01 ROSEMARIE BALBA vs.
PEAK AUTHOR: Adre The Company then issued two memoranda:
DEVELOPMENT INC. and MA. ISABEL NOTES:
VASQUEZ 1. Petition for review under Rule 45 of
[G.R. No. 148288. August 12, 2005] the Rules of Court.
TOPIC: Certiorari 2. Subject of the petition is the
PONENTE: AZCUNA, J Amended Decision of the Court of
Appeals (The CA at first rendered a
Decision, dated October 31, 2000,
but later amended and set it aside.)
3. The case in CA was a petition for
certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65 seeking the nullification of
the Decision of the NLRC. (1st
Decision of CA)
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: It is sometimes necessary to delve into factual issues in order to
resolve allegations of grave abuse of discretion as a ground for the special civil action of
certiorari and prohibition.
ER: Balba was dismissed by the Company hence she filed a case with LA questioning whether
her termination was just and valid. LA dismissed her complaint and appeal was made with
NLRC, where it ruled that she was illegally dismissed. Balba filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 with CA. This was dismissed because the inquiry is limited to the
issue of errors of jurisdiction and there is nothing in the records of the case which would
indicate that NLRC committed any grave abuse of discretion. MR was filed and CA amended
its decision stating NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion considering that the decision of
the LA was supported by substantial evidence and that it should not have been disturbed.
Hence the case. Court ruled that it is sometimes necessary to delve into factual issues in order
to resolve allegations of grave abuse of discretion as a ground for the special civil action of
certiorari and prohibition. Furthermore, the conflicting views of the LA and the NLRC on the
factual issues or the insufficiency of the evidence supporting the respective allegations of the
parties, warranted the review thereof by the CA, at the very least to determine the existence
of grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
FACTS:
Peak Development Inc. (Company) hired Balba initially as a Systems Administration
Personnel where she had to oversee the computerization of the Finance Department.
Later on, Balba was formally appointed as Finance Officer
Balba was assigned to conduct a study on the new law on expanded value added tax (E-
VAT). Thus, she attended an E-VAT seminar at the expense of the respondent company.
Until the law was implemented on January 1, 1996, Balba failed to submit her report.
According to the Company, since the first quarter report was due for submission on
April 20, 1996, Balba was reminded about her long delayed E-VAT [study].
Icaro, the Internal Auditor, noted irregular accounting practices and control systems and
procedures by Balba which includes:
1. absence of subsidiary ledger cards for accounts payable;
2. amounts in words were not indicated on check vouchers;
3. reconciliation of cash position reports against cash balances in the
bank were not done; cash on hand erroneously reported as deposits
in transit; etc.
Instead of cooperating, Balba questioned the authority of the Icaro.
1. placing her under preventive suspension and requiring her to explain why no
disciplinary should be taken against her for insubordination, negligence and
incompetence
2. requiring her to explain why she collected overtime pay despite being a
managerial employee.
Balba submitted her explanation stating:
1. all other audit recommendations were already implemented;
2. that it was only on 3 April 1996 that she was assigned to take charge of the E-
VAT study which was earlier assigned to another person;
3. she submitted her report thereof on 16 April 1996;
4. it was company practice that computations of sales proposals were done by her
department and that her request for the hiring of additional personnel was
justified; and
5. she received the overtime pay in good faith under the impression that it was for
meal/transportation allowance.
Balba was eventually terminated on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. So she
filed with LA to resolve the issue of whether or not the complainants dismissal from
employment was just and valid.
Labor Arbiter: Judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint for illegal
dismissal for lack of merit, and [on the] money claims, the respondent company is
hereby ordered to pay complainant the sum of P7,500.00 as proportionate 13th month
pay for 1996. All other money claims are denied for want of merit. Balba appealed to
NLRC
NLRC: Modified LA decision Balba was illegally dismissed and ordered Company to
give separation pay
A petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 was then filed with the CA.
1. CA initially dismissed the petition because the inquiry is limited to the issue of
errors of jurisdiction and there is nothing in the records of the case which would
indicate that NLRC committed any grave abuse of discretion.
MR was filed and CA issued its Amended Decision which reviewed the factual findings of
the NLRC
CA found that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion considering that the
decision of the LA was supported by substantial evidence and that it should not have
been disturbed.
Hence, the present petition for review under R45.
ISSUE(S): Did the CA err in reversing the factual findings instead of ruling only errors of
jurisdiction (main issue in the case) Yes.
Issues related to Rule 65 [CAs 1st decision which dismissed her appeal] (baka kasi ito talaga
itanong niya) : WON NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in promulgating the decision, the same being in contravention of the express
provisions of the labor code and existing jurisprudence on the just causes for termination of
employment. NO
WON there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. NO
RATIO: in the records of the case, much less the challenged decision and order which
Main Issue: would indicate that indeed public respondent NLRC committed any grave abuse of
o It is sometimes necessary to delve into factual issues in order to resolve allegations of discretion. Far from it, for what the decision of the NLRC shows is that it had
grave abuse of discretion as a ground for the SCA of certiorari and prohibition. The judiciously addressed the issues raised before it rendered judgment and after due
conflicting views of the LA and NLRC on the factual issues warranted the review of thereof. consideration of the evidence at hand. In an action for certiorari, the petitioner
o However, Court agrees with Balba that CA erred in concluding that NLRC committed grave must prove not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to
abuse of discretion. The facts as found by the LA do not constitute grounds for dismissal. lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of public respondent
They do not constitute misconduct. There being no misconduct, there can be no loss of
confidence or breach of trust.
o Court explained as follows why:
Clearly inefficient accounting and financial policies
1. Inefficiency should have a factual basis shown either by comparing it with
efficiency or showing its effects on the company.
2. LA had no benchmark to compare the policies.
3. There is no finding nor evidence that the policies translated into financial
losses or operating disruptions.
Failure to come out with the expected E-VAT study in due time
1. Such failure is not enough basis to lose trust and confidence in Balba
because she did not act with malice nor bad faith. Further, it is not a
misconduct.
2. The company did not suffer any damage due to her failure.
3. When she was first asked to make the report in 1995, there were no
implementing rules issued by the BIR. She could not be expected to come
out with a decent study.
Act of charging overtime pay
1. NLRC found out that managerial employees of the company were entitled
to meal allowances when rendering overtime work. For accounting
purposes, the meal allowance was lumped with overtime pay.
Rule 65 issue:
The sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction and
does not include correction of public respondents evaluation of the evidence and
factual findings.
o Balba in the case would have the Court review the evaluation of the
evidence and factual findings of the NLRC, as well as that of the Labor
Arbiter. The Court find no cogent reason to do so.
o Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies,
which has acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to
specific matters, are generally accorded not only great respect but even
finality
In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not go so far as to evaluate the
sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their
determination, the inquiry being limited essentially to whether or not said public
respondent had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion
o when the ground invoked in a civil action for certiorari is abuse of
discretion, the abuse must be grave as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility
In the case at bench, apart from the bare allegation of petitioner, there is nothing
2. NEW FRONTIER SUGAR v. RTC, AUTHOR: Ramos
EQUITABLE PCI BANK
[G.R. No. 165001; January 31, 2007]
TOPIC: Certiorari
PONENTE: Austria-Martinez, J.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
New Frontier is a domestic corp. which mills raw sugar
1. Aug 2002: Foreseeing that it cannot meet its obligations with its creditors,
petitioner filed a Petition for the Declaration of State of Suspension of
Payments with Approval of Proposed Rehabilitation Plan under the Interim
Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (2000)
RTC: granted the petition and issued a Stay Order, appointing Manuel Clemente as
rehabilitation receiver
Equitable (creditor) filed a Comment/Opposition with Motion to Exclude Property
1. petitioner is not qualified for corporate rehabilitation, as it can no longer
operate because it has no assets left
2. financial statements, schedule of debts and liabilities, inventory of assets,
affidavit of general financial condition, and rehabilitation plan submitted by
petitioner are misleading and inaccurate properties have already been
foreclosed and transferred to it before the petition for rehabilitation was filed,
and petitioner, in fact, still owes respondent bank deficiency liability
RTC Iloilo (Special Commercial Court): issued an Omnibus Order terminating the
proceedings & dismissing the case (denied petitioners omnibus motion)
1. Petitioner filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA
CA: reaffirmed RTC
1. since petitioner no longer has sufficient assets and properties to continue
operations, it is no longer eligible for rehabilitation
2. even if the RTC erred in dismissing the petition, the same could not be
corrected anymore because what petitioner filed before the CA was a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 instead of an ordinary appeal
Petitioner filed this petition for review under Rule 45, assailing the CA decision
ISSUE(S):
1. WON petitioner is eligible for rehabilitation
2. WON special civil action for certiorari was improper
HELD: Petition DENIED. CA decision AFFIRMED.
1. Petitioner is NOT eligible for rehabilitation.
the titles to petitioners properties have already passed on to respondent bank and
petitioner has no more assets to speak of
Rehabilitation contemplates a continuance of corporate life and activities in an effort to
restore and reinstate the corporation to its former position of successful operation and
solvency
o RTC, within 5 days from the filing of the petition for rehabilitation and after
finding that the petition is sufficient in form and substance, shall issue a Stay
Order appointing a Rehabilitation Receiver, suspending enforcement of all
claims, prohibiting transfers or encumbrances of the debtors properties,
prohibiting payment of outstanding liabilities, and prohibiting the withholding
of supply of goods and services from the debtor
o Any transfer of property made in violation of the Stay Order or the Rules may
be declared void by the court upon motion or motu proprio
o As between creditors, the key phrase is "equality is equity." When a
corporation threatened by bankruptcy is taken over by a receiver, all the
creditors should stand on an equal footing. Assets are held in trust for the
equal benefit of all creditors to preclude one from obtaining an advantage
o suspension of the enforcement of all claims against the corporation is subject
to the rule that it shall commence only from the time the Rehabilitation
Receiver is appointed
Here, Equitable acted within its prerogatives when it foreclosed and bought the
property, and had title transferred to it since it was made prior to the appointment of a
rehabilitation receiver
o bank instituted the foreclosure proceedings against petitioners properties on
March 13, 2002 and a Certificate of Sale at Public Auction was issued on May
6, 2002, with respondent bank as the highest bidder
o petition for corporate rehabilitation was filed only on August 14, 2002 and the
Rehabilitation Receiver appointed on August 20, 2002
o fact that there is a pending case for the annulment of the foreclosure
proceedings and auction sales is of no moment
Until a competent court annuls the foreclosure sale of the properties involved, petitioner
is bereft of a valid title over the properties.
o It is the trial courts ministerial duty to grant a possessory writ over the
properties
Petition for rehabilitation did not run its full course but was dismissed by the RTC after
due consideration of the pleadings filed before it
2. YES, special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 was improper.
CERTIORARI is a remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, NOT errors of
judgment.
o original and independent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted
in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of
o since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed
against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the
judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate
remedy
o should be filed not later than 60 days from the notice of judgment, order, or
resolution
o motion for reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing of a petition
for certiorari (to allow the tribunal an opportunity for correction)
Omnibus Order by the RTC is a final order since it terminated the proceedings and
dismissed the case before the trial court; it leaves nothing more to be done. As such,
petitioners recourse is to file an appeal from the Omnibus Order
03 Camutin v. Potente: AUTHOR: Mendoza
[G.R. No.181642; January 29, 2009] NOTES:
TOPIC: Petition for Certiorari
PONENTE: Tinga
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy available only when there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
FACTS:
Petitioners were the registered owners of parcels of land issued in the Register of Deeds
of Cavite. They reside abroad, discovered upon coming back to the Philippines in 1998
that the house and warehouse of respondents Spouses Potente were erected on the
subject lots.
Respondents agreed to pay rentals to the Petitioners and if the property should be sold,
the former would have the right of first refusal.
Respondents failed and refused to pay the agreed rentals. Neither were they able to
purchase the lots. Consequently, petitioners sold a portion of the lots to a third party
who had it fenced. Respondents filed a complaint for Partition against the Petitioners
and the above-stated buyer in the RTC.
Because of the respondents continued refusal to vacate, Petitioners filed a complaint
with the Barangay to have the formers warehouse removed from the properties.
o During the Conference, the parties agreed to wait the outcome of the Partition
case in the RTC.
Petitioners filed a complaint for Unlawful Detainer against the Respondents before the
MTC. The Barangay Chairperson clarified that the agreement was only to wait for the
result of the hearing in the case for partition and not to wait for the termination of the
case altogether.
MTC issued an Order/Writ of Execution where it noted the pendency of the Partition
Case before the RTC and treated such as an amicable settlement to await first the
resolution of the Court on the said pending civil case.
The MTC thus ordered that the proceedings in the ejectment case be indefinitely
suspended and archived subject to its revival upon the final resolution of the Partition
Case. The MTC also denied petitioners MR.
Eventually, the MTC dismissed the Unlawful Detainer Case.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the RTC. Respondents filed a
MTD alleging that the petition for certiorari is a prohibited pleading. The RTC granted the
MTD.
Petitioners went to the SC arguing that the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for
certiorari and hat the MTC likewise erred in suspending the proceedings in the case for
unlawful detainer until the final resolution of the Partition Case.
Petitioners are praying that the RTCs orders be declared null and void. According to
them, the MTC erroneously interpreted the barangay agreement differently from the
clear testimony of the Barangay Chairperson and acted capriciously and whimsically in
ordering the case archived without basis.
Consequently, it was only proper for them to file the petition for certiorari before
the RTC, which should have exercised its authority over the MTC and corrected the
error that the inferior court had committed instead of dismissing their petition.
On the other hand, according to the respondents,
o Petitioners have availed of the wrong remedy. Since the assailed order was
rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, and that the
correct mode of review is an appeal to the CA under Sec. 2(a), Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court;
o The petition raises questions of fact, not of law, as petitioners seek a review
and reexamination of the testimony of the Barangay Chairperson;
o Petitioners ignored the rule on the hierarchy of courts for no apparent reason.
Ultimately, the respondents argued that the dismissal by the RTC of petitioners petition
for certiorari is also in full accord with the summary rules governing cases for ejectment
and unlawful detainer. And that it has become moot and academic in view of the
dismissal of the unlawful detainer case filed before the MTC.
ISSUE(S): Whether the petition for certiorari was correctly dismissed by the RTC for being
moot and academic.
HELD: Yes. Petition denied.
RATIO:
While a petition for certiorari is not allowed against any interlocutory order issued by the
court in the unlawful detainer or ejectment case, in the case at bar, the filing of a
petition for certiorari challenging the MTCs Orders dated 5 June 2007 and 16 August
2007 cannot be deemed a dilatory remedy resorted to by petitioners.
On the contrary, sustaining the MTCs orders would unnecessarily and unfairly delay the
unlawful detainer case, a result contrary to the rules objective of speedy disposition of
cases. Petitioners could also not appeal from the orders of the MTC because these only
ordered the indefinite suspension and archiving of the case.
The case was not resolved on the merits so there is actually no decision from which
petitioners can appeal. Thus, the RTC could have validly ruled on the petition for
certiorari instead of dismissing it on the ground that it is a prohibited pleading.
However, the MTCs revival of the unlawful detainer case and its subsequent
dismissal thereof on the grounds aforestated have rendered the resolution of the
present petition for review superfluous and unnecessary. In their petition for review,
petitioners seek the nullification of the RTCs orders and the subsequent recall of the
MTCs orders suspending the proceedings in the unlawful detainer case and archiving it.
The suspension of the unlawful detainer case has apparently been lifted and the case
has been decided. There is thus no more need for the Court to decide the present
petition on the merits.
Note: Rule 45 v. Rule 65
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and the special civil action of certiorari
under Rule 65 are two separate and distinct remedies. Under Rule 45, a petition brings
up for review errors of judgment while a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 concerns
errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 may be considered as one
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court where it is alleged that the respondents
abused their discretion in their questioned actions.
4.Bugarin V Palisoc AUTHOR: REYES
TOPIC: Certiorari Notes:
PONENTE:
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The remedy to obtain reversal or modification of the judgment on the merits in the
instant case is appeal. This holds true even if the error ascribed to the court rendering
the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power
in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in
the decision.
The existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari
because one of the requirements for the latter remedy is that there should be no
appeal.
Clearly, petitioners petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was filed as a
substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. Certiorari is not and cannot be made a
substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available but was lost through fault
or negligence.
Emergency Recit: Respondents secured a judgment with execution from the MeTC.
Petitioners kept trying to defer the judgment even after being served of a notice of the writ of
execution and a writ to evacuate. Eventually after the lower courts denied their motions to
delay the execution they filed a certiorari. (See doctrine on why SC said this was not proper)
FACTS:
Cecilia B. Palisoc and Marina B. Mata filed a complaint for ejectment before the MeTC
against petitioners.
The court released a decision and declared them the rightful possessors of the properties
in dispute.
It also ordered the petitioners to vacate the premises and pay private respondents the
rentals.
Petitioners appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 274 while
private respondents moved for execution pending appeal.
The RTC affirmed the MeTC decision with the modification that petitioners must start
paying rentals from the date of the appealed decision.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ
of Execution.
The RTC denied the motion and granted private respondents motion for execution for
failure of petitioners to post a supersedeas bond or to pay the back rentals.
Thus, a writ of execution pending appeal was issued. Petitioners were served with the
writ and notice to vacate.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Defer Implementation of the Writ of Execution.
Private respondents filed a Motion to Issue a Special Order of Demolition since
petitioners refused to vacate the premises.
The RTC deferred action on the motions to allow petitioners to exhaust legal remedies
available to them.
Petitioners thereafter filed a Supplement to the Motion to Defer Implementation of Writ
of Execution and Opposition to Motion to Issue Special Order of Demolition, contending
that Section 28 of Republic Act No. 7279 was not complied with.
Private respondents filed a Motion Reiterating the Motion for Issuance of Special Order
of Demolition. the RTC declared the decision denying petitioners appeal final and
executory, and remanded the records of the case to the MeTC without acting on the
motions.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Preliminary
Prohibitory Injunction before the Court of Appeals.
They also filed an Urgent Vigorous Opposition and Motion to Suspend Proceedings on
respondents Motion Reiterating the Motion for Issuance of Special Order of Demolition
before the MeTC.
The MeTC set the Motion for the Issuance of Special Order of Demolition for hearing.
The court granted said motion but gave petitioners five (5) days from receipt of its order
to voluntarily vacate the premises and remove all structures and improvements made
thereon.
MeTC Branch Sheriff Reynaldo T. Nepomuceno reported that petitioners refused to
vacate the premises. Petitioners instead filed a Motion to Quash and Recall the Order
and/or Special Order of Demolition.
The MeTC denied the motion and issued the Special Order of Demolition .
Petitioners filed a petition for review.
ISSUE(S): THE COURT A QUO, IN BRUSHING ASIDE REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 7279 IN THE
RESOLUTION OF THE CASE AGAINST THESE UNDERPRIVILEGED PETITIONERS, HAS DECIDED A
QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE, NOT THERETOFORE DETERMINED BY THE SUPREME COURT,
AND/OR HAS DECIDED IT IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT
HELD: No, Petition denied for lack of merit
RATIO:
Petitioners contend that the Orders of the MeTC violated the mandatory requirements
of Section 28of Rep. Act No. 7279 since there was no 30-day notice prior to the date of
eviction or demolition and there had been no consultation on the matter of
resettlement.
They also claim that there was neither relocation nor financial assistance given. They
insist that the MeTC orders are patently unreasonable, impossible and in violation of the
law.
Private respondents for their part argue that Rep. Act No. 7279 is not applicable. They
aver that there was no proof that petitioners are registered as eligible socialized housing
program beneficiaries in accordance with procedure set forth in the Implementing Rules
and Regulations Governing the Registration of Socialized Housing Beneficiaries issued by
the Department of Interior and Local Government and the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council.
They aver that even if Rep. Act No. 7279 was applicable, the required notices under the
law had already been complied with. According to them, petitioners were already
notified on March 7, 2003 of an impending demolition, when the writ of execution was
served.
Under Section 19, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, a judgment on a
forcible entry and detainer action is immediately executory to avoid further injustice to a
lawful possessor, and the courts duty to order the execution is practically ministerial.
The defendant may stay it only by (a) perfecting an appeal; (b) filing a supersedeas bond;
and (c) making a periodic deposit of the rental or reasonable compensation for the use
and occupancy of the property during the pendency of the appeal. Once the Regional
Trial Court decides on the appeal, such decision is immediately executory under Section
21, Rule 70, without prejudice to an appeal, via a petition for review, before the Court of
Appeals or Supreme Court.
 However, petitioners failed to file a petition for review. Records show that petitioners
received on March 12, 2003 the RTC decision denying their motion for reconsideration.
They had until March 27, 2003 to file a petition for review before the Court of Appeals.
Instead, they filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
In said petition, which is still pending, petitioners contended that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion in affirming the MeTC decision and insisted that the latter
court had no jurisdiction over the complaint.
The remedy to obtain reversal or modification of the judgment on the merits in the
instant case is appeal. This holds true even if the error ascribed to the court rendering
the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power
in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in
the decision.
The existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari
because one of the requirements for the latter remedy is that there should be no
appeal.
Clearly, petitioners petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was filed as a
substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. Certiorari is not and cannot be made a
substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available but was lost through fault
or negligence. Thus, the filing of the petition for certiorari did not prevent the RTC
decision from becoming final and executory The RTC acted correctly when it remanded
the case to the court of origin in the order dated April 11, 2003.
Thus, we find that the MeTC cannot be faulted for issuing the assailed orders to enforce
the RTC judgment. Both orders were issued after the requisite notice and hearing.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals did not issue any writ of preliminary injunction to stay
the execution of the judgment.
Petitioners tried to stay the execution of the order of demolition by filing a petition for
review with prayer for TRO before us. We earlier denied said prayer for TRO. We also
find petitioners contention that the said orders violated Rep. Act No. 7279, particularly
Section 28(c), totally without merit. Under the provision, eviction or demolition may be
allowed when there is a court order for eviction and demolition, as in the case at bar.
Moreover, nothing is shown on record that petitioners are underprivileged and homeless
citizens as defined in Section 3(t) of Rep. Act No. 7279. The procedure for the execution
of the eviction or demolition order under Section 28(c) is, in our view, not applicable.
It also appears that the order of demolition had already been executed. Petitioners had
already vacated the area and private respondents now possess the properties free from
all occupants, as evidenced by the sheriffs turn-over of possession dated May 19, 2003.
Thus, the instant case before us has indeed become moot and academic.
5. Lalican v. Vergara AUTHOR: S A Y O
[G.R. No. Date] NOTES: The issue posed for resolution in this
TOPIC: 65 petition for certiorari and prohibition with
PONENTE: prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order is whether or not a charge
of illegal possession of "lumber" is excluded
from the crime of illegal possession of
"timber" as defined in Sec. 68 of Presidential
Decree No. 705 (The Forestry Reform Code of
the Philippines), as amended, to warrant the
quashal of an information charging the
former offense or a "nonexistent crime."
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Certiorari may be issued only where it is clearly shown that there is patent and gross
abuse of discretion as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of power.
On the other hand, certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the
respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of
discretion. Where the court has jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not
correct, its questioned acts would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of
discretion correctible by certiorari. x x x In other words, certiorari will issue only to
correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the
judges findings and conclusions
Emergency Recit: An information was filed against petitioners for violation of PD 705 as
amended by EO 277 (Forestry Reform Code) for possession and custody of lumber. Petitioners
contend that the law does not cover lumber but only timber. Hence, a motion to quash
information was filed and granted initially, by the RTC but was overturned upon MR.
Petitioners filed 65.
FACTS:
An information for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive
Order No. 277, was filed by the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City against
petitioner Epifanio Lalican, Ruben Benitez, Allan Pulgar and Jose Roblo before the RTC.
"That on or about the 9th day of February, 1991, at Sitio Cadiz,
Barangay Bacungan, City of Puerto Princesa, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without lawful authority or permit, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in their possession, custody and control 1,800
board feet of assorted species and dimensions of lumber on
board two (2) passenger jeeps, with a value of Fourteen
Thousand Pesos (14,000.00), Philippine Currency, to the
damage and prejudice of the Government in the amount
aforestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
At their arraignment on August 9, 1991, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.
Petitioner Lalican filed a motion to quash the information:
the facts charged did not constitute an offense.
Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 refers to "timber and other forest products" and not to
"lumber," and asserting that "timber" becomes "lumber" only after it is sawed
into beams, planks or boards, petitioner alleged that said decree "does not
apply to 'lumber.'"
He added that the law is "vague and standardless" as it does not specify the
authority or the legal documents required by existing forest laws and
regulations.
violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the
law.
The prosecution opposed the motion to quash:
it is not for the courts to determine the wisdom of the law nor to set out the
policy of the legislature which deemed it proper that the word "timber"
should include "lumber" which is a "product or derivative after the timber is
cut."
to hold otherwise would result in the easy circumvention of the law, for one
could stealthily cut timber from any forest, have it sawn into lumber and
escape criminal prosecution.
The prosecution asserted that the issue raised by petitioner was more semantical than a
question of law.
RTC:
guided by the principles that penal laws should be construed strictly against
the state and that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, issued
an Order quashing the information.
It held that the distinction between "timber" and "lumber" is not artificial
nor a matter of semantics as the law itself distinguishes the two terms. Sec.
3(q) of P.D. No. 705 classifies "timber" as a forest product while Sec. 3(aa)
thereof considers "lumber" as a finished wood product.
Adding that unlicensed cutting, gathering and/or collecting of "timber" is
penalized under Sec. 68 while sale of "lumber" without compliance with
grading rules established by the government is prohibited by Sec. 79, the
lower court categorically stated that:
"Logically, lumber, being a manufactured wood product, poses
no more danger to forest lands by being cut, gathered,
collected or removed. It is in fact, only bought and sold. Thus,
Sec. 68 cannot be made to apply to lumber."
The court, however, refrained from exploring the constitutional issues raised by
petitioner upon a holding that the case could be resolved on some other grounds or
 issues. orders to be the subject of review by certiorari would not only delay the
administration of justice but also would unduly burden the courts.
Prosecution filed MR:
pointing out that under the Primer on Illegal Logging of the DENR, timber is
not just any piece of wood for it may consist of squared and manufactured
timber or one which has been sawn to pieces to facilitate transportation or
hauling. It stressed that to consider a person who had made lumber out of
timber as not criminally liable is an absurd interpretation of the law.
underscored the facts that when apprehended, the accused presented an
expired Private Land Timber Permit;
Added to this was the fact that, if the product were indeed lumber, then the
accused could have presented a certificate of lumber origin, lumber sale
invoices in case of sale, tally sheets and delivery receipts for transportation
from one point to another.

Petitioner opposed the MR:

DENR primer's definition of "timber" is erroneous because the law itself
distinguishes "timber" from "sawn lumber." The non-inclusion of "lumber" in
Sec. 68 could only mean a clear legislative intent to exclude possession of
"lumber" from the acts penalized under that section.

RTC: set aside the quashal Order of the previous judge. It declared that from the law
itself, it is evident that what is sought to be penalized is not the possession, without the
required legal documents, of timber only but also of "other forest products." It stated
that even if lumber is not timber, still, lumber is a forest product and possession thereof
without legal documents is equally prohibited by the law which includes "wood" in the
definition of forest products.
Petitioner MRd but was denied thus this 65 petition.
ISSUE(S): WON 65 was proper (NO)
RATIO:
The unavailability of the writ of certiorari, and even that of prohibition, in this case is
borne out of the fact that what petitioner considers as grave abuse of discretion in this
case is the denial of his motion to quash the information filed against him and three
others. This Court has consistently defined the proper procedure in case of denial of a
motion to quash. The accused has to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his
part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion and, if after trial on the
merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized
by law. Certiorari is not the proper remedy where a motion to quash an information is
denied. That the appropriate recourse is to proceed to trial and in case of conviction, to
appeal such conviction, as well as the denial of the motion to quash, is impelled by the
fact that a denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory procedural aspect which
cannot be appealed nor can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari. The remedies of
appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.

An interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is

shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion. However, this Court generally frowns upon this remedial measure as
regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory
06. Sps. Nisce vs. Equitable PCI Bank AUTHOR: SOLIS
[G.R. No. 167434 | Feb. 19, 2007] NOTES:
TOPIC: CERTIORARI
PONENTE: Callejo, Sr.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Sps. Nisce had an obligation under a Promissory Note to Equitable PCI Bank (Bank) in
the amount of P34, 087, 725.76. They secured such obligation with a Suretyship
Agreement executed by Natividad and a mortgage contract over 2 parcels of land
executed by Sps. Nisce.
Sps. Nisce defaulted on their obligation. Thus, the Bank filed a petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure before the Office of the Cleark of Court as Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC-
Makati City. The public auction was scheduled.
Sps. Nisce filed a complaint for nullity of the Suretyship Agreement, damages and legal
compensation with prayer for injunctive relief against the Bank and the Ex-Officio
Sheriff. Sps. Nisce alleged that since they and the Bank were creditors and debtors with
respect to each other, their obligations should have been offset by legal compensation
to the extent of their account with the Bank.
RTC: GRANTED Sps. Nisces plea for a writ of preliminary injunction on a bond of P10M.
The Bank opted not to file a MR, and instead assailed the RTCs order before the CA via
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC. It alleged the following:
(1) that the RTC had acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when issued the assailed order;
(2) the spouses Nisce had failed to prove the requisites for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction; and
(3) respondents claim that their account with petitioner had been extinguished by legal
compensation has no factual and legal basis.
Sps. Nisce contended that the Bank failed to file a MR of the RTCs order, a condition
sine qua non to the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, the error committed by the RTC is a mere error of judgment not correctible
by certiorari; hence, the petition should have been dismissed outright by the CA.
CA: GRANTED the petition and nullifying the assailed order of the RTC. It declared that a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be filed despite the
failure to file a motion for reconsideration, particularly in instances where the issue
raised is one of law; where the error is patent; the assailed order is void, or the
questions raised are the same as those already ruled upon by the lower court.
According to the appellate court, the issue raised before it was purely one of law:
whether the loan account of the spouses was extinguished by legal compensation. Thus,
a motion for the reconsideration of the assailed order was not a prerequisite to a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Sps. Nisce filed a MR and averred that the CA erred in not dismissing respondent Banks
petition for certiorari outright because of the absence of a condition precedent: the
filing of a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Order of the RTC before filing the
petition for certiorari in the CA. They insist that respondent banks failure to file a
motion for reconsideration of the assailed Order deprived the RTC of its option to
resolve the issue of whether it erred in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction in their
favor. Petitioners further insist that a petition for a writ of certiorari is designed solely
to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment, such as errors in the findings
and conclusions of the trial court. Petitioners maintain that the trial courts erroneous
findings and conclusions (according to respondent bank) are not the proper subjects for
a petition for certiorari. Contrary to the findings of the CA, they did not admit in the trial
court that they were in default in the payment of their loan obligations.
The Bank maintains that the sole issue involved in the petition for certiorari of
respondent in the CA was whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of its
discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE(s): WON a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC may be filed despite the
failure to file a MR.
HELD: Depends on the circumstances of the case. In this case, the exception to the general
rule applies.
RATIO:
The general rule is that before filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, the petitioner is mandated to comply with a condition precedent: the filing of a motion
for reconsideration of the assailed order, and the subsequent denial of the court a quo. It
must be stressed that a petition for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and should be filed
only as a last resort. The filing of a motion for reconsideration is intended to afford the public
respondent an opportunity to correct any actual error attributed to it by way of re-
examination of the legal and factual issues.
However, the rule is subject to the following recognized exceptions:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly
raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those
raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question
and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or
of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would
be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and
the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process;
(h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved
As will be shown later, the March 24, 2003 Order of the trial court granting petitioners plea
for a writ of preliminary injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction and thus a nullity. If the trial court issues a writ of preliminary
injunction despite the absence of proof of a legal right and the injury sustained by the
plaintiff, the writ is a nullity
7. Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc., and AUTHOR: The Talio
Eduardo B. Olaguer vs Bangko Sentral NOTES: Long because I included the
Monetary Board, Represented by its laws/provisions involved. Dami eh.
Chairman, Governor Armando M. Tetangco,
Jr., and its Incumbent Members: Juanita D. AFTIL Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc.
Amatong, Alfredo C. Antonio, Peter Fa Vila, CB Central Bank
Nelly F. Villafuerte, Ignacio R. Bunye, and MB Monetary Board
Cesar V. Purisima SB Senate Bill
PSR Philippine Senate Resolution
[G.R. No. 192986; January 15, 2013] T-Bills Treasury Bills
TOPIC: Rule 65 - Certiorari
PONENTE: Reyes, J.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
As provided in Sec. 1 of Rule 65, a writ of certiorari is directed against a tribunal
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Judicial functions are exercised by a body or
officer clothed with authority to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of
the parties are with respect to the matter in controversy. Quasi-judicial function is a
term that applies to the action or discretion of public administrative officers or bodies
given the authority to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings,
and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action using discretion of a
judicial nature.
The CB-MB (now BSP-MB) was created to perform executive functions with respect to
the establishment, operation or liquidation of banking and credit institutions, and
branches and agencies thereof. It does not perform judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Certainly, the issuance of CB Circular No. 905 was done in the exercise of an executive
function. Certiorari will not lie in the instant case.
Emergency Recit: RA 265, which created the CB of the Philippines, empowered the CB-MB to,
among others, set the maximum interest rates which banks may charge for all types of loans
and other credit operations, within limits prescribed by Act 2655 (Usury Law of 1916). The
Usury Law was amended by PD 1684, giving the CB-MB authority to prescribe different
maximum rates of interest which may be imposed for a loan or renewal thereof or the
forbearance of any money, goods or credits, provided that the changes are effected gradually
and announced in advance. In its Resolution No. 2224, the CB-MB issued CB Circular No. 905.
Sec. 1 of the Circular, under its General Provisions, removed the ceilings on interest rates on
loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits. The Circular then went on to amend
Books I to IV of the CBs "Manual of Regulations for Banks and Other Financial Intermediaries"
by removing the applicable ceilings on specific interest rates. Pres. FVR signed into law RA
7653 establishing the BSP to replace the CB. PETITIONERS THEN FILED A PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI DIRECTLY TO THE SC. They claim that they are raising issues of transcendental
importance to the public and asked the SC to declare that the BSP-MB, replacing the CB-MB,
by virtue of RA 7653, has no authority to continue enforcing CB Circular No. 905, issued by the
CB-MB in 1982, which "suspended" Act 2655. The SC denied the petition. (Refer Above).
FACTS:
AFTIL is a non-profit, non-stock corporation organized to engage in pro bono concerns
and activities relating to money lending issues. It filed this petition, joined by its founder
and president, Eduardo B. Olaguer, suing as a taxpayer and a citizen.
RA 265, which created the CB of the Philippines, empowered the CB-MB to, among
others, set the maximum interest rates which banks may charge for all types of loans and
other credit operations, within limits prescribed by Act 2655 (Usury Law). Sec. 109 of RA
265 reads:
Sec. 109. Interest Rates, Commissions and Charges. The Monetary Board may fix
the maximum rates of interest which banks may pay on deposits and on other
obligations.
The Monetary Board may, within the limits prescribed in the Usury Law fix the
maximum rates of interest which banks may charge for different types of loans and
for any other credit operations, or may fix the maximum differences which may
exist between the interest or rediscount rates of the Central Bank and the rates
which the banks may charge their customers if the respective credit documents are
not to lose their eligibility for rediscount or advances in the Central Bank.
Any modifications in the maximum interest rates permitted for the borrowing or
lending operations of the banks shall apply only to future operations and not to
those made prior to the date on which the modification becomes effective.
In order to avoid possible evasion of maximum interest rates set by the Monetary
Board, the Board may also fix the maximum rates that banks may pay to or collect
from their customers in the form of commissions, discounts, charges, fees or
payments of any sort.
The Usury Law was amended by PD 1684, giving the CB-MB authority to prescribe
different maximum rates of interest which may be imposed for a loan or renewal thereof
or the forbearance of any money, goods or credits, provided that the changes are
effected gradually and announced in advance. Thus, Sec. 1-a of Act 2655 now reads:
Sec. 1-a. The Monetary Board is hereby authorized to prescribe the maximum rate
or rates of interest for the loan or renewal thereof or the forbearance of any
money, goods or credits, and to change such rate or rates whenever warranted by
prevailing economic and social conditions: Provided, That changes in such rate or
rates may be effected gradually on scheduled dates announced in advance.
In the exercise of the authority herein granted the Monetary Board may prescribe
higher maximum rates for loans of low priority, such as consumer loans or renewals
thereof as well as such loans made by pawnshops, finance companies and other
similar credit institutions although the rates prescribed for these institutions need
not necessarily be uniform. The Monetary Board is also authorized to prescribe
different maximum rate or rates for different types of borrowings, including
deposits and deposit substitutes, or loans of financial intermediaries.
In its Resolution No. 2224, the CB-MB issued CB Circular No. 905, Series of 1982,
effective on Jan. 1, 1983. Sec. 1 of the Circular, under its General Provisions, removed the
ceilings on interest rates on loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits, to wit:
Sec. 1. The rate of interest, including commissions, premiums, fees and other
charges, on a loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or credits, regardless of
maturity and whether secured or unsecured, that may be charged or collected by
any person, whether natural or juridical, shall not be subject to any ceiling
 prescribed under or pursuant to the Usury Law, as amended.
The Circular then went on to amend Books I to IV of the CBs "Manual of Regulations for
Banks and Other Financial Intermediaries" by removing the applicable ceilings on specific
interest rates. Thus:
o Secs. 5, 9 and 10 of CB Circular No. 905 amended Book I, Subsections 1303,
1349, 1388.1 of the Manual of Regulations, by removing the ceilings for
interest and other charges, commissions, premiums, and fees applicable to
commercial banks;
o Secs. 12 and 17 removed the interest ceilings for thrift banks (Book II,
Subsections 2303, 2349);
o Secs. 19 and 21 removed the ceilings applicable to rural banks (Book III,
Subsection 3152.3-c); and
o Secs. 26, 28, 30 and 32 removed the ceilings for non-bank financial
intermediaries (Book IV, Subsections 4303Q.1 to 4303Q.9, 4303N.1, 4303P).
June 14, 1993 Pres. FVR signed into law RA 7653 establishing the BSP to replace the
CB. The repealing clause thereof, Sec. 135, reads:
Sec. 135. Repealing Clause. Except as may be provided for in Sections 46 and
132 of this Act, Republic Act No. 265, as amended, the provisions of any other law,
special charters, rule or regulation issued pursuant to said Republic Act No. 265, as
amended, or parts thereof, which may be inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act are hereby repealed. Presidential Decree No. 1792 is likewise repealed.
To justify their skipping the hierarchy of courts and going directly to the SC to secure a
writ of certiorari, petitioners contend that the transcendental importance of their
Petition can readily be seen in the issues raised therein, to wit:
o Whether under RA 265 and/or PD 1684, the CB-MB had the statutory or
constitutional authority to prescribe the maximum rates of interest for all kinds
of credit transactions and forbearance of money, goods or credit beyond the
limits prescribed in the Usury Law;
o If so, whether the CB-MB exceeded its authority when it issued CB Circular No.
905, which removed all interest ceilings and thus suspended the Usury Law as
regards usurious interest rates;
o Whether under RA 7653, the new BSP-MB may continue to enforce CB Circular
No. 905.
Petitioners attached to their petition copies of several Senate Bills and Resolutions of the
10th Congress, which held its sessions from 1995 to 1998, calling for investigations by
the Senate Committee on Banks and Financial Institutions into alleged unconscionable
commercial rates of interest imposed by these entities.
o SB Nos. 37 and 1860, filed by Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III and the late Sen. Blas F.
Ople, respectively, sought to amend the Usury Law by fixing the rates of
interest on loans and forbearance of credit;
o PSR Nos. 1053, 1073 and 1102, filed by Sen. Ramon B. Magsaysay, Jr., Sen.
Gregorio B. Honasan, and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon, respectively, urged the
aforesaid Senate Committee to investigate ways to curb the high commercial
interest rates then obtaining in the country;
o Sen. Ernesto Maceda filed SB No. 1151 to prohibit the collection of more than
2 months of advance interest on any loan of money; and
o Sen. Raul Roco filed SR No. 1144 seeking an investigation into an alleged cartel
of commercial banks, called "Club 1821", reportedly behind the regime of high
interest rates.
o The petitioners also attached news clippings showing that in Feb. 1998, the
banks prime lending rates, or interests on loans to their best borrowers,
ranged from 26%-31%.
Petitioners contend that:
o Under Sec. 1-a of Act 2655, as amended by PD 1684, the CB-MB was
authorized only to prescribe or set the maximum rates of interest for a loan or
renewal thereof or for the forbearance of any money, goods or credits, and to
change such rates whenever warranted by prevailing economic and social
conditions, the changes to be effected gradually and on scheduled dates;
o Nothing in PD 1684 authorized the CB-MB to lift or suspend the limits of
interest on all credit transactions, when it issued CB Circular No. 905.
o Under Sec. 109 of RA 265, the authority of the CB-MB was clearly only to fix
the banks maximum rates of interest, but always within the limits prescribed
by the Usury Law.
o CB Circular No. 905, which was promulgated without the benefit of any prior
public hearing, is void because it violated Art. 5 of the New Civil Code, which
provides that "Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or
prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their
validity."
o Just weeks after the issuance of CB Circular No. 905, the benchmark 91-day T-
Bills, then known as "Jobo", bills shot up to 40% per annum, as a result. The
banks immediately followed suit and re-priced their loans to rates which were
even higher than those of the "Jobo" bills. Petitioners thus assert that CB
Circular No. 905 is also unconstitutional in light of Sec. 1 of the Bill of Rights,
which commands that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws."
o RA 7653 did not re-enact a provision similar to Sec. 109 of RA 265, and
therefore, in view of the repealing clause in Sec. 135 of RA 7653, the BSP-MB
has been stripped of the power either to prescribe the maximum rates of
interest which banks may charge for different kinds of loans and credit
transactions, or to suspend Act 2655 and continue enforcing CB Circular No.
905.
ISSUE(S): WON the petition for certiorari was proper.
HELD: Nah son.
RATIO: (A) lang yung about certiorari. (B-C) medj procedural pa so sinama ko na. (D-F) about
the laws involved in this case na so di ko na sinama.
A. The Petition is procedurally infirm.
The decision on whether or not to accept a petition for certiorari, as well as to grant due
course thereto, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. A petition for certiorari
being an extraordinary remedy, the party seeking to avail of the same must strictly
observe the procedural rules laid down by law, and non-observance thereof may not be
brushed aside as mere technicality.
As provided in Sec. 1 of Rule 65, a writ of certiorari is directed against a tribunal
 exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Judicial functions are exercised by a body or
officer clothed with authority to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of
the parties are with respect to the matter in controversy. Quasi-judicial function is a
term that applies to the action or discretion of public administrative officers or bodies
given the authority to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings,
and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action using discretion of a
judicial nature.
The CB-MB (now BSP-MB) was created to perform executive functions with respect to
the establishment, operation or liquidation of banking and credit institutions, and
branches and agencies thereof. It does not perform judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Certainly, the issuance of CB Circular No. 905 was done in the exercise of an executive
function. Certiorari will not lie in the instant case.
B. Petitioners have no locus standi to file the Petition
Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question." In private suits, Sec. 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest," who is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Succinctly put, a partys standing is
based on his own right to the relief sought.
Even in public interest cases such as this petition, the Court has generally adopted the
"direct injury" test that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain
direct injury as a result." Thus, while petitioners assert a public right to assail CB Circular
No. 905 as an illegal executive action, it is nonetheless required of them to make out a
sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief. It is
significant that in this petition, the petitioners do not allege that they sustained any
personal injury from the issuance of CB Circular No. 905.
Petitioners also do not claim that public funds were being misused in the enforcement of
CB Circular No. 905
C. The Petition raises no issues of transcendental importance.
In the 1993 case of Joya vs. PCGG, it was held that no question involving the
constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by
the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely:
(a) that the question must be raised by the proper party; (b) that there must be an actual
case or controversy; (c) that the question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (d) that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be
necessary to the determination of the case itself.
In Prof. David vs. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court summarized the requirements
before taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators can be accorded a standing
to sue, viz:
o the cases involve constitutional issues;
o for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or
that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
o for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the
election law in question;
o for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
o for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of
infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.
While the Court may have shown in recent decisions a certain toughening in its attitude
concerning the question of legal standing, it has nonetheless always made an exception
where the transcendental importance of the issues has been established,
notwithstanding the petitioners failure to show a direct injury. In CREBA vs. ERC, the
Court set out the following instructive guides as determinants on whether a matter is of
transcendental importance, namely: (1) the character of the funds or other assets
involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or
statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest
in the questions being raised. Further, the Court stated in Anak Mindanao Party-List
Group vs. The Executive Secretary that the rule on standing will not be waived where
these determinants are not established.
In the instant case, there is no allegation of misuse of public funds in the implementation
of CB Circular No. 905. Neither were borrowers who were actually affected by the
suspension of the Usury Law joined in this petition. Absent any showing of
transcendental importance, the petition must fail.
More importantly, the Court notes that the instant petition adverted to the regime of
high interest rates which obtained at least 15 years ago, when the banks prime lending
rates ranged from 26%-31%, or even 29 years ago, when the 91-day Jobo bills reached
40% per annum. In contrast, according to the BSP, in the first 2 months of 2012 the bank
lending rates averaged 5.91%, which implies that the banks prime lending rates were
lower; moreover, deposit interests on savings and long-term deposits have also gone
very low, averaging 1.75% and 1.62%, respectively.
Judging from the most recent auctions of T-bills, the savings rates must be approaching
0%.In the auctions held on Nov. 12, 2012, the rates of 3-month, 6-month and 1-year T-
bills have dropped to 0.150%, 0.450% and 0.680%, respectively. According to Manila
Bulletin, this very low interest regime has been attributed to "high liquidity and strong
investor demand amid positive economic indicators of the country."
While the Court acknowledges that cases of transcendental importance demand that
they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure, the delay of at least 15 years in the filing of the instant petition has actually
rendered moot and academic the issues it now raises.
For its part, BSP-MB maintains that the petitioners allegations of constitutional and
statutory violations of CB Circular No. 905 are really mere challenges made by
petitioners concerning the wisdom of the Circular. It explains that it was in view of the
global economic downturn in the early 1980s that the executive department through
the CB-MB had to formulate policies to achieve economic recovery, and among these
policies was the establishment of a market-oriented interest rate structure which would
require the removal of the government-imposed interest rate ceilings.
08 GALICTO v. AQUINO AUTHOR: TAN
G.R. No. 193978. February 28, 2012. Notes: CJ Corona has a separate opinion, but
TOPIC: RULE 65- CERTIORARI its not related to certiorari.
PONENTE: BRION, J.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: Under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition are
availed of to question judicial, quasi-judicial and mandatory acts. Since the issuance of an EO
is not judicial, quasi-judicial or a mandatory act, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is an
incorrect remedy; instead a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Petitioner Galicto filed before the SC a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order, seeking to nullify and enjoin the implementation of Executive Order No. (EO) 7 issued
by the Office of the President. Petitioner asserts that EO 7 is unconstitutional for having been
issued beyond the powers of the President and for being in breach of existing laws. SC held
that the petition is improper. See doctrine.
FACTS:
On July 26, 2010, Pres. Aquino made public in his first State of the Nation Address the
alleged excessive allowances, bonuses and other benefits of Officers and Members of the
Board of Directors of the Manila Waterworks and Sewerage Systema government
owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) which has been unable to meet its standing
obligations.
Subsequently, the Senate of the Philippines (Senate), through the Senate Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, conducted an inquiry in aid of
legislation and found that officials and governing boards of various [GOCCs] and [GFIs] x
x x have been granting themselves unwarranted allowances, bonuses, incentives, stock
options, and other benefits [as well as other] irregular and abusive practices.
The Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 17 urging the President to order the
immediate suspension of the unusually large and apparently excessive allowances,
bonuses, incentives and other perks of members of the governing boards of [GOCCs] and
[GFIs].
Heeding the call of Congress, Pres. Aquino, on September 8, 2010, issued EO 7, entitled
Directing the Rationalization of the Compensation and Position Classification System in
the [GOCCs] and [GFIs], and for Other Purposes.
EO 7 ordered (1) a moratorium on the increases in the salaries and other forms of
compensation, except salary adjustments under EO 8011 and EO 900, of all GOCC and
GFI employees for an indefinite period to be set by the President,9 and (2) a suspension
of all allowances, bonuses and incentives of members of the Board of Directors/Trustees
until December 31, 2010.
The petitioner filed before the SC the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order,
claiming that as a PhilHealth employee, he is affected by the implementation of EO 7,
which was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Petitioner argue, among others, that EO 7 is in substance a law, which is a
derogation of congressional prerogative and is therefore unconstitutional and that the
acts of suspending and imposing moratorium are ultra vires acts because J.R. No. 4,
which respondents point as the authority for issuing EO 7, does not expressly authorize
the president to exercise such powers.
Respondents argue, among others, that certiorari is not applicable to this case.
Meanwhile, on June 6, 2011, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10149, otherwise
known as the GOCC Governance Act of 2011. Section 11 of RA 10149 expressly
authorizes the President to fix the compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs.
ISSUE(S): Whether certiorari is the proper remedy.
HELD: No. Petition dismissed.
RATIO:
Under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition are availed of to
question judicial, quasi-judicial and mandatory acts. Since the issuance of an EO is not
judicial, quasi-judicial or a mandatory act, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is an
incorrect remedy; instead a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), is the proper recourse to assail the
validity of EO 7:
Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental
regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or
validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
(Emphases ours.)
Liga ng mga Barangay National v. City Mayor of Manila is a case in point. In Liga, we
dismissed the petition for certiorari to set aside an EO issued by a City Mayor and
insisted that a petition for declaratory relief should have been filed with the RTC. We
painstakingly ruled:
After due deliberation on the pleadings filed, we resolve to dismiss this
petition for certiorari. First, the respondents neither acted in any judicial or
quasi-judicial capacity nor arrogated unto themselves any judicial or quasi-
judicial prerogatives. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure is a special civil action that may be invoked only against a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Elsewise stated, for a writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must
concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting [to] lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to
determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then
undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the
parties.
Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is a term which applies to the actions,
discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies ... required to investigate
facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from
 them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial
nature.
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is
necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or
property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy
ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power
and authority to determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the
contending parties.
The respondents do not fall within the ambit of tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in essence,
it seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the
questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a
petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original,
jurisdiction. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution provides:
do not appear to us to be the result of any error in reading Rule 65, given the
way the petition was crafted. Rather, it was a backdoor approach to achieve
what the petitioner could not directly do in his individual capacity under Rule
65. It was, at the very least, an attempted bypass of other available, albeit
lengthier, modes of review that the Rules of Court provide. While we stop
short of concluding that the petitioners approaches constitute an abuse of
process through a manipulative reading and application of the Rules of Court,
we nevertheless resolve that the petition should be dismissed for its blatant
violation of the Rules. The transgressions alleged in a petition, however
weighty they may sound, cannot be justifications for blatantly disregarding
the rules of procedure, particularly when remedial measures were available
under these same rules to achieve the petitioners objectives. For our part,
we cannot and should notin the name of liberality and the transcendental
importance doctrineentertain these types of petitions. As we held in the
very recent case of Lozano, et al. vs. Nograles, albeit from a different
perspective, our liberal approach has its limits and should not be abused.
[emphasis supplied]

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: (1)
Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus. (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal
or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:

All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,

international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question. (Italics supplied).

As such, this petition must necessar[ily] fail, as this Court does not have
original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions
of law are involved.

While we have recognized in the past that we can exercise the discretion and rulemaking
authority we are granted under the Constitution, and set aside procedural considerations
to permit parties to bring a suit before us at the first instance through certiorari and/or
prohibition, this liberal policy remains to be an exception to the general rule, and thus,
has its limits. In Concepcion v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC), we emphasized the
importance of availing of the proper remedies and cautioned against the wrongful use of
certiorari in order to assail the quasi-legislative acts of the COMELEC, especially by the
wrong party. In ruling that liberality and the transcendental doctrine cannot trump
blatant disregard of procedural rules, and considering that the petitioner had other
available remedies (such as a petition for declaratory relief with the appropriate RTC
under the terms of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court), as in this case, we categorically ruled:
The petitioners unusual approaches and use of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court