Climate Change: An African Agenda

Africa Progress Panel Expert Meeting
CLIMATE CHANGE:
AN AFRICAN
AGENDA
OCTOBER 2014
CLIMATE CHANGE AN AFRICAN AGENDA FOR GREEN, LOW-CARBON DEVELOPMENT
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CONTENTS
AGENDA 4
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS 6
PARTICIPANT BIOGRAPHIES 7
Panel members 7
Consultation group 8
CONCEPT NOTE 20
CONTRIBUTIONS 26
Innovative financing for containing the threats of climate change in Africa: Why the catalyst must
come from within Jean-Claude Bastos de Morais and Kevin Urama 27
Transformative adaptation in Africas Agriculture Natasha Grist 32
Brief for the 2015 Africa Progress Report Anthony Nyong and Uzoamaka Nwamarah 36
Short note for the Africa Progress Panel Vijay Modi and Jonathan Meierre 40
An African agenda for green, low-carbon development Linah Mohohlo 43
Leapfrogging African agriculture to higher productivity, less greenhouse gas emission and less
climate sensitive production systems, an African based climate smart agricultural
revolution Rudy Rabbinge 45
Climate change and Sub-Saharan Africa Abebe Selassie 47
The role of agriculture in an African agenda for low-carbon development Tesfai Tecle 52
Africa: Challenges and Progress Lars Thunell 56
Energy and Africas transition to a low carbon economy Kevin Urama 60
Africa and Climate Change Ngaire Woods and Arunabha Ghosh 69
NOTES SUBMITTED BY APP ADVISORS 71
Towards a low-carbon development: What does it mean for Africas structural
transformation? Africa Climate Policy Centre (UNECA) 72
Building resilience to climate change in Africa African Risk Capacity (AU) 78
Global climate action: Opportunity for transformational development in Africa? Kwame Pianim 82
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AGENDA
9:30 10:00 BREAKFAST
10:00 10:15 INTRODUCTIONS
10:15 11:35 SESSION I: AFRICAN POSSIBILITIES IN AND AROUND A GLOBAL CLIMATE DEAL
Global Deal: How can political momentum be increased towards a favourable global
climate deal for the COP 21, Paris, December 2015? What would a fair and workable
agreement look like?
African opportunities: How can African countries make progress outside the global
negotiations framework? What would a positive narrative for Africa on climate
change look like?
Priority areas: What are the specific areas in which African action can make a
difference? Climate finance? Technologies for adaptation and mitigation? Energy?
Discussants 5 minutes each

Open exchange
11:30 12:45 SESSION II: PATHS TO POWER: MAXIMISING AFRICAS MODERN ENERGY OPTIONS
Plugging the gap: What is the scale of Africas energy deficit? How can the major
opportunities for regional energy be fast-tracked to help plug the gap?
Energy Mix: Does the imperative of African growth require fossil fuels as the primary
energy source, or is there room for low-carbon energy? Is it possible to envisage an
energy mix that guarantees African growth, efficiency and equity?
Renewables: Does renewable energy offer a viable way of leapfrogging? What are
the pros and cons? What incentives exist for African countries to adopt green energy
policies?

Open exchange
12.45 13.45 LUNCH
13:45 15:00 SESSION III: A BOLDER AGENDA FOR TRANSFORMATIVE AGRICULTURE
Smart transformation: Is climate smart agriculture a viable option as part of a wider
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13:30 14:30
Session 3: Mobilising the right type of investment on the right terms including foreign direct investment
Africa continues to be perceived as a high-risk investment destination, creating a risk premium that effectively
strategy for economic transformation? To what extent can it boost growth and
drives up the cost of capital and insurance, while also shortening the investment horizon. At the same time,
employment and reduce poverty and inequality?
more and more investors investing in Africa are African. What are the incentives to support both external and
Sharing the benefit: What are the examples of successful multiple benefit approaches
domestic investors? How can internal financial systems capture financial flows more effectively? What are the
that allow smallholder farmers to increase yields in a sustainable manner? What
success stories? What are the appropriate policies and regulatory measures to improve investments?
actions are required to scale up these approaches?
Sustaining water: How can Africa use its groundwater resources fairly and sustainably?
Open exchange
What major policy changes are required?
14:30 15:30
Session 4: Thinking about taxation
Open exchange
All countries need to develop a tax base and better manage revenues. It is vital that high growth economies
across Africa mobilise taxation in order to broaden and deepen their revenue base. What are the lessons on
effective 15:00
approaches to taxation?
16:15 SESSIONHowIV:should the challenge
FINANCING beINCENTIVES,
- ISSUES, approached? INNOVATIONS
Open exchange Financing challenges: Why has Africa had such limited success in accessing
international financing mechanisms under the UNFCCC? What is Africa receiving and
15:30 15:45 what does it need? What should the ideal international climate finance architecture
BREAK look like if it is to work for Africa?
Multiple options: Should Africa expect the Green Climate Fund to deliver on promised
15:45 16:45 finance? Does the new BRICS Bank present a significant opportunity? Do emerging
Session 5: Reflecting on the future of aid
regional initiatives such as the ClimDev-Africa Special Fund and the African Risk
Development assistance retainsCapacity
a crucialAgency
role inpresent
Africa opportunities?
and predictions of the demise of aid may prove
premature. What is the role for the future of aid as a source
Accessing private capital: How of finance for human
can Africa development
create goals? Should
a more enabling environment
aid be more focused on capacity building and strengthening institutions? How should we
for private sector investment, for example, by tapping into regional seek to utilise aid
infrastructure
as a lever for private sector finance to invest
facilities? in key sectors such as agriculture and fisheries? What is the role of
aid to support local partners to develop small and medium sized companies?
Discussants 5 minutesDiscussants
each 5 minutes each
Open exchange Open exchange
16:45 17:30
Lessons,16:15
conclusions,
16:30 andBREAK
follow-up
17:30 19:00
16:30 17:30
RECEPTION SESSION V: CONCLUSION AND FOLLOW-UP SUPPORTING EFFORTS TO CHANGE
THE NARRATIVE AND INFLUENCE POLICY
Strategic messaging: How can this years Africa Progress Report (APR) carve out a
distinctive agenda?
What is the potential role of the APR 2015? What partnerships are required?

Open exchange
17:30 19:00 RECEPTION
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LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
AFRICA PROGRESS PANEL MEMBERS

1. Kofi Annan, Chair
2. Michel Camdessus
3. Linah Mohohlo
CONSULTATION GROUP
4. Akinwumi A. Adesina, Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, Federal Republic of
Nigeria
5. Jean-Claude Bastos de Morais, Founder & Chairman, Quantum Global Group & Founder,
African Innovation Foundation
6. Natasha Grist, Research Fellow, Agricultural Development and Policy, Overseas
Development Institute
7. Saviour Kasukuwere, Minister of Environment, Water & Climate, Zimbabwe
8. Simon Mizrahi, Director, Quality Assurance and Results Department, African
Development Bank
9. Vijay Modi, Professor, Columbia University
10. Michael Mller, Acting Director-General, UN Office Geneva
11. Nader Mousavizadeh, Partner and Co-founder, Macro Advisory Partners
12. Rudy Rabbinge, Professor Emeritus, Sustainable Development and Food Security,
Wageningen University and Research Centre
13. Abebe Selassie, Deputy Director, IMF Africa Department
14. Patrick Smith, Editor, Africa Confidential
15. Tesfai Tecle, Senior Advisor, Kofi Annan Foundation
16. Lars Thunell, Senior Advisor, Blackstone Group and Chairman of African Risk Capacity
Insurance Company Limited
17. Mamadou Toure, Managing Director, GE Africa and Founder and Chairman of Africa 2.0
18. Kevin Urama, Managing Director / Head of Research, Quantum Global Research Lab AG
19. Kevin Watkins, Executive Director, Overseas Development Institute
20. Ngaire Woods, Dean, Blavatnik School of Government and Professor of Global Economic
Governance, Oxford University
21. Kandeh Yumkella, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief Executive
Officer, Sustainable Energy for All Initiative
SECRETARIAT
Caroline Kende-Robb, Executive Director
Alinka Brutsch, Associate Communications Officer
Peter da Costa, Senior Adviser
Edward Harris, Head of Communications
Max Bankole Jarrett, Deputy Director
Alero Okorodudu, Executive Assistant
Tayo Omotola, Programme Officer
Damien Som, Research Fellow
Stephen Yeboah, Research Fellow
Andrew Johnston, Consultant, Editor
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PARTICIPANT BIOGRAPHIES
PANEL MEMBERS
Kofi A. Annan
Chair, Africa Progress Panel
Kofi Annan is the Chair of the African Progress Panel, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate and was the
7th Secretary-General of the United Nations. With the Africa progress Panel, Mr Annan advocates
at the highest level for equitable and sustainable development in Africa.
Kofi Annan also chairs the Kofi Annan Foundation with which he campaigns for a fairer, more
secure world by advancing peace and security, sustainable development, and human rights.
Michel Camdessus
Panel member
Michel Camdessus, an economist and French national, was managing director of the International
Monetary Fund from 1987 to 2000.The Funds longest-serving leader to date, he managed it
during a period of immense global change, including the enormous acceleration of globalisation
and challenges ranging from the break-up of the Soviet Union to financial crises in Latin America
and East Asia.
Upon taking office at the Fund, Mr Camdessus faced debt crises in more than a dozen countries
and deepening poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa. From the start, he believed that widespread
poverty threatened global financial stability and should be a leading concern for the IMF. He
also brought renewed focus at the IMF on debt reduction, low-interest loans, poor governance
and military spending.
Mr Camdessus joined Frances Ministry of Finance in 1960. He served as governor of the Bank of
France from 1984 until his appointment as managing director of the IMF. He had been a member
of the UN Secretary-Generals Advisory Board on Water and Sanitation from 2004 to 2013.
Linah Mohohlo
Panel member
Linah Mohohlo is the Governor of the Bank of Botswana. She has also worked for the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and, in her capacity as Governor of the IMF for Botswana, she has been a
member of the International Monetary and Financial Committee, representing the IMF Africa Group
1 Constituency which comprises 23 English speaking sub-Saharan African countries. She served in
the Commission for Africa, and is currently a member of the Africa Progress Panel, Bretton Woods
Committee and UN Staff Pension Fund Investment Committee. She is a recipient of a number of
national and international awards, among which are Central Bank Governor of the Year awards and
Botswanas highest public service award for efficient and devoted service (The Presidential Order
of Honour).
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CONSULTATION GROUP
Akinwumi A. Adesina
Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, Federal Republic of Nigeria
Dr. Akinwumi Ayodeji Adesina is Nigerias Honorable Minister of Agriculture. He is a development
economist and agricultural development expert with 25 years of international experience. He
holds a Masters (1985) and Ph.D. in agricultural economics (1988) from Purdue University, USA,
where he won the outstanding thesis award for that year. He graduated with a Bachelors degree
in agricultural economics (First Class Honors) from the University of Ife, Nigeria in 1981.
Prior to his appointment as the Minister of Agriculture, he was the Vice President (policy and
partnerships) of the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) where he led several bold
policy and innovative finance initiatives that leveraged over USD 3 billion in bank finance
commitments towards agriculture. Working with Presidents, leaders of the banking industry,
and central bank governors across several African countries, Dr. Adesina successfully led one
of the largest global efforts to leverage domestic bank finance for the agricultural sector. A
consummate and highly effective builder of strategic partnerships, Dr. Adesina has worked
effectively across several sectors of the economy to lift millions of people out of poverty.
A bold reformer, he turned the agriculture sector of Nigeria around within two years of his
appointment as Minister. Under his tenure, Nigeria ended 40 years of corruption in the fertilizer
sector by developing and implementing an innovative electronic wallet system, which directly
provides farmers with subsidized farm inputs using their mobile phones. Within two years, this
electronic wallet system reached 8 million farmers and improved the food security of 40 million
people. A firm believer in private sector led growth; he turned the perception of agriculture in
Nigeria from that of subsistence to a viable business undertaking, which successfully attracted
$ 4 billion in private sector investment commitments. Under him, Nigerias food production also
expanded by 15 million metric tonnes within two years, representing over 70% of the four year
national target. He launched Staple Crop Processing Zones to develop financing, investment
and infrastructure systems to establish private sector led food manufacturing industries in rural
areas as a means to spur broad based economic growth, value addition, import substitution,
and to reduce rural-urban migration. The World Bank, the Africa Development Bank, and other
development finance institutions have backed his innovative reforms with USD 2 billion in
financing.
Before joining AGRA in 2008, he served as Associate Director and Regional Director for the
Southern Africa Office at the Rockefeller Foundation, for over a decade. At the Rockefeller
Foundation he initiated programs to develop markets for African farmers, philanthropy for
African business leaders, and improved access to education. He also served on the Technical
Board of the Forum for African Women Educationalists.
Dr. Adesina was Principal Economist for the West Africa Rice Development Association (1990-
1995), Senior Economist and Social Science Coordinator for the International Institute for Tropical
Agriculture (1995-1998) and Assistant Principal Economist of the International Crops Research
Institute for the Semiarid Tropics (1988-1990). A prolific writer, Dr. Adesina has written over 70
scholarly publications on policy, agricultural development, and African development issues. He
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is a globally respected economist and has served as the President of the African Association of
Agricultural Economists, as well as on the Editorial Board of several academic journals, including
the International Journal of Agricultural Economists. He was awarded the Outstanding Black
Agricultural Economist award by the American Association of Agricultural Economists. He was a
Distinguished Africanist Scholar at Cornell University, USA.
In 2007, Dr. Adesina was awarded the prestigious YARA Prize in Oslo, Norway, for his leadership
in pioneering innovative approaches to improve access to agricultural inputs for African
farmers. He received the Distinguished Alumni Award from Purdue University, USA in 2008,
the Distinguished Alumni Award in 2009 and the Grand Commander of Great Ife in 2013, both
from the Obafemi Awolowo University. He was awarded the Borlaug CAST Award in 2010 by the
Council for Agricultural Science and Technology, USA, for his global leadership on agricultural
science and technology. Dr. Adesina was awarded an Honorary Doctor of Humane Letters by
Franklin and Marshall College, USA, for his innovative reforms and global leadership in improving
the lives and livelihoods of the poor.
In 2010, Dr. Adesina was appointed by the United Nations Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, as
one of 17 world leaders to galvanize international support for the United Nations Millennium
Development Goals. Dr. Adesina also serves on the Global Panel on Agriculture and Food Systems
for Nutrition, recently launched at the G8 Food and Nutrition Summit 2013 in London. In 2012,
he was conferred with Nigerias second highest National Honor, the Commander of the Order of
Niger, for his outstanding service to his country.
In 2013, Dr. Adesina won the Forbes Africa Person of the Year award for his bold reforms in
Nigerias agriculture sector, which have empowered more than eight million farmers across
Nigeria to embrace agriculture as a business. He is the first public sector Minister in Africa to win
the award. The influential Leadership Newspaper selected him as the 2013 Public Servant of the
Year, for his bold policy reforms, transparency, and public accountability.
Dr. Adesina has worked and lived extensively in several African countries, including Mali, Niger,
Cte dIvoire, Cameroon, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Tanzania,
Uganda, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Ghana, to name a few. While in Cte dIvoire
he supervised 10 Doctoral theses in agricultural and development economics at the University
of Abidjan, Centre Ivoirien de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (CIRES). He is bilingual and
speaks both English and French.
Dr. Adesina is a Governor and Board member of the International Fund for Agricultural
Development (IFAD) and is widely consulted by global development institutions, including
the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the International Finance Corporation, the
World Economic Forum and the Africa Union. He is celebrated as Africas leading development
entrepreneur based on his ability to develop and successfully execute bold initiatives that
transform the lives of millions of people. His passion is to unlock wealth for African economies,
end poverty, hunger and malnutrition and lift millions of Africas poor, especially women and
youth, into Africas emerging middle class.
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Jean-Claude Bastos de Morais

Founder & Chairman, Quantum Global Group & Founder, African Innovation Foundation
Jean Claude Bastos de Morais is an internationally active entrepreneur, venture capitalist and
philanthropist with a deep interest in African socio-economic development. He has founded
and led numerous businesses over the course of his career.
In 2003, Mr. Bastos de Morais founded the Quantum Global Group, an international group of
companies focused on African progress, particularly in the fields of corporate finance advisory,
asset and private wealth management, real estate and investment consulting.
As the Groups Chairman of the Advisory Board, he provides instrumental expertise on financial
markets, especially across Africa and other emerging markets. More recently in 2014, Mr. Bastos
de Morais has financed the establishment of the Quantum Global Research Lab, established to
provide bottom up econometric models for inclusive development in Africa.
Recognizing the need to develop and professionalize the monetary system in countries such
as Angola, Mr Bastos de Morais in 2008 founded Banco Kwanza Invest, Angolas first investment
bank. Serving as a Member of Board, he advises on the banks strategic direction.
As a Swiss-Angolan, he is also passionate about fuelling innovative breakthroughs that unlock

African potential. In 2010 he founded the African Innovation Foundation (AIF). The Foundation
is focused on driving African-led development through fostering innovation. It hosts the annual
Innovation Prize for Africa (IPA) as well as launched the African Law Library initiative.
Mr Bastos de Morais has written extensively on African growth and development and has
recently also co-edited a book on innovation ethics.
He began his career as management consultant and holds a Master of Arts in Management of
the University of Fribourg in Switzerland.
Peter da Costa
Senior Adviser, Africa Progress Panel
Peter da Costa is a development policy and strategic communication specialist who has worked
extensively in Africa as well as on global issues and initiatives for more than two decades. A
trained journalist, he reported from West Africa during the early 1990s for a range of print,
broadcast and multimedia outlets. In 1994 he became Regional Director for Africa of Inter Press
Service, a global media and development communication agency, and moved to Zimbabwe.
In 1997 he was appointed Senior Communication Adviser to the UN Under-Secretary General and
Executive Secretary, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, headquartered in Ethiopia.
In 2003 he left the UN to pursue doctoral studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies,
University of London, and was subsequently awarded a Ph.D. in Development Studies. His areas
of expertise include Translating Research into Policy; Strategic Communication; Monitoring and
Evaluation; and Organizational Development. He consults extensively with multilateral and
bilateral development agencies, philanthropic foundations and civil society organizations. He
originates from The Gambia and Ghana, and is currently based in Nairobi, Kenya.
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Natasha Grist
Research Fellow, Agricultural Development and Policy, Overseas Development Institute
Dr Natasha Grist is a Research Fellow in Climate Change and Agriculture at the Overseas
Development Institute based in the UK. Her current focus is advising on climate change,
variability and related disaster risk in agricultural programming to enhance food security, reduce
poverty, and as a catalyst for economic growth in Africa. Natashas African experience primarily
centres on West Africa, and also includes Mozambique and Tanzania. She has written a number
of publications, research articles and book chapters on these issues.
Natasha was previously Head of Research for the Climate and Development Knowledge Network
(CDKN), developing strategy and commissioning research of a 15m 5 year applied research
programme. She remains in technical advisory capacity in the agriculture cluster. Natasha
has worked in advisory, planning and evaluation capacity on climate change and agriculture
programmes for UN institutions (UNDP, FAO, IFAD), and many NGOs working on food security,
nutrition, poverty reduction and agriculture. Prior to joining ODI, she was at the UKs Tyndall
Centre for Climate Change, and has lectured up to MSc level on social research and climate
change. Her academic background includes a PhD in forestry and livelihoods in Brazilian
Amazonia.
Max Bankole Jarrett

Deputy Director, Africa Progress Panel
Max Bankole Jarrett is the Deputy Director of the Africa Progress Panel. He has over twenty-
three years of professional experience in the field of political and socio-economic affairs as an
international broadcaster, writer and analyst in the media sector; and, as an Executive Office
aide, speech writer and team leader in the United Nations system. His most recent duties as a
UN officer included serving as an Adviser to the Executive Director of the Coalition for Dialogue
on Africa (CoDA), a policy-oriented think tank that brings together a range of stakeholders to
promote dialogue, and, provides a platform for African voices to be heard.
Between 1990 and 2001 Max worked with the BBC World Service in London, editing, producing
and presenting Network Africa and Focus on Africa, the BBCs award winning daily current
affairs radio programmes for its African audience. During that period, he also wrote country
analyses and reports for the Economist Intelligence Unit.
Max is currently a member of the Governing Council of Africa 2.0, a Pan-African Civil Society
network of young and emerging leaders from Africa and the Diaspora. He also serves on the
Advisory Board of the Washington DC-based Center for Sustainable Development in Africa.
Max received his B.Sc (Hons) in Economics in 1990 from the London School of Economics and
Political Science and his M.A in African Studies (Specialism: The Political Economy of Tropical
Africa) in 1996, from London Universitys School of Oriental and African Studies. He was born not
very far from the Atlantic Ocean in Monrovia, Liberia.
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Saviour Kasukuwere
Minister of Environment, Water & Climate, Zimbabwe
Honourable Saviour Kasukuwere (MP) was born in Mt Darwin, Mashonaland Central Province in
Zimbabwe on the 23rd of October 1970. He graduated from the University of Zimbabwe and holds a
BSc Honours Degree in Political Science and a Masters Degree in International Relations.
He joined the Public Service in 1988 and served for 8 years before retiring in 1995. After retiring
from the Public Service, he ventured into business and formed a holdings company in the transport
sector called Migdale Transport, which acquired two companies namely Commercial Transport and
Johnstone Motor Corporation.
Following successful business ventures in the transport sector, he diversified into energy and financial
services sectors where he established vibrant business enterprises. All his companies have regional
presence in the SADC region.
Honourable Saviour Kasukuwere was elected into Parliament at a youthful age of 30 in the year
2000 and has been re-elected on four occasions. In 2005 he was appointed Deputy Minister of
Youth Development and Employment Creation. Having successfully served as the Deputy Minister,
Honourable Saviour Kasukuwere was later appointed Minister of Youth Development, Indigenisation
and Empowerment in February 2009 and strongly agitated for the empowerment of indigenous
citizens.
In 2013, Honourable Saviour Kasukuwere was appointed the Minister of Environment, Water and
Climate.
Aside from all this, Honourable Saviour Kasukuwere is a devoted husband to his wife Barbara and
the couple has three children. When he is not occupied with work, he enjoys playing golf and likes
reading political books.
Caroline Kende-Robb
Executive Director, Africa Progress Panel
Caroline Kende-Robb is the Executive Director of the Africa Progress Panel. Prior to joining the
Africa Progress Panel, Caroline worked at the World Bank and the IMF for 16 years as a senior
manager and technical expert in the regions of Africa, Europe and Central Asia, and East Asia
and the Pacific. At the World Bank, she led teams to implement World Bank loans and grants
and conduct policy research on a range of global issues including macroeconomic policies and
poverty outcomes, conflict and fragility, climate change, social justice, and financial crises. At
the IMF, Caroline was the first Poverty and Social Development Advisor recruited by the Fund
to manage the introduction of a poverty and social perspective into their macroeconomic
programs and policy dialogue.
Caroline began her career in management for five years in the private sector. She then worked
for the EU and The Gambian Government as a Business and Community Development Advisor
based in a small fishing village. Based in The Gambia, Caroline was the West Africa Field Director
for a small CSO and then the Poverty Alleviation Focal Point for the UNDP.
Caroline is a Board Director for Mara Online and part of the World Economic Forums Global
Agenda Council on Justice. She is also an Advisor for CAMFED, a CSO focused on the education
of girls in Africa, and an Ambassador for Protect African Lions. Caroline is the author of many
publications including, Can the Poor Influence Policy? a book co-published by the World Bank
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and the IMF. She holds a BA (Hons) in Geography and MSc in Social Policy from the London
School of Economics.
Simon Mizrahi
Director, Quality Assurance and Results Department, African Development Bank
Simon Mizrahi is the Director for the Department of Quality Assurance and Results at the African
Development Bank (AfDB). His job is to ensure that the Banks operations achieve the greatest
development impact. Under his stewardship, the US Treasury awarded AfDB three Development
Impact Awardsthe highest number of awards given to a multilateral development bank. Prior to
joining AfDB, Simon worked at the OECD where he was in charge of building international consensus
around the aid effectiveness agenda. In this capacity, he authored the Paris Declaration on Aid
Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action that were adopted by more than 110 countries and
organisations around the world. Simon also worked for Mdecins du Monde and was in charge of the
organisations emergency relief campaign in Rwanda in 1994. He holds an M.Phil. from the University
of Cambridge (UK) and lInstitut dEtudes Politiques de Paris.
Vijay Modi
Professor, Columbia University
Vijay Modi is a Professor and past-Chair of Mechanical Engineering in the School of Engineering and
Applied Science and a faculty member at the Earth Institute, Columbia University. Between October
2011 and 2012, he was a member of the U.N. Secretary Generals high-level task force on Sustainable
Energy for All and he currently leads the U.N. Sustainable Development Solutions Network working
group on Energy Access for All.
He received his Ph.D. from Cornell University in 1984 and worked as a post-doc at MIT from 1984
to 1986 before joining the faculty at Columbia University. Prof. Modis areas of expertise are energy
resources and energy conversion technologies. His laboratory, the Sustainable Engineering Lab (SEL),
has been responsible for technologies such as SharedSolar and widely used tools such as Network
Planner and a free open-source app called FormHub, used over a million times.
While his early work was on computational fluid dynamics and micro-electro-mechanical systems,
his recent work has been on energy infrastructure design & planning; solar energy; energy efficiency
in agriculture, and data analytics spanning from urban settings to remote rural settings.
He is currently working closely with city and national agencies/utilities to understand how energy
services can be more accessible, more efficient and cleaner. His recent project on minigrids is
providing a unique understanding of consumer behavior, demand for energy, and business models
for deploying energy solutions and energy efficiency.
Michael Mller
Acting Director-General, UN Office Geneva
Michael Moller (Denmark) is currently the Acting Director-General of the United Nations Office
at Geneva, the Acting Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and the Personal
Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General to the Conference. Prior to assuming these
duties in November 2013, he was the Executive Director of the Kofi Annan Foundation (2008-11). He
was the United Nations Secretary-Generals Special Representative for Cyprus from 2006 till 2008 and
Director for Political, Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs in the Office of the Secretary-General
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from 2001 till 2006, serving concurrently as Deputy Chief of Staff for the last 2 years of that period.
Between 1997 and 2001 he was the Head of the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Political
Affairs at UN headquarters in New York. He served in different capacities in New York, Iran, Mexico,
Haiti and Geneva where he started his career in 1979 with the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees.
Nader Mousavizadeh
Partner and Co-founder, Macro Advisory Partners
Nader Mousavizadeh is partner and co-founder of Macro Advisory Partners. From 2010-
2013, he was Chief Executive of Oxford Analytica, the global analysis and advisory firm. He was
previously an investment banker at Goldman Sachs from 2004-2009, where he worked in the
Financial Institutions M&A group in New York, and was latterly based in Europe with a number
of global client relationships.
Before entering the private sector, he served at the United Nations, as a political officer in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in the office of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan from 1997-
2003. A magna cum laude graduate of Harvard College and a Rhodes Scholar at the University
of Oxford where he received his M.Phil. in International Relations from Christ Church College,
Mr. Mousavizadeh received his MBA as a Sloan Fellow at the Sloan School of Management at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Elected a Global Leader for Tomorrow by the World Economic Forum, he is a globally recognized
speaker on geopolitical and macroeconomic issues, and a widely published contributor of
articles and essays to The Financial Times, The New York Times, The Times of London, and Foreign
Policy, amongst other publications. He is a foreign affairs columnist for Reuters. He is the co-
author, with Kofi Annan, of Interventions: A Life in War in Peace, and the Editor of the Black Book
of Bosnia.
Prof. Dr. Ir. Roelof (Rudy) Rabbinge

Professor Emeritus, Sustainable Development and Food Security, Wageningen University and
Research Centre
Dr. Rudy Rabbinge is University Professor Emeritus in Sustainable Development and Food
Security at Wageningen University in the Netherlands. He is a former member of the Senate of
the Netherlands Parliament and former chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Royal Institute
of the Tropics. Rabbinge has led various missions and agricultural programs in developing
countries and served as editor of several journals. He was a chair of the board of trustees of
two CGIAR centers and co-chair of the Inter-Academy Panel on Food Security and Agricultural
Productivity in Africa. He is also a member of the board of the Alliance for a Green Revolution in
Africa (AGRA) and chairman of the Council for Earth and Life Sciences of the Royal Netherlands
Academy of Sciences. He formerly served as deputy chairman of the IFDC board and chairman of
the Science Council of the CGIAR.
Rabbinge also serves on the boards of various international agribusiness firms and has
responsibilities in the Board of Trustees of many scientific, agribusiness and public national
and international organizations. He holds degrees in phytopathology, entomology, theoretical
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production ecology and philosophy of science from Wageningen Agricultural University. He was
also a member of the High Level Panel of Experts of the CFS of the United Nations and as such
in 2011 he advised the UN about price volatility and about land use and global investments in
agriculture and horticulture. At present he functions a Special Envoy for Food Security in the
Ministry of Economic Affairs.
Abebe Selassie
Deputy Director, IMF Africa Department
Abebe Aemro Selassie is Deputy Director in the IMFs African Department. Until recently he was
mission chief for Portugal under its IMF/EU-supported adjustment program. Previously at the
IMF he also led the teams working on South Africa as well as the Regional Economic Outlook for
sub-Saharan Africa. Abebe has also worked on Thailand, Turkey and Poland, as well as a range of
policy issues. From 2006-2009 he was the IMFs resident representative in Uganda. Before joining
the IMF, he worked for the Government of Ethiopia.
Patrick Smith
Editor, Africa Confidential
Patrick Smith is the Editor of Africa Confidential. He has worked as a journalist reporting on
politics, economics and security issues in Africa, Asia and the Middle East for 30 years. He has
run detailed investigations into the arms trade, the financing of war and its links to resource
exploitation. Mr. Smith also served as a technical advisor to the United Nations group of experts
investigating illegal exploitation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Mr. Smith has been based
in Paris since 2006.
Tesfai Tecle
Senior Advisor, Kofi Annan Foundation
Dr Tecle has more than 35 years of experience in management and technical expertise in the
fields of international agriculture and rural development. He has provided extensive policy
guidance and promoted investment in developing countries by organizations such as the World
Bank, Regional Development Banks, and the European Union. He has worked with AGRA for
over five years as Special Adviser to Mr. Kofi Annan in his capacity as AGRA Board Chairman.
Prior to joining AGRA, he worked in different units of the Food and Agricultural Organization
of the United Nations (FAO) in Rome for 30 years, both in technical fields and in management.
He held several senior positions at FAO, including: as Chief of FAOs cooperative programs
with international financing institutions; as Director of Coordination of FAOs decentralized
offices and programs; as Director of the FAO Investment Center; and finally as the Assistant
Director-General and Head of Technical Cooperation of FAOs regular and field programs. He has
designed large-scale rural development investment programs, working as program economist
and analyst, and the leader of large, multidisciplinary teams. Before joining FAO, he worked
with the Institute of Development Research in Ethiopia and the World Bank in Washington DC.
He is currently a Senior Adviser on Food and Nutrition Security at the Kofi Annan Foundation,
and serves as a member on several technical advisory boards. He is a member of an External
Panel of Advisers to the Director-General of FAO, and a member of the International Selection
15
Committee, chaired by Prince Albert II of Monaco, for Best Sustainable Development Practices
for the Feeding Knowledge Program and Expo Milan 2015. Dr Tecle, an Eritrean national, holds
a M.Sc. in Agricultural Economics and a PhD in International Economics and Development, both
from Cornell University (USA).
Lars Thunell
Senior Advisor, Blackstone Group and Chairman of African Risk Capacity Insurance Company
Limited
Dr Lars Thunell was appointed as an Independent Non-Executive Director of Standard Chartered
PLC in November 2012.
Lars is currently a director of Kosmos Energy. He is a Senior Advisor to the Blackstone Group, and
is a non-executive director and vice chairman of Sithe Global Power LLP, a director of Fisterra
Energy and Chairman of Global Water Development Partners (all part of the Blackstone Group).
He is also senior advisor to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a US foreign
policy think-tank, a director of the Middle East Investment Initiative, an independent non-profit
organisation and Chairman of African Risk Capacity Insurance Company Limited, a not for profit
mutual insurance company.
Until June 2012, Lars was chief executive officer and executive vice president of the International
Finance Corporation (IFC), a member of the World BankGroup, the largest global development
institution focused on the private sector. In this role, Lars led the IFCs overall strategic direction
in its mission to promote sustainable private sector development.
From 1997-2005, Lars was chief executive officer of SEB, Swedens leading corporate bank. From
1994-1997 he was chief executive officer of Trygg-Hansa, and from 1992-1994, president and
chief executive officer of Securum, the Swedish Government bad bank.
Mamadou Toure
Managing Director, GE Africa and Founder and Chairman of Africa 2.0
Mamadou Kwidjim Toure is the Founder and Chairman of Africa 2.0 Foundation, an initiative-
driven advocacy group that brings together emerging leaders representing African countries
and the Diaspora, who share a common vision of the continents future.
Mamadou currently works as Managing Director with GE Africa. In this role, Mamadou leads a
regional Capital Markets (Sales and Project Finance) team across Sub-Saharan Africa supporting
GEs industrial business growth with sales funding solutions. He is also responsible for developing
market and competitors analysis across the region.
Mamadou previously worked at IFC (International Finance Corporation, World Bank Group) in
Johannesburg, he was in charge of private sector investments in the Telecommunications, Media
and Technologies sector covering Sub-Saharan Africa.
Prior to that, he worked at Fortis Group in Paris within the Investment Banking Team focused
on Mergers and Acquisitions, Government Advisory, Privatizations and Project Finance mostly
in Infrastructure covering Africa. His work included transactions, sector restructuring, advisory
assignments in Power, Water and Telecommunications sector. He started his professional career
16
with KPMG Audit France as an audit consultant.
Over the last 12 years, he has worked on advisory assignments and various investment transactions
in more than 20 African countries. More recently, he contributed to various publications on
telecommunications, media as well as mobile banking topics. He also was speaker at various
conferences and Symposia in Africa, Europe and the Middle East.
Mamadou received a distinction as New Leader for Tomorrow by the Crans Montana Forum in
2011. He has committed his passion for Africa since early age, as he started his first NGO at the
age of 19, (Afrique Tandem) mobilizing more than a hundred African students across Europe to
enable skills and knowledge transfer into the continent through concrete uplifting projects and
linkages programs.
Mamadou speaks 6 languages fluently (French, English, Spanish, German and two African
languages).
After completing high school at Lycee Louis Le Grand in Paris, he graduated from Ecole des
Hautes Etudes Commerciales (EDHEC Business School, in France) with a Master of Science in
Management. In 2010, he completed the Executive Training Program at Harvard Kennedy
School of Government on Public Private Partnerships. Mamadou loves Art, Philosophy, Music
and History books.
Mamadou was ranked among the top 100 most influential people in Africa in 2012 by New
African Business Magazine. In 2013, BRICS Business Magazine identified him among to 25 Faces
of the New Africa. In addition, in 2014, Mamadou made the Forbes Top 10 Most Powerful Men
in Africa list.
Kevin Urama
Managing Director / Head of Research, Quantum Global Research Lab AG
Prof. Kevin Chika Urama holds a First Class Honors degree and a Master of Science in Agricultural
Economics from the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, a Master of Philosophy degree with
distinction, and a Ph.D. in Land Economy from the University of Cambridge, United Kingdom.
A 2002-3 winner of the James Claydon Prize for the most outstanding PhD thesis in economics
or related subjects while studying at St. Edmunds College, University of Cambridge, Prof. Urama
was recently named the Technology Executive of the Year by the Africa Technology Awards in
2012, adding to many international prizes he has received for academic excellence and science
policy leadership.
He is currently the Inaugural Managing Director of the Quantum Global Research Lab, an
independent research facility established in Switzerland, dedicated to leading innovation and
excellence in the delivery of bottom-up econometric models of African economies that are
embedded in African realities as tools for inclusive economic development policy and sustainable
investment decision making in African countries. He was most recently the Executive Director
of the African Technology Policy Studies Network (ATPS) and also the inaugural President
of the African Society for Ecological Economics (ASEE), a Senior Consultant on Sustainable
Development and Green Growth for the African Development Bank (AfDB), and a Consultant for
the preparation of the Comprehensive Climate Change Strategy of the African Union Commission
(AUC). An Extra-Ordinary Professor in the School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University,
South Africa; Professor Urama is also an Adjunct Professor at the Sir Walter Murdoch School of
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Public Policy and International Affairs, Murdoch University, Western Australia; and a Fellow of the
African Academy of Sciences (AAS). He serves on several international and intergovernmental
scientific panels and advisory boards including the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate
Change (IPCC), the International Resource Panel (IRP), High-Level Panel on Global Assessment
of Resources for Implementing the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020, the OECD Green
Growth and Poverty Reduction Task Team, and the UNESCO Governing Board of the International
Research and Training Centre for Science and Technology Strategy (CISTRAT), Beijing, China. He
is a member of the Editorial (Advisory) Boards of many international journals, including Science
and Public Policy, Ecological Economics; Responsible Innovation, and Environmental Policy and
Governance, African Journal of Science, Technology, Innovation and Development, and has
over 100 publications in various media. The Lead author for the African Manifesto for Science,
Technology and Innovation, Prof. Urama seeks to foster self-rule and democratic governance of
science and innovation policy in Africa.
Kevin Watkins
Executive Director, Overseas Development Institute
Kevin Watkins is Executive Director of the Overseas Development Institute. He is a non-resident
senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a senior visiting research fellow at the Global
Economic Governance Programme at Oxford University. Previously, he was the director and lead
author of UNESCOs Education for All Global Monitoring Report (2007 to 2010) and the UNDP
Human Development Report, where he led the research on reports covering global poverty and
inequality, the global water crisis, and climate change. Prior to working with the United Nations,
he worked for thirteen years with Oxfam, where he authored major reports on African debt,
international trade and Oxfams Education Report. He holds a BA in Politics and Social Science
from Durham University and a doctorate from Oxford University. His research interests include
poverty and inequality, education, approaches to equity in public spending and inclusive
economic growth.
Ngaire Woods
Dean of Oxford Universitys Blavatnik School of Government, Professor of Global Economic
Governance, Oxford University
Professor Ngaire Woods is the inaugural Dean of the Blavatnik School of Government and
Professor of Global Economic Governance at the University of Oxford. She is founder and Director
of the Global Economic Governance Programme and co-founder (with Robert O. Keohane) of the
Oxford-Princeton Global Leaders Fellowship Programme.
Her research focuses on global economic governance, the challenges of globalization, global
development, and the role of international institutions. Her publications include The Politics of
Global Regulation (with Walter Mattli); Networks of Influence, and The Globalizers: The IMF, the
World Bank and their Borrowers.
Professor Woods has served as an advisor to the IMF Board, to the UNDPs Human Development
Report and to the Commonwealth Heads of Government. She was educated at Auckland
University (BA in economics, LLB Hons in law) before studying at Balliol College, Oxford (as a
New Zealand Rhodes Scholar), completing an MPhil (with Distinction) and then DPhil (in 1992)
in International Relations.
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Kandeh Yumkella
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief Executive Officer, Sustainable Energy
for All Initiative
Kandeh K. Yumkella is Under Secretary-General in the United Nations and is Chairman of UN-
Energy, the coordination body of United Nations agencies dealing with energy related issues.
As Special Representative & CEO, Mr. Yumkella will seek to mobilize action toward a sustainable
energy future and accelerate the implementation of the Secretary-Generals initiative as well
as engaging with the leadership of relevant stakeholders in government, businesses, academia
and civil society at the highest level to advocate for and promote sustainable energy for all.
From 2005 to 2013 he was the Director-General of the United Nations Industrial Development
Organization (UNIDO). From 1994 to 1995 he was Minister for Trade, Industry and State
Enterprises of Sierra Leone.
He holds a Ph.D. in Agricultural Economics from the University of Illinois, a M.Sc. Agricultural
Economics, Cornell University; and a B.Sc. in General Agriculture, from Njala University College,
Sierra Leone.
19
CONCEPT NOTE
20
CLIMATE CHANGE
An African agenda for green, low-carbon development
2015 is a watershed moment for climate change. The Paris Climate Summit at the end of the year provides a focal
point for international action. There is an expectation from Paris that developed countries, responsible for the lions
share of the impact of climate change, will sign up to new targets to reduce emissions.
The signs are positive. The EU countries have committed to reducing emissions to 40 per cent below 1990 levels
by 2030. In New York in September 2014, world leaders converged around a long-term vision that recognizes that
climate change is a defining issue of our times, and agreed on the need to reduce emissions and build resilience.
They also agreed that climate action should be integral to, and not separate from, efforts to eradicate extreme
poverty and promote sustainable development.
Crucially, there is widespread commitment to limiting global temperature rises to less than 2 degrees Celsius
from pre-industrial levels, and all countries have been called upon to take national actions consistent with this
goal. There is also growing momentum behind the message that global emissions must peak before 2020 and
dramatically reduce after that, towards climate neutrality in the second half of the 21st century.
As President Obama told the New York Summit: [A] new climate agreement [is needed] that is ambitious, inclusive
and flexible before its too late. For African policymakers taking part in the global negotiations, a global climate deal
must enshrine equity, historical responsibility and respective capabilities the three core principles underpinning
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Without such commitments, and without a fair deal on climate financing, it will be difficult to convince developing
countries, including in Africa, that they should take steps to reduce future emissions as they strive to accelerate
growth towards economic transformation.
The 2015 Africa Progress Report will aim to outline why the outcomes of Paris, and the successor arrangement to
the Kyoto Protocol, need to meet African expectations.
Africa has had no option but to adapt to the unprecedented effects of climate change, and there are many stories
of how communities have ensured their livelihoods through creative and innovative adaptation. The 2015 Africa
Progress Report will highlight many of these stories.
However, adaptation is not a transformation strategy and Africa cannot adapt indefinitely. With global temperatures
set to rise further, the impacts of climate change may exceed African capability to remain ahead of the curve. Unless
the international community acts swiftly to mitigate the effects of climate change, these threats could undo recent
progress in improving lives across the continent.
The Report could also argue that Africa can meet its energy needs and sustain growth by pursuing a transition
to a much greater use of clean and renewable energy.. With the right policies in place to enable low-carbon
development, such a transition could act as the catalyst for a dramatic reduction in poverty.
The Global Commission on the Economy and Climate has set out a compelling economic case for the transition to
low-carbon energy systems. There are also indications that political momentum towards a deal is gathering pace.
The UN Summit on Climate Change saw far-reaching commitments, notably from the business community.
As well as setting out an agenda for a fair and effective global climate deal, the Africa Progress Report 2015 could
21
highlight that Africa can contribute to the double zero ambition of eliminating poverty while decarbonizing energy
systems. The report could present a positive vision of what is attainable, backed by practical examples and by a
forthright assessment of the political obstacles to an equitable transition to renewable energy.
PART I: Containing the threats posed by climate change International action and African opportunity
No region has done less to drive climate change than Africa but no region faces greater risks from its effects. The
2015 Climate Summit is the critical moment for containing the risks. Prospects for millions today, and for future
generations, depend on international action and effective national policies.
It is proposed that the Africa Progress Report 2015 could:
Highlight the risk that unchecked climate change will reverse Africas development gains. The report will
focus on the threats posed by losses of agricultural productivity and increased exposure to drought, higher
temperatures and unpredictable rainfall.
Set out the agenda for a global climate deal and action by rich countries and emerging markets. The
report will challenge governments in developed countries to reduce emissions as well as adopt practical low
carbon strategies.
Call for a fairer approach to international climate financing. The report will highlight the failure of current
mechanisms to deliver predictable financial flows to Africa, and table practical alternatives.
Propose a bold agenda for transformative adaptation in African agriculture. Current approaches to climate
change adaptation are based on outmoded thinking and aid delivery mechanisms, with an emphasis on small-
scale projects. Building on the 2014 Africa Progress Report, the 2015 report will call on African governments
to focus on policies that unlock the huge potential of Africas small farmers and to treat adaptation as part of a
wider strategy for agricultural transformation.
Make the case for strengthened initiatives to build Africas resilience to the impacts of climate change and
reduce disaster risk, on a national and regional scale.
PART II: Seizing the opportunity for an equitable low-carbon energy transition that boosts growth, creates
jobs, combats poverty and reduces inequality
Africas energy systems are inefficient and inequitable. They generate high-cost electricity (around eight times the
unit cost of countries in East Asia) through grids that mainly serve national elites. Africas rich get subsidized energy.
The poor get to collect firewood, burn bio-mass and purchase charcoal.
Today, Africa has an opportunity to skip the carbon-intensive energy pathway followed by rich countries and
emerging countries. Renewable technologies provide a low-cost alternative and Africa has an abundance of
renewable assets in the form of solar power, wind and rivers. However, current investment plans and energy policies
have set the region on a high-carbon pathway of dependence on coal and oil. Charting a new course will require a
fundamental rethink in approaches to energy investment.
Some countries are demonstrating what is possible. Ethiopia has set a course for decarbonizing energy over
the next decade. Ghanas giant 155-megawatt Nzema solar project is one of the biggest in the world. Kenya
is developing geothermal and wind power on a scale with the potential to transform energy provision. Other
countries in Africa could match the high level of ambition shown by these examples, as well as countries in other
22
regions. For example, India is planning to reach 400 million people over the next four years through a national solar
strategy that brings together public and private partners.
Equity will be a distinctive theme in the 2015 report. Other reports have made the case that a low-carbon transition
can be achieved at affordable costs; the Africa Progress Report 2015 will take the story forward in arguing that a
low-carbon transition can also be equitable and a force for reducing poverty. Africas poorest and most vulnerable
people could be reached through renewable (and more efficient conventional) energy on terms that drive down
energy costs, stimulate small and medium-sized enterprises, generate jobs and reduce pollution-related health
risks. The major obstacles are not technological but political: inefficient energy systems need to be reformed to
serve the poor better.
It is proposed that the Africa Progress Report 2015 report could:
Document the social, human and economic costs of Africas large energy deficit (see below).
Highlight Africas vast potential for clean and renewable energy. Africa has some of the worlds best
sites for wind, solar, hydro and geothermal power. The report will provide a map of Africas renewable energy
facilities in operation and under development.
Set out the conditions for a transition to low-carbon energy. Energy systems in Africa are dominated by
a big-grid high-carbon infrastructure, fuelled in many countries primarily by coal. Renewable energy could
turn this model on its head. Wind farms and solar parks can provide decentralised or off-grid power directly
to customers, reducing the load on congested transmission lines. Most of the financing used to build and
maintain conventional systems is public partly because regulatory policies, pricing and long planning
horizons deter private investment. By contrast, renewable energy creates investment opportunities for small,
medium-sized and large companies. The Africa Progress Report 2015 will look at the regulatory, investment
and governance requirements for a renewables take-off. It will also look at appropriate technologies and
innovations for mass consumption in remote rural regions, and disadvantaged urban areas too.
Link the low-carbon transition to poverty reduction. The 2015 report will show that with the right policies in
place, a low-carbon energy transition in Africa could act as a catalyst for poverty reduction. It will highlight the
potential for delivering renewable energy to the 60 percent of Africans now living without access to modern
energy. The regions informal settlements, with their high population density, could provide a market for
innovative renewable programmes that lower energy costs for households and support the development of
small enterprises. The renewable sector could become a dynamic hub for creating jobs and developing skills. In
the rural sector, renewable energy could reduce the labour burden on women who currently collect firewood,
generate the electricity needed to support off-farm enterprises, and improve the quality of life. Schools and
health centres could benefit from reliable, affordable energy.
Identify the policies needed to harness renewable energy for the poor, particularly in rural areas such as
modernizing biomass.
Argue that the transition from non-green to renewable energy requires a judicious energy mix. African
economies need energy to pursue industrialization and not all this energy can be clean. Policies are therefore
needed to guide the transition from high- to low-carbon energy.
Curtail multinational practices that exacerbate emissions. While Africa has a small carbon footprint, many
practices across the region constitute a problem. Gas-flaring is a case in point: oil companies in sub-Saharan
Africa flare an amount equivalent to half the continents power consumption. National legislation on flaring is
routinely ignored by major oil companies, reflecting the indifference of governments. Deforestation and other
land-use practices weaken the planets carbon-absorption capacity. Far more could be done through national
23
action and international partnership to unlock triple wins for carbon mitigation, growth and poverty reduction
through improved practices.
How the APR 2015 could carve out a distinctive agenda
As well as setting out an African agenda for the global climate deal, the Africa Progress Report 2015 could explore a
range of regional policy issues.
The report could argue that Africa can go green(er) and eliminate poverty but that there is no automatic
relationship. Currently, Africas energy systems combine restricted access with inefficiency and high levels of
inequality. This costs jobs, undermines growth and locks millions of Africans into cycles of poverty and vulnerability.
Two-thirds of Africans, including the vast majority of urban slum dwellers and rural populations, have no access
to modern electricity.
Small and medium-sized enterprises in Africa face some of the worlds highest energy costs, with damaging
consequences for growth and jobs.
Agriculture and off-farm employment is held back by the limited reach of rural electrification.
Recourse to charcoal, bio-mass and wood for fuel contributes to acute public health problems: around 600,000
Africans are estimated to die annually from indoor air pollution.
The report will ask tough questions about the current direction of energy policy. Why are exports of natural gas
from East Africa lighting the homes and driving the industries of Asia, while energy access in Africa stagnates? Why
are current energy policies geared toward providing subsidized energy more for the middle class and national
elites?
The report will also seek to capture the huge low-carbon energy potential of sub-Saharan Africa, while recognizing
that transitioning to low-carbon energy cannot happen overnight. Redirecting subsidies, creating the right
regulatory environment and attracting foreign investment could unlock Africas huge potential for renewable
energy. But the challenges are not just technological and economic; they are also political. So the report will seek to
identify the conditions under which, say, Kenyas vast geothermal deposits might provide energy to marginalized
groups in the north of the country or slum dwellers in Nairobi. And it will ask how greener growth can create the
jobs needed for Africas youth.
The Global Commission on the Economy and Climate report provides a framework that we might consider adopting
(or adapting). Briefly summarized, it looks at the potential for low-carbon policies that drive growth in three areas:
urban systems; land-use and agriculture; and, energy systems.
As in previous reports, our aim will be to carve out a distinctive agenda. Part of that agenda will be grounded in
evidence illustrating practical solutions to real problems. For example, what are the financial reforms, incentives and
pricing policies needed to expand access to renewable energy in slums? How does renewables financing differ from
traditional big grid financing? What are the strategies needed to deliver affordable energy to rural populations?
The report will also explore Africas potential contribution to global climate action. How can Africa draw on global
support to develop forestry and land use practices that simultaneously benefit Africans and the global climate?
While we need to reflect on the wider agenda, several opportunities present themselves. The run-up to the
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Paris summit is an obvious focal point. There will also be a number of key meetings on development financing.
More broadly, the report could chart distinctive terrain by demonstrating that the double zero ambition of
the Sustainable Development Goals zero poverty by 2030 and progress towards decarbonization could be
something more than the empty slogan it is in danger of becoming.
25
CONTRIBUTIONS
26
INNOVATIVE FINANCING FOR CONTAINING THE THREATS

OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN AFRICA: WHY THE CATALYST MUST
COME FROM WITHIN
By Jean-Claude Bastos de Morais and Kevin Urama
The key points for discussions are listed with a brief description of the available evidence below:
1. Climate finance is a diffuse concept that may mean different things for countries at different levels of
development; quantitative estimates are limited, relate to different concepts, and are incomplete
According to the IPCC Working Group III AR 5 Report, There is no widely agreed definition of what constitutes
climate finance, but estimates of the financial flows associated with climate change mitigation and adaptation
are available. Published assessments of all current annual financial flows whose expected effect is to reduce net
Green House Gas (GHG) emissions and/or to enhance resilience to climate change and climate variability show USD
343 to 385 billion per year globally. Out of this, total public climate finance that flowed to developing countries
is estimated to be between USD 35 and 49 billion/yr in 2011 and 2012. These are provided through bilateral and
multilateral institutions, usually as concessional loans and grants. Estimates of international private climate finance
flowing to developing countries vary, ranging from USD 10 to 72 billion/yr including foreign direct investment
as equity and loans in the range of USD 10 to 37 billion/yr over the period of 20082011. Most of the available
climate finance are invested in adaptation measures, particularly in the energy sector low emission generation
technologies (renewable energy, nuclear, and fossil fuels with carbon capture and storage (CCS), and energy
efficiency investments in buildings, transport, and industry sector. Few research and development (R&D) efforts
and investments are channeled towards, financing adaptation and/or financing transitions pathways for emerging
countries to transform their economies while limiting warming to 20c. The spillover effects of focus on energy
efficiency measures and the switch to low emission technologies for resource rich countries in Africa remain to be
critically examined.
The climate financing framework provided within the scope of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) comprises a family of financing facilities such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF)
to manage the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) and the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), the Green
Climate fund (GCF) and the Adaptation Fund (AF) under the Kyoto Protocol. Since 1991, the Global Environment
Facility (GEF) has provided $12.5 billion in grants and leveraged $58 billion in co-financing for 3690 projects in
165 developing countries to support activities related to biodiversity, climate change, international waters, land
degradation and waste in the context of development projects and programs. The Special Climate Change Fund
(SCCF) was established under the Convention in 2001 to finance projects relating to: adaptation; technology
transfer and capacity building; energy, transport, industry, agriculture, forestry and waste management; and
economic diversification. The Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) was established to support a work program
to assist Least Developed Country Parties (LDCs) carry out, inter alia, the preparation and implementation of
national adaptation program of action (NAPAs). The Least Developed Countries (LDCs) consist of 49 countries and
over 850 million people, located primarily in Africa and Asia with 34 LDCs in Africa alone. The Green Climate Fund
(GCF) promotes the paradigm shift towards low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways by providing
support to developing countries to limit or reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and to adapt to the impacts of
climate change, taking into account the needs of those developing countries particularly vulnerable to the adverse
effects of climate change. The Adaptation Fund (AF) was established in 2001 to finance concrete adaptation projects
and is financed with a share of proceeds from the clean development mechanism (CDM) project activities and
other sources of funding. In other words, many climate financing mechanisms now exist, but as will be shown in
the subsequent sections of the paper, their effectiveness in financing climate change adaptation and mitigation in
Africa remain to be seen.
27
2. Africa is the least contributor to Climate Change but the most vulnerable to its impacts
Africa is historically the lowest generator of GHG in the world (less than 4% of total) but it is disproportionably
affected by climate change. While China, the United States of America and the European Union Contribute 26%,
19% and 15% of global C02 emissions respectively, the contributions by Africa as a continent still remain below
2% of the total global emissions.1 Yet, the continent rank among the most vulnerable to climate change impacts.
This is largely because most African countries are characterized by undiversified economic structures heavily
reliant on natural resources for its economic growth, majority of the population are still employed in agriculture,
poor infrastructure, fragile governance institutions and low human capital development. This raises questions
of historical and moral responsibility for financing climate change adaptation and mitigation which has been a
long standing discourse amongst parties in climate negotiations. Developed countries have committed to the
goal of jointly mobilizing USD 100 billion per year by 2020, scientific evidence suggest that this is challenging but
feasible. However, while the moral imperatives appear to be clear, the possibilities of reaching an agreement for
compensatory payments by the developed countries remain bleak.
3. Evidence suggest that African countries have not benefited much from these global climate facilities, as
large proportions go to China and India who already have absorptive capacity
The investment in registered Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects is estimated at over 400 billion USD
over the period 2004 to 2012 (2004-2012 USD). Of that amount almost 80 billion USD was for projects registered
during 2011 and 195 billion USD for projects registered during 2012 (2011 USD and 2012 USD). The majority of the
investment in CDM projects is private. Renewable energy projects account for over 70% of the total investment.
Figure 1: Accumulated investment through the CDM in USD billion by selected countries and regions as at
end of October 2012 (http://www.cdmpipeline.org)
Key: Country; percentage financing accessed; ROW means Rest of the World
The analyses show that most of the clean development mechanisms (CDM) finance go to China and India. This
translates to 100 USD per capita for China in 2012, USD18, USD10; USD8 and USD 3 for India, Brazil, Rest of the
World and Africa, respectively. While the debate in the literature regarding the reasons for the observed trend
is ongoing, there is an emerging consensus that current global fianc mechanisms will not deliver sustainable
financing for climate change and other sustainable development goals in less developed countries, including Africa.
28
4. To better understand and implement an effective Climate Finance program in Africa, a multi- objective
perspective is required
Financing climate change adaptation and mitigation policies intersects with other investments needed to address
other societal goals, either positively or negatively, creating the possibility of spill over benefits or costs. While
economists still grapple with the challenge of quantifying the co-benefits of climate change adaptation and
mitigation, it is becoming clear that for climate adaptation and mitigation efforts to become financially viable,
the tradeoffs and synergies with other societal goals including the need to improve energy access and security,
access to water, food, and basic infrastructures which remain necessities in Africa MUST be considered in tandem.
In many ways, investing in climate change adaptation in Africa is synonymous with investing in inclusive economic
development transitions in the continent. The continent needs to build its technological and knowledge capabilities
to adapt to climate change by, for example, reducing the energy intensity of growth in many sectors, reducing
poverty, and alternative investments to fill the infrastructure gaps in the roads, sea and air ports, which ultimately
affect energy intensity of growth in Africa. Quantum reductions in energy intensity of growth would be achieved in
Africa if we had efficient roads networks, sea ports and airports for more efficient transportation of goods, including
agricultural produce.
5. The African Private Sector Stand Ready to Invest in Climate Smart Development but the Policy
Environment Remain Challenging
Evidence from the IPCC reports show that the private sector plays a central role in mitigation of greenhouse gasses
if the enabling environment is right. Contributions from the private sector was estimated at 267 billion USD per
year in 2010 and 2011, and 224 billion USD in 2011 and 2012 on average. This represents 74% and 62% of total
climate finance during the periods, respectively. This was made possible by countries with low interest rates, long
term loans, risk guarantees provided by the public sector (governments) of countries to cover the incremental costs
and risks of many mitigation investments. The efficiency of institutions, security of property rights, and credibility
of policies are also amongst the enabling factors for effective engagement of the African Private Sector. Without
strengthening these aspects, Africa is likely to continue to miss out on what is increasingly regarded as the new
energy-efficient industrial revolution.
6. Effective climate policy involves building institutions and capacity for governance
While there is strong evidence that a transition to a sustainable and equitable climate resilient development path is
technically feasible, charting an effective and viable course for climate change mitigation is not merely a technical
and/or financial undertaking. It will involve multiple efforts to building institutional, technological, innovation
and governance capabilities at all levels. Investing in systems of education that empower a diverse set of actors to
participate in sustainable development decision at national and international levels be central. The failure by the
UNFCCC to secure a fair deal on climate change for years now, irrespective of the mounting evidence on the need
for one, is a symbol of the challenges current global and national institutions face in address global commons
problems such as climate change.
7. There are many innovative approaches to financing climate change which could be considered by
Member States to deliver effective adaptation to climate change while sustaining economic growth
So far, the dominant framing of climate finance has been to produce hardware technologies (solar lanterns, solar
panels, and alternative energy technologies) and market these in Africa. This is what many researchers have referred
to as hardware financing. This framing pre-supposes that the additional costs of low carbon technologies would
be internalized through hardware financing policies. Current evidence suggest that these policies do not often
work effectively due to lack of absorptive capacity in Africa, vested interests and power dominance in the global
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climate innovation systems. Recent evidence from review studies conducted in Africa show that investments
in the renewable energy field is not delivering sufficient endogenous capabilities for the maintenance and
sustainable use of these technologies on the continent. Lessons from the past industrial revolutions show that
building endogenous capabilities is a pre-requisite to socio-technical transitions, and sustainable change in the
development pathways needed for effective climate adaptation and mitigation on the continent.
Innovative finance mechanisms have to be at the right scale (spatial and temporal) to provide good leverage for
development financing, and be flexible to the needs of the recipients, scalable and replicable.
For Africa, the following mechanisms could be considered:
7.1 Financing innovation capacity on the continent
Beyond developing climate smart technologies and marketing these in Africa, there is a fundamental need for
catalyzing endogenous innovation on the continent. Several studies reviewing the green markets in Africa show
that financing the development of skills and know how is much more sustainable than financing the transfer of
capital goods and services. It is in this regard that the African Innovation Foundation was established.2 AIF operates
a revolutionary model of innovation programs to unleash the next generation African foundations, geared towards
mobilizing innovation across the continent.
7.2 Blending mechanisms
Blend facilities add grant funds (zero interest rate) to a blend of debt instruments (market interest rates) from a
number of financial institutions to provide a package of finance with reduced rates while preserving the monitoring
mechanism by private lenders.
7.3 Green credit lines
Lines of credit (debt finance) provided to local banks for investing in projects that meet specified
green criteria. By estimating the carbon footprint and/or greenhouse gas emission reductions of different types of
projects the institutions can measure the impact of their financing efforts.
7.4 Risk sharing instruments
Resources are structured in order to maximise cost effectiveness of the action through equity/loan participation,
first-loss (junior debt) piece or guarantee schemes. Instruments often involving public and private finance that
have elements that share risks so as to place the risks for individual investment groups within acceptable bounds.
7.5 Climate change program loans
Loans to governments to support the development of policies and programs to direct investments in specific
sectors as, for example, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) with resources for
covering such areas as fighting forest fires, monitoring illegal felling, protected area networks, sustainable forestry
management and land rights.
7.6 Sovereign Bonds
Issuing sovereign bonds could provide access to long-term funding and help supplement low domestic saving
rates in some countries. Accessing international markets through a sovereign bond can strengthen macroeconomic
discipline by moving forward transparency and structural reforms in response to increased international investors.
Another benefit of international sovereign bond issuance is to provide a benchmark for pricing corporate bonds in
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international markets, over time expanding access for the private sector.
Well known instruments such as carbon taxes, equity and debt financing, credit enhancement and guarantees,
trade credit insurance, local currency financing, concessional or soft loans, grants, rebates, tax credits, C02 offset
mechanisms, national feed-in tariffs, etc., remain relevant but requires robust institutions to attract private sector
interest. The existing barriers including investment risks, low return on investment, access to capital, market size,
human resource and institutional capacity, etc. require careful consideration.
Conclusion
We note that several climate finance mechanisms now exist, but their effectiveness in addressing
the climate challenge in Africa remain bleak. While the moral imperatives for global assistance to Africa to address
the impacts of climate change remain, the catalyst can and must come from within. African countries and African
people must think innovatively and take the opportunities presented by climate change to develop capabilities and
relevant technologies for inclusive growth on the continent. The observed climate change and its disproportionate
vulnerabilities of the African continent is a symptom of Africas low competitiveness in the global economy.
Supporting and encouraging African innovators and entrepreneurs in this direction would be a good policy stance
both in the medium to long terms. International climate finance will neither sufficiently address the challenge nor
leave the continent with the much needed technological capabilities to develop clean products and services of
the future markets, increasingly being shaped by climate discourses, and also the recurrent volatility in the global
economy. Investing in climate resilient development would be investing in future competitiveness of African
economies.
While Africa countries should continue to invest in, and ensure effective use of, international public resources,
which play a critical role in facilitating low-carbon and climate-resilient investments, creating opportunities for local
investors and entrepreneurs would be optimal for African competitiveness and global sustainability. However, for
private sector contributions to climate finance to take off in Africa, fundamental work is required to (i) develop well-
articulated domestic enabling environments to encourage further private investment; (ii) address risk, which lies at
the heart of private investment decisions, and (iii) close the significant knowledge gaps that continue to impede the
effective participation of the private sector in climate finance delivery in Africa.
About half of the climate finance flows that flowed internationally flow from North to South. The vast majority of
the USD 39-62 billion in North-South flows originated from public sources, and most of these are invested in China,
India and other economies which has built absorptive capabilities. This is not optimal for Africa. Governments and
public institutions should cover the increment that makes low-carbon investment decisions uneconomic, and
find policy mechanisms to alter the distribution of risks and returns in ways that reduce costs, improve returns,
or encourages private sector actors to invest in climate resilient development in Africa. There remain significant
large knowledge gaps about adaptation finance; private sector finance; the role of the private sector in financing,
implications for social and economic development of countries, quantifying the co-benefits of adaptation financing,
etc. Little is known about returns to energy efficiency and REDD+; investment flows between and within countries;
public support of incremental investment costs and revenue support; and comparable data between current
finance mechanisms.
Notes
1. http://cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/emis/top2010.tot
2. Urama, 2014. Enhancing Adoption and Diffusion of Climate Smart Clean Energy Technologies is Sub-Saharan Africa: Lessons from the
Lighting Africa, the Africa Clean Cooking Energy Solutions, and Pro -Poor Low Carbon Development Projects, Research Report submitted
to: Climate and Development Knowledge Network (CDKN), South South North, P.O. Box 12842, Mill Street, Gardens, Cape Town 8010,
South Africa.
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TRANSFORMATIVE ADAPTATION IN AFRICAS AGRICULTURE

By Natasha Grist
I. The Risk Environment of Africa
In many cases we are not prepared for the climate-related risks that we already face. Investments in better
preparation can pay dividends both in the present and for the future.
Vicente Barros, Co-Chair of Working Group II, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, March 2014
Climate change poses particular risk to Africa. Most of the poor are rural dwellers and dependent on subsistence
agriculture which is rain-fed and highly vulnerable to climate variability. Despite economic growth and impressive
poverty reduction overall in sub-Saharan Africa over the last 15 years of the Millennium Development Goals, many
are still below the poverty line (Chandy et al. 2013).
Climate change is being experienced already. The most recent IPCC Fifth Assessment Report brings together the
latest data which demonstrate that average annual temperatures have already risen by about 1oC in much of Africa
(Niang et al. 2014). Temperature rise in the region by the end of 2100 is expected to be above 2oC, with impacts
across the region of drought, extreme temperature and sea level rise, although impacts on rainfall are uncertain in
most models. Africas food production systems are among the worlds most vulnerable for four reasons:
Africa relies on rain-fed crop production

The African continent suffers already from high intra- and inter-seasonal climate variability
Africas recurrent droughts and floods affect both crops and livestock
Underneath this, Africas persistent poverty limits the capacity to adapt
As a whole, the continent is experiencing a number of demographic and economic constraints: the population has
more than doubled since 1980; exceeding one billion in 2010 and is expected to reach three billion by the year 2050
if fertility remains constant. Poverty in rural areas in Sub-Saharan Africa decreased slightly from 65% in 1998 to 62%
in 2008, but it is still double the prevailing average in developing countries in other regions of the world. Agriculture
is the main economic activity in terms of employment share and the powerhouse of economic growth and poverty
reduction for many African countries. But farming is 98% rain fed in the sub-Saharan region, so crops and livestock
depend on a precarious situation (IPCC 2014).
Within this future, with added impacts from climate change, are potential stresses on water resources, reduced crop
productivity, changes in range and severity of human and animal disease, losses due to flooding, and losses and
health impacts from extreme heat events.
II. Adaptation Efforts in Africas Farming
Over the last 10 years many African countries have made significant efforts in understanding, planning for, and
initiating adaptation policies and programmes. The focus of these efforts is to maintain or enhance farmers
livelihoods and means of subsistence despite climate change improving their resilience to what is unprecedented
climate change and variability outside farmers previous experience. The process of developing adaptation
approaches is to work with farmers and policy makers to apply climate science, local knowledge and uncertainty
planning to the agricultural sector and existing farming and farmers livelihoods.
Current adaptation efforts mostly fall within a range of low regret / no-regret approaches that increase peoples
ability to survive and cope with current climate variability, improving their absorptive coping capacity (see Figure
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1). These include early warning systems about climate and household adjustments in the case of temporary
difficulty. Some adaptation efforts focus on helping people to improve their adjustment to climate change through
gradual, incremental change: adaptive capacity this might include modifying planting seasons and crop varieties
or the households dependence on farming as a livelihood. These broadly have an agro-technology/information
technology focus with resilience building. For the most part, however, there are few truly transformational
responses in place currently.
Figure 1: Spectrum of Resilience approaches
Source: Bn et al. (2012)
The issue with these approaches to date is that adaptation in agriculture is currently highly focussed on farm level,
primarily technical, innovations, with little integration of the wider development angles. Why is this? Three reasons:
1. There is naturally a science-based solution focus in many agricultural research institutes. Increased productivity
through agricultural intensification has increased yields substantially worldwide since the 1960s. However,
there is still less consideration of real-life constraints such as limits to uptake that we have seen, for example, for
decades with many conservation agriculture and agroforestry approaches.
2. Agricultural ministries may well be more concerned about increases in short term yields and poverty reduction
than long term complex institutional and political issues and dealing with the complex decision making under
uncertainty that climate change poses. An easy solution to provide access to fertiliser for the poor will increase
food security quickly in a nation and avoid more tricky issues such as unequal land holdings and land tenure
issues.
3. Related, the National Adaptation Planning processes that developed the Plans of Action over the last 15 years
(NAPAs) chose projects initially without applying much, or any, social cost-benefit analysis of short term,
or longer term, implications. And so we see that in many cases, incremental changes are developed which
are context-specific: useful, potentially, if applied with care and consideration, but very costly to design and
implement effectively. And with significant challenges to upscaling this to something that is cost-effective on a
broad scale.
III. Why isnt the current approach to adaptation enough?
Firstly, this focus on adaptation ignores the rest of the farming system beyond the field and farm level. The
farm system includes storage, transport, processing and marketing. There are implications and impacts for rural
labour markets and regional and national markets and policy and trade throughout the region. For the poorest in
rural areas, who are landless labourers or those too marginalised to be able to work the land, the implications of
adaptation to climate change, and the needs for social safety nets at wide scale (for example) are little understood
or considered.
Secondly, even within the rural area, adaptation for rural farmers is not just about adapting to climate
change in their crops, but in their livelihoods as a whole, including the wider landscape levels. Again, efforts
to consider these and integrate them into adaptation planning are very much at an initial level, spearheaded now
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by the FAO and Ecoagriculture with their landscapes approach and by CCAFS with their Climate Smart Villages
experimentations.
Thirdly, and most fundamentally, is one of the main issues to be discussed in this consultation that few
adaptation efforts currently focus on truly transformative approaches to adaptation.
IV. How is Transformative Adaptation different?
Transformative adaptation is adaptation which is:
Much bigger scale/intensity (e.g. Regreening the Sahel)

Involving new types of adaptation innovation (e.g. new crop varieties PLUS new partnerships between
institutions)
Involving different places and locations (e.g. resettlements)
Is this enough? There are issues with how transformational or transformative adaptation is interpreted. We need to
be careful to make sure that it is not the same as sustainable development or resilience something that sounds
good but can be interpreted many ways. Clarity is essential here.
What we need in terms of transformative adaptation to climate change in Africa is very important. With scaling up
and the nuggets of some strong policy changes in evidence in some countries, there is hope. But this still falls short
of the true agricultural transformations that are needed. As last years Africa Progress Panel report demonstrated,
rapid economic growth in the past decade in Africa has led to little trickle down on poverty reduction. Business as
usual suggests that about 1/5 of the population would remain in extreme poverty by 2030. Agriculture has a critical
role to play as an economic powerhouse for poverty reduction and economic growth, as the 2008 World Bank
report Agriculture for Development demonstrates.
So transformative adaptation needs to not ONLY be at larger scale with new innovations, bold enough to take
political steps that may not be easy or quick but ALSO transformative adaptation needs to be integrated fully into
the big agriculture questions that will really transform Africas agriculture. These are the old and new chestnuts of
Africas smallholder agriculture: how to provide a way for African farmers to fill the rising urban African demands;
creating opportunities for households with limited land and education; boosts for agricultures growth through
regional trade and investments in physical infrastructure; well-targeted social protection programmes; and
streamlining regulations and trade barriers (Jayne et al 2010). With a renewed, emphasis on these issues though
developing political will and significant investment, transformative adaptation will be able to add its power towards
the sustained transformation and reinvigoration of African economy.
Sources
1. Barros, V. (2014) Quoted in IPCC Press Release from Working Group II Report Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability,
March 2014 http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/ar5/pr_wg2/140330_pr_wgII_spm_en.pdf
2. Bn, C., Godfrey-Wood, R. Newsham, A. and M. Davies (2012) Resilience: New Utopia or New Tyranny? Reflection about the Potentials and
Limits of the Concept of Resilience in Relation to Vulnerability-Reduction Programmes. IDS Working Paper 405. Institute of Development
Studies, Sussex. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.2040-0209.2012.00405.x/pdf
3. Chandy, L., Ledlie, N. & Penciakova. 2013. The Final Countdown: Prospects for Ending Poverty by 2030. Global Economy and Development
at Brookings, Global Views, Policy Paper 2013-04 [Online]. Available: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2013/04/
ending%20extreme%20poverty%20chandy/the_final_countdown.pdf.
4. Jayne. T. S, Mather, D. and E. Mghenyi. (2010) Principal Challenges confronting smallholder agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa, World
Development 38 (10) 1384-1398. https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/wdevel/v38y2010i10p1384-1398.html
5. Kates, R. W, Travis, W. R. & T. J. Wilbanks. 2012. Transformational adaptation when incremental adaptations to climate change are insufficient,
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109 (19), pp.7156-7161.. [Online]. Available: http://www.pnas.org/content/109/19/7156.
abstract doi: 10.1073/pnas.1115521109 .
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6. Niang, I., O.C. Ruppel, M.A. Abdrabo, A. Essel, C. Lennard, J. Padgham, & Urquhart, P. 2014: Africa. In: Climate Change 2014: Impacts,
Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part B: Regional Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, http://ipcc-
wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/WGIIAR5-Chap22_FGDall.pdf . Accessed October 2014
35
BRIEF FOR THE 2015 AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT

By Dr Anthony Nyong and Ms. Uzoamaka Nwamarah*, submitted by
Simon Mizrahi
Africas perspectives on the new international climate change agreement to be endorsed during the UNFCCC
COP 21 in Paris, 2015:
The world has flagrantly failed to curb greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions as stipulated in the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and in the 2005 Kyoto Protocol. The response has rather
been to emit more GHG emissions than we have ever done at any point in history. We talk of the need to keep
global warming below 2 Celsius, and yet researchers from the Postdam Institute for Climate Research tell us that
we are heading towards a 3.5 Celsius warming pathway by the end of this century, if national emissions remain at
currently pledged levels.
No region of the world is immune to the impact of CO2 emissions. The recently published Atlas of Mortality and
Economic Losses from Weather, Climate and Water Extremes by the World Meteorological Organization leaves us
with sobering numbers. The Atlas indicates that from 1970 to
2012, about 4,000 weather, climate and water-related disasters were reported globally. Together they
caused the loss of almost 2 million lives and economic damages of about US$ 2.4 trillion.
While these global figures give cause for concern, the concentration of these losses and deaths in the poorer
regions of the world is indeed very alarming. For instance, about 35% of these cases were reported in Africa, and
caused the loss of about 700,000 lives and economic damages of about US$ 27 billion. It is estimated that 20% more
Africans will be at risk of hunger in 2050 due to a changing climate. Furthermore, it is estimated that the cost of
adapting to these disasters will continue to increase in the face of inaction or insufficient action to address climate
change.
A recent report by UNEP has estimated the financial cost to Africa to adapt to these impacts to be about US$ 4550
billion per year by the 2040s and US$ 350 billion per year by the 2070s. And where the continent fails to find that
sort of money, total damages could reach 7% of Africas gross domestic product by the end of this century. The
current flows of adaptation money to Africa are massively lower than this range with a total committed amount for
adaptation spending in Africa of US$ 350m, of which around US$ 130m has actually been disbursed- This represent
approximately one hundredth of the future annual requirements. The huge gap demonstrates the scale of the
challenge as well as urgent need for African leaders to engage in the debate on sources of future climate change
finance.
In December 2011, with a renewed zeal, parties to the UNFCCC adopted the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action,
which launched a new round of negotiations aimed at developing the new climate change agreement, a protocol,
another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force for the post-2020 period. The aim of the Durban
Platform negotiations is to establish climate effectiveness that is, moving the world onto a pathway to stabilize
atmospheric concentrations of GHGs. This proposed agreement is touted as the last window of opportunity
available to curb emissions and keep global warming below 2 C.
African negotiators are actively participating in negotiating this new agreement and Africas
expectations, amongst others should include:
First, the agreement should be legally binding to all countries/parties. The constraint with existing agreements
36
and protocols is that they have been entirely voluntary, as is the case with the Kyoto Protocol and its second
commitment period. There should also be a system to enforce compliance to this agreement and a penalty
stipulated for non-compliance. It should be based on the principles of equity and common but differentiated
responsibilities. Every nation has a role to play in combatting climate change.
Second, it should commit to an ambitious goal of emission reduction that is based on sound science. The emissions
reductions should not be based on voluntary pledges as is the case now as current pledges will not keep global
warming below 2o C. The agreement should prescribe new substantive commitments by parties and the long term
emissions reduction goal should be broken into specific time periods for ease of monitoring the achievements.
Third, the developed countries should provide new and adequate finances and support developing countries,
especially those in Africa based on the provisions of the UNFCCC. This might include among others, establishing
a collective finance goal with specified timeframes, including provisions to promote predictability of finance, and
establishing a periodic pledging/replenishment process for the Green Climate Fund anchored in the UNFCCC.
Fourth, in view of the importance of adaptation to Africa, the agreement should incorporate some form of a
global goal for adaptation building on existing institutions and mechanisms, and should explore the options
of establishing new commitments relating to adaptationfor example, a collective commitment to enhance
adaptation action, or individual commitments to formulate national adaptation plans and to increase adaptation
support for developing countries.
While Africa is a minor contributor to global greenhouse gas emissions, the continent has enormous opportunities
to tow a low carbon development pathway, by taking advantage of its abundant mitigation potentials mainly from
land use and forestry, and clean and renewable energy. Many African countries are already doing this and have
developed national green growth plans and some have started implementing these plans. The 2015 Agreement will
facilitate the development and implementation of these plans across Africa.
Transformative Adaptation in African Agriculture:
Agriculture is currently the largest source of greenhouse gas emissions in Africa, yet it is also a key sector of most
African economies. Its development is central to the transformation aspirations of the continent. The sector
supports the livelihoods of 80% of its population, provides employment to about 60% of the economically active
Africans and to about 70% of the poorest people on the continent. It accounts for 63% of rural household incomes,
which is higher than in other regions 62% for Asia, 50% for Europe and 56% for Latin America.
Rising temperatures and the resulting highly variable precipitation is already affecting agricultural productivity in
Africa. This will have far reaching socio-economic effects in the form of falling incomes, higher risks and greater
vulnerability for rural producers. In areas of chronic poverty, a simple increase in food prices that can be triggered
by climate-induced shortages can create significant underlying vulnerability and result in crisis.
The newly launched negotiations on the development of an agriculture work program in the UNFCCC process
provide a key opportunity to promote actions that enable the achievement of the triple dividend of food security,
adaptation and mitigation benefits. It is also important to build upon the continued and increased recognition of
the links between agriculture and other mechanisms, such as REDD+, Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions
(NAMAs) and the GCF. A successful climate change and agriculture agreement under the UNFCCC for Africa has
to encourage the adoption of agricultural processes that have a triple dividend of food security, adaptation
and mitigation benefits, in addition, to the enhancement of rural life through increased incomes and improved
livelihoods.
For agriculture to serve as the engine of inclusive and sustainable growth in Africa, it needs to be vibrant, resilient,
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competitive, innovative and environmentally sustainable. It must be capable of creating decent jobs and income as
well as sustainable livelihoods and opportunities of economic development for rural Africans.
In addition, agriculture should be private sector led and should be well integrated with urban Africa as well as
with the international markets. This can be achieved by: (i) supporting countries to develop their agriculture
infrastructure systems - including improving rural infrastructure, rural electrification, irrigation, water management
and leveraging IT systems for agriculture development; (ii) supporting the development of agribusiness and
innovation, which includes the commercialization of agriculture through the development of the agro-industry
and value chains as well as measures to develop agriculture and agribusiness trade, including the promotion of
agriculture commodity exchange markets; (iii) promoting resilience and the sustainable management of natural
resources, including managing the environmental impact of agricultural activities.
Achieving the triple dividend in the agricultural sector will require significant new financing for food security,
adaptation and mitigation. This will require the leveraging of additional funds from three key financing channels:
i) Public financing of agriculture, either from domestic or international sources, ii) Private financing through local
and foreign investment in agriculture and iii) Climate financing derived from a combination of public and private
sources. This climate-focused financing is expected to be channeled through existing and emerging mechanisms
under the UNFCCC, climate funds established outside of the UNFCCC and the carbon market.
Africas vast potential for clean and renewable energy:
Access to mitigation funding is required by African countries to tap the continents abundant clean and renewable
sources of energy. Projects and programs to achieve mitigation through sustainable energy sources include:
developing hydro power, wind, bioenergy, solar ad geothermal power. The continent also can implement energy
efficiency programmes, especially in transmission and distribution grids. A global agreement by 2015 should draw
on public mitigation funding and provision of incentives for private funding in order to make available sufficient
resources to finance the additional costs required by developing countries in their transition to low carbon
development.
The low-carbon transition in Africa should closely be linked to national priorities such as sustainable development
and poverty reduction initiatives. The linkage can be achieved by ensuring complementarity in the efforts of the
respective stakeholders in providing universal access to reliable and affordable modern energy services through
Green Mini Grids/Off-Grids solutions: The respective roles of the stakeholders involve inter alia the identification
of the policies needed to harness renewable energy for the poor, particularly in rural areas such as modernizing
biomass. Developing customer protection policies such as quality of service regulation, environmental policy and
regulation and the establishment of financial support schemes for the rural areas such as loan support and risk
mitigation instruments e.g. Mini Grid Partial Risk Guarantee Instrument.
Setting out the conditions for a transition to low-carbon energy involves inter alia the establishment of the legal
and regulatory frameworks that clarify the roles and responsibility of all the stakeholders in the energy sector,
standardized agreements for power purchase, operation and maintenance targeting small and medium sized
private investments in renewable energy, tariff setting models and structures that have a predictable pricing
mechanism, financial incentives and renewable energy policies that are technology biased (geothermal, solar,
wind) and are country specific to facilitate successful implementation of projects.
The popular maxim states that physical capital goes to where social capital exists. African leaders have the
responsibility of creating the right environments to attract private sector investments into renewable energy and
other green development programs in their respective countries. The most forward-thinking private investors are
on the hunt for any green investment that offers a reasonable yield on the continent. Good environmental policies
consistently implemented; national green growth road maps; innovative financing vehicles to minimize risk; lower
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transaction costs, public- private dialogue: these are the foundations on which green investment will be built. There
is a global commitment from World Leaders to take action on climate change, African leaders cannot afford to be
left behind.
* Additional contributions to the paper were made by: Balgis Osman-Elasha, Anthony Karembu
and Garba Laouli.
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SHORT NOTE FOR THE AFRICA PROGRESS PANEL

By Vijay Modi and Jonathan Demierre
In the last decade Africa has experienced a strong economic growth, and especially Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
with an annual GDP growth rate fluctuating around 5%. To sustain economic development, access to reliable and
affordable energy services is essential. SSA is one of the regions of the world with the lowest rate of electrification
and access to modern cooking fuels, the lowest per capita primary energy and electricity consumptions, and the
least reliable power grids. In the different sectors, and especially in the energy sector, there is a significant lack of
modern and efficient infrastructure that is needed to support economic and human development. Population
growth is also tremendous in Africa; United Nations projections are as high as 2.4 Billion peoples by 2050 (2.1
Billion in SSA and 0.3 Billion in Northern Africa). Together with a high growth in urbanization rate, Africa will count a
number of megacities in the future, with the environmental challenges that implies.
Overview of Energy Resources in Africa
Meeting the fast growing energy needs of Africa in a sustainable way is obviously challenging. Africa has vast
natural resources that can be tapped into. For power generation, there are huge renewable resources that are
underexploited, such as hydro, solar, wind and geothermal. Hydro allows one to produce electricity at very
competitive cost when developed at large scale. In Africa, the most economic underexploited hydro resources are
located far from big consumption centers and often exceed the needs of the countries that own these resources.
Because of the lack of regional transmission infrastructures and the difficulties that come with cross-border projects,
it is often impossible to secure the large capitals that are needed to develop the most economic hydro resources.
Solar resources are abundant all over the continent. Continuously decreasing capital costs of solar generation is
encouraging, however it still requires relatively large upfront investment compared to diesel or gas generation
which is a barrier to the deployment of large scale power plants. Africa has also significant wind resources, however
wind power as the same disadvantage of relatively large upfront investment as solar power. Moreover, grid
integration of fluctuating renewable sources, like solar and wind, is not easy due to their partially unpredictable
nature. When introducing intermittent sources in the grid, sufficient storage and/or dispatchable generation
capacities are needed. Energy storage technologies include pumped-hydro storage (for large scale applications),
thermal storage (typically used with concentrated solar power) and batteries (for small scale applications).
Dispatchable generation technologies are typically gas turbines, diesel engines and hydro (when available) that
can be turned on and off on demand in a relatively short time. Geothermal resources are also present in Africa,
especially in East Africa. The capital cost of geothermal power is high, however it has the advantage to be available
on demand. Biomass energy is largely used in Africa predominantly in a traditional way for cooking. With this is
associated the issues of indoor air pollution (due to the use of open fire), non-sustainable exploitation of wood
resources, and wood gathering work by women and children. Modern bioenergy could play a significant role in
Africa, if it does not conflict with food supply.
Besides renewables, there are also large hydrocarbon resources that are currently exploited in Africa. In North
Africa, a significant share of the hydrocarbon production is consumed domestically. In SSA, oil and gas resources are
exploited predominantly for exports outside of the continent. In the case of oil, there is a lack of refinery capacity in
SSA, therefore a large part of the domestic crude oil is exported and refined products are imported. This leads to the
double negative impact of high oil product prices and low added value for the producing countries. When looking
at natural gas, one of the barriers to the domestic use of SSAs resources is the lack of transportation infrastructure.
Pathway to Low Carbon Mix
While Africa has abundant renewable resources, in the short to medium term, it is unrealistic to bet only on
40
renewable energy to meet the increasing energy needs that go with the current high economic growth. Most
African countries have a limited access to financing resources and a relatively small energy market, which heavily
constrains the development of projects.
Most renewable power generation technologies need significantly higher upfront investment than diesel, HFO
or gas-fired generation for the same available power output. Moreover, when integrating a large quantity of
renewables, extensive transmission infrastructure, and storage and/or backup capacities are needed, which adds up
to the capital costs. However, innovations in energy storage and smart grid technologies as well as the continuous
reduction of capital costs of new renewable technologies should allow to rely exclusively on renewable resources in
the longer term.
To substitute oil in transportation with renewables, the main options are biofuels, electricity and hydrogen. Progress
in biofuels production should allow to improve land-use, use non-arable land and reduce fertilizer needs. This
would allow to make biofuels more competitive with oil products. Battery electric vehicles are still significantly
more expensive than ICE vehicles and the driving range is shorter. However, improvement in battery technology
would make battery electric vehicles more and more competitive in the future. Hydrogen vehicles (fuel cell) are
at an earlier stage of development than battery electric vehicles and would need the deployment of a dedicated
hydrogen distribution system. It has to be noted that, for both battery electric and hydrogen vehicles to be
renewable powered transportation, electricity and hydrogen production must be based on renewable resources.
In industry, residential and commercial sectors, energy needs are basically either electricity or heating. For
electricity, the carbon footprint of those sectors will obviously depend on the generation mix. For heating, the
renewable alternatives can includes biofuels, hydrogen, electricity (if produced with renewable sources) or in some
cases solar thermal.
A number of challenges have to be overcome to have an energy mix based almost only on renewables. Figure 1
and Figure 2 show a stylized long term scenario for Africas energy mix. In this scenario, natural gas plays the role of
a transitional fuel towards a low carbon energy mix.
Figure 1: Per capita primary energy consumption and GHG emissions in Africa (stylized scenario)
Renewables include systems with carbon capture and sequestration. We assume that the share of nuclear power is and will remain
negligible in Africa.
41
Figure 2: Africas primary energy consumption and GHG emissions (stylized scenario)
Renewables inlcude systems with carbon capture and sequestration. We assume that the share of nuclear power is and will remain
negligeable in Africa.
Natural gas is a flexible resource that can be used for various applications. In the residential sector, it could be
a cheap clean cooking alternative. Natural gas as a fuel for combined cycle power plant allows to generate
electricity at an affordable price and can be efficiently used for balancing fluctuating renewable resources, like wind
or solar. CNG could also represent a cheap fuel alternative for road transportation than gasoline or diesel, with less
GHG emissions. The agricultural sector could also benefit from the cheap domestic natural gas, since it could allow
one to produce locally more affordable nitrogenous fertilizers than the current imports.
The use of natural gas as a transitional fuel could allow one to limit the need for capital and the GHG emissions of
Africa, while meeting the growing energy demand that goes with economic and human development.
42
AN AFRICAN AGENDA FOR GREEN, LOW CARBON

DEVELOPMENT
By Linah Mohohlo
Introduction
The briefing note outlines a positive and uplifting green agenda for Africa. Coming from a country (Botswana)
where climatic vagaries have long been a recurring challenge, and the main water supply to the capital city is on
the brink of running dry, it is readily apparent that any heightened vulnerabilities arising from climate change
can quickly impinge on everyday life. So the promotion of such an agenda should also be accompanied by an
appropriate sense of urgency. However, for this reason it is important that the basic premises of the analysis are
interrogated to ensure that they are on a sound footing.
Outcome of the New York Meeting
The starting point of the note is a highly positive assessment of current global attitudes towards adopting measures
to both counter and adapt to climate change. This includes the outcome of the recent meeting (September) at the
United Nations in New York. But how realistic is this? To have the desired impact, the Report should be clear-sighted
about remaining areas of possible tension and disagreement. In other words, a reality check is needed.
To be more specific, while the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon, declared that the New York Meeting had
delivered, others were more equivocal. Most prominently perhaps, Graa Machel followed Mr Ban Ki Moon
by denouncing the continuing lack of commitment among world leaders to address climate change. It may,
nonetheless, be true that the outcome of the meeting was, on balance, positive: the convergence of views
(including between the United States and China) at the aspirational level was encouraging, and the active
commitment from major global businesses to play their part was a clear plus. But the complete absence of
some key players (e.g., Russia) or near silence from others, and a general lack of specific commitments were also
prominent. Perhaps of particular concern for developing economies, while there may now be some momentum
in contributions to the Green Climate Fund, this has been a long time coming (the fund was formally established
in 2010) and formal pledges still fall well-short of the target capital of USD10 billion. If this falls short, the positive
atmosphere could quickly sour as rich country governments are (once again, as with donor aid targets) seen as
reneging on earlier promises. A shortfall in this fund, which is earmarked to rise to as much as USD100 billion,
mainly for poorer countries, would be a severe blow to the prospects for funding a transformational green agenda
in Africa.
Moreover, since the September meeting, the prognosis for the global economy has continued to worsen: growth
in the Eurozone is a particular concern; while financial market instabilities reflect heightened uncertainty. In this
context, more negative attitudes towards action on climate change could regain traction if this is perceived as a
distraction (if not a hindrance) to the task of restoring global growth. Even prior to recent developments, resistance
remains strong in some cases. In the United States, for example, recent initiatives to control carbon emissions have
been introduced through executive orders, not legislative approval.
National Perceptions in Africa
Regarding the prospects for green transformation in Africa, the briefing note makes the important observation
that the major obstacles are not technological but political (p4). But, beyond this, little is said about perceptions
towards climate change in Africa. Is this characterised by concern, indifference, or even resistance/hostility?
43
In practice, we are likely to find that all three attitudes are to varying degrees, but my suspicion is that it is the
apathetic view (it is not our problem) that predominates. If so, the risks of climate change to Africa are not yet
widely understood, which is hardly conducive for promoting support for radical action.
Similarly, it is important to understand the level at which the political objections arise. Is it purely from the ruling
elite, with their own range of vested interests? Or does it reflect more grass-roots concerns, informed or otherwise?
For example, pilot projects in Botswana indicate a degree of grass roots resistance to alternative energy such as
village level solar power, on the basis that it is an inferior, or second class service (compared to grid electricity).
Such questions matter: otherwise, the Reports risks falling on ears that, if not deaf, are not listening very intently,
especially to the parts of the agenda that go beyond lobbying for commitments from the advanced countries
to actions requiring far-reaching, and potentially disruptive, domestic reforms. Moreover, the corollary of these
concerns is that an integral part of the green agenda should be relevant programmes of public education to
promote energy literacy.
Emphasising the Pro-Growth Links
From these comments it should be apparent that, to stand any realistic chance of acceptance in practice, a
green agenda should emphasise, at every stage, how this is also supportive of pro-growth policies. The briefing
note covers this aspect quite effectively, including the important point that the transition from non-green to
renewable energy requires a judicious energy mix (p5). This recognises the practical point that too rapid a move
towards renewables could jeopardise other aspects of the growth agenda which is central to Africas development
objectives.
But this point should be taken further, beyond meeting the energy requirements of domestic industrialisation. As
the note indicates, Africa has vast potential for clean and renewable energy. But these ambitions remain largely
for the future. The current reality is that an increasing number of African countries have more or less firm plans
(and very clear ambitions) for growth based on the development of so far unexploited carbon-fuel resources. It
must be explained how this can be made consistent with a low-carbon agenda. Similarly, the report also needs to
deal explicitly with the issues of nuclear energy (actively being considered in South Africa) which is currently not
mentioned.
The Gender Dimension
The briefing note briefly mentions women in the context of poverty reduction (p5). But the issue of gender needs to
be dealt with more extensively so that it is firmly in the mainstream, crosscutting all the major issues This is not just
to alleviate the specific burden on women (although this is important, going far beyond the collection of firewood),
but for reasons of economic efficiency. According to the World Health Organisation (and contrary to popular
belief ) more people die each year from household pollution than AIDS and malaria combined; however, despite
their central role as household managers, women remain largely disempowered from making rational decisions
regarding household energy choices. For example, the continuing focus on extending grid electricity undermines
the range of cost-effective energy choices facing poor, rural, often female-headed, households. More positively,
suitably empowered women could be a crucial driver in many of the small-scale linkages (for households, business
and agriculture) necessary to entrench a dynamic green revolution at the grassroots level that is crucial to realising
the double zero ambition.
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LEAPFROGGING AFRICAN AGRICULTURE TO HIGHER

PRODUCTIVITY, LESS GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION
AND LESS CLIMATE SENSITIVE PRODUCTION SYSTEMS,
AN AFRICAN BASED CLIMATE SMART AGRICULTURAL
REVOLUTION
By Rudy Rabbinge
The present status of agriculture as described in the 2014 African Agriculture Status report presented at the
African Green Revolution Forum in Ethiopia last September, showed a very mixed picture. There are already typical
examples of countries and regions where farming systems make enormous progress such as farming communities
in Rwanda and Ethiopia. The combination of an advisory, facilitating and stimulating government and private
investment by primary producers has demonstrated to be a good way for a substantial increase in agricultural
productivity and increased food security. Those examples are still exceptional.
The general picture of African agriculture is not substantial different from the analysis and diagnosis formulated
in the Inter Academy Council Report of 2004. Now ten years later some progress has been made but the general
picture of an African Green Revolution is still not much different from 10 years ago.
In the IAC report Realizing the promise and potential of African agriculture, it was clearly demonstrated that
more than 20 different causes/reasons hindered/provided the progress of African agriculture. Basically there are
limitations in four domains, agro technology, institutions and financing, inadequate capacity and absence of
political will.
The green revolution in Europe and the US in the fifties and in Asia and Latin America were present in three
crops, rice, wheat and maize. The productivity rise increased from 4-8 kg/ha/year to 80-150 kg/ha/year. The food
systems were dominated by these three crops representing 70-80 % of all food. Not so in Africa where many more
crops and cropping systems are present. The majority of productivity increase in Asia took place in young alluvial
soils in river basins or coastal plains. Again not so in Africa where weathered and old infertile soils dominate. The
absence of investment in soil fertility caused at many places in Africa out mining of soils and many farmers and
farming communities were catched in an unsustainability spiral. Seeds, soils and water were far from optimal. And
appropriate agronomical measures were impossible due to lack of knowledge, expertise and absence of capacity.
The multitude of farming systems, the important role of root and tuber crops and animal husbandry in these
systems required other knowledge and skills than the farming systems dominating in Asia and Europe.
Agro technology tuned to the specific possibilities and potentials of African farming systems, especially those
which are most promising, were recommended by the Inter Academy Council panel and a production ecological
approach was advised. In production ecology the integration of all disciplines is crucial and plant breeding, soil
science, crop protection, plant nutrition are combined adopting a unifying concept, using a unifying methodology,
a combination of simulation and experimentation, and a unifying approach, the systems approach. Unfortunately in
many cases such an approach is absent and mono-disciplinary approaches, for example plant breeding, dominate.
The future of African agricultural systems requires the production ecological approach as such an approach
is leading to much higher productivity as is demonstrated in many countries and regions, it will minimize
environmental side effects as efficiency and efficacy of the use of external inputs is maximized. Those systems are
much less vulnerable for climate change and more volatile when circumstances change. Mitigation and adaptation
are in such systems core characteristics.
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Agro technological improvement can only be adopted when institutions and financing systems are in place that
stimulate the investments needed and guide their application. Institution building, including functioning local
and regional markets, are crucial for the upsurge of productivity and adoption, implementation and up scaling of
the advanced production ecological systems. There are already typical examples, such as in Ethiopia and parts of
Nigeria and Ghana where this works but expansion and bigger scale application is urgently needed.
That requires also sufficient capacity at all levels. In the IAC report it was demonstrated that the absence of sufficient
capacity at all levels, academic, vocational, practical, is one of the reasons for the extremely low productivity.
Capacity building at all levels with broad programs and in practice training are needed to fulfil that gap. That
requires much public investment and broad schooling and training programs. Various individual projects have
shown already considerable impact but a much broader approach as described in CAADP is not yet functioning.
That capacity can build on the present available knowledge, such as endogenous knowledge but that is certainly
not enough. Therefore a good mix of endogenous knowledge and science based skills may be most effective.
In that case bans such as on GMOs or pesticides are absent, preconceived ideas such as low external input
agricultural or agro-ecological approaches, are critically used and myths such as the strong believe in the strength
of autonomous developments, and in that way efficient systems, is replaced by sound in depth analysis and strong
science based approaches. Programs of capacity building comprising all components, science and academic trained
specialists, strong vocational educated specialist and practisers combined in productivity oriented programs are
needed.
To implement the components laying the basis for an African based, characterized and led green revolution it is
necessary to have a strong political will and adequate leadership. That is urgently needed. The public and private
interest in agriculture and agribusiness has increased considerably, the willingness to invest is there, there is a
growing conviction that the realisation of the promise and potential of African agriculture is possible this decade.
However the enabling environment and political support are crucial. It is for that reason that the African Progress
Panel has to emphasize that the commitment of 2003 in the Maputo declaration and the acceptance and adoption
of the IAC report in 2004, should be fulfilled. That is certainly not yet the situation. There is still underinvestment in
agriculture, no leadership in market development, no strong support for capacity building and too little support for
new innovative financing systems.
To summarize:
Adopt a production ecological approach.

Revisit and actualize the recommendations from the Inter Academy Council report of 2004.
Eliminate bans, myths and preconceived ideas that hinder progress, dynamics and the way forward.
Finetune the activities, agro technological institutions, capacity building to the dominating and most promising
farming systems.
Do envisage climate change as a challenge and a chance, through the development of farming systems
with considerable less greenhouse gas emission and much more volatility to climate change. Use the typical
examples of success as first movers.
46
CLIMATE CHANGE AND SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

By Abebe Selassie
Climate change matters greatly for sub-Saharan Africa
Climate change is a matter of particular concern for most sub-Saharan African countries for a number of reasons.1
A large share of the regions population lives in rural areas (see text figure) and depends directly on rain-fed
agriculture for income. The variability in rainfall that climate change engenders is likely to also lead to income and
consumption volatility. With hardly any savings to rely upon, for most farmers this can have huge consequences on
livelihoods and indeed survival prospects. More worrisome still, climate change is expected to an increase in
the frequency of extreme weather events and natural disasters in the region. Sub-Saharan African countries are
region perhaps least well-positioned placed to deal with such large exogenous shocks.
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And yet, there is little the region can do to avert climate change
Preventing climate change will require considerable international cooperation and policy coordination, which has
yet to fall in place. There are several reasons for this:2
Many countries with high fossil fuel-based emissions have yet to agree to curb these meaningfully;
There is a temporal mismatch between when the emission occurs and its impact is feltand indeed it is past
emissions which account for most of the prospective damage to the environment and the climate change.
There are sharp asymmetries between where emissions emanate and where they will likely have the most
impact. OECD countries account for nearly 38 percent of global emissions and a further 25 percent is generated
by China. In contrast, regions such as sub-Saharan Africa contribute to very small share of global emissions but
would likely be most impacted (in terms of GDP, shares of population).
What can sub-Saharan African countries do?
A multi-faceted approach will be necessary for the region to deal with climate change. For starters, in the division of
responsibilities, mechanisms, and resource mobilization at the global level that is going to be necessary to deal with
climate change, there needs to be acknowledgement and financing for the required new investments and other
expenditures by African countries in the years to come.3 But what can countries do that is within their control? In
many cases, reform of the domestic energy sector, where there is much inefficiency and waste is a strong candidate
for generating savings that can be directed to increased power generation. The rest of this note considers this issue.
The Problem
One of the key challenges in sub-Saharan Africa is the need to generate more energy. Currently, power generation
and access levels remain well below those in low-income countries in other regions. To facilitate greater energy
consumption, governments in many countries subsidize fuel and electricity consumption. But these subsidies
absorb a large share of public resources and the beneficiaries tend to be the better off segments of the population.
Take fuel prices, since end-2008, they have increased by less than global fuel prices have, resulting in a median fiscal
costs of some 1.6 percent of GDP. The level of subsidies varies across countries, with the regions fuel exporting
countries generally having higher levels of subsidies (see text figure). 4
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Similarly, subsidies for electricity services are common in the region. Effective power tariffs are generally set well
below the historical average cost of supplying electricity. And because electricity provision is subject to production
and distribution losses as well as user fee under- collection problems, residential tariffs in many countries are much
higher than in other regions of the world while only covering only about 70 percent of the cost of power. The
implicit fiscal cost averaged around 1.7 percent of GDP in 2009.
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Who Benefits from Existing Policies?
Energy subsidies do of course facilitate higher fuel consumption and electricity use than would otherwise be the
case in the region. However, the main beneficiaries tend to be people in higher income brackets. This is largely
because
fuel and electricity consumption in the region is highly skewed toward higher income households. Available data
show that poorer households consume directly a much smaller share of the total fuel and electricity supplied. For
example, on average, the households in the top consumption quintile capture almost 45 percent of the benefits
of fuel subsidies, while the poorer segments of the population receive less than 10 percent of the subsidy benefits.
Besides relatively higher income households have better access to energy resources
(particularly electricity in urban areas), contributing to this outcome.
Reform and Policy Options
While energy subsidies mostly benefit the better off, their removal can potentially hurt the poor significantly
because their share of income spent in energy consumption is very similar. Hence, subsidy removal should be
accompanied by compensating measures aiming at mitigating the impact on the sectors of the population with
the lowest income. Also, removing subsidies has proved difficult for economic and social reasons. The subsequent
increases in energy prices may hurt productive capacity and competitive losses, while affecting inflation.
In spite of these drawbacks, many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have engaged in the process of reforming
their regulatory frameworks for the prices of energy, including the elimination of subsidies. Countries that
have attempted to remove fuel subsidies include Ghana, Namibia, Niger and Nigeria. Kenya and Uganda have
undertaken actions to remove electricity subsidies. Several lessons from these actions have emerged.
First, transparency and public communication on the size of energy subsidies and their beneficiaries is
instrumental to jump-start the process. In Nigeria for example, the government disclosed that fuel subsidies
outlays exceeded capital expenditures
Second, careful preparation of the public and consultation with stakeholders is essential for success. In Kenya,
consultation with unions allowed the reform to proceed without retrenchment of the staff in the utilities, and a
clear commitment to expand electricity supply with the proceedings was made.
Third, gradual phasing and sequencing appears to work best. This allows for prices to adjust smoothly and
50
facilitates consumers to adapt to those adjustments, gathering more support from the general public. In Kenya,
subsidies were eliminated over the course of
78 years through improved collection, tariff increases and reductions in waste.
Fourth, strong institutions are needed to prevent a reversion of policy. The elaboration and enforcement of a
regulatory framework proved essential in Tanzania, for example.
Fifth, other policies must accompany price reductions. To break the cycle of underinvestment, poor
maintenance and high costs of production and distribution of energy, it is key to create an environment that
facilitates efficiency gains. This calls for supportive policy actions such as reducing public debt levels, invest in
more efficient technologies, and promote regional pools with the engagement of the private sector.
Sixth, credibility of alternative safety nets substituting the subsidies for the poorest segments of the population
is a must. Supporting mechanisms should be implemented such as conditional cash transfers, accompanied by
improvements in the quality of energy provision.
Notes
1. See Collier and others (2008).
2. See IMF, 2008: The Fiscal Implications of Climate Change http://www.imf.org/external/pp/longres.aspx?id=4238
3. See IMF, 2009: Financing the Response to Climate Change,http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2010/spn1006.pdf
4. See Alleyne, T. (2013) and references therein.
References
1. Alleyne, T. (2013), Energy Subsidy Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa: Experiences and Lessons, African Department, International Monetary
Fund, Washington, D.C.
2. Arze del Granado, J., D. Coady and R. Gillingham, 2010, The Unequal Benefi ts of Fuel Subsidies: A Review of Evidence for Developing
Countries, World Development 40(11), pp. 22342248.
3. Briceo-Garmendia, C. and M. (2011), Power Tariffs: Caught between Cost Recovery and Affordability, World Bank Policy Research Working
Paper 5904, World Bank, Washington, D.C.
4. Collier, P., G. Conway and T. Venables (2008), Climate Change and Africa, Oxford
5. Review of Economic Policy 24(2), pp. 337-353.
51
THE ROLE OF AGRICULTURE IN AN AFRICAN AGENDA FOR

LOW-CARBON DEVELOPMENT*
By Tesfai Tecle
Among the challenges currently facing humanity two critical ones stem from changes occurring within global
food and climate systems. The 2008 food price crisis and the clear signs of global warming, which the majority
of scientists have warned that they are symptomatic of deeper and longer term changes, have brought food
and nutrition security and climate change to the top of international agenda. Since agriculture has significant
roles in both, it is imperative that agricultural initiatives address the two challenges together rather that in
isolation from each other.
With agriculture contributing about 30% of developing countries GDP and 65% of employment (80% for
Africa), the impact of climate change on agriculture has repercussions on livelihoods, food production,
degradation of ecosystems and the overall economies of countries particularly those with agriculture-
based economies, such as Africa. At the same time, agriculture is an important source of greenhouse gas
emissions(17% of the global total) although it, fortunately, also holds significant climate change mitigation
potential through reduction of GHG emissions as well as enhancement of sequestration through appropriate
agricultural practices. Moreover, farmers constitute the largest group of natural resources managers on earth.
According to FAOs Main Text, agriculture is broadly defined to include crops, livestock, fisheries and forestry.
For purposes of this Expert Consultation, the term agriculture is used to include all land-use activities involving
the cultivation, production, and processing of food, fuel and fibre, as well as utilization of oceanic resources and
other water bodies.
Agriculture is characterized by a number of special features that distinguish it from other sectors, such as: the
sectors role in producing food and meeting survival needs; its context and site-specific nature that makes
uniform strategies and solutions ineffective; its relative vulnerability to being directly affected by climate
change compared with most other sectors; its adaptation needs and mitigation potential (mainly through
sequestration); and its complex links to food security, trade and broader land-use and forestry policies.
The projected increase of the worlds population to at least 9 billion people and the rise in global calorie intake
by 60% due to greater affluence, by 2050, as well as the rising demands on land for the generation food,
fibre and fuels, will require significant increases in agricultural productivity under conditions of economic
and financial uncertainty and growing competition for the increasingly limited natural resources. Under
such growing demands, a carbon-neutral agricultural sector may be difficult to achieve in the short term.
Nevertheless, it would be appropriate to focus policy interventions on meeting African as well as global
agricultural production requirements without commensurate increases in emissions. For example, climate
change mitigation could be achieved through greater efficiency in agricultural production practices hence,
lowering the emissions intensity per unit of production (for example per litre of milk or per Kg. of meat),
and in some cases through absolute reductions in greenhouse gas emissions including removal through
sequestration in agricultural soils and biomass.
There is of course a potential risk with raising the profitability of agricultural lands through improved efficiency
in that it can act as an incentive to expand them, often at the expense of forests. Policy makers would, therefore,
need to adopt dynamic approaches to deal with the interconnected multiple objectives of meeting agriculture
and adaptation needs, forest conservation goals, and climate mitigation targets. Recent methodologies of
integrated land-use planning and landscape approaches could help in the development of appropriate policies
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that allow integration of multiple goals although their introduction in Africa has so far been limited to few
countries.
Although there is, recently, a widespread recognition that the challenges of food & nutrition security
and climate change are closely linked within the agriculture sector, related policy measures, institutional
arrangements and funding channels are poorly coordinated at both the national and international levels,
particularly in Africa. In accordance with the Cancun Agreements of the 16th session of COP of the UNFCCC,
countries were encouraged to launch on their own early national actions to increase their capacities and
knowledge to engage in agricultural adaptation and mitigation practices that safeguard food & nutrition
security and enhance overall development, while international negotiations on the details on financing,
support mechanisms, measurement issues, etc. continue. It is in this context the concept of climate-smart
agriculture was launched at The Hague in November 2010 during the 1st Global Conference on Agriculture,
Food Security and Climate Change with a keynote speech by Kofi Annan. Climate-smart agriculture seeks to
maximize benefits and minimize negative trade-offs across the multiple objectives that agriculture is being
called on to address, i.e., global food & nutrition security, sustaining rural livelihoods, contributing to overall
development, and climate change adaptation & mitigation. Its key elements include: increasing productivity
and the resilience of agricultural systems, reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and enhancing
sequestration, and managing interface with other land-uses.
There is no blue-print for climate-smart agriculture, but under the early action measures, there is scope for
countries and communities to increase their capacities and knowledge to engage in agricultural adaptation
and mitigation in nationally appropriate ways that safeguard food & nutrition security and enhance overall
development - if provided with essential financial, technical and technological support. For example,
policy-makers could be supported to identify and promote practices that enable agriculture to contribute
simultaneously to climate change, food & nutrition security, and other development goals, while farmers can
be assisted to run demonstration activities on appropriate agricultural production systems that would generate
data for use in formulating long-term national strategies to promote climate-smart agriculture broadly. There
is scope as well for emissions reduction throughout the food value chain, beyond farming. For example, better
and efficient post-harvest storage and distribution systems could have significant mitigating impact of GHG
emissions.
Feeding the growing worlds population in a context of agricultural systems constrained by climate change will
require significant expansion of trans-border exchange of agricultural products since the imbalance between
supply and demand of food is projected to increase. Climate change will, thus, affect comparative advantages
in agriculture. Trading patterns are likely to change as the result of variations in yields and prices, with prices
most likely being driven up, which in turn could lead to significant changes in global trade flows. It would be,
therefore, essential to ensure mutually supportive approaches between climate change and trade policies
as they relate to agriculture. Trade combined with increased investment in agricultural production can help
address imbalances of supply and demand and make food available in world markets by offsetting climate-
induced production decreases in certain regions. Africa, the region where livelihoods are intricately related
to farming and where there is the greatest potential to benefit from the supply side of the imbalances - if
appropriate climate-smart agricultural practices are adopted, could benefit from international trade systems
that encourage appropriate flexibilities in liberalization agreements combined with productivity-enhancing
measures to deal with market failures and imperfect institutions. Unfortunately, existing multilateral trade rules
pose major challenges and are unlikely to be breached by good-faith climate change policies. However, many
potential conflicts could be avoided if consensus on a global climate change framework is reached in Paris next
year.
Adopting agricultural practices that are able to withstand changes in climate and contribute to the reduction
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of greenhouse gas emissions require the application of new technologies and changes in relevant laws and
policies. However, introduction of new technologies and associated capacity building have significant cost
implications for which most developing countries in general, and Africa in particular, will need financial
support. Under the Cancun Agreement, developing countries had confirmed their commitment to provide
new and additional resources starting with an initial annual amount of $30 billion for the period 2010-2012
and reaching $100 billion by 2020. So far, progress in mobilizing the promised financial resources has been
very disappointing, even if one takes into account the prevailing difficult economic situation in several OECD
countries. Although Africa is likely to benefit from a scaled-up flow of international climate finance in the future,
it is unlikely to be adequate to address the investment needs for adaptation and mitigation. It will, therefore, be
necessary for African governments to use public funds strategically to remove investment barriers and facilitate
private investment and to effectively blend traditional agricultural finance with climate finance.
Given the need to increase food and agricultural production significantly in the future, efficiency-accounting
approaches that incentivise increased food output while reducing the intensity of greenhouse gas emissions
per unit of output are very relevant. Efficiency-accounting methods measure emissions intensity per unit
of output. Unfortunately, the method is data-demanding, and African countries are hampered by lack of
availability of reliable data and their limited measurement capacities. Although there is yet no international
consensus on indicators, frameworks and methods for measurement of performance and benefits of
adaptation and mitigation, the inadequacy of information in the African context is hampering improvements
in capacities for reliable estimation of emissions, for example. If Africa is to benefit significantly from future
climate finance resources where MRV (monitoring, reporting and verification) is a requirement, there will be a
need for more investment in agricultural monitoring and evaluation capacity and research activities to improve
greenhouse data availability by strengthening existing agricultural monitoring & evaluation systems.
The Global Oceans Action Summit for Food Security and Blue Growth, held at The Hague in April of this year
states eighty percent of all life on the planet is found in oceans.and the oceans provide a global life
support system that helps regulate climate As regards food & nutrition security, the oceans are the main
source of fish which contributes close to 20% of the animal protein consumed by the worlds population.
According to FAO, 3 billion people depend on fish for 20% of their average per capita intake of animal protein.
Moreover, about 800 million people are dependent on fisheries for their livelihoods, a large majority of them
small fishermen and fish-handlers. Today, as with other sectors in agriculture, fisheries are being affected by
climate change, in addition to the serious problems of overfishing, habitat change and pollution. Actions
to solve these problems have been unsuccessful so far, but Blue Growth initiatives hold a lot of promise,
especially sustainable development efforts of fish farming and aquaculture of which coastal African countries
stand to potentially benefit the most.
Main conclusions: the impacts of climate change on agriculture have severe repercussions on economic
activities, livelihoods and food production, particularly in agriculture-dependent societies such as in Africa. At
the same time, the agriculture sector holds significant climate change mitigation potential through reduction
GHG emissions and enhancement of sequestration. Climate change adaptation and mitigation will, therefore,
have to be pursued in the context of meeting projected food production demands. Although there is as yet
no international agreement for policy frameworks within which to operate, there are some practices that hold
great potential:
1. Transformation of agriculture to meet growing demands for food provides opportunities to build synergies
and manage trade-offs across the multiple objectives of food & nutrition security and climate change
adaptation & mitigation. Since a carbon-neutral agricultural sector is likely to be unrealistic to achieve, it
may be more appropriate to focus policy interventions on meeting food & nutrition security by enhancing
climate resilience of production and distribution systems without commensurate increase in emissions.
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2. By using tested practices, new technologies and systems that are already available, agriculture offers
opportunities to deliver simultaneously on improving agricultural resilience to climate change. However,
these will need incentives from climate finance, or other sources, to ensure adoption especially in the
African context.
3. Finance, technology and capacity building are essential to motivate large-scale adaptation efforts and
emission reductions from the agricultural sector. Technology development, institutional strengthening,
increased capacity building, and dedicated financial support can promote more sustainable and climate-
friendly agricultural practices.
4. Strengthening existing agricultural monitoring and evaluation systems is essential for implementing
effective climate response measures and for climate performance and benefit measurements.
* Sources: various FAO, IFPRI and World Bank reports on climate change and food security, and working papers of the
Technical Working Group of the Alliance for Climate-Smart Agriculture (on which I am a member).
55
AFRICA: CHALLENGES AND PROGRESS

By Lars Thunell
Introduction
Africa has experienced enormous positive change over the last decade. However, there is still considerable progress
to be made in dismantling the barriers to growth and development the Continent faces. In this paper, we will focus
on two critical long-term challenges to Africas development- infrastructure and power generation, and finance
for small and medium enterprises - and outline potential approaches for addressing them. We will also cover the
outbreak of the Ebola Virus Disease, a critical challenge facing Africa in the short term.
Infrastructure and power generation
Africas infrastructure-whether transport, communications or power generation-significantly lags behind that of

other emerging regions. For instance, it is estimated that the road density per thousand square kilometres in Africa
is barely one fifth that seen in the BRICs. Africas per capita power consumption is estimated to be only 1% of that
of high income countries and is actually falling because population growth exceeds growth in new supply. Some
estimates put Nigerias total grid capacity at a level sufficient only to run one refrigerator for every thirty people.
The Continents infrastructure gap places tangible restrictions on growth and development, slowing diversification
and economic migration up the value chain and hampering the development of large scale industrialisation. The
World Bank estimates that Africas infrastructure deficit holds back its economic growth by 2% each year. Poor
infrastructure also restricts access to global markets, including other African countries.
Unfortunately, in the past, countries have often resorted to short-term solutions to address some of their most
pressing infrastructure challenges; for example building diesel power plants which are quick to erect and
relatively cheap. However, these plants tend to run for a limited time only, have proved to be highly costly from an
operational and fuel perspective and emit high levels of pollution. These short term solutions impose higher costs
on households and businesses. It is estimated that Africas firms lose over 5% of sales as a result of ongoing power
outages. In the informal sector, losses can climb to 20% of sales in the absence of costly backup generation facilities.
The World Bank estimates that Africa needs to invest about US$ 93 billion annually to close its infrastructure gap.
Among the challenges faced, power is the largest and most pressing, accounting for roughly half the forecasted
funding requirement. Africa accounts for one sixth of the worlds population but generates only 4% of its electricity
and the World Bank estimates that around 500m Africans are without modern energy.
Progress has accelerated. Despite the disruption caused by the Financial Crisis, investment levels are on the rise,
driven by structural reforms in a number of countries. Countries such as Ghana, Nigeria and Kenya have undertaken
significant programmes to improve key sectors of infrastructure in their countries. The combination of structural
reforms, robust regulatory regimes, strong contracts and concessions, and demonstrations of commitment and
predictability from African governments are catalyzing private investment into the Continent.
However, substantial challenges remain. Most countries in Sub Saharan Africa are still at a nascent stage of
attracting international capital on a scale sufficient to fund their substantial infrastructure requirements. Africa
will for some time need credit enhancements. Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) including the African
Development Bank (AfDB) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) have historically anchored most
infrastructure deals. Multilaterals such as the World Bank Group (including the Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency and the International Development Association) provide political risk insurance, cover contract frustration,
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non-honoring of sovereign obligations, transferability, convertibility, and civil disturbance risks. Experience shows
that commercial banks are willing to lend against this cover if the other aspects of an infrastructure project are also
sound.
However, debt provided by DFIs and by banks with the support of Multilaterals will not be adequate to finance the
vast number of transactions that are needed to truly address Africas infrastructure needs. Heavy reliance on DFIs
is often where developing economies start out in their search for financial liquidity, but Africa is now at a turning
point where Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) and commercial banks need to play a larger role by increasing their
appetite for risk on the Continent.
Given the stronger regulatory and contractual environment, ECAs and commercial banks are becoming more
comfortable with the credit risks involved in longer term infrastructure financings. This increased ECA and bank
involvement serves as a critical bridge in the maturing of Africas ability to tap various liquidity pools. But more
needs to be done.
Standard Chartered Bank is committed to working with our partners to address these problems and help accelerate
the flow of private finance to support investment in vital infrastructure. In 2013, the US government launched the
Power Africa initiative to develop 10,000 MW of new generation capacity across seven Sub-Saharan countries over
the next five years, bringing electricity to 20 million households who currently do not have access to power. We are
proud to be the largest private sector contributor to Power Africa and has increased its funding commitment to
$5bn, having made robust progress on our original target of $2bn in under 12 months. We expect to support the
delivery of an additional 7,500 MW of power to Africa-more than the current generation capacity of Nigeria and
Cote DIvoire combined.
As part of Power Africa, we have structured and provided thought leadership on risk mitigation for a number of
important deals, many of which are being done on an Independent Power Purchase basis for the first time. These
include:
The Azura-Edo Independent Power Project in Nigeria: Targeted for completion in 2017, the 450MW Azura-
Edo open cycle gas turbine power station is setting an industry standard in legal and regulatory frameworks for
other developing power plants to follow, and will create over 1,000 jobs within the local community;
Okija Power Project in Nigeria: This 495MW plant will use domestic natural gas to generate electricity in
south-eastern Nigeria
Zambian Energy Corporation in Zambia: Our investment into the Zambian Energy Corporations regional
operation, CEC Africa (CECA), will help CECAs infrastructure expansion in a number of Sub-Saharan countries.
We believe there is potential to unlock further funding for African infrastructure if initiatives like Power Africa can
be complemented by action by African governments to put in place the right framework to support investment.
Measures could include:
Clear rules and investor safeguards;
Meticulous adherence to timelines. This is crucial for generating investor confidence, as are the right central
government guarantees for obligations under infrastructure concessions or public private partnership
contracts;
Well-planned privatisations with proper unbundling of infrastructure assets and competition where
appropriate (for instance in power generation);
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Effective and transparent market regulation;
Tariff rationalisation to ensure that returns on assets reflect their actual costs;
Development of infrastructure projects on a regional level, which will improve efficiency and help attract
private funding (for smaller markets in particular);
The establishment of a ministry of infrastructure, charged with coordinating and supporting all private sector
infrastructure investment, would be of great benefit in countries that have major infrastructure deficits. It is
essential that governments have a clear understanding of investor demands and are able to develop investor-
ready projects;
Involving local banks and encouraging new entrants to the thinned ranks of project finance banks should be
an objective of both policymakers and project sponsors.
Donor governments and multilateral institutions can also build on the strong role they already play, for instance, by
expanding their political risk guarantee cover and increasing their appetite for smaller deals.
Finance for small and medium enterprises
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are a critical driver of Africas growth and the spread of opportunity. They
account for as much as 40 per cent of the Continents GDP and half of its employment. Yet far too many SMEs
struggle to get the financing they need to maximise their potential. The AfDB estimates that SMEs across Sub-
Saharan Africa could face a funding gap of up to $140bn. Surveys suggest that access to finance is by far the largest
constraint of SME growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, with 25 per cent of companies reporting it as the most important
barrier to business. Addressing these constraints is essential both to unleash the full productive potential of African
economies and to ensure that accelerating growth is translated into rising employment and shared prosperity.
Informality, a lack of transparent information, poor legal frameworks and creditor rights and a lack of adequate
knowledge, systems and funding for SME business in the financial sector all contribute to Africas SME funding
gap. Partly as a result of high start up costs and onerous and expensive business registration procedures, the
majority of African SMEs are informal, significantly limiting their ability to access formal banking services, a
problem exacerbated by the frequent lack of transparent audited accounts. Challenges with property registration
and legal enforcement mechanisms that make it difficult for banks to secure loans effectively against assets limit
some financial institutions willingness to lend. Importantly, many banks also lack the knowledge, systems and
experienced staff to effectively engage and assess potential small business customers. Often as a result, SME
lending is restricted, tenors can be short-the AfDB suggests that almost 60 per cent of SME loans have a tenor of less
than one year-and costs charged to SMEs can be high.
Standard Chartered has significant experience banking African SMEs. We serve over 100,000 SMEs in eight Sub-
Saharan countries and have increased our loans to SMEs in Africa by 27 per cent a year over the last five years. In
a number of our markets, we are among the main lenders to SMEs. Our work with small businesses in Africa forms
part of the broader commitment we have made to increase our loans to SMEs globally by 45% over the five years
from 2013.
Our experience suggests that as with infrastructure, a number of policy measures could help support better access
to finance for SMEs, including the strengthening of legal frameworks. Credit guarantee schemes could also play an
important role, especially in markets where SME lending is not commercially viable.
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Ebola
The outbreak of the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) unfolding in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone is one of the critical
short-term challenges facing the Continent. If collective action by both national governments and the international
community, and public and private sector is able to contain and arrest the outbreak, develop vaccines or
treatments, and support these nations in rebuilding, the region will have averted a major obstacle to growth and
development, as well as humanitarian disaster.
There is much excellent and informed commentary on the international response and what could be done to
strengthen it, but improved education, co-ordination, and experienced logistical support are increasingly critical.
Standard Chartered has been heavily involved in efforts to contain the outbreak and manage its impact in Sierra
Leone as the only international bank with a presence in the country. We are working closely with the authorities,
multilateral institutions and non-profits and with other multinational companies to support efforts to combat
the spread of the disease and help sustain economic activity during the outbreak. Our on-the-ground experience
suggests that more could potentially be done-both in country and at headquarters level- to engage with private
sector actors and co-ordinate their efforts.
The challenges the affected countries and the international community have faced in co-ordinating the response
to the Ebola outbreak also raise a broader issue. Africa is one of the regions of the World most at risk from natural
disasters and a changing climate: for instance, 14 of the 20 countries assessed to be most vulnerable to effects of
climate change are African. Yet it is among the least prepared. According to the World Development Report, the
majority of Sub-Saharan countries are in the bottom quintile for risk preparation. The weakness of the regions
infrastructure poses challenges, hindering countries ability to mitigate risk and to manage disasters when they
occur. As the World Bank highlighted in its report Building Resilience last year, more needs to be done both at
national and international level to integrate climate adaptation and disaster risk planning into Africas development
to help Africa countries to improve their resilience, to strengthen their ability to adapt to and prepare for risks and
to put in place capacity to manage situations once they occur.
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ENERGY AND AFRICAS TRANSITION TO A LOW CARBON

ECONOMY
By Kevin Urama
1. Introduction
1.1 Climate change is considered by many to be the most pressing challenge facing the human society today,
yet total anthropogenic Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions have continued to increase over 1970 to 2010 with
larger absolute decadal increases toward the end of this period. Total anthropogenic GHG emissions were the
highest in human history from 2000 to 2010 with about half of cumulative CO2 emissions between 1750 and 2010
occurring in the last 40 years (IPCC 2014). This is in spite of a growing number of climate change mitigation policies
and investments in climate smart technologies during the period.
1.2 Economic growth (income per capita), population growth, energy intensity of GDP, and carbon intensity
of energy systems continue to be the major drivers of GHG emissions globally (IPCC 2014). About 47% of the
increased CO2 emissions between 2000 and 2010 directly come from energy supply, with industry, transport and
buildings contributing 30%, 11% and 3% respectively. CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and industrial
processes contributed about 78% of the total GHG emission increase from 1970 to 2010.
1.3 Africa is the most vulnerable continent to climate variability and change. Africas vulnerability is aggravated
by the interaction of multiple stressors including high dependence on rain-fed agriculture, widespread poverty
and weak adaptive capacity. The effects of climate change on rural African communities are likely to be severe,
with reductions in crop yields and livestock productivity, shortages of drinking water, spread of diseases such as
malaria, reduced potential for hydro- generation of electricity, large-scale migration of climate change refugees and
subsequent civil conflicts and unrest. For example, the estimated drought related economic losses in Djibouti over
the period 2008-2011 were equivalent to average 3.9% per year of GDP. The overall effects of the 2008-2011 drought
in Kenya was estimated at Ksh. 968.6 billion (US$12.1 billion) which includes Ksh. 64.4 billion (US$805.6 million) for
the destruction of physical and durable assets, and Ksh. 904.1 billion (US$11.3 billion) for losses in the flows of the
economy across all sectors. The value of damage and losses caused by rainfall deficit conditions in Uganda in 2010
and 2011 is estimated at 2.8 trillion Shillings or US$ 1.2 billion. This amount is equivalent to 7.5% of the countrys
gross domestic product (GDP) in 2010. For Africa, climate change is real and its impacts are already affecting socio-
economic development negatively. Accelerated climatic changes are expected to lead to potentially large impacts
across Africa in the future (Annex 1).
1.4 Mitigation and adaptation can positively or negatively influence the achievement of other societal goals.
This includes goals related to human health, food security, biodiversity, local environmental quality, energy access,
livelihoods, and equitable sustainable development; and vice versa.
1.5 Potential global responses to the challenge are therefore complex and multi-faceted involving a range
of changes in development processes and pathways, human lifestyles, ways of doing business, land use and
industrial production activities. Due to the significant proportion of global Green House Gas (GHG) emissions that
are related to the burning of fossil fuels for energy production and the difficulty in decoupling energy consumption
and economic growth, development and deployment of low carbon energy technologies has remained central
themes in climate change adaptation and mitigation science and policy discussions, but implementation remain
slow.
1.6 For African countries, the challenges might be even more complex than in other developing countries. To
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contextualize the specific challenges faced by Africa in transitioning to a low carbon economy, I have summarized
a number of stylized facts below: first setting out the role of energy systems in the global climate change, as
extracted from IPCC 2014 reports (Box 1) and second on the current and future outlooks of Africas energy systems
as extracted from various reports (Box 2):
Box 1: Some Stylized Facts from the IPCC Reports
The energy supply sector contributed approximately 35% of total anthropogenic GHG emissions
in 2010, the highest of all known drivers of climate change. This is due to higher energy demand
associated with rapid economic growth and an increase of the share of coal in the global fuel mix.
Without active policies, this is set to grow.
Multiple options exist to reduce energy supply sector GHG emissions, including (i) energy
efficiency improvements and fugitive emission reductions in fuel extraction as well as in energy
conversion, transmission, and distribution systems; (ii) fossil fuel switching; and (iii) lowGHG
energy supply technologies such as renewable energy (RE), nuclear power, and carbon dioxide
capture and storage (CCS).
A fundamental transformation of the energy supply system is required to stabilize GHG

concentrations at low levels. This includes longterm substitution of unabated fossil fuel
conversion technologies by lowGHG alternatives.
The use of Renewable Energy (RE) options offer a number of co-benefits such as a reduction of air
pollution, local employment opportunities, few severe accidents compared to some other forms
of energy supply, as well as improved energy access and security. Some RE technologies can have
technology and locationspe- cific adverse side effects, though those can be reduced to a degree
through appropriate technology selection, operational adjustments, and siting of facilities.
Nuclear energy is a lowGHG emission technology with specific emissions below 100 gCO2eq per
kWh on a lifecycle basis and with currently more than 400 operational nuclear reactors worldwide.
Share of nuclea r energy in world power generation has declined from 17% to 11% in 1993 and
2012, respectively. This has been due to increasing concerns about operational safety and (nuclear
weapon) proliferation risks, unre- solved waste management issues as well as financial and
regulatory risks.
Carbon dioxide capture and storage technologies could reduce the specific CO2eq lifecycle
emissions of fossil power plants but this is yet to be applied to a large scale due to concerns about
the operational safety and longterm integrity of CO2 storage as well as transport risks.
Bioenergy coupled CCS (BECCS) offers the prospect of energy supply with negative emissions.
Where natural gas is available and the fugitive emissions associated with its extraction and supply
are low, nearterm GHG emissions from energy supply can be reduced by replacing coalfired with
highly efficient natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) power plants or combined heat and power
(CHP) plants.
In general, evidence suggest that Direct GHG emissions from the fossil fuel chain can be reduced
through various measures, including the capture or oxidation of coal bed methane, the reduction
of venting and flaring in oil and gas systems, as well as energy efficiency improvements and the
use of lowGHG energy sources in the fuel chain. In the longer term, GHG pricing can support the
adoption of lowGHG energy technologies due to the resulting fuel and technologydependent
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mark up in marginal costs. Technology policies (e.g., feedin tariffs, quotas, and tendering/bidding)
have proven successful in increasing the share of RE technologies.
Capacity building, the removal of financial barriers, the development of a solid legal framework,
and sufficient regulatory stability are pre-requisites for successful energy transition policies.
Property rights, contract enforcement, and emissions accounting are essential for the successful
implementation of climate policies in the energy supply sector.
The energy infrastructure in developing countries, especially in Least Developed Countries (LDCs),
is still un- developed and not diversified. Centralized and distributed energy systems offer varying
co-benefits at various scales including local employment creation, income generation for poverty
alleviation, as well as building muchneeded technical capability and knowledge transfer. There
are also risks in that the distributive impacts of higher prices for lowcarbon energy might become
a burden on lowincome households, thereby undermining energyaccess programs, which can,
however, be addressed by policies to support the poor.
Box 2.1: Africas Current & Future Energy Outlook
Africa generates approximately 3.1% of total world electricity generation and consumes 2.9% of
total consumption.
The same figures for electricity generation and consumption in other regions are: 32.2% and
33.6% in Asia and Oceania; 28.0% and 27.7% in North America; 5.2% and 4.9% in Central and
South America; 20.20% and 20.10% in Europe; 7.70% and 7.30% in Eurasia; and 3.40% and 4.40%
in the Middle East, respectively.
Less than a third of households in the majority of oil- and gas-rich Africa countries have access to
electricity or to clean fuels for cooking.
About 150 000 people, mainly women and children, die prematurely each year in these countries
because of indoor air pollution from burning traditional fuels essentially fuelwood and charcoal
for cooking in inefficient stoves or open fires.
Growth in electricity generation on the continent in the next decade is expected to remain largely
dependent of fossil fuels.
However, renewable energy programs are being developed in both sub-Saharan Africa and the
North Africa regions that may help diversity energy sources for the much-needed economic
growth on the continent.
South African utilizes coal as its primary feedstock in electricity production
Hydropower is the primary resource available for electricity production in Central and Eastern
Africa, with diesel and geothermal resources also utilized in East Africa;
Due to the significant abundance of hydrocarbon deposits in West Africa, the major resource for
energy production in these regions is natural gas and liquid fuels, primarily diesel;
This is also the case for North Africa, however natural gas represents the regions primary feedstock
for electricity generation;
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In total, coal dominates the primary feedstock for electricity generation in Africa (46%), followed
by natural gas (25%), hydro and other renewable energy sources (17%), liquid fuels (10%) and
nuclear (2%).
Box 2.2: Africas Energy Futures
Africa needs to scale up energy infrastructure to strengthen energy security and climate resilience.
Using 2005 as a baseline, the World Bank estimated that Sub-Saharan Africa needs to add 7 GW
of new generation capacity each year through 2015 to meet suppressed demand, keep pace with
projected economic growth, and support the rollout of further electrification. Nearly 31 GW of
generation projects have been planned for the next 5 - 7 years in Sub-Saharan Africa. Although
not sufficient to fully bridge the regions energy deficit, this capacity addition is critical progress.
Once completed, the additions will double the overall installed capacity of the Sub- Saharan
region (excluding South Africa). However, less than 16 GW of additional capacity are currently in
pipeline; an additional 15 GW should therefore be prepared, financed and implemented as soon
as possible.
Oil and gas exports in the top-ten producing sub-Saharan African countries are set to grow
steadily to 2030, providing the means for alleviating poverty and expanding energy access;
Government revenues from oil and gas are set to rise strongly, giving these countries the means
to speed up economic and social development and alleviate poverty. The government take in
the top ten oil- and gas-producing countries is projected to rise from some $80 billion in 2006
to about $250 billion in 2030. Nigeria and Angola account for 86% of the $4.1 trillion cumulative
revenues of all ten countries over 2006-2030. All these countries desperately need sustained and
sustainable economic development.
Africa should be able to maintain its low contribution to global carbon emissions as demand for
energy grows through (i) developing its large hydro resources; (ii) gradual replacement of coal
based power generation by lower carbon emitting fossil fuels such as natural gas and nuclear; and
(iii) development of its significant geothermal, wind, and solar potential.
2. The Paradox
2.1 The IPCC reports identify potential trade-offs in low carbon energy transitions, especially for countries
where the key drivers of CO2 emissions (GDP growth and population) are rapidly increasing. With research
and development and international investment finance increasingly switching to low emissions generation
technologies (renewables, nuclear, and fossil fuels with Carbon Capture and Stor- age (CCS), and energy efficiency
in buildings, transport and industry sectors, the spillover effects could be adverse for fossil fuel exporting
economies in Africa. IPCC 2014 scenarios suggest that higher energy efficiency and shift to low emission sources,
contribute to a reduction in demand for fossil fuels, thus reducing investments in the later. On the other hand, most
developing countries, including Africa, have received particular attention in the low carbon development dialogues
and development interventions for multiple reasons, including inter alia: (i) its relative comparative advantage
in the requisite renewable energy resources, (ii) the potential opportunities to avoid lock in to high carbon
technologies if Africa countries de-carbonize the industrialization process now rather than later. Perhaps,
the most compelling global policy imperative for leap frogging transitions to climate smart clean energy options
in Africa, relates to the potentials of enhancing economic competitiveness through bridging the gaps in
energy access and security on the continent while decoupling economic growth from GHG emission: This is
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achievable if we can find sustainable ways of significantly reducing the energy intensity of GDP and carbon
intensity of energy systems in Africa. Population control policies would also make significant contributions
to the decarburization process.
2.2 While Africas current contributions to global CO2 emissions remain low (below 4%), the carbon footprint
of the continent has grown significantly during the past decade following increased growth rates in Gross
Domestic Products (GDP) of many African countries during the period. Integrated As- sessment models and
empirical consistently find that increasing GDP of countries remain positively correlated with growth in CO2
emissions. China for instance, overtook the United States of America in CO2 emissions as its economy grew in the
past decade.
2.3 Available evidence suggest that decoupling GDP from GHG emissions including is possible mostly for
economies that have achieved a certain level of economic and technical efficiency in their industrialization
process thereby reducing energy intensity of production and providing incomes for clean- up. This raises
policy questions regarding whether African countries should concentrate on growing GDP first, and then clean
up latter. Existing models show that the externality costs of the principle of grow first and clean up later is
economically, socially and environmentally unsustainable. As the most vulnerable continent, it pays to grow smart
rather than grow more now and face huge environmental externality costs later.
2.4 Africa is endowed with vast renewable and non-renewable sources of energy, and with limited sunk costs
in carbon intensive energy infrastructures, providing cost effective potentials for integrating low carbon
energy options in the energy mix. Estimates show that the continent has 1,750TWh potential of hydropower and
14,000 MW of geothermal potential. The continent also receives abundant solar radiation through the year with its
solar energy potential estimated to be equivalent to 90-100 million tons of oil per annum. With regard to potential
for solar power production, it is estimated that with adequate investment in the Concentrated Solar Power (CSP)
technology, Africa can produce enough electricity to meet its own needs and export surplus electricity to Europe.
Recent studies have confirmed the availability of abundant wind energy resources along some of the coastal and
specific inland areas of Africa. With respect to non-renewable energy, coal resources are available in many African
countries, including South Africa. At the end of 2007, the continent had over 117 billion barrels of proven oil
reserves and over 14.6 trillion cubic meters of proven gas reserves.
2.5 However, Africas huge endowments in non-renewable and renewable energy resources are largely
unutilized. Africa has the highest portion of total technical potential in hydropower that is still unde- veloped
ranging up to 92% in many African countries. Installed capacities for hydropower in other regions of the world are
also far higher than in Africa and Australasia/Oceania, Africa due mainly to un- derdevelopment of the resource and
Australasia/Oceania because of size, climate and topography. The potential of geothermal energy is stated to be
14,000 MW in East Africa Rift Valley. The geothermal potential for selected African countries include: Kenya (3GW),
Ethiopia (more than 1GW), Djibouti (ap- proximates 850 MW), Uganda (450MW) and Tanzania (150MW). Available
data suggest that only 129MW has been exploited in Kenya and 7 MW in Ethiopia.
2.6 Overall, the resource potentials of hydro, solar, wind and geothermal energy resources in Africa
present huge supply side market opportunities for low carbon technology development and transfer.
Available evidence shows that Africa has significant comparative resource advantage to take a lead in the global
renewable energy markets if necessary policy environments and the right incentives are provided. However market
penetration of renewable energy and clean technologies in many Africa countries remains low. A major barrier
to transition to low carbon economy in Africa is a low-risk ad- justed rate of return on investments vis--vis high
carbon intensive alternatives often resulting in high cost of capital.
2.7 There are many knowledge gaps in the global discourse on clean and renewable energy options that
require attention for the pros and corns of RE switching policies can be fully appreciated. This includes
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questions regarding: Energy for what and for whom?; What energy sources provide best comparative advantages
to countries?; How relevant are these technologies to local needs?; Renewable Energy by whom? Who are the
Winners and Losers in the Value Chain?; What is the role of energy efficiency in the fossil fuel sector in a climate
smart economy?; What knowledge brokerage and management approaches are required to upscale renewable
energy technologies to the Poor? Are there real opportunities for RE technologies to facilitate sustainable energy
systems and infrastructures in African economies? I address some of these question which emerged from my recent
review of the clean energy markets in Africa briefly below:
2.7.1 Energy for what and for whom?

One issue all of the clean energy policy dialogues and projects in Africa seldom address is an understanding of the
extent to which different low carbon energy technologies are able to facilitate industrialization and productive
economic activities. Apart from reported evidences of improved educational performances of pupils in some rural
areas, there have not been examples of other productive uses of the technology for high power industrial uses
such as in heavy duty production, processing, and in manufacturing. Several observers, for example, question
the extent to which solar PV fulfils this criterion, whilst others argue that in fact solar PV makes important indirect
contributions to human development and industrialization process through, for example, improved health
conditions and educational attainment (improving labour productivity in the long run). These impacts cannot be
underestimated in areas where grid access is expensive and unlikely in the near future. Nevertheless, this is an
empirical question that require urgent research. Should policies focus on upscaling solar PV and fuel efficient cook
stoves, or fundamental shifts in the energy systems to reduce the energy intensity of industrial growth? At present,
there is insufficient evidence to support either side of this debate, and it is likely that the answer is context-specific
and more complex than either side tends to claim. Nevertheless, without urgent empirical research it is impossible
for this debate to move beyond the realm of rhetoric.
2.7.2 What energy sources provide best comparative advantages to countries?

The current intervention approaches appear to have made the assumption that renewable energy technologies
(especially solar energy technologies) and clean cook stoves offer the best opportunity for low carbon development
and improving the energy access for all African countries. While solar energy technologies are obviously good for
the environment, this does not mean that it is the most efficient source of lighting for all African countries. On the
other hand, clean cook stoves significantly reduce the use of biomass (fuel wood) for cooking but many argue that it
may lock the African poor households to the use of fuel wood in cooking, creating a dis-incentive for development
and adoption of alternative high end technologies. Many stakeholders argue that the off-grid options may create
short term benefits in terms of expanded access to the rural poor in the short run, but as well delay proactive
policies for the national governments to provide them access to more productive energy services. This is a common
paradox of poverty alleviation programs which carries in it an implicit assumption that it is acceptable for poverty
to remain, only alleviated. I believe that disruptive innovations are necessary in Africas energy sector to introduce
new energy systems that take into account Africas resource competitiveness and development needs. For oil rich
countries, RE technologies need not be seen as alternatives to fossil fuels, but additional sources that need to be
harnessed to improve energy access and security for citizens. Huge opportunities in energy efficiency options for
reducing GHG emissions from emerging economies are yet to be explored comprehensively. The perception of RE
as an alternative to switch to, may continue to fan negative attitudes which create resistance to renewable energy
options in some African countries. Taking the opportunity to diversify the energy systems is what Africa needs at its
current stage of development.
2.7.3 How relevant are the RE technologies to local needs?

The clean energy programs have been unable to establish themselves as demand-driven projects that understand
the local needs and dynamics of securing energy, not just for lighting and cooking but for economically
productive uses such as energy for small, medium and large scale enterprises. There is a rather high demand for
renewable energy technologies that offer prospect for package services of providing lighting, telecommunication,
refrigeration, and other energy services needed by rural and peri-urban populations in a cost-effective and efficient
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manner in areas off the national electricity grid.
2.7.4 Renewable Energy by whom? Who are the Winners and Losers in the Value Chain?
A limitation of the existing RE projects in Africa has been the low emphasis on the locally produced lighting and
cooking products. It is often the case that there is low compatibility of imported renewable-energy technologies
from industrialized countries with the levels of managerial and manufacturing skills and local resources available
in developing countries. Also lacking is information about developments in renewable-energy technologies which
tend to impede investment in these technologies in developing countries. The local content policies in many of
the developed and emerging countries could, for example, create significant dis-incentives for local production in
African countries. Some stakeholders therefore argue that the promotion of renewable energy technologies for
African markets is part of larger interest in the African countries as consumers rather than producers of technology,
hence re-enforcing the knowledge and technology dependence that has characterized the current industrial
revolution. While the technological capabilities challenges, institutional barriers, as well as market constraints
that hamper the deployment of RE technologies remain, the predominance of imported RE technologies on the
African markets raises important questions that calls for more detailed political economy and global value chain
research to determine the winners and losers, as well as spillover effects for African economies. To ensure long
term economic benefits of these technologies, African governments agenda on renewable energy may have to
focus on supporting indigenous research and development to reduce the cost of renewable energy technologies
and support the use of decentralized off-grid alternative technologies which are competitive with conventional
electricity supply. Policy measures to increase the extent to which African countries capture the economic value
associated with the growth in renewable energy technology markets within their own borders, is necessary. Recent
studies show that RETs from China and India dominate African markets with unclear impacts on RET capacity
development on the continent.
2.7.5 What is role of energy efficiency in the fossil fuel sector in a climate smart economy?
Currently, fossil fuel based energy sources are prioritized in national energy policies of several African countries
as main source of energy to drive economic development. All viable sectors of economies in Africa are heavily
dependent on petroleum (oil and gas) and other fossil fuels. With the discovery of oil in several parts of many
African countries, this dependency is unlikely to change some case, countries have managed to supplement their
energy production with geothermal and other thermal sources (Box 2 above). At the global level, nothing in the
empirical data series suggest that the pressure on fossil fuels will lesson, on the contrary, there is little sign of a
global turnaround.
However, energy (and carbon intensity) of growth has declined over the past decades, suggesting that decoupling
is possible. A number of assessment studies by the International Resources Panel (IRP) have shown that decoupling
GDP growth from environmental impacts is possible and mostly through systems innovations that improve
efficiency and productivity in life cycles of products/services. The energy efficiency of many energy systems in
African countries remains very low, providing opportunities for decarburization yet to be fully harnessed? To meet
the urgent need and growing demand for energy services, majority of African countries are expected to continue
with the use of fossil fuels which will increase carbon emissions. Whilst this position of fossil fuel use may be
justifiable due to the pressing energy demand for growth, the heavy reliance of countries on the oil sector exposes
them to substantial economic vulnerability. In addition, the continents sensitivity and exposure to the impact of
climate change demands an adjustment in current development path towards low-carbon pathways. The initial cost
of renewable energy technologies (RETs) might remain higher than fossil energy technologies in the near term, but
evidence has shown that long term investment in RETs has the potential to avoid technological investments that
would lock African countries into high carbon pathways in the future is necessary. Yet, the reaction of policymakers
towards renewable energy has been that of caution due to the initial high investment or skepticism due to many
risks and uncertainties in the sector, relegating renewables as low priority in energy policies and planning in many
countries.
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2.7.6 What knowledge brokerage and management approaches are required to upscale renewable energy technologies
to the Poor?
Public knowledge about the use of renewable-energy products, their financing, benefits and
reliability is very limited. This has accounted for the low market penetration of portable, renewable off-grid
lighting products across Africa. Although off-grid portable lighting market has increased, this has not motivated
local entrepreneurs to venture into renewable energy investment due to the uncertain level of market potentials.
While the subject of intellectual property rights is a longstanding research topic in technology transfer issues, its
implications for effective diffusion of technologies to the bottom of the pyramid remain unsettled.
2.7.7 Are there opportunities for RETs to facilitate strengthening of energy systems in Africa?
Current energy systems in Africa have failed to provide the platform needed to support the economic development
of the majority of Africas poor. In fact, energy has been supplied in insufficient quantity, at a cost, form and quality
that has limited its consumption by the majority of Africas population, making the continent the lowest per
capita consumer averaging about 0.66 Tons of Oil Equivalent (TOE) compared to the global average of 1.8 TOE
in 2008. Over the past four decades, the gap between energy supply and demand in Africa has widened, while
it has narrowed in other developing countries. Unless governments diversify the energy sources in domestic,
commercial, and industrial sectors and adopts new available technologies to reduce energy wastages and to save
cost, the present energy crisis in the continent will persist. This may require a mix of renewable and non-renewable
energy sources as may be defined by specific country contexts: comparative resource advantages, energy services
requirements, technological capabilities, etc.
3. Conclusion
The policy discourse on energy and Africas challenges to adopt a low carbon growth pathway is much more
globally, and emissions by any agent (e. g., individual, community, company, country) affect other agents. Effective
mitigation will therefore not be achieved if individual agents advance their own interests inde- pendently.
International cooperation is therefore required to effectively mitigate GHG emissions and address other climate
change issues. Issues of equity, justice, and fairness arise with respect to mitigation and adaptation, especially with
regard to the right to development by the poor. With energy access and security still very low on the continent,
and opportunities for efficiency gains in the current energy systems, Africas responses to climate change
require fundamental re-thinking of existing systems and pragmatic choices of suitable energy mix that address
development needs while at the same time, reducing the GHG emissions.
Countries past and future contributions to the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere are different, and
countries also face varying challenges and circumstances, and have different capacities to address mitigation and
adaptation. The evidence suggests that out-comes seen as equitable can lead to more effective cooperation. Energy
policies intersects with other societal goals creating the possibility of co-benefits or adverse side-effects. Increasing
access to modern energy services for meeting basic cooking and lighting needs in Africa could yield substantial
improvements in human welfare at relatively low costs. These inter- sections, if well-managed, can strengthen the
basis for undertaking climate action. The overall objective should be to enable the continent achieve climate-
smart socio-economic development
Annex 1: Summary of the Projected impacts of climate change in
Temperatures: By 2050, average temperatures in Africa are predicted to increase by 1.5 to 3C, and
will continue further upwards beyond this time. Warming is very likely to be larger than the global
annual mean warming throughout the continent and in all seasons, with drier subtropical regions
warming more than the moister tropics.
Ecosystems: It is estimated that, by the 2080s, the proportion of arid and semi-arid lands in Africa is
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likely to increase by 5-8%. Ecosystems are critical in Africa, contributing significantly to biodiversity
and human well-being. Between 25 and 40% of mammal species in national parks in sub-Saharan
Africa will become endangered. There is evidence that climate is modifying natural mountain
ecosystems via complex interactions and feedbacks.
Rainfall: There will also be major changes in rainfall in terms of annual and seasonal trends, and
extreme events of flood and drought. Annual rainfall is likely to decrease in much of Mediterranean
Africa and the northern Sahara, with a greater likelihood of decreasing rainfall as the Mediterranean
coast is approached. Rainfall in southern Africa is likely to decrease in much of the winter rainfall
region and western margins. There is likely to be an increase in annual mean rainfall in East Africa.
It is unclear how rainfall in the Sahel, the Guinean Coast and the southern Sahara will evolve. In the
tropical rain-forest zone, declines in mean annual precipitation of around 4% in West Africa, 3% in
North Congo and
2% in South Congo for the period 1960 to 1998 have been noted.
Droughts: By 2080, an increase of 5 to 8% of arid and semi-arid land in Africa is projected under a
range of climate scenarios (TS). Droughts have become more common, especially in the tropics and
subtropics, since the 1970s. Human health, already compromised by a range of factors, could be
further negatively impacted by climate change and climate variability, e.g., malaria in southern Africa
and the East African highlands.
Water: By 2020, a population of between 75 and 250 million and 350-600 million by 2050, are
projected to be exposed to increased water stress due to climate change. Climate change and
variability are likely to impose additional pressures on water availability, water accessibility and water
demand in Africa
Agriculture: By 2020, in some countries, yields from rain-fed agriculture could be reduced by up to
50%. Agricultural production, including access to food, in many African countries is projected to be
severely compromised. Projected reductions in yield in some countries could be as much as 50% by
2020, and crop net revenues could fall by as much as
90% by 2100, with small-scale farmers being the most affected. This would adversely affect food
security in the
continent and exacerbate malnutrition.
Sea-level rise: Africa has close to 320 coastal cities (with more than 10,000 people), and an estimated
population of 56 million people (2005 estimate) living in low elevation (<10-m) coastal zones. Towards
the end of the 21st century, projected sea level rise will affect low-lying coastal areas with large
populations. Sea-level rise will probably increase the high socio-economic and physical vulnerability
of coastal cities. The projection that sea-level rise could increase flooding, particularly on the coasts of
Eastern Africa, will have implications for health.
Energy: Access to energy is severely constrained in sub-Saharan Africa, with an estimated 51% of
urban populations and only about 8% of rural populations having access to electricity. Extreme
poverty and the lack of access to other fuels mean that 80% of the overall African population relies
primarily on biomass to meet its residential needs, with this fuel source supplying more than 80%of
the energy consumed in sub-Saharan Africa. Further challenges from urbanisation, rising energy
demands and volatile oil prices further compound energy issues in Africa.
Source: IPCC Summary for Policymakers, 2007
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AFRICA AND CLIMATE CHANGE

By Ngaire Woods and Arunabha Ghosh
Key Points
A stable and secure pool of climate finance for adaptation is essential for Africa, and weak implementation of
mitigation measures by major emitters make this ever more urgent.
There is a serious risk that promises of future climate financing will prove empty, volatile, or be subject
to backsliding. The long history of mutual mistrust between North and South as donors and recipients of
development aid is a challenge for climate finance negotiations.
Alongside effective decisionmaking and disbursement of adaptation finance, effective monitoring, verification,
and compliance mechanisms will be needed to ensure commitments on financing and technology transfers
are met.
Holding both sides to account in the financing relationship will be a key element for any financing mechanism to be
both politically acceptable and effective. From the above discussion, three principles emerge for climate financing
mechanisms and their governance.
1. Ensure the creation of a secure pool of climate finance
There must be a credible basis for confidence that a huge gap will not emerge between promised and delivered
financial assistance. This principle underpins proposals for mechanisms that assure financing without appropriation
or interference at the national level in donor countries, such as a carbon tax, aviation, and/or maritime levies,
auctions of emission allowances, or direct development assistance. Regardless of the option(s) chosen, the funding
needs to be allocated and disbursed in a way which reduces unpredictability and unexpected conditionality of
financing.
2. Use (or build) trusted institutions for decisionmaking and disbursement of finance
Many institutions including multilateral and bilateral aid agencies have become involved in adaptation finance,
with many industrialized countries favor the World Bank as a financing and disbursement mechanism. The Banks
resources, however, do not look adequate - and nor to many developing countries, does its governance. For
example, concerns arose about the World Banks Clean Technology Fund (CTF) very early on when it was seen
as hostage to US politicians and organizations opposed to financing coal-based technologies. Some of these
problems could be resolved through governance structures that would provide greater representation and control
to developing countries, as was attempted in the Adaptation Fund model (with a board, comprising 16 members
and 16 alternates, represents the 5 United Nations regional groups (2 from each), the small island developing states
(1), the least developed countries (1), Annex I Parties (2), and non-Annex I Parties (2)}.
3. Develop effective monitoring, verification, and compliance mechanisms for financing and technology
transfer commitments
A third important element of financing mechanisms concerns monitoring and verification. To date, reporting
on financial contributions has been mixed at best thanks to data deficiencies, multiple sources of funding, and
inconsistencies in definitions. A credible financing mechanism in the climate regime would need new institutional
features for monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of financial flows. First, self-reporting by member states
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should be supplemented by more frequent institutional reporting to measure the origin and destination of financial
flows. One option is to use the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Developments (OECD) Creditor
Reporting System. But, if the WTOs new aid-for-trade monitoring mechanism is a precedent, developing countries
would demand a dedicated system under the UNFCCC to ensure there was no double counting of assistance
provided. Secondly, the data must be also analyzed to evaluate the impact of financial flows. Here the experience
of the World Bank and regional development banks in project evaluation could strengthen reviews held within the
UNFCCC. Third, knowledge networks could be established at a regional level to facilitate the sharing of information
and experience across countries and build capacity for monitoring and evaluation. Finally, compliance-oriented
peer review procedures would be needed within the UNFCCC to apply pressure on developed countries to comply
with commitments. Discussions about the timeliness, adequacy, and impact of financial transfers should be
included in extensive reviews similar to those conducted for emissions and implementation of commitments under
Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol.
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NOTES SUBMITTED BY APP ADVISORS

FOR THE EXPERT MEETING
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TOWARDS A LOW-CARBON DEVELOPMENT: WHAT DOES IT MEAN

FOR AFRICAS STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION?
By Africa Climate Policy Centre (UNECA)
Submitted by Fatima Denton, Director of Strategic Initiatives and
Coordinator of the African Climate Policy Centre, UNECA
I. Introduction and Context
Over the past decade, Africa has continued to enjoy unprecedented growth at an average of 4% per year.
Nonetheless, the increasingly frequent and unpredictable climate events are threatening to reverse the continents
socio-economic gains. After over twenty years of participation in the global climate change negotiations under the
UNFCCC, Africa is now urged to look into a new growth trajectory that is heavily propelled by resource efficiency.
Given Africas historically low contribution to global carbon emissions, adaptation and mitigation actions in
response to climate change in Africa do not necessarily need to follow low-carbon trajectories. However, as it
aspires for a blue and green revolution and in a bid to avoid replicating industrialized countries carbon-intensive
development models, Africa needs to effect a low-carbon transition. Its rapidly growing population and its
increasing pace of urbanization require that the continents human security needs are considered within the
framework of low carbon transition, and factored in future investments pathways.
Africas natural resource endowment provides a solid foundation for pursuing alternative development pathways.
The continents tremendous natural wealth offers the opportunity to build low-carbon intensive systems for water,
transport, energy and sustainable land-use for its economic development. The continent is more than capable of
overcoming climate change challenges and turning risks into development opportunities to make the transition to
a low carbon pathway. This requires a paradigm shift in production systems, innovations, and technologies, which
can effectively address development challenges while capturing expanding markets from a growing middle class.
However, what a low-carbon transition really entails for Africa needs to be defined and analyzed in terms of
compatibility, adoptability and comparability with those of other regions. There is also need to draw lessons from
low-carbon development efforts undertaken by industrialized and emerging countries alike. This information will
enable Africa to make the right investments for low-carbon transitions in agriculture, water, energy, sustainable
forest management, ensuring effective use of human capital in the process.
The form and pattern of African low-carbon transition, shaped by its abundant resources of water and renewable
energy sources, must be established particularly within the small operational scale that characterizes private
sector practices and investments in Africa such as smallholder farming. Where the transition should occur, it
needs to be identified and tailored to cater to the aspirations of the citizens, and support Africas transformational
agenda. Each African country must assess and evaluate its natural resources, its geographical specificities, its
human and social capital, and its level of economic development to determine how to best optimize its low-carbon
opportunities towards transformational change that addresses poverty and equity issues while guaranteeing food,
energy and water security.
II. Low-Carbon Pathway through the Nexus Approach
The prisms through which to frame Africas low-carbon transition need to shed more light on how to align the
continents priority development goals with the ambition of alleviating poverty and improving human welfare
through food, water, and energy securities. While industrial transformation is critical, it must be linked to household
wellbeing through improved and affordable access to key welfare services. The low-carbon transition requires
the adoption of a nexus approach in tackling Africas development issues. The main components for a low-carbon
transition therefore include energy, water and food/agriculture (Figure 1).
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Pathways for reducing emissions have increasingly become identifiable, especially as Africa progresses in the
optimization of the performances of these components. Climate Policy Initiative (CPI 2014) emphasizes the need
to meet investment requirements for the low-carbon transition pathways to yield meaningful benefits such as
lower operational costs and increased amortization. The investment costs for transitioning through any of these
pathways must be determined as well as the opportunities and returns on investment. Similarly, the trade-offs
need to be identified in order to level out disparities and ensure a smooth transition. Additionally, there are global
public benefits as well as national benefits in adopting low-carbon pathways. This makes a compelling case for
financial support for the process in Africa as the continent currently bears the largest proportion of climate change
burden. Consequently, the 2015 climate change negotiations in Paris will be crucial for the continent, especially in
mobilizing new financing for low-carbon investments and adaptation and mitigation efforts.
III. Transboundary Water Systems within the Nexus Approach
The entry point for the capitalization of the nexus approach at the regional and sub-regional levels is the integrated
management of transboundary water systems such as river basin catchments and watersheds. One-third of
the worlds major water basins larger than 100,000km are in Africa, demonstrating the multiple windows of
opportunities that exist in fulfilling human security needs on the continent (ECA 2014).
On the other hand, water use across key development priorities varies, ranging from a larger amount of water
withdrawal for agriculture (85%), 9% as potable water for household use, to 6% for industrial purposes. Africas
water catchments account for 11% of the worlds total potential for hydropower production, that is over 1.852TWh/
yr, three times more than the continents current demand of 554TWh/yr. Similarly, the potential for irrigation is
nearly 40 million hectares, representing about 10% of total arable land, which is capable of boosting agricultural
production by about 50%.
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IV. Governance for a Low-Carbon Investment
As low carbon transition aims to deliver a transformative agenda, it is imperative that this new development
paradigm promotes a governance architecture that promotes inclusive growth, equity and shared prosperity.
Managing projects such as transboundary natural resource systems call for governance frameworks that ensure the
sustainable use of resources among multiple stakeholders with diverse interests. This is critical for guaranteeing
equity, averting conflicts, and ensuring that all voices are heard. Such governance frameworks require appropriate
institutional and policy structures. According the Global Environment Outlook report, transboundary natural
resource policies strengthen the integrated management of shared terrestrial and marine ecosystems (UNEP 2012).
In light of these governance challenges, the interconnected issues of climate change, poverty reduction and human
security should be addressed using a nexus approach. By sharing a common resource pool at the national and
regional levels, the financial risk and responsibility is shared and better addressed by joint efforts. Not only is this
nexus approach comprehensive, but it also avoids tradeoffs and offsite consequences within and among African
nations.
National policy frameworks should promote smart partnerships between the public and private sectors, which
include the global corporations and local small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs), and provide incentives and
an enabling environment for low carbon investment. In addition, adaptation policy frameworks such as National
Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPAs) should be recalibrated and downscaled to facilitate sectorally integrated
responses that meet micro-level adaptation requirements of the SMME sector.
However, such restructuring is currently constrained by the low positioning of climate change issues in
environmental ministries and relevant agencies, which in turn hinders the integration of adaptation efforts into
macro-economic planning, and the coordination of responses with other policy sectors. Institutional reforms for the
emergence of stronger sectoral coordination and the mainstreaming of adaptation responses in macro-economic
planning are therefore critical.
VI. Financing Mechanisms for Low-Carbon Transition
Climate finance is essential for Africa to address the impacts of climate change on the continent, but also to
accelerate its transition to a low carbon pathway.
Climate finance offers the possibility for Africa to deploy new technologies for adaptation and mitigation, and
catalyze the mobilization of new funds within the continent from various sources, including the private sector,
national budgets and innovative financing mechanisms.
The lack of transparency and uncertainty in international climate fund flows into Africa is fueling insecurity in terms
of climate change responses. In terms of actual investment, of all of the adaptation funds disbursed so far from
all sources including the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR),
Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA), African Development Fund (ADF) and Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF),
which amount to a total of US$395M) 44% have gone to Sub-Saharan Africa. More specifically, 56% of approved
LDCF funds ($222M) and 26% of SCCF funds ($50M) have also been disbursed to the region to support the
implementation of NAPAs.
And yet:
Only two countries, Rwanda and Senegal, have successfully mobilized funds from the Adaptation Fund as
national implementing entities;
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) disbursement on the continent has been less than 2%;
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Only 12% of all Multilateral Development Bank funds for mitigation financing for the period 2006-2009 have
gone to Africa;
Currently, all global funds are hosted, governed and administered outside Africa; and
There is no dedicated funding stream for low carbon transition.

To be relevant to a transformative agenda, global public funds should be redirected towards more strategic
investments that promote local research and development effort, whose output should feed into the global climate
knowledge production process. Climate change multilateral funding has not been as forthcoming as anticipated
in various multilateral agreements. This is an equity issue that is continuing to weigh down on global climate
negotiations. One possible solution to the lack of transparency in international climate financing is to invest in
mechanisms that ensure committed funding is actually disbursed.
Another solution has been the mobilization of national funds in response to global financing framework
inadequacies. The Overseas Development Institute finds that in Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, three countries that
have mobilized significant local public funds for climate change, most of the funding was restricted to three or four
ministries (energy, water and environment, and agriculture). The study recommends that national funds earmarked
for climate change should target other sectors as well (ODI 2014).
VII. Investment in Climate Information Services
Climate research needs to prioritize climate change scientific challenges and gaps in Africas peoples understanding
of the interactions between the climate system and the energy-water-forestry/agriculture (EWF/A) nexus. It seeks to
address the following two questions:
(i) What kind of climate information services do decision makers need to deliver on the energy-water-food nexus
that support leveraging strategies?
(ii) Which specific climate information services are required to support investment pathways in this area?
The EWF/A nexus can be characterized by the five bilateral interfaces:
Energy-water
Energy-forestry
Energy-agriculture
Forestry-water
Agriculture-water
Each bilateral interface consists of linkages with resource sectors that are dynamically linked to one another in a
complex interdependent manner. Through this, it supports and interacts with human, socio-economic activities,
infrastructure, and ecosystems. Key to this system is climate variability, which influences each component of the
EWF/A nexus.
Much of the understanding of the climate impacts on the EWF/A system in Africa are derived from the very limited
observations of the EWF/A response to current and past climate variability, as well as to uncertain and spatially
coarse projections of future climate change. Although Africas climate varies substantially across and within sub-
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regions, the research focus is often restricted to Western Africa, Eastern Africa, and Southern Africa with little
attention paid to North and Central Africa. In addition, assessments of the climate risk and vulnerability of the
EWF/A are sparsely reported in climate science literature.
Improved climate science is critical for the development of climate information services which in turn provide
timely, tailored information and knowledge to decision makers, generally in the form of tools, products, websites, or
bulletins. These services are an important part of improving Africas capacity to manage climate-related risk.
Climate information services can yield substantial benefits by expanding research beyond natural sciences and into
the social sciences, emerging climate science frontiers (ACPC 2013), as well as through improved prediction and
feedback capabilities between the African climate drivers and EWF/A nexus.
Addressing the climate-EWF/A related questions that regional decision-makers are asking will require the
development of models capable of evaluating different adaptation strategies, and testing diverse mitigation
options. Accounting for the trade-offs, co-benefits, and uncertainties associated with these actions such as
technology costs, performance and availability will impact results.
Overall, climate research is useful for:
Improved understanding of the physical processes underlying the climate variability in Africa. For instance,
African rainfall is driven by complex local, regional, and remote processes (e.g. El Nino, La Nina), which need to
be accounted for by prediction systems;
Improved modeling capability for detailed regional scale predictions with the development of reliable
dynamical downscaling systems (e.g. high spatial resolution regional climate models or global climate models);
Improved observational networks to validate the ability of the climate modeling systems;
Evaluation strategies, which require robust metrics for benchmarking model performances and data systems;
Seamless prediction tools that provide stakeholders with climate information in the near- as well as long-term;
Modeling capabilities that account for potential future environmental constraints (e.g., availability of water),
economic limitations (e.g., existing infrastructure) and scenario development to inform decision making
processes for the deployment of future energy transitions;
Analysis of the climate-EWF/A system, which requires a new class of models, measurements and observations
that are consistent with global climate and socio-economic constraints, and are capable of resolving regional
human decision-making and natural processes in a way that integrates the full range of relevant interactions
and feedbacks.
Finally, climate information services can support the investment pathway by providing reliable information that
enhances our understanding of the interactions and feedbacks between energy, water, forestry, and agriculture.
Mitigation and adaptation options often tie directly into one of the EWF/A components. Understanding the
behavior of climate-EWF/A interactions is therefore paramount to the effective design, selection, implementation,
and monitoring of adaptation and mitigation strategies.
VIII. Way forward: The African Agenda
In summary, an African agenda for low-carbon development implies the following priorities:
1. Investment for transition pathway
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Climate information services

Governance framework
Increased private sector engagement
2. Investment in the opportunities

Job creation
Poverty reduction
3. Move towards national ownership for financing climate change
4. Promotion of national implementing entities for international financial funds.
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BUILDING RESILIENCE TO CLIMATE CHANGE IN AFRICA

By African Risk Capacity (AU)
Submitted by Lars Thunell
Africa is widely recognized to be the region most vulnerable to weather risks. Weather-related disasters are already
undermining record growth across the continent, threatening hard-won development gains and vulnerable
populations. Increasing climate volatility will counteract investments being made by countries to mitigate, prepare
for and manage current weather risks. The World Bank estimates an adaptation investment cost need of $14-17
billion per year over the period 2010-50 for sub-Saharan countries to adapt to an approximately 2C warmer climate
forecast for 2050. Climate change is particularly threatening to the future of African agriculture, which impacts
global food security and the economic livelihoods of hundreds of millions of Africans.
The African Risk Capacity (ARC) isspecialized agency of the African Union (AU) that operates a
groundbreaking extreme weather insurance mechanism designed to help AU member states resist and
recover from the ravages of natural disasters. As currently structured, the international system for responding
to natural disasters is not as timely or equitable as it could be. Funding is secured on a largely ad hoc basis after
disaster strikes and only then can relief be mobilized toward the people who need it most. In the meantime, lives
are lost, assets are depleted, and development gains suffer major setbacks forcing more people into chronic
destitution and food insecurity in the worlds least developed countries.
ARC is an African solution to one of the continents most pressing challenges, transferring the burden of climate risk
away from governments and the farmers and pastoralists whom they protect to the ARC that can handle that
risk much better. This African-owned, AU-led financial entity uses Africa RiskView, an advanced satellite weather
surveillance software to estimate and trigger readily available funds to African countries hit by severe drought
(with floods and tropical cyclone products to be covered in the future). Because such droughts do not happen
in the same year in all parts of the continent, pan-African solidarity in the creation of a disaster risk pool like ARC
is financially effective. Pooling risk across the continent significantly reduces the cost to countries of emergency
contingency funds, while decreasing reliance on external aid.
ARC Agency currently has 24 signatories to its Establishment Treaty. The Agency Governing Board is chaired by
the Coordinating Minister for the Economy and Honourable Minister of Finance of Nigeria Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala.
It established its first financial affiliate the ARC Insurance Company Limited in 2014 to deliver sovereign level risk
management products to African governments. ARC Agency aims to establish its second affiliate, the Extreme
Climate Facility in 2016 announced this year at the UN Secretary Generals Climate Summit a multi-year funding
mechanism that will issue climate change catastrophe bonds.
The ARC Group provides operational, data-driven, scalable solutions to propose as a central element of the
African agenda at COP 21 in Paris. Specifically, it addresses the mandate of the Green Climate Fund as well
as the needs of the Loss & Damage Work Programme to put in place institutional arrangements to scale up
regional risk pooling.
ARC Insurance company limited
The ARC Groups first financial affiliate, ARC Insurance Company Limited (ARC Ltd), was established and licensed in
Bermuda in January 2014. Its Board of Directors is chaired by former Executive Vice President and CEO of the IFC Dr
Lars Thunell. The Company Directors were elected by the seven Founding Members:
Class A African Governments from which ARC Ltd will receive US $17.5 million in premium income in
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exchange for US $130 million in drought coverage for the 2014/15 agricultural seasons. 60% of the premium
income paid this year is from internally generated revenues and is not donor subsidized. The first ARC risk pool
includes Kenya, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger and Senegal.
Class C Capital Contributors (returnable equity at the end of a 20-year period, with no interest)
The seed capital for ARC Ltd came from the United Kingdom: GBP 30 million transferred of GBP 90 million
committed over five years and Germany: EUR 35 million transferred of EUR 50 million committed over two years.
The first policies for the Sahel incepted May 1, 2014 bringing an additional US $50-70m in new risk to the
reinsurance markets. This is unprecedented making ARC a truly disruptive innovation.
The ARC Secretariat is actively working towards renewals of the first pool of countries and carrying out its capacity-
building programme in an additional eight new countries meant to form the second pool in May 2015.
The extreme climate facility
The World Bank estimates an adaptation investment cost need of $14-17 billion per year over the period 2010-
50 for sub-Saharan countries to adapt to an approximately 2C warmer climate forecast for 2050. To date, funds
have not been forthcoming in the magnitude required. As a result, African leaders have been exploring innovative
and diverse ways to address the challenge of providing funding for climate adaptation across the continent. The
Extreme Climate Facility (XCF) is a new financial mechanism that will secure direct access for African governments to
climate finance to respond to the impacts of increased climate volatility.
The XCF is a data-driven, multi-year vehicle that will provide financial support to eligible African countries to help
them build climate resilience and be financially prepared to undertake greater adaptation measures should extreme
weather event frequency and intensity increase in their region. It is an African-led initiative that is designed to
access private capital, diversifying the sources and increasing the amount of international funding available for
climate adaptation in Africa.
African Risk Capacity (ARC) provides an ideal platform from which to develop and operationalise such a new facility.
The XCF will use both public and private funds and facilitate direct access to climate adaptation finance for eligible
African governments based on the demonstrated need for enhanced adaptation measures. Its financial obligations
to African countries will be securitized and issued as a series of climate change catastrophe bonds. The bonds will
provide additional climate change adaptation financing to participating AU countries, in the event that weather
shocks such as extreme heat, droughts, floods or cyclones increase in occurrence and intensity. The bonds are
financed by capital provided through private investors, with donors supporting the annual bond coupon payments.
XCF is structured so as to issue more than US $1 billion in African climate change bonds over the next 30 years.
The XCF is entirely driven by objective climate data, using Africas meteorological climatology as a baseline.
XCF establishes a multi-hazard Extreme Climate Index (ECI) for each African climatic region. The index will track
increases in the frequency and magnitude of extreme climate events over and above the baseline. When the index
exceeds pre-determined thresholds, countries will automatically receive payments from the XCF to support their
pre-approved climate adaptation plans. Should they occur, payments would start small and would increase with
subsequent cat bond issuances, growing alongside increasing evidence of observed deviations from the baseline
climatology.
ARCs contribution to long-term growth and resilience
For many countries in Africa, a small shock in terms of a rainfall deficit or elevated food prices can precipitate a call
for a major humanitarian intervention and emergency response. The resilience in such countries is significantly low
79
such that they struggle through most years, let alone during a drought. For example, in a country such as Niger,
where households currently display very low resilience, the ARC team has calculated that to withstand a 1-in-5 year
drought event, the income of the most vulnerable households would have to grow by an annual average of 3.4%
over the next five years in real terms to build sufficient resilience in order to adequately cope without requiring
external assistance (see graph below).1 In the meantime, insurance is not the correct tool to deal with this chronic
risk. In order to improve such countries resilience to natural disasters, thereby enabling sustained growth on the
continent, two key elements are required: risk management and investment.
Figure 1: Risk management and investment increase resilience and growth in the long run
Investments that support long-term resilience against food insecurity can address chronic risks and provide a
base of predictable on-going assistance that can support poor and vulnerable households to build assets and
livelihoods, which will in turn develop resilience to cope with normal and somewhat frequent, mild shocks (e.g.
every two to four years) without external assistance. This does not mean that ARC offers no value to countries that
lack investments into a framework to deal with frequent risks, however the mechanism can provide greater benefits
where there are existing systems that can be quickly scaled-up to address transient needs.
From this base level of investment, in which chronic risks are addressed and households are able to begin to
accumulate assets and secure livelihoods, sound risk management becomes critical. In order to protect the
resilience achieved through investments, countries need to ensure that future shocks, mild or severe, do not erode
such gains, and that the number of households falling into poverty, or depleting their assets, does not grow. This is
where a tool such as ARC can offer the most value, providing dedicated contingency funds that can scale up safety
net systems in a reliable, timely manner, allowing them to remain solvent and sustainable, protecting hard-won
gains for households, and reducing the countrys reliance on emergency appeals.
When countries achieve these key components of investment and risk management, they can enjoy the benefits of
a virtuous cycle of attracting further investment by always protecting the benefits investment brings with prudent
risk management. A country with a stable social protection system, not relying on emergency appeals every year or
diverting national resources frequently to deal with emergencies, can focus rather on additional investments into
agriculture and food security to increase productivity and resilience to shocks (e.g. irrigation schemes), alongside
other investments that will diversify the countrys economy away from reliance on rain-fed agriculture.
The stability fostered by investment and sound risk management will crowd-in private sector investment, in
80
addition to creating space for donors to back programmes that focus on long-term growth, rather than supporting
costly humanitarian interventions. All of this will drive increased resilience, whereby households become less
vulnerable to shocks, enjoy increased productivity and subsequent food security, and the country as a whole
develops a more diversified economy and an associated taxpayer base.
As the process continues in the long run, resilience at the national and household level will be increased, the safety
net programmes reduced and ARC can be phased out as countries suffer setbacks only from less frequent shocks,
which can be more affordably managed via the commercial market. Countries would also be able to utilise growing
and diversified revenue streams to employ contingent loans and other innovative products to manage these risks.
Notes
1 The analysis measures resiliency as a households distance from the international poverty line, in this case assumed to be USD 1.25, and uses a
scaling factor of 1.5 to quantify the loss of agricultural income from a given deviation in an areas drought index from normal conditions (based
on Africa RiskView default model settings). Using 1-in-5, 1-in-10 and 1-in-15 year events as estimates for different drought severity, the minimum
loss of livelihood in dollar terms associated with all three frequencies of event in each region of the country is estimated, and then averaged
across all areas to calculate a national figure. Finally, the required income today to withstand those losses 5, 10 and 15 years ahead is calculated
in order to determine the annual growth rate (i.e. the geometric average) to reach such levels.
81
GLOBAL CLIMATE ACTION: OPPORTUNITY FOR

TRANSFORMATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA?
By Kwame Pianim, Economist; Management and Investment Consultant
A landmark Global Action on Climate Change a Game-Changer for African Transformation?
The year 2015 could become a defining moment in the global push for green low carbon growth if ambitious and
inclusive agreement is arrived at to reduce carbon emission and minimize the contribution of fossil fuels to global
warming and climate change. Expected global action could be deemed inclusive if it meets the needs of African
economies by improving our access to technology for appropriate solar and other renewable energies that abound
in Africa. Such an agreement could also be supportive of sustainable African development if the mechanisms and
policy instruments put in place, help us build capacity for greater resilience against climate change and its induced-
drought, with innovative and improved water management systems to support the adoption of productivity
enhancing inputs and high yielding planting materials.
To transform economic development in Africa in the coming decades and put Africa on a new upward and
sustainable growth trajectory, the cultural practices, technology and inputs will need upgrading. It is evident on
the ground that increasing climatic change is being accompanied with farmlands receiving the same annual rainfall
but the seasonal distribution is radically different. Ethiopia has demonstrated that with relatively good water
management systems in place the devastating drought and famine of thirty years are no hopefully history. This was
not achieved through investments in major irrigation dams but rather with boreholes and innovative rural water
management approaches.
Energy and Water as Critical Requirements for inclusive Transformation
Transforming agriculture into a modern science-based activity demands education and skills training in the rural
areas where the bulk of our populations live. Effective skills training ns education requires good and non-hazardous
lighting. The two strategic and critical inputs for modernizing and upgrading agriculture and rural life in Africa
depend on energy and water.
If global action on climate change leads to technological advances in the development of appropriate solar
technology at reduced installation and generation costs, Africa can benefit. Immensely. This will facilitate Africas
adoption of a green and low carbon transformational development. Current costs for establishment of large
solar power (above IMW) stands at some $2.5 million per MW as compared with conventional fossil energy based
thermal facilities of around $1 million per MW. Already the solar power generation that seems to have captured
the imagination of Africa is the large major PV plants with capacity from 40MW to 155 MW. Feed in tariffs hover
around 22 US cent per kWh as compared with conventional combined cycle fossil fuel based generation of 6 to 8
US Cents. And these large systems must of necessity be on-grid systems. Grid system centered power is notorious in
Africa for bypassing the rural areas or condemning them to one phase power that is not too helpful for productivity
application.
Fortunately for Africa the new developments and investments in the US and Japan according to Bloomberg Energy
Information focused on below 1MW solar systems with over $25 billion being invested in the first quarter of 2014.
Can multi-purpose, community managed mini-dams and off-grid community and household based solar
power be the answer for inclusive technology upgrading?
82
Africas path to accelerated and sustainable development, requires broadly based and wide disseminating
upgrading of technology in all fields in both industry and agriculture, in urban and rural areas. The type of
water and power that are requires for ensuring a green and low carbon path to development are to be found in
community and off-grid based solar and small scale irrigation and water works based on the many rivers in the rural
areas on which feasibility studies have already been carried out with good prospects. These are less than 5MW. The
water systems will allow good potable water for the community and the system for both the power and the water
works for drinking and for irrigation can be operated and managed by the community.
For utilizing the enormous natural resources of Africa and a modernized and productive agriculture as the platform
for industrialization and agro-processing centered manufacturing, no doubt, large investments in Africas hydro
potential for grid based power generation and distribution will be critical. But to ensure widespread and broadly
disseminated upgrading of technology and the generation of decent wage salaried employment for the youth in
the countryside, off-grid solar and river based small irrigation schemes that combine potable water access with
irrigation and power generation systems should be an integral part of any strategy for Africa forging a new path for
green and low carbon transformation development for Africa.
Already packaged solar applications exist where with a 12 x18 solar panel one can generate enough power for 6
high density light bulbs to light us a community center to help children study or provide power for one household
to rid it of hazardous kerosene lantern. And these packages are also equipped to allow cell phones to be charged
on them. The cellphone is probably one of the most productivity-enhancing devices that is transforming and
inducing inclusiveness in financial services and helping farmers monitor prices for efficient marketing of their
produce. It can be a matter of life and death for a woman in labour if a midwife can be summoned by phone.
Empowering rural folks to charge their cellphones can be life-enhancing.
Influencing the Policy Landscape in Global Climate Action
The technologically advanced nations and the emerging economies should be encouraged to intensify research
for improving the cost and quality of solar power especially the below 1MW type and the community and off grid
applications. The technology should enhance the use of radiation to power the panels during the rainy season
when for three months there is limited sunlight. Wind energy can be developed to be used alongside solar to
complement it, as there is invariably wind during rains. Technological advances in solar, wind and in community
operated small-scale hydro for power, potable water and irrigation in the advanced and emerging economies will
be a major transformational driver in Africas march towards low carbon development.
Most African nations have a target of between 10 to 20% for renewable energy component of total energy
generation for the next decade or two. A similar percentage of this target should be set for the community based
off-grid renewables and small scale dams.
The private sector especially the International Oil companies operating in developing countries as well as telecom
companies and natural resource mining and exploiting companies should be encouraged to ensure that 10% of
their Corporate Social Responsibility outlays is invested in support of programmes that provide rural communities
with access to renewable energy.
Can Africa shame others by leading the effort to fund the fight against carbon emission and climate change?
Can Africa help shame others to come up with realistic funding for Climate Change? The fifteen major oil producers
in the world produce among themselves some 69 million barrels a day. A 300-day year will yield some 21 billion
barrels a year. Even a one dollar per barrels per annum will generate around $21 billion for investment in renewable
technology and help fund part of the wide diffusing solar investments in Africa and other high risk countries that
83
lack the technological and financial capacity to protect themselves against the potentially devastating effects of
climate change.
African oil producers are estimated as producing about 15 million barrels a day (10.7 million barrels a day in 2007
projected). On a 300-day production year, Africas annual output may be estimated at 4.5 billion barrels. This
can generate, on one dollar a barrel per annum put aside voluntary levy, annual inflows of $4.5 billion into a
Renewable Energy War Chest. This will help light Africas path to low carbon energy development.
Africa should challenge other producers to match their contribution. And the producers can ask the net consumers
to contribute $2 per barrel per annum as their share of the fight to reduce carbon emission to minimize the risk of
climate change.
Conclusion
There is a great opportunity for Africa to take advantage of global action on climate change to adopt low carbon
and clean energy development strategy that will also help us unleash the nation building potential of the rural
communities and create jobs for the youth where they are located. This will help reduce global tensions being
fuelled by immigration fears. Climate change induced water shortages and its concomitant tensions in Africa will
worsen mass immigration and the threat it poses for ultra nationalism and protectionism. Finally, this irrational fear
may undermine globalization and its economic benefits and the global solidarity it has helped bolster.
84
NOTES
85

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Africa Progress Panel Expert Meeting

come from within Jean-Claude Bastos de Morais and Kevin Urama 27

Transformative adaptation in Africas Agriculture Natasha Grist 32

An African agenda for green, low-carbon development Linah Mohohlo 43

climate sensitive production systems, an African based climate smart agricultural

revolution Rudy Rabbinge 45

Climate change and Sub-Saharan Africa Abebe Selassie 47

Africa: Challenges and Progress Lars Thunell 56

Energy and Africas transition to a low carbon economy Kevin Urama 60

Africa and Climate Change Ngaire Woods and Arunabha Ghosh 69

NOTES SUBMITTED BY APP ADVISORS 71

Towards a low-carbon development: What does it mean for Africas structural

transformation? Africa Climate Policy Centre (UNECA) 72

Building resilience to climate change in Africa African Risk Capacity (AU) 78

9:30 10:00 BREAKFAST

10:00 10:15 INTRODUCTIONS

Discussants 5 minutes each

Discussants 5 minutes each

12.45 13.45 LUNCH

13:45 15:00 SESSION III: A BOLDER AGENDA FOR TRANSFORMATIVE AGRICULTURE

Smart transformation: Is climate smart agriculture a viable option as part of a wider

Discussants 5 minutes each

17:30 19:00 RECEPTION

AFRICA PROGRESS PANEL MEMBERS

Andrew Johnston, Consultant, Editor

Jean-Claude Bastos de Morais

As a Swiss-Angolan, he is also passionate about fuelling innovative breakthroughs that unlock

Max Bankole Jarrett

Prof. Dr. Ir. Roelof (Rudy) Rabbinge

with KPMG Audit France as an audit consultant.

It is proposed that the Africa Progress Report 2015 report could:

How the APR 2015 could carve out a distinctive agenda

INNOVATIVE FINANCING FOR CONTAINING THE THREATS

For Africa, the following mechanisms could be considered:

7.1 Financing innovation capacity on the continent

7.2 Blending mechanisms

7.3 Green credit lines

7.4 Risk sharing instruments

7.5 Climate change program loans

7.6 Sovereign Bonds

TRANSFORMATIVE ADAPTATION IN AFRICAS AGRICULTURE

I. The Risk Environment of Africa

Africa relies on rain-fed crop production

II. Adaptation Efforts in Africas Farming

Figure 1: Spectrum of Resilience approaches

Source: Bn et al. (2012)

III. Why isnt the current approach to adaptation enough?

IV. How is Transformative Adaptation different?

Transformative adaptation is adaptation which is:

Much bigger scale/intensity (e.g. Regreening the Sahel)

BRIEF FOR THE 2015 AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT

Transformative Adaptation in African Agriculture:

Africas vast potential for clean and renewable energy:

SHORT NOTE FOR THE AFRICA PROGRESS PANEL

Overview of Energy Resources in Africa

Pathway to Low Carbon Mix

AN AFRICAN AGENDA FOR GREEN, LOW CARBON

Outcome of the New York Meeting

National Perceptions in Africa

Emphasising the Pro-Growth Links

The Gender Dimension

LEAPFROGGING AFRICAN AGRICULTURE TO HIGHER

Adopt a production ecological approach.

CLIMATE CHANGE AND SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA