Spouses Yu vs. Pacleb (G.R. No. 172172, Feb.
24, 2009) During pendency of the case, respondent died, succeeded by
FACTS: Baltazar Pacleb and his late first wife Angelita Chan are
registered owners of an 18,000-square meter parcel of land in
Barrio Langcaan, Dasmarinas,Cavite, covered by TCT No. T-
118375
On Feb. 27, 1992, Spouses Baltazar Pacleb and Angelita Chan
sold the property to Rebecca del Rosario.
On May 7, 1992, the lot was thereafter sold to Ruperto Javier.
On Nov. 10, 1992, a Contract to Sell was entered into between
Javier and Spouses Yu wherein petitioner spouses agreed to
pay Javier P200,000 as partial payment and P400,000 to be
paid upon execution of the contract, and Javier undertook to
deliver possession of the Langcaan Property and to sign a deed
of absolute sale within 30 days from execution of contract. All
the aforementioned sales were not registered.
In 1993, spouses Yu filed a complaint with the RTC for specific
performance and damages against Javier, contending that
Javier represented to them that the Langcaan Property was
not tenanted, but after they already paid P200,000 as initial
payment and entered into the agreement of sale on Sept. 11,
1992, they discovered that it was tenanted by Ramon Pacleb,
son of Baltazar Pacleb. Subsequently, spouses Yu demanded
for the cancellation of the agreement and for the return of
their initial payment.
On March 10, 1995, spouses Yu, Ramon, and the latters wife
executed a Kusangloob na Pagsasauli ng Lupang Sakahan at
Pagpapahayag ng Pagtalikod sa Karapatan, where spouses Yu
paid Ramon P500,000 in exchange for the waiver of his
tenancy rights over the subject property. But on Oct. 12, 1995,
Baltazar Pacleb filed a complaint for annulment of the deed of
sale to Javier, alleging that the deed of sale executed between
him and his late first wife Angelita was spurious as their
signatures were forgeries.
Meanwhile, on Nov. 23, 1995, spouses Yu filed an action for
forcible entry against respondent with the MTC alleging that
they had prior physical possession of the Langcaan Property
through their trustee Ramon until the latter was ousted by
respondent in Sept. 1995.
MTC ruled in favor of spouses Yu, affirmed by the RTC, but set
aside by CA.
His first action for annulment of deed of sale having been
dismissed, respondent filed action for removal of cloud from
title on May 29, 1996, contending that the deed of sale
between him and his late first wife and Rebecca del Rosario
could not have been executed on Feb. 27, 1992, because on
said date, he was residing in the U.S. and his late first wife died
20 years ago.
his surviving spouse and representatives of children with his
first wife. RTC held that spouses Yu are purchasers in good
faith, but on appeal, CA reversed and set aside lower courts
decision and ordered for the cancellation of the annotation in
favor of spouses Yu on the TCT of Langcaan Property.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioner spouses are innocent
purchasers for value and in good faith.
2. WON the action for specific performance filed by the
petitioners against Javier is not merely an action in
personam, but an action in rem, and is thus,
conclusive and binding upon respondent even if he
was not a party thereto since it involves a question of
possession and ownership of real property.
HELD:
1. Petitioner spouses are not innocent purchasers for
value, and they are not in good faith.
Several facts should have put petitioner spouses on inquiry as
to the alleged rights of their vendor, Javier, over the Langcaan
property.
First, the property remains to be registered in the name of
respondent despite the 2 Deeds of Absolute Sale from
respondent to Del Rosario then from the latter to Javier, and
both deeds were not even annotated in the title of the subject
property.
Second, the 2 deeds of absolute sale were executed only 2
months apart containing identical provisions.
Third, the fact that the Langcaan Property is in the possession
of Ramon, son of the registered owners, this should have made
petitioner spouses suspicious as to the veracity of the alleged
title of their vendor, Javier. Petitioner spouses could have
easily verified the true status of the subject property from
Ramons wife, since the latter is their relative.
The law protects to a greater degree a purchaser who buys
from the registered owner himself. Corollary, it requires a
higher degree of prudence from one who buys from a person
who is not the registered owner, although the land object of
the transaction is registered. While one who buys from the
registered owner does not need to look behind the certificate
of title, one who buys from one who is not the registered
owner is expected to examine not only the certificate of title
but all factual circumstances necessary for him to determine if
there are any flaws in the title of the transferor, or in his
capacity to transfer the land. Therefore, petitioner spouses
cannot be considered as innocent purchasers in good faith,
and respondent has a better right over the Langcaan Property
as the true owner thereof.
 2. The action for specific performance and damages predecessor-in-interest within the period and in the concept
filed by petitioners against Javier to compel him to required by law.
perform his obligations under their Contract to Sell is
an action in personam. Ruling:

In the case at bar, when private respondent filed her

The purpose of the action is to compel Javier to accept the full
payment of the purchase price, and to execute a deed of
absolute sale over the property in favor of the petitioners. The
obligations of Javier mentioned attach to Javier alone and do
not burden the property. Thus, the complaint filed by the
petitioners is an action in personam and is binding only upon
the parties properly impleaded therein and duly heard or given
an opportunity to be heard. So, the action cannot bind the
respondent since he was not a party therein and considering
the fact that his signature and that of his late first wife were
forged in the deed of sale. Hence, the petition is denied and
the Court affirms the ruling of the CA finding the respondent
having a better right over the property as the true owner
thereof.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SOCORRO P. JACOB
Facts:
A parcel of lot was sold by Sotero Bondal to Macario
Monjardin, the uncle of the private respondent. Later, said lot
was sold to the parents of private respondent and when the
spouses died, Socorro was declared as sole heir of her parents,
thus the sole owner of the property.
In 1970, Pres. Marcos issued Proc. No.739 which declared a
parcel of land as a reserve for the development of geothermal
energy. The lot allegedly owned by Socorro was covered by the
proclamation.
Nevertheless, in 1994, private respondent filed an application
with the RTC Albay for the confirmation and registration of her
alleged title.
application with the RTC on May 6, 1994, Lot No. 4094 was no
longer alienable and disposable property of the public domain,
since as of August 14, 1970, by virtue of Proclamation No. 739,
it was segregated from the public domain and declared part of
the reservation for the development of geothermal energy.
Private respondent filed her application for confirmation 24
years after the said proclamation was issued; thus, the period
of her possession and occupancy after such proclamation can
no longer be tacked in favor of the claimant.
In this case, Socorro has no vested right over the land because
she failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that all
substantial requisites for acquisition of public lands (along with
the procedural) had been complied with.
Private respondent failed to adduce clear and convincing
evidence that by August 14, 1970, she had already acquired
ownership over the property by herself or through her
predecessors-in-interest through open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the property since
1945 or earlier.
While tax receipts and tax payments are good indicia, the PR
failed to offer in evidence the deed of sale purportedly
executed between Sotero and Macario.
Even so, the PR cannot even tack her own possession of the
property to that of her parents. In fact, she failed to adduce
evidence that her uncle had been in OCA possession of the
property. Also, the mere casual cultivation of portions of land
by her mother does not constitute sufficient basis for a claim
of ownership.

When cross-examined, PR admitted that she had no copy of Finally, the fact that after her parents purchase the lot, they
the deed of sale executed by Sotero Bondal in favour of began receiving the share of the produce of the property does
Macario Monjardin. not in itself constitute proof of such adverse possession.

The OSG opposed averring that the land belongs to the public There is thus no evidence that the parents of private
domain and not subject to provate appropriation. respondent ever had open, continuous, adverse and actual
possession of Lot No. 4094.
The TC ruled in favour of the PR.

The CA also ruled in her favour.

It declared that although PR failed to adduce in

evidence the deed of sale bet Sotero and Macario, her
testimony and other documentary evidence was enough to
prove EOC possession under a bona fide claim of ownership for
the requisite period of time before August 14, 1970.

Issue: Whether or not respondent has established by clear and

convincing evidence her possession and that of her
VDA. DE SARMIENTO v. LESACA
SUMMARY: Sarmiento bought a parcel of land from Lesaca.
However, no delivery of actual possession as made because of
one Martin Delosos claim of ownership over the land. The
Court held that the rescission of the contract of purchase and
sale was valid, for Lesaca failed to deliver on her reciprocal
obligation to deliver the land to the vendee.
DOCTRINE: The execution of a deed of sale in a public
document is equivalent to delivery of possession of lands,
provided that there was no impediment the would prevent the
passing of property from one party to another.
FACTS:
Sarmiento filed a complaint in the CFI of Zambales praying for
the rescission of the contract of sale executed with the
defendant Lesaca for failure of the latter to place the former
in the actual physical possession of the lands she bought.
Sarmiento bought the land for P5,000 and when she tried to
take actual physical possession, she was prevented by one
Martin Deloso who claimed to be the owner. Later, she went
after Lesaca and asked for another land of the same kind or the
return of the purchase price with interest, to which Lesaca
refused.
CFI: Declared that the sale was rescinded, ordered the return
of the purchase price, plus the expenses for the registration of
the deed of sale, plus interest.
CA: Certified the case to the SC because it involved questions
of law.
RULING: Petition granted.
Whether the execution of the deed of sale in a public
document is equivalent to delivery of possession of lands
YES.
According to Articles 1461 and 1462 of the Old Civil Code, the
vendor is bound to deliver to the vendee the thing sold by
placing the latter in the control and possession of the subject
matter in the contract.
However, if the sale were executed through a public
instrument, such would be equivalent to delivery unless the
contrary appears or is clearly to be inferred from such
instrument.
Whether there is any stipulation in the sale to infer that the
vender did not to intend deliver possession in spite of the
public document NONE.
The contract provided that the vendee should "take actual
possession thereof * * * with full rights to dispose, enjoy and
make use thereof in such manner and form as would be most
advantageous to herself," referring to actual and not
symbolical possession.
Whether the vendor complied with her express commitment
to deliver possession of the land sold - NO.
Sarmiento was never able to take possession of the land
because of the refusal and interference of Martin Deloso, who
claimed ownership.
Despite the law stating that the execution of a public
document was equivalent to delivery, such would only be
possible if there is no impediment that may prevent the
passing of the property to the vendee, which in this case, is
Martin Delosos claim to ownership.
Whether Sarmiento can rescind the contract of sale - YES.
The Court used Article 1124 of the Old civil Code, referring to
reciprocal obligations. The contract of purchase and sale is a
reciprocal obligation and failure to comply with the obligation
means that the one prejudiced can choose fulfillment or
rescission.
Lesaca failed to deliver the land and as per the law, Sarmiento
had the right to choose the rescission of the contract of sale.
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC of PH
FACTS:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an
application for land registration before the RTC of Cavite-
Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite,
consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that
he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and
that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of
the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that
the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare
property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino
had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe
fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his
four sons inherited the property and divided it among
themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife, Magdalena, had
become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the
Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban
and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in
administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which
originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this
property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during
trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the
Community Environment & Natural Resources Office,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-
DENR), which stated that the subject property was verified to
be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land
Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-
A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.
On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved the application for
registration.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the
property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he
had been in possession of the property in the manner and for
the length of time required by law for confirmation of
imperfect title. On 23 Feb 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed
the RTC ruling and dismissed the application of Malabanan.
ISSUES:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable
and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such
classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the
applicant for registration provided that it is established that
the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable and
disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible
to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil
Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character
either because of its use or because its slope is below that of
forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil
Code on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject
land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree or both?
HELD: The Petition is denied.
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or
through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and
registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality
of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession
since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should
have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of
possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial
confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared
alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by
Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is
recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial
property. However, public domain lands become only
patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are
alienable or disposable. There must also be an express
government manifestation that the property is already
patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil
Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial
can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of
the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the
government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial
property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to
secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which
patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and other
extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a
person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with
just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a
persons uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial
property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith
or just title, ripens into ownership.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is
insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired
ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to
establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-
interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June
1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their
possession, according to their own evidencethe Tax
Declarations they presented in particularis to the year 1948.
Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2)
as basis for registration. While the subject property was
declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no
competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use
service or for the development of the national evidence,
conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The
classification of the subject property as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain does not change its status
as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the
Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.
CRISTETA CHUA-BURCE, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES.
FACTS:
Ramon Rocamora, manager of Metrobank, requested
FructuosoPenaflor, Assistant Cashier, to conduct a physical
bundle count of cash inside the vault, which should total to P4
million. They found out that there was a shortage of P150,000.
After 4 investigations conducted by the bank and NBI, the
reports concluded that Cristeta Chua-Burce, Cash Custodian,
was primary responsible for the shortage. Unable to explain
the shortage, the services of the accused was terminated.
Chua-Burce, together with her husband Antonio Burce, were
charged with the crime of estafa. A civil case was also
instituted. The accused prayed for suspension of criminal case
due to a prejudicial question. It was first granted but denied by
the CA. The CRIMINAL and CIVIL cases continued.
The CRIMINAL CASE ruled that she was guilty of estafa. CIVIL
CASE also found her liable for the shortage of P150,000. She
appealed both rulings to the CA but the court affirmed the two
TC rulings.
ISSUE:
(1) W/N there was a valid trial
(2) W/N the elements of estafa were proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
RULING:
(1) Yes, there was a valid trial.
The accused allege that the public prosecutor did not
intervene with the case (violation of Sec 5 RULE 110 ) and did
not present evidence for the criminal case (no evidence for the
accused to be convicted).
But the fact showed that the public prosecutor actively
participated with the criminal case. And both parties, during
the pre-trial, agreed to adopt their respective evidences in the
CIVIL CASE to the CRIMINAL CASE. The agreement was reduced
into writing, inconformity with the Rules of Court. Being bound
by the pre-trial agreement, it is now too late in the day to
challenge its contents.
(2) No, the crime of estafa was not proven.
The elements of Estafa, ART. 315 (1) (b), are the following:
a) The personal property is received in trust, on commission,
for administration, or any other circumstances, with the duty
return.
b) There is a conversion/diversion of such property or denial
that he received it.
c) Such conversion/diversion is to the injury of another
d) There is demand for such property
The 1st element is absent. The 1st element gives the tranferee
both material and juridical possession of the personal
property. Juridical possession means the transferee has a right
over the thing which he may even set up against the owner.The
possession of the accused of the money had no juridical
possession. Being a cash custodian, her possession is akin to
that of a bank teller. And possession of a bank teller is
possession of the bank. she was a mere custodian.
*She should have been charged with qualified theft, but
double jeopardy is already in play.
*Difference between an agent and teller. TELLER payment to
the teller is a payment to the bank, he is a mere custodian.
AGENT he can assert his independent, autonomous right to
retain money, even against the owner.
MARIA CARLOS vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
On December 19, 2001, petitioner Maria Carlos,
represented by her daughter, Teresita Carlos Victoria, filed an
application for registration and confirmation of title over a
parcel of land. Petitioner alleged, that she is the owner of said
parcel of land which she openly, exclusively and notoriously
possessed and occupied since July 12, 1945 or earlier under a
bona fide claim of ownership; that there is no mortgage or
encumbrance affecting said property, nor is it part of any
military or naval reservation; that the property is being used
for industrial purposes; and that there are no tenants or
lessees on the property. Petitioner further claimed that she
has been in possession of the subject land in the concept of an
owner; that her possession has been peaceful, public,
uninterrupted and continuous since 1948 or earlier; and
tacking her possession with that of her predecessors-in-
interest, petitioner has been in possession of the land for more
than 50 years.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Director of Lands, filed an opposition to petitioners
application.
During the hearing, they presented documentary and
testimonial evidence to prove their allegations and to establish
that the land in question is disposable and alienable. It was
however admitted by the petitioner that the said land in
question was sold to Ususan Development Corporation in 1996
but failed to deliver the title. Hence, the petitioner made a
commitment to the corporation to deliver the certificate of
title so that they could collect the unpaid balance of the
purchase price.
The trial court granted the application. However, the
Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the trial
court noting that the applicant at the time she filed her
application for registration of title was no longer in possession
and occupation of the land in question and thus has no
registrable title over the said land.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was in possession of the
property at the time of the application for confirmation of title.
Held: The court ruled in negative.
Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the
following: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and
alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that
they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim
of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12,
1945.
Petitioner has met the first requirement but not the second
one. The applicant, Maria Carlos, no longer had possession of
the property at the time of the application for the issuance of
a certificate of title. The application was filed in court on
December 19, 2001. As admitted, the said land was sold to
Ususan Development Corporation in 1996. This clearly
contradicts petitioners claim that she was in possession of the
property at the time that she applied for confirmation of title.
Nonetheless, even if it were true that it was petitioner who had
actual possession of the land at that time, such possession was
no longer in the concept of an owner. Possession may be had
in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and
possession of a holder. A possessor in the concept of an owner
may be the owner himself or one who claims to be so. On the
other hand, one who possesses as a mere holder
acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to
be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong.
Petitioner herein acknowledges the sale of the property to
Ususan Development Corporation in 1996 and in fact promised
to deliver the certificate of title to the corporation upon its
obtention. Hence, it cannot be said that her possession since
1996 was under a bona fide claim of ownership. Under the
law, only he who possesses the property under a bona fide
claim of ownership is entitled to confirmation of title.
SPOUSES ROY PO LAM and JOSEFA ONG PO LAM, v. COURT
OF APPEALS and FELIX LIM now JOSE LEE.
Facts:
Spouses Roy Po Lam and Josefa Ong Po Lam, as transferees
pendente lite are not purchasers in good faith of lots, prime
commercial lots located in the heart of Legaspi City. The court
ordered them to reconvey said lots to private respondent Jose
Lee. These were sold by Lim Kok Chiong. Later, Felix Lim and
Lim Kok Chiongs brother filed a complaint with the then Court
of First Instance of Albay against his brother and LAHCO to
annul the deeds of sale covering said lots on the ground that
the sale included pro-indiviso portion of the lots which Felix
Lim had inherited from his foster parents. As to their motion
for reconsideration, it remained in status quo until upon the
retirement of Justice Purisima who once decided the case. The
matter of the motion for reconsideration was assigned by
raffle for study and the preparation of the appropriate action.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court in
April 1980.
Issue:
Whether Po Lam spouses are purchasers in bad faith.
Held:
It must be stressed that the sole basis for finding petitioners to
be purchasers in bad faith was the subsistence of the notice of
lis pendens. The meaning, nature, recording, and effects of a
notice of lis pendens are clearly stated in Section 14, Rule 13
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The doctrine of lis
pendens is founded upon reason of public policy and necessity,
the purpose of which is to keep the subject matter of the
litigation within the power of the court until the judgment or
decree shall have been entered; otherwise by successive
alienations pending the litigation, its judgment or decree shall
be rendered abortive and impossible of execution. The Motion
for Reconsideration of petitioners-spouses Roy Po Lam and
Josefa Ong Po Lam is GRANTED and declaring them to be
PURCHASERS IN GOOD FAITH.
Baltazar v. Caridad [G.R. No. L-23509. June 23, 1966.]
Facts: In the cadastral proceeding, the trial court rendered
decision, dated 23 January 1941, awarding Lot 8864 of the Laoag
(cadastre to the spouses Julio Baltazar and Constancia Valencia as
their conjugal partnership property. Said decision having become
final, the corresponding decree was issued on 12 July
1941, and pursuant thereto, said lot was registered in
the names of applicant spouses under OCT O-1445,
which was later transcribed, on 5 November 1959, in
the office of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Norte. In the
meanwhile, Julio Baltazar, the registered owner of Lot 8864, died.
On 6 December 1961, his surviving wife and children
filed a motion, in the cadastral case praying for writ of possession
against Silvina Caridadand her daughter, Eduarda Caridad, who
had been in possession of the southern portion of said Lot 8864
since1939, while the cadastral case involving said lot was pending
before the trial court, and before the decision was rendered and
the corresponding decree issued in 1941.
No writ having theretofore been issued in Baltazars
favor, the trial court issued an order, on 11 December 1961,
granting Baltazars motion, and overruled Caridads opposition
but directed the sheriff not to remove or destroy the permanent
improvements on the lot without an express command.
On 2 January 1962, the order having become final, the
sheriff enforced the writ and placed Baltazar in possession of the
southern portion of the lot.
On 23 January 1962, Baltazar presented a motion to
compel Eduarda and Silvina Caridad to remove their respective
houses which they built in 1958 and 1959, respectively, in the
southern portion of the disputed lot, and, in the event of their
failure to do so, to order the sheriff to demolish the same. On 20
March 1962, the trial court, after due hearing, granted Baltazars
motion, ordering the Caridads to remove their respective houses
from the southern portion of said lot 8864 within 30 days from
receipt of said order.
Not satisfied, the Caridads appealed (CA-GR 31289-R). The
appellate court, however, certified the appeal to the Supreme
Court for raising only questions of law. The Supreme Court
affirmed the appealed order; with costs against the Caridads.
1. Order compelling Caridads to remove their respective
houses from the disputed lot; Lack of opposition in
previous proceedings
The order granting Baltazars motion to compel the
Caridads to remove their respective houses from the disputed lot,
is valid and enforceable against the latter.
This may be concluded based on the circumstances that (1)
that the Caridads do not dispute that during the
pendency of the cadastral proceeding (to which judgment was re
ndered awarding said lot 8864, and consequent issuance of the
final decree of registration of the same, in favor of Julio Baltazar),
the late Andres Caridad, his surviving spouse Silvina Caridad, and
their children, one of whom is Eduarda Caridad, were in
possession of the southern portion of the disputed lot ; (2) that
Eduarda Caridad claims right and title thereto as a mere heir and
successor-in-interest of said Andres Caridad; and (3) that the
Caridads do not dispute the propriety and validity of the order of
the cadastral court, granting the writ of possession in favor
of Baltazar as well as its enforcement.
2. CFI has jurisdiction, sitting as a land registration court,
to issue writ of possession and order the demolition
3. Section 13, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
Section 13, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that the officer
must enforce an execution for the delivery or restitution of
property by placing the plaintiff in possession of such property,
and by levying as hereinafter provided upon so much of the
property of the judgment debtor as will satisfy the amount of
costs, damages, rents, and profits included in the execution.
However, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or
remove the improvements made by the defendant or his
agent on the property, except by special order of the court, which
order may only issue upon petition of the plaintiff after
due hearing and upon the defendants failure to remove the
improvements within a reasonable time to be fixed by the court.
4. Rule applies to land registration cases in a suppletory
character and not only to ordinary actions involving the
delivery or restitution of property
The provision of the Rules of Court applies not only to ordinary
actions involving the delivery or restitution of property, but also
to proceedings under the land registration law. The provisions of
the Rules of Court are applicable to land registration cases in a
suppletory character (Rule 132). Thus, if the writ of possession
issued in a land registration proceeding implies the delivery of
possession of the land to the successful litigant therein, a writ of
demolition must, likewise, issue, and especially considering that
the latter writ is but a complement of the former which without
said writ of demolition would be ineffective. To require a
successful litigant in a land registration case to institute another
action for the purpose of obtaining possession of the land
adjudged to him, or for the purpose of securing fruits of his
victory, would be a cumbersome process. It would foster
unnecessary and expensive litigations and result in multiplicity
of suits, which the judicial system abhors.
5. Power of a judge to issue all auxiliary writs to carry into
effect the jurisdiction conferred upon the court by law
Section 6, Rule 124, of the Rules of Court - In the present case, the
Judge has the power to issue all auxiliary writs, including the writ
of demolition, processes and other means necessary to carry into
effect the jurisdiction conferred upon it by law in land registration
cases to issue a writ of possession to the successful litigant.
6. Builders in bad faith; Rights of registered
owner cannot be defeated by an unsuccessful
opponent through the subterfuge of replacing his
old house with a new one
The Caridads cannot be regarded as builders in good faith because
they are bound by the 1941 decree of registration that obligated
their parents and predecessors-in-interest. Good faith must rest
on a colourable right in the builder, beyond a mere stubborn belief
in ones title despite judicial adjudication. The fact that in1959 the
Caridads demolished and replaced their old house with new and
bigger ones cannot enervate the rights of the registered owners.
Otherwise, the rights of the latter to enjoy full possession of their
registered property could be indefinitely defeated
by an unsuccessful opponent through the simple subterfuge of
replacing his old house with a new one from time to time.
Heirs of Roxas vs. CA, Maguesun Corporation
FACTS:
Maguesun Corporation filed an Application for Registration of
two parcels of unregistered land located in Tagaytay. In
support of its application for registration they presented a
Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 10, 1990, executed by
Zenaida Melliza as vendor who bought the property from
Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas two and a half months earlier,
as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated March 26, 1990 and an
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication dated March 24, 1990.
Notices of the initial hearing were sent by the Land
Registration Authority to Hilario Luna, Jose Gil and Leon Luna
while Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas was not notified
because she was not named as an adjoining owner, occupant
or adverse claimant. Publication was made in the Official
Gazette and the Record Newsweekly. After an Order of
general default was issued, the trial court proceeded to hear
the land registration case.
On October 4, 1990, LRA reported that the subject parcels of
land had previously been applied for registration at the CFI of
Cavite by Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon but no
decision has been made.
February 13, 1991 the RTC granted Maguesun Corporation's
application for registration. Consequently RTC issued the
Order for Issuance of the Decree on March 14, 1991, after it
ordered the application of Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de
Leon dismissed.
It was only when the caretaker of the property was being
asked to vacate the land that petitioner Trinidad de Leon Vda.
de Roxas learned of its sale and the registration of the lots in
Maguesun Corporation's name. Hence, she filed a petition for
review before the RTC to set aside the decree of registration
on the ground that Maguesun Corporation committed actual
fraud, alleging that her signature was forged in both the Deed
of Sale and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication; that Maguesun
Corporation intentionally omitted her name as an adverse
claimant, occupant or adjoining owner in the application for
registration submitted to the LRA, such that the latter could
not send her a Notice of Initial Hearing
RTC that Maguesun Corporation did not commit actual fraud
and dismissed the petition for review of decree of registration
April 15, 1992. CA affirmed the findings of RTC, ruling that
Roxas failed to and demonstrate that there was actual or
extrinsic fraud, not merely constructive or intrinsic fraud, a
prerequisite for purposes of annuling a judgment or
reviewing a decree of registration. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Was there actual fraud on the part of Maguesun
Corporation to warrant the reopening and the setting aside of
the registration decree?
HELD:
The Court here finds that respondent Maguesun Corporation
committed actual fraud in obtaining the decree of
registration sought to be reviewed by Roxas.
Actual Fraud; Defined.
Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or
positive fraud proceeds from an intentional deception
practiced by means of the misrepresentation or concealment
of a material fact. Constructive fraud is construed as a fraud
because of its detrimental effect upon public interests and
public or private confidence, even though the act is not done
or committed with an actual design to commit positive fraud
or injury upon other persons.
Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is
regarded as intrinsic where the fraudulent acts pertain to an
issue involved in the original action, or where the acts
constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated
therein, and is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party
from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the
court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to
the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured,
so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy.
Extrinsic fraud is also actual fraud, but collateral to the
transaction sued upon.
The distinctions are significant because only actual fraud or
extrinsic fraud has been accepted as grounds for a judgment
to be annulled or, as in this case, a decree of registration
reopened and reviewed. The "fraud" contemplated by the
law in this case (Section 32, P.D. No 1529) is actual and
extrinsic, which includes an intentional omission of fact
required by law.
Intentional Omission of Name
In the corporation's application for registration filed with the
RTC only the following names appeared: Hilario Luna, Jose
Gil, Leon Luna, Provincial Road. The court found that the
some words are typed in with a different typewriter, with the
first five letters of the word "provincial" typed over correction
fluid.
However, Maguesun Corporation, annexed a differently-
worded application for the petition to review the application
of the Roxas where in instead of PROVINCIAL ROAD, the
name ROXAS appeared.The discrepancy which is unexplained
appears intentional.
It is reasonable to assume that the reason is to mislead the
court into thinking that "Roxas" was placed in the original
application as an adjoining owner, encumbrancer, occupant
or claimant, the same application which formed the basis for
the LRA in sending out notices of initial hearing. Section 15 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 also requires the applicant for
registration to state the full names and addresses of all
occupants of the land and those of adjoining owners, if
known and if not known, the extent of the search made to
find them. Maguesun Corporation failed to comply with this
requirement.
Possession in OCENO
The truth is that the Roxas family had been in possession of
the property uninterruptedly through their caretaker, Jose
Ramirez. Maguesun Corporation also that the subject land
was unoccupied when in truth and in fact, the Roxas family
caretaker resided in the subject property. Maguesun
Corporation is likewise charged with the knowledge of such
possession and occupancy, for its President, who signed the
Deed of Sale over the property, knew fully well that her
grandaunt Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas owned the
property. It is reasonable to expect her as a buyer to have
inspected the property prior to the sale such that the
ascertainment of the current possessors or occupants could
have been made facilely.
Maguesun Corporation intentional concealment and
representation of Roxas interest in the subject lots as
possessor, occupant and claimant constitutes actual fraud
justifying the reopening and review of the decree of
registration.
Concealment of the Existence of Trinidad Roxas
Mention of the late President's name as well as that of
Trinidad was made principally in the Formal Offer of Exhibits
for Maguesun Corporations tax declarations and as
predecessor-in-interest. However, this is not sufficient
compliance with what the law requires to be stated in the
application for registration. Disclosure of petitioner's adverse
interest, occupation and possession should be made at the
appropriate time, i.e., at the time of the application for
registration, otherwise, the persons concerned will not be
sent notices of the initial hearing and will, therefore, miss the
opportunity to present their opposition or claims.
Publication of Notice of Initial Hearing
While publication of the notice in the Official Gazette is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court, publication in
a newspaper of general circulation remains an indispensable
procedural requirement. Couched in mandatory terms, it is a
component of procedural due process and aimed at giving "as
wide publicity as possible" so that all persons having an
adverse interest in the land subject of the registration
proceedings may be notified thereof. Although jurisdiction of
the court is not affected, the fact that publication was not
made in a newspaper of general circulation is material and
relevant in assessing the applicant's right or title to the land.
Forgery and Discrepancies
A close scrutiny of the evidence on record leads the Court to
the irresistible conclusion that forgery was indeed attendant
in the case at bar. Although there is no proof of respondent
Maguesun Corporation's direct participation in the execution
and preparation of the forged instruments, there are
sufficient indicia which proves that Maguesun Corporation is
not the "innocent purchaser for value" who merits the
protection of the law.
The questioned signatures taken from the Deed of Sale and
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication are starkly different from the
sample signatures in several documents executed by
Trinidad. The questioned signatures are smooth and rounded
and have none of the jagged and shaky character of
petitioner's signatures characteristic of the penmanship of
elderly persons.
The fact that petitioner was not the sole heir was known to
the general public, as well as the demise of the late President
on April 15, 1946 while delivering a speech at Clark Field,
Pampanga. The aforementioned irregularities are too glaring
to have been ignored. If Tinidad did in fact execute said
Affidavit, there is no reason why she should state facts other
than the unadulterated truth concerning herself and her
family.
Maneclang v. Baun
Facts:
On June 12, 1947, Margarita Suri Santos died intestate, leaving
several parcels of land containing 7,401 square meters more
or less. She was survived by her husband Severo Maneclang
and 9 children. On July 30, 1947, a petition for the settlement
of her estate was filed by Hector S. Maneclang, one of her
legitimate children, with the Court of First Instance at Dagupan
City, Pangasinan. At the time of the filing of the petition, 7 of
her 9 children were below the age of 18 but no guardian ad
litem was appointed by the court for the minor children.
On 2 September 1949, Pedro M. Feliciano, the
administrator of the intestate estate filed a petition asking the
court to give him the authority to dispose of so much of the
estate that is necessary to meet the debts enumerated in the
petition. While notice thereof was given to the surviving
spouse, Severo Maneclang, through his counsel, Atty. Teofilo
Guadiz, no such notice was sent to the heirs of Margarita.
On September 9, 1949, despite the absence of notice
to the heirs, the intestate court issued an Order granted
Felicianos petition. Following the order Oscar Maneclang, the
new administrator executed a deed of sale in favor of the City
of Dagupan, represented by its mayor, a portion consisting of
4,415 square meters of the lot. This sale was approved by the
intestate court on 15 March 1954.
The City of Dagupan immediately took possession of
the land and constructed thereon a public market It has been
in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the property
since the construction of the market. Some other parcels of
land belonging to the intestate estate were sold by the
administrator pursuant of the same authority previously
granted.
On 28 September 1965, the new judicial
administratrix of the intestate estate, Adelaida S. Maneclang,
daughter of the late Margarita filed with the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan an action for the annulment of the
sales made by the previous administrator pursuant to the
order cancellation of titles, recovery of possession and
damages against the vendees Juan T. Baun and Amparo Baun,
etc and the City of Dagupan.
Issue/s:
1. W/N the sale to the City of Dagupan is null and void
ab initio
2. W/N the plaintiff is in estoppel in assailing the legality
of the sale
3. W/N the defendant City of Dagupan is a purchaser in
good faith and for value
4. W/N the amount to be paid by the City is right
Ruling:
The authority to sell, the sale itself and the order
approving it would be null and void ab initio.
The Civil Code provides that the father or mother, as such, the
administrator of the child's property but it does not follow that
for purposes of complying with the requirement of notice
under Rule 89 of the Rules of the Court, notice to the father is
notice to the children.
It is explicitly provided that notice must be in be
writing, must be given to the heirs, devisees, and legatees
and that the court shall fix a time and place for hearing such
petition and cause notice to be given to the interested
parties.
In this case, however, only the surviving spouse, Severo
Maneclang, was notified through his counsel. The remaining
seven (7) children were still minors with no guardian ad litem
having been appointed to represent them. Obviously then,
the requirement of notice was not satisfied. The requisite set
forth in the aforesaid sections of Rule 89 are mandatory and
essential. Without them, the authority to sell, the sale itself
and the order approving it would be null and void ab initio.
Estoppel is unavailable as an argument against the
administratrix of the estate and against the children.
The court reiterated the ruling in Boaga vs. Soler, "that a
decedent's representative is not estopped to question the
validity of his own void deed purporting to convey land; and if
this be true of the administrator as to his own acts, a fortiori,
his successor can not be estopped to question the acts of his
predecessor are not conformable to law."
The children who were already of legal age at the time
of sale were already barred by laches
It took (12) years, 10 months and 24 days from the sale
before an action for annulment was filed. Four of the children
were already of legal age when deed of sale was executed.
Their inaction and delay constituted laches. This conclusion
will not apply to the minor children at the time of the sale.
Neither delay nor negligence could be attributed to them as a
basis for laches. Accordingly, the estate is entitled to recover
5/9 of the questioned property.
The City of Dagupan is a buyer in good faith.
While the order granting the motion for authority to sell was
actually issued on September 9, 1949, the same was secured
during the incumbency of the then judicial administrator
Pedro Feliciano. Even if it is to be assumed that Mayor
Fernandez and Councilor Guadiz induced Oscar Maneclang to
sell the property, the fact remains that there was already the
order authorizing the sale. Having been issued by a Judge
who was lawfully appointed to his position, he was
disputably presumed to have acted in the lawful exercise of
jurisdiction and that his official duty was regularly
performed.
It was not incumbent upon them to go beyond the
order to find out if indeed there was a valid motion for
authority to sell. Otherwise, no order of any court can be relied
upon by the parties.
Under Article 526 of the Civil Code, a possessor in
good faith is one who is not aware that there exists in his title
or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it;
furthermore, mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of
law may be the basis of good faith. It implies freedom from
knowledge and circumstances which ought to put a person on
inquiry.
We find no circumstance in this case to have alerted
the vendee, the City of Dagupan, to a possible flaw or defect
in the authority of the judicial administrator to sell the
property. Since good faith is always presumed, and upon him
who alleges bad faith on the part of the possessor rests the
burden of proof, it was incumbent upon the administrator to
established such proof, which We find to be wanting.
However, Article 528 of the Civil Code provides that:
"Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character
except in the case and from the moment facts exist which
show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the
thing improperly or wrongfully." The filing of a case alleging
bad faith on the part of a vendee gives cause for cessation of
good faith.
Upon the filing of the Answer, the City of Dagupan
already became a possessor in bad faith. The Supreme Court
took into consideration the fact that the property had no
access to the national road prior to the sale to the City, and
that it was the citys improvements that caused the
appreciation of the value of the property.
Pursuant to Article 546 of the Civil Code, Dagupan
may retain possession of the property until it shall have been
fully reimbursed the value of the building in the amount of
P100,000.00 and 5/9 of the purchase price amounting to
P6,493.05
Villafuerte vs CA thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be
reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or
Facts: threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his
Spouses Reynaldo C. Villafuerte and Perlita Tan- property.
Villafuerte operated a gasoline station known as Peewees The doctrine finds no application when occupation was
Petron Powerhouse Service Station and General effected through lawful means such as in this case where
Merchandise on the premises of three (3) adjoining lots at the petitioners possession of the lots owned by private
corner of Gomez Street and Quezon Avenue in Lucena City. respondents was effected through lease agreements
One of these lots, is owned by several persons namely,
Edilberto de Mesa, Gonzalo Daleon and his brother Federico A. 2. No.
Daleon and Mrs. Anicia Yap-Tan, mother of appellee Perlita
Tan-Villafuerte. Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired through
force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who
Appellants Edilberto de Mesa and Gonzalo Daleon objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a
acquired their respective lots subject to the lease by Petrophil right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke
Corporation which had built thereon the gasoline station being the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to
managed by the Villafuerte couple. When the lease of deliver the thing.
Petrophil Corporation expired on December 31, 1988, the
Villafuertes obtained a new lease on the lot of Edilberto de Having disregarded the plain requirement of the law,
Mesa for a period expiring on December 31, 1989. private respondents were held accountable to petitioners for
the various damages prayed for by petitioners in their
As regards the lot of Daleon brothers, the Villafuertes amended complaint.
were not as lucky. For, instead of obtaining a lease renewal,
what they received were demand letters from the brothers
counsel ordering them to vacate the premises. Instead of
complying therewith, the Villafuertes simply ignored the
demand and continued operating the gas station.
Gonzalo Daleon filed a complaint against the
Villafuertes in the Office of the Barangay Captain of
Barangay Tres, Lucena City. No settlement was reached.
Villafuertes, upon expiration of lease contract with
Edilberto de Mesa, the same was not renewed. The spouses
continued to operate their gasoline station and other
businesses on the lot of de Mesa despite the latters demand
to vacate.
Edilberto de Mesa and Gonzalo Daleon, with the aid
of several persons and without the knowledge of the
Villafuertes, caused the closure of the latters gasoline station
by constructing fences around it. Villafuertes countered with a
complaint for damages with preliminary mandatory injunction
against both Edilberto de Mesa and Gonzalo Daleon. The
complaint seeks vindication for the alleged malicious and
unlawful fencing of the plaintiffs business premises.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the respondents can invoke the
doctrine of self-help contained in Article 429 of the
Civil Code.
2. Whether or not it was improper for private
respondents to resort to fencing their properties in
order to remove petitioners from the premises.
Ruling:
1. No. Private respondents could not invoke the
doctrine of self-help contained in Article 429 of the
Civil Code.
Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right
to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal
 LLOBRERA v. FERNANDEZ G.R. No. 142882| 02 MAY 2006 deposit made by the petitioners intended as consignation has
no legal effect insofar as the respondent is concerned.
FACTS:

Respondent Fernandez, one of the registered co-owners of a

land (which is the subject of this controversy), served a written
demand letter upon petitioner spouses Llobrera to vacate the
premises. The latter refused, necessitating respondents
formal complaint against them.

Since the parties failed to reach any settlement, respondent

then filed a verified Complaint for ejectment and damages
against petitioners with MTCC.

Petitioners alleged that they had been paying monthly rental

of P20.00, but by June 1996 such were refused by the lessors
representatives. Thus, they consigned the same to a bank
where they continued to maintain and update their monthly
rentals.

MTCC rendered judgment in respondents favor. On appeal,

the RTC affirmed the lower courts judgment. Such judgment
was also affirmed with the CA.

ISSUE: Whether a payment refused by the creditor

extinguishes the obligation.

HELD: NO. Petition denied.

The Court upheld the judgment favoring the ejectment of

petitioners since it is consistent with law and jurisprudence.
The alleged consignation of the P20.00 monthly rental to a
bank account in the respondents name cannot save the day
for the petitioners simply because of the absence of any
contractual basis for their claim to rightful possession of the
subject property.

Consignation based on Article 1256 of the Civil Code

indispensably requires a creditor-debtor relationship between
the parties, in the absence of which, the legal effects thereof
cannot be availed of. Article 1256 pertinently provides: [i]f the
creditor to whom tender of payment has been made refuses
without just cause to accept it, the debtor shall be released
from responsibility by the consignation of the thing or sum
due. Unless there is an unjust refusal by a creditor to accept
payment from a debtor, Article 1256 cannot apply.

In the case at bar, the possession of the property by the

petitioners being by mere tolerance as they failed to establish
through competent evidence the existence of any contractual
relations between them and the respondent, the latter has no
obligation to receive any payment from them. Since
respondent is not a creditor to petitioners as far as the
alleged P20.00 monthly rental payment is concerned,
respondent cannot be compelled to receive such payment
even through consignation under Article 1256. The bank