N O V E M B E R 2 0 0 8

PandemicInfluenza,
Electricity,andthe
CoalSupplyChain

AddressingCrucialPreparedness
GapsintheUnitedStates

Nicholas S. Kelley, MSPH

Michael T. Osterholm, PhD, MPH
________________________
N O V E M B E R 2 0 0 8

PandemicInfluenza,Electricity,andtheCoalSupplyChain
AddressingCrucialPreparednessGapsintheUnitedStates

TheCenterforInfectiousDiseaseResearch&Policy(CIDRAP)
CIDRAP,foundedin2001,isagloballeaderinaddressingpublichealthpreparednessandemerging
infectiousdiseaseresponse.PartoftheAcademicHealthCenterattheUniversityofMinnesota,the
centerreducesillnessanddeathfrominfectiousdiseasesbyeffectingchangethroughpublicpolicy
refinement,fosteringtheadoptionofsciencebasedbestpracticesinpublichealthamongprofessionals
andthepublic,andconductingoriginalinterdisciplinaryresearch.

AbouttheAuthors

NicholasS.Kelley,MSPH
ResearchassistantwithCIDRAPBusinessSourceandadoctoralstudentintheDivisonof
EnvironmentalHealthSciencesattheUniversityofMinnesota'sSchoolofPublicHealth.This
reportisbasedonresearchheconductedforaprojectsubmittedtothefacultyoftheGraduate
SchooloftheUniversityofMinnesotainpartialfulfillmentoftherequirementsforthedegreeof
MasterofScience.

MichaelT.Osterholm,PhD,MPH
DirectoroftheCenterforInfectiousDiseaseResearch&Policy,directoroftheNIHsupported
CenterofExcellenceforInfluenzaResearchandSurveillancewithinCIDRAP,aprofessorinthe
DivisionofEnvironmentalHealthSciences,SchoolofPublicHealth,andanadjunctprofessorin
theMedicalSchool,UniversityofMinnesota.HeisalsoamemberoftheInstituteofMedicine
(IOM)oftheNationalAcademyofSciences.AseditoroftheCIDRAPBusinessSource,aWeb
basedinformationsystemforpandemicandotherdiseasethreatstobusiness,Dr.Osterholm
hasbeenaninternationalleaderonthecriticalconcernregardingourpreparednessforan
influenzapandemic.

Acknowledgments
Thefollowingindividualsgraciouslyvolunteeredtheirtime,knowledge,andreview:LauraHussey,
EdisonElectricInstitute;DanKeen,AssociationofAmericanRailroads;PaulLang,ArchCoal;Dr.Kenneth
Friedman,USDepartmentofEnergy,DanielFlood,XcelEnergy;andStanJohnson,NorthAmerican
ElectricReliabilityCorporation.Thisreportdoesnotnecessarilyrepresenttheirviewpointsorthoseof
theiremployers.

CIDRAPstaffmembersAmyBeckerLaFrance,KathleenKimballBaker,AaronDesmond,MartySwain,
andJimWappesalsoprovidedassistance.

Acopyofthisreportisavailableathttp://www.cidrapsource.com/reports/coal

Copyright2008RegentsoftheUniversityofMinnesota

2
TableofContents
1. ExecutiveSummary
2. Introduction
a. Historicaloverview
b. Pandemicplanninginthe21stcentury
c. Theimportanceofelectricity
d. Pandemicplanningintheenergysector
e. AnoverviewofpowergenerationintheUnitedStatesandtheroleofcoal
f. Whatcouldhappentothecoalsupplychainduringapandemic?
3. Methods
a. ReviewofelectricalreliabilityintheUnitedStates
b. Reviewofthe2005coaldisruptioninthePowderRiverBasin
c. Literaturereviewontheimpactofpoweroutagesonpublichealth
d. Reviewoffederalandselectedguidanceonpandemicplanning
e. Reviewofcoalproducingstates'pandemicplans
f. Reviewoftheimpactofthe191819pandemiconcoalproduction
4. Results
a. ReviewofelectricalreliabilityintheUnitedStates
b. Reviewofthe2005coaldisruptioninthePowderRiverBasin
c. Literaturereviewontheimpactofpoweroutagesonpublichealth
d. Reviewoffederalandselectedguidanceonpandemicplanning
e. Reviewofcoalproducingstates'pandemicplans
f. Reviewoftheimpactofthe191819pandemiconcoalproduction
5. Discussion
a. Pandemicthreattiespublichealthtoinfrastructure
b. Rethinkingpandemicvaccineandantiviraldrugallocationstrategies
c. Theneedisclear,butleadershipislacking
d. Lackofconceptualframeworkdoesnotprecludeunderstandingtheimpact
e. Gapsinpandemicpreparednessglobally
f. Futureresearch
g. Recommendations
h. Protectingthecoalsupplychain
6. Appendix
a. AppendixA:Referencesforthereviewofthe2005PowderRiverBasincoal
disruption
b. AppendixB:Referencesforthereviewoffederalandselectedguidanceon
pandemicplanning
c. AppendixC:Thenumberofmines,theirtype,andproductionbystate
d. AppendixD:Detailsofcoalproducingstates'pandemicplansreviewed
e. AppendixE:Anoverviewofthecoalsupplychain
7. References

3
ExecutiveSummary
What'sthelinkbetweenpandemicinfluenza,electricity,andthecoalsupplychain?
Andwhyshouldanyonecare?

I
nfluenzapandemicsarearecurringcauseofwidespreadmorbidityandmortalityinhumans.They
occurwhenapredictablesetoffactorscoincides:AnewinfluenzaAvirusthatishighlypathogenic
andantigenicallyuniqueisreadilytransmittedtoandbyhumans.Thenextpandemicwilloccurinan
unprecedentedsocietalandeconomiccontextaglobaljustintimeeconomythatwillseriously
compromisethepublichealthresponse.Theglobaleconomywilllikelysufferserioussupplychain
delaysandfailures,owingtoalackofsurgecapacityandthelikelihoodofinternationalanddomestic
travel/traderestrictions.
Duringthenextpandemic,thedemandforcriticalproductsandservicesthatwedependonfor
immediatehealthandsafetywilllikelyoutstripsupply,promptingshortagesthatcouldexacerbate
morbidityandmortality.Oneexampleofsuchacriticalproductiselectricity.Coal,amajorsourceof
energyforgeneratingelectricityinmanyareasoftheworld,istheprimaryfuelforpowergenerationin
theUnitedStates.Usagevariesbyregion;theMidwest,forexample,generatesapproximately75%ofits
electricityfromcoal,whereasthewestcoastgeneratesabout5%fromcoal.Despiteregionaldifferences
incoalusage,apandemicislikelytobreaklinksinthecoalsupplychain,thusdisruptingelectrical
generation.Thishasthepotentialtoseverelyendangerthebulkelectricalpowersysteminmostofthe
UnitedStates.
Aneffectiveoverallandpublichealthresponsedependslargelyontheavailabilityofelectricity.
Preventingdisruptionsinthecoalsupplychainisparamount,andsuchaneffortwillcertainlyrequirea
financialinvestment.Buttheconsequenceoffailingtopreparemaybecatastrophic.
Webelievethenationmustreducetheriskthatapandemicposestothegenerationofelectricity
andthecollateraldamagetosocietythatwilloccurwithoutelectricity.Thefollowingstepsurgently
needtobetaken:
1. Buildcoalstocks.Thebuildupofcoalstocksinpreparationforpeakelectricaldemand(the
summerintheUnitedSates)resultsinthehighestcoalstocklevelfortheyear.Webelievethat
thispeakcoalstocklevelshouldnowbemaintainedasthenewminimumateverycoalpower
plantaroundthenationyearround.

4
2. Placecoalminersandsupportinginfrastructurepersonnelinthehighestprioritylevels

forpandemicresponse.TheUnitedStatesgovernmentshouldassumeprimaryresponsibility
forensuringthatcoalminersandtheirsupportinginfrastructurepersonnelhavepriorityaccess
toantiviraldrugs,pandemicvaccines,andothercriticalproductsandservices(eg,critical
pharmaceuticaldrugsandfood).Currently,theyarenotidentifiedasapriorityinthefederalor
stateplanstosupportcriticalinfrastructureduringapandemic.
3. Planfordisruptionsinthecoalsupplychain.Fullyexpecttoseeunprecedenteddisruptions
ofglobal,national,andregionalsupplychainsandemployeeabsenteeismthatcouldrequire
responsesbeyondwhatistypicallyfoundinbusinesscontinuityplansandnotcurrently
addressedinnationalandstatedisastermanagementplans.
4. Anticipateanddevelopstrategiesforrespondingtodisruptionsinelectricalservice.
Adverseweatherandequipmentfailuresarethemostcommoncausesofelectricaldisruptions.
Bothwilloccurduringapandemicinadditiontoprobablefuelshortages.

5
Introduction

Acoalshortageduringaninfluenzapandemicportendsgrimoutcomes.Withthisreport,we
attempttoconceptualizewhathappenswhenapandemicdisruptsthesupplychainforcoal,
thefuelnearlyhalfoftheUnitedStatesreliesuponforelectricitythecornerstoneofpublic
healthandorganizationalcontinuity.

Historicaloverview

I
nfluenzapandemicsarenaturallyoccurringeventsthathavebeenrecordedsinceantiquity.They
occurwhenthefollowingfactorscoincide:(1)anewinfluenzaAvirusthatis(2)highlypathogenic
and(3)antigenicallyuniqueis(4)readilytransmittedtoandbyhumans.
Althoughtheinfluenzaviruswasnotidentifieduntil1933,historicalrecordsdescribeinfluenza
pandemicsdatingbacktothedaysofHippocrates.Thefirstsevereinfluenzapandemicforwhich
substantialhistoricalrecordsexistoccurredin1580(Potter2001),anditreportedlydepopulatedsome
Spanishcities(Beveridge1991).Inthelast300years,10influenzapandemicshavebeendocumented
(Potter1998,Osterholm2005a).
Theinfluenzapandemicof191819hasbeenstudiedextensivelyasoneofthemostdramatic
infectiousdiseaseoutbreakseverrecorded(Potter1998,Barry2005,Taubenberger2006).From50
millionto100millionpeoplediedinthispandemic(Johnson2002).Thetwothatfollowed,in195758
and196869,wererelativelymildincomparison(Potter1998).
Basedonprecedent,anotherinfluenzapandemicisinevitable.Experiencewithinfluenza
pandemicsoftherecentpastislargelyguidingourresponseforthenextone.Weknowthat"pandemics
havealwaysspreadinpatternsconsistentwiththespeedandpathwaysofhumantravel"(Patterson
1986).Further,seriouslyillindividualsareonlypartoftheimpactacommunityexperiencesasaresultof
apandemic.Alargenumberoflessseverelyillindividualsmaybecomea"threattothecommunity"by
reducingcommunityresourceslosttoabsenteeism(Kilbourne1987).
Thepastthreepandemics,whichoccurredinthe20thcentury,haveprovidedthebackground
fromwhichwehavederivedmostoftheassumptionsaboutthenextpandemic.Theseassumptions
include(1)aclinicalattackrateof30%orhigher,(2)50%oftheillrequiringoutpatientcare,(3)
communitiesaffectedfor6to8weeks,(4)theentireworldexperiencingthepandemicatapproximately

6
thesametime,and(5)eachwaveofthepandemiclastingbetween2to3months(HHSa).Whilethere
isvalueinusingpastpandemicexperiencestoprojectwhatwillhappeninthefuture,historyasaguide
forpandemicpreparednessislimited.
AcandidateforthenextpandemicisthenovelinfluenzaA/H5N1virus,whichiscurrently
causinganinternationalepidemicinwildbirdsandpoultry.Weknowthefollowing(WHOworkinggroup
2006):
Thevirushascausedalimitednumberofhumaninfections.
Ahighcasefatalityratehasbeendocumented.
ThecurrentInfluenzaA/H5N1epidemicinbirdsisantigenicallyunique.
InfluenzaA/H5N1hasnotyetacquiredtheabilitytospreadeasilybetweenhumans,butitcould
dosoatanytime.
InfluenzaA/H5N1isnottheonlyviruswithpandemicpotential;epidemiologistsareconcernedabout
theinfluenzaA/H7family,amongotherinfluenzaAstrains(Belser2008).Whileitisunclearwhich
infuenzastrainwillcausethenextpandemc,therewillbeanotherinfluenzapandemic.

Pandemicplanninginthe21stcentury
The"flatteningoftheworld"(atermcoinedbyNew York TimescolumnistThomasFriedman)has
changedsocietydramaticallysince1968,theyearofthelasthumaninfluenzapandemic(Friedman
2006).Inaflatworld,Friedmansays,supplychains(alltheinputsforaproduct,fromitsorigintoend
use)dependonrapidandreliablecommunication,andpreviousdemanddeterminesprojectionsof
productsneeded.Stocksofproductscanbekepttoaminimum,therebyreducingcostsupanddown
thesupplychain.
Theworldhasneverexperiencedapandemicduringthejustintimeglobaleconomy
(Osterholm2005a,Osterholm2007).Today'ssupplychainslacksurgecapacitytheabilitytoquickly
scaleuptomeetdemands(Sheffi2005,Friedman2006).Duringaninfluenzapandemic,thenumberof
illnessesanddeathsworldwidewillinevitablycauseproblemsthroughoutsupplychains.Worker
absenteeism(whetherfromillness,fear,needtocarefordependentsorlovedones,orlackofabilityto
travel)anddisruptionsininternationalanddomestictravelwillaffecteveryfacetofsupplychainsthat
deliverthecriticalproductswedependonforimmediatehealthandsafety,suchaselectricityand,in
turn,watersuppliesandsewagesystems,food,prescriptiondrugs,andcommunitysafety(Osterholm
2005b).Sointerwovenaretheseproductsandservicesinourlivestoday,theiravailabilityissimply

7
takenforgranted.Mostofthecriticallifesavingdrugsfoundineveryhospital,forexample,are
producedoutsideoftheUnitedStates,particularlyinChinaandIndia.Apandemicwilllikelyseriously
disrupttheinternationalsupplychainofthesepharmaceuticalproducts,fromthesynthesisofanactive
ingredientinafacilityinAsiatodeliveryofthefinisheddrugtoahospitalpharmacyintheUnitedStates.
Wecanalsoexpecttorunshortofsuppliesofproductsusedtopreventandcontrolthespread
ofinfectiousagents(Neil2006,Rhea2007).Duringthe2003outbreakofsevereacuterespiratory
syndrome(SARS),forexample,therewereshortagesofmedicalproductssuchasN95respirators(Lim
2004).TheproblemswithmedicalsupplyshortagesduringtheSARSepidemic,whichdidnotspread
beyondafewcountriesorcontinueforalongperiod,willpaleincomparisontowhatcanbeexpected
duringaninfluenzapandemic,asregionswillnotbeabletoresupplyoneanotherduringwavesof
outbreaksinwhichnoareawillbespared.Clearly,thejustintimesupplychaindynamicshavemade
pandemicpreparednessacomplicatedissueinthe21stcentury.
Evenwiththiseconomicbackdrop,pandemicplanninghasfocusedprimarilyonpublichealth
preventionstrategies.Butpublichealthplanninghasnothistoricallyincludedbusinesscontinuityor
criticalinfrastructureplanning.Norhaspublichealthhadastatutoryauthoritytorequireplanningand
preparednessofthecriticalinfrastructure(GAO2008).Mostoftheguidancedoesnotfactorinthe
dynamicsofapandemicinthe21stcentury,asidefrompointingoutthatsupplychaindisruptionsare
likely.Considerableworkhasbeendevotedtovaccine/antiviraldrugdistributionplans,preventing
infections,andhealthcaresurgecapacity.Anextensivebodyofliteraturecanbefoundonthesecore
publichealthstrategies,includingthoseofeverystateandthenationalpandemicpreparednessplan.
Federallevelguidance.USDepartmentofHealthandHumanServices(HHS)guidancefocuses
onpreventing illness and deathrelatedtopandemicinfluenzainfections.Theunderlyingassumptionis
thattheprimaryimpactofapandemicwillbethemorbidityandmortalityassociatedwiththedisease
itself.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS)guidance,ontheotherhand,isconcernedwith
maintaining critical infrastructures and key resourcesduringapandemic.Itsunderlyingassumptionis
thattheimpacttothecriticalinfrastructureandkeyresourcesintheUnitedStatescouldbeas
significantasthediseaseitself.ThesetwoviewsareharmonizedintheNationalStrategyforPandemic
Influenza(NSPI)publishedin2005(HSC2005).Butbothviewsarenotreflectedintheseparateplanning
guidancefromthetwoexecutivebranchagencies.Thislackofcoordinationonprioritiesand
assumptionshashamperedcomprehensiveandconsequentialpandemicplanningeffortsintheUnited
States.

8
 Statelevelguidance.Todateeverystatehasdevelopedapandemicinfluenzaplan,mostof
whichareavailableongovernmentWebsites.Threereviewshaveaddressedstatepandemicinfluenza
planssinceplanningbeganinearnestin2005.Thefirstreview,byHolmbergetal,focusedexclusivelyon
suchpublichealthmeasuresasvaccineallocationandcontainmentstrategies.Theauthorsfoundthat
stateplans(manywereindraftform)werequitevaried,andtheyconcludedthatthevariability
stemmedfromalackofstrongfederalleadershipandpooranswerstocriticalepidemiologicquestions,
suchaswhatatypicalintrahouseholdattackrateisduringapandemic(Holmberg2006).Thenext
review,byThomasetal,focusedontheethicsunderlyingstateplans.Theauthorsfoundthatmost
statesdidnotadequatelyaddresssuchissuesasprovidinganethicaljustificationforallocationofscarce
resourcesduringapandemic(Thomas2007).Themostrecentreview,whichwasrequestedbyCongress
andconductedbyListeretal,consideredmultipleaspectsofpandemicplanningatthestatelevel.While
theauthorshighlightedmanyareasthatneedimprovement,ofmostconcernwasthelackofplanning
forservicecontinuationoutsideofpublichealthandhealthcare.Theyfoundthatonly7outof51(their
analysisincludedtheDistrictofColumbia)statedocumentsmentionedplansforcontinuationofsuch
essentialservicesasutilities(Lister2007).Essentialservices,similartocriticalproducts,areoneswe
dependonforhealthandsafety.Suchservicesaremostlytakenforgranteduntiladisruptionoccurs.
Utilities,includingpowercompaniesthatprovideelectricity,areprimeexamplesofessentialservices.

Theimportanceofelectricity
Electricityistheunderpinningofsocietyindevelopedcountries.Butourdependenceisrarely
recognized,exceptduringoccasionalelectricalblackoutswhenproductionlinesatmanufacturingplants
shutdown,computersystemsgooffline,andcitiesgrowdark.Fortunatelytheseeventsareveryrare
andshortlivedinmostdevelopedcountries.Whiletheconsequencesofanypoweroutagescanbe
broad,thispaperfocusesonthepublichealtheffects.
Werecognizethatapproximately2billionpeopleintheworlddonothaveaccesstoastable
supplyofelectricity.However,thesepeoplestilluseproductsorservicesthatcomefrompartsofthe
worldthatdohaveelectricity.Forexample,manyregionsoftheworldinwhichelectricityisintermittent
orunavailabledependonvaccinesproducedinfactoriesthatuseelectricity.
Whenoneconsiderspublichealthpreparedness,theavailabilityofelectricitygenerallyisnot
consideredafactorofconcernforpublichealthplanners.Electricityistypicallyregardedasreliableand
is,inmostinstances,availableforallpublichealthneeds.Whetherplanningforinfluenzavaccination

9
clinics,investigatingoutbreaksofafoodbornedisease,orrespondingtoabioterrorismevent,public
healthworkersalmostalwaysassumethatthelightswillbeonandpoweravailable.Fordisaster
scenariosthatwouldcompromiseelectricity,suchasafterahurricane,planningactivitiestakeinto
accountthelossofpower.Mostpandemicplanningactivities,however,donotconsiderthepotential
forthelossofelectricity.
MostAmericansrarelyexperiencepoweroutagesformorethanashorttime(Apt2004,Hines
2008).Between1984and2006,organizationsreportedtotheUSDepartmentofEnergy(DOE)and
NationalElectricityReliabilityCorporation(NERC)that861disturbancesaffectedpowerdelivery(Hines
2008).Ofthesedisturbances,some44%wererelatedtoweather(eg,icestorms,wind),nearly30%
involvedequipmentfailure,and5%werecausedbysupplyshortages(Hines2008).Morethanonecause
canbereportedforafailure(eg,highwindsandicestormscouldbelistedforanoutage),sothese
numbersareapproximate.
TheUnitedStateshashadseveralmajorelectricalblackoutsinthelasthalfcentury,yetvery
littlehasbeenwrittenaboutthepublichealthimpactoflong termelectricalpowerloss.Much,
however,hasbeenpublishedaboutshorttermelectricalblackoutsandtheirimpactonacutecare,the
risksofcarbonmonoxidepoisoningfromgenerators,andthesurgeinmedicalneedsinthecommunity
afterablackout.Literaturecanbefoundonsuchtopicsasheatwavesandthehealthimpactof
associatedblackouts,thoughthesearticlesfocusonspecificsituationsanddonotexpandanalysisto
broaderpublichealthimplicationsrelatedtolongtermelectricalblackouts.
HurricaneKatrinawasavividreminderthatkeycomponentsofpublichealth,suchassafewater
andrefrigerationoffoodandmedications,canberenderedineffectiveifcriticalinfrastructuresbreak
down.PoweroutageswerecommonafterKatrina,becausepartsoftheelectricalinfrastructurewere
destroyed.Manyhealthcarefacilitieslostpowerforweeks(Currier2006,LSU2006).Hospitalsand
clinicswerenottheonlyfacilitiesimpairedbythelossofpower.ThreemajorpipelinesintheGulfCoast
thattransportoilandfueltotheMidwestandeastcoastoftheUnitedStateswereeithertotallyshut
downorpartiallyoutofserviceforafewdays(Slaughter2005).Thebiggestproblemfacingcrews
restoringpowerafterKatrinawasthe"lackoffood,waterandshelterforitsrepaircrewswhoare
literallysleepingintheirtrucks"(OfficeofElectricityDeliveryandEnergyReliability2005).Conditions
liketheseleadtosuchpublichealthproblemsasincreasingrisksofinfectiousdiseaseandoccupational
injury.

10
 Publichealthpreparednesstoday,whetherforachronicdiseaseorapandemic,dependson
infrastructureadvancesofthepastcenturyand,inparticular,ontheavailabilityofelectricity.The20th
centurysawgreatimprovementsinpublichealth(CDC1999c),oneofthemostsignificantofwhich
concernedthecontrolofinfectiousdiseases(CDC1999a).Theavailabilityofcleandrinkingwater,
sanitarysewagesystems,andrefrigerationallofwhichrequireelectricityaccountedforsomeofthe
largestdropsininfectiousdiseasemortality(CDC1999a,CDC1999b).Theabilitytoprovidesafedrinking
waterinthe1900shadasignificantimpactonreducinginfectiousdiseasemortality.Forexample,the
leadingcauseofmortalityofchildreninMinneapolisin1900wastyphoidfever,theresultofconsuming
waterfromcontaminatedindividualwatersupplies(OsterholmMT,unpublisheddata).Today,standard
environmentalhealthpracticeslikeensuringthesafetyandmaintenanceofourwatersystemsis
consideredthefoundationofpublichealth.Suchpracticestypicallyoperateinthebackgroundunlessa
breakdownintheinfrastructureoccurs.
Butelectricitytrulyundergirdsthepublichealthinfrastructure.Itissovitaltodaythatoneofus
hasnoted:"ThomasEdison,notJohnSnow,isreallythefatherofmodernpublichealth"(OsterholmMT,
Jun16,2008).Withoutelectricityortheavailabilityoruseofbackuppowersources,safewater
treatmentanddistributionsystems,sanitarywastetreatmentsystems,foodrefrigerationprocesses,and
vaccinemanufacturingplantscannotoperate.Inaddition,trafficlightsgodark,telecommutingisn't
possible,publichealthsurveillanceactivitiesarecrippled,elevatorsstopworking,andtheheatingand
coolingofbuildingscease.Whileitmightseemobviousthatelectricityiscriticalforpublichealth,the
literatureonthistopicissparse.Incontrast,ampleliteratureexistsregarding(1)air,water,andfood,
andensuringthatsuchbasicneedsareprotectedforthesakeofthepublic'shealthand(2)thedangers
thatelectricalpowergeneration,primarilycoalbased,posetothepublic'shealth.Thisbodyof
literature,however,doesnotreflectanunderstandingofhowmuchsocietydependsonthe
infrastructurethatprovidesournation'spoweroranunderstandingofwhatthisinfrastructure
comprises(Leavitt2006).
Thispaperisthefirstattempttoconceptualizethepotentialimpactofaninfluenzapandemicon
electricityintheUnitedStates,specificallyonthesupplyofcoal,andthesubsequentdangertopublic
health.ItprovidesadetailedanalysisofthecoalsupplychainthatoriginatesinthePowderRiverBasin
(PRB)ofWyomingandMontana,whichisthelargestsinglesourceoffuelforpowergenerationinthe
UnitedStates(Freme2008).Whilecoalisminedinmultiplelocationsaroundthecountry,thequality
andtypeofcoalvariesatdifferentmines.Moderncoalboilersarenottypicallydesignedtousemore

11
thanonetypeofcoal,suchaslowsulfurcoalfromthePRB.Withoutmodifications,coalminedonthe
eastcoastcannotbeusedinplantsdesignedtoburnlowsulfurcoalfromthePRB.NonPRBcoalis
typicallyusedforpowergenerationinthesamegeographicregionfromwhichitismined.Intimesof
coalshortages,asmightbeanticipatedwithapandemic,themereavailabilityofcoalinonelocation
doesnotmeanthatitcanbeusedinotherlocations.Wewilldiscusslaterinthisreporttheexampleofa
coalsupplychaindisruptionthatnearlyinterruptedservicetoamajorcoalfueledpowerplantnear
Atlanta.Eventhoughcoalminesaregeographicallyclosetothisplant,thefacilityhadtoimportfrom
Indonesiathetypeofcoalthatcouldbeburnedinitsboilers.(Seepage26forfurtherdiscussion.)
Ouranalysisexaminespandemicpreparednessinthethreemaincomponentsofthissupply
chain(production,transport,andconsumption)andtheplanningguidancegiventothesecomponents
bynongovernmentalorganizations(NGOs)andbystateandfederalgovernments.Thisanalysiswill
provideinsightintothedynamicsofpandemicpreparednessinthe21stcenturyandtheimpactthat
pandemicscanhaveinourflatworld.
Inshort,ifaninfluenzapandemicdisruptsournation'scoalsupplychain,thenwhatimpactcan
weexpectonourpublichealthsystemandwhatcanwedonow?Acoalshortageduringapandemic
portendsgrimoutcomes.Societycantakestepstoensurethatcoalisminedandtransportedwhereand
whenneeded,whichmeansdecisionmakersatalllevelsmustclearlyunderstandtheinextricabletie
betweenpublichealthandelectricityandactaccordinglywellbeforethepandemiconset.

Pandemicplanningintheenergysector
Theenergysectorcomprisesmultipleassetsthatprovideenergyinitsraworrefinedformsandare
typicallyassociatedwithelectricity,naturalgas,orpetroleum.Electricalassetsrangefromtransmission
anddistributioninfrastructurestofacilitiesthatgenerateelectricityfromawiderangeofsources,like
coal,nuclear,naturalgas,andrenewables.Naturalgasandpetroleumassetsrangefromwellsto
transmissionanddistributioninfrastructuresandrefineries.Suchassetscanbefoundthroughoutthe
nation,fromoilwellsinAlaskatorefineriesinLouisiana,andfromwaterthatspinsturbinesinadamin
theTennesseeValleytocoalseamsinWyoming.Whilediverse,theassetsactuallyareinterdependent.
Boththemovementofoilfromwellstorefineriesanditsrefinementtodieselrequireselectricity.The
movementofcoaloutofthegroundandtopowerplants,whereelectricityisproduced,alsorequires
dieselfuel.Andwhiletheelectricalsectorcannotfunctionwithoutnaturalgasandoilassets,thispaper
focusesspecificallyoncoalfueledpowerplants.

12
 Baseloadpower.Coal,hydroelectric,andnuclearpowerprovidemostbaseloadpoweron
whichthenation'spowergridsystemrelies.Baseloadpower,thebackboneoftheelectricalgrid
system,iscontinuouslysuppliedatarelativelyconstantleveltoaccommodatearelativelyconstant
demandforelectricity.CoalprovidesthelargestpercentageofbaseloadpowerintheUnitedStates.If
coalbasedpowerfailsduetoawidespreadpandemicrelatedsupplychaindisruption,thecountry's
powersystemwillbecrippled.Whilethissituationistheoreticallypossible,regionaldisruptionsare
morelikelytooccur,becausecertainregionsdependsoheavilyoncoal.(SeeFigure2.)However,given
thatanyoneareaofthecountrydependsuponproductsandservicesfromotherareas,regional
disruptionsinelectricitywillhavenationalimpact.Evenlosingindividualpowerplantscouldresultin
unforeseenproblems(Mili2004).Theeffectsofthepowergrid'scollapsingwouldbecatastrophic.
Simplyput,withoutelectricitythecriticalindustriesinournationandaroundtheworldshutdown.
Generators.Mostcontingencyplansforpoweroutagesrelyongenerators.Generally,these
generatorsusedieselfuel.Somegeneratorsusenaturalgasoranotherfuelthatisdeliveredviapipeline.
Onsitesuppliesofdieselfuelaretypicallyinuseforhours,notdays.Thesefuelsuppliesarethen
maintainedbyemergencyfuelcontracts.Fuelcontractsaretypicallyfilledattherefineryorfuel
transportmedium(pipelineorbarge)usedintheregion.Powerdisruptionsarethemostcommonform
ofemergencyshutdownsthatrefineriesexperience(EIA2007d).Mostrefineries,sansthelargerones,
donothavethecapacitytocontinueworkiftheirpowersupplyisdisrupted.Whenpowerisdisrupted,
emergencygeneratorskickinandprovideenoughpowertosafelyshutdownthefacility,whichcantake
upto48hours.Thelargerrefineriesmighthaveonsitecogenerationplantsthatgenerateelectricityfor
therefineries,butthesearestillvulnerabletopoweroutages,astheydependonfuel(mostlynatural
gas)beingdeliveredviapipelines,whicharepoweredbyelectricity.AftertheexperiencewithHurricane
Katrina,manykeypointsonthemainpipelinesnowhavegeneratorbackup.Electricityiscriticalfor
naturalgasproductionandtransport.Ifapowerdisruptionresultsinrefineriesshuttingdown,therewill
likelybelimitedfuelsuppliestomeettheseemergencyfuelcontracts,unlessfuelcanbeobtainedfrom
sourcesthatarenotaffected.Giventhegeographicconcentrationofrefineries,suchascenariois
unlikely(Parfomak2007).
Theelectricalsectorhasalonghistoryofdealingwithnaturaldisastersanddisruptions,which
hascreatedarobustcultureofpreparednessintheindustry.Partofthisculturecomesfroman
understandingthatthemultipleenergysourcesprovidepowerforournation,thusmakingelectrical
generationmoreredundant.UsingguidancefromtheDHSandHHS,however,theelectricalgeneration

13
industryhasdevelopedpandemicplansthatprimarilyfocusonemployeehealthandsafety(EEI2007,
NERC2005).
Theindustryhasprojectedthatduringapandemicelectricityusagewoulddrop1%to9%,owing
tocommunitymitigationmeasuresandworkerabsenteeism(OntarioEmergencyPreparednessTask
Force2007).Thereisexistingconcernaboutenergysupplies,specificallycoal,beingdisruptedduringa
pandemic;theElectricitySectorCoordinatingCouncilandtheEdisonElectricInstitute(EEI)havenoted
thatcoalstocksmayneedtobeincreasedtoensureadequatefuellevelsduringapandemic(GAO2007).
Presumably,disruptionsinminingandtransportationwillcauseashortageofcoalbytheendofthefirst
wave.Whiletheenergysectorhasdonesignificantworktoensurethehealthofitsworkforceduringa
pandemic,littleprogresshasbeenmadetoensurethepreparednessofthecoalsupplychainupon
whichtheindustrydepends.

AnoverviewofpowergenerationintheUnitedStatesandtheroleofcoal
CoalcurrentlyisthepredominantenergysourceforthegenerationofelectricityintheUnitedStates.In
2007,coalwasthesourceof48.6%oftheelectricitygenerated(EIA2008d).Figure1showstheprimary
energysourcesusedtogeneratethenation'selectricity.

Figure1:Percentageofnetelectricitygenerationbyenergysource,UnitedStates,2007(EIA2008d)

In2007,theelectricalpowersectorgenerated4,006,482megawatthoursofpowerintheUnitedStates
(EIA2008d).Morethan71%ofthispowerwasderivedfromafossilfuel,includingcoalornaturalgas.As
ofJanuary1,2007,theUnitedStateshad620coalpoweredplants(EIA2008d).Clearly,coalisthe
cornerstoneofelectricalpowergenerationintheUnitedStatesandhasbeensincethe1950s,as
Graph1indicates.

14
 Graph1:Percentageofelectricalgenerationbasedoncoal,1950to2006(EIA2007b)

80%

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Year

CoalislikelytocontinuetoprovidemostelectricalpowerintheUnitedStates,thoughregional
differencesexist,asseeninFigure2.

Figure2:Percentageofnetelectricalgenerationintheelectricalpowersectorbasedoncoal,in2007
(Freme2008)

15
Coalisprojectedtosupply54%ofthenation'selectricityby2030(EIA2008b).Inaccordancewiththis
projection,currently28newcoalpoweredplantsarebeingbuiltintheUnitedStates(NETL2008).A
trendworthnotingisthegrowingattentiontoenvironmentalconcernsaroundcoalusageandthe
impactthiswillhaveoninvestmentsinthesecurityofthecoalsupplychain.Itisunclearwhatthe
concernsaboutcarbonemissioncapswilldotodiscouragetheconstructionofnewcoalfiredplants.
OneoftheprimaryreasonstheUnitedStatesreliessoheavilyoncoalforthegenerationof
electricityisthatithasthelargestknownreservesofthefuelintheworld(EIA2007c).Atcurrentusage
rates,knowncoalreservesintheUnitedStatescouldprovidewellover200years'worthoffuel,though
amoredetailedanalysisisneededtoensuretheseestimatesareaccurate(CommitteeonCoalResearch,
Techonology,andResourceAssessmentstoInformEnergyPolicy2007).
ForyearsthemainsourceofcoalintheUnitedStateswastheundergroundminesinsuchstates
asWestVirginia,Pennsylvania,andKentucky.Undergroundcoalminesconsistentlyproducedmorecoal
peryearthansurfaceminesuntil1974(EIA2007b).PassageoftheCleanAirAct,intendedtoreduce
sulfurdioxideemissions,rampedupsurfacemininginthe1970sinthequesttoaccesslowsulfurcoal.
TheUnitedStateshappenstohavealargereserveinthePRBinWyomingandMontana.Bothstatessaw
aboomincoalproductioninthe1970s,andWyominghasbecomethelargestsourceofcoalinthe
UnitedStates.In2007,Wyomingproduced453.6millionshorttonsofcoaloralmost40%oftheUnited
States'coalproduction(Freme2008).Figure3showsthe39statescurrentlyusingcoalfromWyoming
andMontana(EIA2008c).

Figure3:PercentageofelectricalpowergeneratedfromWyoming/Montanacoalbystate,2006(EIA
2008c,EIA2007b)

16
Combined,Wyoming,andMontanahave26coalmines,andthePRBminesaccountfor17ofthem(EIA
2008a).AllofthePRBminesaresurfaceminesandtheyarehighlyproductive.In2007,forexample,
thelargestcoalmineintheUnitedStateswasNorthAntelopeRochelleinthePRB,whichproduced91.5
milliontonsoffuel(Freme2008).Thatonemineproducedmorecoalthan22oftheother24coal
producingstates(Freme2008).ThecoalinthePRBliesinthickseamsveryclosetothesurface,which
makesitconducivetorapidandextremelyproductiveextraction.
In2007,6,399minersworkedthe17minesinthePRBandproduced479.5millionshorttonsof
coal,makingthemsomeofthemostproductiveminersintheworld(EIA2008a).Inaddition,many
thirdpartyvendorsassistedminersbymaintainingequipmentandloadingthetrains,amongother
activities.ThehighlevelsofproductivityperpersonatPRBmines,whileimpressive,couldmakeany
disruptionintheavailabilityofminersrisky,becauseproductivitycoulddropdramaticallyifwidespread
illnessweretooccur.Fortunately,PRBmineshaveneverexperiencedasituationthatwoulddisruptthe
availabilityofminers.And,likemostpeoplealivetoday,thesehighlyproductiveminershaveyetto
experienceasevereinfluenzapandemic.

Whatcouldhappentothecoalsupplychainduringapandemic?
Thecoalminingindustrywillnotescapetheeffectsofapandemic,andtheareasofproductionand
transportationwillbearthebrunt,becausedemandforcoalwillnotdropduringapandemic.Coal
miningisanenergyandhumanintenseactivity.EquipmentusedinthePRBismassive,requiring
enormousamountsoffuelandelectricityandhighlyexperiencedandskilledworkers.Eachworkerhas
anessentialrole,includingthelimitednumberofpeoplewhocansafelyandeffectivelydriveoneofthe
400tontrucksusedtotransportcoalfromtheminetotheprocessingfacility,whichcanbemilesaway.
If,forexample,adrivermakes10tripsashift,delivering4,000tonsofcoalashift,theimpactofthis
drivermissing10workshiftswouldbe40,000fewertonsofcoalbeingprocessedattheminesthe
equivalentofthreefullcoaltrains.
Withmorethan6,000minersworkinginthePRB,losingeven5%oftheworkforcewould
severelyreduceminingproductivity.A30%workforceabsenteeismratewouldresultin1,800miners
missingworkfordaystoweeks.Theresultwouldbesignificantlylesscoalbeingmined,aseachminer
playssuchanintegralroleinminingproductivity.Areductioninmineproductivitywillresultinlesscoal
beingshipped,and,ultimately,coalstocksbeingdrawndown.

17
 AlmostallcoalcomingoutofthePRBismovedonrailroads,oftengreatdistances.Asthe
internationalcoalmarketcontinuestoexpand,thedemandforPRBcoalontheeastcoastoftheUnited
Statesisincreasing(Carey2008).ThemorethatutilitiesontheeastcoastturntocoalfromthePRB,the
morestressedthesupplychainwillbecome.PRBcoaltravelsasfarawayasGeorgia,a1,400mileone
waytrip(Sharp2008).Onlongdistancetrips,asinglecoaltrainmighthave11differenttraincrews(a
conductorandanengineer)whoworklocallyontrackstheyhavememorizedduetothevariability
requiredintrainspeedperlocalrailroadconditions(McPhee2005a).Crewsareguidedby12different
dispatchers.Eachdispatcher(locatedinaremotefacilitywithotherdispatchers)orchestratesthe
movementoftrainsandauthorizescrewstotravelthestretchoftrackthedispatchercontrols(McPhee
2005b).Federallawallowsthesehighlytrainedtraincrewstobeonthejobforamaximumof12hours
atatime,thoughthisrulewilllikelybesuspendedduringapandemic(EstablishmentofEmergency
ReliefDockets2007).Evenwiththissuspension,therailsystemisgoingtohavedifficultyoperatingnear
currentcapacityduringapandemic.
TheDepartmentofTransportation(DOT)suggeststhatrailroadsprioritizetheirservicesto
ensureessentialproductslikecoalaretransportedduringtheperiodsofhighabsenteeismexpected
duringapandemic(DOT2008).Whileitislikelythatcoalandothercriticalproducts(eg,chlorinefor
watertreatment)willbeprioritizedbytherailindustry,othercargowillnecessarilyfallbythewayside,a
causeforconcernbecausetherailroadindustryisessentialforkeepingmostofthecriticalindustriesin
thenationinbusiness.Evenshortdisruptionscanbecatastrophicforthem(CriticalInfrastructure
AssuranceOffice1997).
EveryregionintheUnitedStatesisexpectedtoexperiencethepandemicinasimilartime
frame,thougheachregion'sfirstcaseandpeaknumberofcasesarenotlikelytooccuronthesameday,
ratherwithindaystoweeksofeachother.Therailroadsystemcurrentlyoperatesmanyvitalcoalroutes
atornearcapacity(AAR2007).Anydisruptionalongthesupplychain,beitdelayedunloadingatpower
plantsorreducedloadingatthemines,damagestheefficiencyoftheentiresystem.Giventhetightness
ofthesystem,anydelaycanresultinmultipledelays.Becausetherailsystemdoesnothavethe
capacitytoappreciablyincreasecoalshipments,coalstockscouldremainatsuboptimallevelsforlong
periods.

18
Methods

Analysisforthisreportwasbasedancomprehensivereviewofpowerindustryreports;
governmenthearings,plans,reports,andguidance;accountsofthe191819pandemic;
reviewofaderailmentthataffectedshipmentsfromthePowerRiverBasinin2005;and
scientificliterature.Thissectionsummarizesstepstaken.

ReviewofelectricalreliabilityintheUnitedStates
NERCisanonprofitorganizationresponsibleforensuringreliablebulkpowerinNorthAmerica.NERC
publishestwoseasonalreliabilityassessmentsperyear,summerandwinter,aswellasonelongterm
(10year)reliabilityassessment.Themostrecentwinter,summer,andlongtermreliabilityassessments
werereviewed(NERC2007a,NERC2007c,NERC2008).Specialattentionwaspaidtothehistoryofcoal
stocksandcurrentprojections.

Reviewofthe2005coaldisruptioninthePowderRiverBasin
Thecircumstancesofa2005coalshipmentdisruptioninthePRBresemblethepotentialimpactofa
pandemicandthusprovidedacasestudytoreview.ThePRBisthesinglelargestsourceofenergyfor
electricalgenerationintheUnitedStates.Adisruptioncausedbyphysicaldamagetoraillinesseverely
reducedrailcapacityoutofthePRB.Whilephysicaldamageisnotexpectedduringapandemic,
workforceabsenteeismwilllikelycauseareductioninminingandtransport,thuslimitingtheshipment
ofcoaloutofthePRB.
Reportsonthedisruptionfrom(1)NERC,(2)theDOEOfficeofElectricityDeliveryandEnergy
Reliability,and(3)theCongressionalResearchService(CRS)werereviewedindetail.Testimonyand
commentsfromthreehearingswerealsoreviewed:
FederalEnergyRegulatoryCommissiondiscussionwithutilityandrailroadrepresentativeson
reliabilitymatters,June15,2006
SurfaceTransportationBoardpublichearingonrailtransportationofenergyresourcescriticalto
thenation'senergysupply,July18,2007

19
 SenateCommitteeonEnergyandNaturalResourcehearingoncoalbasedgenerationreliability,
May25,2006.
CurrentinformationoncoalandelectricityfromtheDOEEnergyInformationAdministration(EIA)was
alsoreviewedtoprovideaperspectiveofthecurrentsituation.Documentsreviewedarelistedin
AppendixA.

Literaturereviewontheimpactofpoweroutagesonpublichealth
Aliteraturereviewontheimpactofelectricalpoweroutagesonpublichealthwasperformedviaa
searchofPubMed,IEEEXplore,GoogleScholar,andtheCompendexandEngineeringIndex,usingthe
followingkeywords:blackout,poweroutage,electricity,lackofpower,naturaldisaster,generator,
publichealth,criticalinfrastructure,andpowerfailure.Thekeywordswereusedinavarietyof
combinations.Abstractswerereviewedtodetermineifapaperaddressedtheimpactofpoweroutages
onpublichealth.Papersthatfocusedonasingleimpact,suchashowahospitalemergencyroom
handledapoweroutage,wereexcluded,astheydidnotaddressbroadpublichealthissues.

Reviewoffederalandselectedguidanceonpandemicplanning
Twelvekeyguidancedocumentsfocusedonbusinessorcriticalinfrastructurepreparednessfora
pandemicand/orrecognizedassignificantinpandemicplanningwereidentified.(SeeAppendixBfora
listoftheguidancedocumentsandreasonsforchoosingthem.)Adetailedreviewandakeywordsearch
wereperformed.Alistofkeywordswascompiled,representingcommontermsassociatedwith
electricalgeneration.Keywordsincluded:criticalinfrastructure,electricity,power,coal,fuel,utilities,
andenergy.ThedocumentsweresearchedusingthesearchfeatureinAdobeAcrobat8Professional
(AdobeSystemsInc.,SanJose,Calif.)forinstancesinwhichthesekeywordsappeared.Thecontextfor
eachkeywordwasexaminedtoensureitreferredtoplanningfortheelectricalsector.

Reviewofcoalproducingstates'pandemicplans
Pandemicplanswerereviewedfrom25statesthatprovidealmostallthecoalforthegenerationof
electricityintheUnitedStates.CoalproducingstateswerederivedfromTable1oftheEIA's2007
Annual Coal Report,whichisprovidedinAppendixC(EIA2008a).Thepandemicinfluenzaplansforthese
stateswerethenaccessedviathestateplanlistingonwww.pandemicflu.gov(HHSc).Toensurethe
mostcurrentplanwasanalyzed,eachwascomparedtothestatepandemicplanlistmaintainedbythe

20
CenterforInfectiousDiseaseResearchandPolicyattheUniversityofMinnesota(CIDRAP2008).State
pandemicinfluenzaWebsiteswerealsosearchedforadditionalmaterialrelatedtobusinessorcritical
infrastructurepandemicplanning.AllplanswereaccessedbetweenApril14,2008,andMay10,2008.
Allplansweredownloadedasportabledocumentfiles(PDFs)orreceivedasMicrosoftWorddocuments
andconvertedtoPDFs.WestVirginiaprovideditsdraftplanviaemail.
Excludedfromtheanalysiswerethefollowingstatesforthefollowingreasons:
Arkansas.Thepandemicplanwasnotmadeavailable.
NorthDakota.Theplanwasonlyasummaryofactivities.
Mississippi.Theplanaddressesonlyhowthestatewillreceiveanddistributeassetsfromthe
StrategicNationalStockpile(SNS).
Alistwascompiledofkeywordsthatarecommontermsassociatedwithelectricalgeneration.Keywords
included:criticalinfrastructure,electricity,power,coal,fuel,naturalgas,utilities,trains,andrailroads.
ThestatepandemicplansweresearchedusingthesearchfeatureinAdobeAcrobat8Professional
(AdobeSystemsInc,SanJose,Calif.)forinstancesinwhichthesekeywordsappeared.Thecontextfor
eachkeywordwasexaminedtoensureitreferredtoplanningfortheelectricalsector.

Reviewoftheimpactofthe191819pandemiconcoalproduction
Archivesof The ChicagoDaily TribuneandNew York TimesweresearchedviatheProQuestdatabasefor
referencesbetweenMarch1,1918,andDecember31,1919,tocoalshortagesduetoaninfluenza
pandemic(dateswerechosensothatthepandemicwasfullyincluded).Asimilarsearchwasperformed
onPubMedandGoogleScholarforarticlesthatreferencedcoalshortagesin191819causedbythe
influenzapandemic.TheUSgovernment'spandemicfluportal(pandemicflu.gov)wassearchedfor
referencestocoal.TestimoniesfromCongressionalhearingsoncoalshortagesin191819werealso
reviewedforreferencestotheinfluenzapandemic.

21
Results

Acomprehensivereviewofgovernmentandindustryreportsandguidance,scientific
literature,historicalaccountsofthe191819pandemic'simpactoncoal,andhearingsabouta
2005trainderailmentthatdisruptedcoalsupplyyieldedtroublingfindings.Despitethe
nation'smassiverelianceonthecoalindustryforelectricitygeneration,littlehasbeendone
tosecurethiscriticalinfrastructureandthepeoplewhorunitduringapandemic.

ReviewofelectricalreliabilityintheUnitedStates
Thebasisforpandemicplanningintheelectricitygenerationanddeliveryindustrydependsonthe
reliabilityofthecurrentsystem.InOctober2007,NERCreleaseditslongtermreliabilityassessmentof
thebulkelectricalpowersysteminNorthAmericafor2007through2016.Thisassessmenthighlighted
fivekeyfindingsthatneedtobeaddressedinthenext10years:
1. Insufficientcapacitymargins("extra"energythatcanbeusedforemergencies)
2. Thespecialconsiderationsrequiredfortheintegrationofwind,solar,andnuclearpowertothe
bulkpowersystem
3. Ahighdependenceofsomeregionsonnaturalgas
4. Insufficienttransmissionresources(highvoltagepowerlinesthattraverseregions)
5. Anagingworkforce.
Capacitymargins,thepowerproducedbeyondwhatisprojectedtobeneeded,havebeenreducedby
suchfactorsasregulatoryactions,deregulation,politicalobstacles,environmentalconstraints,and
investorpreferences.Longterminvestmentsincapacityinaderegulatedindustryaremoreuncertain
andrisky.Shortterminvestmentsworkaslongasthereissufficientuncommittedcapacity(projectsthat
areintheplanningstage,butnotfarenoughtobefirmlycommittedtoprovidepowerinthefuture),but
theyarenotsufficientforlongtermplanningformeetingelectricaldemand.Currentpoliticaland
environmentaltrendshavereducedtheamountofuncommittedcapacity,makingthelongterm
capacitymarginsuncertain.Integrationofwind,solar,andnuclearenergyrequiresextensivelongterm
planningandmoreinvestmentsintransmissionresourcestobringthepowergeneratedtolarge
populationcenters.Thedependenceofsomeregionsonnaturalgasisofgreatconcern,becausesupply

22
constraintsareexpectedtoincreaseinthenext10yearsasregionsincreasinglyturntonaturalgasand
refusetouseotherenergysources,suchascoaloroil.Transmissionresourcesareimproving,butthe
industrystillranksaging infrastructureandlimitedconstructionasitsNo.1challengeforreliability.The
industry,likeothers,isworkingonchallengesposedbyanagingworkforce.Alltheseissuesmustbe
addressedtoensureareliablesupplyofpowerinNorthAmerica.
NERC's2007longtermassessmentwasthefirsttocatalogemergingissueswithwhichthe
industryisdealing.Ofthe14issuesidentified,twoareofimportancetothispaper:
1. Supplyoffossilfuels.ConcernisincreasingabouttheabilityofNorthAmericatoimportthe
volumeofnaturalgasprojectedtobeneeded,owingtosupplyconstraintsinthedomesticand
foreigninfrastructure.Theconcernaboutfossilfuelsupplyalsoextendstocoal,astheglobal
marketisrapidlychangingandrailcapacitycontinuestotighten.
2. Demandforpowersystemequipmentworldwide.Drivenbydevelopingnations,thegrowing
demandhasnoticeablylengthenedthetimefromwhenaproductisorderedtowhenitis
delivered:Mostmanufacturersarerunningatornearcapacityandcannotprovideaquick
turnaroundonorders.Insomecasesthetimefromordertodeliveryhasincreasedbyayear.
AsofJanuary1,2007,the620coalpoweredplantsintheUnitedStates(EIA2008d)allmaintaintheir
coalstocksdifferently.Eachcoalplanthasauniquesetofconditionsthatdictatesthesizeofitscoal
stocks,butingeneral30daysofcoalistheindustryaverage.Someplantswillkeepmorethan30daysof
coalonhandandsomewillkeepless.Afewplantsreceivetheircoalviabargesonwaterwaysthat
freezeinthewinter,sotheymustmaintainasufficientamountofcoaltolastthroughthewinter.Some
otherplantsoperateatthemouthofcoalminesandhavelowercoalstocks,astheyareatthesource.
Municipalutilitycompaniestendtomaintainlargercoalstocksthanindependentpowercompanies,
whichhaveagreaterfinancialincentivetorunas"lean"astheycan.
Coalfueledpowerplantsmaintaincoalstockssothatpowergenerationcancontinueinthe
eventofexpectedandunexpectedshorttermdisruptionsinthesupplychain.However,asGraph2
shows,coalstocksinthe1950sweresubstantiallyhigherthanthosefoundtoday;theywereat
approximately90daysofburn,thenumberofdaysaplantcouldoperateifitscoalsupplywascutoff.
(Daysofburnarehowcoalstocksarefrequentlyreported.)

23
Graph2:Historicalelectricalsectorcoalstock,consumption,andratioofstocktoconsumption(EIA
2007b)

Overtime,coalstockshavegraduallybecomesmaller.Inthe1990s,aconcertedefforttocutcostsinthe
competitiveelectricalsectorresultedincoalstocksbeingdecreasedfromapproximately60to30days
ofburn.Coalbecameacommoditythatpowercompaniesassumedwouldbereliablytransportedwith
minordisruptions.Powercompaniesbecameincreasinglydependentonthecoaltransportsystem,as
coalbecametreatedasajustintimedeliverablecommodity.Before2005,mostpowercompanieshad
neverexperiencedprolongeddelaysintheshipmentsofcoalandthusroutinelyoperatedwithlower
stocks.Aseveredisruptionin2005(describedonpage26)changedthisnotion,demonstratingthatrail
capacitycouldnotexpandtoallowtheindustrytorecoverfromlargedelaysincoaltransport.Whileit
appearsthecostofcoalconservation(foranexplanationofthisprocess,seepage26)followingthe
disruptionsin2005hascausedtheelectricalsectortoreevaluateitscoalsstocks,theincreasesinstock
wouldbelargelyinsufficientforasustainedandsubstantialdecreaseintheminingandtransportofcoal
(Graph3).

24
Graph3:Electricalsectorcoalstockbyquarter(EIA2008e)

Whilecoalstockshaveincreased,NERC,inits2008SummerReliabilityAssessment,notestheincreasein
stockisnotuniform(NERC2008).CoalstocksfromthePRBhavereachedan"unusuallyhigh"64daysof
burnatthebeginningof2008,whilestocksofnorthernAppalachiancoalhavefallentoalowlevelof
36.8daysofburn(NERC2008).Thisisduemostlytonotablechangestotheinternationalcoalmarketin
thelastfewmonths.SafetyrelatedmineclosuresinChina,weatherrelatedproductiondelaysinChina
andAustralia,anddecreasedoutputbysomeEuropeanmineshaveallproducedashortageofcoalin
theinternationalmarket.Theresultisasignificantincreaseintheexportofcoalminedintheeastern
partoftheUnitedStates.
Thereasonscoalstockscanfluctuateinclude:
Economicpressures.Theelectricalsector,whilepartofthecriticalinfrastructure,isstilla
businessthatmustmanageitsfinancesinaresponsibleway.Coalstockswillfluctuatebasedon
forecasteduseandprice.Ifcoalischeap,stockswilllikelyincrease.
Seasonalchanges.Coalstocksarethehighestwhenplantsprepareforpeakelectricalusage
daysinthesummerandlowestinspringandfall,whendemandisthelowest.
Mineandtransportationissues.Extremeweatherisacommoncauseofstocksfluctuating.
Stocksalsofluctuatebasedonrepairontheminesoronthetransportationinfrastructure.

25
Untilrecently,severeinterruptionsduetoglobaleventssuchasapandemichadnotbeenconsidered.

Reviewofthe2005coaldisruptioninthePowderRiverBasin
ThePRB,whichprovidestheUnitedStateswithalmost40%ofitscoal,isthesinglelargestenergysource
forpowergenerationinthecountry,anditscoalisprimarilydeliveredbyrailroad.Adisruptionin2005
servesasanexampleoftheimpactapandemicmighthaveonthecoalsupplychain.Inlate2004,coal
deliveriesatsomeutilitiesbecameinconsistent,owingtorailcapacityissues(seeAppendixEforan
overviewofthecoalsupplychainandpage16foranoverviewofPRBcoal,inthecontextofelectricity
generationintheUnitedStates).Somepowerplantsreporteda10%dropincoalshipmentsduringthis
time,whichresultedindecreasedcoalstocksattheplants.Demandforcoalwasgreaterthanthe
systemcouldhandle.Inrecentyears,railroads,utilities,andmineshaveallmadeimprovementsthat
havemitigatedtheseearliercapacityissues.
OnMay14,2005aBurlingtonNorthernSantaFe(BNSF)trainderailedontheSouthPRBJoint
Line.TheSouthPRBJointLineisa103mileraillinethatisjointlyownedandmaintainedbyBNSFand
UnionPacific(UP).BNSFhandlesthedispatchingoftrainsonthelinefromitsdispatchcenterinFort
Worth,Tex.ThelineconnectsCaballoJunction(nearGillette,Wyo.)andShawneeJunction(near
Douglas,Wyo.),allowingbothUPandBNSFtoconnecttotheirlargerrailinfrastructureinWyoming,
fromtheminesinthePRB.OnMay15,aUPtrainderailedonthesameline.Thesetwoderailments
damagedallthreeraillinesontheSouthPRBJointLine.Thederailmentswerecausedbyunstable
tracks,whichwastheresultofacombinationofaccumulatedcoaldust,aboveaveragerainfall,andold
tracks.AllrailmovementofcoalinthesouthernPRBwastemporarilyhalteduntiltrackscouldbe
repaired.Allthreetrackswerereturnedtoservicein3weeks.Duringthisperiod,powerplantswere
forcedtodrawdowntheircoalstocks.
Oncethethreetrackswererepaired,BNSFandUPembarkedonamassivemaintenanceand
upgradeprogramontheSouthPRBJointLine.(Now,mostofthelineisquadrupletrack.Morethan130
trainstravelthesetracksdaily.Measuredintons permile,theSouthPRBJointLineisthebusiestand
mostdensefreightrailroadsystemintheworld.)Duringtheupgradeeffort,someutilitycompanies
reporteda15%to20%reductionincoalshipmentsformultiplemonths;afewdidnotreportreductions
ofthismagnitude.Thereductioninservicemadepowerplantscontinuetorelyontheircoalstocksto
makeupforreducedcoalshipments,anditpreventedcoalstocksfrombeingreplenished.PRBfueled
powerplantssawcoalstocklevelsfalltoworrisomelevels.BySeptember2005,manypowerplants

26
weredowntolessthan10daysofcoalintheirstockpile,withsomereportingonly2daysofcoalon
hand.PlantSchere,inJuliette,Georgia,forexample,thesecondlargestcoalpowerplantinthewestern
hemisphere,wasreducedto2daysofcoalandchosetoimportcoalfromIndonesiainaneffortto
rebuilditscoalstockpile.Mostmoderncoalboilersaredesignedtousespecifickindsofcoal,suchas
lowsulfurcoalfromthePRB.Theseboilersrequirecoalwithsimilarcharacteristicstothecoalitwas
designedtouse;inthiscaseIndonesiancoalissimilartoPRBcoal.
AccordingtoaCRSanalysisof27entitiesintheelectricalsectorthatrelyonPRBcoal,25
institutedcoalconservationprograms.Coalconservationcanentailreplacingcoalbasedelectricity
generationwithelectricitygeneratedfromanotherfuelsource(typically,naturalgas),purchasing
electricityonthegrid,reducingelectricitygeneratingtime,andpurchasingadditionalcoalfromother
domesticorinternationalsources.AccordingtotheEIA,asaresultofthe2005disruption,coalstocksin
theelectricalsectorwerestillbeingrebuiltthroughout2007.

Literaturereviewontheimpactofpoweroutagesonpublichealth
Twopublishedpapersthataddresstheimpactofpoweroutagesonpublichealthwereidentifiedinthe
literaturereview.ThefirstisbasedontheexperienceoftheNewYorkCityHealthDepartmentduringan
unprecedentedelectricalblackout5yearsago.OnThursday,August14,2003,at4:15pm,anelectrical
blackoutstruckthenortheasternpartoftheUnitedStates(Beatty2006).Thedepartmentundertook
effortstoensurevaccinecoldstoragewassafelymaintained,checkedthequalityofthecity'swater
supply,initiatedsyndromicsurveillancetoensuretheblackoutwasnotpartofamoresinisterplot,
increasedinspectionsofrestaurantstoensuresafedisposalofspoiledfood,andhadthelaboratory
continuetoprocesssamples,amongotheractions(Beatty2006).Theemergencyoperationscenter
functionedwithoutpoweruntil2amFridaymorning,asitdidnothaveemergencybackuppoweronsite
(Beatty2006).Subsequently,BeattyetalworkedcloselywiththeUSCentersforDiseaseControland
Prevention(CDC)topublishguidelinesfortheappropriatepublichealthresponseduringapoweroutage
(Beatty2006,CDCa).
Thesecondpaper,fromAustralianresearchers,focusedoneffortstomitigatethepublichealth
effectsofanaturaldisasterthatdestroyedalargeportionofthecriticalinfrastructureinNewSouth
Wales.DuringtheweekofJune7,2007,aseriesofstormscausedwidespreadfloodinganddamageto
homes,businesses,hospitals,andcriticalinfrastructureintheHunterregionofNewSouthWales
(Cretikos2007).Oneofthebiggestpublichealthissuesintheregionwasthelossofelectricitytowater

27
andwastewatertreatmentfacilities.Someregionsexperiencedsewagebackupsandhadtoimplement
waterconservationefforts(Cretikos2007).ThepublichealthresponsewassimilartothatinNewYork
City,withanincreaseinenvironmentalsamplingandsyndromicsurveillance.Damagestothe
infrastructuremadegettingoutpublichealthpreventionmessagedifficult,andthisledtobuildinga
closeworkingrelationshipwiththelocalradiostation.Cretikosetalconcludedthatallstatesand
territoriesshouldmakeformalarrangementstoprovideemergencymessagesoverthelocalradio
network,ifonesarenotalreadyinplace(Cretikos2007).
Whilebothofthesepapersaddressedbroadpublichealthissuesassociatedwithelectrical
blackouts,neitheroftheeventsreviewedlastedforasustainedperiodaswouldhappenduringan
influenzapandemic.Theredoesnotappeartobeanypeerreviewedliteratureabouttheimpactoflong
termpoweroutagesonthehealthofthepublic.Nordoesthereappeartobeanypeerreviewed
literatureontheimpactofgeographicallywidespreadoutages.

Reviewoffederalandselectedguidanceonpandemicplanning
The12guidancedocumentsonpandemicplanningthatwerereviewedeachusedthesamebasic
assumptionsaboutpandemicplanning,namelythatitdiffersfromnormalbusinesscontinuityplanning.
ThefollowingstatementfromtheEEIsummarizestheseassumptions:

Planningforapandemicisuniquefromotherbusinesscontinuityplanningbecauseitrequiresbusinesses
topreparetooperatewithasignificantlysmallerworkforce,athreatenedsupplysystem,andlimited
supportservicesforanextendedperiodoftimeatanunknowndateinthefuture.

TheWhiteHouseHomelandSecurityCouncilfurtherelaborateduponthispoint,requiringspecific
planningforsupplyshortagesintheUSpandemicinfluenzaimplementationplanin:
Action5.1.2.5:
DHSandDOT,incoordinationwithDODandStates,shalldeveloparangeofoptionstocopewith
potentialshortagesofcommoditiesanddemandforessentialservices,suchasbuildingreservesof
essentialgoods,within20months.Measureofperformance:optionsdevelopedandavailableforState,
local,andtribalgovernmentstorefineandincorporateincontingencyplans.

Action5.1.3.2:
DHS,incoordinationwithDOT,HHS,DOC,Treasury,and[USDepartmentofAgriculture],shallworkwith
theprivatesectortoidentifystrategiestominimizetheeconomicconsequencesandpotentialshortages
ofessentialgoods(eg,food,fuel,medicalsupplies)andservicesduringapandemic,within12months.
Measureofperformance:theprivatesectorhasstrategiesthatcanbeincorporatedintocontingency
planstomitigateconsequencesofpotentialshortagesofessentialgoodsandservices.

28
ThelastupdateoncompletedactionsintheimplementationplanwasreleasedOctober17,2008,and
action5.1.2.5islistedinprogress,whileaction5.1.3.2islistedascompleted(HSC2008).Action5.1.3.2
wasidentifiedasbeingcompletebasedonchecklistsdevelopedforprivatesectorpreparedness.Itis
unclearhowthesechecklistsprovide"strategiestominimizetheeconomicconsequencesandpotential
shortagesofessentialgoodandservices."Oneofthechecklistshighlightedintheprogressreportwas
thebusiness pandemic influenza planning checklist,whichwasoneofthe12documentsreviewed.
Whilemostdocumentsreviewedspecificallynotedthelikelihoodofsupplyshortagesduringa
pandemic,therewasagenerallackofconceptualunderstandingofwhatsuchshortageswouldlooklike
duringapandemicorwhatmustbedonenowtoreducethelikelihoodthattheywilloccur.The
documentsalsonotedthatcriticalinfrastructureplanningwasessential.
TheenergysupplychainisonlyspecificallymentionedintheNationalInfrastructureAdvisory
Council(NIAC)prioritizationofthecriticalinfrastructuredocument.However,thisreferenceaddresses
componentsinthepowerdeliverysystem,suchastransformersorutilitypoles.WhiletheNIACguidance
pointsouttheimportanceofthetransportationsectorinmovingcoalviarailroadsandbarges,noneof
the12documentsprioritizestheminingofcoal.Thisabsenceislikelyduetocoalproductionnotbeing
listedofficiallyasacriticalinfrastructureorkeyresource(WhiteHouse2003b).Coalsupplyisnot
coveredinthepublicversionoftheDOECriticalInfrastructureandKeyResourcesSectorSpecificPlan
(DHS/DOE2007).Coalisalsonottypicallythoughtofasanenergysecurityrisk;thus,itislargelyignored
(Farrell2004).
Workersinoccupationsassociatedwithcoalmining(includingsupportinginfrastructure,like
vehiclemaintenance)arecurrentlyprioritizedinfederalvaccineallocationplanstoreceiveaninfluenza
pandemicvaccineaspartofthegeneralpopulation,dependingontheirhealthstatusandage.Thisis
thelowestofthefederalprioritycategories.Somecriticaltransportationworkers,suchastrain
engineers,willreceiveapandemicvaccineinthe3rdprioritytierifthepandemicissevere.However,
duringamoderatepandemictheseworkerswillalsoreceivethevaccineaspartofthegeneral
population,dependingontheirhealthstatusandage.Inshort,thecurrentfederalpandemic
preparednessplanshavefailedto(1)conceptualizethemagnitudeofsupplychaindisruptionsthatwill
occurinaglobaljustintimeeconomy,(2)addresshowtopreventpandemicrelatedelectricalpower
disruptions,and(3)offerguidanceonhowtorespondifelectricalpowerisdisruptedduringapandemic.

29
Reviewofcoalproducingstates'pandemicplans
IntheUnitedStates,25statesproducecoal.Thepandemicinfluenzaplansfor22ofthosestateswere
analyzedtodeterminethestatusforthecontinuationoftheenergysectorduringapandemic;results
areshowninTable1.(MoreinformationaboutthepandemicplansanalyzedisinAppendixD.)

Table1:Guidanceprovidedbycoalproducingstatesforcontinuityoftheelectricalsector

Uses federal Uses federal Specifies Mentions Prioritizes Has a

guidance guidance on what state legal coal plan for
on vaccine antiviral agency is authority production fuel (gas
prioritization drug responsible to direct & diesel)
prioritization for the critical shortages
continuation supplies
of CI/KR*
Alabama X X X
Alaska
Arizona
Colorado
Illinois X X X X
Indiana X X
Kansas X
Kentucky X X
Louisiana X
Maryland X X X
Missouri X X
Montana X
New Mexico
Ohio
Oklahoma X X
Pennsylvania
Tennessee X
Texas
Utah
Virginia X
West Virginia
Wyoming X X
* CI/KR = Critical infrastructure/key resource

30
Inaddressingcriticalinfrastructureplanninginthestate,manyofthestateplanshadtextsimilarto
Kentucky's:

Onlylimitedinformationwasavailablefromwhichtoassesspotentialimpactsoncriticalinfrastructure
sectorssuchastransportationandutilityservices.Becauseofchangesinbusinesspracticesandthe
complexityofnetworks,informationfrompriorpandemicswasnotconsideredapplicable.

Elevenof22statesexplicitlyadheretofederalguidanceonvaccineprioritizationwithintheenergy
sector.Themostcurrentguidanceplacesthesectorintier2andisbasedontheworkoftheNational
InfrastructureAdvisoryCouncil(NIAC2007).Coalminingisnotconsideredpartoftheenergysectorin
theNIACguidanceandthusnotprioritizedforapandemicvaccine.Ironically,whileworkersinthecoal
miningindustrywillbevaccinatedaspartofthegeneralpopulation,criticalworkersintheoiland
naturalgasindustrieswillbevaccinatedatthesametimeascriticalworkersintheenergysector.Ifa
pandemicissevere,somecriticaltransportationworkers,suchastrainconductors,willreceive
pandemicvaccineinthethirdtier.
OnlythreestatesAlabama,Illinois,andMarylandspecifiedwhatagencyhadresponsibility
forensuringthecontinuityofthecriticalinfrastructureintheirstates.Thisiscriticalinformationthatthe
energysectorneedsindeterminingwhichagencyorpersonitshouldbeworkingwithtoplanforits
pandemicresponseineachstate.Illinoiswastheonlystatetospecificallydescribethegovernor'slegal
authoritytodirectcriticalproductsduringanemergencysuchasapandemic.Suchauthoritymightbe
criticalforensuringcoaltransportduringapandemic.

Reviewoftheimpactofthe191819pandemiconcoalproduction
Coalin191819wasusedprimarilyforindustrialpurposeslikemakingsteel.Therailroadsalsoused
coalpoweredtrains,andhomeswereheatedwithcoal.Theinfluenzapandemicof191819caused
seriousdisruptionsincoalsupply.Oneofthefirstmentionsofthepandemic'simpactoncoalmining
wasinanAugust5,1918,articleintheNew York Times.Itreportedthatcoalhadnotbeenshippedfrom
GermanytoSwitzerlandduringtheprevious4daysandthatmanyminershadstoppedworkduetothe
"epidemicofSpanishgrip"(New York Times1918e).CopperminesinPeruwerealsohithard.Areportin
theNew York TimesonAugust4,1918,statedthatlargecopperminingplants"havebeenvirtually
paralyzedforthelasttendays"(New York Times1918d).ThesituationinTorontowassimilar.InOctober
1918,onereportnotedthat"coalbecamedifficulttoobtainandfuelsuppliesforthesickandfor

31
industrydiminished"(Macdougall2006).Fuelsupplyissuesalsokepttheschoolsfromreopeninginearly
November(Macdougall2006).
Thecoalminingindustryitselfwasalsoseverelyaffectedbythepandemic.OnOctober16,1918,
theNew York Timesreported,"Theepidemic,whichisragingtheeasterncoalregions,iscostingthe
consumingpublicatthatrateof1,000,000to1,200,000tonsofanthracitemonthly"(New York Times
1918c).AnthraciteisahardcoalfoundinPennsylvaniaandknownforitshighheatvalue.InOctober
1917,arecordof7,110,950tonsofanthracitewasshipped.Atypicalshipmentwasaround6.4million
tonsin1918(New York Times1917,NewYork Times1918a).Thepandemicresultedinmonthlycoal
shipmentsbeingaboutonesixthbelownormallevels.Newsreportsalsonotedthatnumerouscollieries
(coalminesandtheassociatedbuildings)wereclosedandthatopenoneswerestrugglingtoproduce
with"depletedforces"(New York Times1918c).
ThecoalshortagesalsoforcedtheNewYorkCityHealthDepartmenttomonitortheheating
situationinthecitytoensurethatallresidents,especiallythosewhoweresick,hadheat(New York
Times1918c).Thecoalshortagecreatedanadditionalburdenonanalreadystressedhealth
department.OnNovember4,1918,theNew York TimesquotedDelosW.Cooke,statefuel
administrator,saying,"Thesupplyofpreparedordomesticsizesofanthraciteisnotplentiful.Onthe
contrary,itisshortandgreatlyreducedjustnowbythescourgeofinfluenzaintheanthracitemining
region"(New York Times1918f).OnNovember10,1918,theNew York Timesreportedthatthestate's
fueladministrationagainurgedconservationofcoalas"productionofbothbituminousandanthracite
coalcontinuestodecreaseastheresultoftheinfluenzaepidemic"(New York Times1918b).The
Northeastwasnottheonlyregiontosuffercoalproblemsduetothepandemic.MinesinTennessee
reporteda"50percentdecreaseinproduction,"andmanyminesintheregion"wereonthevergeof
closingdown"(Garret2008).Illinoisreportedthatcoalminingdistrictswerehithard,andKentuckyhad
minesthatdidnotoperatefor6weeks(HHSb).
WorthnotingisthatcoalwasinshortsupplyduringWorldWarIforvariousreasons,mostly
relatedtoashortageofworkerswhowentofftowarandalargeincreaseinmanufacturing,leadingto
anextraordinaryincreaseintheneedforcoal.Theshortagecausedproblemsforthemanufacturing
sector,whichdependedheavilyoncoal.Congressheldtwohearingsspecificallyonthistopic,in1918
and1919.OnDecember2,1918,JosephB.Dickson,ananthracitecoaldistributor,testifiedtothispoint
whenSenatorWilliamKennyon(RIowa)askedforsuggestions"astohowthiscoalsituationcanbe
relieved."Mr.Dickson'sreplyistelling:

32
 Myownfeelingisthatthegradualshuttingdownofwarindustriesandthereturntonaturalconditions
willrelievethepressureinavery,veryshorttime.Ibelieveitwouldhavebeenrelievedbythistimeifwe
hadnothadthisepidemic,whichverymateriallyinterferedwiththeproductionofanthracitecoal
(Dickson1918).

Eventuallytheindustryrecovered,butthesevereimpactoftheinfluenzapandemicof191819iswell
documented.Whiletheprocessofcoalmininghaschangedinmanywayssince1918,itstilldependson
menandwomenwhodrivethedumptrucks,operatethemachinerytoremovethecoal,anddrivethe
trains.
Thus,theeventsof191819couldbeseenasaforeshadowingofthenextpandemic.Atthevery
leastitisworthkeepingtheseexperiencesinmindasonethinksabouttheimpactapandemicmay
cause.

33
Discussion

Pandemicplanningneedstomeettherealitiesoftheworldinwhichapandemicwilloccur.
Thecoalsupplychain,aswehaveshown,iscrucialforaneffectivepandemicresponse.We
concludethatstepscanandmustbetakentopreventthecoalsupplychainfrombeing
compromisedduringapandemic.

T
herewillbeanotherinfluenzapandemicinthefuture,thoughthetimingandcharacteristicsare
unknown.Preparingforthenextpandemiciscrucialinthisjustintimedeliveryworld,yetthere
isalimitedemphasisonpandemicpreparednessoutsideofthehealthcaresector(UNSystem
InfluenzaCoordinator&WorldBank2008).Thisisofgreatconcern,asthelackofpreparednessofnon
healthcaresectorswilldictatetheworld'sresponseduringthenextpandemic(Osterholm2005a,
Osterholm2007a).TheUnitedStatesbulkpowersystemhasnumerouschallengestoovercomeinthe
next10yearstoensurereliablepower,evenwithoutanexternalcrisis.Apandemicwillundoubtedly
makeaddressingsuchchallengesmoredifficult.Thedataherehavedemonstratedthat:
1. Nationalandstatepandemicplanningguidanceplansandstateplansfailtoaddresscoal
productionandtransportation.
2. ThedisruptionofcoaldeliveryfromthePRBin2005causedcriticaldropsincoalstocksat
electricalgenerationplantsinalargeareaoftheUnitedStatesandforcedtheindustryto
conservecoal.Disruptionsofevengreatermagnitudecanbeexpectedduringapandemic,while
theprogramsusedtoconservecoalmaybecompromised.
Giventhecriticalityofcontinuouscoalsupplytoelectricgeneratingplantsandtherolethegenerating
plantsplayinmaintainingoursociety,thepublichealthimplicationsofalossofcoalsupplymustbe
carefullyevaluated.
Thedatadocumentedheresupporttwomainconclusions:
1. Currentlevelsofpandemicpreparednessarelikelyinsufficienttosustainthecoalsupplychain
duringapandemic;thelinkbetweenthepublichealthresponseandreliableaccesstocoal
fueledelectricityisneitherunderstoodnoraddressedincurrentpandemicplansintheUnited
States.

34
 2. Thepublichealthsectordependsonastablesupplyofelectricityand,intheabsenceof
electricity,willhavegreatdifficultycarryingoutitskeyfunctionsduringapandemic.
Clearly,notenoughpandemicoremergencypreparednessplanningingeneralhasbeendevotedto
ensurethecontinuityofthecoalsupplychain.Amongthemajorreasonsforthisdilemmaare:
Pandemicplanningisassumedtobelargelyapublichealthissue.
Meaningfulmodelsdonotexistthatdepictpandemicrelatedsupplychaindisruptionsina
globaljustintimeeconomy.
Leadershipinpandemicplanningislackingforthecriticalinfrastructuresector,specificallyfor
maintainingthecoalsupplychain.
Althoughpandemicplanninghasbeenregardedprimarilyasapublichealthissue,thisreport
demonstratesitisamuchbiggerconcern.Unfortunately,veryfewstateornationalplansinclude
elementsoutsideofhealthcare/publichealth.Althoughthisproblemisbeginningtobeaddressed,most
planningisstillprimarilybasedonpublichealthguidance.Thissituationrepresentsacriticalplanning
shortcoming.Publichealthguidanceisnotmeanttoaddressthecomplexitiesofthemodernbusiness
world,inwhichmuchofthecriticalinfrastructureexists.Thecriticalinfrastructureisnotrequiredto
adheretopublichealthguidance,aspublichealthhasnostatutoryauthorityoverthisindustry.
However,withpandemicplanning,publichealthneedstobeinvolvedincriticalinfrastructureplanning,
theresultsofwhichdirectlyaffectpublichealth'sabilitytocarryoutitstasksduringtheemergency.
Therootsofthisdisconnectgobackseveraldecades.Thefoundationsofpandemicplanningin
theUnitedStatesdatebackto1988whenPresidentRonaldReaganissuedExecutiveOrder12656,
whichassignedfederalagenciesspecificresponsibilitiesforemergencypreparedness(WhiteHouse
1988).ThisexecutiveorderwaslateramendedbyPresidentGeorgeW.Bushinlate2001toestablish
theDHS(WhiteHouse2001).HomelandSecurityPresidentialDirective5establishedtheNational
IncidentManagementSystem(NIMS)(WhiteHouse2003b).DHSdevelopedtheNationalResponsePlan
(NRP)andNIMS,whichistheframeworkfromwhichalleventsofnationalsignificance(incidentsthat
requireacoordinatedfederalresponse)aremanaged.Itwaswithinthisframeworkthatpandemic
planningintheUnitedStatesbeganasPresidentBushunveiledtheNationalStrategyforPandemic
Influenza(NSPI)onNovember1,2005(HSC2005).
SincethelaunchoftheNSPI,theresponseplanhasbeenrevisedandisnowknownasthe
NationalResponseFramework(NRF)(DHS2008f).TheNRFmoreclearlydefinestherolesand
responsibilitiesofgovernment(stateandfederal),NGOs, andtheprivatesectorduringan"allhazards"

35
event.("Allhazards"isatermthatreferstoaplanningframeworkthatisscalableforallknownhazards.
Forexample,thesamebasicprinciplesintheNRFwouldapplytoatornadoastheywouldtoanuclear
incident.)HHS,theleadfederalagencyresponsibleforthepublichealthandmedicalresponseduringa
pandemic,hasproducedthebulkofthefederalguidanceonpandemicplanningandhoststhefederal
government'spandemicplanningportal(www.pandemicflu.gov).Astheleadfederalagency,HHS
providestechnicalassistancetootherfederalagenciesinfulfillmentoftheiremergencysupport
functions,asoutlinedintheNRF.Inshort,selectedfederalagenciesandtheirresponsibilitiesareas
follows:
HHS:ensuringthecontinuationofpublichealthduringapandemic
DHS:pandemicplanningforcriticalinfrastructure
DOE:pandemicplanningfortheenergysector
DOT:pandemicplanninginthetransportationsector
DepartmentoftheInterior(DOI):pandemicplanningregardingnaturalresourcesonfederalland

Pandemicthreattiespublichealthtoinfrastructure
ThoughHHSischargedwiththecontinuationofpublichealthduringapandemic,ambiguityexistsabout
howitcanfulfillitstaskswithinthescopeofitscurrentauthority,whichdoesn'tincludeauthorizationto
protectthecriticalinfrastructureuponwhichitsresponsedepends.Weknowthatapandemicwillcause
problemsbeyondthemorbidityandmortalityissueswithwhichpublichealthisaccustomedtodealing.
Forexample,thesupplychainsforcriticalproductswillbedisruptedbyapandemic,increasing
morbidityandmortalityonmultiplelevels.Astheprimaryagencyresponsibleforthenation'shealth,
HHSisexpectedtoprovideguidanceonsuchissuesasinfectioncontrolwhenstandardbarrier
precautionscannotbefollowedbecausemasks,glovesandgownsareunavailable.Becausetheimpact
ofapandemicwillbefeltbyallorganizationsandinstitutions,itiscriticalthatHHSbepreparedto
provideleadershipwhenneeded.
ThescopeofHHSauthorization.Aspartoftheexecutivebranch,HHSisrequiredbyHomeland
SecurityPresidentialDirective20(HSPD20)tohaveaplanforcontinuityofoperations(COOP)inplace
sothatitcanhelpensuretheeightNationalEssentialFunctions(NEFs)aremaintainedduringtimesof
crises(GovernmentOrganizationandEmployees2007,WhiteHouse2007).HSPD20definesNEFsas
"subsetsofgovernmentfunctionsthatarenecessarytoleadandsustaintheNationduringa
catastrophicemergency"(WhiteHouse2007).HHSwillberesponsibleforensuringtheeighthNEF:

36
 ProvidingforcriticalFederalGovernmentservicesthataddressthenationalhealth,safety,andwelfare
needsoftheUnitedStates.ThisNEFincludesFederalexecutivedepartmentandagencyfunctionsthat
ensurethatthecriticalFederallevelhealth,safety,andwelfareservicesoftheNationareprovidedduring
anemergency(DHS2008e).
FederalContinuityDirective1(FCD1)requiresthatprimarymissionessentialfunctions(PMEFs),those
thatsupporttheNEFs,mustbecontinuedduringanemergencyuntil"normaloperationscanbe
resumed,"whichcouldbemonthsduringapandemic(DHS2008e).FCD1notesthatplanningforCOOP
fortheNEFswillrequire"therobustinvolvementofNFGs[nonfederalgovernments]andtheprivate
sector"(DHS2008e).Italsostatesthatagenciesshould"identifyinterdependenciesandensure
resiliencywithcriticalinfrastructureandservicesatalllevels"(DHS2008e).Giventheissuesthatcould
arisewiththereliabilityofelectricityduringapandemicandthedependenceofthepublichealth
infrastructureonelectricity,HHSwillhaveproblemscontinuingitsNEFsandPMEFsduringapandemic.
WhilethisresponsibilitydoesnotgiveHHStheauthoritytorequirecertainlevelsofplanningfromthe
energysector,itdoesrequireHHStoactivelydetermineitsinterdependenciesandmitigationstrategies.
Oneoftheseinterdependenciesiselectricity.Withoutelectricity,HHSwillbeunableto
maintaintheNEFsandthePMEFsasrequired.OneofthelargestcoalfueledpowerplantsintheUnited
StatesisnearAtlanta,wheretheCDCisbased.DuetodisruptioninthePRBandotherissuespreviously
discussed,thispowerplanthadonly2daysofcoalbySeptember2005(FERC2006).Suchdisruptions
canbeexpectedduringapandemicandhavethepotentialtocompromisethegenerationofelectricity.
TherequirementsofFCD1suggestthatHHSwillworkorwillhavealreadyworkedwith:
Itsfederalpartnersandstateandlocalpublichealthagenciesinareaswherecritical
infrastructure/keyresourcesareconcentrated
Criticalinfrastructure/keyresourcesectorstoensurethatcriticalsupplychainslikecoalare
resilientatalllevels
ThePRBisanareawithaconcentrationofcriticalinfrastructure/keyresourcesandisresponsiblefor
providingakeyenergyresourcetothecountry.Inadditiontoprovidingacriticalproportionofthecoal
forthenation,italsoproducesoil,naturalgas,anduranium,amongotherkeyresources.ThePRBcoal
fieldsarefoundin17countiesinWyomingandMontana,butactiveminingoccursinonlyafewcounties
(Kaplan2007).Oneofthese17countiesisCampbellCounty,Wyoming,whichproducesmostofthecoal
minedinthePRB(BLM2008).CampbellCountyhasonehospital,CampbellCountyMemorialHospital
(BLM2005).Duringapandemic,thehospital's90+bedsaregoingtobeinshortsupply,andalternative
caresiteswillbeoverwhelmed(Hargrove2007).ItsimplyisnotpossiblefortheeightWyomingcounties
wherethePRBislocated,whichcombinedhavesome225hospitalbeds,tohandlethesurgeofcases

37
expectedinapandemicinaregionwithmorethan95,000residents(BLM2005).Whilepreventionof
illnessamongthecoalmininginfrastructureemployeesandtheirfamiliesmustbetheprimarygoalto
maintaincoalproduction,theavailabilityofcriticalmedicalservicesfortheilltofacilitatetheirrapid
returntoworkwillbeseriouslycompromisedinthePRBarea.

Rethinkingpandemicvaccineandantiviraldrugallocationstrategies
Oneofthecornerstonesofthefederalpandemicpreparednessapproachisthedeploymentofa
pandemicvaccine;however,thetimingofdeliveryandtheproductionquantityofaneffectivevaccine
areunknowns.Thedevelopmentandproductionofapandemicvaccine,underthebestofconditions,
willtakeafewmonthsfromthepointapandemicstrainisidentified.TheUnitedStatescurrently
maintainsastockpileofaprepandemicvaccineforH5N1,forwhichtherearealimitednumberof
doses.
Aprepandemicvaccinecanhelpbridgethegapbetweenwhenapandemicbeginsandwhena
pandemicstrainspecificvaccineisavailable.Thedevelopmentofaprepandemicvaccineforstockpiling
requiressurveillancetoidentifyinfluenzastrainsthatmaybeemergingasthecauseofthenext
pandemic.ThecurrentsupplyofprepandemicvaccineisbasedonastrainoftheinfluenzaA/H5N1
virusnowcirculating.Theefficacyofthisvaccinewillnotbeknownuntilapandemicemerges,andifthe
pandemicisnotcausedbyH5N1,itwillprovidelittletonoprotection.
Becausescarcityofthepandemicvaccineisassumedinthefirst4to6monthsofthepandemic
intheUnitedStates,afederalplanhasbeendevelopedtoallocateit(HHS2008a).Thefederalallocation
planassignstiersofpriorityforvaccination.Peopleintier1willreceiveapandemicvaccinefirst.Itis
generallyassumedthatthevaccinewillnotbecomeavailableuntilapandemiciswidespreadandsupply
chains,suchascoals,arealreadystressed.
Coalminersandtheirsupportingindustries(eg,operationsthatmaintaintheminers'
equipment)arenotlistedinanyprioritytierandthuswillnotbeprioritizedforavaccine(NIAC2007,
HHS2008a).Instead,thesecriticalworkerswillbevaccinatedaspartofthegeneralpopulationunless
theirageorhealthconditionplacestheminahighertier.Criticalworkersinthenaturalgasandoil
industries,alongwithcriticalworkersintheelectricalutilityindustry,arelistedinprioritytier2(NIAC
2007,HHS2008a).Alimitednumberofcriticaltransportationworkers,suchastrainengineers,will
receivevaccinesinprioritytier3intheeventofaseverepandemic;otherwise,theywillbevaccinated
withthegeneralpopulation(NIAC2007,HHS2008a).Thetrainengineersandconductorsthattransport

38
coalarehighlyproficientatmovingsomeoftheheaviestcargotransportedbyrailroadsonroutesthey
havememorized.
Theentirecoalsupplychain,fromminetotransport,andcriticalelectricalsectoremployees,
shouldbeplacedintier1ofthefederalvaccineallocationplan.Theflowofelectricityduringapandemic
isascriticalastheproductsandservicescurrentlylistedintier1,allofwhichdependonelectricity.
Protectingthesupplychainforelectricitywilllikelyhaveahighpublichealthbenefit,asitwillhelpto
minimizethesecondarypublichealthconsequencesofapandemic,whichmaysurpassthedirectimpact
ofapandemic(Osterholm2007b,Kass2008).
Thecurrentallocationstrategyalsodoesnottakeintoaccounttheproportionofcritical
infrastructure/keyresourcestafftothegeneralpopulation.ThesecondlargestemployerinthePRBis
mining(BLM2005).Thelargestemployerisinthecategoryof"trade,serviceandothersector,"inwhich
alargenumberareindustriesthatsupportmining(BLM2005).Assuch,asignificantproportionofthe
populationemployedincriticalinfrastructurerelatedjobsisnotprioritizedinthecurrentallocation
strategyandwillnotreceiveavaccineuntilthegeneralpublicthroughouttheUnitedStatesdoes.In
short,currentfederalpublichealthguidanceasfollowedwillnotprovideadequatesupporttothecoal
miningindustryanditssupportingindustries.
ThereisastockpileofantiviraldrugsforinfluenzaintheSNSandinmanystatesforuseduringa
pandemic.Thevastmajorityoftheantiviraldrugswillbeusedfortreatment,withalimitednumber
availableforbothpreandpostexposureprophylaxis(HHS2008b).Prophylaxis(useofantiviralsto
preventillness)isrecommendedonlyforhealthcareworkersandfrontlineemergencyservice
personnel.Thereasongivenintheguidanceisthattheseworkerswillbeexposedfrequentlyandthus
shouldbegivenpreexposureprophylaxis.Unlesscoalcompaniesmaintainanddistributestockpilesof
antiviraldrugstotheiremployeesforpreventinginfluenza,itishighlyunlikelythattheywillreceive
thesedrugsunlesstheybecomesick.Thecurrentallocationplandoesnotprovideforamechanismfor
essentialworkerslikecoalminerstoreceiveeitherpreorpostexposureprophylaxis.

Theneedisclear,butleadershipislacking
Whatagencywillberesponsibleforensuringthatcoalminingcontinuesduringapandemicremains
unclear.Whatiscertainisthatmodernpublichealthdependsonelectricity.Forexample,almostevery
measurementofpublichealthpreparednessintheCDCinauguralreportonpublichealthpreparedness
hingesonelectricity(CDC2008).Watertreatmentisenergyintensive.Some80%ofthecostof

39
producinganddistributingfreshcleanwaterisduetoelectricity(EPRI2002).IntheUnitedStates,5%of
electricitygeneratedannuallyisusedfortransportingthiswaterviaanelaborateinfrastructureof
pipelinesandstoragetanks(EPRI2002).Withoutelectricity,waterandsewersystemswouldnot
functionbeyondafewdays.Refrigerationiscriticalforpreventingfoodbornedisease(CDC1999b).Itis
alsokeytomaintainingtheeffectivenessofvaccinesthatpreventinfectiousdiseases.Almostall
refrigerationdependsonelectricity.Publichealthalsodependsonamodernlaboratorysystemto
detectandidentifydiseasesinthecommunities.SuchsystemsfromPulseNet,thesystemfor
fingerprintingbacteriacausingfoodbornediseases,tootherlaboratoryteststodeterminewater
contaminationrequireelectricity.Alackofelectricitywillalsoreducetheavailabilityofproductsand
servicesonwhichpublichealthdepends,whileatthesametimeincreasingthedemandforpublic
healthservices(asseenduringpoweroutagesorheatwaves).Itishardtoimaginethepublichealth
systemprovidingassistanceduringapandemicwithoutelectricity,asitreliesonorrequireselectricity
tofunction.
Themazeofagenciesthatrelatetocoalminingbutarenotassignedtoensurethecontinuityof
itssupplychainduringapandemicincludes:
DepartmentofEnergy.TheNationalInfrastructureProtectionPlan(NIPP),theNRF,andESF12
identifytheDOEastheleadagencyfortheprotectionoftheenergysector(DHS/DOE2007,DHS2008f,
DHS2008c).AccordingtotheDOE,its"overarchingmissionistoadvancethenational,economic,and
energysecurityoftheUnitedStates"(DOE).Thus,itisofconcernthataDecember2007reportbythe
DOE'sinspectorgeneralconcludedthat,duetolackofplanningforincreasedworkerabsenteeism,the
DOE"maynotbeabletoensurecontinuityofitsmissioncriticalfunctions"duringapandemic(DOE
2007).Fuelsupplies,specificallycoal,arenotaddressedintheDOECriticalInfrastructureandKey
ResourcesProtectionPlan(DHS/DOE2007).ItshouldbenotedthattheDOEisnotresponsiblefor
ensuringthecontinuationofcoalmining.
DepartmentofHomelandSecurity.Theterm"criticalinfrastructure"typicallyincludesthose
entitiesconsideredsocriticalthattheirdestructionorseriouslossoffunctionwoulddramaticallyhurt
thenation(Moteff2003).Aspreviouslynoted,coalminingisnotexplicitlylistedaspartofthecritical
infrastructureorkeyresourcesasdefinedbyHSPD7,andcoalistypicallynotregardedasafuelfor
whichenergysecurityisanissue;thus,theindustrytypicallyisoverlookedduringplanningforfuel
supplyissues(WhiteHouse2003a,Farrell2004).Thecriticalinfrastructureshouldincludecoalmining.If

40
itdid,theindustrywouldlikelyfallundertheresponsibilityofDHStoensureitcontinuestooperate
duringapandemic,asDHSistheleadagencyforcriticalinfrastructureandkeyresources(DHS2008a).
DepartmentofInterior.ItisalsopossiblethattheDOIwouldassumeresponsibility,becausea
largepercentageofcoalisminedonleasedfederalland,andtheDOIistheagencyresponsiblefor
pandemicplanningfornaturalresourcesonsuchland(DOE/DOI/USDA2007).
DepartmentofLabor.AnotherpossibilityisthattheMineSafetyandHealthAdministration
(MSHA),apartoftheDOL,wouldberesponsibleforensuringthecontinuationofmining,iftheprimary
reasonfordisruptionswasrelatedtothehealthoftheminers.Congressdeclaredthatthe"firstpriority
andconcernofallinthecoalorotherminingindustrymustbethehealthandsafetyofitsmostprecious
resourcetheminer"andgaveauthoritytotheMSHAtoregulatetheindustry(FederalMineSafetyand
HealthActof1977).
Foreffectivemitigationstrategiestobeemployedinthecoalminingindustry,aleadfederal
agencyneedstobeclearlydefined.

Lackofconceptualframeworkdoesnotprecludeunderstandingtheimpact
Academia,theprivatesector,andgovernmentagencieshavenotprovidedameaningfulmodelor
conceptualframeworkforpandemicplanninginaglobaljustintimeeconomy,thoughnumerousones
havedepictedhowapandemicmightspread,howmitigationtechniquesmightwork,andthepotential
financialimpact.Afewstudieshavelookedatsupplychaininterruptionsduetoapandemic,butlittle
researchexistsontheimpactthatworkerabsenteeismwillhaveduringapandemic.Asstateshave
noted,theabsenceofthiskindofdataandanalysisonsupplychaindisruptionsorexamplesofhow
workabsenteeismcanaffectthecriticalinfrastructureinsituationslikeapandemicmakeplanning
difficult.Asaresult,plannerstendtorelyonmemoryofmorerecentworkplacedisruptions(eg,strikes)
andlocalizedepisodesofsupplychaindisruptionsforplanning.Butsucheventsdonotportraythe
globalnatureofapandemic,asworkersfromunaffectedareaswon'tbebroughtintohelp(becauseall
areaswillbeaffected)andproductslikelywillnotbeavailableglobally.
Todate,itappearsthatthistypeofresearchhasnotbeenspecificallyrequested.Norisitthe
kindofresearchtiedtomoreprestigiousandfinanciallyrewardingwork,suchaspandemicvaccine
developmentorsupplychainoptimization.Soitisunderstandablewhylittleresearchhasoccurredon
thisimportanttopic.

41
 Weareawareofonlyonepaper,whichwaspresentedataconferenceinearly2008,that
addressestheissueofworkerabsenteeisminonecriticalinfrastructuretransportoffreight(Jones
2008).Jonesetalhavepublishedtheonlysimulationofthenation'sfreightsystem(maritimeandrail)
duringapandemic.Theauthorslookedatthecapacityofeightportterminalsonthewestcoastand18
railyardsthroughouttheUnitedStatesandtriedtodeterminetheimpactonthefreightsystemifa
percentageoftheworkforcewasabsentduetoapandemic.Theirmodelassumedthatshipment
volumesdidnotdecrease(althoughitislikelythattheywill).Theirresultsareconcerning,specificallyfor
therailindustry.
Theyfoundthata5.8%absenteeismratepeakinginthethirdmonthofapandemicwouldresult
inanestimated2daydelayinrailshipments.Theyfoundthata28.2%absenteeismrate,peakinginthe
thirdmonthofapandemic,wouldreducerailcapacityby45%.Theyconcludedthatthere"islikelytobe
anenormousdisruptionintherailsystemoveraperiodoftwomonthsormore"(Jones2008).This
findingwasderivedprimarilyfromexaminingtheresultofreducedstaffingatrailyards,which
diminishedefficiencyandcapacity.Thissortofadisruptioninthefreightrailsystemisunprecedented.
Whileunittrains(eg,coaltrains)willlikelybelessaffectedthanthefreightsystemoverall(unit
trainsdonotrequiremodificationsinrailyardsasmostfreighttrainsdo),theywillstillbeaffected.
Freighttrainstypicallytransportmultiplecommoditiesgoingtomultiplelocations.Whentheyarriveat
railyards,therailcarsmayberedeployedtootherfreighttrainsfortransportationtoanotherrailyard
ortothecars'finaldestination.Unittrainscontainthesamecommodityandaregoingtothesame
location;thus,theydonotneedtobemodifiedinrailyards.Railyardshavelimitedcapacitytohold
trains,whichcanresultintrainsbeing"parked"onthelinescomingintotherailyards,waitingtoenter.
Theselogjamswillcausesignificantdisruptionsforalltraintraffic,regardlessofyardusage.
Thelasttimetherewasaconsiderable(15%to20%)reductionincoalshipmentsviarail,the
energysectorwassignificantlyaffectedwithin12weeksofthedisruptionafterthederailmentthat
damagedtracksontheJointLineinthePRB.Italsoresultedinnumerouseffectivecoalconservation
methods,whichallowedthepowersystemintheUnitedStatestostayfunctional.Withoutthese
alternatives,theimpacttothecountry'spowersystemcouldhavebeencatastrophic.Thenation's
powersystemisresilientandhasmultiplefuelsources;thus,thepotentialforacatastrophicimpactis
notexpectedtomaterializeuntilweeksintoapandemicandonlyifthereisasignificantimpacttothe
coalsupplychain.Themethodsusedtopreventthissignificantimpactprimarilypurchasingpoweron

42
thegrid,increasednaturalgasusage,andpurchasesofadditionalcoalwilllikelybeimpairedduringa
pandemic.
CoalwilllikelynotbeshippedtotheUnitedStatesduringapandemic,asthemaritimefreight
industryisgoingbeseverelytaxed(Luke2008).Further,asthedevelopingworlddrawsmoreandmore
oncoalforpower,thesupplysituationbecomesincreasinglychaotic.Supplyavailablenowistiedupin
contractsforfutureusebycountriesdeveloping theireconomies.Therewilllikelybelesselectricityto
buyonthegrid,asstaffing/supplyissuescausepowerlevelstofluctuate.
Domesticproductionofnaturalgaswilllikelybereducedwhenabsenteeismincreases.Imports
ofnaturalgaswilllikelyfallifmaritimefreightishindered.Anotherpossibilityisthatcountriesthat
exportnaturalgasandcoalcouldusetheirresourcesastoolstodemandaid,specificallypandemic
vaccine.TheUnitedStatesisconsideredoneofthebetterpreparednationsintheworldforapandemic
andthuswillbeperceivedtohaveresourcesthataregloballyinscarcesupply.Suchactionisnot
unprecedented.RussiacurrentlyusesitscontrolofnaturalgaspipelinesintoEurope,andIndonesia
refusestoshareitsavianinfluenzaisolateswiththeworldforgeopoliticalreasons(Belkin2008,Fidler
2008).Finally,ifrailtrafficisdisruptedduringapandemicformonths,asitwasin2005,thenthe
reliabilityofcoalbasedpowerwillbecompromised.Thescenarioworsensifalternativesourcesoffuel
arenotasreadilyavailableastheywereduringthelastmajordisruptionincoaltransport.
Industryexpertsareawareofthissituation,yetlittlehasbeendonetoremedyitnotforlack
oftrying,butprimarilybecauseofthecostsofincreasingcoalstocksatpowerplantsincurrentmarket
conditions.Theamountofcoalkeptonthegroundbycoalpoweredplantshasdecreasedsignificantly
fromthe1970s,whenkeeping60to90daysofcoalstockwasthenorm.Thereductionto30daysof
coalwasencouragedbypublicutilitycommissionsasawaytocutcosts(NERC2007a).Mostpublic
utilitycommissionswillnotallowpowercompaniestoraisetheirelectricityratessolelyforthepurpose
ofincreasingtheircoalstocks.Similarly,mostpowercompanieswillnotspendtheextracapitalto
increasecoalstocksinthecompetitiveUSenergymarket.

Gapsinpandemicpreparednessglobally
ThegapsinpandemicplanningfortheenergysectorarenotuniquetotheUnitedStatesandhavebeen
reportedaroundtheworld(UscherPines2006,Coker2006,Ortu2008,MounierJack2007,ECDC2007,
UNSystemInfluenzaCoordinator&WorldBank2008).TheUnitedNationsSystemInfluenza
Coordinator(UNSIC),whooverseaspandemicpreparednessattheUN,startedaprograminearly2007

43
aimedatimprovingthepreparednessinnonhealthsectorsintheUNandinmembernations.The
UNSICPandemicInfluenzaContingency(PIC)teamhasperformedadditionalanalysesofnational
pandemicplansandfoundthatpreparednessoutsideofthehealthcaresectorislacking.TheUNSICPIC
WebsiteoffersanalysesofpandemicplanningattheUNandmembernations(OCHA2008).

Figure4:Energysectorpandemicpreparednessmap
(OCHA2008)

AsFigure4shows,theUnitedStatesisoneoffournationsbelievedtobe"moreprepared"intheenergy
sector,whilemostoftheworldisconsidered"lessprepared"forensuringtheflowofenergyduringa
pandemic.Thisisofgreatconcern,notonlyfortheimpactitwillhaveonhumanlifeifelectricityfails,
butalsointhelossofproductionandtradeofcriticalproductsfromaroundtheworld.
Intoday'sglobaleconomy,theimpactofapandemiconpowergenerationinothernationscan
directlyaffecttheresponseofcountriesthatdependonproductsfromothernations.Recentcoal
shortagesandrisingfuelcostshavedrivenupelectricityratessharplyinChina,whichhasresultedinthe
world'slargestaluminumsmelterreducingproduction(Yu2008).Problemswithpowerandrisingfuel
costsweresomeofthereasonscitedforHongRayEnterprises(basedinChina),theworld'slargest
manufacturerofvinylexamgloves,toinvokeaforce majeureclause(Medline2008).Acontinued
shortageofcoalinSouthAfricahasrequiredthatminingcompaniesreducetheirdemandforelectricity
yetagain.SouthAfricanminingproductionhasdropped(Burgis2008);globally,metalpriceshaverisen
sharply,andsuppliersarescramblingtofindalternativemanufacturingcapacity.

44
 Suchproblemsareoccurringwithoutapandemicstressingtheglobaljustintimeeconomy.
ManycriticalproductsareproducedoverseasandshippedtotheUnitedStates,includingmorethan
10%ofthemedicalsupplyimportsthatarefromChina(Langton2008).Moreimportant,50%ofclinical
thermometers,13%ofsyringes,and13%ofrespiratorsimportedbytheUnitedStatescomefromChina
(Langton2008).ThevastmajorityofpharmaceuticalsusedintheUnitedStatesarealsomanufactured
abroad.Theseproductswilllikelybeinhighdemandduringapandemic.Amongotherfactors,alackof
reliablepoweroverseaswilllikelycausefragilesupplychainstocrumbleduringapandemic.TheUnited
Statescanexpectanincreaseinmorbidityandmortalityduringapandemicwhenstandardsofcareare
modifiedbecauseofsupplyshortagesandariseinpatientnumbers.Inessence,aswerunoutofcritical
supplies,thecareprovidedduringapandemicwillbesimilartothecareprovidedduringthe191819
pandemic.

Futureresearch
Theimpactofapandemiconthecoalsupplychainisnotentirelyclear.Allindicationsarethatitcould
besignificant.Moreresearchisurgentlyneededtofurtherunderstandthelikelihoodofthisscenario
occurringandtoestimatethepotentialimpactofpandemicsofvariousseveritiesonthecoalsupply
chain.TheNationalEnergyTechnologyLaboratoryattheDOEinpartnershipwithCarnegieMellon
Universityhasdesignedasystemtoassessvulnerabilitiesinthenation'spowersystemcausedbya
supplydisruption(Shih2007).Thesystemwasdesignedtolookatvulnerabilitiesinthecoalsupplychain
fromthepointofviewofgeographicdisruptions(eg,akeyrailbridgebeingdestroyed).Intheory,this
systemcouldbeusedtoprojecttheimpactofpandemicsofvariousseverities.Wewillsubmita
proposaltousethissystemthisyear.
Thelackofleadershipatthefederallevelforpandemicplanninginthecoalindustryisanother
seriousconcern.Furtherresearchissuggestedtodeterminewhatagencyisultimatelyresponsiblefor
thisplanning.TheUnitedStatescurrentlystockpilessuchcriticalproductsasoil,becausetonothave
themoveraperiodoftimecouldcompromisenationalinterests.Giventheheavydependenceoncoal
andthepossibilitiesofdisruptions,theavailabilityofregionalorstateownedcoalstockpilesshouldbe
examined.
Theeasiestwaytopreventacoalsupplychaindisruptionfromreducingelectricityproduction
duringapandemicistorampupcoalstocksatpowerplants.Suchastrategyassumesthatspacefor
additionalcoalisavailableandthatotherissues,suchasenvironmentalconcerns,areaddressed.

45
Thoughsomeintheindustrymightconsiderbuildingupcoalstockstooriskyfinancially,asound
argumentcanbemadethatmaintainingthepeakcoalstocklevels,associatedwiththepreparationfor
peakelectricaldemand,asarequiredminimumcoalstocklevelyearroundcanbecomparedto
investingwiselyininsurance,anecessarycostofdoingbusiness.Acomparisonofthecoststothe
industryofrunningoutofcoalduringapandemicversustheexpenseofmaintainingamuchlarger
stockpileshouldbeperformedatthenationallevel.Itislikelymorefinanciallyviabletomaintaina
largerstockpiletomitigatemanyoftheproblemsthispaperhighlights.
Publichealthneedstobetterunderstandtheinfrastructureonwhichitdepends.Havingmore
researchontheinterdependenciesofthepublichealthinfrastructurewouldalsobevaluable.Public
healthmustunderstandtheimplicationsofitspoliciesoncriticalinfrastructure.Forinstance,
communitymitigationmeasuressuchasclosingschoolscoulddisruptdeliveryofcoalifworkersinthe
smalltownsalongthesupplychainhavefewoptionsbuttostayhomewiththeirchildrenorother
familymembers.Manystatesalreadyhavemultidisciplinarygroupsthataddressissuesrelatedto
emergencypreparedness.Itwouldbebeneficialifthesegroupsdevotedmoreefforttounderstanding
eachagency'sinterdependenciesandexpectationsduringanemergency.
Atthenationallevel,muchmoreworkisneededtounderstandthedependenceofpublichealth
onelectricalpower.AgoodstartingplaceforthisresearchwouldbetheworkdoneattheCarnegie
MellonElectricityIndustryCenterforthestateofPennsylvania(Apt2005).Theauthorsconductedan
extensivestudylookingattheimpactofanelectricalgridfailureonthecontinuationofcriticalservices.
Itwouldalsobevaluablefortheprioritizationofcriticalinfrastructuretobebasedontheessential
natureofthatinfrastructure.Forexample,electricityisneededtoproducevaccines;thus,generating
electricityisequallycriticaltovaccinemanufacturingitself(Osterholm2007b).
Whilepublichealthshouldcontinuetobeinvolvedineffortstoaddressglobalclimatechange,it
shoulddosowithresponsibleforesight.Thesamepassionthatpublichealthputsbehindoppositionto
newpowerplantsshouldbeusedtoadvocateforalternativepowerplantsandtheassociated
transmissionresources.Thiswilllikelycomenaturallyaspublichealthbecomesmoreawareofits
dependenceonelectricityandthechallengesfacingelectricalgenerationinthefuture.Itiscrucialfor
theelectricalsectortobecomemoreenvironmentallyresponsible,butitmustnotbecomelessreliable
atthesametime.
Muchworkisneededtopreparetheelectricalsectoraroundtheworldforapandemic.Two
mainissuesmustbeaddressedrelatedtopandemicplanningandtheelectricalsector.

46
 Conceptualizefuelsupplydisruptions.Almosteverynationimportsfuel,yetpandemicplanning
isprimarilyfocusedonissueswithinnationalborders.Thenarrowfocuscouldbedevastatingfor
nations,suchasJapan,thatdependheavilyonimportedfuellikenaturalgasforelectrical
generation(EIA2006).Pandemicplanningmustmovebeyondnationalborders,becauseour
globaljustintimeeconomyknowsvirtuallynoborders.
Addressfailingpowersystemsintheworld.NationssuchasSouthAfricaandChinahave
recentlyorarecurrentlyexperiencingblackoutsduetocoalsupplydeficiencies.Thecoalsupply
chainssupportingtheirenergysectorsareunabletomaintainenoughcoalatpowerplants,and
blackoutsarenotunusual.Theseblackoutshavealreadyaffectedglobalcommerce(Koh2008,
Shelley2008).Theworldmustfigureoutawaytodealwithglobalmanufacturinghubsthat
experienceblackoutsduringapandemicduetotheincrediblyfragilefuelsupplychains.

Recommendations
Basedonanunderstandingoftheinextricablelinkbetweenpublichealthandelectricity(andthesupply
ofcoal,inparticular),decisionmakersshouldconsiderthefollowingrecommendationstoreducethe
risksposedbyaninevitablepandemic:

Recommendation1:Buildcoalstocks.Firstandforemost,everyeffortmustbemadetoensurethe
reliabilityofelectricitysupplyduringapandemic.Withcoalplants,themostpracticalwaytoensurea
steadysupplyoffuelduringapandemicistokeeplargerstocksatpowerplantsorstoragefacilities.
Whentheindustrypreparesforpeakelectricaldemand(thesummerintheUnitedStates),coal
stocksreachtheirhighestfortheyear.Thispeakcoalstocklevelshouldnowbemaintainedasthenew
minimumlevelateverycoalpowerplantaroundthenation.Thenormalfluctuationincoalstocksdue
toprice,season,andotherissuesshouldoccurabovethispeakcoalstocklevel.Giventheunknown
timingofapandemicandthelongleadtimeneededtosignificantlyincreasecoalstocks,thislevelwill
providealargerbufferagainstsupplychaindisruptionsexpectedduringapandemic.Coalstockscanbe
increasedintheUnitedStatesinatleastthreeways:
1. Arepresentativegroupoftheelectricalsectorcouldbeconvenedtomakethisnewminimum
coalstocklevelanindustry guideline.SuchgroupsalreadyexistinorganizationsliketheEEI,
whichcurrentlyhelpsdevelopindustryguidelines.

47
 2. TheNationalAssociationofRegulatoryUtilitiesCommissionerscouldpromulgatethenew
minimumcoalstocklevelintheformofaresolution.Suchactionwouldbringtheissuetothe
attentionofthepublicutilitycommissionersineachstate,whocouldaddthenewminimum
coalstocklevelasarequirement.Suchanapproachcouldbeeffectiveforutilityfacilitiesthat
areregulatedbystatepublicutilitycommissions(PUCs)butwouldnotnecessarilyaffect
facilitiessuchascompetitivegenerationplantsthatarenotsubjecttoPUCregulation.
3. TheFederalEnergyRegulatoryCommissioncouldrequiretheNorthAmericanElectrical
ReliabilityCorporationtopromulgatethisnewminimumcoalstocklevelasareliability standard.
Representativesofthecoalandtransportationindustriesneedtobeinvolvedinthesedecisions,
becauseanationalincreaseincoalstockswillhaveanimpactontheiroperations.Therewillbea
significantcostassociatedwithincreasingcoalstockstoandmaintainingthematthisnewminimum
level.Thiscostshouldbepassedontotheconsumersresponsibly.

Recommendation2:Placecoalminersandtheirsupportinginfrastructurepersonnelinthe
highestprioritylevelsforpandemicresponse.TheUnitedStatesgovernmentshouldassume
primaryresponsibilityforensuringcoalminersandtheirsupportinginfrastructurehavepriorityaccess
toantiviraldrugs,pandemicvaccine,andothercriticalproductsandservices(eg,criticalpharmaceutical
drugs,food),becausetheyarenotcurrentlyindentifiedasapriorityinthefederalorstateplansfor
supportingthecriticalinfrastructureduringapandemic.Assuch,coalminersandtheirsupporting
infrastructurearenotincorporatedintoallocationplans.
Giventhenation'sdependenceonminersandtheirsupportinginfrastructure,theUnitedStates
governmentshouldensuretheyareprioritizedforallocationofpandemicvaccine,antiviraldrugs,and
criticalproductsinapandemic,untilsuchtimeasthesecriticalworkerscanbeincorporatedintocurrent
stateandlocalplans.Withoutfederalinterventionandprioritizationofcoalminersandtheirassociated
infrastructure,elevationoftheirpriorityisunlikelytohappenforsometime,asstatesandlocalitiesdid
notincludethesecriticalworkersintheplanningprocessorprocureanallotmentofsupplies(eg,
antiviraldrugs)forthem.Thefollowingreviewshowcoalminersmayhavebeenoverlookedandhowto
properlyincludethem.
Vaccines.TheallocationofpandemicvaccineisprimarilybasedontheworkoftheNational
InfrastructureAdvisoryCouncilsworkonprioritization.Likeothernationalguidance
documents,thisworkdoesnotrecognizetheneedtoprioritizecoalmininganditssupporting

48
infrastructure.Stockpilesofcoalatpowerplantsarerarelyfullydepleted,thoughduringa
pandemic,aswehaveshown,supplychaindisruptionswilllikelyfullydepletethemordraw
themdowntodangerouslylowlevels.Depletingthecoalstockscouldtakesometimeandmay
nothavebeenseenasanacuteproblemorevenrecognized.Manufacturingpandemicvaccine
willtakeseveralmonths,thesametimeframeinwhichcoalstocksareprojectedtobeat
dangerouslevels.AlimitednumberofdosesofaprepandemicvaccineforH5N1arecurrently
stockpiled.However,theefficacyofthisvaccinewillbeunknownuntilapandemicbegins,andit
maynotproveusefulifthepandemicisadifferentstrain.Todate,coalminershavenotbeen
consideredamongthefirsttoreceivepandemicinfluenzavaccinethetieredvaccineallocation
plan.Buttherationaleforincludingthemissound.Whileitisobviousthatemployeecategories
currentlylistedintier1(eg,firstresponders)shouldbeatthisprioritylevelforoccupational
exposurepurposes,theyalsorequiretheavailabilityofelectricitytoperformtheircriticaljob
associatedduties.Therestofthecoalsupplychain,transportation,andelectricalsectorshould
beincludedaspartoftier1ofthefederalvaccineallocationstrategy.Intier1ofthefederal
allocationplan,24millionpeopleareeligibletoreceiveapandemicvaccine.Thecoalindustryin
2007employedapproximately81,000peopleintheUnitedStates(EIA2007a).Furthermore,
additionalworkersareemployedinnumeroussupportingindustries,suchasthosewhobuild
andmaintainenginesformineequipment.Whilenotalltheseemployeesarecriticalforthe
continuationofoperations,thenumberoftrulyessentialemployeesneedstobedetermined.
Thereare244,600criticalemployeesinrailroadandinlandwaterwaytransportationindustries,
asdefinedbytheNIAC;however,onlyaportionofthemareinvolvedinthemovementofcoal
(NIAC2007).Whilethecurrentnumberofcriticalemployeesinthecoalsupplychainis
unknown,basedonavailabledata,itislikelyunder300,000.Theseworkersshouldallbe
includedintier1ofthefederalvaccineallocationplan.
Influenzaantiviraldrugs.Theallocationguidanceforinfluenzaantiviraldrugsisbasedprimarily
onusingthesedrugsfortreatment.Thereissomelimitedguidanceonprophylaxis
(administrationofantiviralstopreventanindividualfromfallingill).Accordingtotheguidance,
peoplewhoreceiveprophylaxismustfallintoaspecificcategory,forexample,healthcare
workersorfrontlineemergencyservicespersonnel.Prophylaxisisunlikelytooccurwithstate
andfederalstockpiles,owingtorestraintsrelatedtothenumberofdrugcoursesavailable.Most
prophylaxis,ifany,willgotothoseexposedtoasickindividual.Intheabsenceofprivatelyheld

49
 stockpilesofantiviraldrugsbycoalminingcompanies,therewilllikelybeverylimitedsupplies
ofantiviraldrugsavailablefortreatmentorprophylaxisofemployeesinthecoalmining
industry.Coalminersandtheirsupportinginfrastructureshouldbeconsideredessentialand
givenhighestpriorityforantiviraldrugtreatmentandprophylaxis.
Othercriticalsupplies.Likemostindustries,thecoalminingindustryundoubtedlyemploys
criticalindividualswhohavechronicmedicalconditions,suchasdiabetes,orwhosefamily
membersdo.Pharmaceuticalproductsusedtoaddresstheseconditionslikelywillbeinshort
supplyduringapandemic.Wealsoknowthatothercriticaldrugswillbescarce.Shortagesof
criticalproductslikefoodareexpectedduringapandemic.Ethicalallocationplansneedtobe
developedtoaddresstheseshortages,andtheyshouldtakeintoaccountoccupations,including
coalminersandsupportinginfrastructurepersonnel,amongmanyothervariables.

Recommendation3:Planfordisruptionsinthecoalsupplychain.Therewillbedisruptionsinthe
coalsupplychainduringapandemic.Intheabsenceofpriorplanning,thesedisruptionswillbemore
severe.ItisanticipatedthatthesedisruptionswillbesimilarinimpacttothedisruptionsofPRBcoalin
2005.Coalshipmentsarelikelytobereducedbyatleast15%to20%forperiodsupto60days.This
disruptioncouldalsooccurmorethanonceif,asinotherpandemics,illnesscomesinwaves.
Thesedisruptionswilloccurupanddownthesupplychain;therefore,itiscriticalthatthewhole
supplychainbeinvolvedinpandemicplanning.Thecompanythatsuppliesthetiresforthedumptrucks
atthesurfaceminesinthePRB,forexample,mighthavesupplyorstaffingshortagesthatpreventit
frommaintainingthetrucks'tires,thusreducingthenumberinoperation.Maintainingalarger
inventoryofcriticalsuppliesandcrosstrainingwillhelpthesecompaniescontinuetofunctionwhen
supplychainsaredisrupted.Atmines,highabsenteeismcouldleadtoadropinproductivity,
exacerbatingsupplydisruptionwithloweredoutput.Tocounterthisdilemma,largermineoperations
mightwanttoconsolidateoperationstemporarily;smallermineoperationsmightwanttoconsider
shorttermpoolingofresources(stafforequipment)tomaintainthehigherlevelsofproductivity.A
pandemicwillcauseproblemsbeyondthosetypicallyconsideredinbusinesscontinuityplanning,suchas
multiplesuppliersbeingunabletofulfillorders,orsimultaneoushighlevelsofabsenteeismbetween
workersandtheirbackups.Thissituationwillrequireplanningbeyondwhatisnormallyanticipated.

50
Recommendation4:Anticipateanddevelopstrategiesforrespondingtodisruptionsin
electricalservice.Givenmultiplewavesofillness,apandemiccouldlastupto18months.Duringthis
time,stormswillcontinuetostrike,humanaccidentswillstilloccur,actsofterrorismareareal
possibility,andelectricalcomponentswillcontinuetofail.Someofthesedisturbancescouldhappen
duringtimesofhighabsenteeism,makingrestorationofserviceevenmorechallenging.Everypower
companycurrentlyhasproceduresforsuchcrisesasblackoutscausedbyicestorms,buttheprocedures
typicallyassumethatresources(people,equipmentand/orparts)canberapidlyobtainedfromutilities
inunaffectedareas.Thiswillnotbethecaseduringapandemic,asnoareawillbespared.Further,
proceduresarenottypicallydevelopedfordealingwithfuelshortages,becausetheyarerareand
localized.Plannersshouldplanondealingwithandrespondingtopowerdisruptionsduringperiods
whenfuel(forpowergenerationandresponsevehicles)maybescarce.Astheseplansaredevelopedor
modified,careshouldbetakentoensurethatpeoplewhoreceivepowerwhenitisscarceareproviding
themostcriticalservicestothecommunity.Theseplansshouldalsobeintegratedwithcommunity
mitigationstrategies,suchasclosingschoolsandmallsthatdonotneedpower.

Protectingthecoalsupplychain
Anotherinfluenzapandemicisanticipated;however,thetimingandcharacteristicswillnotbeknown
untilthepandemichasbegun.Thispandemicwillbethefirsttooccurinajustintimeglobaleconomy.
Whiletherehasbeensubstantialplanningforpandemicpreparednessinthehealthcaresector,ithas
largelybeenoutsidetherealitiesimplicitinajustintimeworld.Asthisreporthasshown,apandemic
hasthepotentialtocauseunprecedenteddisruptionsthroughoutthecoalsupplychain,endangering
thereliabilityofelectricityintheUnitedStates.Pandemicplanningneedstomeettherealitiesofthe
worldinwhichapandemicwilloccur.Thecoalsupplychain,aswehaveshown,iscrucialforaneffective
pandemicresponse.Wehaveconcludedthatstepscanbetakentopreventthecoalsupplychainfrom
beingcompromisedduringapandemic.Wemustdoeverythingtoprotectthecoalsupplychain,andin
turnelectricalgeneration,asourpandemicresponsehingesonelectricitynotbeingcompromised.

51


AppendixA:Referencesforthereviewofthe2005PowderRiverBasincoal
disruption
EIA(EnergyInformationAdministration).(2007a)Annualcoalreport2006.Sep2008[Fulltext]
EIA.(2007b)Annualenergyreview2006.Jun26,2007[Fulltext]
EIA.(2008)Annualenergyoutlook2008.Jun2008[Fulltext]
FederalEnergyRegulatoryCommission.Discussionswithutilityandrailroadrepresentativesonmarketsand
reliabilitymatters.(DocketNo.AD068000)May23,2006[Fulltext]
FremeF.UScoalsupplyanddemand.2007review.Apr2008[Fulltext]
KaplanSM.Railtransportationofcoaltopowerplants:reliabilityissues.CRSReportforCongress.Sep26,2007
[Fulltext]
NERC(NorthAmericanElectricReliabilityCorporation).(2006a)2006Longtermreliabilityassessment:the
reliabilityofthebulkpowersystemsinNorthAmerica.Oct2006[Fulltext]
NERC.(2006b)2006Summerassessment:reliabilityofthebulkpowersysteminNorthAmerica.May2006[Full
text]
NERC.(2007a)2007Longtermreliabilityassessment20072016.Oct25,2007[Fulltext]
NERC.(2007b)2007Summerassessment:thereliabilityofthebulkpowersysteminNorthAmerica.May2007[Full
text]
NERC.(2008)2008Summerreliabilityassessment:toensurethereliabilityofthebulkpowersysteminNorth
America.May20,2008[Fulltext]
OfficeofElectricityDeliveryandEnergyReliability.DeliveriesofcoalfromthePowderRiverBasin:eventsand
trends20052007.Oct2007[Fulltext]
SurfaceTransportationBoard.Railtransportationofenergyresourcescriticaltothenation'senergysupply.(STB
ExParteNo.672)PublichearingJul18,2007[Audiomeeting]
USSenateCommitteeonEnergyandNaturalResources.Coalbasedgenerationreliability.(S.HRG.109601)
HearingMay25,2006.Washington,DC:GovernmentPrintingOffice,2006[Fulltext]

52
 AppendixB:Referencesforthereviewoffederalandselectedguidanceonpandemicplanning

Title Authoring Date of URL Reason for including

Guidance on Allocating and
Targeting Pandemic
Influenza Vaccine
Agency Publication
HHS 7/23/2008 http://www.pandemicflu.go This guidance document prioritizes the critical infrastructure
(energy and transportation assets) for receiving a pandemic
v/vaccine/allocationguidanc vaccine. A similar prioritization scheme is used for antivirals.
e.pdf

Final Report and National 1/16/2007 http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrar This document served as the cornerstone for the HHS
Recommendations of the Infrastructure prioritization of critical infrastructure. The recommendations of
Prioritization of Critical Advisory
y/assets/niac/niac this working group were carried over into national prioritization
Infrastructure for a Council (NIAC) pandemicwg_v8 guidance. This working group document also defined these
Pandemic Outbreak in the 011707.pdf critical infrastructures and tiers within them for receiving
United States Working vaccines.
Group

Third Global Progress UN System 12/18/2007 http://un This document provides a high level overview of pandemic
Report: Response to Avian Influenza planning around the world and at the UN. It points out
Influenza and State of Coordinator &
influenza.org/files/1218 weaknesses and provides suggestions for improvement. It
Pandemic Readiness World Bank 07UN specifically addressed planning in non-health related sectors.
WBAHIProgressReportfinal.
pdf
Pandemic Influenza DHS 12/2006 http://pandemicflu.gov/plan This guidance document is widely referenced in the critical
Preparedness, Response, infrastructure for pandemic planning.
and Recovery Guide for
/pdf/cikrpandemicinfluenza
Critical Infrastructure and guide.pdf
Key Resources

National Strategy for Whitehouse: 11/1/2005 http://www.whitehouse.gov This guidance document lays out the strategy for responding to
Pandemic Influenza Homeland a pandemic in the US.
Security
/homeland/nspi.pdf
Council
National Strategy for Whitehouse: 5/2006 http://www.whitehouse.gov This guidance document specifics tasks and responsibilities for
Pandemic Influenza: Homeland implementation of the US pandemic influenza plan.
Implementation Plan Security
/homeland/nspi_implement
Council ation.pdf

53
Checklist for Influenza WHO 10/2005 http://www.who.int/entity/ This document is considered the cornerstone of many
Pandemic Preparedness pandemic-planning checklists around the world and is a widely
Planning
csr/resources/publications/i citied guidance document.
nfluenza/FluCheck6web.pdf
39 Steps Governments Pandemic 12/2007 http://un This revised guidance was developed to ensure government
Should Take to Prepare for a Influenza continues to function during a pandemic.
Pandemic Contingency
influenza.org/files/39
(PIC) UN steps.pdf
Business Pandemic HHS & CDC 09/2006 http://pandemicflu.gov/plan A widely cited business preparedness checklist on pandemic
Influenza Planning Checklist preparedness.
/pdf/businesschecklist.pdf
North American Plan for Security and 8/17/2007 http://www.state.gov/docu This guidance document outlines the North American plan for
Avian and Pandemic Prosperity critical infrastructure during a pandemic.
Influenza Partnership of
ments/organization/91311.
North America pdf
Electricity Sector Influenza North 2/1/2006 ftp://www.nerc.com/pub/sy This guidance document was developed specifically for the
Pandemic Planning, American electrical sector.
Preparation, and Response Electric
s/all_updl/cip/Influenza%20
Reference Guide Reliability Pandemic%20Reference%20
Council Guide.pdf
(NERC)
Straight Talk About Electrical Edison Electric 5/2007 http://www.eei.org/industr This guidance document was developed specifically for the
Utilities and Pandemic Institute (EEI) electrical sector.
Planning
y_issues/reliability/business
_continuity/pandemic_plan
ning/Straight_Talk.pdf

Note: The authors were not able to obtain pandemic planning guidance from the National Mining Association and the Association of American Railroads, which does not mean
guidance does not exist.

54
AppendixC:Thenumberofmines,theirtype,andproductionbystate
Thistableshowsthe25coalproducingstatesintheUnitedStates.Italsoprovidesinformationaboutthenumber
ofmines,typesofmines,andproductionineachstate.Thisinformationisusefulinsettingthecontextofthe
paper,assomestates,notablyWyoming,dominatethecoalindustry.

continued

55
Source:EIA2008b

56
AppendixD:Detailsofcoalproducingstates'pandemicplansreviewed

State Date on pandemic Plan in draft form URL of plan

plan

Alabama 04/2007 No http://adph.org/pandemicflu/assets/Alabama%20

PI%20Operational%20Plan%20041607.pdf

Alaska 02/2008 No http://www.pandemicflu.alaska.gov/panfluplan.p

df

Arizona 06/2006 No http://www.azdhs.gov/pandemicflu/pdf/az_influe

nza_pandemic_response_plan.pdf

Colorado 12/2006 No http://www.cdphe.state.co.us/epr/Public/Interna

lResponsePlan/CDPHEPanfluVer2.pdf

Illinois 10/2006 No http://www.idph.state.il.us/pandemic_flu/Illinois

%20Pandemic%20Flu%20Plan%20101006%20Fina
l.pdf
Indiana 10/2006 No http://www.in.gov/isdh/bioterrorism/PandemicFl
u/pdfs/PandemicInfluenzaPlan.pdf

Kansas 10/2005 No http://www.kdheks.gov/flu/download/KS_Pan_fl

u_10_05.pdf

Kentucky 04/2007 No http://chfs.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/6CD366D26726

4AD085BB
E83CF769560E/0/KyPandemicInfluenzaPreparedn
essPlan.pdf
Louisiana 09/2006 Yes http://www.dhh.louisiana.gov/offices/publication
s/pubs
276/Pandemic%20Influenza%20Plan_100906.pdf
Maryland 04/2008 No http://bioterrorism.dhmh.state.md.us/docs_and_
pdfs/Pan%20Flu%202008_MD%20Revised%20Pan
%20Flu%20Annex%20%20%20042308.pdf
Missouri 01/2008 No http://www.dhss.mo.gov/PandemicPlan/PanFluPl
an.pdf

Montana 05/2006 No http://www.dphhs.mt.gov/PHSD/Communicable

disease/pandemicfluplan/3flu2006
RevisedFluPlan51706.pdf

57
New Mexico 04/2007 Yes http://www.health.state.nm.us/ohem/.document
s/New%20Mexico%20PanFLU%20Ops%20Doc%20
16Apr07%20draft%20for%20distribution.pdf

Ohio 03/2006 Yes http://www.ohiopandemicflu.gov/docs/ODHPanF

luPlan.pdf

Oklahoma 09/2007 No http://www.ok.gov/health/documents/TPRS_200

7%20OK%20State%20Pandemic%20Plan%20.pdf

Pennsylvania 2005 Yes http://www.dsf.health.state.pa.us/health/lib/heal

th/pandemic/PAPandemicFluPlan.pdf

Tennessee 07/2006 No https://health.state.tn.us/Ceds/PDFs/2006_PanFl

u_Plan.pdf

Texas 10/2005 Yes http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/idcu/disease/influen

za/pandemic/Draft_PIPP_10_24_web.pdf

Utah 08/2007 Yes http://www.pandemicflu.utah.gov/plan/CorePan

Flu08302007.pdf

Virginia 03/2006 Yes http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/PandemicFlu/pdf/D

RAFT_Virginia_Pandemic_Influenza_Plan.pdf

West Virginia 05/2008 Yes Received via email

Wyoming 01/2008 No http://wdh.state.wy.us/Media.aspx?mediaId=373

6

58
AppendixE:Anoverviewofthecoalsupplychain

The17minesinthePowderRiverBasin(PRB)operateinasimilarway.Theoverburden(theearthabove
thecoal)isremovedandadraglineremovesthecoal.Thiscoalisdumpedintothebedofatruckor
ontoaconveyer.Dumptruckscarrybetween250to400tonsofcoaltoaprocessingfacilitythatbreaks
thecoalintosmallerchunks.Fromtheprocessingfacilitythecoalisloadedintohoppersforstorageuntil
itistransferredontoatrain.
MostofthecoalminedinthePRBistransportedbytraintoitsfinaldestination.Trainsare
loadedviaanautomatedsystem,whichtypicallydropsbetween110to120tonsofcoalineachgondola
(aspecializedpieceofequipment)whilethetrainismoving.Eachtraintypicallyhasmorethan120cars.
TrainsproceedoutofthePRBontheJointLine,thebusiestraillineintheworld.Daily,morethan60of
loadedtrainsleavethePRBandmorethan60emptytrainsreturn.Theprocesshappens24hoursaday,
365daysayear.
TrainsleavingthePRBareheadingforaspecificpowerplantintheUnitedStates.Thesetrains
areconsideredunits,meaningthatthecarsandtheenginesarenotseparatedinatrainyard.Theyare
dedicatedtrainsmovingbackandforthbetweenthemineandthepowerplant.
Mostpowercompaniesowntheirownfleetofgondolas,whichareusedsolelyfortransporting
coaltotheirfacilities.Ageneraloverviewofhowpulverizedcoalcombustionsystemworksfollows.
Whentrainsarrive,coalisplacedintheplant'sbunkerifspaceisavailable.Fromthebunker,coalmoves
toapulverizerbeforebeingblownintotheboiler,whichgeneratesthesteamtoturntheturbinethat
generateselectricity.Electricityisthensentoutviatransmissionlinestothegrid,whereitgoesthrough
differenttransformersbeforebeingusedbyapowerconsumer.
Ifbunkersarefullwhenthetrainarrives,thecoalisplacedontopofthestockpilethatsitsinthe
powerplantyard.Betweentrainshipmentsthecoalisreclaimedfromthecoalstockpileandusedtofill
thebunker.Stockpilestypicallyholdanaverageof30daysworthofcoalatthesummerpeakburnrate.
Mostpowerplantsbuildupcoalstocksinthespring,inpreparationforpeaksummerusage.Thecoal
stockpilerarelydropstolessthan15days.Thecloserthatcoalistothebottomofthestockpile,the
pooreritsquality.Thisisaresultofthepressureexertedonthecoalatthebottomofthepile,chemical
degradation,andthelikelihoodofdirtandrocksbeingscoopedupwiththecoal,asthesestockpilesare
keptonbareground.

59
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