EMINENT DOMAIN

4. ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V. SECRETARY OF DAR

(175 SCRA 343) July 14, 1989

Facts:
These are consolidated cases involving common legal questions including serious challenges to the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 also known as the "Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988"
In Manaay and Hermano vs Juico (G.R. No. 79777), the petitioners are questioning the P.D No. 27 and E.O Nos. 228 and 229 on the grounds inter alia of separation of
powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
In Acuna et al vs Arroyo et al (G.R. No. 79310), the petitioners in this case claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by
the Constitution belongs to the Congress and not to the President, the also allege that Proclamation No. 131 and E.O No. 229 should be annulled for violation of the constitutional
provisions on just compensation, due process and equal protection. They contended that the taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation which such payment
is not contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O No. 229.
In Pabico vs Juico et al (G.R. No. 79744), the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President and that the said executive orders violate
the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation which was denied to the petitioners.
In the main case, the Association of Small Land Owners et al vs the Secretary of Agrarian Reform however, the petitioners claim that they cannot eject their tenants and
so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules of the decree. They therefore ask the
Honorable Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to issue the said rules.Issue:
Whether or not the laws being challenged is a valid exercise of Police power or Power of Eminent Domain.Ruling:
Police Power through the Power of Eminent Domain, though there are traditional distinction between the police power and the power of eminent domain, property
condemned under police power is noxious or intended for noxious purpose, the compensation for the taking of such property is not subject to compensation, unlike the taking of
the property in Eminent Domain or the power of expropriation which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner of the property expropriated.

5. PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC

Facts:
Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to provide free Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political
parties and candidates. The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to enable them to make known their qualifications, their
stand on public Issue and their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election information.
Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution
No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government against the taking of private property for public
use without just compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police
power) of the Comelec over the information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.
Issue:
Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.
Held:
The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media companies to donate Comelec space amounts to taking of private
personal property without payment of the just compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has not been established by
respondent Comelec, considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the constitution,
but not without payment of just compensation. Also, Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at bench, there is no
showing of existence of a national emergency to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.
6. FORFOM DEVELOPMENT CORP vs. PHIL. NATIONAL RAILWAYS

FACTS: Forfom is the registered owner of several parcels of land in San Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna under Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-34384, T-34386 and 34387,
all of the Registry of Deeds of Laguna. Said parcels of land were originally registered in the name of Felix Limcaoco, predecessor-in-interest of Forfom, under Original
Certificates of Title (OCT) Nos. (0-326) 0-384 and (0-328) 0-386.In a cabinet meeting held on 1 November 1972, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos approved the Presidential
Commuter Service Project, more commonly known as the Carmona Project of the President. Per Resolution No.751 dated 2 November 1972 of the PNR Board of Directors, its
General Manager was authorized to implement the project. The San Pedro-Carmona Commuter Line Project was implemented with the installation of railroad facilities and
appurtenances. During the construction of said commuter line, several properties owned by private individuals/corporations were traversed as right-of-way. Among the properties
through which the commuter line passed was a 100,128square-meter portion owned by Forfom covered by TCT Nos. T-34384, T-34386 and T-34387.On 24 August 1990, Forfom
filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Binan, Laguna a complaint2 for Recovery of Possession of Real Property and/or Damages. It alleged that PNR, with the aid of
military men, and without its consent and against its will, occupied 100,128 square meters of its property located in San Pedro, Laguna and installed thereon railroad and railway
facilities and appurtenances. It further alleged that PNR rented out portions of the property to squatters along the railroad tracks. Despite repeated verbal and written demands for
the return of the property or for the payment of its price, PNR failed to comply. It prayed that PNR be ordered to vacate the property and to cause the eviction of all shanties and
squatters that PNR had taken in as lessees, and that it be restored to the peaceful occupation and enjoyment thereof. The trial court found that the properties of Forfom were taken
by PNR without due process of law and without just compensation. Although the power of eminent domain was not exercised in accordance with law, and PNR occupied
petitioner's properties without previous condemnation proceedings and payment of just compensation, the RTC ruled that, by its acquiescence, Forfom was estopped from
recovering the properties subject of this case. As to its right to compensation and damages, it said that the same could not be denied. The trial court declared that P10.00 per square
meter was the fair and equitable market value of the real properties at the time of the taking thereof.

ISSUES:

1) Can petitioner Forfom recover possession of its property because respondent PNR failed to file any expropriation case and to pay just compensation?

2) Is the time when just compensation should be fixed at the time of the taking or, as Forfom maintains, at the time when the price is actually paid?

HELD:

1) In the case at bar, the expropriator (PNR) entered the property of Forfom, a private land. The entrance into Forfom's property was permanent, not for a fleeting or brief period.
PNR has been in control, possession and enjoyment of the subject land since December 1972 or January 1973. PNR's entry into the property of Forfom was with the approval of
then President Marcos and with the authorization of the PNR's Board of Directors. The property of Forfom measuring around eleven hectares was devoted to public use - railroad
tracks, facilities and appurtenances for use of the Carmona Commuter Service. With the entrance of PNR into the property, Forfom was deprived of material and beneficial use and
enjoyment of the property. It is clear from the foregoing that there was a taking of property within the constitutional sense. It can be gathered from the records that Forfom accepted
the fact of the taking of its land when it negotiated with PNR for just compensation, knowing fully well that there was no expropriation case filed at all. Forfom's inaction for
almost eighteen (18) years to question the absence of expropriation proceedings and its discussions with PNR as to how much petitioner shall be paid for its land preclude it from
questioning the PNR's power to expropriate or the public purpose for which the power was exercised. In other words, it has waived its right and is estopped from assailing the
takeover of its land on the ground that there was no case for expropriation that was commenced by PNR.

2) Where actual taking was made without the benefit of expropriation proceedings, and the owner sought recovery of the possession of the property prior to the filing of
expropriation proceedings, the Court has invariably ruled that it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling for purposes of compensation.51 In the case at
bar, the just compensation should be reckoned from the time of taking which is January 1973. The determination thereof shall be made in the expropriation case to be filed without
delay by the PNR after the appointment of commissioners as required by the rules.

7. Republic vs. Spouses Cancio

Facts:
On Jan. 15, 1979, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1811 which reserved certain parcels of land of the public domain in Lapulapu city in favor of Philippine Economic
Zone Authority (then Export Processing Zone Authority), a GOCC, for the establishment of Mactan Exprt Processing Zone. However, some of the parcels of land covered by the
proclamation, including that of Spouses Agustin and Imelda Cancio, were private land.
Petitioner offered to purchase respondents lot at P1,100/sq. m. (P52,294,000 for the whole property). The letter containing the offer further instructed respondents "to consider and
accept, otherwise we will initiate expropriation proceedings in the proper court."
Respondents, instead of accepting the offer, filed an unlawful detainer case against Maitland in the MTC of Lapu Lapu City.
Petitioner commenced expropriation proceedings for respondents property with the RTC of Lapu Lapu City, Branch 54 on August 27, 2001.
Respondents, however, filed a motion to require petitioner to comply with RA 8974, specifically Section 4(a) thereof, which requires that, upon the filing of the complaint for
expropriation, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property an amount equivalent to 100% of the current zonal valuation thereof for purposes of the
issuance of a writ of possession.
Petitioner moved for its reconsideration. It argued that RA 8974 was inapplicable as the payment required under the law applied only to instances where the property was still in
the owners possession and had yet to be transferred to the government. It could not be validly invoked when the property was already in the governments possession, as in this
case.
Petitioners cite AO No. 5 as the legal authority when it offered to purchase respondents property in an amount equivalent to 10% higher that the zonal value thereof and prayed in
its complaint for expropriation that it be issued a writ of possession upon a showing that the amount equivalent to 10% of the offered amount has been duly deposited while
Respondents are firm that RA 8974 Is the controlling law in this case as expropriation was instituted when said law was already in effect.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 8974 is applicable to this case for purposes of the issuance of the writ of possession.
Ruling:
Yes. RA 8974 applies to instances when the national government expropriates property for national government infrastructure projects.
The inapplicability of R 8974 is highlighted by the fact that it requires a deposit based on the current zonal valuation of the property. To apply such valuation to this case would be
to violate the cardinal principle in eminent domain proceedings that the just compensation for the property should be its fair market value at the time of taking. The nature and
character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion to determine just compensation to the landowner.
There was a confusion regarding the nature of the amount to be paid for the instance of a writ of possession. It was previously clarified that the payment of the provisional value as
a condition for the issuance of a writ of possession is different from the payment of just compensation for the expropriated property. While the provisional value is based on the
current relevant zonal valuation (or the preliminary or provisional determination of the value of the property), just compensation is based on the prevailing fair market value of the
property (or the final determination of the fair market value of the property).
There is therefore no need yet to determine with reasonable certainty the final amount of just compensation in resolving the issue of a writ of possession.

8. LBP vs Raymunda Martinez

Facts:
After compulsory acquisition by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), on November 16, 1993, of respondent Martinez's 62.5369-hectare land in Barangay Agpudlos,
San Andres, Romblon, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL), petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) offered
P1,955,485.60 as just compensation. Convinced that the proffered amount was unjust and confiscatory, respondent rejected it. Thus, the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB), through its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) conducted summary administrative proceedings for the preliminary determination of
just compensation in accordance with Section 16 (d) of the CARL.
On September 4, 2002, PARAD Virgilio M. Sorita, finding some marked inconsistencies in the figures and factors made as bases by LBP in its computation, rendered judgment
ordering the Land Bank of the Philippines to pay landowner-protestant RAYMUNDA MARTINEZ for her property covered and embraced by TCT No. T-712 with an area
of62.5369 hectares, more or less, which the Department of Agrarian Reform intends to acquire, the total amount of TWELVE MILLION ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY NINE
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED NINETY TWO and 50/100 Pesos (Php12,179,492.50), in the manner provided for by law.
A petition for the fixing of just compensation docketed as Agrarian Case No. 696 was then filed by LBP's counsel before the Special Agrarian Court (SAC), the Regional Trial
Court of Odiongan, Romblon, Branch 82. After filing her answer to the said petition, respondent, contending that the orders, rulings and decisions of the DARAB become final
after the lapse of 15 days from their receipt, moved for the dismissal of the petition for being filed out of time. Petitioner opposed the motion.
LBP primarily contended that the Office of the PARAD gravely abused its discretion when it issued the writ of execution despite the pendency with the SAC of a petition for the
fixing of just compensation.
Issue:
Whether or not the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) gravely abused his discretion when he issued a writ of execution despite the pendency of LBP's
petition for fixing of just compensation with the Special Agrarian Court (SAC).

Ruling:
The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) gravely abused his discretion in issuing the writ of execution to implement his decision; that respondent's defense
of res judicata or the alleged finality of the PARAD's decision was never pleaded in her answer, hence, was already deemed waived; that the PARAD had no jurisdiction to issue
the writ of execution due to the pending petition for determination of just compensation with the SAC;and that the Court's August 14, 2007 Decision in this case is contrary to its
October 11, 2007 Decision in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Suntay, G.R. No. 157903 on the issue of whether the petition for determination of just compensation was filed out of
time.
We ruled in this case that the PARAD's decision had already attained finality because of LBP's failure to file the petition for the fixing of just compensation within the 15-day
period.
 9. Hon. Vicente Eusebio v. Jovito M. Luis et. al.
Facts: Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 53591 and 53589 with an area of 1,586 square meters. Said parcel
of land was taken by the City of Pasig sometime in 1980 and used as a municipal road now known as A. Sandoval Avenue, Barangay Palatiw, Pasig City.
On February 1, 1993, the Sanggunian of Pasig City passed Resolution No. 15 authorizing payments to respondents for said parcel of land. However, the Appraisal Committee of
the City of Pasig, in Resolution No. 93-13 dated October 19, 1993, assessed the value of the land only at P150.00 per square meter. In a letter dated June 26, 1995, respondents
requested the Appraisal Committee to consider P2,000.00 per square meter as the value of their land.
Mayor Eusebio wrote a letter dated September 9, 1996 informing respondents that the City of Pasig cannot pay them more than the amount set by the Appraisal Committee.
Respondents prayed that the property be returned to them with payment of reasonable rental for sixteen years of use from date of filing of the complaint until full payment, or in
the event that said property can no longer be returned, that petitioners be ordered to pay just compensation and rental for sixteen years of use both with legal interest of 12% per
annum from the date of filing of the complaint until full payment. In addition, respondents prayed for payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs.

Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. petitioners must be disabused of their belief that respondents action for recovery of their
property, which had been taken for public use, or to claim just compensation therefor is already barred by prescription.
Issue: whether respondents are entitled to regain possession of their property taken by the city government in the 1980s and, in the event that said property can no longer be
returned, how should just compensation to respondents be determined.
Held: the Court cannot uphold the ruling that said petitioners are jointly liable in their personal capacity with the City of Pasig for payments to be made to respondents. There is a
dearth of evidence which would show that said petitioners were already city government officials in 1980 or that they had any involvement whatsoever in the illegal taking of
respondents property.Thus, any liability to respondents is the sole responsibility of the City of Pasig.
The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 28, 2003 is MODIFIED

10. NATIONAL POWER CORP vs HEIRS OF MACABANGKIT SANGKAY

FACTS:
Pursuant to its legal mandate under Republic Act No. 6395 (An Act Revising the Charter of the National Power Corporation), NPC undertook the Agus River
Hydroelectric Power Plant Project in the 1970s to generate electricity for Mindanao. The project included the construction of several underground tunnels to be used in diverting
the water flow from the Agus River to the hydroelectric plants. On November 21, 1997, the respondents as the owners of the land with an area of 221,573 square meters situated in
Ditucalan, Iligan City, sued NPC in the RTC for the recovery of damages and of the property, with the alternative prayer for the payment of just compensation. They alleged that
they had belatedly discovered in 1995 that one of the underground tunnels of NPC traversed their land.NPC countered that the Heirs of Macabangkit had no right to compensation
under section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 6395 and their cause of action, should they be entitled to compensation, already prescribed in five years due to the tunnel having been
constructed in 1979. The RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. The NPC appealed to the CA on August 25, 1999. On October 5, 2004, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not NPC is liable for the payment of just compensation
Ruling:

Yes, NPC is liable for the payment of just compensation since the construction of the tunnel constituted taking of the land. Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only
occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land. This is so because in this case, the nature of the easement
practically deprives the owners of its normal beneficial use. The taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or
appropriation. Indeed, the expropriators action may be short of acquisition of title, physical possession, or occupancy but may still amount to a taking. Compensable taking
includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner,
lessening or destroying its value. It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use of his property nor material whether the property is removed from the
possession of the owner, or in any respect changes hands.

The topographic survey map, the sketch map and the ocular inspection readily point the extent and presence of the tunnel construction traversing the entire and the whole
length of the plaintiffs-appellees property. Moreover, the Five-year prescriptive period under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 does not apply to claims for just compensation.
Such prescriptive period is applicable only to an action for damages, and does not extend to an action to recover just compensation like this case Consequently, NPC cannot
thereby bar the right of the Heirs of Macabangkit to recover just compensation for their land.
11. ANUNCIACION VDA. DE OUANA ET. AL. vs REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), the predecessor of the Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA), pursued a program to expand the Lahug
Airport in Cebu City. Thus, it offered to buy lots located in Banilad Estate from its private owners with the guarantee that the owners will have the preferred right of
repurchase/reconveyance if such project was not successfully realized or was abandoned. Some of the private land owners, the petitioners in G.R. 168812, were prompted by the
assurance given by NAC and after finding the amount to be paid to them as reasonable, the former executed deeds of sale with the right to repurchase. However, some owners,
particularly the petitioners in G.R. 168770, found the compensation offered by NAC as unjust. Thus, the government instituted expropriation proceedings, exercising its power of
eminent domain, in order to acquire the lands in question for the expansion project of the Lahug Airport. NAC successfully acquire the land. However, the expansion did not
happen. Thus, the private land owners instituted proceedings to recover their private lands that were taken for the expansion project. Under Civil Case Ceb-187370, Inocian et al
VS Republic of the Philippines (G.R. No. 168812), the RTC rules in favor of petitioners and the Court of Appeals sustained the decision. The Rationale: The government acquired
the lands through conditional sale; the condition being that once the expansion project is unsuccessful or ceased to exist/operate, the Inocian and his children has the right to
recover the lands. Meanwhile, the petition instituted by Ouana and his heirs in Civil Case No. R-1881 (G.R. 168770) was not granted by the RTC nor the Court of Appeals. The
Rationale is that the lands were not taken through a contract of sale but was taken through expropriation proceedings that did not guarantee right of recovery. The said land is
partially occupied by illegal settlers and is being negotiated to be sold to a land developer. The MCIAA petitioned for review under certiorari under G.R. 168770 the decision of the
lower courts. Ouana and his heirs instituted a petition for review under certiorari for the reversal of the decision of the lower courts.

ISSUE: Whether or not the private land owners under the two consolidated cases have the right to recover their land which was taken by the Government under its power of
Eminent Domain for the Expansion Project of the Lahug Airport?

RULING:

Yes, the private owners have the right to recover said lands. The twin elements of just compensation and public purpose are, by themselves, the direct limitation on the
power of Eminent Domain. If the genuine public necessity of the expropriation ceases, then there is no more cogent point for the retention of said land by the government. A
condemner must should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation; failing, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If
not, it behooves the condemner to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter so desires. The government cannot plausibly keep the expropriated land in any manner it
so desires because its dishonors the judgement of expropriation and is not keeping with the idea of fair play. To renounce ownership over ones land for the common good is
already hard in itself; But it is even worse when the power of Eminent Domain is used to benefit a select few.

Thus, the Supreme Court sustained the ruling of the lower courts for Civil Case Ceb-187370 (G.R. 168812) and reversed the Decisions of the lower courts for Civil Case
R-1881 (G.R. 167880). It ruled that it is in line with equity and justice that the lands be reconveyed to the private owners. However, the just compensation received by the private
owners from the government must be returned as well in keeping with the idea of justice and fair play.

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**Eminent Domain