
than auction sales, where the public office is awarded to the highest bidder as if it
were an article of commerce. The offer of cash in exchange for his vote would be
virtually irresistible to a person mired in poverty and in the throes of the elemental
struggle for survival. That there are millions of such persons can only compound this
terrible situation. But what makes it especially revolting is the way these helpless
persons are manipulated and imposed upon and tantalized to surrender their
birthright for a mess of pottage. The unscrupulous candidates who do not hesitate to
use their wealth to buy themselves into elective officethese are the real saboteurs
of democracy. These are the scoundrels who would stain the pristine ballot in their
cynical scheme to usurp public office by falsifying the will of the people. Section 11(b)
aims to minimize this malignancy, it is true, but unfortunately by a method not
allowed by the Constitution.
In the Comment it submitted after the Solicitor General expressed support for the
petitioners, the Commission on Elections relies heavily on Badoy v. Commission on
Elections to sustain the exercise of its authority to regulate and supervise the mass
9
media during the election period as conferred upon it by what is now Section 4 of
Article IX in the present Constitution. However, that case is not in point for what was
upheld there was Section 12(f) of Rep. Act No. 6132 providing as follows:
The Commission on Elections shall endeavor to obtain free space from newspapers,
magazines and periodicals which shall be known as Comelec space, and shall allocate this
space equally and impartially among all candidates within the areas in which the newspapers
are circulated. Outside of said Comelec space, it shall be unlawful to print or publish, or cause
to be printed or published, any advertisement, paid
_______________
8 Coleman v. MacLennon, 78 Kan. 11, cited in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254.
9 35 SCRA 285.
40
comment or paid article in furtherance of or in opposition to the candidacy of any person for
delegate, or mentioning the name of any candidate and the fact of his candidacy, unless all
the names of all other candidates in the district in which the candidate is running are also
mentioned with equal prominence.
The Court, through Justice Makasiar (but over strong dissents from Justices
Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo), declared:
Considering the foregoing limitation in paragraph F, Sec. 12 in the light of the other
provisions of R.A. No. 6132 designed to maximize, if not approximate, equality of chances
among the various candidates in the same district, the said restriction on the freedom of
expression appears too insignificant to create any appreciable dent on the individuals liberty
of expression.
What is challenged in the case at bar is not that law but Section 11(b), which does not
merely require mention of the candidates rivals in the paid advertisement or
commercial, an innocuous enough requirement, to be sure. What Section 11(b) does
is prohibit the advertisement or commercial itself in what is unmistakably an act of
censorship that finds no justification in the circumstances here presented. Surely,
that blanket and absolute prohibition to use the mass media as a vehicle for the
articulation of ideas cannot, by the standards of Badoy, be considered too
insignificant to create any appreciable dent on the individuals liberty of expression.
What is in point is Sanidad v. Commission on Elections, where this Court, 10
through Mr. Justice Medialdea, unanimously declared unconstitutional a regulation

of the Commission on Elections providing as follows:
Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers.During the plebiscite
commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to
campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.
_______________
181 SCRA 529.

10
41
VOL. 207, MARCH 5, 1992 41
On the argument that the said persons could still express their views through the air
time and newspaper space to be allocated by the respondent, the Court declared:
Anent respondent Comelecs argument that Section 19 of Comelec resolution 2167 does not
absolutely bar petitioner-columnist from expressing his views and/or from campaigning for
or against the organic act because he may do so through the Comelec space and/or Comelec
radio/television time, the same is not meritorious. While the limitation does not absolutely
bar petitioners freedom of expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the forum where
he may express his view. No reason was advanced by respondent to justify such abridgment.
We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioners freedom of
expression for no justifiable reason. (Emphasis supplied)
This decision was promulgated without a single dissent, even from the incumbent
members then who are now sustaining Section 11(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646. Contrary
to Justice Davides contention, there is not a single word in this decision upholding
the prohibition in question.
The respondent also paints a distressing picture of the current political scene and
expresses its despair over the plight of the poor candidate thus:
Respondent Commission invites appreciation of the realities of present-day political
campaigns. In todays election competitions the success of ones candidacy rests to a great
extent on the candidates ability to match the financial and material resources of the other.
Where a candidate is given limitless opportunity to take his campaign to areas of persuasion
through the media, what is left of a winning chance for a poor, if deserving, candidate? But
for the regulatory power of Sec. 11(b) of Republic Act No. 6646, a wealthy candidate could
block off an opponent of lesser means from the public view by buying all print space in
newspapers and air time in radio and television.
I am certain the Court shares the apprehensions of the sober elements of our society
over the acute disadvantage of the poor candidate vis-a-vis a wealthy opponent
determined to win at all costs (which he can afford). However, for all its anxiety to
solve this disturbingly widespread difficulty, it is inhibited, as all of us must be, by
the mandate of the Constitution to give untrammeled rein to the dissemination and
exchange of ideas concerning the elections.
42
The problem is not really as bad as the respondent would imagine it, for it is unlikely
that the rich candidate would or could buy all print space in newspapers and air time
in radio and television to block off his opponents. Let us not be carried away by
hyperbolic speculations. After all, as the respondent itself points out, it is empowered
by the Constitution to supervise or regulate the operations of the mass media in
connection with election matters, and we may expect that it will use this power to
prevent the monopoly it fears, which conceivably will consume all the funds the
candidate is allowed to spend for his campaign. It should be pointed out that the rich
candidate violates no law as long as he does not exceed the maximum amount
prescribed by the Election Code for campaign expenses. The mere fact that the poor
candidate can spend only a small fraction of that amount does not prevent the right
candidate from spending all of it if he is so minded. This may be a heartless way of
putting it, but that is in fact how the law should be interpreted. The Election Code
fixes a maximum limit for all candidates, rich or poor alike; it does not say that the
rich candidate shall spend only the same amount as the poor candidate can afford.
I realize only too well that the ideas that may be conveyed by the prohibited media
advertisements will mostly be exaggerations or distortions or plain poppycock and
may intrude upon our leisure hours if not also offend our intelligence and exhaust
our patience. We may indeed be opening a Pandoras box. But these are unavoidable
in the free society. As part of the larger picture, these impositions are only minor
irritations that, placed in proper perspective, should not justify the withdrawal of the
great and inalienable liberty that is the bedrock of this Republic. It is best to
remember in this regard that freedom of expression exists not only for the thought
that agrees with us, to paraphrase Justice Holmes, but also for the thought that we
abhor.
I submit that all the channels of communication should be kept open to insure the
widest dissemination of information bearing on the forthcoming elections. An
uninformed electorate is not likely to be circumspect in the choice of the officials who
will represent them in the councils of government. That they may exercise their
suffrages wisely, it is important that they be apprised of the election issues, including
the credentials, if any,
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VOL. 207, MARCH 5, 1992 43
of the various aspirants for public office. This is especially necessary now in view of
the dismaying number of mediocrities who, by an incredible aberration of ego, are
relying on their money, or their tinsel popularity, or their private armies, to give them
the plume of victory.
For violating the liberty to know, to utter and to argue freely according to
conscience, above all liberties, the challenged law must be struck down. For blandly
sustaining it instead, the majority has inflicted a deep cut on the Constitution that
will ruthlessly bleed it white, and with it this most cherished of our freedoms.
PARAS, J., Dissenting:
In a ghastly blow against our cherished liberties, the Supreme Court, with insensate,
guillotine-like efficiency, rendered a decision which in the interest of accuracy and
candidness, I would like to turnthe serious attack on our freedom of expression. It
is sad but I have no choice except to say that I dissent.
The freedom to advertise ones political candidacy in the various forms of media is
clearly a significant part of our freedom of expression and of our right of access to
information. Freedom of expression in turn includes among other things, freedom of
speech and freedom of the press. Restrict these freedoms without rhyme or reason,
and you violate the most valuable feature of the democratic way of life.
The majority says that the purpose of the political advertisement provision is to
prevent those who have much money from completely overwhelming those who have
little. This is gross error because should the campaign for votes be carried out in other
fora (for example, rallies and meetings) the rich candidate can always be at a great
advantage over his less fortunate opponent. And so the disparity feared will likewise
appear in campaigns other than through media. It is alleged also that the candidate
with money can purchase for himself several full page advertisements, making his
poor opponents really poor in more ways than one. This is not realistic for the poor
opponents may, for certain reasons be given or favored with advertisements free of
charge, and money will not be needed in this case. And yet under the statute in
question, even free or gratuitous advertise-
44
ments in print, in radio or in television are included in the prohibition. And then
again, it is contended by the majority that a poor candidate can still make use of
media by consenting to interviews and news reports about his campaign, which
interviews and reports are, according to the majority still allowable. But then these
interviews and news reports are still subtle advertisements and they can be had if a
candidate deliberately looks for media practitioners to interview him or to write about
him. If the majority is to be consistent, these interviews and news reports should also
be disallowed. A case in point is the senatorial candidate who was interviewed on
television last Tuesday (March 3, 1992). Portions of the interview follow:
Q. In 19___, were you not the Secretary of
_____________ ?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. When you were Secretary, did you not
accomplish the following?
(Interviewer then enumerated
various accomplishments.)
A. Yes, I did.
There can be no doubt that this interview is disguised propaganda, and yet, if we
follow the majority opinion, this is allowable. Is this not illogicalthat is, if the ban
stays?
And then again, if we were to consider the ban as constitutional, the unknown or
lesser known candidates would be at a distinct disadvantage. They will have to hold
numerous rallies (spending oodles and oodles of money). And only those who had
previously received public exposure by dint of government service or by prominence
in the movies, in music, in sports, etc. will be the ones recalled by the voters. This
will indeed be unfortunate for our country.
It is true that freedom of speech and freedom of the press are not absolute, and
that they have their own limitations. But I do not see how these limitations can make
the disputed prohibition valid and constitutional.
I therefore reiterate my opinion that this political ads prohibition is grossly unfair,
politically inept and eminently unconstitutional.
Petitions dismissed.
o0o
45
ANNOTATED
Blo Umpar Adiong vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 103956. March 31, 1992. *
BLO UMPAR ADIONG, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Constitutional Law; Commission on Elections; Freedom of Speech; The COMELECs
prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or private
except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on
constitutional grounds.The COMELECs prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on
mobile places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the
COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds.
Same; Same; Same; The qualitative significance of freedom of expression arises from the
fact that it is the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other freedom.This
qualitative significance of freedom of expression arises from the fact that it is the matrix, the
indispensable condition of nearly every other freedom. (Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
[1937]; Salonga v. Pao, 134 SCRA 438 [1985]) It is difficult to imagine how the other
provisions of the Bill of Rights and the right to free elections may be guaranteed if the
freedom to speak and to convince or persuade is denied and taken away.
Same; Same; Same; Verily, the restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be
posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizens private property which in this case is
a privately-owned vehicle.The resolution prohibits the posting of decals and stickers not
more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length in any
place, including mobile places whether public or private except in areas designated by the
COMELEC. Verily, the restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so
broad that it encompasses even the citizens private property, which in this case is a
privately-owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed
by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that
no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile
places whether public or private except in the
_______________
*EN BANC.
713
VOL. 207, MARCH 31, 1992 713
Blo Umpar Adiong vs. Commission on
Elections
authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be
justified by the Constitution.In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on
mobile places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the
COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution.
PETITION to review the decision of the Commission on Elections.

Romulo R. Macalintal for petitioner.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The specific issue in this petition is whether or not the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on mobile places, public
or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that
it fixes.
On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant
to its powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts
Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws.
Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:
SEC. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda.The following are lawful election propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers, handwritten or printed letters, or other
written or printed materials not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and
fourteen (14) inches in length: Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any
of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
SEC. 21 (f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda.
It is unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in
any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common
posted areas and/or billboards, at the campaign headquarters of the candidate or political
714
ANNOTATED
party, organization or coalition, or at the candidates own residential house or one of his
residential houses, if he has more than one: Provided, that such posters or election
propaganda shall not exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in size. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
The statutory provisions sought to be enforced by COMELEC are Section 82 of the
Omnibus Election Code on lawful election propaganda which provides:
Lawful election propaganda.Lawful election propaganda shall include:
1. (a)Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers or other written or printed materials of

a size not more than eight and one-half inches in width and fourteen inches in length;
2. (b)Handwritten or printed letters urging voters to vote for or against any particular
candidate;
3. (c)Cloth, paper or cardboard posters, whether framed or posted, with an area not
exceeding two feet by three feet, except that, at the cite and on the occasion of a
public meeting or rally, or in announcing the holding of said meeting or rally,
streamers not exceeding three feet by eight feet in size, shall be
allowed: Provided, That said streamers may not be displayed except one week before
the date of the meeting or rally and that it shall be removed within seventy-two hours
after said meeting or rally; or
4. (d)All other forms of election propaganda not prohibited by this Code as the
Commission may authorize after due notice to all interested parties and hearing
where all the interested parties were given an equal opportunity to be
heard: Provided, That the Commissions authorization shall be published in two
newspapers of general circulation throughout the nation for at least twice within one
week after the authorization has been granted. (Section 37, 1978 EC)
and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646 which provides:

Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda.In addition to the forms of election propaganda
prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful: (a) to draw,
paint, inscribe, write, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place,
whether private, or public, except in the common poster areas and/or billboards provided in
the immediately preceding section, at the candidates own residence, or at the campaign
headquarters of the candidate or political party: Provided, That such posters or election
715
VOL. 207, MARCH 31, 1992 715
propaganda shall in no case exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in area: Provided,
Further, That at the site of and on the occasion of a public meeting or rally, streamers, not
more than two (2) and not exceeding three (3) feet by eight (8) feet each may be displayed five
(5) days before the date of the meeting or rally, and shall be removed within twenty-four (24)
hours after said meeting or rally; x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections
now assails the COMELECs Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals
and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him
such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section
11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban
on radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the
field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition.
The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles would be his last
medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992
elections. Finally, the petitioner states that as of February 22, 1992 (the date of the
petition) he has not received any notice from any of the Election Registrars in the
entire country as to the location of the supposed Comelec Poster Areas.
The petition is impressed with merit. The COMELECs prohibition on posting of
decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or private except in designated
areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds.
Firstthe prohibition unduly infringes on the citizens fundamental right of free
speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). There is no public interest
substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case.
There are various concepts surrounding the freedom of speech clause which we
have adopted as part and parcel of our own Bill of Rights provision on this basic
freedom.
All of the protections expressed in the Bill of Rights are important but we have
accorded to free speech the status of a preferred freedom. (Thomas v. Collins, 323 US
516, 89 L. Ed. 430 [1945]; Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, 36 SCRA 228 [1970])
716
ANNOTATED
This qualitative significance of freedom of expression arises from the fact that it is
the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other freedom. (Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 [1937]; Salonga v. Pao, 134 SCRA 438 [1985]) It is
difficult to imagine how the other provisions of the Bill of Rights and the right to free
elections may be guaranteed if the freedom to speak and to convince or persuade is
denied and taken away.
We have adopted the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. (New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 11 L. Ed. 686 [1964]; cited in the concurring opinion of
then Chief Justice Enrique Fernando in Babst v. National Intelligence Board, 132
SCRA 316 [1984]) Too many restrictions will deny to people the robust, uninhibited,
and wide open debate, the generating of interest essential if our elections will truly
be free, clean and honest.
We have also ruled that the preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for
the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information
to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. (Mutuc v. Commission
on Elections, supra)
The determination of the limits of the Governments power to regulate the exercise
by a citizen of his basic freedoms in order to promote fundamental public interests or
policy objectives is always a difficult and delicate task. The so-called balancing of
interestsindividual freedom on one hand and substantial public interests on the
otheris made even more difficult in election campaign cases because the
Constitution also gives specific authority to the Commission on Elections to supervise
the conduct of free, honest, and orderly elections.
We recognize the fact that under the Constitution, the COMELEC during the
election period is granted regulatory powers vis-a-vis the conduct and manner of
elections, to wit:
SEC. 4. The Commission may, during the election period supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and
other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants special privileges,
or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency,
717
VOL. 207, MARCH 31, 1992 717
or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its
subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and
space, and the right to reply, including reasonable equal rates therefore, for public
information campaigns and forms among candidates in connection with the object of holding
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. (Article IX (c) section 4)
The variety of opinions expressed by the members of this Court in the recent case
of National Press Club v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 102653, March 5, 1991)
and its companion cases underscores how difficult it is to draw a dividing line between
permissible regulation of election campaign activities and indefensible repression
committed in the name of free and honest elections. In the National Press Club, case,
the Court had occasion to reiterate the preferred status of freedom of expression even
as it validated COMELEC regulation of campaigns through political advertisements.
The gray area is rather wide and we have to go on a case to case basis.
There is another problem involved. Considering that the period of legitimate
campaign activity is fairly limited and, in the opinion of some, too short, it becomes
obvious that unduly restrictive regulations may prove unfair to affected parties and
the electorate.
For persons who have to resort to judicial action to strike down requirements
which they deem inequitable or oppressive, a court case may prove to be a hollow
remedy. The judicial process, by its very nature, requires time for rebuttal, analysis
and reflection. We cannot act instantly on knee-jerk impulse. By the time we revoke
an unallowably restrictive regulation or ruling, time which is of the essence to a
candidate may have lapsed and irredeemable opportunities may have been lost.
When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or
party and freedom to know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions
intended for maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local officials and
COMELEC should lean in favor of freedom. For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom
of the citizen and the States power to regulate are not antagonistic. There can be no
free and honest elections if in the efforts to maintain them, the freedom to speak and
the right to know are unduly curtailed.
718
ANNOTATED
There were a variety of opinions expressed in the National Press Club v. Commission
on Elections (supra) case but all of us were unanimous that regulation of election
activity has its limits. We examine the limits of regulation and not the limits of free
speech. The carefully worded opinion of the Court, through Mr. Justice Feliciano,
shows that regulation of election campaign activity may not pass the test of validity
if it is too general in its terms or not limited in time and scope in its application, if it
restricts ones expression of belief in a candidate or ones opinion of his or her
qualifications, if it cuts off the flow of media reporting, and if the regulatory measure
bears no clear and reasonable nexus with the constitutionally sanctioned objective.
Even as the Court sustained the regulation of political advertisements, with some
rather strong dissents, in National Press Club, we find the regulation in the present
case of a different category. The promotion of a substantial Government interest is
not clearly shown.
A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of
the Government, if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest. (Id., at 377, 20 L Ed 2d 672, 88 S Ct 1673. (City Council v.
Taxpayers For Vincent, 466 US 789, 80 L Ed 2d 772, 104 S Ct 2118 [1984])
The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles
does not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public
interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished
citizens right of free speech and expression. Under the clear and present danger rule
not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought
to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over ones mouth or a
writing instrument to be stilled:
The case confronts us again with the duty our system places on the Court to say where the
individuals freedom ends and the States power begins. Choice on that border, now as always
delicate, is perhaps
719
VOL. 207, MARCH 31, 1992 719
more so where the usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced by the preferred
place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedom secured by the
First Amendment x x x That priority gives these liberties a sanctity and a sanction not
permitting dubious intrusions and it is the character of the right, not of the limitation, which
determines what standard governs the choice x x x.
For these reasons any attempt to restrict those liberties must be justified by clear public
interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and present danger. The rational
connection between the remedy provided and the evil to be curbed, which in other context
might support legislation against attack on due process grounds, will not suffice. These rights
rest on firmer foundation. Accordingly, whatever occasion would restrain orderly discussion
and persuasion, at appropriate time and place, must have clear support in public danger,
actual or impending. Only the greatest abuses, endangering permanent interests, give
occasion for permissible limitation. (Thomas V. Collins, 323 US 516 [1945]. (Emphasis
supplied)
Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not
so much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the
freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to
convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once
the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes
a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else. If, in
the National Press Club case, the Court was careful to rule out restrictions on
reporting by newspapers or radio and television stations and commentators or
columnists as long as these are not correctly paid-for advertisements or purchased
opinions with less reason can we sanction the prohibition against a sincere
manifestation of support and a proclamation of belief by an individual person who
pastes a sticker or decal on his private property.
Secondthe questioned prohibition premised on the statute and as couched in the
resolution is void for overbreadth.
A statute is considered void for overbreadth when it offends the constitutional
principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally
subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
720
ANNOTATED
freedoms. (Zwickler v. Koota, 19 L ed 2d 444 [1967]).
In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the governmental purpose be
legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of
legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the
same basic purpose.
In Lovell v. Griffin, 303 US 444, 82 L ed 949, 58 S Ct 666, the Court invalidated an
ordinance prohibiting all distribution of literature at any time or place in Griffin, Georgia,
without a license, pointing out that so broad an interference was unnecessary to accomplish
legitimate municipal aims. In Schneider v. Irvington, 308 US 147, 84 L ed 155, 60 S Ct. 146,
the Court dealt with ordinances of four different municipalities which either banned or
imposed prior restraints upon the distribution of handbills. In holding the ordinances invalid,
the court noted that where legislative abridgment of fundamental personal rights and
liberties is asserted, the courts should be astute to examine the effect of the challenged
legislation. Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience
may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify
such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic
institutions. 308 US, at 161. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 US 296, 84 L ed 1213, 60 S Ct.
900, 128 ALR 1352, the Court said that [c]onduct remains subject to regulation for the
protection of society, but pointed out that in each case the power to regulate must be so
exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom.
(310 US at 304) (Shelton v. Tucker, 364 US 479 [1960])
The resolution prohibits the posting of decals and stickers not more than eight and
one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length in any place,
including mobile places whether public or private except in areas designated by the
COMELEC. Verily, the restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be
posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizens private property, which in
this case is a privately-owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another
cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III
of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without
due process of law.
721
VOL. 207, MARCH 31, 1992 721
Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns, it includes the right to
acquire, use, and dispose of it; and the Constitution, in the 14th Amendment, protects these
essential attributes.
Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns. It is elementary that it
includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it.
The Constitution protects these essential attributes of property. Holden v. Hardy, 169
U.S. 366, 391, 41 L. ed. 780, 790, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383. Property consists of the free use,
enjoyment, and disposal of a persons acquisitions without control or diminution save by the
law of the land. 1 Cooleys Bl. Com. 127. (Buchanan v. Warley 245 US 60 [1917])
As earlier stated, we have to consider the fact that in the posting of decals and stickers
on cars and other moving vehicles, the candidate needs the consent of the owner of
the vehicle. In such a case, the prohibition would not only deprive the owner who
consents to such posting of the decals and stickers the use of his property but more
important, in the process, it would deprive the citizen of his right to free speech and
information:
Freedom to distribute information to every citizen wherever he desires to receive it is so
clearly vital to the preservation of a free society that, putting aside reasonable police and
health regulations of time and manner of distribution, it must be fully preserved. The danger
of distribution can so easily be controlled by traditional legal methods leaving to each
householder the full right to decide whether he will receive strangers as visitors, that
stringent prohibition can serve no purpose but that forbidden by the constitution, the naked
restriction of the dissemination of ideas. (Martin v. City of Struthers, Ohio, 319 U.S. 141; 87
L. ed. 1313 [1943])
The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this
right is joined by a liberty interest, the burden of justification on the part of the
Government must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not met
in this case.
Section 11 of Rep. Act 6646 is so encompassing and invasive that it prohibits the
posting or display of election propaganda in any place, whether public or private,
except in the common poster areas sanctioned by COMELEC. This means that a
private person cannot post his own crudely prepared personal poster on his own front
door or on a post in his yard. While the
722
ANNOTATED
COMELEC will certainly never require the absurd, there are no limits to what
overzealous and partisan police officers, armed with a copy of the statute or
regulation, may do.
The provisions allowing regulations are so loosely worded that they include the
posting of decals or stickers in the privacy of ones living room or bedroom. This is
delegation running riot. As stated by Justice Cardozo in his concurrence in Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan (293 U.S. 388; 79 L. Ed. 446 [1935]), The delegated power is
unconfined and vagrant. . . This is delegation running riot. No such plentitude of
power is susceptible of transfer.
Thirdthe constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate
equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by
Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, Section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4
of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other
private vehicles. Compared to the paramount interest of the State in guaranteeing
freedom of expression, any financial considerations behind the regulation are of
marginal significance.
Under section 26 Article II of the Constitution, The State shall guarantee equal
access to opportunities for public service, x x x while under section 1, Article XIII
thereof The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for the common good. (Emphasis supplied)
It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas,
tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the
vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election
propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate. Whether the candidate is
rich and, therefore, can afford to doleout more decals and stickers or poor and without
the means to spread out the number of decals and stickers is not as important as the
right of the owner to freely express his choice and exercise his right of free speech.
The owner can even prepare his own decals or stickers for posting on his personal
property. To strike down this right and enjoin it is impermissible encroachment of his
liber-
723
VOL. 207, MARCH 31, 1992 723
ties.
In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places
whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the
COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution:
x x x The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for
the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest
functionary, is a postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule
of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy.
The three departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is
entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes
must be observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the
restrictions on its authority, either substantive or formal, be transcended. The Presidency in
the execution of the laws cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. In its task of applying
the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon to maintain
inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review to pass
upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is a
logical corollary of this basic principle that the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any
governmental measure that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of
its being the supreme law. (Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, supra)
The unusual circumstances of this years national and local elections call for a more
liberal interpretation of the freedom to speak and the right to know. It is not alone
the widest possible dissemination of information on platforms and programs which
concern us. Nor are we limiting ourselves to protecting the unfettered interchange of
ideas to bring about political change. (Cf. New York Times v. Sullivan, supra) The big
number of candidates and elective positions involved has resulted in the peculiar
situation where almost all voters cannot name half or even two-thirds of the
candidates running for Senator. The public does not know who are aspiring to be
elected to public office.
There are many candidates whose names alone evoke qualifications, platforms,
programs and ideologies which the voter may accept or reject. When a person attaches
a sticker with such
724
ANNOTATED
a candidates name on his car bumper, he is expressing more than the name; he is
espousing ideas. Our view of the validity of the challenged regulation includes its
effects in todays particular circumstances. We are constrained to rule against the
COMELEC prohibition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15(a) of
Resolution No. 2347 of the Commission on Elections providing that decals and
stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in
paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof is DECLARED NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-
Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., See concurrence.
Feliciano and Bellosillo, JJ., On leave.
CRUZ, J.: Concurring:
I join Mr. Justice Gutierrez and reiterate the views expressed in my dissent in
National Press Club v. Commission on Elections. The stand taken by the Court in the
case at bar is a refreshing change from its usual deferential attitude toward
authoritarianism as a persistent vestige of the past regime. After the disappointing
decision in the ad ban case, I hope that the present decision will guide us to the
opposite direction, toward liberty and the full recognition of freedom of expression.
This decision is a small step in rectifying the errors of the past, but it is a step just
the same, and on the right track this time.
Regarding the sticker ban, I think we are being swamped with regulations that
unduly obstruct the free flow of information so vital in an election campaign. The
Commission on Elections seems to be bent on muzzling the candidates and imposing
all manner of silly restraints on their efforts to reach the electorate. Reaching the
electorate is precisely the purpose of an election campaign, but the Commission on
Elections obviously believes that the candidates should be as quiet as possible.
Instead of limiting the dissemination of information on the election issues and the
qualifications of those vying for public
725
VOL. 207, MARCH 31, 1992 725
office, what the Commission on Elections should concentrate on is the education of
the voters on the proper exercise of their suffrages. This function is part of its
constitutional duty to supervise and regulate elections and to prevent them from
deteriorating into popularity contests where the victors are chosen on the basis not
of their platforms and competence but on their ability to sing or dance, or play a
musical instrument, or shoot a basketball, or crack a toilet joke, or exhibit some such
dubious talent irrelevant to their ability to discharge a public office. The public
service is threatened with mediocrity and indeed sheer ignorance if not stupidity.
That is the problem the Commission on Elections should try to correct instead of
wasting its time on much trivialities as where posters shall be allowed and stickers
should not be attached and speeches may be delivered.
The real threat in the present election is the influx of the unqualified professional
entertainers whose only asset is the support of their drooling fans, the demagogues
who drumbeat to the clink of coins their professed present virtues and past innocence,
the opportunists for whom flexibility is a means of political survival and even of
financial gain, and, most dangerous of all, the elements of our electorate who would,
with their mindless ballots, impose these office-seekers upon the nation. These are
the evils the Commission on Elections should try to correct, not the inconsequential
and inane question of where stickers should be stuck. I have nothing but praise for
the zeal of the Commission on Elections in pursuing the ideal of democratic elections,
but I am afraid it is barking up the wrong tree.
Petition granted.
Note.Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 prohibiting columnists,
commentators or announcers from using their columns to campaign for or against the
plebiscite issues is a restriction of freedom of expression (Sanidad vs. Commission on
Elections, 181 SCRA 529).
o0o
726
ANNOTATED
Policarpio vs. Manila Times Pub. Co., Inc.
No. L-16027. May 30, 1962.
LUMEN POLICARPIO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. THE MANILA TIMES PUB.CO.,
INC., CONSTANTE C. ROLDAN, MANUEL V. VILLA-REAL, E. AGUILAR CRUZ
and CONSORCIO BORJE, defendants-appellees.
Criminal Complaints; Filing with fiscal's office by the PCAC; Idea imparted regarding
probable guilt of accused.The filing of criminal complaints with the city fiscal's office by
another agency of the Government, like the PCAC, particularly after an investigation
conducted by the same, imparts the idea, that the probability of guilt on the part of the
accused is greater than when the complaints are filed by a private individual, specially when
the latter is a former subordinate of the alleged offender, who was responsible for the
dismissal of the complainant from her employment.
Libel; Publication containing derogatory informations; Requirements for publication to
enjoy immunity.To enjoy immunity, a publication containing derogatory information must
be not only true, but, also, fair, and it must be made in good faith and without any comments
or remarks.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

Mario Bengzon for plaintiff-appellant.
Alfredo Gonzales and Rafael M. Delfin for defendants-appellees.
149
VOL. 5, MAY 30, 1962 149
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing plaintiff's
complaint and defendants' counterclaim, without special pronouncement as to costs.
Originally certified to the Court of Appeals, the record on appeal was subsequently
forwarded to us in view of the amount involved in the complaint (P300,000.00).
Plaintiff Lumen Policarpio seeks to recover P150,000.00, as actual damages,
P70,000, as moral damages, P60,000 as correctional and exemplary damages, and
P20,000, as attorney's fees, aside from the costs, by reason of the publication in the
Saturday Mirror of August 11, 1956, and in the Daily Mirror of August 13, 1956, "of
two (2) articles or news items which are claimed to be per se defamatory, libelous and
false, and to have exposed her to ridicule, jeopardized her integrity, good name and
business and official transactions, and caused her grave embarrassment, untold and
extreme moral, mental and physical anguish and incalculable material, moral,
professional and business damages. The defendants are The Manila Times
Publishing Co., Inc., as publisher of The Saturday Mirror and The Daily Mirror,
which are newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, and Constante C.
Roldan, Manuel V. Villa-Real, E. Aguilar Cruz and Consorcio Borje, as the reporter
or author of the first article and the managing editor, the associate editor and the
news editor, respectively, of said newspapers.
After its motion to dismiss the complaint had been denied by the Court of First
Instance of Manila, in which the present action was initiated, the defendants filed a
joint answer admitting the formal allegations of the complaint, denying the other
allegations thereof, alleging special defenses and setting up a counterclaim for
P10,000, as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. In due course, later on, said
court rendered the aforementioned decision, upon the ground that plaintiff had not
proven that defen-dants had acted maliciously in publishing the aforementioned
articles, although portions thereof were inaccurate or false.
Plaintiff is a member of the Philippine bar. On August 11 and 13, 1956, and for
sometime prior thereto, she
150
ANNOTATED
was executive secretary of the local UNESCO National Commission. As such officer,
she had preferred charges against Herminia D. Reyes, one of her subordinates in said
Commission, and caused her to be separated from the service. Miss Reyes, in turn,
preferred counter-charges which were referred to Col. Crisanto V. Alba, a Special
Investigator in the Office of the President. Pending completion of the administrative
investigation, which began in June, 1956, Miss Reyes filed with the Office of the City
Fiscal of Manila, on August 8, 1956, a complaint against the plaintiff for alleged
malversation of public funds and another complaint for alleged estafa thru
falsification of public documents, which were scheduled for investigation by said office
on August 22, 1956, at 2:00 p.m. Meanwhile, or on August 11, 1956, the following
appeared, with a picture of the plaintiff, in the front page of The Satur-day Mirror:
"WOMAN OFFICIAL SUED
PCAC RAPS L. POLICARPIO ON FRAUDS
Unesco Official Head Accused on
Supplies, Funds Use by Colleague
By Constante C. Roldan
"Lumen Policarpio, executive secretary of the Unesco national commission here, was charged
with malversation and estafa in complaints filed with the city fiscal's office by the
Presidential Complaints and Action Commission today.
"The criminal action was initiated as a result of current administrative investigation
against the Unesco official being conducted by Col. Crisanto V. Alba, Malacaan technical
assistant, on charges filed by Herminia D. Reyes, a Unesco confidential assistant. The Unesco
commission functions under the Office of the President.
"Fiscal Manases G. Reyes, to whom the cases were assigned, immediately scheduled
preliminary investigation of the charges on August 22 at 2 p.m. Colonel Alba, in turn,
indicated that the administrative phase of the inquiry will continue Monday and then resume
on August 21 at Malacaan Park. The Palace Investigator said there are other charges, but
would not specify these.
"Alba said Miss Reyes had testified on circumstances supposedly substantiating the
malversation charge. Testimony had allegedly indicated that the accused had used Unesco
stencils for private and personal purposes. Specification reputedly said that
151
VOL. 5, MAY 30, 1962 151
Miss Policarpio had taken stencils from the Unesco storeroom and used these for French
lessons not at all connected with Unesco work; for the preparation of contracts of sale of
pianos in her business establishment; for preparation of invitations sent to members of the
League of Women Voters of which she is one of the officers.
"Cited as witnesses on this charge are Miss Reyes, Francisco Manalo of Barrio Salabat,
Taal, Batangas, Federico Vergara and Pablo Armesto both of the Unesco.
"Regarding the charge of estafa through falsification of public documents allegedly also
committed sometime in 1955, Miss Policarpio was accused of having collected expenses for
supposed trips. The accusation said the Unesco official had sought reimbursement of
expenses for a trip to Baler, Quezon, on Aug. 19, last year, representing expenses of her car
when in fact she supposedly rode in an army plane.
"Testimony indicated that a newspaperwoman who was a supposed co-passenger had even
written about the plane trip in her newspaper column. The same voucher also allegedly
collected expenses for going to a Unesco Bayambang (Pangasinan) project, although records
reputedly showed that she was absent in that conferences.
"Witnesses cited on the charge include Aurelio Savalbaro, a Philippine Air Force pilot, Lt.
Clemente Antonio and others, also of the PAF.
"Miss Policarpio becomes the second high-ranking woman government official to face
charges involving financial disbursements in their office. The first was Sen. Pacita M.
Gonzales who is still under charge of mis-spending funds of the Social Welfare
Administration and the UNAC while she had charge of these.
"The complainant, Miss Reyes, was earlier ordered relieved from her Unesco post by Miss
Policarpio on charges including conduct 'unbecoming a lady', and as a result had not been
paid her salary. She appealed to Malacaan which dismissed her suit and later she sued
before Judge Rafael Amparo to compel payment of her salary. The court also rejected her plea
on the ground that she had not exhausted all administrative remedies, the Palace not having
made a clearcut decision on her case."
The Daily Mirror of August 13, 1956, likewise, carried on its first pagewith a picture
of plaintiff and of Miss Reyes, taken during the administrative investigation being
conducted by Col. Albaanother news item, reading:
"PALACE OPENS INVESTIGATION
OF RAPS AGAINST POLICARPIO
Alba Probes Administrative Phase of
152
ANNOTATED
Fraud Charges Against Unesco Woman
Official; Fiscal Sets Prelim Quiz
Of Criminal Suit on Aug. 22.
"The administrative phase of two-pronged investigation of Miss Lumen Policarpio, head of
the Unesco national commission here, opened in Malacaan before Col. Crisanto V. Alba.
"The judicial inquiry of charges filed by Herminia D. Reyes, also the complainant in the
Malacaan case before the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission, will be
conducted by Fiscal Manases G. Reyes on Aug. 22 at 2 p.m.
"Miss Policarpio stands accused by Reyes of having malversed public property and of
having fraudulently sought reimbursement of supposed official expenses.
"Colonel Alba, at the start of his investigation at the Malacaan Park, clarified that
neither he nor the PCAC had initiated the criminal action before the city fiscal's office. The
complaint before the fiscal was started by an information sheet naming Herminia D. Reyes
as complainant and citing other persons as witnesses. Fiscal Reyes set preliminary
investigation of these charges for Aug. 22.
"Miss Reyes, technical assistant of the Unesco, stated at the Palace inquiry that during
1955 Miss Policarpio allegedly used several sheets of government stencils for her private and
personal use, such as for French lessons, contracts of sale of pianos and for invitations of the
League of Women Voters of which she (Miss Policarpio) is an officer. The Unesco commission
here functions under the Office of the President.
"The charge was filed with the PCAC, and the PCAC endorsed it to Colonel Alba for
investigation.
"Miss Policarpio this morning was not represented by any lawyer. Federico Diaz, lawyer
representing complainant Miss Reyes, petitioned for the suspension of Miss Policarpio,
executive secretary of the Unesco.
"Alba did not act immediately on the petition. He said he was holding a hearing on the
petition on August 15.
"During this morning's investigation three witnesses appeared. The first witness was
Atty. Antonio Lopez of the PCAC who brought with him 18 sheets of stencil which were
allegedly used by Miss Policarpio for her personal use. These sheets were admitted as
temporary exhibits.
"The second witness was Federico Vergara of the Unesco who said that he received four of
the 18 sheets, but he could not identify which of the sheets he had received.
"The third witness was Francisco Manalo who certified on the charge of oppression in
office against Miss Policarpio.
"The other charge of Miss Reyes corresponded to supposed reimbursements sought by
Miss Policarpio for a trip to
153
VOL. 5, MAY 30, 1962 153
Quezon Province and to Pangasinan. On the first, Miss Reyes' complaint alleged the Unesco
official had asked for refund of expenses for use of her car when, Miss Reyes claimed, she had
actually made the trip aboard an army plane.
"Miss Reyes also said Miss Policarpio was absent from the Bayambang conference for
which she also sought allegedly refund of expenses.
"The complainant had previously been ordered relieved of her Unesco post by Miss
Policarpio and had later sued at the Palace and before the Court for payment of her salary."
The title of the article of August 11, 1956"WOMAN OFFICIAL SUED"was given
prominence with a 6-column (about 11 inches) banner headline of one-inch types.
Admittedly, its sub-title"PCAC RAPS L. POLICARPIO ON FRAUD"printed in
bold one-centimeter types, is not true. Similarly, the statement in the first paragraph
of the article, to the effect that plaintiff "was charged with malversation and estafa
in complaints filed with the city fiscal's office by the Presidential Complaint and
Action Commission"otherwise known as PCACis untrue, the complaints for said
offenses having been filed by Miss Reyes. Neither is it true that said "criminal action
was initiated as a result of current administrative investigation",as stated in the
second paragraph of the same article.
Plaintiff maintains that the effect of these false statements was to give the general
impression that said investigation by Col. Alba had shown that plaintiff was guilty,
or, at least, probably guilty of the crimes aforementioned, and that, as a consequence,
the PCAC had filed the corresponding complaints with the city fiscal's office. She
alleges, also, that although said article indicates that the charges for malversation
and for estafa through falsification against her referred, respectively, to the use by
her of Unesco stencils allegedly for private and personal purposes, and to the
collection of transportation expenses, it did not mention the fact that the number of
stencils involved in the charge was only 18 or 20, that the sum allegedly
misappropriated by her was only P54, and that the falsification imputed to her was
said to have been committed by claiming that certain expenses for which she had
sought and secured reimbursement were incurred
154
ANNOTATED
in trips during the period from July 1, 1955 to September 30, 1955, although the trips
actually were made, according to Miss Reyes, from July 8 to August 31, 1955. By
omitting these details, plaintiff avers, the article of August 11, 1956, had the effect of
conveying the idea that the offenses imputed to her were more serious than they
really were. Plaintiff, likewise, claims that there are other inaccuracies in the news
item of August 13, 1956, but, we do not deem it necessary to dwell upon the same for
the determination of this case.
Upon the other hand, defendants contend that, although the complaints in the city
fiscal's office were filed, not by the PCAC, but by Miss Reyes, this inaccuracy is
insignificant and immaterial to the case, for the fact is that said complaints were filed
with said office. As regards the number of sheets of stencil allegedly misused and the
amount said to have been misappropriated by plaintiff, as well as the nature of the
falsification imputed to her, defendants argue that these "details" do not affect the
truthfulness of the article as a whole, and that, in any event, the insignificant value
of said sheets of stencil and the small amount allegedly misappropriated, would have
had, if set forth in said article, a greater derogatory effect upon the plaintiff, aside
from the circumstance that defendants had no means of knowing such "details".
It appears, however, that prior to August 11, 1956, Col. Alba had already taken
the testimony of Antonio P. Lopez, Francisco Manalo and Federico Vergara, as
witnesses for Miss Reyes. Hence, defendants could have ascertained the "details"
aforementioned, had they wanted to. Indeed, some of the defendants and/or their
representatives had made appropriate inquiries from Col. Alba before said date, and
some "details"though not those adverted to aboveappear in the article then
published, whereas the number of sheets of stencil allegedly misused was mentioned
in the news item of August 13, 1956.
Moreover, the penalty prescribed by law for the crime either of estafa or of
embezzlement depends partly upon the amount of the damage caused to the offended
party (Articles 315 to 318, Revised Penal Code). Hence, the
155
VOL. 5, MAY 30, 1962 155
amount or value of the property embezzled is material to said offense.
Again, it is obvious that the filing of criminal complaints with the city fiscal's office
by another agency of the Government, like the PCAC, particularly after an
investigation conducted by the same, imparts the ideal that the probability of guilty
on the part of the accused is greater than when the complaints are filed by a private
individual, specially when the latter is a former subordinate of the alleged offender,
who was responsible for the dismissal of the complainant from her employment. It is
only too apparent that the article published on August 11, 1956, presented the
plaintiff in a more unfavorable light than she actually was.
It goes without saying that newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of discretion
in determining the manner in which a given event should be presented to the public,
and the importance to be attached thereto, as a news item, and that its presentation
in a sensational manner is not per se illegal. Newspaper may publish news items
relative to judicial, legislative or other official proceedings, which are not of
confidential nature, because the public is entitled to know the truth with respect to
such proceedings, which, being official and non-confidential, are open to public
consumption. But, to enjoy immunity, a publication containing derogatory
information must be not only true, but, also, fair, and it must be made in good faith
and without any comments or remarks.
Defendants maintain that their alleged malice in publishing the news items in
question had not been established by the plaintiff. However, Article 354 of the
Revised Penal Code, provides:
"Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good
intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
"1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any
legal, moral or social duty; and
"2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any
statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings,
156
ANNOTATED
or of any other act performed by public officers in the exericse of other functions."
In the case at bar, aside from containing information derogatory to the plaintiff,
the article published on August 11, 1956, presented her in a worse predicament than
that in which she, in fact, was. In other words, said article was not a fair and true
report of the proceedings therein alluded to. What is more, its sub-title"PCAC
RAPS L. POLICARPIO ON FRAUD"is a comment or remark, besides being false.
Accordingly, the defamatory imputations contained in said article are "presumed to
be malicious".
Then too, how could defendants claim to have acted with good intentions or
justifiable motive in falsely stating that the complaints had been filed with the Office
of the City Fiscal by the PCAC as a result of the administrative investigation of Col.
Alba? Either they knew the truth about it or they did not know it. If they did, then
the publication would be actually malicious. If they did not, or if they acted under a
misapprehension of the facts, they were guilty of negligence in making said
statement, for the consequences of which they are liable solidarily (Articles 2176,
2194, 2208 and 2219[I], Civil Code of the Philippines; 17 R.C.L. sec. 95, p. 349).
We note that the news item published on August 13, 1956, rectified a major
inaccuracy contained in the first article, by stating that neither Col. Alba nor the
PCAC had filed the aforementioned complaints with the city fiscal's office. It,
likewise, indicated the number of sheets of stencil involved in said complaints. But,
this rectification or clarification does not wipe out the responsibility arising from the
publication of the first article, although it may and should mitigate it (Jimenez vs.
Reyes, 27 Phil. 52). For this reason, we feel that the interest of justice and of all
parties concerned would be served if the defendants indemnify the plaintiff in the
sums of P3,000, by way of moral damages, and P2,000, as attorney's fees.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one
shall be entered sentencing the defendants herein to pay jointly and severally to the
plain-
157
VOL. 5, MAY 30, 1962 157
People vs. Lumantas
tiff the aforementioned sums of P3,000, as moral damages, and P2,000, by way of
attorney's fees, in addition to the costs. It is so ordered.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon,
JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., is on leave.
Decision reversed.
Note.See Macleod vs. Philippine Publishing Co., 12 Phil. 427.
____________

No. L-26549. July 31, 1970.
EUGENIO LOPEZ, publisher and owner of the MANILA CHRONICLEand JUAN
T. GATBONTON, petitioners, vs. THE HON.COURT OF APPEALS and FIDEL G.
CRUZ, respondents.
Libel; Damages; Publication of plaintiffs photograph is actionable; Case at bar.An
action for libel would lie arising from a publication in a weekly magazine of the plaintiffs
photograph as being responsible for the hoax of the year, even though the publisher made a
correction of their mistake immediately upon discovery thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Pressure of deadline not a defense in libelous publication in a weekly
magazine.While a newspaper should not be held to account for honest mistakes owing to
pressure of a daily deadline, there is no such pressure to meet, and no occasion to act with
haste in a weekly magazine.
Same; Same; Same; Retraction mitigates amount of damages.A retraction published
to correct the mistake does not wipe out the responsibility arising from the publication of the
libelous photograph or article, although it may and should mitigate it.
Dizon, Dissenting:
Libel; Damages; Actual malice must be proved.For liability in damages to arise from
an alleged libelous publication, without offending press freedom, there is need to prove that
the publication was made with actual malicethat is, with the knowledge of its falsity or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
APPEAL by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.

117
VOL. 34, JULY 31, 1970 117
Lopez vs. Court of Appeals
Salonga, Ordoez, Sicat & Associates for petitioners.
FERNANDO, J.:
There is an element of novelty in this appeal by certiorari from a decision of

respondent Court of Appeals holding petitioners, the then publisher and editor of This
Week Magazine, liable in damages to the tune of eleven thousand pesos arising from
the publication of a picture of respondent, Fidel G. Cruz, as being responsible for the
hoax of the year. The absence of any connection either fanciful or remote with such
event is admitted. The view is pressed by petitioners, invoking a liberal construction
of the implications of press freedom, owning up to the mistake, unfortunately not
discovered until it was too late, and publishing a correction as an earnest of its good
faith, that they should not be made to pay at all. This Court, without discounting the
elements of plausibility of their contention, cannot, however, close its eyes to the
injury inflicted on respondent and indulge them in such a plea. It is not disposed
though to affirm respondent Courts decision in its entirety. Considering all the
circumstances, the damages awarded to private respondent appear to be far too
generous. A reduction is in order. The sum of one thousand pesos would be enough.
So we decide.
The antecedents of the case follow: In the early part of January, 1956, there
appeared on the front page of The Manila Chronicle, of which petitioner Eugenio
Lopez was the publisher, as well as on other dailies, a news story of a sanitary
inspector assigned to the Babuyan Islands, Fidel Cruz by name, sending a distress
signal to a passing United States Airforce plane which in turn relayed the message
to Manila. He was not ignored, an American Army plane dropping on the beach of an
island an emergency-sustenance kit containing, among other things, a twoway radio
set. He utilized it to inform authorities in Manila that the people in the place were
living in terror, due to a series of killings committed since Christmas of 1955. Losing
no time, the Philippines defense establish-
118
ANNOTATED
ment rushed to the island a platoon of scout rangers led by Major Wilfredo
Encarnacion. Upon arriving at the reported killer-menaced Babuyan Claro, however,
Major Encarnacion and his men found, instead of the alleged killers, a man, the same
Fidel Cruz, who merely wanted transportation home to Manila. In view of this
finding, Major Wilfredo Encarnacion branded as a hoax, to use his own descriptive
word, the report of Fidel Cruz. That was the term employed by the other newspapers
when referring to the above-mentioned incident.
This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle, then edited by petitioner Juan T.
Gatbonton, devoted a pictorial article to it in its issue of January 15, 1956. Mention
was made that while Fidel Cruz story turned out to be false, if brought to light the
misery of the people living in that place, with almost everybody sick, only two
individuals able to read and write, food and clothing being scarce. Then in the
January 29, 1956 issue of This Week Magazine, the January News Quiz included
an item on the central figure in what was known as the Calayan Hoax, who
nevertheless did the country a good turn by calling the governments attention to that
forsaken and desolate corner of the Republic. Earlier in its Special Year End Quiz
appearing in its issue of January 13, 1956, reference was made to a health inspector
who suddenly felt lonely in his isolated post, cooked up a story about a murderer
running loose on the island of Calayan so that he could be ferried back to civilization.
He was given the appellation of Hoax of the Year.
The magazine on both occasions carried photographs of the person purporting to
be Fidel Cruz. Unfortunately, the pictures that were published on both occasions were
that of private respondent Fidel G. Cruz, a businessmancontractor from Santa Maria,
Bulacan. It turned out that the photographs of respondent Cruz and that of Fidel
Cruz, sanitary inspector, were on file in the library of the Manila Chronicle in
accordance with the standard procedure observed in other newspaper offices, but
when the news quiz format was prepared, the two photographs were in-
119
VOL. 34, JULY 31, 1970 119
advertently switched.
As soon, however, as the inadvertent error was brought to file attention of
petitioners, the following correction was iinmediately published in This Week
Magazine on January 27, 1957: While we were rushing to meet the deadline for
January 13th issue of This Week, we inadvertently published the picture of former
Mayor Fidel G. Cruz of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, businessman and contractor, in Our
Own Whos Who feature in the Year End Quiz of This Week in lieu of the health
inspector Fidel Cruz, who was connected with a story about a murderer running loose
on Calayan Island. We here express our profound regrets that such an error
occurred. Together with the foregoing correction, petitioners published the picture
of Fidel Cruz; the photographs and the correction moreover were enclosed by four
lines, the type used was bolder than ordinary, and the item was placed in a
conspicuous place m order to call the attention of the readers to such amends being
made. 1
Respondent Fidel G. Cruz sued petitioners in the Court of First Instance of Manila
for the recovery of damages alleging the defamatory character of the above
publication of his picture. After trial duly had, he was awarded five thousand pesos
as actual damages, another five thousand pesos as moral damages, and one thousand
pesos for attorneys fees. That judgment was affirmed on appeal to respondent Court.
Hence, this petition for certiorari with the result, as already announced at the
opening of this opinion, that while respondent Cruz is entitled to prevail, the damages
awarded him should be reduced.
1. It is on the freedom of the press that petitioners would stake their case to
demonstrate that no action for libel would lie arising from the publication of the
picture of respondent Cruz identified as responsible for the hoax of the year, when
such was not the case at all. It is easily understandable why. No liability would be
incurred
_______________
1 The above statement of facts appearing in the Petition pp 1-5 was accepted in the decision now on
appeal by respondent Court. Vide Appendix. Brief for the Petitioners, pp. 52-61.
120
ANNOTATED
if it could be demonstrated that it comes within the wellnigh all-embracing scope of
freedom of the press. Included therein is the widest latitude of choice as to what items
should see the light of day so long as they are relevant to a matter of public interest,
the insistence on the requirement as to its truth yielding at times to unavoidable
inaccuracies attendant on newspapers and other publications being subject to the
tyranny of deadlines. If no such showing could be plausibly made, however, it is
difficult to resist the conclusion that there was in fact the commission of such quasi-
delict. It was held in Lu Chu Sing v. Lu Tiong Gui, that the repeal of the old Libel
2
Law (Act No. 277) did not abolish the civil action for iibel. A libel was defined in that
3
Act as a malicious defamation, expressed either in writing, printing, or by signs or
pictures, or the like, x x x, tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead or to
impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish the alleged or natural defects
of one who is alive, and thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt, or
ridicule, There was an express provision in such legislation for a tort or a quasidelict
4
action arising from libel. There is reinforcement to such a view in the new Civil Code
5
providing for the recovery of moral damages for libel, slander or any other form of
defamation. 6
_______________
2 76 Phil. 669 (1956).

3 Ibid, p. 676.
4 Section 1, Act No. 277 (1901).
5 According to Section 11 of the Act: In addition to the criminal action hereby prescribed, a right of civil
action is also hereby given to any person libeled as hereinbefore set forth against the person libeling him
for damages sustained by such libel, and the person so libeled shall be entitled to recover in such civil action
not only the actual pecuniary damages sustained by him but also damages for injury to his feelings and
reputation, and in addition such punitive damages as the court may think will be a just punishment to the
libeler and an example to others. Suit may be brought in any Court of First Instance having jurisdiction of
the parties. The presumptions, rules of evidence, and special defenses herein provided for criminal
prosecutions shall be equally applicable in civil actions under this section.
6 Art. 2219 (8).
121
VOL. 34, JULY 31, 1970 121
There has been no time then in our judicial history when civil actions for libel did not
form a staple part of litigations which had reached this Court. Such is the case in a
7
far greater measure in the United States. According to the standard treatise of Newell
on Slander and Libel: Publication of a persons photograph in connection with an
article libelous of a third person, is a libel on the person whose picture is published,
where the acts set out in the article are imputed to such person. In support of the 8
above statement, he made reference to several cases. Other decisions to the same
9
effect have been promulgated since the fourth edition of Newell pub-
_______________
7 Causin v. Ricamora, 5 Phil. 31 (1905); Causin v. Jakosalem, 5 Phil. 155 (1905); Worcester v.
Ocampo, 22 Phil. 42 (1912) ; Jimenez v. Reyes, 27 Phil. 52 (1914); Sotelo Matti v. Bulletin Publishing Co., 37
Phil. 562 (1918); Kunkle v. Cablenews-American, 42 Phil. 757 (1922); Phee v. La Vanguardia, 45 Phil.
211 (1923); Oliver v. La Vanguardia, 48 Phil. 429 (1925) ; Santiago v. Calvo, 48 Phil. 919 (1926) ; El Hogar
Filipino v. Prautch and Poblete, 49 Phil. 171 (1926) ; Guevara v. Almario, 56 Phil. 476 (1932); Lu Chu Sing
v. Lu Tiong Gui, 76 Phil. 669 (1946); Quisumbing v. Lopez, 96 Phil. 510 (1955); Sison v. David, L-11268,
Jan. 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 60; Tolentino v. Baylosis, L-15742, Jan. 31, 1961, 1 SCRA 396; Policarpio v. Manila
Times Pub. Co., L-16027, May 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 148; Duque v. Santiago, L-16916, Nov. 29, 1962, 6 SCRA
661; Dizon v. Encarnacion, L-18615, Dec. 24, 1963, 9 SCRA 714; Deao v. Godinez, L-19518, Nov. 28,
1964, 12 SCRA 483; Corpus v. Cuaderno, L-16969, April 30, 1966, 16 SCRA 807; Jimenez v. Cabangbang, L-
15905, Aug. 3, 1966, 17 SCRA 876; Imperial v. Ziga, L-19726, April 13, 1967, 19 SCRA 726; Ubarra v.
Biscom Employees Coop. Asso., L-25332, Oct. 14, 1968, 25 SCRA 498; Deles v. Aragona, Adm. Case No. 598,
March 28, 1969,, 27 SCRA 633.
8 Newell, Slander and Libel, 4th ed., 259-260 (1924). Cf. Gatley on Libel and Slander, 5th ed., 19-20
(1960).
9Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1909); Wandt v. Hearsts Chicago American, 109 N. W. 70
(1906); James v. Ft. Worth Telegram Co., 117 S.W. 1028 (1909); De Sando v. New York Herald Co., 85 N.Y.S.
1903; Farley v. Evening Chronicle Pub. Co., 87 S.W. 565 (1905).
122
ANNOTATED
lished in 1924. Why libel law has both a criminal and a civil aspect is explained by
10
Hale in his Law of the Press thus: On the one hand, libeling a person results in
depriving him of his good reputation. Since reputation is a thing of value, truly rather
to be chosen than great riches, an impairment of it is a personal wrong. To redress
this personal wrong money damages are awarded to the injured person. On the other
hand, the publication of defamatory statements tends strongly to induce breach of
the peace by the person defamed, and hence is of peculiar moment to the state as the
guardian of the public peace. Viewed from this angle, libel is a crime, and as such
subjects the offender to a fine or imprisonment. 11
The first decision cited by Newell is a decision of Justice Holmes. The case is Peck
v. Tribune Co. Plaintiff there complained of her picture being published in an
12
advertisement in defendants newspaper. The Chicago Sunday Tribune, with certain

words of commendation for a brand of liquor attributed to her when in fact she did
not make such a statement at all and could not have made it, as she was a total
abstainer. The defendant was held liable, for as Justice Holmes pointed out: There
was some suggestion that the defendant published the portrait by mistake, and
without knowledge that it was the plaintiffs portrait, or was not what it purported
to be. But the fact, if it was one, was no excuse. If the publication was libelous, the
defendant took the risk. As was
______________
10 Ostrowe v. Lee, 175 N.E. 505 (1931); Riley v. Askin and Marine Co., 132 S.E. 584 (1926); Becker v.
Brinkop, 78 S.W. 2d 538 (1935); Knapp v. Post Printing and Publishing Co., 144 P. 2d 981 (1944); Corbett
v. Am. Newspapers, 5 A. 2d 245 (1939); Myers v. Afro-American Pub. Co., 5 N.Y.S. 2d 223 (1938); Flake v.
Greensboro News Co., 195 S.W. 55 (1938); Petransky v. Repository Printing Co., 200 N.E. 647 (1936); Lanka
v. Park Entertainments, 1 N. E. 2d 42 (1936); Jackson v. Consumer Publications, 11 N.Y.S. 2d 462
(1939); Smith v The Journal Co., 73 N.W. 2d 429 (1955); Dahl v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 166 N.Y.S. 2d
708 (1957); Greer v. Skyway Broadcasting Co., 124 S.E. 2d 98 (1962).
11 Hale, Law of the Press, 3rd ed. 6 (1948)
12 214 US 185 (1909).
123
VOL. 34, JULY 31, 1970 123
said of such matters by Lord Mansfield, Whenever a man publishes, he publishes at
his peril. x x x The reason is plain. A libel is harmful on its face. If a man sees fit to
publish manifestly hurtful statements concerning an individual, without other
justification than exists for an advertisement or a piece of news, the usual principles
of tort will make him liable if the statements are false, or are true only of someone
else. 13
Learned Hand, in holding that an action for libel would lie arising from a
publication in an advertisement of plaintiffs photograph yielding a grotesque,
monstrous and obscene impression and that he was substantially enough ridiculed
to complain reached the conclusion that because the picture taken with the legends
was calculated to expose the plaintiff to more than trivial ridicule, it was prima facie
actionable; that the fact that it did not assume to state a fact or an opinion is
irrelevant; and that in consequence the publication is actionable. It is likewise an
14
accepted fact that such publications do occasion greater injury to reputation than
would mere words alone. Cardozo so aptly put the matter thus: It has its genesis in
evils which the years have not erased. Many things that are defamatory may be said
with impunity through the medium of speech. Not so, however, when speech is caught
upon the wing and transmuted into print. What gives the sting to the writing is its
permanence of form. The spoken word dissolves, but the written one abide and
perpetuates the scandal. xxx When one speaks of a writing in this connection, one
does not limit oneself to writings in manuscripts or books. Any symbol suffices
pictures, hieroglyphics, shorthand notesif only what is written is intelligible to him
who reads. 15
2. That is only one side of the picture, however. There is an impressive recognition
in our decisions of the curtailment to which press freedom would be subjected if an
_______________
13 Ibid, p. 189.
14 Burton v. Crowell Pub. Co., 82 F. 2d 154, 156 (1936).
15 Ostrowe v. Lee, 175 N. E. 505, 506 (1981).
124
ANNOTATED
action for libel were not rigorously scrutinized to remove doubts as to its being utilized
to penalize the exercise of that constitutional right. Thus, in the first leading
case, United States v. Bustos, Justice Malcolm could correctly stress: The interest
16
of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public
affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the
case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of
officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation:
the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must
not to be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus
can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does
not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as an individual is less than the State, so
must expected criticism be born for the common good. On this aspect of the question
17
which, as answered by him, would require that a criminal suit for libel should not be
utilized as a means for stifling press freedom, he categorically declared: Public
policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have
demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has
been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege. 18
In another civil action for libel, such a thought is expressed differently in this wise:
So long as it is done in good faith, newspapers have the legal right to have and
express opinions on legal questions. To deny them that right would infringe upon the
freedom of the press. The last word on the subject, up to now at least, came
19
from Quisumbing v. Lopez. In the language of the then Chief Justice Paras, who
20
penned the opinion: The Court

_______________
16 37 Phil. 731 (1918).

17 Ibid, pp. 740-741.
18 Ibid, p. 742. Cf. Another decision of Justice Malcolm is United States v. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 225 (1922).
19 El Hogar Filipino v. Prautch, 49 Phil. 171, 176 (1926).
20 96 Phil. 510 (1955).
125
VOL. 34, JULY 31, 1970 125
of Appeals found as a fact that there is no evidence in the record to prove that the
publication of the news item under consideration was prompted by personal ill will
or spite, or that there was intention to do harm, and that on the other hand there
was an honest and high sense of duty to serve the best, interests of the public, without
self-seeking motive and with malice towards none. Every citizen of course has the
right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not consider that the
respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused
the freedom of the press. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance
as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our
democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and edition usually have to
race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they
should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or
imperfection in the choice of words. 21
It was not until 1964 that the United States Supreme Court had occasion to speak
its mind on the subject. In the leading case of New York Times Co. v. Sulivan, the 22
nature of the question presented was set forth by Justice Brennan for the Court in
the opening paragraph of his opinion: We are required in this case to determine for
the first time the extent to which the constitutional protections for speech and press
limit a States power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public official
against critics of his official conduct. This is the Courts approach to such an issue:
23
In deciding the question now, we are compelled by neither precedent nor policy to
give any more weight to the epithet libel than we have to other mere labels of state
law. xxx Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace,
obscenity, solicitation of legal business, and the various other formulae for the
repression of expression
______________
21 Ibid, pp. 514-515.

22 376 US 254 (1964).
23 Ibid, p. 256.
126
ANNOTATED
that have been challenged in this Court, libel can claim no talismanic immunity from
constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards that satisfy the First
Amendment. Continuing the same trend, the opinion stressed further: Thus we
24
consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials, xxx The present advertisement, as an
expression of grievance and protest on one of the major public issues of our time,
would seem clearly to qualify for the constitutional protection.
25
For liability to arise then without offending press freedom, there is this test to
meet: The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits
a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his
official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice
that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not. The United States Supreme Court went further in Curtis Publishing
26
Co. v. Butts, where such immunity was held as covering statements concerning
27
public figures regardless of whether or not they are government officials. Why there
should be such an extension is understandable in the light of the broad scope enjoyed
by press freedom which certainly allows a full and free discussion of public issues.
What can be more logical and appropriate, then, than such an expansion of the
principle. As noted by a commentator: Since discussion of public issues cannot be
meaningful without reference to the men involved on both sides of such issues, and
since such men will not necessarily be public officials, one cannot but agree that the
Court
______________
24 Ibid, p. 269.
25 Ibid, pp. 270-271.
26 Ibid, pp. 279-280.
27 388 US 130 (1967).
127
VOL. 34, JULY 31, 1970 127
was right in Curtis to extend the Times rule to all public figures. 28
The significance of the foregoing line of decisions impressive for their consistency
is quite obvious. No inroads on press freedom should be allowed in the guise of
punitive action visited on what otherwise could be characterized as libel whether in
the form of printed words or a defamatory imputation resulting from the publication
of respondents picture with the offensive caption as in the case here complained of.
This is not to deny that the party responsible invites the institution either of a
criminal prosecution or a civil suit. It must be admitted that what was done did invite
such a dire consequence, considering the value the law justly places on a mans
reputation. This is merely to underscore the primacy that freedom of the press enjoys.
It ranks rather high in the hierarchy of legal values. If the cases mean anything at
all then, to emphasize what has so clearly emerged, they call for the utmost care on
the part of the judiciary to assure that in safeguarding the interest of the party
allegedly offended, a realistic account of the obligation of a news media to disseminate
information of a public character and to comment thereon as well as the conditions
attendant on the business of publishing cannot be ignored. To single out one
decision, Quisumbing v. Lopez so speaks in tones loud and clear.
3. It is to the haven thus afforded by such a highly sympathetic ruling to press
freedom that petitioners would seek refuge. The defamatory matter complained of in
the Quisumbing case appeared in the headline. It was without basis, as shown by the
text of the news item itself. Nonetheless, for the reasons expressed with vigor and
clarity by former Chief Justice Paras, no liability was deemed incurred by the then
publisher of the Manila Chronicle. A newspaper, it is stressed, should not be held to
account to a point of suppression for honest mis-
_______________
Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Time to Time, 56 California Law Rev.. 935, 954 (1968).
28
128
ANNOTATED
takes or imperfection in the choice of words. The above ruling, coupled with the
requirement in the New York Times decision of the United States Supreme Court,
would for the writer of this opinion, furnish a sufficient basis for the success of this
appeal. The Court, however, is not inclined to view matters thus.
Obviously Quisumbing v. Lopez is not squarely in point. Here there was no pressure
of a daily deadline to meet, no occasion to act with haste as the picture of respondent
was published in a weekly magazine. Moreover, there is the added requirement of
reasonable care imposed by such decision which from the facts here found, appeared
not to be satisfied. It cannot be concluded then that the plea of petitioners is
sufficiently persuasive. The mandate of press freedom is not ignored, but here it does
not speak unequivocally. It is not decisive of the basic issue. By itself, it does not have
a controlling significance. So we hold.
4. Petitioners would make much, likewise, of their correction, which has all the
force of a retraction, as a basis from being absolved from any pecuniary responsibility.
The present Chief Justice in Policarpio v. Manila Times restated the controlling
29
principle: We note that the news item published on August 13, 1956, rectified a major
inaccuracy contained in the first article, by stating that neither Col. Alba nor the
PCAC had filed the aforementioned complaints with the city fiscals office. It,
likewise, indicated the number of sheets of stencil involved in said complaints. But,
this rectification or clarification does not wipe out the responsibility arising from the
publication of the first article, although it may and should mitigate it (Jimenez vs.
Reyes, 27 Phil. 52). 30
The correction promptly made by petitioners would thus call for a reduction in the
damages awarded. It should be noted that there was no proof of any actual pecuniary
loss arising from the above publication. It is worthwhile
_______________
L-16027, May 30, 1962, 5. SCRA 143.

29
Ibid, p. 156.
30
129
VOL. 34, JULY 31, 1970 129
to recall what Justice Malcolm referred to as the tolerant attitude on the part of
appellate courts on this score, the usual practice being more likely to reduce damages
for libel than to increase them. 31
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of August 25, 1966

affirming the lower court decision of March 22, 1958 is hereby modified, petitioners
Eugenio Lopez and Juan T. Gatbonton being ordered to pay jointly and severally the
sum of P500.00 as moral damages and the additional amount of P500.00 for attorneys
fees. Costs against petitioners.
Concepcion, CJ., Reyes, J.B.L., Zaldivar and Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., dissents in a separate opinion.
Castro and Barredo, JJ., concur in the result.
DIZON, J., Dissenting:
Much to my regret I am constrained to dissent from the scholarly opinion penned for
the majority by Mr. Justice Enrique Fernando.
I accept the antecedent facts of the case as set forth on pp. 2-3 of the majority
opinion and, precisely on the basis thereof, I hold the view that the decision appealed
from should be reversed.
The case should be resolved, in my opinion, in the light of New York Times
Company vs. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), as the ruling therein laid down was
amplified in Curtis Publishing Company vs. Butts, 388 U.S. 120 (1967). After
considering the facts involved and the doctrine laid down in said cases, the majority
opinion says that for liability in damages to arise from an alleged libelous publication,
without offending press freedom, there is need to prove that the publication was made
with actual malicethat is, with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not.
_______________
Guevarra v. Almario. 56 Phil. 476 (1932).

31
130
ANNOTATED
Under the facts of the present case, there is obviously no criminal liability for libel.
As far as liability in damages is concerned, it is equally clear upon the record that
there is no evidence of actual malicethat is, there is no evidence showing that
petitioners or their subordinates knew that the imputation made to respondent Cruz
was false or that, in publishing that imputation, they had recklessly disregarded the
question of whether it was false or true.
On the other hand, any liability in damages, on the part of petitioners, on the basis
of tort would seem to be equally untenable. In the first place, the alleged hoax to
which respondent Cruz person was related as a result of the publication in question
if considered without passion and in the right perspectiveascribes to him nothing
immoral or involving moral turpitude. In the second place, in the light of the
circumstances surrounding the case, whatever negligence there might have been on
the part of petitioners or their subordinates would amount only to what might be
legitimately considered as excusable negligencethus eliminating any idea of
malice or intention to cause injury, on their part.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, I vote to reverse the decision appealed from.
Decision modified.
Notes.(a) Basis of liability for libel.The enjoyment of a private reputation is
as much a constitutional right as the possession of life, liberty or property. It is one
of those rights necessary to human society that underlie the whole scheme of
civilization. The law recognizes the value of such reputation and imposes upon him
who attacks it, by slanderous words or libelous publication, the liability to make full
compensation for the damages done (Worcester vs. Ocampo, 22 Phil. 42).
(b) Effect of honest mistake in identity on liability for damages arising from libelous
publication.In Phee vs. La Vanguardia, 45 Phil. 211, the defendant, who was
131
VOL. 34, JULY 31, 1970 131
sued for libel, contended that the publication was an honest mistake in identity.
Ruling on this contention, the Supreme Court held that that circumstance would be
considered only in mitigation of damages. Under all authorities, where the
publication of an article is libelous per se, an honest mistake is not a complete
defense.
(c) Effect of apology or retraction.Under the earlier decisions of the Supreme
Court, an apology or retraction seemed to be considered as a defense or at least a
ground for mitigation of liability. To have either of these effects, however, the
retraction should contain an admission of the incorrectness of the libelous publication
and evince a desire to repair the wrong occasioned thereby (Sotelo Matti vs. Bulletin
Publishing Co., 37 Phil. 562, 565). And failure to retract will not be condoned simply
because the plaintiff did not make a formal demand for retraction, especially if he
gave notice, by going to the office of the defendant, that there was a mistake in
identity (Phee vs. La Vanguardia, supra).
(d) Damages recoverable.The amount of damages in a libel case must depend
upon the facts of the particular case and the sound discretion of the court (Guevarra
vs. Almario, 56 Phil. 476).
Actual damages need not be proved, at least where the publication is libelous per
se (Phee vs. La Vanguardia, supra; Jimenez vs. Reyes, 27 Phil. 52; Quemuel vs. Court
of Appeals, 22 SCRA 44) or when the amount of the award is more or less nominal
(U.S. vs. Cara, 41 Phil. 828; Freeman vs. U.S., 40 Phil. 1039; Quemuel vs. Court of
Appeals, supra). The reason is that, by its nature, libel causes dishonor, disrepute
and discredit, and injury to the reputation of the offended party is its natural and
probable consequence (Quemuel vs. Court of Appeals, supra). The liability for
damages on account of injury to feelings and reputation in a civil action for libel is an
obligation ex delicto, and the damages are compensatory and recoverable under
Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code (Lu Shu Sing vs. Lu Tiong Gui, 76 Phil. 669).
132
ANNOTATED
Quimiguing vs. Icao
Although moral damages may undoubtedly also be recovered under Article 2219 of
the new Civil Code, there is a holding enunciated before said Code went into effect,
that the right to recover punitive and exemplary damages had been abolished by the
Revised Penal Code which repealed Act No. 277, Section 11 of which granted such
right (See Lu Chu Sing vs. Lu Tiong Gui, supra). It would seem, however, that if the
action is one based on quasi-delict (as in the Lopez case, supra), exemplary or
corrective damages may also be awarded under Article 2231 of the new Civil Code.
________________

ANNOTATED
MVRS Publications, Inc. vs. Islamic Dawah
Council of the Philippines, Inc.
G.R. No. 135306. January 28, 2003. *
MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., MARS C. LACONSAY, MYLA C. AGUJA and

AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., petitioners, vs. ISLAMIC DAWAH COUNCIL OF
THE PHILIPPINES, INC., ABDUL-RAHMAN R.T. LINZAG, IBRAHIM F.P.
ARCILLA, ABDUL RASHID DE GUZMAN, AL-FARED DA SILVA and IBRAHIM
B.A. JUNIO, respondents.
Criminal Law; Libel; Slander; Defamation Defined; Words which are merely insulting
are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however
opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for
an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages.Defamation,
which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a persons character, fame or
reputation through false and malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure reputation
or to diminish the esteem, respect,
_______________
*EN BANC.
211
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 211
good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about
the plaintiff. It is the publication of anything which is injurious to the good name or
reputation of another or tends to bring him into disrepute. Defamation is an invasion of
a relational interest since it involves the opinion which others in the community may have,
or tend to have, of the plaintiff. It must be stressed that words which are merely insulting
are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however
opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis
for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact that
the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be
interpreted to advert to an identified or identifiable individual.Declarations made about a
large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified or identifiable individual.
Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member of a class, no
member of such class has a right of action without at all impairing the equally demanding
right of free speech and expression, as well as of the press, under the Bill of Rights.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Defamation of a large group does not give rise to a cause of
action on the part of an individual unless it can be shown that he is the target of the
defamatory matter.In Arcand v. The Evening Call Publishing Company, the United States
Court of Appeals held that one guiding principle of group libel is that defamation of a large
group does not give rise to a cause of action on the part of an individual unless it can be shown
that he is the target of the defamatory matter.
VITUG, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:

Criminal Law; Libel; Slander; In order that defamatory words can be actionable in court,
it is essential that they are personal to the party maligned, as ascertained or ascertainable
individual; Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member of
a class, no member of such class has a right of action.In order that defamatory words can
be actionable in court, it is essential that they are personal to the party maligned, an
ascertained or ascertainable individual. It is only then that plaintiff s emotions and/or
reputation can be said to have been injured; thus, the plaintiff, to recover, must show that he
or she is the person to whom the statements are directed. Declarations made about a large
class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified or identifiable individual.
Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member of a class, no
member of such class has a
212
ANNOTATED
right of action without at all impairing the equally demanding right of free speech and
expression, as well as of the press, under the bill of rights.
CARPIO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Criminal Law; Libel; Slander; Instant case is not about libel which requires the
identification of the plaintiff in the libelous statement. Clearly, the instant case is not about
libel which requires the identification of the plaintiff in the libelous statement. If this were a
libel case under Article 30 of the Civil Code, which authorizes a separate civil action to
recover civil liability arising from a criminal offense, I would agree that the instant case could
not prosper for want of identification of the private respondents as the libeled persons. But
private respondents do not anchor their action on Article 30 of the Civil Code.
Same; Same; Same; This case must be decided on the issue of whether there was such
tortious conduct and not whether there was defamation that satisfied the elements of the crime
of libel.Private respondents insist that this case is principally about tortious conduct under
Article 26 of the Civil Code. Unlike the action in Article 30 of the Civil Code which must arise
from a criminal offense, the action under Article 26 may not constitute a criminal offense.
Article 26, adopted from American jurisprudence, covers several kinds of intentional torts.
Paragraph 4 of Article 26, which refers to acts humiliating another for his religious beliefs,
is embraced in the tort known as intentional infliction of mental or emotional distress. This
case must be decided on the issue of whether there was such tortious conduct, and not
whether there was defamation that satisfied the elements of the crime of libel.
Same; Same; Same; Article 26 specifically applies to intentional acts which fall short of
being criminal offenses.The intent of the Code Commission is quite clear: Article 26
specifically applies to intentional acts which fall short of being criminal offenses. Article 26
itself expressly refers to tortious conduct which may not constitute criminal offenses. The
purpose is precisely to fill a gap or lacuna in the law where a person who suffers injury
because of a wrongful act not constituting a crime is left without any redress. Under Article
26, the person responsible for such act becomes liable for damages, prevention and other
relief. In short, to preserve peace and harmony in the family and in the community, Article
26 seeks to eliminate cases of damnum absque injuria in human relations.
Same; Same; Same; In intentional tort under Article 26, the offensive statements may not
even be published or broadcasted but merely hurled privately at the offended party.
Consequently, the elements that qualify
213
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 213
the same acts as criminal offenses do not apply in determining responsibility for tortious
conduct under Article 26. Where the tortious act humiliating another because of his religious
beliefs is published in a newspaper, the elements of the crime of libel need not be satisfied
before the aggrieved person can recover damages under Article 26. In intentional tort under
Article 26, the offensive statements may not even be published or broadcasted but merely
hurled privately at the offended party.
Same; Same; Same; In intentional infliction of mental distress, the opinion of the
community is immaterial to the existence of the action although the court can consider it in
awarding damages.In intentional infliction of mental distress, the gravamen of the tort is
not the injury to plaintiffs reputation, but the harm to plaintiffs mental and emotional state.
In libel, the gist of the action is the injury to plaintiffs reputation. Reputation is the
communitys opinion of what a person is. In intentional infliction of mental distress, the
opinion of the community is immaterial to the existence of the action although the court can
consider it in awarding damages. What is material is the disturbance on the mental or
emotional state of the plaintiff who is entitled to peace of mind. The offensive act or statement
need not identify specifically the plaintiff as the object of the humiliation.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Criminal Law; Libel; Slander; Elements of Defamation.In the present civil case, it is
necessary that respondents are able to establish by preponderance of evidence the following
elements of defamation: 1. That there must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect,
real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance. 2. That
the imputation must be made publicly. 3. That it must be malicious. 4. That the imputation
must be directed at a natural or juridical person, or one who is dead. 5. That the imputation
must tend to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of the person defamed.
Same; Same; Same; Words published are libelous if they discredit plaintiff in the minds
of any considerable and respectable class in the community, taking into consideration the
emotions, prejudices, and intolerance of mankind.As a general rule, words, written or
printed, are libelous per se if they tend to expose a person to public hatred, contempt, ridicule,
aversion, or disgrace, induce an evil opinion of him in the minds of right thinking persons,
and deprive him of their friendly intercourse in society, regardless of whether they actually
produce such results. Otherwise stated, words published are libelous if they discredit plaintiff
in the minds of any considerable and respectable class in the community, taking
214
ANNOTATED
into consideration the emotions, prejudices, and intolerance of mankind. It has been held
that it is not necessary that the published statements make all or even a majority of those
who read them think any less of the person defamed, but it is enough if a noticeable part of
those who do read the statements are made to hate, despise, scorn or be contemptuous of the
person concerning whom the false statements are published.
Same; Same; Same; Liability for libel does not depend on the intention of the defamer,
but on the fact of the defamation.Significantly, liability for libel does not depend on the
intention of the defamer, but on the fact of the defamation. In matters of libel, the question
is not what the writer of an alleged libel means, but what is the meaning of the words he has
used. The meaning of the writer is quite immaterial. The question is, not what the writer
meant, but what he conveyed to those who heard or read.
Same; Same; Same; The state of mind of the person who publishes a libel is immaterial
in determining liability.Want of intention to vilify does not render an objectionable
publication any the less a libel and a publication is not excused by the publishers ignorance
that it contains libelous matter. The state of mind of the person who publishes a libel is
immaterial in determining liability. The law looks at the tendency and consequences of the
publication rather than the motive or intention of the writer or publisher. It does not signify
what the motive of the person publishing the libel was, or whether he intended it to have a
libelous meaning or not. The defendant may not have intended to injure the plaintiffs
reputation at all and he may have published the words by mistake or inadvertence, or in jest,
or without intending to refer, or knowing that he was referring, to the plaintiff, or any
existing person, or again he may have been actuated by the best motives in publishing the
words, but such facts will usually afford the defendant no defense, though they may be urged
in mitigation of damages.
Same; Same; Same; Distinction between a cause of action based on libel or defamation,
whether in a criminal or civil case, and one based on Article 26.Before proceeding any
further, a distinction must first be made between a cause of action based on libel or
defamation, whether in a criminal or civil case, and one based on Article 26. In libel, the
gravamen of the claim is reputational harm; whereas, under Article 26, it can be the
embarrassment, emotional harm or mental distress caused upon a person. In libel cases, its
four (4) constitutive elements, to wit: (a) defamatory imputation; (b) malice; (c) publication;
and (d) identifiability of the victim, must be established, by mere preponderance of evidence
in a civil case which herein petitioners have done in the present case. Said elements,
215
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 215
however, are not essential in a cause of action based on tort under Article 26, wherein
one is liable for personal injury, whether administered intentionally, wantonly or by
negligence. Personal injury herein refers not only to reputation but also encompasses
character, conduct, manner, and habits of a person.
Same; Same; Same; Paragraph 4 of Article 26 which makes one liable for vexing or
humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs finds proper application in the case at
bar.Paragraph 4 of Article 26 which makes one liable for vexing or humiliating another on
account of his religious beliefs finds proper application in the case at bar. The Code
Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that religious freedom does not authorize anyone
to heap obloquy and disrepute upon another by reason of the latters religion.
Same; Same; Same; The freedom of speech does not require a journalist to guarantee the
truth of what he says or publishes but it does prohibit publishing or circulating statements in
reckless disregard without any bona fide effort to ascertain the truth thereof.The freedom of
expression and the right of speech and of the press are, to be sure, among the most zealously
protected rights in the Constitution. But the constitutional right of freedom of expression
may not be availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths nor may it be used to insult others, for
such would be contrary to the plain mandate of the Civil Code for each person to respect the
dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The
freedom of speech does not require a journalist to guarantee the truth of what he says or
publishes but it does prohibit publishing or circulating statements in reckless disregard
without any bona fide effort to ascertain the truth thereof.
Remedial Law; Actions; Class Suits; Essential elements in order that a class suit may
prosper.In order that a class suit may prosper, Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
requires the concurrence of three (3) essential elements, namely: (1) that the subject matter
of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; (2) that the parties
are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court; and (3) that the
action be maintained by parties who will fairly and adequately represent the class.
Same; Same; Same; A judgment in a class action concludes upon all members of the
class, whether formally joined as parties or not.There should be no room for apprehension
on future litigations relating to the assailed article in view of the fact that the instant suit is
a class suit. In a class suit, each member of the class for whose benefit the action is brought
216
ANNOTATED
is a party plaintiff; the persons represented are quasi parties or parties by
representation. A suit brought in behalf of others in a class gives the court jurisdiction of the
whole subject matter, and of all the parties, such that the judgment will be binding on all
persons belonging to the class represented. In other words, a judgment in a class action
concludes upon all members of the class, whether formally joined as parties or not. The class
action has preclusive effect against one who was not named representative of the class, as
long as he was a member of the class which was a party to the judgment.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

J.G. De Belen & Associates for petitioners.
Linzag, Arcilla & Associates Law Offices for private respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
I may utterly detest what you write, but I shall fight to the death to make it possible for you to
continue writing it.
Voltaire
VOLTAIRES PONTIFICAL VERSE bestirs once again the basic liberties to free
speech and free pressliberties that belong as well, if not more, to those who
question, who do not conform, who differ. For the ultimate good which we all strive
to achieve for ourselves and our posterity can better be reached by a free exchange of
ideas, where the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the free marketnot just the ideas we desire, but including those
thoughts we despise. 1
ISLAMIC DAWAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., a local federation of

more than seventy (70) Muslim religious organizations, and individual Muslims
ABDULRAHMAN R.T. LINZAG, IBRAHIM F.P. ARCILLA, ABDUL RASHID DE
GUZMAN, ALFARED DA SILVA and IBRAHIM B.A. JUNIO, filed in the Re-
_______________
1Cf. Holmes, J., dissenting in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 630.
217
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 217
gional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a
class suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS
PUBLICATIONS, INC., MARS C. LACONSAY, MYLA C. AGUJA and AGUSTINO
G. BINEGAS, JR., arising from an article published in the 1 August 1992 issue
of Bulgar, a daily tabloid. The article reads:
ALAM BA NINYO?
Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga
Muslim?
Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin
kahit na sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila
itong Diyos at sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo na
sa araw na tinatawag nilang Ramadan.
The complaint alleged that the libelous statement was insulting and damaging to the
Muslims; that these words alluding to the pig as the God of the Muslims was not only
published out of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and
disparage the Muslims and Islam, as a religion in this country, in violation of law,
public policy, good morals and human relations; that on account of these libelous
words Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the Philippines but the entire Muslim
world, especially every Muslim individual in non-Muslim countries.
MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., in their
defense, contended that the article did not mention respondents as the object of the
article and therefore were not entitled to damages; and, that the article was merely
an expression of belief or opinion and was published without malice nor intention to
cause damage, prejudice or injury to Muslims. 2
On 30 June 1995 the trial court dismissed the complaint holding that the plaintiffs
failed to establish their cause of action since the persons allegedly defamed by the
article were not specifically identified
_______________
2Petitioners Mars C. Laconsay and Myla C. Aguja failed to file their Answer and were declared in
default.
218
ANNOTATED
It must be noted that the persons allegedly defamed, the herein plaintiffs, were not identified
with specificity. The subject article was directed at the Muslims without mentioning or
identifying the herein plaintiffs x x x x It is thus apparent that the alleged libelous article
refers to the larger collectivity of Muslims for which the readers of the libel could not readily
identify the personalities of the persons defamed. Hence, it is difficult for an individual
Muslim member to prove that the defamatory remarks apply to him. The evidence presented
in this case failed to convince this court that, indeed, the defamatory remarks really applied
to the herein plaintiffs. 3
On 27 August 1998 the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. It
opined that it was clear from the disputed article that the defamation was directed
to all adherents of the Islamic faith. It stated that pigs were sacred and idolized as
god by members of the Muslim religion. This libelous imputation undeniably applied
to the plaintiff-appellants who are Muslims sharing the same religious beliefs. It
added that the suit for damages was a class suit and that ISLAMIC DAWAH
COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.s religious status as a Muslim umbrella
organization gave it, the requisite personality to sue and protect the interests of all
Muslims. 4
Hence, the instant petition for review assailing the findings of the appellate court
(a) on the existence of the elements of libel, (b) the right of respondents to institute
the class suit, and, (c) the liability of petitioners for moral damages, exemplary
damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit.
Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a
persons character, fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. It is 5
that which tends to injure reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or
confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the
_______________
3 Decision penned by Judge Vetino E. Reyes, RTC-Br. 4, Manila, Civil Case No. 92-62441, Islamic
Dawah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. MVRS Publications, Inc.
4 Decision penned by Justice Teodoro P. Regino, concurred in by Justices Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr.,
and Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr.

5 Blacks Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951), 505.
219
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 219
plaintiff. It is the publication of anything which is injurious to the good name or
6
reputation of another or tends to bring him into disrepute. Defamation is an invasion

7
of a relational interest since it involves the opinion which others in the community
may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff. 8
It must be stressed that words which are merely insulting are not actionable as
libel or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-
natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an
action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact 9
that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself. 10
Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to

an identified or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or
alluding to a particular member of a class, no member of such class has a right of
action without at all impairing the equally demanding right of free speech and
11
expression, as well as of the press, under the Bill of Rights. Thus, in Newsweek, Inc.
12
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we dismissed a complaint for libel

13
against Newsweek, Inc., on the ground that private respondents failed to state a cause
of action since they made no allegation in the complaint that anything contained in
the article complained of specifically referred to any of them. Private respondents,
incorporated associations of sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental claiming to
have 8,500 members and several individual members, filed a class action suit for
damages in behalf
_______________
6 Words and Phrases, Defamation, citing Local 15 of Independent Workers of Noble County, Inc. v.
International Broth. of Elec. Workers, D.C., Ind., 273 F. Supp. 313, 320.
7 Id., citing Whitby v. Associates Discount Corp., 207 N.E. 2d 482, 484, 591 Ill. App. 2d 337.
8 Prosser and Keeton on Torts, (5th ed. 1984).
9 50 Am. Jur. 2d, Libel and Slander, 705 (1995).
10 Ibid.
11 50 Am Jur. 2d, Libel and Slander, 674 (1995).
12 Art. III, Sec. 4, 1987 Constitution.
13 G.R. No. 63559, 30 May 1986, 142 SCRA 171, 176-177.
220
ANNOTATED
of all sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental. The complaint filed in the Court of
First Instance of Bacolod City alleged that Newsweek, Inc., committed libel against
them by the publication of the article Island of Fear in its weekly newsmagazine
allegedly depicting Negros Province as a place dominated by wealthy landowners and
sugar planters who not only exploited the impoverished and underpaid sugarcane
workers but also brutalized and killed them with impunity. Private respondents
alleged that the article showed a deliberate and malicious use of falsehood, slanted
presentation and/or misrepresentation of facts intended to put the sugarcane planters
in a bad light, expose them to public ridicule, discredit and humiliation in the
Philippines and abroad, and make them the objects of hatred, contempt and hostility
of their agricultural workers and of the public in general. We ratiocinated
x x x where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential
that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in
that group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can
prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the
action separately, if need be x x x x The case at bar is not a class suit. It is not a case where
one or more may sue for the benefit of all, or where the representation of class interest
affected by the judgment or decree is indispensable to make each member of the class an
actual party. We have here a case where each of the plaintiffs has a separate and distinct
reputation in the community. They do not have a common or general interest in the subject
matter of the controversy.
In the present case, there was no fairly identifiable person who was allegedly injured
by the Bulgar article. Since the persons allegedly defamed could not be identifiable,
private respondents have no individual causes of action; hence, they cannot sue for a
class allegedly disparaged. Private respondents must have a cause of action in
common with the class to which they belong to in order for the case to prosper.
An individual Muslim has a reputation that is personal, separate and distinct in
the community. Each Muslim, as part of the larger Muslim community in the
Philippines of over five (5) million people, belongs to a different trade and profession;
each has a varying interest and a divergent political and religious viewsome
221
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 221
may be conservative, others liberal. A Muslim may find the article dishonorable, even
blasphemous; others may find it as an opportunity to strengthen their faith and
educate the non-believers and the infidels. There is no injury to the reputation of
the individual Muslims who constitute this community that can give rise to an action
for group libel. Each reputation is personal in character to every person. Together,
the Muslims do not have a single common reputation that will give them a common
or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
In Arcand v. The Evening Call Publishing Company, the United States Court of
14
Appeals held that one guiding principle of group libel is that defamation of a large
group does not give rise to a cause of action on the part of an individual unless it can
be shown that he is the target of the defamatory matter.
The rule on libel has been restrictive. In an American case, a person had allegedly
15
committed libel against all persons of the Jewish religion. The Court held that there
could be no libel against an extensive community in common law. In an English case,
where libel consisted of allegations of immorality in a Catholic nunnery, the Court
considered that if the libel were on the whole Roman Catholic Church generally, then
the defendant must be absolved. With regard to the largest sectors in society,
16
including religious groups, it may be generally concluded that no criminal action at

the behest of the state, or civil action on behalf of the individual, will lie.
In another case, the plaintiffs claimed that all Muslims, numbering more than 600
million, were defamed by the airing of a national television broadcast of a film
depicting the public execution of a Saudi Arabian princess accused of adultery, and
alleging that such film was insulting and defamatory to the Islamic religion. The 17
United States District Court of the Northern District of

_______________
14 567 F.2d 1163, 1164 (1977).

15 P. Wittenberg, Dangerous Words: A Guide to the Law of Libel, 226-227, citing People v. Edmundson,
168 N.Y. Misc. 141.
16 Id., 227, citing Rex v. Gathercole, 2 Lewin 237.
17 Khalid Abdullah Tariq Al Mansour Faissal Fahd Al Talal v. Fanning, Civ. No. C 80-1869 RPA, 25
September 1980, 506 F. Supp. 186.

222
ANNOTATED
California concluded that the plaintiffs prayer for $20 Billion in damages arising
from an international conspiracy to insult, ridicule, discredit and abuse followers of
Islam throughout the world, Arabs and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia bordered on
the frivolous, ruling that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate an actionable
claim for defamation. The California Court stressed that the aim of the law on
defamation was to protect individuals; a group may be sufficiently large that a
statement concerning it could not defame individual group members. 18
Philip Wittenberg, in his book Dangerous Words: A Guide to the Law of

Libel, discusses the inappropriateness of any action for tortious libel involving large
19
groups, and provides a succinct illustration:

There are groupings which may be finite enough so that a description of the body is a
description of the members. Here the problem is merely one of evaluation. Is the description
of the member implicit in the description of the body, or is there a possibility that a
description of the body may consist of a variety of persons, those included within the charge,
and those excluded from it?
A general charge that the lawyers in the city are shysters would obviously not be a charge
that all of the lawyers were shysters. A charge that the lawyers in a local point in a great
city, such as Times Square in New York City, were shysters would obviously not include all
of the lawyers who practiced in that district; but a statement that all of the lawyers who
practiced in a particular building in that district were shysters would be a specific charge, so
that any lawyer having an office within that building could sue.
If the group is a very large one, then the alleged libelous statement is considered to
have no application to anyone in particular, since one might as well defame all
mankind. Not only does the group as such have no action; the plaintiff does not
establish any personal reference to himself. At present, modern societal groups are
20
both numerous and complex. The same principle follows with these groups: as the
size of these groups increases, the chances for
_______________
18 Id., 187.
19 Ibid.
20 See Note 8, pp. 767-768.
223
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 223
members of such groups to recover damages on tortious libel become elusive. This
principle is said to embrace two (2) important public policies: first, where the group
referred to is large, the courts presume that no reasonable reader would take the
statements as so literally applying to each individual member; and second, the
limitation on liability would satisfactorily safeguard freedom of speech and
expression, as well as of the press, effecting a sound compromise between the
conflicting fundamental interests involved in libel cases. 21
In the instant case, the Muslim community is too vast as to readily ascertain who
among the Muslims were particularly defamed. The size of the group renders the
reference as indeterminate and generic as a similar attack on Catholics, Protestants,
Buddhists or Mormons would do. The word Muslim is descriptive of those who are
believers of Islam, a religion divided into varying sects, such as the Sunnites, the
Shiites, the Kharijites, the Sufis and others based upon political and theological
distinctions. Muslim is a name which describes only a general segment of the
Philippine population, comprising a heterogeneous body whose construction is not so
well defined as to render it impossible for any representative identification.
The Christian religion in the Philippines is likewise divided into different sects:
Catholic, Baptist, Episcopalian, Presbyterian, Lutheran, and other groups the
essence of which may lie in an inspired charlatan, whose temple may be a corner
house in the fringes of the countryside. As with the Christian religion, so it is with
other religions that represent the nations culturally diverse people and minister to
each ones spiritual needs. The Muslim population may be divided into smaller groups
with varying agenda, from the prayerful conservative to the passionately radical.
These divisions in the Muslim population may still be too large and ambiguous to
provide a reasonable inference to any personality who can bring a case in an action
for libel.
The foregoing are in essence the same view scholarly expressed by Mr. Justice
Reynato S. Puno in the course of the deliberations in
_______________
50 Am Jur 2d, 675 (1995).

21
224
ANNOTATED
this case. We extensively reproduce hereunder his comprehensive and penetrating
discussion on group libel
Defamation is made up of the twin torts of libel and slanderthe one being, in general,
written, while the other in general is oral. In either form, defamation is an invasion of the
interest in reputation and good name. This is a relational interest since it involves the
opinion others in the community may have, or tend to have of the plaintiff.
The law of defamation protects the interest in reputationthe interest in acquiring,
retaining and enjoying ones reputation as good as ones character and conduct warrant. The
mere fact that the plaintiff s feelings and sensibilities have been offended is not enough to
create a cause of action for defamation. Defamation requires that something be,
communicated to a third person that may affect the opinion others may have of the plaintiff.
The unprivileged communication must be shown of a statement that would tend to hurt
plaintiff s reputation, to impair plaintiff s standing in the community.
Although the gist of an action for defamation is an injury to reputation, the focus of a
defamation action is upon the allegedly defamatory statement itself and its predictable effect
upon third persons. A statement is ordinarily considered defamatory if it tend[s] to expose
one to public hatred, shame, obloquy, contumely, odium, contempt, ridicule, aversion,
ostracism, degradation or disgrace . . . The Restatement of Torts defines a defamatory
statement as one that tends to so harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the
estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.
Consequently as a prerequisite to recovery, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove as part
of his prima facie case that the defendant (1) published a statement that was (2) defamatory
(3) of and concerning the plaintiff.
The rule in libel is that the action must be brought by the person against whom the
defamatory charge has been made. In the American jurisdiction, no action lies by a third
person for damages suffered by reason of defamation of another person, even though the
plaintiff suffers some injury therefrom. For recovery in defamation cases, it is necessary that
the publication be of and concerning the plaintiff. Even when a publication may be clearly
defamatory as to somebody, if the words have no personal application to the plaintiff, they
are not actionable by him. If no one is identified, there can be no libel because no ones
reputation has been injured x x x x
In fine, in order for one to maintain an action for an alleged defamatory statement, it must
appear that the plaintiff is the person with refer-
225
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 225
ence to whom the statement was made. This principle is of vital importance in cases where a
group or class is defamed since, usually, the larger the collective, the more difficult it is for
an individual member to show that he was the person at whom the defamation was directed.
If the defamatory statements were directed at a small, restricted group of persons, they
applied to any member of the group, and an individual member could maintain an action for
defamation. When the defamatory language was used toward a small group or class,
including every member, it has been held that the defamatory language referred to each
member so that each could maintain an action. This small group or class may be a jury,
persons engaged in certain businesses, professions or employments, a restricted subdivision
of a particular class, a society, a football team, a family, small groups of union officials, a
board of public officers, or engineers of a particular company.
In contrast, if defamatory words are used broadly in respect to a large class or group of
persons, and there is nothing that points, or by proper colloquium or innuendo can be made
to apply, to a particular member of the class or group, no member has a right of action for
libel or slander. Where the defamatory matter had no special, personal application and was
so general that no individual damages could be presumed, and where the class referred to
was so numerous that great vexation and oppression might grow out of the multiplicity of
suits, no private action could be maintained. This rule has been applied to defamatory
publications concerning groups or classes of persons engaged in a particular business,
profession or employment, directed at associations or groups of association officials, and to
those directed at miscellaneous groups or classes of persons.
Distinguishing a small groupwhich if defamed entitles all its members to sue from a
large groupwhich if defamed entitles no one to sueis not always so simple. Some
authorities have noted that in cases permitting recovery, the group generally has twenty five
(25) or fewer members. However, there is usually no articulated limit on size. Suits have been
permitted by members of fairly large groups when some distinguishing characteristic of the
individual or group increases the likelihood that the statement could be interpreted to apply
individually. For example, a single player on the 60 to 70 man Oklahoma University football
team was permitted to sue when a writer accused the entire team of taking amphetamines
to hop up its performance; the individual was a full-back, i.e., a significant position on the
team and had played in all but two of the teams games.
A prime consideration, therefore, is the public perception of the size of the group and
whether a statement will be interpreted to refer to every
226
ANNOTATED
member. The more organized and cohesive a group, the easier it is to tar all its members with
the same brush and the more likely a court will permit a suit from an individual even if the
group includes more than twenty five (25) members. At some point, however, increasing size
may be seen to dilute the harm to individuals and any resulting injury will fall beneath the
threshold for a viable lawsuit.
x x x x There are many other groupings of men than those that are contained within the
foregoing group classifications. There are all the religions of the world, there are all the
political and ideological beliefs; there are the many colors of the human race. Group
defamation has been a fertile and dangerous weapon of attack on various racial, religious
and political minorities. Some states, therefore, have passed statutes to prevent concerted
efforts to harass minority groups in the United States by making it a crime to circulate
insidious rumors against racial and religious groups. Thus far, any civil remedy for such
broadside defamation has been lacking.
There have been numerous attempts by individual members to seek redress in the courts
for libel on these groups, but very few have succeeded because it felt that the groups are too
large and poorly defined to support a finding that the plaintiff was singled out for personal
attack x x x x (citations omitted).
Our conclusion therefore is that the statements published by petitioners in the
instant case did not specifically identify nor refer to any particular individuals who
were purportedly the subject of the alleged libelous publication. Respondents can
scarcely claim to having been singled out for social censure pointedly resulting in
damages.
A contrary view is expressed that what is involved in the present case is an
intentional tortious act causing mental distress and not an action for libel. That
opinion invokes Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire where the U.S. Supreme Court held
22
that words heaping extreme profanity, intended merely to incite hostility, hatred or
violence, have no social value and do not enjoy constitutional protection;
and Beauharnais v. Illinois where it was also ruled that hate speech which
23
denigrates a group of persons identified by their religion, race or ethnic origin

defames that group and
_______________
315 U.S. 568 (1942).

22
343 U.S. 250 (1952).

23
227
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 227
the law may validly prohibit such speech on the same ground as defamation of an
individual.
We do not agree to the contrary view articulated in the immediately preceding
paragraph. Primarily, an emotional distress tort action is personal in nature, i.e., it
is a civil action filed by an individual to assuage the injuries to his emotional
24
tranquility due to personal attacks on his character. It has no application in the

instant case since no particular individual was identified in the disputed article
of Bulgar. Also, the purported damage caused by the article, assuming there was any,
falls under the principle of relational harmwhich includes harm to social
relationships in the community in the form of defamation; as distinguished from the
principle of reactive harmwhich includes injuries to individual emotional
tranquility in the form of an infliction of emotional distress. In their complaint,
respondents clearly asserted an alleged harm to the standing of Muslims in the
community, especially to their activities in propagating their faith in Metro Manila
and in other non-Muslim communities in the country. It is thus beyond cavil that
25
the present case falls within the application of the relational harm principle of tort
actions for defamation, rather than the reactive harm principle on which the concept
of emotional distress properly belongs.
Moreover, under the Second Restatement of the Law, to recover for the intentional
infliction of emotional distress the plaintiff must show that: (a) The conduct of the
defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff; (b) The conduct
was extreme and outrageous; (c) There was a causal connection between the
defendants conduct and the plaintiffs mental distress; and, (d) The plaintiffs mental
distress was extreme and severe. 26
_______________
24 Not a group, unless the attack is directed against identifiable individuals within the group.
25 Rollo, p. 55.
26 See SECOND RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, TORTS 2D 46.
46. Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress

(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally x x x causes severe emotional distress to another is
subject to liabil
228
ANNOTATED
Extreme and outrageous conduct means conduct that is so outrageous in character,
and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in civilized society. The defendants
actions must have been so terrifying as naturally to humiliate, embarrass or frighten
the plaintiff. Generally, conduct will be found to be actionable where the recitation
27
of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment
against the actor, and lead him or her to exclaim, Outrageous! as his or her
reaction. 28
Emotional distress means any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as

extreme grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, disappointment, worry,
nausea, mental suffering and anguish, shock, fright, horror, and chagrin. Severe 29
emotional distress, in some jurisdictions, refers to any type of severe and disabling
emotional or mental condition which may be generally recognized and diagnosed by
professionals trained to do so, including posttraumatic stress disorder, neurosis,
psychosis, chronic depression, or phobia. The plaintiff is required to show, among
30
other things, that he or she has suffered emotional distress so severe that no
reasonable person could be expected to endure it; severity of the distress is an element
of the cause of action, not simply a matter of damages. 31
Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must prove more than mere worry,
anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger. Liability does not arise from mere
insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty expressions, or other trivialities. In
determining
_______________
ity for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm. x x
x
27 See 38 Am. Jur. 2d 15 citing cases. See also D. Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and
the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 Col.
L. Rev. 42 (1982).
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
229
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 229
whether the tort of outrage had been committed, a plaintiff is necessarily expected
and required to be hardened to a certain amount of criticism, rough language, and to
occasional acts and words that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind; the mere fact
that the actor knows that the other will regard the conduct as insulting, or will have
his feelings hurt, is not enough. 32
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell illustrates the test case of a civil action for damages
33
on intentional infliction of emotional distress. A parody appeared in Hustler

magazine featuring the American fundamentalist preacher and evangelist Reverend
Jerry Falwell depicting him in an inebriated state having an incestuous sexual liaison
with his mother in an outhouse. Falwell sued Hustler and its publisher Larry Flynt
for damages. The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia
ruled that the parody was not libelous, because no reasonable reader would have
understood it as a factual assertion that Falwell engaged in the act described. The
jury, however, awarded $200,000 in damages on a separate count of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, a cause of action that did not require a false
statement of fact to be made. The United States Supreme Court in a unanimous
decision overturned the jury verdict of the Virginia Court and held that Reverend
Falwell may not recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress. It was argued
that the material might be deemed outrageous and may have been intended to cause
severe emotional distress, but these circumstances were not sufficient to overcome
the free speech rights guaranteed under the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Simply stated, an intentional tort causing emotional distress must
necessarily give way to the fundamental right to free speech.
It must be observed that although Falwell was regarded by the U.S. High Court
as a public figure, he was an individual particularly singled out or identified in the
parody appearing on Hustler magazine. Also, the emotional distress allegedly
suffered by Rever-
_______________
See 38 Am. Jur 2d 7 citing cases.

32
485 U.S. 46 (1988). Mr. Justice Anthony Kennedy did not take part.
33
230
ANNOTATED
end Falwell involved a reactive interestan emotional response to the parody which
supposedly injured his psychological well-being.
Verily, our position is clear that the conduct of petitioners was not extreme or
outrageous. Neither was the emotional distress allegedly suffered by respondents so
severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. There is no evidence
on record that points to that result.
Professor William Prosser, views tort actions on intentional infliction of emotional
distress in this manner 34
There is virtually unanimous agreement that such ordinary defendants are not liable for
mere insult, indignity, annoyance, or even threats, where the case is lacking in other
circumstances of aggravation. The reasons are not far to seek. Our manners, and with them
our law, have not yet progressed to the point where we are able to afford a remedy in the
form of tort damages for all intended mental disturbance. Liability of course cannot be
extended to every trivial indignity x x x x The plaintiff must necessarily be expected and
required to be hardened to a certain amount of rough language, and to acts that are definitely
inconsiderate and unkind x x x The plaintiff cannot recover merely because of hurt feelings.
Professor Calvert Magruder reinforces Prosser with this succinct observation, viz.: 35
There is no occasion for the law to intervene in every case where someones feelings are hurt.
There must still be freedom to express an unflattering opinion, and some safety valve must
be left through which irascible tempers may blow off relatively harmless steam.
Thus, it is evident that even American courts are reluctant to adopt a rule of recovery
for emotional harm that would open up a wide vista of litigation in the field of bad
manners, an area in which a toughening of the mental hide was thought to be a
more
_______________
34 See Note 8, 12, p. 59 citing Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49
Harv. L. Rev. 1033, 1035. See also SECOND RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, TORTS 2D 46.
35 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1053. See also SECOND RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, TORTS 2D 46 citing
Magruder.
231
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 231
appropriate remedy. Perhaps of greater concern were the questions of causation,
36
proof, and the ability to accurately assess damages for emotional harm, each of which
continues to concern courts today. 37
In this connection, the doctrines in Chaplinsky and Beauharnais had largely been
superseded by subsequent First Amendment doctrines. Back in simpler times in the
history of free expression the Supreme Court appeared to espouse a theory, known as
the Two-Class Theory, that treated certain types of expression as taboo forms of
speech, beneath the dignity of the First Amendment. The most celebrated statement
of this view was expressed in Chaplinsky:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These
include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or fighting
wordsthose which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.
Today, however, the theory is no longer viable; modern First Amendment principles
have passed it by. American courts no longer accept the view that speech may be
proscribed merely because it is lewd, profane, insulting or otherwise vulgar or
offensive. Cohen v. California is illustrative: Paul Robert Cohen wore a jacket
38 39
bearing the words Fuck the Draft in a Los Angeles courthouse in April 1968, which
caused his eventual arrest. Cohen was convicted for violating a California statute
prohibiting any person from disturb[ing] the peace x x x by offensive conduct. The
U.S. Supreme Court conceded that Cohens expletive contained in
_______________
36 S. Olsen, White v. Monsanto: Louisiana Adopts the Restatement Approach to Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress, 66 Tulane L. Rev. 2096 (1992) citing Magruder.

37 Ibid., citing 38 Am. Jur. 2D 8-12.
38 Smolla, Free Speech in an Open Society, 1993 Ed., at pp. 160-162.
39 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
232
ANNOTATED
his jacket was vulgar, but it concluded that his speech was nonetheless protected
by the right to free speech. It was neither considered an incitement to illegal action
nor obscenity. It did not constitute insulting or fighting words for it had not been
directed at a person who was likely to retaliate or at someone who could not avoid the
message. In other words, no one was present in the Los Angeles courthouse who
would have regarded Cohens speech as a direct personal insult, nor was their any
danger of reactive violence against him.
No specific individual was targeted in the allegedly defamatory words printed on
Cohens jacket. The conviction could only be justified by Californias desire to exercise
the broad power in preserving the cleanliness of discourse in the public sphere, which
the U.S. Supreme Court refused to grant to the State, holding that no objective
distinctions can be made between vulgar and nonvulgar speech, and that the emotive
elements of speech are just as essential in the exercise of this right as the purely
cognitive. As Mr. Justice Harlan so eloquently wrote: [O]ne mans vulgarity is
another mans lyric x x x words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their
cognitive force. With Cohen, the U.S. Supreme Court finally laid the Constitutional
40
foundation for judicial protection of provocative and potentially offensive speech.

Similarly, libelous speech is no longer outside the First Amendment protection.
Only one small piece of the Two-Class Theory in Chaplinsky survivesU.S. courts
continue to treat obscene speech as not within the protection of the First
Amendment at all. With respect to the fighting words doctrine, while it remains
alive it was modified by the current rigorous clear and present danger test. Thus,
41
in Cohen the U.S. Supreme Court in applying the test held that there was no showing
that Cohens jacket bearing the words Fuck the Draft had threatened to provoke
imminent violence; and that protecting the sensibilities of onlookers was not
sufficiently compelling interest to restrain Cohens speech.
Beauharnais, which closely followed the Chaplinsky doctrine, suffered the same
fate as Chaplinsky. Indeed, when Beauharnais
_______________
Id., at pp. 25-26.

40
See Note 38.

41
233
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 233
was decided in 1952, the Two-Class Theory was still flourishing. While concededly
the U.S. High Tribunal did not formally abandon Beauharnais, the seminal shifts in
U.S. constitutional jurisprudence substantially undercut Beauharnais and seriously
undermined what is left of its vitality as a precedent. Among the cases that dealt a
crushing impact on Beauharnais and rendered it almost certainly a dead letter case
law are Brandenburg v. Ohio, and, again, Cohen v. California. These decisions
42 43
recognize a much narrower set of permissible grounds for restricting speech than
did Beauharnais. 44
In Brandenburg, appellant who was a leader of the Ku Klux Klan was convicted
under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Statute for advocating the necessity, duty and
propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means
of accomplishing industrial or political reforms; and for voluntarily assembling with
a group formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism. Appellant
challenged the statute and was sustained by the U.S. Supreme Court, holding that
the advocacy of illegal action becomes punishable only if such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action. Except in unusual instances, Brandenburg protects the advocacy of
45
lawlessness as long as such speech is not translated into action.

The importance of the Brandenburg ruling cannot be overemphasized. Prof.
Smolla affirmed that Brandenburg must be understood as
overruling Beauharnais and eliminating the possibility of treating group libel under
the same First Amendment standards as individual libel. It may well be considered
46
as one of the lynchpins of the modern doctrine of free speech, which seeks to give
special protection to politically relevant speech.
In any case, respondents lack of cause of action cannot be cured by the filing of a
class suit. As correctly pointed out by Mr. Justice
_______________
42 395 U.S. 444 (1969).

43 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
44 See Harvard Law Review, Vol. 101:682 (1988), at pp. 684-687.
45 Ibid., at p. 447.
46 See Note 38 at p. 165.
234
ANNOTATED
Jose C. Vitug during the deliberations, an element of a class suit is the adequacy of
representation. In determining the question of fair and adequate representation of
members of a class, the court must consider (a) whether the interest of the named
party is coextensive with the interest of the other members of the class; (b) the
proportion of those made parties as it so bears to the total membership of the class;
and, (c) any other factor bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the
rest of the class. 47
The rules require that courts must make sure that the persons intervening should
be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned. In the present
controversy, Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines, Inc., seeks in effect to assert
the interests not only of the Muslims in the Philippines but of the whole Muslim world
as well. Private respondents obviously lack the sufficiency of numbers to represent
such a global group; neither have they been able to demonstrate the identity of their
interests with those they seek to represent. Unless it can be shown that there can be
a safe guaranty that those absent will be adequately represented by those present, a
class suit, given its magnitude in this instance, would be unavailing. 48
Likewise on the matter of damages, we agree that moral damages may be

recovered only if the plaintiff is able to satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual
basis for the damages and its causal connection with the acts complained of, and so 49
it must be, as moral damages although incapable of pecuniary estimation are

designed not to impose a penalty but to compensate for injury sustained and actual
damages suffered. Exemplary damages, on the other hand, may only be awarded if
50
claimant is able to establish his right to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory

damages. Unfortunately, neither of the requirements to sustain an
51
_______________
47 59 Am Jur 2d, 456 (1977).

48 Citing Industrial Generating Co. v. Jenkins, 410 SW 2d 658; Los Angeles County Winans, 109 P
640; Weberpals v. Jenny, 133 NE 62.
49 Art. 2217, New Civil Code.
50 Simex International, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88013, 19 March 1990, 183 SCRA 360.
51 See Art. 2234, New Civil Code.
235
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 235
award for either of these damages would appear to have been adequately established
by respondents.
In a pluralistic society like the Philippines where misinformation about another
individuals religion is as commonplace as self-appointed critics of government, it
would be more appropriate to respect the fair criticism of religious principles,
including those which may be outrageously appalling, immensely erroneous, or those
couched as fairly informative comments. The greater danger in our society is the
possibility that it may encourage the frequency of suits among religious
fundamentalists, whether Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, or others.
This would unnecessarily make the civil courts a battleground to assert their
spiritual ideas, and advance their respective religious agenda.
It need not be stressed that this Court has no power to determine which is proper
religious conduct or belief; neither does it have the authority to rule on the merits of
one religion over another, nor declare which belief to uphold or cast asunder, for the
validity of religious beliefs or values are outside the sphere of the judiciary. Such
matters are better left for the religious authorities to address what is rightfully
within their doctrine and realm of influence. Courts must be viewpoint-neutral when
it comes to religious matters if only to affirm the neutrality principle of free speech
rights under modern jurisprudence where [a]ll ideas are treated equal in the eyes of
the First Amendmenteven those ideas that are universally condemned and run
counter to constitutional principles. Under the right to free speech, there is no such
52
thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its
correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other
ideas. Denying certiorari and affirming the appellate court decision would surely
53
create a chilling effect on the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech, of
expression, and of the press.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 27 August 1998 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision of
the RTC-Br. 4, Manila, dismissing
_______________
See Note 38 at p. 46.

52
Id., citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-340 (1974).
53
236
ANNOTATED
the complaint for lack of merit, is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Corona and Callejo, Sr., concur.
Vitug, J., See Concurring Opinion.
Mendoza, J., In the result.
Panganiban, J., In join the Dissent of Justice A.T. Carpio.
Carpio, J., See Dissenting Opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J., See my dissenting opinion.
Carpio-Morales, J., I join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Azcuna, J., I join the dissent of Justice Austria-Martinez.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
VITUG, J.:
The innate right of a person to an unimpaired reputation and good name is no less a
constitutional imperative than that which protects his life, liberty or property. Thus,
the law imposes upon him who attacks anothers reputation, by slanderous words or
libelous publication, a liability to make compensation for the injury done and the
damages sustained. 1
Private respondent Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines, Inc., a federation of

more than 70 Muslim religious organizations in the country, and the other named
respondents all claim, with understandable indignation, that they have been defamed
by an item published by petitioners in Bulgar, a tabloid, circulated in the Metro
Manila area. The article reads:
_______________
1See Worcester vs. Ocampo, 22 Phil. 42.

237
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 237
ALAM BA NINYO?
Muslim?
Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin
kahit na sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila
itong Diyos at sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo na
sa araw na tinatawag nilang Ramadan
Private respondents, for themselves and in behalf of all Muslims, filed the complaint
before the trial court against petitioners, alleging that the published article was
defamatory and an insult to respondents. The trial court dismissed the complaint. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court and ordered
petitioners to pay damages to private respondents.
Aggrieved, petitioners are now before the Court to assail the findings of the Court
of Appeals on the existence of the elements of libel, the right of respondents to
institute the class suit, and the liability of petitioners for moral damages, exemplary
damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit.
The present controversy stems from a civil action for damages and not from a
criminal complaint. The Civil Code recognizes the possibility of such a civil action
either pursuant to Article 26, paragraph (4), to the effect that although it may not
constitute a criminal offense, vexing or humiliating another on account of his
religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal
condition, can give rise to a cause of action for damages, or consonantly with Article
33 which provides that in case of defamation, a civil complaint for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal case, may be brought by the injured party.
Both civil actions are based on tort liability under common law and require the
plaintiff to establish that he has suffered personal damage or injury as a direct
consequence of the defendants wrongful conduct. In fine, it must be shown that the
act complained of is vexatious or defamatory of, and as it pertains to, the claimant,
thereby humiliating or besmirching the latters dignity and honor.
238
ANNOTATED
Defined in simple terms, vexation is an act of annoyance or irritation that causes
distress or agitation. Early American cases have refused all remedy for mental
2
injury, such as one caused by vexation, because of the difficulty of proof or of

measurement of damages. In comparatively recent times, however, the infliction of
3
mental distress as a basis for an independent tort action has been recognized. It is
said that one who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly
causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional
distress. Nevertheless, it has also been often held that petty insult or indignity
4
lacks, from its very nature, any convincing assurance that the asserted emotional or
mental distress is genuine, or that if genuine it is serious. Accordingly, it is generally
5
declared that there can be no recovery for insults, indignities or threats which are
6 7
considered to amount to nothing more than mere annoyances or hurt feelings. At all 8
events, it would be essential to prove that personal damage is directly suffered by the
plaintiff on account of the wrongful act of the defendant.
A kindred concept, albeit of greater degree of perversity, defamation, broadly
defined, is an attack on the reputation of another, the unprivileged publication of
false statements which naturally and proximately result in injury to another. It is 9
that which tends to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which a
person is held, or to excite adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feel-
_______________
2 Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., p. 1565.

3 Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 5th Ed., p. 55.
4 Restatement (Second) of Torts 46 (1965).
5 Prosser and Keeton, supra, p. 59.
6 Slocum vs. Food Fair Stores of Florida, Inc., Fla. 1958, 100 So. 2d 396; Wallace vs. Shoreham Hotel
Corp., Mun. App. D.C. 1946, 49 A2d 81; Stavnezar vs. Sage-Allen & Co., 1959, 146 Conn. 460, 152 A. 2d.
312.
7 Taft vs. Taft, 1867, 40 Vt. 229; Stratton vs. Posse Normal School of Gymnastics, 1928 163 N. E.
905; State National Bank of Iowa Park vs. Rogers, Tex. Civ. App. 1935, S. W. 2d 825.
8 Wallace vs. Shoreham Hotel Corp., supra.
9 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander 2.
239
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 239
ings or opinions against him. Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest
10
since it involves the opinion which others in the community may have, or tend to
have, of the plaintiff. The Revised Penal Code, although not the primary governing
11
law in this instance, provides an instructive definition of libel as being a form

of defamation expressed in writing, print, pictures, or signs, to wit: A libel is a public
12
and malicious imputation of a crime, or vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit,
or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is
dead. 13
While arguably, the article subject of the complaint could be characterized as

vexatious or defamatory and as imparting an erroneous interpretation of a Muslim
practice that tends to ridicule the Islamic faith, it is, however, impersonal on its face,
its language not being directed at any particular person but to a large segment of
society. In order that defamatory words can be actionable in court, it is essential that
they are personal to the party maligned, an ascertained or
ascertainable individual. It is only then that plaintiff s emotions and/or reputation
14
can be said to have been injured; thus, the plaintiff, to recover, must show that he or
she is the person to whom the statements are directed. Declarations made about a
15
large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified or identifiable

individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a particular
member of a class, no member of such class has a right of action without at all 16
impairing the equally demanding right of free speech and expression, as well as of
the press, under the bill of rights. 17
_______________
10 Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., p. 417.

11 Prosser and Keeton, supra, p. 771.
12 See Article 355, Revised Penal Code.
13 Article 353, Revised Penal Code.
14 Corpus vs. Cuaderno, Sr., 16 SCRA 807 (1966); Kunkle vs. Cablenews American, et al., 42 Phil.
757; Borjal vs. Court of Appeals,301 SCRA 1 (1999).

15 50 Am Jur 2d (1995), p. 674.
16 Id.
17 Sec. 4, Art. III, 1987 Constitution.
240
ANNOTATED
If an article, for instance, states that judges in the Philippines are corrupt, such a
general condemnation cannot reasonably be interpreted to be pointing to each judge
or to a certain judge in the Philippines. Thus, no particular magistrate can claim to
have been disgraced or to have sustained an impaired reputation because of that
article. If, on the other hand, the article proclaims that judges in Metro Manila are
corrupt, such statement of derogatory conduct now refers to a relatively narrow
group that might yet warrant its looking into in an appropriate suit. And if the article
accuses the Justices of the Supreme Court of corruption, then there is a specific
derogatory statement about a definite number of no more than fifteen persons.
Jurisprudence would appear to suggest that in cases permitting recovery, the
group generally has 25 or fewer members. When statements concern groups with
18
larger composition, the individual members of that group would be hardput to show
that the statements are of and concerning them. Although no precise limits can be
19
set as to the size of a group or class that would be sufficiently small, increasing size,
at some point, would be seen to dilute the harm to individuals and any resulting
injury would fall beneath the threshold for a viable lawsuit. This principle is said to
20
embrace two important public policies: 1) where the group referred to is large, the
courts presume that no reasonable reader would take the statements as so literally
applying to each individual member; and 2) the limitation on liability would
satisfactorily safeguard freedom of speech and expression, as well as of press,
effecting a sound compromise between the conflicting fundamental interests involved
in libel cases. 21
Thus, no recovery was allowed where the remarks complained of had been made
about correspondence schools, one school suing; or 22
_______________
18 Restatement (Second) of Torts 564A comment b (1977).

19 50 Am Jur 2d, (1995), p. 675.
20 Neil J. Rosini, The Practical Guide to Libel, supra, citing Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 84 A.D.
2d 229.
21 50 Am Jur 2d, (1995), p. 675.
22 189 F. 86, as cited by Ella Cooper Thomas in The Law of Libel and Slander (New York, 1973), p. 21.
241
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 241
where there was imputation of criminality to a union, one member suing; or where 23
an attack was made on Catholic clergymen, one clergyman suing. 24
In Newsweek, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court dismissed a class
25
suit for scurrilous remarks filed by four incorporated associations of sugar planters
in Negros Occidental in behalf of all sugar planters in that province, against
Newsweek, Inc., on the ground, among other things, that the plaintiffs were not
sufficiently ascribed to in the article published by the defendant. And so also it was
in an older case, where the Court ratiocinated that an article directed at a class or
26
group of persons in broad language would not be actionable by individuals composing

the class or group unless the statements were sweeping but, even then, it would be
highly probable, said the Court, that no action could lie where the body is composed
of so large a number of persons that common sense would tell those to whom the
publication was made that there was room for persons connected with the body to
pursue an upright and law abiding course and that it would be unreasonable and
absurd to condemn all because of the actions of a part.
In the present case, the subject article relates to the entire Muslim population and
not just to the Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines or to any of the individual
respondents. There is no direct reference or allusion to the federation or any of its
members, or to any of the individual complainants. Respondents scarcely can claim
having been singled out for social censure pointedly resulting in damages. Islamic
Dawah Council of the Philippines, Inc., itself, much like any other artificial being or
juridical entity, having existence only in legal contemplation, would be devoid of any
such real feeling or emotion as ordinarily these terms are understood, and it cannot 27
have that kind of reputation that an individual has that

_______________
23 131 N.Y.S. 680, as cited in The Law of Libel and Slander, supra.
24 81 N.E. 459, as cited in The Law of Libel and Slander, supra.
25 142 SCRA 171 (1986).
26 Uy Tioco vs. Yang Shu Wen, 32 Phil. 624.
27 ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 572 (1999).
242
ANNOTATED
could allow it to sue for damages based on impinged personal reputation. 28
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition and to SET ASIDE the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals, REINSTATING thereby the order of dismissal
rendered by the Regional Trial Court.
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
I dissent not because the newspaper article in question is libelous, but because it
constitutes an intentional tortious act causing mental distress to those whom private
respondent Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines, Inc. represents.
1. I.Nature of Action: Not a Libel but a Tort Case
Private respondents filed this class suit under Articles 19, 20, 21 and 26 of the Civil
Code. Accordingly, private respondents stated their case as follows:
Statement of Case
The Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. [Art. 19]
Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same. [Art. 20]
Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. [Art. 21]
Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbor and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute
a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
1. (1)Prying into the privacy of anothers residence;
_______________
28 50 Am Jur 2d (1995), p. 678.

243
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 243
1. (2)Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relation of another;

2. (3)Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
3. (4)Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious belief, lowly station in
life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition. [Art. 26]
It is on account of the foregoing provisions of our Civil Code that plaintiffs brought to the
court a quo a civil case for damages on account of a published article at the editorial section
of the defendant newspaper. x x x. 1
Petitioners acknowledge that private respondents principal cause of action is based

on tortious conduct when petitioners state in their Petition that [p]laintiffs rely
heavily on Article 26 of the Civil Code particularly par. 4 thereof. Petitioners,
however, assert that the newspaper article in question has not caused mental
anguish, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation or similar injury to
private respondents. 2
Clearly, the instant case is not about libel which requires the identification of the
plaintiff in the libelous statement. If this were a libel case under Article 30 of the 3
Civil Code, which authorizes a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising
from a criminal offense, I would agree that the instant case could not prosper for want
of identification of the private respondents as the libeled persons. But private
respondents do not anchor their action on Article 30 of the Civil Code.
Private respondents insist that this case is principally about tortious conduct
under Article 26 of the Civil Code. Unlike the action in Article 30 of the Civil Code
which must arise from a criminal offense, the action under Article 26 may not
constitute a criminal
_______________
1 Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, pp. 4-5.

2 Pages 16 -17, Petition.
3 Article 30 of the Civil Code provides as follows: When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil
liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of
the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of.
244
ANNOTATED
offense. Article 26, adopted from American jurisprudence, covers several kinds of
intentional torts. Paragraph 4 of Article 26, which refers to acts humiliating another
for his religious beliefs, is embraced in the tort known as intentional infliction of
mental or emotional distress. This case must be decided on the issue of whether there
was such tortious conduct, and not whether there was defamation that satisfied the
elements of the crime of libel.
1. II.The Tortious Act in Question
The newspaper article in question published by petitioners states as follows:

ALAM BA NINYO?
Muslim? Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang
kainin kahit na sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila kakain. Ginagawa
nila itong Diyos at sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo
na sa araw na tinatawag nilang Ramadan.
Private respondents claim that the newspaper article, which asserts that Muslims
worship the pig as their god, was published with intent to humiliate and disparage
Muslims and cast insult on Islam as a religion in this country. The publication is not
only grossly false, but is also the complete opposite of what Muslims hold dear in their
religion.
The trial court found that the newspaper article clearly imputes a disgraceful act
on Muslims. However, the trial court ruled that the article was not libelous because
the article did not identify or name the plaintiffs. Declared the trial court:
There is no doubt that the subject article contains an imputation of a discretable act when
4
it portrayed the Muslims to be worshipping the pig as their god. Likewise, there is no doubt
that the subject article was published, the newspaper Bulgar containing the same having
been circulated in Metro Manila and in other parts of the country.
_______________
4 Should be discreditable.
245
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 245
The defendants did not dispute these facts. x x x However, x x x identity of the person is
not present.
It must be noted that the persons allegedly defamed, the herein plaintiffs were not
identified with specificity. The subject article was directed at the Muslims without
mentioning or identifying the herein plaintiffs. x x x.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, private respondents assailed the trial court
for deciding the case as a libel case rather than a case for damages for violation of
Articles 19, 20, 21 and 26 of the Civil Code. The Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court not on the basis of Articles 19, 20, 21 and 26, but on the
ground that the newspaper article was libelous. Thus, the Court of Appeals held:
It is clear from the disputed article that the defamation was directed at all adherents of the
Islamic faith. It stated that pigs were sacred and idolized as god by members of the Muslim
religion. This libelous imputation undeniably applied to the plaintiffs-appellants who are
Muslims sharing the same religious beliefs.
Thus, both the trial and appellate courts found the newspaper article in question
insulting and humiliating to Muslims, causing wounded feelings and mental anguish
to believers of Islam. This is a finding of fact that the Court is duty bound to
respect. This finding of fact establishes that petitioners have inflicted on private
5
respondents an intentional wrongful acthumiliating persons because of their

religious beliefs. Like the trial and appellate courts, we find the newspaper article in
question dripping with extreme profanity, grossly offensive and manifestly
outrageous, and devoid of any social value. The article evidently incites religious
hatred, discrimination and hostility against Muslims.
Private respondents have certainly suffered humiliation and mental distress
because of their religious beliefs. The only question is whether the wrongful act
committed by petitioners, which does
_______________
5 International Corporate Bank v. Gueco, 351 SCRA 516 (2001); French Oil Mill Machinery Co., Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 462 (1998); Lagandaon v. Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 330 (1998); Sandoval v.
Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 283 (1996).
246
ANNOTATED
not constitute the crime of libel, is a case of damnum absque injuria or an actionable
tort under paragraph 4, Article 26 of the Civil Code.
1. III.Why Article 26 of the Civil Code was Enacted
The Code Commission explained the inclusion of Article 26 in the Civil Code in this
wise:
The present laws, criminal or civil, do not adequately cope with interferences and vexations
mentioned in Article 26.
The privacy of ones home is an inviolable right. Yet the laws in force do not squarely and
effectively protect this right.
The acts referred to in No. 2 are multifarious, and yet many of them are not within the
purview of the law in force.
Alienation of the affection of anothers wife or husband, unless it constituted adultery or
concubinage, is not condemned by the law, much as it may shock society. There are numerous
acts, short of criminal unfaithfulness, whereby the husband or the wife breaks the marital
vows, thus causing untold moral suffering to the other spouse. Why should not these acts be
the subject matter of a civil action for damages? In American law, they are.
Again, there is meddling of so-called friends who poison the mind of one or more members
of the family against the other members. In this manner many a happy family is broken up
or estranged. Why should not the law try to stop this by creating a civil action for damages?
Of the same nature is that class of acts specified in No. 3: intriguing to cause another to
be alienated from his friends.
No less serious are the acts mentioned in No. 4: vexing or humiliating another on account
of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect or other personal
condition. The penal laws against defamation and unjust vexation are glaringly inadequate.
Religious freedom does not authorize anyone to heap obloquy and disrepute upon another
by reason of the latters religion.
Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt because of the latters lowly
station in life. To a certain extent this is inevitable, from the nature of the social make-up, but
there ought to be a limit somewhere, even when the penal laws against defamation and unjust
vexation are not transgressed. In a democracy, such a limit must be established. The courts
will recognize it in each case. Social equality is not sought by the legal provision under
consideration, but due regard for decency and propriety.
247
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 247
Place of birth, of physical defect and other personal conditions are too often the pretext of
humiliation cast upon other persons. Such tampering with human personality, even though
the penal laws are not violated, should be the cause of civil action.
The article under study denounces similar acts which could readily be named, for they
occur with unpleasant frequency. (Emphasis supplied)
6
The intent of the Code Commission is quite clear: Article 26 specifically applies to
intentional acts which fall short of being criminal offenses. Article 26 itself expressly
refers to tortious conduct which may not constitute criminal offenses. The purpose
is precisely to fill a gap or lacuna in the law where a person who suffers injury
because of a wrongful act not constituting a crime is left without any redress. Under
Article 26, the person responsible for such act becomes liable for damages,
prevention and other relief. In short, to preserve peace and harmony in the family
and in the community, Article 26 seeks to eliminate cases of damnum absque
injuria in human relations.
Consequently, the elements that qualify the same acts as criminal offenses do not
apply in determining responsibility for tortious conduct under Article 26. Where the
tortious act humiliating another because of his religious beliefs is published in a
newspaper, the elements of the crime of libel need not be satisfied before the
aggrieved person can recover damages under Article 26. In intentional tort under
Article 26, the offensive statements may not even be published or broadcasted but
merely hurled privately at the offended party.
In intentional infliction of mental distress, the gravamen of the tort is not the
injury to plaintiffs reputation, but the harm to plaintiffs mental and emotional state.
In libel, the gist of the action is the injury to plaintiffs reputation. Reputation is the
com-munitys opinion of what a person is. In intentional infliction of
7
_______________
6Report of the Code Commission, pp. 32-33.

7In People v. Silvela, 103 Phil. 773, the Court, citing American jurisprudence, stated: If the defamatory
matter is not seen or heard by anyone except the defamer and the defamed, damages to character reputation
can not result since a mans reputation is the estimate in which others hold
248
ANNOTATED
mental distress, the opinion of the community is immaterial to the existence of the
action although the court can consider it in awarding damages. What is material is
the disturbance on the mental or emotional state of the plaintiff who is entitled to
peace of mind. The offensive act or statement need not identify specifically the
plaintiff as the object of the humiliation. What is important is that the plaintiff
actually suffers mental or emotional distress because he saw the act or read the
statement and it alludes to an identifiable group to which he clearly belongs.
If one of the petitioners, without specifically naming private respondents, hurled
the same statement in private separately to each of the private respondents, the act
would be actionable under Article 26 because it would cause mental distress to each
private respondent. The fact that the statement was made publicly in fact makes
matters worse because the mental or emotional distress caused on private
respondents would even be aggravated by the publicity. This merely illustrates that
the requirements of libel have no application in intentional torts under Article 26
where the impression of the public is immaterial while the impact on the mind or
emotion of the offended party is all-important. That is why in American jurisprudence
the tort of intentional infliction of mental or emotional distress is completely separate
and distinct from the twin torts of libel and slander.
8 9
The majority opinion, however, cites the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell as authority that a person may not recover for intentional
10
infliction of emotional distress arising from a publication unless the publication

contained a false statement of fact that was made with actual malice, that is, with a
_______________
him, and not what he himself thinks. Blacks Law Dictionary (6th Ed.) defines reputation thus:
Estimation in which one is held; the character imputed to a person by those acquainted with him. That by
which we are known and is the total sum of how we are seen by others. x x x General opinion, good or bad,
held of a person by those of the community in which he resides.
8 M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W. 2d 681 (1980); Section 46, Restatement (Second) of Torts.
9 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710 (1964).
10 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
249
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 249
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. The majority opinions
reliance on Hustler is misplaced. The doctrine in Hustler applies only to public
figures, and the U.S. Supreme Court found that respondent Falwell is a public
figure for purposes of First Amendment law. The U.S. Supreme Court held
in Hustler that
We conclude that public figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of publication such as the one here at
issue without a showing in addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact
which was made with actual malice, i.e., with knowledge that the statement was false or
with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, Hustler allows recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress if
the aggrieved party is a private person and not a public figure even if there is no
showing that the false statement was made with actual malice. In the instant case,
private respondents are not public figures or public officials but ordinary private
individuals represented by private respondent Islamic Dawah Council of the
Philippines, Inc.
1. IV.Constitutional Guarantee of Full Respect for Human Rights
The 1987 Constitution provides that [t]he State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights. The Constitution created a
11
Commission on Human Rights with the function, among others, to [M]onitor the
Philippine Governments compliance with international treaty obligations on human
rights. The framers of the Constitution made it clear that the term human rights
12
as used in the Constitution referred to the civil and political rights embodied in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to which the Philippines is a
13
signatory. This is clear from the following exchange in the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission:
_______________
11 Section 11, 1987 Constitution.

12 Section 18 (7), Article XIII, 1987 Constitution.
13 Entered into force on March 23, 1976.
250
ANNOTATED
MR. GARCIA: But it does not mean that we will refer to each and every specific
article therein, but only to those that pertain to the civil and politically related, as
we understand it in this Commission on Human Rights.
MR. GUINGONA: Madam President, I am not clear as to the distinction between
social and civil rights.
MR. GARCIA: There are two international covenants: the International Covenant
(on) Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights. The second covenant contains all the different rightsthe
rights of labor to organize, the right to education, housing, shelter, etcetera.
MR. GUINGONA: So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of the committee
to those the Gentleman has specified.
MR. GARCIA: Yes, to civil and political rights.
MR. GUINGONA: Thank you. (Emphasis supplied)
14
Article 20 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides
that [a]ny advocacy of x x x religious hatred that constitutes incitement to
discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law. The Human Rights
Committee created under the Covenant, in its 1983 Nineteenth Session, reported to
member states that:
1. 1.x x x In view of the nature of article 20, States parties are obliged to adopt
the necessary legislative measures prohibiting the actions referred to therein.
However, the reports have shown that in some States such actions are neither
prohibited by law nor are appropriate efforts intended or made to prohibit
them. Further, many reports failed to give sufficient information concerning
the relevant national legislation and practice.
2. 2.x x x For article 20 to become fully effective there ought to be a law making
it clear that propaganda and advocacy as described therein are contrary to
public policy and providing for an appropriate sanction in case of violation. x
x x.
15
_______________
14 Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights, 229 SCRA 117 (1994).

CCPR General Comment 11, 19th Session (1983), Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
15
251
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 251
The Covenant, being an international treaty to which the Philippines is a signatory,
is part of the countrys municipal law. The Covenant carries great weight in the
16
interpretation of the scope and meaning of the term human rights as used in the
Constitution. Unquestionably, the framers of the Constitution intentionally referred
to the civil and political rights embraced in the Covenant in describing the term
human rights. The Constitution even mandates the independent Commission on
Human Rights to monitor the compliance of the Philippine Government, which
includes the judiciary, with its treaty obligations under the Covenant.
Paragraph 4, Article 26 of the Civil Code makes civilly liable any person who
humiliates another because of his religious beliefs. This is just a soft prohibition of
advocacy of religious hatred that incites discrimination, hostility or violence, the act
the Covenant seeks to curb and which the Philippine Government has undertaken to
declare unlawful. Other countries that signed the Covenant have criminalized the
acts prohibited under the Covenant. Since our ratification of the Covenant in 1986,
the Philippines has not enacted any special legislation to enforce the provisions of the
Covenant, on the ground that existing laws are adequate to meet the requirements
of the Covenant. There is no other law, except paragraph 4, Article 26 of the Civil
Code, that can provide a sanction against intentional conduct, falling short of a
criminal act, advocating religious hatred that incites hostility between Muslims and
Christians in this country.
If we are to comply in good faith with our treaty obligations under the Covenant,
as the Constitution expressly mandates the Philippine Government, we must give
redress under Article 26 to the outrageous profanity suffered by private respondents.
Our Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land. Pacta sunt servandaevery treaty in force binds the parties
who must comply with the treaty in good faith is one such principle. Thus, if we
17
refuse to apply Article 26 to the instant case, then we admit that we have no
_______________
16 La Chemise Lacoste, S. A. v. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 373 (1984); Ram Singh v. Insular Collector of
Customs, 38 Phil. 862 (1918).

17 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 26.
252
ANNOTATED
law to enforce the Covenant. In effect, we admit non-compliance with the Covenant.
The Supreme Court of Canada, in interpreting Canadas obligation under the
Covenant, explained in R. v. Keegstra: 18
C.E.R.D. (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination) and
I.C.C.P.R. (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) demonstrate that the
prohibition of hate promoting expression is considered to be not only compatible with a
signatory nations guarantee of human rights, but is as well an obligatory aspect of this
guarantee. Decisions under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms are also of aid in illustrating the tenor of the international
communitys approach to hate propaganda and free expression. This is not to deny that
finding the correct balance between prohibiting hate propaganda and ensuring freedom of
expression has been a source of debate internationally (see, e.g., Nathan Lerner, The U.N.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1980), at pp. 43-54).
But despite debate Canada, along with other members of the international community, has
indicated a commitment to prohibiting hate propaganda, and in my opinion this court must
have regard to that commitment in investigating the nature of the government objective
behind s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code. That the international community has collectively
acted to condemn hate propaganda, and to oblige State Parties to C.E.R.D. and I.C.C.P.R. to
prohibit such expression, thus emphasizes the importance of the objective behind s. 319(2)
and the principles of equality and the inherent dignity of all persons that infuse both
international human rights and the Charter.
As a signatory to the Covenant, the Philippines is, like Canada, obligated under
international law and the 1987 Constitution to protect the inherent dignity and
human rights of all its citizens.
1. V.Freedom of Expression and Profane Utterances
The blatant profanity contained in the newspaper article in question is not the speech
that is protected by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression. Words that
heap extreme profanity, intended merely to incite hostility, hatred or violence, have
no social value and do not enjoy constitutional protection. As ex-
_______________
3 S.C.R. 697 (1990).

18
253
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 253
plained by the United States Supreme Court in the landmark case of Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire: 19
Allowing the broadest scope to the language and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, it
is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all
circumstances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
fighting wordsthose which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality. Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication
of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal
act would raise no question under that instrument. (Emphasis supplied)
Chaplinsky expressly includes profane utterances as belonging to the narrowly
limited classes of speech that are not constitutionally protected. Profane utterances,
like asserting that Muslims worship the pig as their God, have no social value
meriting constitutional protection. Blacks Law Dictionary (6th Ed.) defines the words
profane and profanity as follows:
Profane. Irreverence toward God or holy things. Writing, speaking, or acting, in manifest or
implied contempt of sacred things. Town of Torrington v. Taylor, 59 Wyo. 109, 137 P.2d 621,
624; Duncan v. U.S., C.C.A. Or., 48 F.2d 128, 133. That which has not been consecrated.
Profanity. Irreverence towards sacred things; particularly, an irreverent and
blasphemous use of the name of God. Vulgar, irreverent, or coarse language. It is a federal
offense to utter an obscene, indecent, or profane language on radio. 18 U.S.C.A.
1464. See also Obscenity.
The majority opinion states that the doctrine in Chaplinsky had largely been
superseded by subsequent First Amendment doctrines: The majority opinion then
cites the 1971 case of Cohen v.
_______________
315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766 (1942).

19
254
ANNOTATED
California as an illustrative case that American courts no longer accept the view
20
that speech may be proscribed merely because it is lewd, profane, insulting or

otherwise vulgar or offensive. However, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, a 1988 case
21
which the majority opinion also cites, clearly explains the state of American law on
this matter, thus:
Admittedly, these oft-repeated First Amendment principles, like other principles, are
subject, to limitations. We recognized in Pacifica Foundation that speech that is vulgar,
offensive, and shocking is not entitled to absolute constitutional protection under all
circumstances. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, we held that that a State could lawfully
punish an individual for the use of insulting fighting wordsthose which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. These limitations
are but recognition of the observation in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) that this Court has long recognized that not all speech is of equal
First Amendment importance. x x x. [other citations omitted] x x x.
Indeed, while democratic societies maintain a deep commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open, this free debate
has never been meant to include libelous, obscene or profane utterances against
private individuals. Clearly, the newspaper article in question, dripping with
22
extreme profanity, does not enjoy the protection of the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech.
_______________
20 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
21 Supra, note 10.
22 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Prior to New York Times, the prevailing view in the
U.S. was that lewd, obscene and profane speech was not constitutionally protected, whether directed at
private individuals or public officials. New York Times imposed, with respect to public officials, a qualified
constitutional privilege. The U.S. Supreme Court stated that the constitutional protections for speech and
press require a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice,
that is, with knowledge that it was false or made with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
255
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 255
1. VI.Courts Duty and Power to Enforce Constitutional Rights
The 1987 Constitution has conferred on the Court the power to [p]romulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. This is an
innovation in the 1987 Constitution to insure, in the words of former Chief Justice
Roberto R. Concepcion, one of the framers of the Constitution, that the protection
and enforcement of these constitutional rights is something that the courts have to
consider in the exercise of their judicial power. This provision stresses that
23
constitutional rights, whether found in the Bill of Rights or in other provisions of the
Constitution like in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, are not merely
declaratory but are also enforceable. 24
One such right, the enforcement and protection of which is expressly guaranteed
by the State under the Constitution, is the right to full respect for human rights.
The trial and appellate courts have found that private respondents religious beliefs
and practices have been twisted, ridiculed and vilified by petitioners. This is a clear
violation of the human rights of private respondents under the Constitution and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It now becomes the duty of the
Court, as the guardian of the fundamental rights of the people, to exercise its power
to protect and enforce the constitutional rights of private respondents.
The Court, pursuant to its rule making power, can require that in actions like the
instant case, the plaintiffs must bring a class suit. This will avoid multiplicity of suits
considering the numerous potential plaintiffs all over the country. A judgment in a
class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is binding under the res
judicata principle on all members of the class whether or not they were before the
court. This rule will address the fear that cases will swamp the courts all over the
25
country if profanities against religious groups are made actionable under Article 26.
_______________
23 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, pp. 491-492.

24 Ibid.
25 Re: Request of the Heirs of the Passengers of Doa Paz, 159 SCRA 623 (1988).
256
ANNOTATED
1. VII.The Special Circumstance of Muslim Secession in the South
Limitations on freedom of expression have always been rooted on special

circumstances confronting a society in its historical development. In the 1950s, faced
with rising racial tension in American society, the U.S Supreme Court ruled
in Beauharnais v. Illinois that hate speech which denigrates a group of persons
26
defined by their religion, race or ethnic origin defames that group and the law may
validly prohibit such speech on the same ground as defamation of an individual. This
was the only time that the U.S. Supreme Court upheld group libel, and since then,
there has been a consistent retreat from this doctrine as blacks and other ethnic
groups became more assimilated into the mainstream of American
society. Beauharnais expressly acknowledged that race riots and massive
immigration of unassimilated ethnic groups justified the legislature in punishing x
x x libels directed at designated collectives and flagrantly disseminated.
The majority opinion states also that Beauharnais has been superseded
by Brandenburg v. Ohio. The majority opinion explains that Brandenburg, a 1969
27
decision, ruled that advocacy of illegal action becomes punishable only if such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action. While Beauharnais has been apparently weakened by
subsequent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, it was not overturned
in Brandenburg which did not even cite or
mention Beauharnais. What Brandenburg overturned was Whitney v.
California, thus
28
Accordingly, we are here confronted with a statute which, by its own words and as applied,
purports to punish mere advocacy and to forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly
with others merely to advocate the described type of action. Such a statute falls within the
condemnation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The contrary teaching of Whitney v.
California, supra, cannot be supported, and that decision is therefore overruled. (Emphasis
supplied).
_______________
26 343 U.S. 250 (1952).

27 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
28 274 U.S. 357.
257
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 257
In any event, Brandenburg involved the constitutionality of a criminal statute which
sought to punish the mere advocacy of violence as a means to accomplish industrial
or political reform. This is distinctly different from the instant case, which involves
profane utterances that have long been recognized as devoid of social value and
outside the purview of constitutionally protected speech. 29
In 1990, the Canadian Supreme Court, in R. v. Keegstra, upheld a law 30
criminalizing hate speech toward any section of the public distinguished by color,
race, religion or ethnic origin. The Canadian Supreme Court rejected the clear and
present danger test of the U.S. Supreme Court, stating that it did not address the
psychological trauma hate propaganda causes and the subtle and incremental way
hate propaganda works. The Canadian Supreme Court found the U.S. Supreme
Courts Beauharnais decision more reflective of Canadian values rather than later
U.S. decisions that weakened Beauharnais. The Canadian Supreme Court handed
down Keegstra at a time when Canada was becoming a multi-racial society following
the influx of immigrants of different color, ethnic origin and religion. The following
passages in Keegstra are instructive:
A myriad of sourcesboth judicial and academicoffer reviews of First Amendment
jurisprudence as it pertains to hate propaganda. Central to most discussions is the 1952 case
of Beauharnais v. Illinois, where the Supreme Court of the United States upheld as
constitutional a criminal statute forbidding certain types of group defamation. Though never
overruled, Beauharnais appears to have been weakened by later pronouncements of the
Supreme Court (see, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 [1964]; Ashton v. Kentucky, 384
U.S. 195 [1966]; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 [1964]; Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 [1969]; and Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 [1971]). The trend reflected
in many of these pronouncements is to protect offensive, public invective as long as the
speaker has not knowingly lied and there exists no clear and present danger of violence or
insurrection.
xxx
_______________
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra, note 18; Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, supra, note 10.
29
Supra, note 18.

30
258
ANNOTATED
The question that concerns us in this appeal is not, of course, what the law is or should be in
the United States. But it is important to, be explicit as to the reasons why or why not
American jurisprudence may be useful in the s. 1 analysis of s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code.
In the United States, a collection of fundamental rights has been constitutionally protected
for over 200 years. The resulting practical and theoretical experience is immense, and should
not be overlooked by Canadian courts. On the other hand, we must examine American
constitutional law with a critical eye, and in this respect La Forest J. has noted in R. v.
Rahey, (1987) 1 S.C.R. 588 at 639:
While it is natural and even desirable for Canadian courts to refer to American constitutional
jurisprudence in seeking to elucidate the meaning of Charter guarantees that have counterparts in
the United States Constitution, they should be wary of drawing too ready a parallel between
constitutions born to different countries in different ages and in very different circumstances. . .
Canada and the United States are not alike in every way, nor have the documents
entrenching human rights in our two countries arisen in the same context. It is only common
sense to recognize that, just as similarities will justify borrowing from the American
experience, differences may require that Canadas constitutional vision depart from that
endorsed in the United States. (Other citations omitted)
xxx
First, it is not entirely clear that Beauharnais must conflict with existing First
Amendment doctrine. Credible arguments have been made that later Supreme Court cases
do not necessarily erode its legitimacy (see, e.g., Kenneth Lasson, Racial Defamation as Free
Speech: Abusing the First Amendment (1985), 17 Colum. Human Rights L. Rev. 11). Indeed,
there exists a growing body of academic writing in the United States which evinces a stronger
focus upon the way in which hate propaganda can undermine the very values which free
speech is said to protect. This body of writing is receptive to the idea that, were the issue
addressed from this new perspective, First Amendment doctrine might be able to
accommodate statutes prohibiting hate propaganda (see, e.g., Richard Delgado, Words That
Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling (1982), 17 Harv. C.R.-
C.L. Law Rev. 133; Irving Horowitz, Skokie, the ACLU and the Endurance of Democratic
Theory (1979), 43 Law & Contemp. Prob. 328; Lasson, op. cit., at pp. 20-30; Mari Matsuda,
Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victims Story (1989), 87 Mich. L. Rev.
2320, at p. 2348; Doe v. University of Michigan: First AmendmentRacist and Sexist
Expression on CampusCourt Strikes Down University Limits on Hate Speech (1990), 103
Harv. L. Rev. 1397).
259
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 259
In deciding Keegstra, the Canadian Supreme Court also relied on Canadas treaty
obligations under the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights which requires signatory states to prohibit any advocacy of x x x religious
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. During
the negotiations of the Covenant, the United States objected to this provision on free
speech grounds. When it finally ratified the Covenant, the United States made a
reservation rejecting this provision insofar as it conflicts with U.S. constitutional
protections. The Covenant opened for ratification on December 19, 1966 and entered
31
into force on March 23, 1976. The Philippines ratified the Covenant in 1986 without
any reservation, just like Canada. The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines even
created a Commission on Human Rights to [M]onitor the Philippine Governments
compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights. Obviously,
Canada and the Philippines are alike in their obligations under the Covenant, but
the United States is differently situated. 32
In our country, there has been a long festering and bloody Muslim secessionist
movement in the South, fueled not only by poverty but also by the palpable feeling
among Muslims that the Christian majority is not treating Muslims fairly. Private
respondents in the instant case, despite the outrageous profanity hurled at them by
petitioners, chose not to join their secessionist brethren in the armed struggle but
instead decided to petition our courts for legal redress of their grievance. They could
have easily retaliated by flinging their own blasphemous invectives against the
Christian
_______________
31 Hate Speech in the Constitutional Law of the United States, William B. Fisch, American Journal of
Comparative Law, Fall 2002.
32 American constitutional law generally protects hate speech of various kinds, including religious and
racial. In this area, the law of the United States is precisely contrary to international human rights norms.
Article 20(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states, Any advocacy of national,
racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be
prohibited by law. David M. Smolin, Exporting the First Amendment?: Evangelism, Proselytism, and the
International Religious Freedom Act, 31 Cumberland Law Review, 2000-2001.
260
ANNOTATED
religion. They did not, realizing perhaps that answering profanity with more
profanity would mean answering hatred with more hatred, further dividing rather
than unifying the Filipino nation.
Just last November of 2002, a Christian newspaper in Nigeria where the Miss
World contest was being held opined that the Prophet Mohammed would have
approved of the beauty contest. The newspaper stated: What would Mohammed
think? In all honesty, he would have probably chosen a wife from one of them. These
words provoked bloody rioting in Nigeria among Muslims who felt insulted by the
article. Hundreds died in the religious riots. Yet the offensive article in the Nigerian
newspaper pales in comparison to the utterly profane newspaper article in the instant
case.
Indeed, private respondent Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines a federation
of more than 70 Muslim religious organizations in the Philippines, deserves
commendation for bringing this case before our courts for a peaceful and legal
resolution of the issue. Private respondents have placed their trust and faith in our
courts, knowing and insisting that they are entitled to a just remedy under paragraph
4, Article 26 of the Civil Code. It is time to breathe life to this long dormant provision
of the Civil Code, to give even just a token redress to religious minorities who suffer
mental and emotional distress from mindless profanity committed by irresponsible
persons belonging to the religious majority. In the process we will contribute in
avoiding a further cleavage in the fabric of our nation, and demonstrate to our Muslim
brothers that their grievances can be redressed under the rule of law.
The instant case does not even call for a re-examination of the clear and present
danger test which we have adopted in this jurisdiction in determining the
constitutionality of legislation that impinges on civil liberties. Even under the clear
33
and present danger test, profane utterances are not constitutionally protected at least
with respect to profanities directed against private individuals. The special
circumstance involving the Muslim secessionist movement in the South should make
us more sensitive to the grievances
_______________
33 ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. Commission on Elections, 323 SCRA 811 (2000).

261
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 261
of our Muslim brothers who continue to have faith in the rule of law in this country.
Since the peace of mind of private respondents has been violated by the publication
of the profane article in question, Article 26 of the Civil Code mandates that the
tortious conduct shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other
relief. Article 2219 of the same Code provides that [M]oral damages may be
recovered in x x x actions referred to in Articles 21, 26 x x x. Private respondents are
entitled to moral damages because, as duly established by the testimonies of
prominent Muslims, private respondents suffered emotional distress which was
34
evidently the proximate result of the petitioners wrongful publication of the article
in question. 35
1. VII.Conclusion
Almost thirty years ago, I had occasion to write about Article 26 in this wise:
At the time Article 26 was lifted by the Code Commission from American jurisprudence,
many of the rights embodied therein were not yet widely accepted by American courts, and
in fact even now at least one, the right to privacy, is still struggling to gain recognition in
some states. While we have been quick to leapfrog American state decisions in recognizing
such rights, we have, however, been painfully slow in galvanizing the same in actual cases.
To date Article 26 stands almost as a mere decorative provision in our statutes, but it may
be harnessed fruitfully anytime. 36
Now is the time to apply this provision of law since the instant case falls clearly
within paragraph 4 of Article 26. Applying Article 26 will not undermine freedom of
speech since the profane publication in question belongs to the class of speech that
clearly does not enjoy constitutional protection. Applying Article 26 demonstrates
good faith compliance with our treaty obligations under the Inter-
_______________
34 Decision of Judge Vetino E. Reyes dated June 31, 1995, pp. 4-6.
35 Article 2217, Civil Code.
36 Antonio T. Carpio, Intentional Torts in Philippine Law, Philippine Law Journal, Vol. 47, No. 5
(December 1972).
262
ANNOTATED
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Applying Article 26 implements the
constitutional policy that the State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights. Applying Article 26 constitutes compliance
by the Court of its constitutional duty to protect and enforce constitutional rights.
Applying Article 26 will help bind the wounds that mindless profanities inflict on
religious minorities in violation of their human rights.
Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the petition and affirm the award by the Court of
Appeals of P50,000.00 moral damages, P10,000.00 exemplary damages, and
P10,000.00 attorneys fees to respondent Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines,
Inc. based on paragraph 4, Article 26 of the Civil Code.
DISSENTING OPINION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
I vote to affirm the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals with certain
modifications.
For a proper perspective of the issues involved in the present petition, it must be
emphasized that the portion of the subject article which alludes to the Muslims as
not eating pork because it is dirty is not the bone of contention of respondents,
because admittedly, the Muslims may eat pork if driven by necessity, as expressed in
the Quran, to wit:
Allah has forbidden you only what dies of itself and blood and the flesh of swine and that
over which any other (name) than (that of) Allah has been invoked. Then, whoever is driven
by necessity, not desiring, nor exceeding the limit, no sin is upon him.
1
The focal point of private respondents claim for damages is the insult heaped upon
them because of the malicious publication that the Muslims worship the pig as their
God which is absolutely contrary to their basic belief as Muslims that there is only
one God
_______________
1Quran, Chapter 16:115. See also Chapter 7:145.

263
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 263
they call Allah, and, that the greatest sin in Islam is to worship things or persons
other than Allah. 2
Petitioners are liable for damages both under Articles 33 and 26(4) of the Civil
Code. The instances that can be brought under Article 26 may also be subject to an
action for defamation under Article 33. In such a case, the action brought under
Article 26 is an alternative remedy, and the plaintiff can proceed upon either theory,
or both, although he can have but one recovery for a single instance of publicity. 3
Article 33 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
Necessarily, Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code comes into play. In the present
civil case, it is necessary that respondents are able to establish by preponderance of
evidence the following elements of defamation:
1. 1.That there must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance.
2. 2.That the imputation must be made publicly.
3. 3.That it must be malicious.
4. 4.That the imputation must be directed at a natural or juridical person,
or one who is dead.
_______________
2 Michael J. Diamond and Peter G. Gowing, Islam and Muslim: Some Basic Information. 1981 New
Day Publishing, Quezon City, pp. 29-30. (Michael J. Diamond is Vicar General of the Prelature of Marawi,
Marawi City, Lanao del Sur, Peter G. Gowing was a Doctor of Theology in Ecumenics and Church History).
3 R. A. Epstein, C. O. Gregory, and H. Kalven, Jr., Cases and Materials on Torts, 1984 Ed., p. 1271 citing
Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts, Section 652E.

264
ANNOTATED
1. 5.That the imputation must tend to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt
of the person defamed. 4
An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a

crime, the possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or an act, omission,
condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in
contempt, or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead. 5
As a general rule, words, written or printed, are libelous per se if they tend to expose
a person to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, aversion, or disgrace, induce an evil
opinion of him in the minds of right thinking persons, and deprive him of their friendly
intercourse in society, regardless of whether they actually produce such
results. Otherwise stated, words published are libelous if they discredit plaintiff in
6
the minds of any considerable and respectable class in the community, taking into
consideration the emotions, prejudices, and intolerance of mankind. It has been held 7
that it is not necessary that the published statements make all or even a majority of
those who read them think any less of the person defamed, but it is enough if a
noticeable part of those who do read the statements are made to hate, despise, scorn
or be contemptuous of the person concerning whom the false statements are
published. 8
Thus, in order to be libelous per se, the defamatory words must be of such a nature
that the court can presume as a matter of law that they will tend to disgrace and
degrade the person or hold him up to public hatred, contempt, ridicule or cause him
to be shunned and avoided; in other words, they must reflect on his integrity, his
character, and his good name and standing in the community, and tend to expose him
to public hatred, contempt, or disgrace. The imputation must be one which tends to
9
affect plaintiff in a class of

_______________
4 Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book II, Fourteenth Edition, Revised 1998, p. 921.
5 Vasquez vs. Court of Appeals, 314 SCRA 460, 471 (1999).
6 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander, 13.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander, 13. See also 50 Am. Jur. 2d, Libel and Slander, 82.
265
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 265
society whose standard of opinion the court can recognize. It is not sufficient, 10
standing alone, that the language is unpleasant and annoys or irks plaintiff, and
subjects him to jests or banter, so as to affect his feelings. 11
In the present case, it is evident that the subject article attributes a discreditable
or dishonorable act or condition to all Muslims in general, a derision of the religious
beliefs of the Muslims and of the objectives of respondent Council to herald the truth
about Islam, in particular. The portion of the assailed article which declares that the
Muslims worship the pigs as God is obnoxiously contrary to the basic belief of the
Muslims.
Thus, the article is not only an imputation of irreligious conduct but also a
downright misrepresentation of the religious beliefs of Muslims. It has been held that
scandalous matter is not necessary to make a libel; it is enough if the defendant
induces an ill opinion to be held of the plaintiff, or to make him contemptible or
ridiculous; or that the imputation tends to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt of
12
the offended party. 13
Petitioners stance that the article Alam Ba Ninyo? is but an expression of belief
or opinion does not justify said publication. It cannot be considered as a mere
information being disseminated. Petitioners defense that the article itself was merely
a contribution of a reader, or that the writer was soliciting opinion from the readers,
does not hold water, since the article did not in any way refer to such circumstance.
Verily, the article, read as a whole with the other paragraphs, calls the attention of
the readers to a statement of fact, not fiction, and that the writer speaks with
authority on the subject matter. Bulgar in fact prides itself as being the Pahayagan
Ng Katotohanan.
_______________
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 25 Words and Phrases, Libel, p. 119 citing Cooper vs. Greeley, N.Y., I Denio, 347, 359.
13 Article 353, Revised Penal Code.
266
ANNOTATED
Significantly, liability for libel does not depend on the intention of the defamer, but
on the fact of the defamation. In matters of libel, the question is not what the writer
14
of an alleged libel means, but what is the meaning of the words he has used. The 15
meaning of the writer is quite immaterial. The question is, not what the writer meant,
but what he conveyed to those who heard or read. 16
In other words, it is not the intention of the speaker or writer, or the understanding
of the plaintiff or of any particular hearer or reader, by which the actionable quality
of the words is to be determined. It is the meaning that the words in fact conveyed,
rather than the effect which the language complained of was fairly calculated to
produce and would naturally produce on the minds of persons of reasonable
understanding, discretion, and candor, taking into consideration accompanying
explanations and surrounding circumstances which were known to the hearer or
reader. The alleged defamatory statement should be construed not only as to the
expression used but also with respect to the whole scope and apparent object of the
writer. 17
Want of intention to vilify does not render an objectionable publication any the less
a libel and a publication is not excused by the publishers ignorance that it contains
libelous matter. The state of mind of the person who publishes a libel is immaterial
18
in determining liability. The law looks at the tendency and consequences of the
publication rather than the motive or intention of the writer or publisher. It does not 19
signify what the motive of the person pub-

_______________
14 R. L. McEwen and P. S. C. Lewis, Gatley on Libel and Slander, 89 (1967), citing Russell L. J. in
Cassidy vs. Daily Mirror, 2 K.B. 354 (1929); Newstead vs. London Express, 1 K.B. 377, 396 (C.A.) (1940).
See also 50 Am. Jur., Libel and Slander, 25.
15 People vs. Encarnacion (CA), 48 Official Gazette 1817, 1820 (1952), citing Lord Bramwell in Hentys
Case, 52 L.J.Q.B. 232 (1882).

16 Ibid.
17 People vs. Encarnacion (CA), supra citing 53 C.J.S. 48-50.
18 M. H. Newell, The Law on Slander and Libel in Civil and Criminal Cases, 6, (1924), citing Curtis vs.
Mussey, 6 Gray (Mass.) 261.

19 R. L. McEwen and P. S. C. Lewis, Gatley on Libel and Slander, 8, (1967).
267
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 267
lishing the libel was, or whether he intended it to have a libelous meaning or not. The 20
defendant may not have intended to injure the plaintiffs reputation at all and he may
have published the words by mistake or inadvertence, or in jest, or without intending
21
to refer, or knowing that he was referring, to the plaintiff, or any existing person, or
again he may have been actuated by the best motives in publishing the words, but
such facts will usually afford the defendant no defense, though they may be urged in
mitigation of damages. 22
Tested with the foregoing principles of law, there is no doubt that the article in
question is defamatory under Article 33 of the Civil Code. If the imputation is
defamatory, the Court has held that malice is presumed and the burden of
23
overcoming the presumption of malice by mere preponderance of evidence rested on
the petitioners.
A careful examination of the records of the case does not reveal any cogent reason
that would set aside the presumption of malice. In fact, there is convincing evidence
that the publication of the assailed article was malicious, as more extensively
discussed in the latter portion of herein opinion.
Furthermore, there is no showing that the instant case falls under any of the
exceptions provided for in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Art. 354. Requirement of publicity.Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown,
except in the following cases:
_______________
20 Ibid., citing Nevill vs. Fine Arts Co., 2 Q.B. 163 (1895).
21 Ibid., citing Blake vs. Stevens, 11 L.T. 543 (1864); Fox vs. Broderick, 14 Ir. C.L.R. 453 (1864); Shepheard vs.
Whitaker, LR.L. 10 C.P. 502 (1875); Tompson vs. Dashwood, 11 Q.B.D. 43 (1883); Morrison vs. Ritchie, 4 F. 645
(Ct. of Sess.) (1902); Van Wiginton vs. Pulitzer, 218 Fed. R. 795 (1914).
22 Ibid., citing Cook vs. Ward, 6 Bing. 409 (1830); R. vs. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868); Bowen vs. Hall, 6
Q.B.D. 343 (1881); Jones vs. Hutton, 2 K.B. 279 (1909).

23 Vicario vs. Court of Appeals, 308 SCRA 25, 34 (1999).
268
ANNOTATED
1. 1.A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any
legal, moral or social duty; and
2. 2.A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of
any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential
nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any
other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
Consequently, there is no compelling reason to disregard the findings of the Court of

Appeals that no evidence was presented to overcome said presumption of malice.
On the matter of publication, there is no dispute that the same is present, as the
subject article was admittedly published in the newspaper Bulgar which was
circulated in Metro Manila and in other parts of the country.
It must be emphasized that not only did both the trial court and the appellate court
find that the subject article was published, they also held that the subject article
contains an imputation of a discretable act when it portrayed the Muslims to be
worshipping the pig as their god.
But the trial court and the appellate court differed as to the presence of the
element of the identity of the persons defamed. While the trial court held that the
libelous article does not identify the personalities of the persons defamed and
therefore respondents had no cause of action, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
Muslims were the defamed persons and respondent IDCP has the requisite
personality to sue for damages. The appellate court is right.
Specific identity of the person defamed means that the third person who read or
learned about the libelous article must know that it referred to the plaintiff. In order 24
to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim is identifiable although it is not
necessary that he be named; it is likewise not sufficient that the offended party
recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed,
_______________
50 Am. Jur. 3d, Libel and Slander 493.

24
269
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 269
but it must be shown that at least a third person could identify him as the object of
the libelous publication. 25
It cannot be refuted that the obvious victims in the article in question are
specifically identifiedthe Muslims. The principle laid down in Newsweek, Inc. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, that where the defamation is alleged to have been
26
directed at a group or class, it is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or

allembracing as to apply to every individual in that class or group, or sufficiently
specific so that each individual in that class or group can prove that the defamatory
statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action separately, if
need be, obviously applies to the present case. Certainly, the defamatory imputation
contained in the subject article is a sweeping statement affecting a common or general
interest of all Muslims, that is, their religious belief in Allah as the one and only God.
The publication was directed against all Muslims without exceptions and it is not
necessary to name each one of them as they could only have one cause of action which
is the damage suffered by them caused by the insult inflicted on their basic religious
tenets.
All premises considered, petitioners are indeed liable for damages under Article
33 of the Civil Code.
Significantly, the respondents brought to the attention of the Court of Appeals the
failure of the trial court to appreciate Article 26(4) of the Civil Code, but the appellate
court simply delved exclusively on the applicability of libel and the existence of its
elements.
Ordinarily, the Court may only pass upon errors assigned. However, this rule is
27
not without exceptions. The Court has ruled that an appellate court is accorded a
broad discretionary power to consider errors not assigned, involving, among others,
(1) matters
_______________
25 Borjal vs. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 1, 18 (1999), citing Kunkle vs. Cablenews-American, 42 Phil.
757 (1922), Corpus vs. Cuaderno, Sr., 16 SCRA 807 (1966), and People vs. Monton, 6 SCRA 801 (1962).
26 142 SCRA 171 (1986).
27Jimenez vs. Patricia, Inc., 340 SCRA 525 (2000); Philippine Basketball Association vs. Court of
Appeals, 337 SCRA 358 (2000); Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 333 SCRA
663 (2000); Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 145, 153 (1997).
270
ANNOTATED
not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving
at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice
or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (2) matters not specifically assigned as errors
on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing
on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court
ignored; and (3) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the
determination of a question properly assigned, is dependent. Evidently, all three
28
exceptions apply to the present case.

Necessarily, the Court has to dwell on the applicability of Article 26 (4) of the Civil
Code in support of respondents claim for damages.
Before proceeding any further, a distinction must first be made between a cause of
action based on libel or defamation, whether in a criminal or civil case, and one based
on Article 26. In libel, the gravamen of the claim is reputational harm; whereas,
under Article 26, it can be the embarrassment, emotional harm or mental distress
caused upon a person. In libel cases, its four (4) constitutive elements, to wit: (a)
29
defamatory imputation; (b) malice; (c) publication; and (d) identifiability of the
victim, must be established, by mere preponderance of evidence in a civil case which
30
herein petitioners have done in the present case. Said elements, however, are not
essential in a cause of action based on tort under Article 26, wherein one is liable for
personal injury, whether ad-
_______________
28 Catholic Bishop of Balanga vs. Court of Appeals, 264 SCRA 181, 191-192 (1996). See also Sy vs. Court
of Appeals, 330 SCRA 550, 555-556 (2000); Logronio vs. Taleseo, 312 SCRA 52, 61-62 (1999); Dando vs.
Frazer, 227 SCRA 126, 133 (1993); Espina vs. Court of Appeals,215 SCRA 484, 488 (1992); Carillo vs. De
Paz, 18 SCRA 467, 471 (1966); Hernandez vs. Andal, 78 Phil. 196, 209-210 (1947).
29 T. B. Aquino, Torts and Damages, 2001 Ed., p.470, citing Watkins, p. 145.
30 Vasquez vs. Court of Appeals, 314 SCRA 460, 471 (1999); Alonzo vs. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 51,
59 (1995); Daez vs. Vasquez, 191 SCRA 61, 67 (1990).

271
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 271
ministered intentionally, wantonly or by negligence. Personal injury herein refers
31
not only to reputation but also encompasses character, conduct, manner, and habits
of a person. 32
American Tort Law, on the basis of which, Philippine Tort Law was patterned, has
recognized that if the plaintiff is shown to have suffered a wrong, the mere paucity of
cases or absence of any precedent does not constitute sufficient reason for refusing
relief if a sound principle of law can be found which governs, or which by analogy
ought to govern. The fact that a case is novel does not operate to defeat recovery, if
33
it can be brought within the general rules of law applicable to torts. Neither is the 34
fact that a tort action does not fit into a nicely defined or established cubbyhole of
the law has been said not to warrant, in itself, the denial of relief to one who is
injured. Thus, to ignore the application of the proper provision of law in the instant
35
case would be an abdication of the judiciarys primordial objective, which is, the just
resolution of disputes.
Article 26 is an integral part of the Chapter in the Civil Code on human relations,
designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience.
These guides for human conduct should run as golden threads through society, to the
end that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of
justice. Article 26, which enhances and preserves human dignity and personality,
36
provides:
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of
his neighbors and other persons. The follow-
_______________
31 74 Am Jur 2d Torts 2, citing Fisher vs. Toler, 194 Kan 701, 401 P2d 1012.
32 74 Am Jur 2d Torts 2, citing Tisdale vs. Eubanks, 180 NC 153, 104 SE 339, 11 ALR 374; Smith vs.
Buck, 119 Ohio St 101, 162 NE 383, 61 ALR 1343.
33 74 Am Jur 2d Torts 4; 1 Am Jur 2d, Actions 49.
34 74 Am Jur 2d Torts 4, citing Miller vs. Monsen, 228 Minn 400, 37 NW2d 543, Harris vs. Nashville Trust
Co., 128 Tenn 573, 162 SW 584.

35 74 Am Jur 2d Torts 4, citing Seidel vs. Greenberg, 108 NJ Super 248, 260 A2d 863, 40 ALR 3d 987.
36 Report of the Code Commission, p. 39.
272
ANNOTATED
ing and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause
of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
1. (1)Prying into the privacy of anothers residence;

2. (2)Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
3. (3)Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
4. (4)Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in
life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition. (Emphasis supplied)
The raison detre for the foregoing statutory provision, as stated by the Code
Commission in its Report, is worth setting forth verbatim:
The sacredness of human personality is a concomitant of every plan for human amelioration.
The touchstone of every system of laws, of the culture and civilization of every country, is how
far it dignifies man. If in legislation, inadequate regard is observed for human life and safety;
if the laws do not sufficiently forestall human suffering or do not try effectively to curb those
factors or influences that wound the noblest sentiments; if the statutes insufficiently protect
persons from being unjustly humiliated, in short, if human personality is not properly
exaltedthen the laws are indeed defective. Sad to say, such is to some degree the present
state of legislation in the Philippines. To remedy this grave fault in the laws is one of the
principal aims of the Project of Civil Code. Instances will now be specified.
The present laws, criminal and civil, do not adequately cope with the interferences and
vexations mentioned in Article 26. (Emphasis supplied)
37
Thus, Article 26 provides aggrieved individuals with a legal remedy against

violations of human personality, even though such do not amount to violations of
penal laws. Social equality is not sought, but simply due regard for decency and
propriety. 38
Among the rights covered by Article 26 are: (a) personal dignity, (b) personal
security; (c) family relations, (d) social intercourse, (e) privacy and (f) peace of
mind. However, it has been held that the
39
_______________
37 Report of the Code Commission, pp. 33-34.

38 Ibid.
39 Tolentino, supra at 89.
273
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 273
violations mentioned in the Article 26 are not exclusive but are merely examples and
do not preclude other similar acts. Thus, disturbing or offensive utterances, such as
40
threats, false statements, or insulting, humiliating, scandalous, or abusive

language, may give rise to an action in tort where such language causes mental or
41
emotional disturbance, as in this case, or bodily injury or illness resulting therefrom. 42
Paragraph 4 of Article 26 which makes one liable for vexing or humiliating another
on account of his religious beliefs finds proper application in the case at bar. The Code
Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that religious freedom does not authorize
anyone to heap obloquy and disrepute upon another by reason of the latters religion. 43
In support of respondents claim for damages, Professor Abdul Rafih Sayedy, Dean
of the Institute of Islamic Affairs of the University of the Philippines, testified in this
wise:
WITNESS:
A: First, I understood that this tabloid is the voice
of katotohanan but regarding this article it is
not katotohanan. To the Muslim it is a
blasphemy. It is an abuse and desecration and
belief of the Muslims and the Muslims are
commanded by God to worship no other than
Him. So how could the publisher publish that
the Muslims are worshipping pigs, that
Muslims in his mind do not eat animals while
they are also eating slaughtered chicken, cow
and carabao and other non-prohibited animals.
So to the Muslims this is an insult, not only to
the Muslims in Mindanao but to the whole
Muslim community. This is a blasphemy to the
Muslims.
Q As a Muslim, Professor Sayedy, how do you
feel about this article?
_______________
40 Concepcion vs. Court of Appeals, 324 SCRA 85, 94 (2000) citing E. P. Caguioa, Comments and Cases
on Civil Law, 1959 Ed., Vol. 1, p. 41.

41 Ibid.
42 74 Am Jur 2d Torts 32. 38 Am Jur 2d Fright, Shock and Mental Disturbance.
43 Report of the Code Commission, p. 33.
274
ANNOTATED
A I feel insulted and I feel that the beliefs of the
Muslims are over abused by the publisher and
it is a defamation and desecration on the
religion of the Islam.
Q What is the concept of God insofar as the
religion of Islam is concerned?
A The concept of God is that God is the only
God, He was not begotten and He is to be
worshipped and no other to be worshipped
aside from him, He has no beginning and has
no end, He is the creator of all creatures and
He should be honored by all creatures. 44
Clearly therefrom, the assailed article is vexatious and humiliating to Muslims as

they adore only one God, they call Allah. Muslims are called Muslims because they
sincerely believe in the Quran and the Hadith (the Saying and the Conduct of the
Prophet). It cannot be over-stressed that Muslims do not eat pork because it is
forbidden in the Quran for being unclean not because they hold pigs as sacred and
worship them; and that to the Muslims, the greatest sin in Islam is to worship persons
or things other than Allah. 45
Petitioner Myla C. Aguja, who testified as Myla Tabora, admitted in open court
that she: wrote the subject article; was a graduate of Mass Com; based the said
article on her interpretation of what she recalled she had read in Readers Digest
while she was still in high school; and did not verify if what she recalled was
true. Such shocking irresponsible attitude on her part who at that time was an
46
Assistant Editor of Bulgar is utterly malicious, in the same degree as the failure of
the rest of the petitioners (except Binegas, Jr.) to verify the truthfulness of the
47
subject article, for which they should be held liable for damages.
The freedom of expression and the right of speech and of the press are, to be sure,
among the most zealously protected rights in the Constitution. But the constitutional
right of freedom of expression may not be availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths
nor may it be used to insult others, for such would be contrary to the plain
_______________
44 TSN, May 10, 1993, pp. 8-9.

45 Michael J. Diamond and Peter G. Gowing, supra, Note 24.
46 TSN, Hearing of November 18, 1990, pp. 8-9 and 19.
47 See next page.
275
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 275
mandate of the Civil Code for each person to respect the dignity, personality, privacy
and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The freedom of speech does not
require a journalist to guarantee the truth of what he says or publishes but it does
prohibit publishing or circulating statements in reckless disregard without any bona
fide effort to ascertain the truth thereof. 48
By causing the assailed article to be published in reckless disregard of the truth

thereof, petitioners publisher MVRS, Editor-in-Chief Mars C. Laconsay, Assistant
Editor and writer Myla C. Aguja (Myla Tabora) exhibited utter irresponsibility and
acted contrary to the Code of Ethics adopted by the journalism profession in the
Philippines, for which they deserve condemnation. The assailed article has falsely
portrayed all Muslims as worshippers of pig or swine and thus, perverted their
religious beliefs and demeaned the Muslims as a segment of human society. It
belittled the Muslims by inverting the relative importance of their religious beliefs
and practice, thereby disgracing the ideals and aspirations of the Muslim people.
Such amounts to a violation of their personal dignity and peace of mind, which are
the very rights affirmed by Article 26.
Petitioner Binegas should be absolved from liability. It is not refuted that the
principal function of petitioner Binegas, Jr., as Circulation Manager of Bulgar, was
to supervise the delivery and the distribution of the paper, monitor the accounts of
the agents and schedule the circulation personnel. It is likewise unrebutted that
petitioner Binegas, Jr. was never consulted on what articles are to be published; that
he had no authority to decide whether or not a certain publication of Bulgar shall be
circulated; and that his only duty was to distribute the issue after its printing. As 49
such, his duty being ministerial in character, petitioner Binegas, Jr., should have
been exonerated from liability.
Now, do plaintiffs-respondents IDCP and its officers have the requisite personality
to institute the suit? The answer is in the affirmative. Respondents IDCP and its
officers have the requisite
_______________
48In Re: Emil P. Jurado, 243 SCRA 299, 327 (1995), citing Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. vs. Capulong, 160
SCRA 861 (1988).
49 Ibid., pp. 6, 11-12.
276
ANNOTATED
personality to institute the suit inasmuch as the action is properly a class suit.
The concept of a true class suit has been elucidated upon in Re: Request of the
Heirs of the Passengers of Doa Paz, thus: 50
What makes a situation a proper case for a class suit is the circumstance that there is only
one right or cause of action pertaining or belonging in common to many persons, not separately
or severally to distinct individuals.
The true class action, which is the invention of equity, is one which involves the enforcement of a
right which is joint, common, or secondary or derivative. x x (It) is a suit wherein, but for the class
action device, the joinder of all interested parties would be essential.
A true class actionas distinguished from the so-called hybrid and the spurious class action in
U.S. Federal Practiceinvolves principles of compulsory joinder, since x x (were it not) for the
numerosity of the class members all should x x (be) before the court. Included within the true class
suit x x (are) the shareholders derivative suit and a class action by or against an unincorporated
association. x x. A judgment in a true class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is
binding under res judicata principles upon all the members of the class, whether or not they were
before the court. It is the nondivisible nature of the right sued on which determines both the
membership of the class and the res judicata effect of the final determination of the right.
The object of the suit is to obtain relief for or against numerous persons as a group or as
an integral entity, and not as separate, distinct individuals whose rights or liabilities are
separate from and independent of those affecting the others. (Emphasis supplied)
In order that a class suit may prosper, Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
requires the concurrence of three (3) essential elements, namely: (1) that the subject
matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; (2)
that the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the
court; and (3) that the action be maintained by parties who will fairly and adequately
represent the class.
_______________
50 159 SCRA 623, 627 (1988), citing 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties 415, Moore, Federal Practice, 2d., Vol. 3B,
pp. 23-257, 23-258.

277
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 277
Under the first requisite, the person who sues must have an interest in the
controversy, common with those for whom he sues, and there must be that unity of
interest between him and all such other persons which would entitle them to
maintain the action if suit was brought by them jointly. 51
As to what constitutes common interest in the subject matter of the controversy

has been explained in Sulo ng Bayan, Inc. vs. Araneta, Inc., thus: 52
The interest that will allow parties to join in a bill of complaint, or that will enable the court
to dispense with the presence of all the parties, when numerous, except a determinate
number, is not only an interest in the question, but one in common in the subject matter of
the suit, xxx a community of interest growing out of the nature and condition of the right in
dispute; for, although there may not be any privity between the numerous parties, there is a
common title out of which the question arises, and which lies at the foundation of the
proceedings x x x [here] the only matter in common among the plaintiffs, or between them
and the defendants, is an interest in the question involved, which alone cannot lay a
foundation for the joinder of parties. There is scarcely a suit at law, or in equity, which settles
a principle or applies a principle to a given state of facts or in which a general statute is
interpreted, that does not involve a question in which other parties are interested. x x x
It has further been held that in order to maintain a class action there must be an
ascertainable class as well as a community of interest among the members of that
class in questions of law and fact involved. The class must be cognizable and
53
manageable, and must be defined at the outset of the action. There must be a
cognizable class beyond the general strains which can be conceived to create a class
of any superficially resembling parties, but it is not necessary that the exact number
comprising the class be specified or that the members be identified. 54
_______________
51 Certia vs. Notre Dame du Lac University, 141 N.E. 318.

52 72 SCRA 347, 357 (1976) citing Scott vs. Donald, 165 U.S. 107, 41 Law. Ed. 447, 52 S. Ct. 217.
53 67A C.J.S. Parties, 24.
54 Ibid.
278
ANNOTATED
The first element is present in this case. The class spoken of in the assailed article
that segregates them from the other members of the general populace is the Muslim
people, and their common interest, undoubtedly, is their religious belief in adoring
Allah as the one and only God and that the greatest sin is to worship persons or things
other than Allah. The article is an outrageous misrepresentation, inflicting stark
insult on the religious beliefs of the Muslims.
Concerning the second element, i.e., numerosity of partiesone must bear in mind
that the purpose of the rule permitting class actions is to furnish a mode of obtaining
a complete determination of the rights of the parties in such cases, when the number
is so great as to preclude involvement by actual service. In this class of cases, one is
allowed to sue for all as a matter of convenience in the administration of justice. A
class action is particularly proper in an action wherein the persons are so
multitudinous as vexatiously to prolong and probably altogether prevent a full
hearing. 55
Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that Muslims in this country comprise a
lot of the population, thus, it is highly impractical to make them all parties or bring
them all before the court. It is beyond contradiction that the Muslims affected by the
assailed article are multitudinous, and therefore, the second element is present in
the instant case.
With regards to the third element, that the action be maintained by one who fairly
and adequately represents the class, it is essential that the relief sought must be
beneficial to the class members, the party must represent the entire class asserted,
and be a member of the class he claims to represent, in addition to having an interest
in the controversy common with those for whom he sues. For adequate 56
representation, it is sufficient that there are persons before the court who have the
same interest as the absent persons and are equally certain to bring forward the
entire merits of the question and thus give such interest effective protection. It has 57
_______________
55 Ibid. Also 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties 46, 55 and 62; 67A C.J.S. Parties, 698.
56 Ibid.
57 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties 63.
279
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 279
also been held that whether the class members are adequately represented by the
named plaintiffs depends on the quality of representation rather than on the number
of representative parties as compared with the total membership of the class. Thus, 58
even one member of a large class can provide the kind of representation for all that
is contemplated by the class suit. 59
Respondent IDCP, as a religious organization, being a federation or umbrella

organization of more than seventy (70) Muslim religious organizations in the
Philippines, and its officers who are individual respondents as well, carry the
requisite personality to file a case for damages in behalf of all Muslims.
Unequivocally, they properly represent the Muslims who are similarly situated and
affected by the assailed article.
Respondent officers of IDCP namely, Abdulrahman R.T. Linzag, Ibrahim F. P.
Arcilla, Abdul Rashid De Guzman, and Ibrahim B. A. Junio, as well as their witness,
Professor Abdul Rafih Sayedy, not only testified on how the assailed article
emotionally, as well as psychologically, affected each of them, but also as to how the
said article received the condemnation and contempt of other Muslims, further
evidenced by the letter dated September 21, 1992 from thirty-one (31) students of the
Islamic University Madinah AlMukarramah, K.S.A., and the seething letter of one
60
Abdil T. Arafat of South Cotabato province, dated September 29, 1992. 61
Moreover, an officer may sue in his own behalf if the defamation affects him as
well as the corporation, or where the defamation against the officer has a direct
62
relation to the corporations trade or business and it causes injury. 63
_______________
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Exhibit B.
61 Exhibit C.
6253 C.J.S., Libel and Slander, 146 citing Stidham vs. State Bank of Ebson, 270 p. 594, 126 Kan 600
(1928), Rusciano & Son Corporation vs. Mihalyfi, 1 N.Y.S. 2d 787, 165 Misc. 932; R.G. Dun & Co. vs. Shepp,
91 S. W. 2d 330, 127 Tex. 80.
63 Brayton vs. Cleveland Special Police Co., 63 Ohio St 83, 57 N.E. 1085 (1900).
280
ANNOTATED
Thus, without a shred of doubt, respondents IDCP and the individual respondents,
and all Muslims they represent, have interest so identical that the motive and
inducement to protect and preserve may be assumed to be the same in each. By 64
instituting the suit, the respondents necessarily represent all Muslims. 65
Under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages which include physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury, although incapable of
pecuniary computation, may be recovered for acts and actions based on Article 26. 66
Individual Muslim plaintiffs-respondents, Abdulrahman R.T. Linzag, Ibrahim F.

P. Arcilla, Abdul Rashid De Guzman, and Ibrahim B. A. Junio, as well as their
witness, Professor Abdul Rafih Sayedy, as proper representatives of the class action
testified on the despair, mental anguish, social humiliation and inferior feeling
experienced by the Muslims as a result of the vexatious article. Thus, the award of 67
moral damages is justified.

The award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees is likewise warranted and
the amount is in accordance with Articles 2229 and 2208 of the Civil Code.
68 69
_______________
6459 Am. Jur. 2d Parties 62, p. 473 citing Maxwell vs. Brougher, 222 P2d 910, 99 C.A. 2d 824.
6559 Am. Jur. 2d Parties 62, p. 473 citing Nunelly vs. First Federal Building & Loan Association of
Agden, 154 P.2d 620, 107 Utah 347.
66 Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
xxx xxx x x x;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
xxx xxx x x x.
67 TSNs, April 26, 1993, pp. 23, 25; July 30, 1993, pp. 13-14, 16-17; November 12, 1993, pp. 7, 9, 20-21;
April 18, 1994, pp. 7, 10-12.

68 Article 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.

69 Article 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial
costs, cannot be recovered, except:

281
VOL. 396, JANUARY 28, 2003 281
However, damages awarded to individual respondents should be deleted inasmuch as
the instant case is considered as a class suit and they merely acted as officers and
members of the principal plaintiff-respondent IDCP.
One last point. There should be no room for apprehension on future litigations
relating to the assailed article in view of the fact that the instant suit is a class suit.
In a class suit, each member of the class for whose benefit the action is brought is a
party plaintiff; the persons represented are quasi parties or parties by
representation. A suit brought in behalf of others in a class gives the court jurisdiction
of the whole subject matter, and of all the parties, such that the judgment will be
binding on all persons belonging to the class represented. 70
In other words, a judgment in a class action concludes upon all members of the
class, whether formally joined as parties or not. The class action has preclusive effect
71
against one who was not named representative of the class, as long as he was a member
of the class which was a party to the judgment. 72
Thus, in the case at bar, the Muslims, who are parties represented by respondent
IDCP and its officers, are thereby precluded from instituting separate or individual
suits for damages against MRVS Publications, Inc., et al., as they are bound by the
judgment in this class action, which amounts to res judicata.
_______________
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

xxx xxx xxx
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorneys fees and expenses of litigation
should be recovered.
In all cases, the attorneys fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
70 67A C.J.S. Parties 30.
71 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties 90, citing Williams v. State (La), 350 So. 2d 131; Schlosser v. Allis-Chalmers
Corp., 86 Wis. 2d 226, 271 N.W. 2d 879; Drainage Dist. Of Lincoln County v. Kirkpatrick-Pettis Co., 140 Neb
530, 300 NW 582.
72 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments 108.
282
ANNOTATED
Vicente vs. Planters Development Bank
In the light of all the foregoing, I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion.
Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside. That of the trial court reinstated
and affirmed.
Note.In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be
identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. (Borjal vs. Court of
Appeals, 301 SCRA 1 [1999])
o0o

[No. 12592. March 8, 1918.]
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs.FELIPE BUSTOS ET AL.,
defendants and appellants.
1. 1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS; AsSEMBLY

AND PETITION; HISTORY.Freedom of speech as cherished in democratic
countries was unknown in the Philippine Islands before 1900. It was among the
reforms sine quibus non insisted upon by the Filipino People. The Malolos
Constitution, the work of the Revolutionary Congress, in its bill of rights, zealously
guarded these basic rights. A reform so sacred to the people of these Islands and won
at so dear a cost should now be protected and carried forward.
1. 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.The Constitution of the United States and the State constitutions
guarantee the right of freedom of speech and press and the right of assembly and
petition.Beginning with the President's Instructions to the Commission of April 7,
1900, these guaranties were made effective in the Philippines. They are now part
and parcel of the Organic Lawof the Constitutionof the Philippine Islands.
1. 3.ID.; ID.; ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.These paragraphs in the

Philippine Bill of Rights carry with them all the applicable English and American
jurisprudence.
1. 4.ID.; ID.; GENERAL PRINCIPLES.The interests of society and the maintenance

of good government demand a full discussion of
732
732 PHILIPPINE REPORTS
ANNOTATED
United States vs. Bustos.
1. public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is necessary
for free speech. "The people are not obliged to speak of the conduct of their officials
in whispers or with bated breath in a free government, but only in a despotism."
(Howarth vs. Barlow [1906], 113 App. Div. N. Y., 510.) Of course, criticism does not
authorize defamation.
1. 5.ID.; ID.; ID.The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to
criticize judicial conduct.
1. 6.ID.; ASSEMBLY AND PETITION; GENERAL PRINCIPLES.The right to

assemble and petition is a necessary consequence of republican institutions and the
complement of the right of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens
to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that
any person or group of persons can apply without fear of penalty to the appropriate
branch or office of the Government for a redress of grievances.
1. 7.ID.; FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS; ASSEMBLY AND
PETITION; PRIVILEGE.The doctrine of privileged communications rests upon
public policy, "which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice,
though, as an incidental result, it may, in some instances, afford an immunity to the
evil-disposed and malignant slanderer." (Abbott vs. National Bank of Commerce,
Tacoma [1899], 175 U. S., 409, 411.)
1. 8.ID.; ID.; ID.; QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE.Qualified privilege is a prima

facie privilege which, may be lost by proof of malice. "A communication made bona
fide upon any subject matter in which the party communicating has an interest or in
reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a
corresponding interest or duty, although it contain criminatory matter which
without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable." (Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E.
& B. 344; 1 Jur. [N. S.], 846; 25 L. J. Q. B., 25; 3 W. R., 474; 85 E. C. L., 344.)
1. 9.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is
probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith,
the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. Personal injury
is not necessary. The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the
communication is made in intemperate terms. Finally, if a party applies to the wrong
person through some natural and honest mistake as to the respective functions of
various officials, such an unintentional error would not take the case out of the
privilege.
1. 10.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MALICE.In the usual libel case, malice can be presumed from
defamatory words. Privilege destroys that presumption. The onus of proving malice
then lies on the plaintiff.
733
VOL. 37, MARCH 8, 1918. 733
1. 11.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.A privileged communication should not be subjected to

microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive
scrutiny will defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged
communications.
1. 12.ID.; ID.; ID.Previous decisions of this court concerning libel reviewed and
distinguished.
1. 13.ID.; ID.; ID.A petition, prepared and signed at an assembly of numerous citizens
including affidavits by five individuals, charging a justice of the peace with
malfeasance in office and asking for his removal, was presented through lawyers to
the Executive Secretary. The Executive Secretary referred the papers to the judge of
first instance of the district. The judge of first instance, after investigation,
recommended to the GovernorGeneral that the justice of the peace be removed from
office. Later, on the/justice of the peace filing a motion for new trial, the judge of first
instance ordered the suppression of the charges and acquitted the justice of the peace
of the same. Criminal action was then begun against the petitioners, now become the
defendants, charging that portions of the petition presented to the Executive
Secretary were libelous. The trial court found thirty-two of the defendants guilty and
sentenced each of them to pay a nominal fine. On a review of the evidence, we find
that express malice was not proved by the prosecution. Good faith surrounded the
action of the petitioners. Their ends and motives were justifiable. The charges and
the petition were transmitted through reputable attorneys to the proper functionary.
The defendants are not guilty and instead of punishing them for an honest endeavor
to improve the public service, they should rather be commended for their good
citizenship.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. Moir, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Kincaid & Perkins for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes, for appellee,
MALCOLM, J.:
This appeal presents the specific question of whether or not the defendants and
appellants are guilty of a libel of Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe
and Masantol, Province of Pampanga. The appeal also submits the larger question of
the attitude which the judiciary should
734
take in interpreting and enforcing the Libel Law in connection with the basic
prerogatives of freedom of speech and press, and of assembly and petition. For a
better understanding, the facts in the present appeal are first narrated in the order
of their occurrence, then certain suggestive aspects relative to the rights of freedom
of speech and press and of assembly and petition are interpolated, then the f facts are
tested by these principles, and, finally, judgment is rendered.
First, the facts. In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of
Pampanga assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary
through the law office of Crossfield & O'Brien, and five individuals signed affidavits,
charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol,
Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. Crossfield &
O'Brien submitted this petition and these affidavits with a complaint to the Executive
Secretary. The petition transmitted by these attorneys was signed by thirty-four
citizens apparently of considerable standing, including councilors and property
owners (now the defendants), and contained the statements set out in the information
as libelous. Briefly stated' the specific charges against the justice of the peace were.
1. 1.That Francisca Polintan, desiring to make complaint against Mariano de los

Reyes, visited the justice of the peace, who first told her that he would draw
up the complaint for P5; afterwards he said he would take P3 which she paid;
also kept her in the house for four days as a servant and took f from her two
chickens and twelve "gandus;"
2. 2.That Valentin Sunga being interested in a case regarding land which was on
trial before the justice of the peace, went to see the justice of the peace to
ascertain the result of the trial, and was told by the justice of the peace that
if he wished to win he must give him P50. Not having this amount, Sunga
gave the justice nothing, and a few days later was informed that he had lost
the case. Returning again to the office of the justice of the peace in order to
735
VOL. 37, MARCH 8, 1918. 735
1. appeal, the justice told him that he could still win if he would pay P50;
2. 3.That Leoncio Quiambao, having filed a complaint for assault against four
persons, on the day of the trial the justice called him over to his house, where
he secretly gave him (Quiambao) P30; and the complaint was thereupon
shelved.
The Executive Secretary referred the papers to the judge of first instance for the
Seventh Judicial District requesting investigation, proper action, and report. The
justice of the peace was notified and denied the charges. The judge of first instance
found the first count not proved and counts 2 and 3 established. In view of this result,
the judge, the Honorable Percy M. Moir, was of the opinion "that it must be, and it is
hereby, recommended to the Governor-General that the respondent be removed from
his position as justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Province of Pampanga,
and it is ordered that the proceedings had in this case be transmitted to the Executive
Secretary."
Later the justice of the peace filed a motion for a new trial; the judge of first
instance granted the motion and reopened the hearing; documents were introduced,
including a letter sent by the municipal president and six councilors of Masantol,
Pampanga, asserting that the justice of the peace was the victim of prosecution, and
that one Agustin Jaime, the auxiliary justice of the peace, had instituted the charges
for personal reasons; and the judge of first instance ordered a suppression of the
charges against Punsalan and acquitted him of the same. Attorneys for complainants
thereupon appealed to the Governor-General, but whether the papers were forwarded
to the Governor-General as requested the record does not disclose.
Criminal action against the petitioners, now become the defendants, was
instituted on October 12, 1916, by virtue of the following information:
"That on or about the month of December, 1915, in the municipality of Macabebe,
Pampanga, P. I., the said accused, voluntarily, illegally, and criminally and with
malicious in-
736
tent to prejudice and defame Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano who was at said time and
place justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol of this province, wrote, signed,
and published a writing which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and
libelous against the justice of the peace Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano, in which
writing appear among other things the following:
" 'That the justice of the peace, Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano, of this town of
Macabebe, on account of the conduct observed by him heretofore, a conduct highly
improper of the office which he holds, is found to be a public functionary who is
absolutely unfit, eminently immoral and dangerous to the community, and
consequently unworthy of the office.
" That this assertion of the undersigned is evidenced in a clear and positive manner
by facts so certain, so serious, and so denigrating which appear in the affidavits
attached hereto, and by other facts no less serious, but which the undersigned refrain
from citing herein for the sake of brevity and in order not to bother too much the
attention of your Honor and due to lack of sufficient proof to substantiate them.
" 'That should the higher authorities allow the said justice of the peace of this town
to continue in his office, the protection of the rights and interests of its inhabitants
will be illusory and utopic; rights and interests solemnly guaranteed by the
Philippine Bill of Rights, and justice in this town will not be administered in
accordance with law.
" 'That on account of the wrongful discharge of his office and of his bad conduct as
such justice of the peace, previous to this time, some respectable citizens of this town
of Macabebe were compelled to present an administrative case against the said
Roman Punsalan Serrano before the judge of first instance of Pampanga, in which
case there were made against him various charges which were true and certain and
of different characters.
" 'That after the said administrative case was over, the said justice of the peace,
far from changing his bad and despicable conduct, which has roused the indignation
of this
737
VOL. 37, MARCH 8, 1918. 737
town of Macabebe, subsequently performed the acts abovementioned, as stated in the
affidavits herewith attached, as if intending to mock at the people and to show his
mistaken valor and heroism.'
"All of this has been written and published by the accused with the deliberate
purpose of attacking the virtue, honor, and reputation of the justice of the peace, Mr.
Roman Punsalan Serrano, and thus exposing him to public hatred, contempt, and
ridicule. All contrary to law."
It should be noted that the inf formation omits paragraphs of the petition
mentioning the investigation before the judge of first instance, the affidavits upon
which based and the concluding words, "To the Executive Secretary, through the
office of Crossfield & O'Brien."
The Honorable Percy M. Moir found all the defendants, with the exception of Felix
Fernandez, Juan S. Alfonso, Restituto Garcia, and Manuel Mallari, guilty and
sentenced each of them to pay a fine of P10 and one thirty-second part of the costs, or
to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. New attorneys for the
defense, coming into the case, after the handing down of the decision, filed on
December 16, 1916, a motion for a new trial, the principal purpose of which was to
retire the objection interposed by the then counsel for the defendants to the admission
of Exhibit A consisting of the entire administrative proceedings. The trial court
denied the motion. All the defendants, except Melecio S. Sabado and Fortunato
Macalino appealed making the f following assignments of error:
1. "1.The court erred in overruling the motion of the convicted defendants for a
new trial.
2. "2.The court erred in refusing to permit the defendants to retire the objection
inadvertently interposed by their counsel to the admission in evidence of
the expediente administrativo out of which the accusation in this case arose.
3. "3.The court erred in sustaining the objection of the prosecution to the
introduction in evidence by the accused of the affidavits upon which the
petition forming the basis of the libelous charge was based.
738
1. "4.The court erred in not holding that the alleged libelous statement was
unqualifiedly privileged.
2. "5.The court erred in assuming and impliedly holding that the burden was on
the defendants to show that the alleged libelous statements were true and
free from malice.
3. "6.The court erred in not acquitting the defendants.
4. "7.The evidence adduced fails to show the guilt of the defendants beyond a
reasonable doubt. This is especially true of all the defendants, except Felipe
Bustos, Dionisio Mallari, and Jose T. Reyes."
We have thus far taken it for granted that all the proceedings, administrative and
judicial, were properly bef fore this court. As a matter of f act counsel for def fendants
in the lower court made an improvident objection to the admission of the
administrative proceedings on the ground that the signatures were not identified and
that the same was immaterial, which objection was partially sustained by the trial
court. Notwithstanding this curious situation by reason of which the attorney for the
defense attempted to destroy through his objection the very foundation for the
justification of his clients, we shall continue to consider all the proceedings as before
us. Not indicating specifically the reason for this action, let the f following be stated:
The administrative proceedings were repeatedly mentioned during the trial. These
proceedings were the basis of the accusation, the information, the evidence, and the
judgment rendered. The prosecution cannot be understood without knowledge of
anterior action. Nothing more unjust could be imagined than to pick out certain words
which standing by themselves and unexplained are libelous and then by shutting off
all knowledge of facts which would justify these words, to convict the accused. The
records in question are attached to the rollo, and either on the ground that the
attorneys for the defense retired the objection to the introduction of the
administrative proceedings by the prosecution, or that a new trial should have been
had because under section 42 of the Code of Criminal Procedure "a case may be
reopened on account of errors at law committed at the trial,"
739
VOL. 37, MARCH 8, 1918. 739
or because of the right of this court to call in such records as are sufficiently
incorporated into the complaint and are essential to a determination of the case, or
finally, because of our conceded right to take judicial notice of official action in
administrative cases and of judicial proceedings supplemental to the basis action, we
examine the record as before us, containing not alone the trial for libel, but the
proceedings previous to that trial giving rise to it. To this action, the Government can
not complain for it was the prosecution which tried to incorporate Exhibit A into the
record.
With these facts pleading justification, before testing them by certain principles
which make up the law of libel and slander, we feel warranted in seizing the
opportunity to 'intrude an introductory and general discussion of f freedom of speech
and press and assembly and petition in the Philippine Islands. We conceive that the
time is ripe thus to clear up certain misapprehensions on the subject and to place
these basic rights in their proper light.
Turning to the pages of history, we state nothing new when we set down that
freedom of speech as cherished in democratic countries was unknown in the
Philippine Islands before 1900. A prime cause for revolt was consequently ready
made. Jose Rizal in "Filipinas Despus de Cien Aos" (The Philippines a Century
Hence, pages 62 et seq.) describing "the reforms sine quibus non," which the Filipinos
insist upon, said:
"The minister, * * * who wants his reforms to be reforms, must begin by declaring
the press in the Philippines free and by instituting Filipino delegates."
The Filipino patriots in Spain, through the columns of "La Solidaridad" and by
other means invariably in exposing the wants of the Filipino people demanded
"liberty of the press, of cults, and of associations." (See Mabini, La Revolucin
Filipina.) The Malolos Constitution, the work of the Revolutionary Congress, in its
Bill of Rights, zealously guarded freedom of speech and press and assembly and
petition.
740
Mention is made of the foregoing data only to deduce the proposition that a reform so
sacred to the people of these Islands and won at so dear a cost, should now be
protected and carried forward as one would protect and preserve the covenant of
liberty itself.
Next comes the period of American-Filipino cooperative effort, The Constitution of
the United States and the State constitutions guarantee the right of freedom of
speech and press and the right of assembly and petition. We are therefore, not
surprised to find President McKinley in that Magna Charta of Philippine Liberty, the
Instruction to the Second Philippine Commission, of April 7, 1900, laying down the
inviolable rule "That no law shall be passed abridging the f freedom of speech or of
the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the
Government for a redress of grievances."
The Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, and the Jones Law, the
Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, in the nature of organic acts for the Philippines,
continued this guaranty. The words quoted are not unfamiliar to students of
Constitutional Law, for they are the counterpart of the first amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, which the American people demanded before
giving their approval to the Constitution.
We mention the foregoing facts only to deduce the proposition never to be forgotten
for an instant that the guaranties mentioned are part and parcel of the Organic Law
of the Constitutionof the Philippine Islands.
These paragraphs found in the Philippine Bill of Rights are not threadbare
verbiage. The language carries with it all the applicable jurisprudence of great
English and American Constitutional cases. (Kepner vs. U. S. [1904], 195 U. S.,
100; Serra vs. Mortiga [1907], 204 U. S., 470.) And what are these principles?
Volumes would inadequately answer. But included are the following:
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full
discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public me"
741
VOL. 37, MARCH 8, 1918. 741
is a scalpel in the case of f free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the
abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust
accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public
officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts.
Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course,
criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual is less than
the State, so must expected criticism be born for the common good. Rising superior to
any official or set of officials, to the Chief Executive, to the Legislature, to the
Judiciaryto any or all the agencies of Governmentpublic opinion should be the
constant source of liberty and democracy. (See the well considered cases
of Wason vs. Walter, 4 L. R. 4 Q. B., 73; Seymour vs. Butterworth, 3 F. & F., 372; The
Queen vs. Sir R. Carden, 5 Q. B. D., 1.)
The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize
judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern.
Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper
comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as
any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled. Attempted
terrorization of public opinion on the part of the judiciary would be tyranny of the
basest sort. The sword of Damocles in the hands of a judge does not hang suspended
over the individual who dares to assert his prerogative as a citizen and to stand up
bravely before any official. On the contrary, it is a duty which every one owes to
society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is
further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate
or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose
duty it is to inquire into and punish them. In the words of Mr. Justice Gayner, who
contributed so largely to the law of libel. "The people are not obliged to speak of the
conduct of their officials in whispers or with
742
bated breath in a free government, but only in a despotism,"
(Howarth vs. Barlow [1906], 113 App. Div., N. Y., 510.)
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican
institutions and the complement of the right of free speech. Assembly means a right
on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs.
Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty,
to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The
persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the
charges made.
Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government
have demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result
has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege.
"The doctrine of privileged communications rests upon public policy, 'which looks
to the free and unfettered administration of justice, though, as an incidental result,
it may in some instances afford an immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant
slanderer.' " (Abbott vs. National Bank of Commerce, Tacoma [1899], 175 U. S., 409,
411.)
Privilege is classified as either absolute or qualified. With the first, we are not
concerned. As to qualified privilege, it is as the words suggest a prima facie privilege
which may be lost by proof of malice. The rule is thus stated by Lord Campbell, C. J.
"A communication made bona fide upon any subjectmatter in which the party
communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged,
if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contained
criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable."
(Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. & B., 344; 1 Jur. [N. S.], 846; 25 L. J. Q. B., 25; 3 W. R., 474;
85 E. C. L., 344.)
A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege is a complaint made
in good faith and without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public of-
743
VOL. 37, MARCH 8, 1918. 743
ficial when addressed to an officer or a board having some interest or duty in the
matter. Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for
belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of
privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. But the statements must be
made under an honest sense of duty; a self-seeking motive is destructive, Personal
injury is not necessary. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient
administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is
privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith
believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. The
privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the communication is made in
intemperate terms. A further element of the law of privilege concerns the person to
whom the complaint should be made. The rule is that if a party applies to the wrong
person through some natural and honest mistake as to the respective functions of
various officials such unintentional error will not take the case out of the privilege.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege
destroy that presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies on, the plaintiff.' The
plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the existence of malice as the true motive
of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of probable cause will amount to proof of
malice. (See White vs. Nicholls [1845], 3 How., 266.)
A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to
discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the
protection which the law throws over privileged communications. The ultimate test
is that of bona fides. (See White vs. Nicholls [1845], 3 How.,
266; Bradley vs. Heath [1831], 12 Pick. [Mass.], 163; Kent vs. Bongartz [1885], 15 R.
L, 72; Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, vol. 1, pp. 308, 309; Newell, Slander and
Libel, various citations; 25 Cyc. pages 385 et seq.)
Having ascertained the attitude which should be assumed
744
relative to the basic rights of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and
petition, having emphasized the point that our Libel Law as a statute must be
construed with reference to the guaranties of our Organic Law, and having sketched
the doctrine of privilege, we are in a position to test the facts of this case with these
principles.
It is true that the particular words set out in the inf formation, if said of a private
person, might well be considered libelous per se. The charges might also under certain
conceivable conditions convict one of a libel of a government official. As a general rule
words imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace dishonesty or corruption or
incapacity or misconduct touching him in his office are actionable. But as suggested
in the beginning we do not have present a simple case of direct and vicious
accusations published in the press, but of charges predicated on affidavits made to
the proper official and thus qualifiedly privileged. Express malice has not been proved
by the prosecution. Further, although the charges are probably not true as to the
justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith
surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or
misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens
to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venalwere justifiable. In
no way did they abuse the privilege. These respectable citizens did not eagerly seize
on a frivolous matter but on instances which not only seemed to them of a grave
character, but which were sufficient in an investigation by a judge of first instance to
convince him of their seriousness. No undue publicity was given to the petition. The
manner of commenting on the conduct of the justice of the peace was proper. And
finally the charges and the petition were submitted through reputable attorneys to
the proper functionary, the Executive Secretary. In this connection it is sufficient to
note that justices of the peace are appointed by the Governor-General, that they may
be removed by the Governor-General upon the recommendation of a Judge of
745
VOL. 37, MARCH 8, 1918. 745
First Instance, or on the Governor-General's own motion, and that at the time this
action took place the Executive Bureau was the office through which the Governor-
General acted in such matters. (See Administrative Code of 1917, secs. 203 and 229,
in connection with the cases of U. S. vs. Galeza [1915], 31 Phil., 365, and of
Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. & B., 344, holding that where defendant was subject to
removal by the sovereign, a communication to the Secretary of State was privileged.)
The present facts are further essentially different from those established in other
cases in which private individuals have been convicted of libels of public officials.
Malice, traduction, falsehood, calumny, against the man and not the officer, have
been the causes of the verdict of guilty. (See U. S. vs. Sedano [1909], 14 Phil., 338,
339; U. S. vs. Contreras [1912], 23 Phil., 513; U. S. vs. Montalvo [1915], 29 Phil.,
595.)
The Attorney-General bases his recommendation for confirmation on the case of
the United States vs. Julio Bustos ([1909], 13 Phil., 690). The Julio Bustos case, the
Attorney-General says, is identical with the Felipe Bustos case, with the exception
that there has been more publicity in the present instance and that the person to
whom the charge was made had less jurisdiction than had the Secretary of Justice in
the Julio Bustos case. Publicity is immaterial if the charge against Punsalan is in fact
a privileged communication. Moreover, in the Julio Bustos case we find wild
statements, with no basis in fact, made against reputable members of the judiciary,
"to persons who could not furnish protection." Malicious and untrue communications
are not privileged. A later case and one more directly in point to which we invite
especial attention is United States vs. Galeza ([1915], 31 Phil., 365). (Note
also Yancey vs. Commonwealth [1909], 122 So. W., 123.)
We find the defendants and appellants entitled to the protection of the rules
concerning qualified privilege, growing out of constitutional guaranties in our bill of
rights. Instead of punishing citizens for an honest endeavor to
746
Flores vs. Zurbito.
improve the public service, we should rather commend them for their good
citizenship. The defendants and appellants are acquitted with the costs de officio, So
ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Johnson, Araullo, Street, and Fisher, JJ., concur.
CARSON, J., concurring:
I concur.
I think it proper to observe, however, that in my opinion the Attorney-General is
entirely correct when he says that this case is substantially identical with the former
"Bustos case (The United States vs. Bustos, 13 Phil. Rep., 690). I believe that a
careful reading of our decisions in these cases is sufficient to demonstrate that fact.
The truth is that the doctrine of the prevailing opinion in the former Bustos case has
long since been abandoned by this court; and in my opinion it would make for the
more efficient administration of the Libel Law in these Islands to say so, in so many
words. (Cf. U. S. vs. Sedano, [1909], 14 Phil. Rep., 338, 339; U.
S. vs. Contreras [1912], 23 Phil. Rep., 513; U. S. vs. Montalvo [1915], 29 Phil. Rep.,
595; and U S. vs. Galeza [1915], 31 Phil. Rep., 365.)
Judgment reversed; defendants acquitted.
______________

VOL. 137, JULY 22, 1985 717
Gonzales vs. Kalaw Katigbak
No. L-69500. July 22, 1985. *
JOSE ANTONIO U. GONZALEZ in behalf of MALAYA FILMS, LINO BROCKA,

JOSE F. LACABA, and DULCE Q. SAGUISAG, petitioners, vs. CHAIRMAN MARIA
KALAW KATIGBAK, GENERAL WILFREDO C. ESTRADA (Ret.), and THE BOARD
OF REVIEW FOR MOTION PICTURES AND TELEVISION (BRMPT), respondents.
Constitutional Law; Motion Pictures; Censorship is, in extreme cases, a sine qua non to
the meaningful exercise of the rights to free speech and press.Censorship or previous
restraint certainly is not all there is to free speech or free press. If it were so, then such basic
rights are emasculated. It is, however, except in exceptional circumstances a sine qua non for
the meaningful exercise of such right. This is not to deny that equally basic is the other
important aspect of freedom from liability. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this litigation,
the emphasis should rightly be on freedom from censorship. It is, beyond question, a well-
settled principle in our jurisdiction. As early as 1909, in the case of United States v. Sedano,
a prosecution
________________
*EN BANC.
718
ANNOTATED
for libel, the Supreme Court of the Philippines already made clear that freedom of the
press consists in the right to print what one chooses without any previous license.
Same; Same; The power of the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television
(BRMPT) is limited to the classification of films.It is the opinion of this Court, therefore,
that to avoid an unconstitutional taint on its creation, the power of respondent Board is
limited to the classification of films. It can, to safeguard other constitutional objections,
determine what motion pictures are for general patronage and what may require either
parental guidance or be limited to adults only. That is to abide by the principle that freedom
of expression is the rule and restrictions the exemption. The power to exercise prior restraint
is not to be presumed, rather the presumption is against its validity.
Same; Same; The test to determine whether a motion pictures exceeds the bounds of
permissible exercise of free speech and, therefore, should be censored, is the clear and danger
test.The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is the
clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has a right to
prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but also present. There should be no doubt that
what is feared may be traced to the expression complained of. The causal connection must be
evident. Also, there must be reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element
cannot be ignored. Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the
requirement of its being well-nigh inevitable. The basic postulate, therefore, as noted earlier,
is that where the movies, theatrical productions, radio scripts, television programs, and other
such media of expression are concernedincluded as they are in freedom of expression
censorship, especially so if an entire production is banned, is allowable only under the
clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to public safety, public
morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest. There is merit to the observation
of Justice Douglas that every writer, actor, or producer, no matter what medium of
expression he may use, should be freed from the censor.
Same; Same; The law frowns on obscenity.The law, however, frowns on obscenity
and rightly so. As categorically stated by Justice Brennan in Roth v. United States, speaking
of the free speech and press guarantee of the United States Constitution: All ideas
719
VOL. 137, JULY 22, 1985 719
having even the slightest redeeming social importanceunorthodox ideas, controversial
ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinionhave the full protection of the
guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more important
interests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as
utterly without redeeming social importance. Such a view commends itself for approval.
Same; Same; There is difficulty in determining what is obscene.There is, however,
some difficulty in determining what is obscene. There is persuasiveness to the approach
followed in Roth: The early leading standard of obscenity allowed material to be judged
merely by the effect of an isolated excerpt upon particularly susceptible persons. Regina v.
Hicklin [1868] LR 3 QB 360. Some American courts adopted this standard but later decisions
have rejected it and substituted this test: whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to prurient interest. The Hicklin test, judging obscenity by the effect of isolated
passages upon the most susceptible persons, might well encompass material legitimately
treating with sex, and so it must be rejected as un-constitutionally restrictive of the freedoms
of speech and press. On the other hand, the substituted standard provides safeguards
adequate to withstand the charge of constitutional infirmity.
Same; Same; Sex and obscenity are not synonymous.It is quite understandable then
why in the Roth opinion, Justice Brennan took pains to emphasize that sex and obscenity
are not synonymous. Further: Obscene material is material which deals with sex in a
manner appealing to prurient interest. The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and
scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection
of freedom of speech and press. Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human life, has
indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest to mankind through the ages; it is one of
the vital problems of human interest and public concern.
Same; Same; Certiorari; The BRMPT abused its discretion in classifying the movie
Kapit sa Patalim as For Adults Only, but there are not enough votes to maintain that such
an abuse can be considered grave. The classification serves as a warning that Kapit is not fit
for the young.This being a certiorari petition, the question before the Court is whether or
not there was a grave abuse of discretion. That there was an abuse of discretion by respon-
720
ANNOTATED
dent Board is evident in the light of the difficulty and travail undergone by petitioners
before Kapit sa Patalim was classified as For Adults Only, without any deletion or cut.
Moreover its perception of what constitutes obscenity appears to be unduly restrictive. This
Court concludes then that there was an abuse of discretion. Nonetheless, there are not
enough votes to maintain that such an abuse can be considered grave. Accordingly, certiorari
does not lie. This conclusion finds support in this explanation of respondents in its Answer
to the amended petition: The adult classification given the film serves as a warning to
theater operators and viewers that some contents of Kapit are not fit for the young. Some of
the scenes in the picture were taken in a theater-club and a good portion of the film shots
concentrated on some women erotically dancing naked, or at least nearly naked, on the
theater stage. Another scene on that stage depicted the women kissing and caressing as
lesbians. And toward the end of the picture, there exists scenes of excessive violence
attending the battle between a group of robbers and the police. The vulnerable and imitative
in the young audience will misunderstand these scenes. Further: Respondents further
stated in its answer that petitioner company has an option to have the film reclassified to For-
General-Patronage if it would agree to remove the obscene scenes and pare down the violence
in the film. Petitioners, however, refused the For Adults Only classification and instead,
as noted at the outset, filed this suit for certiorari.
Same; Same; Radio and Television; This ruling is limited to motion pictures. Television
is subject to a less liberal approach as it reaches its audience freely regardless of age.All that
remains to be said is that the ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity applicable to
motion pictures. It is the consensus of this Court that where television is concerned, a less
liberal approach calls for observance. This is so because unlike motion pictures where the
patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every home where there is a set. Children
then will likely will be among the avid viewers of the programs therein shown. As was
observed by Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Jerome Frank, it is hardly the concern of the law
to deal with the sexual fantasies of the adult population. It cannot be denied though that the
State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the
young.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Board of Review for Motion
Pictures and Television.

721
VOL. 137, JULY 22, 1985 721
Irene R. Cortes, Perfecto V Fernandez, Haydee Yorac and Joker P. Arroyo for
petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
In this case of first impression, a certiorari proceeding filed on January 10, 1985,
there is a persuasive ring to the invocation of the constitutional right to freedom of
expression of an artistand for that matter a man of letters tooas the basis for a
1
ruling on the scope of the power of respondent Board of Review for Motion Pictures
and Television and how it should be exercised. The dispute between the parties has
been narrowed down. The motion picture in question, Kapit sa Patalim was classified
For Adults Only. There is the further issue then, also one of first impression, as to
the proper test of what constitutes obscenity in view of the objections raised. Thus
the relevance of this constitutional command: Arts and letters shall be under the
patronage of the State. 2
The principal petitioner is Jose Antonio U. Gonzalez, President of the Malaya
3
Films, a movie production outfit duly registered as a single proprietorship with the
Bureau of Domestic Trade. The respondent is the Board of Review for Motion Pictures
and Television, with Maria Kalaw Katigbak as its Chairman and Brig. Gen. Wilfredo
C. Estrada as its Vice-Chairman, also named respondents.
In a resolution of a sub-committee of respondent Board of October 23, 1984, a
permit to exhibit the film Kapit sa Patalim under the classification For Adults Only,
with certain changes and deletions enumerated was granted. A motion for
________________
1 The Constitution provides: No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances.
2 Article XV, Section 9, par. (2) reads in full: Filipino culture shall be preserved and developed for
national identity. Arts and letter shall be under the patronage of the State.
3 The other petitioners are Lino Brocka, Jose F. Lacaba and Dulce Q. Saguisag.
722
ANNOTATED
reconsideration was filed by petitioners stating that the classification of the film For
Adults Only was without basis. Then on November 12, 1984, respondent Board
4
released its decision: Acting on the applicants Motion for Reconsideration dated 29
October 1984, the Board, after a review of the resolution of the sub-committee and an
examination of the film, Resolves to affirm in toto the ruling of the subcommittee.
Considering, however, certain vital deficiencies in the application, the Board further
Resolves to direct the Chairman of the Board to Withheld the issuance of the Permit
to exhibit until these deficiencies are supplied. Hence this petition.
5
This Court, in a resolution of January 12, 1985, required respondent to answer. In

such pleading submitted on January 21, 1985, as one of its special and affirmative
defenses, it was alleged that the petition is moot as respondent Board has revoked
its questioned resolution, replacing it with one immediately granting petitioner
company a permit to exhibit the film Kapit without any deletion or cut [thus an]
adjudication of the questions presented above would be academic on the
case. Further: The modified resolution of the Board, of course, classifies Kapit as
6
for-adults-only, but the petition does not raise any issue as to the validity of this
classification. All that petitioners assail as arbitrary on the part of the Boards action
are the deletions ordered in the film. The prayer was for the dismissal of the petition.
7
An amended petition was then filed on January 25, 1985. The main objection was
the classification of the film as For Adults Only. For petitioners, such classification
is without legal and factual basis and is exercised as impermissible restraint of
artistic expression. The film is an integral whole and all its portions, including those
to which the Board now offers belated objection, are essential for the integrity of the
film. Viewed as a whole, there is no basis even for the vague speculations advanced
by the Board as basis for its classifica-
________________
4 Petition, par. 3.33.
5 Ibid, par. 3.35.
6 Answer, 9-10.
7 Ibid, 10.
723
VOL. 137, JULY 22, 1985 723
tion. There was an answer to the amended petition filed on February 18, 1985. It
8
was therein asserted that the issue presented as to the previous deletions ordered by
the Board as well as the statutory provisions for review of films and as to the
requirement to submit the master negative have been all rendered moot. It was also
submitted that the standard of the law for classifying films afford a practical and
determinative yardstick for the exercise of judgment. For respondents, the question
of the sufficiency of the standards remains the only question at issue.
It would be unduly restrictive under the circumstances to limit the issue to one of
the sufficiency of standards to guide respondent Board in the exercise of its power.
Even if such were the case, there is justification for an inquiry into the controlling
standard to warrant the classification of For Adults Only. This is especially so, when
obscenity is the basis for any alleged invasion of the right to the freedom of artistic
and literary expression embraced in the free speech and free press guarantees of the
Constitution.
1. Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of ideas
and the expression of the artistic impulse. Their effects on the perception by our
people of issues and public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing cultural
traits is considerable. Nor as pointed out in Burstyn v. Wilson is the importance of
9
motion pictures as an organ of public opinion lessened by the fact that they are
designed to entertain as well as to inform. There is no clear dividing line between
10
what involves knowledge and what affords pleasure. If such a distinction were
sustained, there is a diminution of the basic right to free expression. Our recent
decision in Reyes v. Bagatsing cautions against such a move. Press freedom, as
11
stated in the opinion of the Court, may be identified with the liberty to discuss
publicly and truthfully any matter of public
________________
8 Amended Petition, 20.

9 343 US 495 (1942).
10 Ibid, 501.
11 G.R. No. 65366, November 9, 1983, 125 SCRA 553. Cf. Winters v. New York, 333 US 507 (1948).
724
ANNOTATED
concern without censorship or punishment. This is not to say that such freedom, as
12
is the freedom of speech, absolute. It can be limited if there be a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a right to prevent. 13
2. Censorship or previous restraint certainly is not all there is to free speech or
free press. If it were so, then such basic rights are emasculated. It is, however, except
in exceptional circumstances a sine qua non for the meaningful exercise of such right.
This is not to deny that equally basic is the other important aspect of freedom from
liability. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this litigation, the emphasis should rightly
be on freedom from censorship. It is, beyond question, a well-settled principle in our
jurisdiction. As early as 1909, in the case of United States v. Sedano, a prosecution 14
for libel, the Supreme Court of the Philippines already made clear that freedom of
the press consists in the right to print what one chooses without any previous license.
There is reaffirmation of such a view in Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, where 15
an order of respondent Commission on Elections giving due course to the certificate

of candidacy of petitioner but prohibiting him from using jingles in his mobile units
equipped with sound systems and loud speakers was considered an abridgment of the
right of the freedom of expression amounting as it does to censorship. It is the opinion
of this Court, therefore, that to avoid an unconstitutional taint on its creation, the
power of respondent Board is limited to the classification of films. It can, to safeguard
other constitutional objections, determine what motion pictures are for general
patronage and what may require either parental guidance or be limited to adults
only. That is to abide by the principle that freedom of expression is the rule and
restrictions the exemption. The power to exercise prior restraint is not to be
presumed, rather the presumption is against its validity. 16
________________
12 Ibid, 560.
13 Ibid, 561.
14 14 Phil. 338. Cf. US v. Sotto, 38 Phil. 666 (1918).
15 L-32717, November 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 228.
16 Cf. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivans, 372 US 58 (1962); Organization for Better Austria v. Keafe, 402
US 415 (1971).
725
VOL. 137, JULY 22, 1985 725
1. 3.The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be

limited is the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character
that the State has a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be dear but
also present. There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to
the expression complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also,
there must be reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time
element cannot be ignored. Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable.
There is the requirement of its being well-nigh inevitable. The basic postulate,
therefore, as noted earlier, is that where the movies, theatrical productions,
radio scripts, television programs, and other such media of expression are
concernedincluded as they are in freedom of expressioncensorship,
especially so if an entire production is banned, is allowable only under the
clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to public
safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public
interest. There is merit to the observation of Justice Douglas that every
17
writer, actor, or producer, no matter what medium of expression he may use,

should be freed from the censor. 18
2. 4.The law, however, frowns on obscenityand rightly so. As categorically

stated by Justice Brennan in Roth v. United States, speaking of the free
19
speech and press guarantee of the United States Constitution: All ideas
having even the slightest redeeming social importanceunorthodox ideas,
controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion
have the full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they
encroach upon the limited area of more important interests. But implicit in
the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly
without redeeming social importance. Such a view commends itself for
20
approval.
________________
17 Cf. Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553, 562.

18 Superior Films v. Regents of University of State of New York, 346 US 587, 589 (1954), Douglas, J.,
concurring.
19 354 US 476 (1957).
20 Ibid, 484-485. There was reference to international agreements of over 50 nations and the obscenity
laws of all the then

726
ANNOTATED
1. 5.There is, however, some difficulty in determining what is obscene. There is

persuasiveness to the approach followed in Roth: The early leading standard
of obscenity allowed material to be judged merely by the effect of an isolated
excerpt upon particularly susceptible persons. Regina v. Hicklin [1868] LR 3
QB 360. Some American courts adopted this standard but later decisions have
rejected it and substituted this test: whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest. The Hicklin test, judging
obscenity by the effect of isolated passages upon the most susceptible persons,
might well encompass material legitimately treating with sex, and so it must
be rejected as un-constitutionally restrictive of the freedoms of speech and
press. On the other hand, the substituted standard provides safeguards
adequate to withstand the charge of constitutional infirmity. 21
2. 6.The above excerpt which imposes on the judiciary the duty to be ever on
guard against any impermissible infringement on the freedom of artistic
expression calls to mind the landmark ponencia of Justice Malcolm in United
States v. Bustos, decided in 1918. While recognizing the principle that libel
22
is beyond the pale of constitutional protection, it left no doubt that in

determining what constitutes such an offense, a court should ever be mindful
that no violation of the right to freedom of expression is allowable. It is a
matter of pride for the Philippines that it was not until 1984 in New York
Timer v. Sullivan, thirty-six years later, that the United States Supreme
23
Court enunciated a similar doctrine.

3. 7.It is quite understandable then why in the Roth opinion, Justice Brennan
took pains to emphasize that sex and obscenity are not
synonymous. Further: Obscene material is
24
________________
48 States of the Union as well as 20 obscenity laws enacted by the Congress of the United States from
1842 to 1956. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 US 568 (1942) was also cited.
21 Ibid, 488-489.
22 37 Phil. 731.
23 376 US 254.
24 Roth v. United States, 354 US 476, 487 (1957).
727
VOL. 137, JULY 22, 1985 727
material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest. The
portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient
reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press.
Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human life, has indisputably been a
subject of absorbing interest to mankind through the ages; it is one of the vital
problems of human interest and public concern. 25
8. In the applicable law, Executive Order No. 876, reference was made to
respondent Board applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as
standard, words which can be construed in an analogous manner. Moreover, as far
26
as the question of sex and obscenity are concerned, it cannot be stressed strongly that
the arts and letters shall be under the patronage of the State. That is a 27
constitutional mandate. It will be less than true to its function if any government
office or agency would invade the sphere of autonomy that an artist enjoys. There is
no orthodoxy in what passes for beauty or for reality. It is for the artist to determine
what for him is a true representation. It is not to be forgotten that art
and belleslettres deal primarily with imagination, not so much with ideas in a strict
sense. What is seen or perceived by an artist is entitled to respect, unless there is a
showing that the product of his talent rightfully may be considered obscene. As so
well put by Justice Frankfurter in a concurring opinion, the widest scope of freedom
is to be given to the adventurous and imaginative exercise of the human spirit in 28
this sensitive area of a mans personality. On the question of obscenity, therefore, and
in the light of the facts of this case, such standard set forth in Executive Order No.
878 is to be construed in such a fashion to avoid any taint of unconstitutionally. To
repeat, what was stated in a recent decision citing the language of Justice
29
________________
25 Ibid.
26 Executive Order No. 876, Section 3(c) (1963).
27 Article XV, Section 9, par. (2), last sentence of the Constitution.
28 Kingsley v. Regents, 360 US 684, 695 (1959).
29 Lopez, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 65022, May 31, 1985.
728
ANNOTATED
Malcolm in Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, it is an elementary, a fundamental, and a
30
universal role of construction, applied when considering constitutional questions,

that when a law is susceptible of two constructions one of which will maintain and
the other destroy it, the courts will always adopt the former. As thus construed,31
there can be no valid objection to the sufficiency of the controlling standard and its
conformity to what the Constitution ordains.
9. This being a certiorari petition, the question before the Court is whether or not
there was a grave abuse of discretion. That there was an abuse of discretion by
respondent Board is evident in the light of the difficulty and travail undergone by
petitioners before Kapit sa Patalim was classified as For Adults Only. without any
deletion or cut. Moreover its perception of what constitutes obscenity appears to be
unduly restrictive. This Court concludes then that there was an abuse of discretion.
Nonetheless, there are not enough votes to maintain that such an abuse can be
considered grave. Accordingly, certiorari does not lie. This conclusion finds support
in this explanation of respondents in its Answer to the amended petition: The adult
classification given the film serves as a warning to theater operators and viewers that
some contents of Kapit are not fit for the young. Some of the scenes in the picture
were taken in a theater-club and a good portion of the film shots concentrated on
some women erotically dancing naked, or at least nearly naked, on the theater stage.
Another scene on that stage depicted the women kissing and caressing as lesbians.
And toward the end of the picture, there exists scenes of excessive violence attending
the battle between a group of robbers and the police. The vulnerable and imitative in
the young audience will misunderstand these scenes. Further: Respondents 32
further stated in its answer that petitioner company has an option to have the film
reclassified to For-General-Patronage if it would agree to remove the obscene scenes
and pare down the violence in the film. Petitioners, however,
33
________________
30 47 Phil. 385 (1925).

31 Ibid, 415.
32 Answer to Amended Petition, 4.
33 Ibid, 4-5.
729
VOL. 137, JULY 22, 1985 729
refused the For Adults Only classification and instead, as noted at the outset, filed
this suit for certiorari.
10. All that remains to be said is that the ruling is to be limited to the concept of
obscenity applicable to motion pictures. It is the consensus of this Court that where
television is concerned, a less liberal approach calls for observance. This is so because
unlike motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their way, television reaches
every home where there is a set. Children then will likely will be among the avid
viewers of the programs therein shown. As was observed by Circuit Court of Appeals
Judge Jerome Frank, it is hardly the concern of the law to deal with the sexual
fantasies of the adult population. It cannot be denied though that the State as parens
34
patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young.
WHEREFORE, this Court, in the light of the principles of law enunciated in the
opinion, dismisses this petition for certiorari solely on the ground that there are not
enough votes for a ruling that there was a grave abuse of discretion in the
classification of Kapit sa Patalim as For Adults Only.
Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-
Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., in the result. Petitioner has no cause of action for certiorari.
De la Fuente, J., did not take part.
Abad Santos, J., is on official leave.
Petition dismissed.
Notes.The request of a school head for a review of student organs publication
policies does not constitute an impairment of freedoms of speech and press.
(Laxamana vs. Borlata, 47 SCRA 29.)
The Constitution frowns upon disorder or tumult attending a public rally.
Peaceable assembly is guaranteed, but not
________________
Cf. United States v. Roth, 237 F 2d 796 (1956).

34
730
ANNOTATED
De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals
resort to force. (Reyes vs. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553.)
Litigations involving permits to stage a rally are better started at the trial court
level. (Ruiz vs. Gordon, 126 SCRA 233.)
The curtailment of the freedoms of speech and press of radio and TV stations is
permissible for election purposes. (United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO) vs.
COMELEC, 104 SCRA 17.)
Remarks made at a board meeting are privileged in nature as a valid exercise of
ones constitutional freedom of expression. An employee cannot be dismissed for
making such remarks alleged to be libelous. (Union of Supervisors (R.B.)NATU vs.
Sec. of Labor, 109 SCRA 139.)
o0o

ANNOTATED
Pita vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 80806. October 5, 1989. *
LEO PITA, doing business under the name and style of PINOY PLAYBOY,
petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON BAGATSING, and NARCISO
CABRERA, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Press Freedom; Whether the tendency of the matter charged as
obscene is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and
into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall is the test
in determining the existence of obscenity.The Court states at the outset that it is not the
first time that it is being asked to pronounce what obscene means or what makes for an
obscene or pornographic literature. Early on, in People vs. Kottinger, the Court laid down the
test, in determining the existence of obscenity, as follows: whether the tendency of the
matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such
immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being
obscene may fall. Another test, so Kottinger further declares, is that which shocks the
ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency.
Same; Same; Same; If the pictures here in question were used not exactly for arts sake
but rather for commercial purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional
protection.As the Court declared, the issue is a complicated one, in which the fine lines
have neither been drawn nor divided. It is easier said than done to say, indeed, that if the
pictures here in question were used not exactly for arts sake but rather for commercial
purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection.
Same; Same; There is no challenge on the right of the State in the legitimate exercise of
police power to suppress smutprovided it is smut.In the case at bar, there is no challenge
on the right of the State, in the legitimate exercise of police power, to suppress smut
provided it is smut. For obvious reasons, smut is not smut simply because one insists it is
smut. So is it equally evident that individual tastes develop, adapt to wide-ranging
influences, and keep in step with the rapid advance of civilization. What shocked our
forebears, say, five decades ago, is not necessarily repulsive to the present generation. James
Joyce and D.H. Lawrence were censored in the thirties yet their works are considered
important literature today.
_______________
*EN BANC.
363
VOL. 178, OCTOBER 5, 1989 363
Goyas La Maja desnuda was once banned from public exhibition but now adorns the
worlds most prestigious museums.
Same; Same; Obscenity is not a bare matter of opinion.But neither should we say that
obscenity is a bare (no pun intended) matter of opinion. As we said earlier, it is the divergent
perceptions of men and women that have probably compounded the problem rather than
resolved it.
Same; Same; Immoral lore or literature comes within the ambit of free expression
although not its protection; Burden to show the existence of grave and imminent danger that
would justify adverse action lies on the authorities.Undoubtedly, immoral lore or
literature comes within the ambit of free expression, although not its protection. In free
expression cases, this Court has consistently been on the side of the exercise of the right,
barring a clear and present danger that would warrant State interference and action. But,
so we asserted in Reyes v. Bagatsing, the burden to show the existence of grave and
imminent danger that would justify adverse action . . . lies on the . . . authorit[ies].
Same; Same; Clear and Present Danger Rule; There must be objective and convincing,
not subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence of such clear and present danger.There
must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence of such
clear and present danger. It is essential for the validity of . . . previous restraint or
censorship that the . . . authority does not rely solely on his own appraisal of what the public
welfare, peace or safety may require. To justify such a limitation, there must be proof of
such weight and sufficiency to satisfy the clear and present danger test.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court not convinced that private respondents have shown the
required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which
mandatory injunction had been sought.The Court is not convinced that the private
respondents have shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the
literature for which mandatory injunction had been sought below. First of all, they were not
possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2)
authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Police Power; Fact that the former respondent Mayors
act was sanctioned by police power is no license to seize property in disregard of due process;
Police power
364
ANNOTATED
defined.The fact that the former respondent Mayors act was sanctioned by police
power is no license to seize property in disregard of due process. In Philippine Service
Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, we defined police power as state authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.
Presidential Decrees Nos. 960 and 969 are, arguably, police power measures, but they are
not, by themselves, authorities for high-handed acts. They do not exempt our law enforcers,
in carrying out the decree of the twin presidential issuances (Mr. Marcos), from the
commandments of the Constitution, the right to due process of law and the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, specifically.
Same; Same; Searches and Seizures; Searches and seizures may be done only through a
judicial warrant otherwise they become unreasonable and subject to challenge.It is basic
that searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial warrant, otherwise, they
become unreasonable and subject to challenge. In Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP, We
countermanded the orders of the Regional Trial Court authorizing the search of the premises
of We Forum and Metropolitan Mail, two Metro Manila dailies, by reason of a defective
warrant. We have greater reason here to reprobate the questioned raid, in the complete
absence of a warrant, valid or invalid. The fact that the instant case involves an obscenity
rap makes it no different from Burgos, a political case, because, and as we have indicated,
speech is speech, whether political or obscene.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court not ruling out warrantless searches.The Court is not
ruling out warrantless searches, as the Rules of Court (1964 rev.) (the Rules then prevailing),
provide: SEC. 12. Search without warrant of person arrested.A person charged with an
offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of
the commission of the offense. But as the provision itself suggests, the search must have been
an incident to a lawful arrest, and the arrest must be on account of a crime committed. Here,
no party has been charged, nor are such charges being readied against any party, under
Article 201, as amended, of the Revised Penal Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Argument that there is no constitutional nor legal
provision which would free the accused of all criminal responsibility because there had been
no warrant and that violation of penal law must be punished, rejected.We reject outright
the argument that [t]here is no constitutional nor legal provision which would
365
VOL. 178, OCTOBER 5, 1989 365
free the accused of all criminal responsibility because there had been no warrant, and
that violation of penal law [must] be punished. For starters, there is no accused here to
speak of, who ought to be punished. Second, to say that the respondent Mayor could have
validly ordered the raid (as a result of an anti-smut campaign) without a lawful search
warrant because, in his opinion, violation of penal laws has been committed, is to make the
respondent Mayor judge, jury, and executioner rolled into one. And precisely, this is the very
complaint of the petitioner.
PETITION to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

William C. Arceno for petitioner.
Casibang, Perello and De Dios for private respondent.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner, publisher of Pinoy Playboy, a mens magazine, seeks the review of
the decision of the Court of Appeals, rejecting his appeal from the decision of the
1
Regional Trial Court, dismissing his complaint for injunctive relief. He invokes, in
particular, the guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures of the
Constitution, as well as its prohibition against deprivation of property without due
process of law.
There is no controversy as to the facts. We quote:
On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the
City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group,
Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of
Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, news-stand owners and peddlers
along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be
obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the
University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and
several officers and members of various student organizations.
Among the publications seized, and later burned, was Pinoy Playboy magazines
published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita.
_____________
1 Gonzaga-Reyes, Minerva, J., Javellana, Luis A. and Ramirez, Pedro A., JJ., Concurring.
366
ANNOTATED
On December 7, 1983, plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as
superintendent of Western Police District of the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin and/or
restrain said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiffs magazines or from
otherwise preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent,
artistic and educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is
protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press.
By order dated December 8, 1983 the Court set the hearing on the petition for preliminary
injunction on December 14, 1983 and ordered the defendants to show cause not later than
December 13, 1983 why the writ prayed for should not be granted.
On December 12, 1983, plaintiff filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary
restraining order against indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiffs
Pinoy Playboy Magazines, pending hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction in
view of Mayor Bagatsings pronouncement to continue the Anti-Smut Campaign. The Court
granted the temporary restraining order on December 14, 1983.
In his Answer and Opposition filed on December 27, 1983 defendant Mayor Bagatsing
admitted the confiscation and burning of obscence reading materials on December 1 and 3,
1983, but claimed that the said materials were voluntarily surrendered by the vendors to the
police authorities, and that the said confiscation and seizure was (sic) undertaken pursuant
to P.D. No. 960, as amended by P.D. No. 969, which amended Article 201 of the Revised Penal
Code. In opposing the plaintiffs application for a writ of preliminary injunction, defendant
pointed out that in that anti-smut campaign conducted on December 1 and 3, 1983, the
materials confiscated belonged to the magazine stand owners and peddlers who voluntarily
surrendered their reading materials, and that the plaintiffs establishment was not raided.
The other defendant, WPD Superintendent, Narcisco Cabrera, filed no answer.
On January 5, 1984, plaintiff filed his Memorandum in support of the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction, raising the issue as to whether or not the defendants and/or their
agents can without a court order confiscate or seize plaintiffs magazine before any judicial
finding is made on whether said magazine is obscene or not.
The restraining order issued on December 14, 1983 having lapsed on January 3, 1984, the
plaintiff filed an urgent motion for issuance of another restraining order, which was opposed
by defendant on the ground that issuance of a second restraining order would violate the
367
VOL. 178, OCTOBER 5, 1989 367
Resolution of the Supreme Court dated January 11, 1983, providing for the Interim Rules
Relative to the Implementation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which provides that a
temporary restraining order shall be effective only for twenty days from date of its issuance.
On January 9, 1984 defendant filed his Comment and/or Rejoinder Memorandum in
support of his opposition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
On January 11, 1984, the trial court issued an Order setting the case for hearing on
January 16, 1984 for the parties to adduce evidence on the question of whether the
publication Pinoy Playboy Magazine alleged (sic) seized, confiscated and/or burned by the
defendants, are obscence per se or not.
On January 16, 1984, the Court issued an order granting plaintiffs motion to be given
three days to file a reply to defendants opposition dated January 9, 1984, serving a copy
thereof to the counsel for the defendants, who may file a rejoinder within the same period
from receipt, after which the issue of Preliminary Injunction shall be resolved.
Plaintiffs supplemental Memorandum was filed on January 18, 1984. Defendant filed his
Comment on plaintiffs supplemental Memorandum on January 20, 1984, and plaintiff filed
his Reply-Memorandum to defendants Comment on January 25, 1984.
On February 3, 1984, the trial court promulgated the Order appealed from denying the
motion for a writ of preliminary injunction, and dismissing the case for lack of merit. 2
The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal upon the grounds, among other things, as
follows:
We cannot quarrel with the basic postulate suggested by appellant that seizure of allegedly
obscene publications or materials deserves close scrutiny because of the constitutional
guarantee protecting the right to express oneself in print (Sec. 9, Art. IV), and the protection
afforded by the constitution against unreasonable searches and seizure (Sec. 3, Art. IV). It
must be equally conceded, however, that freedom of the press is not without restraint, as the
state has the right to protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public
morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the author, publishers and sellers of obscene
publications (Sec. 1, Art. 201, Revised Penal Code, as amended by P.D. No. 960 and P.D. No.
969). Also well settled is the rule that the right against unreasonable searches
_____________
2 Rollo, 30-31.
368
ANNOTATED
and seizures recognizes certain exceptions, as when there is consent to the search or seizure,
(People vs. Malesugui, 63 Phil. 22) or search is an incident to an arrest, (People vs. Veloso, 48
Phil. 169; Alvero vs. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637) or is conducted in a vehicle or movable structure
(See Papa vs. Magno, 22 SCRA 857). 3
The petitioner now ascribes to the respondent court the following errors:
1. 1.The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court and, in
effect, holding that the police officers could without any court warrant or order
seize and confiscate petitioners magazines on the basis simply of their
determination that they are obscene.
2. 2.The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court and, in
effect, holding that the trial court could dismiss the case on its merits without
any hearing thereon when what was submitted to it for resolution was merely
the application of petitioner for the writ of preliminary injunction. 4
The Court states at the outset that it is not the first time that it is being asked to
pronounce what obscene means or what makes for an obscene or pornographic
literature. Early on, in People vs. Kottinger, the Court laid down the test, in
5
determining the existence of obscenity, as follows: whether the tendency of the

matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to
such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged
as being obscene may fall. Another test, so Kottinger further declares, is that
6
which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an

indecency. Kottinger hastened to say, however, that [w]hether a picture is obscene
7
or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case, and that ultimately,
8
the question is to be decided by the judgment of the aggregate sense of the

community reached by it. 9
____________
3 Id., 41.
4 Id., 12-13.
5 45 Phil. 352 (1923), per Malcolm, J.
6 Supra, 356
7 Supra, 357.
8 Supra.
9 Supra, 359.
369
VOL. 178, OCTOBER 5, 1989 369
Yet Kottinger, in its effort to arrive at a conclusive definition, succeeded merely in
generalizing a problem that has grown increasingly complex over the years. Precisely,
the question is: When does a publication have a corrupting tendency, or when can it
be said to be offensive to human sensibilities? And obviously, it is to beg the question
to say that a piece of literature has a corrupting influence because it is obscene,
and vice-versa.
Apparently, Kottinger was aware of its own uncertainty because in the same
breath, it would leave the final say to a hypothetical community standard
whatever that isand that the question must supposedly be judged from case to case.
About three decades later, this Court promulgated People v. Go Pin, a prosecution
10
under Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. Go Pin was also even hazier:
x x x We agree with counsel for appellant in part. If such pictures, sculptures and paintings
are shown in art exhibits and art galleries for the cause of art, to be viewed and appreciated
by people interested in art, there would be no offense committed. However, the pictures here
in question were used not exactly for arts sake but rather for commercial purposes. In other
words, the supposed artistic qualities of said pictures were being commercialized so that the
cause of art was of secondary or minor importance. Gain and profit would appear to have
been the main, if not the exclusive consideration in their exhibition; and it would not be
surprising if the persons who went to see those pictures and paid entrance fees for the
privilege of doing so, were not exactly artists and persons interested in art and who generally
go to art exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and improve their artistic tastes, but rather
people desirous of satisfying their morbid curiosity and taste, and lust, and for love for
excitement, including the youth who because of their immaturity are not in a position to
resist and shield themselves from the ill and perverting effects of these pictures.11
xxx xxx xxx

As the Court declared, the issue is a complicated one, in which the fine lines have
neither been drawn nor divided. It is easier
____________
97 Phil. 418 (1955), per Montemayor, J.
10
Supra, 419.
11
370
ANNOTATED
said than done to say, indeed, that if the pictures here in question were used not
exactly for arts sake but rather for commercial purposes, the pictures are not
12
entitled to any constitutional protection.

It was People v. Padan y Alova, however, that introduced to Philippine
13
jurisprudence the redeeming element that should accompany the work, to save it
from a valid prosecution. We quote:
x x x We have had occasion to consider offenses like the exhibition of still or moving pictures
of women in the nude, which we have condemned for obscenity and as offensive to morals. In
those cases, one might yet claim that there was involved the element of art; that connoisseurs
of the same, and painters and sculptors might find inspiration in the showing of pictures in
the nude, or the human body exhibited in sheer nakedness, as models in tableaux vivants.
But an actual exhibition of the sexual act, preceded by acts of lasciviousness, can have no
redeeming feature. In it, there is no room for art. One can see nothing in it but clear and
unmitigated obscenity, indecency, and an offense to public morals, inspiring and causing as
it does, nothing but lust and lewdness, and exerting a corrupting influence specially on the
youth of the land. x x x 14
Padan y Alova, like Go Pin, however, raised more questions than answers. For one
thing, if the exhibition was attended by artists and persons interested in art and who
generally go to art exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and improve their artistic
tastes, could the same legitimately lay claim to art? For another, suppose that the
15
exhibition was so presented that connoisseurs of [art], and painters and sculptors
might find inspiration, in it, would it cease to be a case of obscenity?
16
Padan y Alova, like Go Pin also leaves too much latitude for judicial arbitrament,
which has permitted an ad lib of ideas and two-cents worths among judges as to
what is obscene and what is art.
____________
12 Supra.
13 101 Phil. 749 (1957).
14 Supra, 752.
15 Go Pin, supra.
16 Padan y Alova, supra.
371
VOL. 178, OCTOBER 5, 1989 371
In a much later decision, Gonzalez v. Kalaw Katigbak, the Court, following trends in
17
the United States, adopted the test: Whether to the average person, applying
contemporary standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to prurient interest. Kalaw-Katigbak represented a marked departure
18
from Kottinger in the sense that it measured obscenity in terms of the dominant
theme of the work, rather than isolated passages, which were central
to Kottinger (although both cases are agreed that contemporary community
standards are the final arbiters of what is obscene). Kalaw-Katigbak undertook
moreover to make the determination of obscenity essentially a judicial question and
as a consequence, to temper the wide discretion Kottinger had given unto law
enforcers.
It is significant that in the United States, constitutional law on obscenity continues
to journey from development to development, which, states one authoritative
commentator (with ample sarcasm), has been as unstable as it is unintelligible. 19
Memoirs v. Massachusettes, a 1966 decision, which characterized obscenity as one

20
utterly without any redeeming social value, marked yet another development.
21
The latest word, however, is Miller v. California, which expressly 22
abandoned Massachusettes, and established basic guidelines, to wit: (a) whether

23
the average person, applying contemporary standards would find the work, taken as
a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . .; (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 24
(A year later, the American Supreme Court decided Hamling

______________
17 No. 69500, July 21, 1985, 137 SCRA 717, per Fernando, C.J.
18 Supra, 726, citing Roth v. United States, 354 US 476 (1957).
19 TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 656 (1978 ed.).
20 383 US 410 (1966).
21 See TRIBE, id., 661.
22 413 US 15 (1973).
23 Supra, 24.
24 Supra.
372
ANNOTATED
v. United States, which repeated Miller, and Jenkins v. Georgia, yet another
25 26
reiteration of Miller. Jenkins, curiously, acquitted the producers of the motion

picture, Carnal Knowledge, in the absence of genitals portrayed on screen, although
the film highlighted contemporary American sexuality.)
The lack of uniformity in American jurisprudence as to what constitutes
obscenity has been attributed to the reluctance of the courts to recognize the
constitutional dimension of the problem. Apparently, the courts have assumed that
27
obscen-ity is not included in the guaranty of free speech, an assumption that, as we

averred, has allowed a climate of opinions among magistrates predicated upon
arbitrary, if vague theories of what is acceptable to society. And [t]here is little
likelihood, says Tribe, that this development has reached a state of rest, or that it
will ever do so until the Court recognizes that obscene speech is speech nonetheless,
although it is subjectas in all speechto regulation in the interests of [society as a
whole]but not in the interest of a uniform vision of how human sexuality should be
regarded and portrayed. 28
In the case at bar, there is no challenge on the right of the State, in the legitimate
exercise of police power, to suppress smutprovided it is smut. For obvious reasons,
smut is not smut simply because one insists it is smut. So is it equally evident that
individual tastes develop, adapt to wide-ranging influences, and keep in step with the
rapid advance of civilization. What shocked our forebears, say, five decades ago, is
not necessarily repulsive to the present generation. James Joyce and D.H. Lawrence
were censored in the thirties yet their works are considered important literature
today. Goyas La Maja desnuda was once banned from public exhibition but now
29
adorns the worlds most prestigious museums.

But neither should we say that obscenity is a bare (no pun
_____________
25 418 US 87 (1974).
26 418 US 153 (1974).
27 TRIBE, id.
28 Id., 661-662; emphasis in the original.
29 See Kingsley Pictures v. N.Y. Regents, 360 US 684 (1959). The case involved the movie version in Lady
Chatterleys Lover. See also United States v. One Book called Ulysses, 5 F. Supp. 182 (1934).
373
VOL. 178, OCTOBER 5, 1989 373
intended) matter of opinion. As we said earlier, it is the divergent perceptions of men
and women that have probably compounded the problem rather than resolved it.
What the Court is impressing, plainly and simply, is that the question is not, and
has not been, an easy one to answer, as it is far from being a settled matter. We share
Tribes disappointment over the discouraging trend in American decisional law on
obscenity as well as his pessimism on whether or not an acceptable solution is in
sight.
In the final analysis perhaps, the task that confronts us is less heroic than rushing
to a perfect definition of obscenity, if that is possible, as evolving standards for
proper police conduct faced with the problem, which, after all, is the plaint specifically
raised in the petition.
However, this much we have to say.
Undoubtedly, immoral lore or literature comes within the ambit of free
expression, although not its protection. In free expression cases, this Court has
consistently been on the side of the exercise of the right, barring a clear and present
danger that would warrant State interference and action. But, so we asserted 30
in Reyes v. Bagatsing, the burden to show the existence of grave and imminent
31
danger that would justify adverse action . . . lies on the . . . authorit[ies]. 32
There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof of the
existence of such clear and present danger. It is essential for the validity of . . .
33
previous restraint or censorship that the . . . authority does not rely solely on his own
appraisal of what the public welfare, peace or safety may require. 34
To justify such a limitation, there must be proof of such weight and sufficiency to
satisfy the clear and present danger test. 35
____________
30 Gonzales vs. COMELEC, No. L-27833, April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA 835; Reyes v. Bagatsing, No. 65366,
November 9, 1983, 125 SCRA 553.

31 Supra.
32 Supra, 572 per Teehankee, J., Concurring; emphasis in the original.
33 Supra, emphasis in the original.
374
ANNOTATED
The above disposition must not, however, be taken as a neat effort to arrive at a
solutionso only we may arrive at onebut rather as a serious attempt to put the
question in its proper perspective, that is, as a genuine constitutional issue.
It is also significant that in his petition, the petitioner asserts constitutional
issues, mainly, due process and illegal search and seizure.
As we so strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case involving the delivery of a political
speech, the presumption is that the speech may validly be said. The burden is on the
State to demonstrate the existence of a danger, a danger that must not only be: (1)
clear but also, (2) present, to justify State action to stop the speech. Meanwhile, the
Government must allow it (the speech). It has no choice. However, if it acts
notwithstanding that (absence of evidence of a clear and present danger), it must
come to terms with, and be held accountable for, due process.
The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown the required
proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which
mandatory injunction had been sought below. First of all, they were not possessed of
a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2)
authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant.
The Court of Appeals has no quarrel that . . . freedom of the press is not without
restraint, as the state has the right to protect society from pornographic literature
that is offensive to public morals. Neither do we. But it brings us back to square
36
one: were the literature so confiscated pornographic? That we have laws

punishing the author, publisher and sellers of obscence publications (Sec. 1, Art. 201,
Revised Penal Code, as amended by P.D. No. 960 and P.D. No. 969), is also fine, but 37
the question, again, is: Has the petitioner been found guilty under the statute?
_____________
36 Rollo, id., 41.

37Id., The question whether or not Presidential Decrees Nos. 960 and 969 are unconstitutional is another
thing; we will deal with the problem in the proper hour and in the appropriate case. Judicial restraint is a
bar to a consideration of the problem that does not exist, or if it exists, it exists but in the abstract.
375
VOL. 178, OCTOBER 5, 1989 375
The fact that the former respondent Mayors act was sanctioned by police power is
no license to seize property in disregard of due process. In Philippine Service
Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, We defined police power as state authority to enact
38
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote
the general welfare. Presidential Decrees Nos. 960 and 969 are, arguably, police
39
power measures, but they are not, by themselves, authorities for high-handed acts.
They do not exempt our law enforcers, in carrying out the decree of the twin
presidential issuances (Mr. Marcos), from the commandments of the Constitution,
the right to due process of law and the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, specifically. Significantly, the Decrees themselves lay down procedures for
implementation. We quote:
Sec. 2. Disposition of the Prohibited Articles.The disposition of the literature, films, prints,
engravings, sculptures, paintings, or other materials involved in the violation referred to in
Section 1 hereof (Art. 201), RPC as amended) shall be governed by the following rules:
1. (a)Upon conviction of the offender, to be forfeited in favor of the Government to be

destroyed.
2. (b)Where the criminal case against any violator of this decree results in an acquittal,
the obscene/immoral literature, films, prints, engravings, sculptures, paintings or
other materials and articles involved in the violation referred to in Section 1
(referring to Art. 201) hereof shall nevertheless be forfeited in favor of the
government to be destroyed, after forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Chief of
Constabulary.
3. (c)The person aggrieved by the forfeiture action of the Chief of Constabulary may,
within fifteen (15) days after his receipt of a copy of the decision, appeal the matter
to the Secretary of National Defense for review. The decision of the Secretary of
National Defense shall be final and unappealable. (Sec. 2, PD No. 960 as amended
by PD No. 969.)
Sec. 4. Additional Penalties.Additional penalties shall be imposed as follows:

1.In case the offender is a government official or employee
______________
38 G.R. No. 81958, June 30, 1988.

39 Supra, at 3.
376
ANNOTATED
1. who allows the violations of Section 1 hereof, the penalty as provided herein shall be
imposed in the maximum period and, in addition, the accessory penalties provided
for in the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall likewise be imposed. 40
Under the Constitution, on the other hand:

41
SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not
be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized
by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized. 42
It is basic that searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial warrant,
otherwise, they become unreasonable and subject to challenge. In Burgos v. Chief of
Staff, AFP, We countermanded the orders of the Regional Trial Court authorizing
43
the search of the premises of We Forum and Metropolitan Mail, two Metro Manila
dailies, by reason of a defective warrant. We have greater reason here to reprobate
the questioned raid, in the complete absence of a warrant, valid or invalid. The fact
that the instant case involves an obscenity rap makes it no different from Burgos, a
political case, because, and as we have indicated, speech is speech, whether political
or obscene.
The Court is not ruling out warrantless searches, as the Rules of Court (1964 rev.)
(the Rules then prevailing), provide:
SEC. 12. Search without warrant of person arrested.A person charged with an offense may
be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of the of-
_______________
40 Pres. Decree No. 960, sec. 2 as amended by Pres. Decree No. 969.
41 CONST. (1973), the Charter then in force.
42 Supra, art. IV, sec. 3.
43 No. 64266, December 26, 1984, 133 SCRA 800.
377
VOL. 178, OCTOBER 5, 1989 377
fense. 44
but as the provision itself suggests, the search must have been an incident to a lawful
arrest, and the arrest must be on account of a crime committed. Here, no party has
been charged, nor are such charges being readied against any party, under Article
201, as amended, of the Revised Penal Code.
We reject outright the argument that [t]here is no constitutional nor legal
provision which would free the accused of all criminal responsibility because there
had been no warrant, and that violation of penal law [must] be punished. For
45 46
starters, there is no accused here to speak of, who ought to be punished. Second,
to say that the respondent Mayor could have validly ordered the raid (as a result of
an anti-smut campaign) without a lawful search warrant because, in his opinion,
violation of penal laws has been committed, is to make the respondent Mayor judge,
jury, and executioner rolled into one. And precisely, this is the very complaint of the
petitioner.
We make this resum.
1. 1.The authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge,
if in their opinion, an obscenity rap is in order;
2. 2.The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be
seized are obscene, and pose a clear and present danger of an evil
substantive enough to warrant State interference and action;
3. 3.The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene: the
question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on His Honors sound
discretion.
4. 4.If, in the opinion of the court, probable cause exists, it
_______________
44 RULES OF COURT (1964), Rule 126, sec. 12. As amended, the provision now reads as follows: SEC.
12. Search incident to lawful arrest.A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons
or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. [RULES
ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1985 rev.), Rule 126, sec. 12.]
45 Rollo, id., 51.
46 Id.
378
ANNOTATED
1. may issue the search warrant prayed for;

2. 5.The proper suit is then brought in the court under Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code;
3. 6.Any conviction is subject to appeal. The appellate court may assess whether
or not the properties seized are indeed obscene.
These do not foreclose, however, defenses under the Constitution or applicable

statutes, or remedies against abuse of official power under the Civil Code or the 47
Revised Penal code.48

_______________
47CIVIL CODE, art. 32. The provision states:

ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs,
defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
1. (1)Freedom of religion;
2. (2)Freedom of speech;
3. (3)Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
4. (4)Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
5. (5)Freedom of suffrage;
6. (6)The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
7. (7)The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
8. (8)The right to the equal protection of the laws;
9. (9)The right to be secure in ones person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures;
10. (10)The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
11. (11)The privacy of communication and correspondence;
12. (12)The right to become member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;
13. (13)The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of
grievances;
14. (14)The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
15. (15)The right of the accused against excessive bail;
16. (16)The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face
to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
17. (17)Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against ones self, or from being forced to confess
guilt, or from being induced by a
379
VOL. 178, OCTOBER 5, 1989 379
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. It appearing, however, that the magazines subject of
the search and seizure
_______________
1. promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes
a State witness;
2. (18)Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or
inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
3. (19)Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendants act or omission constitutes
a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action
for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution
(if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes
a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
48 REV. PEN. CODE, arts. 129, 130. The provisions state:
ART. 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those legally obtained.In
addition to the liability attaching to the offender for commission of any other offense, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding P1,000
pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall procure a search warrant without just
cause, or, having legally procured the same, shall exceed his authority or use unnecessary severity in
executing the same.
The acts, committed by a public officer or employee, punishable by the above article are:
1. (1)Procuring a search warrant without just cause;

2. (2)Exceeding ones authority or using unnecessary severity in the execution of a legally procured
search warrant.
ART. 130. Searching domicile without witnesses.The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee who, in cases where a search is proper,
shall search the domicile, papers or other belongings of any person, in the absence of the latter, any member
of his family, or in their default, without the presence of two witnesses residing in the same locality.
380
ANNOTATED
Avedana vs. Court of Appeals
have been destroyed, the Court declines to grant affirmative relief. To that extent,
the case is moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Corts, Grio-
Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa and Feliciano, JJ., In the result.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., On leave.
Petition granted. Decision reversed and set aside.
Note.General search warrants are outlawed because they place the sanctity of
the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of
the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. (Stonehill vs. Diokno, L-19550, June
19, 1967, 20 SCRA 383.)
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[No. 21049.

December 22, 1923]

1. 1.CRIMINAL LAW; ARTICLE 256 OF THE PENAL CODE, WHETHER IN FORCE;

1. 3.ID.; THE TREASON AND SEDITION LAW APPLIED; SEDITION DEFINED.

1. 4.ID.; ID.; FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY.The provisions

1. 5.ID.; ID.; SECTION 8 OF THE TREASON AND SEDITION LAW CONSTRUED;

1. 6.ID.; SUFFICIENCY OF INFORMATION OR, COMPLAINT.The designation of

1. 8.GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; NATURE OF

1. 9.ID.; ID.; SEDITIOUS ATTACK ON THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.The Gover-

APPEAL from a judgment of Court of First Instance of Sorsogon. Flordeliza, J.

1March 16, not reported.

VILLAMOR, J., with whom concurs AVANCEA, J., concurring and

JOHNSON, J., concurring with the concurring and dissenting opinion of

EASTERN BROADCASTING CORPORATION (DYRE) petitioner, vs. THE HON.

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

1. 1.Petitioner Eastern Broadcasting Corporation has already sold its radio

(2) It is necessary to reiterate that while there is no controlling and precise

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:

1G.R. No. 65366, November 9, 1983, 125 SCRA 553.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

246 Phil. 83.

constitutionalism is particularly keen in critical times and in periods of transition.

SCRA 624; and Aquino vs. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

Fuente and Alampay.

for existence if broadcasts are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining

government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment

internal revenue agents) if allowed to override constitutional limitations would

of U.S. vs. Apurado that instances of disorderly conduct by individual members of

9 7 Phil. 422, 426, per Carson, J.

G.R. No. 68828, prom. march 27, 1985.

Supra, see fn. 6.

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

Copyright 2017 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

PETITION FOR REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Industrial Relations.

The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter referred to as

1. "3.That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass

1L-7428, May 24, 1955.

2American Com. vs. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 421.

1. (3)The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition

Philippines, 1952 ed., 71.

5 Laski, The State in Theory and Practice, 35-36.

6 See Chafee on Freedom of Speech and Press, 1955, pp. 13-14.

Appeals, 24 SCRA, 663, 692.

1. government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public

"delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and

sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." 11

in Gonzales vs. Comelec, April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA 835, 895.

or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely

balancing-of-interests test. Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable danger

Justice Fernando, Bill of Rights, 1970 Ed., pp. 78-81, 96-113.

16 Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra.

17 Dennis vs. U.S. (1951), 341 U.S. 494.

Pickering vs. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968).

opinion of Justice Castro; Camasura vs. Provost Marshall, 78 Phil. 131.

27 Fay vs. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).

28 West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette, supra.

procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional

Insistence on the application of the questioned Court of Industrial Relations rule in

L-23714, June 13, 1970, 33 SCRA 887, 907-908.

30-f L-27807, Aug. 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 738, 742-3.