SAMPLLE Q & A

Treason
Q: A was charged with the crime of treason. In his defense, he asserts that he can no longer be prosecuted
for treason since he already lost his Filipino citizenship under paragraphs 3, 4, and 6 of the
Commonwealth Act No. 63, which provides that a Filipino may lose his citizenship by accepting
commission in the military, naval, or air service of a foreign country when he joined the Japanese
armed forces. Is his defense tenable?

A: No. A cannot divest himself of his Philippine citizenship by simple expedient of accepting a
commission in the military, naval, or air service of such country. If such contention would be sustained,
the very crime would be the shield that would protect him from punishment (People v. Manayao, 78 Phil
721).

Misprision of Treason
Q: X, a Filipino citizen, has knowledge of treason committed by someone and does not report its
commission to the proper authorities. Can he be held liable for Misprision of Treason?

A: No. Art. 116 does not apply when the crime of treason is already committed. This is so because Art.
116 speaks of knowledge of any conspiracy against the Government of the Philippines, not knowledge
of treason actually committed by another.

Inciting to War or Giving Motives to reprisal

Q: From 1658 to 2012, the inhabitants of Sabah Malaysia were paying rents to the Sultanate of Sulu. On
2013, Sultan J, of the Sultanate of Sulu decided to send its royal forces in order to claim ownership over
Sabah on the basis of a document ceding ownership of Sabah from Brunei in favor of Sulu. Since Sabah
is already part of the territory of Malaysia and claiming that the act of Sultan J violates Art. 118 of the
RPC, the Philippine government sued Sultan J. Will the suit prosper?

A: No. Art. 118 is applicable only when the offender performs unlawful or unauthorized acts. Sultan J
was merely asserting his right to own the territory of Sabah when he sent its royal forces. The cession
made by Brunei in favor of the Sultanate of Sulu is a lawful and authorized basis upon which the claim of
Sultan J may be made.

Piracy
If piracy was committed outside the Philippine waters, will the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over
the offense?

A: Yes, for piracy falls under Title I Book 2 of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an exception to the
rule on territoriality in criminal law under Article 2. The same principle applies even if the offenders were
charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy under the Code but under a special law, P.D. 532 which
penalizes piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761, 1997)

Circumstances qualifying the crimes of piracy and mutiny

1. Whenever they have seized a vessel by boarding or firing upon the same; NOTE: The first qualifying
circumstance does not apply to mutiny since the offenders are already on board the ship.
2. Whenever the pirates have abandoned their victims without means of saving themselves; or 3.
Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, physical injuries, or rape.
No complex crime of piracy with murder

There is only one crime committed qualified piracy. Murder, rape, homicide, physical injuries are mere
circumstances qualifying piracy and cannot be punished as separate crimes, nor can they be complexed
with piracy. Qualified piracy is considered a special complex crime. It is punishable by reclusion perpetua
to death regardless of the number of victims.

Arbitrary Detention
Q: X, a police officer, falsely imputes a crime against A to be able to arrest him but he appears to be not
determined to file a charge against him. What crime, if any, did X commit?

A: The crime is arbitrary detention through unlawful arrest (Boado, 2008).

Rebellion
Q: Is the ruling in Hernandez applicable even if the common crime committed is punishable by a special
law?

A: Yes. All crimes, whether punishable under special a or general law, which are mere components or
ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime or rebellion and cannot be
isolated and charged as separate crimes themselves (Ponce Enrile v. Amin, G.R. No. 93335, September
13, 1990).

Q: As a result of the killing of SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, Elias Lovedioro was charged with and subsequently
found guilty of the crime of murder. On appeal, Lovedioro claims that he should have been charged with
the crime of rebellion, not murder as, being a member of the NPA, he killed Lucilo as a means to or in
furtherance of subversive ends. The Solicitor General, opposing appellants claim, avers that it is only
when the defense had conclusively proven that the motive or intent for the killing of the policeman was
for "political and subversive ends" will the judgement of rebellion be proper. Between the appellant and
the Solicitor General, who is correct?

A: The Solicitor General is correct. It is not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly proven. Both
purpose and overt acts are essential components of the crime. With either of these elements wanting, the
crime of rebellion legally does not exist. If no political motive is established and proved, the accused
should be convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the
act, and mere membership in an organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and
of itself, suffice (People v. Lovedioro, G.R. No. 112235, 1995).

Q: For the killing of Redempto Manatad, a policeman and who was then in the performance of his official
duties, accused Rodrigo Dasig, a self-confessed member of the sparrow unit, the liquidation squad of the
NPA, was found guilty of murder with direct assault. On appeal, he claims that he should be convicted at
most of simple rebellion and not murder with direct assault. Is the appeal meritorious?

A: Yes, since the killing of Manatad is a mere component of rebellion or was done in furtherance thereof.
It is of judicial notice that the sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the New People's Army with the
objective of overthrowing the duly constituted government. It is therefore not hard to comprehend that the
killing of Pfc. Manatad was committed as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends of the NPA.
Consequently, appellant is liable for the crime of rebellion, not murder with direct assault upon a person
in authority, as the former crime absorbs the crime of direct assault when done in furtherance thereof
(People v. Dasig, et. al., G.R. No. 100231. April 28, 1993).

Q: On May 5, 1992, at about 6:00 a.m., while Governor Alegre of Laguna was on board his car traveling
along the National Highway of Laguna. Joselito and Vicente shot him on the head resulting in his instant
death. At that time, Joselito and Vicente were members of the liquidation squad of the New Peoples
Army and they killed the governor upon orders of their senior officer Commander Tiago. According to
Joselito and Vicente, they were ordered to kill Governor Alegre because of his corrupt practices. If you
were the prosecutor, what crime will you charge Joselito and Vicente? (1998 Bar Question)

A: If I were the prosecutor, I would charge Joselito and Vicente with the crime of rebellion, considering
that they were members of the liquidation squad of the New People's Army and the killing was upon
orders of their commander; hence, politically-motivated (People v. Avila, 207 SCRA 1568).

Coup detat
Q: How is the crime of coup detat committed? (2012 Bar Question)

A: When a person holding public employment undertakes a swift attack, accompanied by strategy or
stealth, directed against public utilities or other facilities needed for the exercise and continued possession
of power for the purpose of diminishing state power.

Q: If the attack is quelled but the leader is unknown, who shall be deemed the leader thereof? (2002 Bar
Question)

A: The leader being unknown, any person who in fact directed the others, spoke for them, signed receipts
and other documents issued in their name, or performed similar acts, on behalf of the rebels shall be
deemed the leader of such rebellion, insurrection or coup d'etat.

Conspiracy and Proposal to commit Rebellion/Coup detat

Q: On account of the testimony of the prosecutions witness, the accused, together with some more or less
forty persons who were said to be conspiring to overthrow the Government, was heard to have said,
"What a life this is, so full of misery, constantly increasing. When will our wretchedness end? When will
the authorities remedy it? What shall we do?" Is there a conspiracy?

A: None, as the prosecution failed to establish the existence of conspiracy to rebel by showing that there
is (1) an agreement and (2) decision to commit rebellion. Mere words of discontent, although they reveal
dissatisfaction on account of the evils, real or fictitious, to which they refer, are not alone sufficient to
prove the existence of a conspiracy to rebel, much less with the aid of force, against the constituted
Government (U.S. v. Figueras, et. al., G.R. No. 1282, September 10, 1903).

Q: Accused is the founder and leader of the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO). The theory of the
prosecution is that the accused has conspired with the Communist Party of the Philippines by giving
monetary aid, among others, to help the Huks. Further, he gave speeches advocating the principles of
Communism and urging his audience to join the uprising of laboring classes against America and the
Quirino administration. Is the accused guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion?

A: No, as there was no evidence showing that those who heard his speeches there and then agreed to rise
up arms to overthrow the government. Accused was merely a propagandist and indoctrinator of
Communism, he was not a Communist conspiring to commit the actual rebellion by the mere fact of his
leadership of the CLO (People v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L6025, 1964).

Q: VC, JG, and GG conspired to overthrow the Philippine Government. VG was recognized as the titular
head of the conspiracy. Several meetings were held and the plan was finalized. JJ, bothered by his
conscience, confessed to Father Abraham that he, VG, JG and GG have conspired to overthrow the
government. Father Abraham did not report this information to the proper authorities. Did Father
Abraham commit a crime? If so, what crime was committed? What is his criminal liability? (1994 Bar
Question)

A: No, Father Abraham did not commit a crime. His failure to report such conspiracy is due to an
insuperable cause, one of the exempting circumstances under Article 12 of the RPC, as under our law, a
priest cannot be compelled to disclose any information received by him by reason of confession made to
him under his professional capacity.

Direct Assault
Q: As the town president failed to pay their salaries, the defendant, accompanied by four armed men,
went to the house of the former and compelled him by force to leave it and go to the Presidencia. He kept
him there confined until the relatives of the town president had raised enough money to pay what was due
them as salaries. What crime did the accused commit?

A: The facts constitute the crime of direct assault. There is no public uprising when the accused,
accompanied by armed men, compelled by force the town president to go with them to proceed to the
municipal building and detained him there. By reason of detaining the town president, he inflicted upon a
public officer an act of hate or revenge. This is one of the objects of sedition, which is essentially what the
accused intended to attain (U.S. v. Dirain, G.R. No. 1948, 1905).

Q: When the policemen effected the arrest of the accused, he approached them and hit one of them in the
breast with his hand or fist, at which instant the policeman seized him by the wrist and resistance ceased.
Is the accused guilty of direct assault?

A: No, as when the offended party is agent of person in authority, any force or aggression is not sufficient
constitute to an assault. To come within the purview of Art. 148, the force used against the agent of a
person in authority must be of serious character than that employed in this case. Logic tells us that
resistance is impossible without force (U.S. v. Tabiana, G.R. No. L-11847, 1918).

Q: When the news that his carabao, which earlier destroyed a planted area belonging to another, was
seized and taken to the police station reached the accused, he confronted and protested to the municipal
president, who was then inspecting the quarantine of the animals. The president, upon hearing his protest,
promised to intervene in the matter and to see whether the carabao could be withdrawn. Upon hearing
this, the accused insulted the president and gave him a slap on the face. What crime did the accused
commit?

A: The accused committed direct assault upon a person in authority. When the offended party is a person
in authority, it is not necessary to ascertain what force the law requires in order to constitute an assault
since the law itself defines concretely this force in providing that it consists in mere laying hands upon the
person. The degree of force employed by the offender against the person in authority is immaterial as the
law simply mentions the laying hands sufficient (U.S. v. Gumban, G.R. No. L-13658, 1918). If the intent
of the accused is to embarrass the person in authority, the offense is Direct Assault with Slander by Deed.
Q: Who are deemed to be persons in authority and agents of persons in authority? (2000 Bar Question)

A: Persons in authority are those directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a
member of some court or government corporation, board, or commission. Barrio captains and barangay
chairmen are also deemed persons in authority.

Agents of persons in authority are persons who by direct provision of law or by election or by
appointment by competent authority, are charged
with maintenance of public order, the protection and security of life and property, such as barrio
councilman, barrio policeman, barangay leader and any person who comes to the aid of persons in
authority.

In applying the provisions of Arts. 148 and 151 of the RPC, teachers, professors and persons charged with
the supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities, and lawyers in the
actual performance of their professional duties or on the occasion of such performance, shall be deemed
persons in authority.

Q: Because of the approaching town fiesta in San Miguel, Bulacan, a dance was held in Barangay
Carinias. A, the Barangay Captain, was invited to deliver a speech to start the dance. While A was
delivering his speech, B, one of the guests, went to the middle of the dance floor making obscene dance
movements, brandishing a knife and challenging everyone present to a fight. A approached B and
admonished him to keep quiet and not to disturb the dance and peace of the occasion. B, instead of
heeding the advice of A, stabbed the latter at his back twice when A turned his back to proceed to the
microphone to continue his speech. A fell to the ground and died. At the time of the incident A was not
armed. What crime was committed? (2000 Bar Question)

A: The complex crime of direct assault with murder was committed. Since A was stabbed at the back
when he was not in a position to defend himself nor retaliate, there was treachery in the stabbing. Hence,
the death caused by such stabbing was murder. The Barangay Captain was in the act of trying to pacify B
who was making trouble in the dance hall when he was stabbed to death. He was therefore killed while in
the performance of his duties. In the case of People v. Hecto (135 SCRA 113), the Supreme Court ruled
that "as the barangay captain, it was his duty to enforce the laws and ordinances within the barangay. If in
the enforcement thereof, he incurs, the enmity of his people who thereafter treacherously slew him, the
crime committed is murder with assault upon a person in authority (People v. Dollantes, G.R. No.
70639, 1987).

Forgery
Q: A received a treasury warrant, a check issued by the Government. It was originally made payable to B,
or his order. A wrote Bs name on the back of said treasury warrant as if B had indorsed it, and then
presented it for payment. It was paid to A. Was there forgery?

A: Yes, because when A wrote Bs name on the back of the treasury warrant which was originally made
payable to B or his order, he converted, by such supposed indorsement, the treasury warrant to one
payable to bearer. It had the effect of erasing the phrase or his order upon the face of the warrant. There
was material alteration on a genuine document (US v. Solito, G.R. No. L-12546, August 25, 1917).

Falsification By Public Officer, Employee Or Notary Or Ecclessiastical Minister

Q: X was charged with falsification because in her certificate of candidacy for the position of councilor
she had willfully and unlawfully made the false statement that she was eligible to said office although
she knew fully well that she was under 23 years old. Was the charge proper?

A: No. When the accused certified she was eligible for the position, she practically wrote a conclusion of
law. Hence she may not be declared guilty of falsification because Art. 171 punishes untruthful
statements in narration of facts (People v. Yanza, G.R. No. L-12089, April 29, 1960).
Q: Augustina filed a criminal complaint against Bernante for falsification of public document because the
latter allegedly falsified leave forms. It was alleged that Bernante made it appear in his leave application
that he was on forced leave and on vacation leave on certain dates. In truth, Bernante was serving a 20-
day prison term because of his conviction of the crime of slight physical injuries. Is Bernante liable for
the crime of falsification of documents?

A: No. Augustina failed to point to any law imposing upon Bernante the legal obligation to disclose
where he was going to spend his leave of absence. Legal obligation means that there is a law requiring
the disclosure of the truth of the facts narrated. Bernante may not be convicted of the crime of
falsification of public document by making false statements in a narration of facts absent any legal
obligation to disclose where he would spend his vacation leave and forced leave (Enemecio v. Office of
the Ombudsman [Visayas] G.R. No. 146731, Jan. 13, 2004).

Q: In falsification of public documents, is it necessary that there be the idea of gain or intent to injure a
third person?

A: No. In falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of
gain or the intent to injure a third person because in the falsification of a public document, what is
punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed
(Galeos v. People, G.R. Nos. 174730-37, February 9, 2011).

Q: A counterfeited the signature of B but what he entered in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of B
are all true. Since there was no damage to the government, did he commit a crime?

A: Yes. In falsification of a public document, it is immaterial whether or not the contents set forth therein
were false. What is important is the fact that the signature of another was counterfeited. In a crime of
falsification of a public document, the principal thing punished is the violation of public faith and the
destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. Thus, intent to gain or injure is immaterial. Even
more so, the gain or damage is not necessary (Caubang v. People, G.R. No. L-62634 June 26, 1992).

Q: Can falsification be committed by omission?

A: Yes.
Illustration: An assistant bookkeeper who, having bought several articles for which he signed several
chits, intentionally did not record in his personal account most of the said chits and destroyed them so that
he could avoid paying the amount thereof is guilty of falsification by omission (People v. Dizon, 47 Phil
350).

Falsification By Private Individuals And Use Of Falsified Documents

Q: Is there a complex crime of estafa through falsification of a private document?
A: None. The fraudulent gain obtained through deceit in estafa, in the commission of which a private
document was falsified is nothing more or less than the very damage caused by the falsification of such
document. The proper crime to be charged is estafa, if estafa can be committed without falsification, such
as when a private document is falsified to conceal the misappropriation of money in possession of the
offender, or when estafa was already consummated.
If estafa cannot be committed without falsification, then the crime is falsification such as when the private
document is falsified to obtain the money which was later misappropriated.

False Testimony
Q: Can a defendant who falsely testified in his own behalf in a criminal case be guilty of false testimony
favorable to the defendant?

A: Yes. It must not be forgotten that the right of an accused to testify in his own behalf is secured to him,
not that he may be enabled to introduce false testimony into the record, but to enable him to spread upon
the record the truth as to any matter within his knowledge which will tend to establish his knowledge.
Defendant is liable if he testifies in his favor by falsely imputing the crime to another person (U.S. v.
Soliman, G.R. No. L-11555, January 6, 1917).

NOTE: The ruling in Soliman would only apply if the defendant voluntarily goes upon the witness stand
and falsely imputes to some other person the commission of a grave offense. If he merely denies the
commission of the crime or his participation therein, he should not be prosecuted for false testimony
(Reyes, 2008).

Crimes related to Opium and other Prohibited Drugs (in Relation to R.A> 9165
Q: Petitioner was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu. In the buy-bust
operation, there is non-compliance by the police with the directive of Section 11, Article 11 of R.A. No.
9165. Will it invalidate the integrity of the seized items?

A: No. Non-compliance with those requirements under justifiable grounds shall not render void and
invalid the seizures as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved (People v. Asmad, G.R. No. 184808, November 14, 2011).

Q: If an accused was caught in possession of shabu and marijuana in one occasion, should he be charged
with, and convicted of, one offense only?

A: Yes. The law do not address a case wherein an individual is caught in possession of different kinds of
dangerous drugs. However, it is a well-known rule of legal hermeneutics that penal or criminal laws are
strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Thus, an accused may only be
convicted of a single offense of possession of dangerous drugs if he or she was caught in possession of
different kinds of dangerous drugs in a single occasion. If convicted, the higher penalty shall be imposed,
which is still lighter if the accused is convicted of two (2) offenses having two (2) separate penalties.
This interpretation is more in keeping with the intention of the legislators as well as more favorable to the
accused (David v. People, October 2011).

Q: If Juan was caught in possession of any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for
Dangerous Drugs, what is his offense?
A: Possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs is prima
facie evidence that the possessor has smoked, consumed, administered to himself, injected, ingested or
used a dangerous drug and shall be presumed to have violated Sec. 15 of this Act (Sec. 12).

Q: Chuck and Kenneth were walking along Sampaloc when they saw a group of policemen approaching
them. Chuck immediately handed to Kenneth, the sachet of shabu he was carrying inside his pocket. The
police saw Kenneth placing the shabu inside his bag. If Kenneth was unaware that what was inside the
sachet given to him was shabu, is he nonetheless liable under the Dangerous Drugs Act? (2002 Bar
Examination)

A: No, Kenneth will not be criminally liable because he is unaware of the content of the sachet handed to
him by Chuck, and therefore, the criminal intent to possess the drug in violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act is absent. There would be no basis to impute criminal liability to her in the absence of animus
possidendi

Q: Julian, 41 years old, was charged as a drug pusher under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002. During pre-trial, he offered to plead guilty to the lesser offense concerning use of dangerous drugs.
Is he allowed to plea to a lesser offense?

A: No, Julian is not allowed to plead to a lesser offense because plea bargaining is expressly prohibited
under the Comprehensive Dangerous Act of 2002 (R.A. 9165, Sec. 23).

Q: In the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, is the failure of the policemen to make a physical
inventory and to photograph the two plastic sachets containing shabu render the confiscated items
inadmissible in evidence?

A: No. In People v. Bralaan, it was ruled that noncompliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with
Sec. 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefore, and as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items, are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team. Its non-compliance will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated
from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused (Imson v. People, G.R. No. 193003, July 13, 2011).

NOTE: In cases of dangerous drugs, what is important and necessary is for the prosecution to prove with
moral certainty that the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against the accused be the same
item recovered from his possession (People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 191266, June 6, 2011).

Q: As a rule, non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165 is not fatal as
long as there is justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
confiscated/seized items, are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. When will this
provision not apply?

A: If there were not merely trifling lapses in the handling of the evidence taken from the accused but the
prosecution could not even establish what procedure was followed by the arresting team to ensure a
proper chain of custody for the confiscated prohibited drug (People v. Ulat y Aguinaldo, G.R. No.
180504, October 5, 2011).
Q: Pamela, a high school student, was caught using shabu inside the campus of the school she is
attending. Who shall have the authority to apprehend her?

A: All school heads, supervisors and teachers are deemed persons in authority and empowered to
apprehend, arrest or cause the apprehension or arrest of any person who shall violate any of the said
provisions of Article II of Dangerous Drugs Act, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
(Sec. 44, IRR R.A. 9165).

Anti Trafficking in Persons Act

Persons liable under this Act
1. Any person, natural or juridical, to commit or in any of the punishable acts of trafficking
2. Any person who promote or facilitate the acts of trafficking
3. Any person who buys or engages the services of trafficked persons for prostitution shall be penalized

Crimes committed by Public Officers

Q: Javier was charged with malversation of public funds. She was the private sector representative in the
National Book Development Board (NBDB), which was created by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8047,
otherwise known as the Book Publishing Industry Development Act. Is Javier, a private sector
representative to the board a public officer?

A: Yes. Notwithstanding that Javier came from the private sector to sit as a member of the NBDB, the
law invested her with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, so that the purpose of
the government is achieved. In this case, the government aimed to enhance the book publishing industry
as it has a significant role in the national development. Hence, the fact that she was appointed from the
public sector and not from the other branches or agencies of the government does not take her position
outside the meaning of a public office (Javier v. Sandiganbayan, GR 147026-27, September 11, 2009).

Direct Bribery
Q: Supposed a law enforcer extorts money from a person, employing intimidation and threatening to
arrest the latter if he will not come across with money, what crime is committed?

A: If the victim actually committed a crime and the policeman demanded money so he will not be
arrested, the crime is bribery. But if no crime has been committed and the policeman is falsely charging
him of having committed one, threatening to arrest him if he will not come across with some
consideration, the crime is robbery (Sandoval, 2010).

Malversation of Public Property and Funds

Q: When a public officer has no authority to receive the money for the Government, and upon receipt of
the same, he misappropriated it, can he be held liable for malversation?

A: No. If the public officer has no authority to receive the money for the Government, the crime
committed is estafa, not malversation (US v. Solis, 7 Phil 195), since he cannot be considered an
accountable officer in that situation.

Q: A revenue collection agent of BIR admitted his cash shortage on his collections to get even with the
BIR which failed to promote him. A special arrangement was made between the BIR and the agent
wherein the BIR would withhold the salary of the latter and apply the same to the shortage incurred until
full payment was made. Is the collection agent guilty of the crime of malversation of funds?
A: Yes. An accountable public officer may be convicted of malversation even if there is no direct
evidence of misappropriation and the only evidence is that there is a shortage in his accounts which he has
not been able to satisfactorily explain. In the present case, considering that the shortage was duly proven,
retaliation against the BIR for not promoting him does not constitute a satisfactory or reasonable
explanation of his failure to account for the missing amount (Cua v. People, G.R. No. 166847, November
16, 2011).

Q: When a municipal officer who, in good faith paid out public funds persons in accordance with the
resolution of the municipal council but the payments were turned out to be in violation of the law, is there
criminal liability?

A: None. When an accountable public officer, in good faith makes a wrong payment through honest
mistake as to the law or to the facts concerning his duties, he is not liable for malversation. He is only
civilly liable (People v. Elvina, 24 Phil 230).

Q: A private property was attached or levied by the sheriff, can it be a subject of the crime of
malversation?

A: Yes, though the property belonged to a private person, the levy or attachment of the property
impressed it with the character of being part of the public property it being in custodia legis.

Q: If falsification of documents was resorted to for the purpose of concealing malversation, is a complex
crime committed?

A: No, for complex crimes require that one crime is used to commit another. If the falsification is resorted
to for the purpose of hiding the malversation, the falsification and malversation are separate offenses
(People v. Sendaydiego).

Q: Does the accused need to commit misappropriation to be liable under this Article?

A: No. It is not essential that there be misappropriation. If there is misappropriation, he would also be
liable for malversation under Art. 217 (Reyes, 2008).

Q: X appropriated the salary differentials of secondary school teachers of the Sulu State College contrary
to the authorization issued by the DBM. Can X be held liable for technical malversation?

A: No. The third element is lacking. The authorization given by DBM is not an ordinance or law
contemplated in Art. 220 (Abdulla v. People, G.R. No. 150129, April 6, 2005).

Q: Suppose the application made proved to be more beneficial to the public than the original purpose for
which the amount or property is appropriated, is there technical malversation?

A: Yes, because damage is not an essential element of technical malversation.

Q: Suppose the funds had been appropriated for a particular public purpose, but the same was applied to
private purpose, what is the crime committed?

A: The crime committed is simple malversation only.

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
Q: Mayor Adalim was charged with murder. He was transferred from the provincial jail and detained him
at the residence of Ambil, Jr. Considering that Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 punishes the giving by a public
officer of unwarranted benefits to a private party, does the fact that a Mayor was the recipient of such
benefits take petitioners case beyond the ambit of said law?

A: No. In drafting the Anti-Graft Law, the lawmakers opted to use private party rather than private
person to describe the recipient of the unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference for a reason. A
private person simply pertains to one who is not a public officer while a private party is more
comprehensive in scope to mean either a private person or a public officer acting in a private capacity to
protect his personal interest. When Mayor Adalim was transferred from the provincial jail and detained
him at Ambil, Jr.s residence, they accorded such privilege to Adalim, not in his official capacity as a
mayor, but as a detainee charged with murder. Thus, for purposes of applying the provisions of Section
3(e), R.A. No. 3019, Adalim was a private party (Ambil Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 175457, July 6, 2011).

Q: In violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government; and giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, must both be present to convict the
accused of the said crime?

A: This Court has clarified that the use of the disjunctive word or connotes that either act of (a)
causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government; and (b) giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference, qualifies as a violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended. The use of the disjunctive or connotes that the two modes need not be present at the same
time. In other words, the presence of one would suffice for conviction (Alvarez v. People, G.R. No.
192591, June 29, 2011).

Q: Is the proof of quantum of damage necessary to prove the crime? A: The Court En Banc held in
Fonacier v. Sandiganbayan, 238 SCRA 655, that proof of the extent or quantum of damage is not
essential. It is sufficient that the injury suffered or benefits received can be perceived to be substantial
enough and not
merely negligible. Under the second mode of the crime defined in Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
therefore, damage is not required. In order to be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that the
accused has given unjustified favor or benefit to another, in the exercise of his official, administrative or
judicial functions (Alvarez v. People, G.R. No. 192591, June 29, 2011).