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Zenaida Gregorio, petitioner, v. Court of Appeals, Sansio Philippines, Inc.

and
Emma J. Datuin, respondents
GR No. 179799, September 11, 2009

FACTS: Respondents Emma J. Datuin (Datuin) and Sansio Philippines, Inc. (Sansio) filed an
affidavit of complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) against petitioner
Zenaida R. Gregorio (Gregorio), a proprietor of Alvi Marketing. Datuin and Sansio claimed that
Gregorio delivered insufficiently funded bank checks as payment for appliances Alvi Marketing
bought from Sansio. Gregorio was then indicted for three counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 3, Manila. The MTC issued a warrant of
arrest and she was subsequently arrested by armed operatives while visiting her family house in
Quezon City. On December 5, 1997, Gregorio filed before the MTC a Motion for Deferment of
Arraignment and Reinvestigation. She alleged that she could not have issued the bounced checks
as she did not have a checking account with the bank on which the checks were drawn. This was
certified by the manager of the said bank. Gregorio also alleged that the signature on the bounced
checks were radically and patently different from her own signature. The MTC granted the
motion, and a reinvestigation was conducted. Subsequently, the MTC ordered the B.P. Blg. 22
cases dismissed.

On August 18, 2000, Gregorio filed a complaint for damages against Sansio and Datuin before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Ligao, Albay. Part of her complaint was that as a
result of her wrongful arrest and arraignment, she suffered helplessness, hunger and humiliation
and being distraught. Datuin and Sansio meanwhile filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds that
Gregorios complaint arose from grounds of compensation arising from malicious prosecution.
On October 10, 2000, the RTC denied this Motion to Dismiss. Sansio and Datuin then filed a
Motion for Reconsideration but was again denied in January 5, 2001. They went to the Court of
Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the presiding judge of the RTC in
denying their motions to dismiss and for reconsideration. On January 31, 2007, the CA rendered
a Decision granting the petition and ordering Gregorios damage suit to be dismissed.

ISSUE: Are Sansio and Datuin liable for damages to Gregorio?

HELD: Yes. Among other reasons, the Supreme Court decided that Gregorios rights to personal
dignity, personal security, privacy, and peace of mind were infringed by Sansio and Datuin when
they failed to exercise the requisite diligence in determining the identity of the person they
should rightfully accuse of tendering insufficiently funded checks. . . . Because she was not able
to refute the charges against her, petitioner was falsely indicted for three (3) counts of violation
of B.P. Blg. 22. Gregorio was conveniently at her city residence while visiting her family. She
suffered embarrassment and humiliation over her sudden arrest and detention and she had to
spend time, effort, and money to clear her tarnished name and reputation, considering that she
had held several honorable positions in different organizations and offices in the public service,
particularly her being a Kagawad in Oas, Albay at the time of her arrest.
Sabina Exconde vs Delfin and Dante Capuno

101 Phil 843 Civil Law Torts and Damages Liability of Parents

Dante Capuno was a 15 year old boy who was a pupil of Balintawak Elementary School. In
March 1949, he attended a boy scout parade for Dr. Jose Rizal. While they were inside a jeep, he
took control of the wheels which he later lost control of causing the jeep to go turtle thereby
killing two other students, Isidoro Caperina and one other. Isidoros mother, Sabina Exconde,
sued Dante Capuno for the death of her son. Pending the criminal action, the mother reserved her
right to file a separate civil action which she subsequently filed against Dante and his dad, Delfin
Capuno.

ISSUE: Whether or not Delfin Capuno, as the father of Dante is liable for damages.

HELD: Yes. The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father, and, in case of his death
or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live
with them, is obvious. This is necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over
them which imposes upon the parents the duty of supporting them, keeping them in their
company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means, while, on the other
hand, gives them the right to correct and punish them in moderation. The only way by which
they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent the damage which Delfin failed to prove.

On the other hand, the school is not liable. It is true that under the law, teachers or directors of
arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are
under their custody, but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to
any academic educational institution.

Spouses Moises and Brigida Palisoc vs Antonio Brillantes

41 SCRA 548 Civil Law Torts and Damages Liability of teachers/heads of establishments
of arts and trades

In March 1966, while Dominador Palisoc (16 years old) was watching Virgilio Daffon and
Desiderio Cruz work on a machine in their laboratory class in the Manila Technical Institute (a
school of arts and trades), Daffon scolded Palisoc for just standing around like a foreman. This
caused Palisoc to slightly slap the face of Daffon and a fistfight ensued between the two. Daffon
delivered blows that eventually killed Palisoc. The parents of Palisoc sued Daffon, the school
president (Teodosio Valenton), the instructor (Santiago Quibulue), and the owner (Antonio
Brillantes). The basis of the suit against Valenton, Quibulue, and Brillantes was Article 2180 of
the Civil Code.
The lower court, as well as the CA, ruled that only Daffon is liable for damages and that
Valenton, Quibulue, and Brillantes are not liable because under Article 2180, they are only liable
so long as they [the students] remain in their custody. And that this means, as per Mercado vs
Court of Appeals, that teachers or heads of establishments are only liable for the tortious acts of
their students if the students are living and boarding with the teacher or other officials of the
school which Daffon was not.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling in the Mercado Case still applies.

HELD: No. The SC abandoned the ruling in the Mercado Case as well as the ruling in the
Exconde Case as they adopted Justice JBL Reyes dissenting opinion in the latter case. Valenton
and Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of the school must be held jointly and severally
liable for the quasi-delict of Daffon. The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the
students could have been avoided, had said defendants but complied with their duty of providing
adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school premises to protect their
students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow students or other parties. At any rate, the law
holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last
paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by (proving) that they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage. In the light of the factual findings of the lower
courts decision, said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability. The SC
reiterated that there is nothing in the law which prescribes that a student must be living and
boarding with his teacher or in the school before heads and teachers of the school may be held
liable for the tortious acts of their students.

PICART vs. SMITH, JR., G.R. No. L-12219, March 15, 1918

STREET, J.:

FACTS: On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony over said bridge.
Before he had gotten half way across, Smith approached from the opposite direction in an
automobile. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to
give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave
two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not
observing the rule of the road.

Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed by
the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up
against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the
reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side.
As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the
road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the
other side. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the
right while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the
horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no
possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car
sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the automobile passed in such
close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge, got
hit by the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some
violenceAs a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused
temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.

From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from liability Picart has appealed.

ISSUE: WON Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the
damage done

HELD: the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and judgment is here rendered that the
Picart recover of Smith damages

YES

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in
the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The existence of negligence in a given
case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before
him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of
ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. The question as to what
would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always
determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular
case.

Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course
actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is
always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper
criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be
negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect
harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding
against its consequences.

Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence is
clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion,
have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would
therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course.
Under these circumstances the law imposed on the Smith the duty to guard against the threatened
harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of
antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already
stated, Smith was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent
is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties
were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of
the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who
has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.

G.R. NO. 124354 APRIL 11, 2002

ROGELIO E. RAMOS and ERLINDA RAMOS, in their own behalf and as natural guardians of the minors,
ROMMEL RAMOS, ROY RODERICK RAMOS, and RON RAYMOND RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DE LOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER, DR. ORLINO HOSAKA and DR. PERFECTA
GUTIERREZ, respondents.

FACTS:

Sometime in 1985, petitioner Erlinda Ramos, after seeking professional medical help, was advised to
undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladder (cholecystectomy). She was referred
to Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon, who agreed to perform the operation on her. The operation was scheduled for
June 17, 1985 at 9:00 in the morning at private respondent De Los Santos Medical Center (DLSMC). Since
neither petitioner Erlinda nor her husband, petitioner Rogelio, knew of any anesthesiologist, Dr. Hosaka
recommended to them the services of Dr. Gutierrez.

Petitioner Erlinda was admitted to the DLSMC the day before the scheduled operation. By 7:30 in the
morning of the following day, petitioner Erlinda was already being prepared for operation. Upon the
request of petitioner Erlinda, her sister-in-law, Herminda Cruz, who was then Dean of the College of
Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center, was allowed to accompany her inside the operating room.

At around 9:30 in the morning, Dr. Hosaka had not yet arrived so Dr. Gutierrez tried to get in touch with
him by phone. Thereafter, Dr. Gutierrez informed Cruz that the operation might be delayed due to the
late arrival of Dr. Hosaka. In the meantime, the patient, petitioner Erlinda said to Cruz, "Mindy, inip na
inip na ako, ikuha mo ako ng ibang Doctor."By 10:00 in the morning, when Dr. Hosaka was still not
around, petitioner Rogelio already wanted to pull out his wife from the operating room. He met Dr.
Garcia, who remarked that he was also tired of waiting for Dr. Hosaka. Dr. Hosaka finally arrived at the
hospital at around 12:10 in the afternoon, or more than three (3) hours after the scheduled operation.

Cruz, who was then still inside the operating room, heard about Dr. Hosakas arrival. While she held the
hand of Erlinda, Cruz saw Dr. Gutierrez trying to intubate the patient. Cruz heard Dr.
Gutierrez utter: "ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan." Cruz
noticed a bluish discoloration of Erlindas nailbeds on her left hand. She (Cruz) then heard Dr. Hosaka
instruct someone to call Dr. Calderon, another anesthesiologist. When he arrived, Dr. Calderon
attempted to intubate the patient. The nailbeds of the patient remained bluish, thus, she was placed in a
trendelenburg position a position where the head of the patient is placed in a position lower than her
feet. At this point, Cruz went out of the operating room to express her concern to petitioner Rogelio that
Erlindas operation was not going well.

Cruz quickly rushed back to the operating room and saw that the patient was still in trendelenburg
position. At almost 3:00 in the afternoon, she saw Erlinda being wheeled to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU).
The doctors explained to petitioner Rogelio that his wife had bronchospasm. Erlinda stayed in the ICU for
a month. She was released from the hospital only four months later or on November 15, 1985. Since the
ill-fated operation, Erlinda remained in comatose condition until she died on August 3, 1999.
Petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a civil case for damages against private
respondents. After due trial, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of petitioners.

Essentially, the trial court found that private respondents were negligent in the performance of their
duties to Erlinda. On appeal by private respondents, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts
decision and directed petitioners to pay their "unpaid medical bills" to private respondents.

Petitioners filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari. The private respondents were then
required to submit their respective comments thereon. On December 29, 1999, this Court promulgated
the decision which private respondents now seek to be reconsidered.

ISSUES:

1. WHETHER OR NOT DR. ORLINO HOSAKA (SURGEON) IS LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE;

2. WHETHER OR NOT DR. PERFECTA GUTIERREZ (ANESTHESIOLOGIST) IS LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE; AND

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HOSPITAL (DELOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER) IS LIABLE FOR ANY ACT OF
NEGLIGENCE COMMITTED BY THEIR VISITING CONSULTANT SURGEON AND ANESTHESIOLOGIST.

RULING:

In the case at bar, the following issues were resolved as follows:

1) Dr. Hosaka's irresponsible conduct of arriving very late for the scheduled operation of petitioner
Erlinda is violative, not only of his duty as a physician "to serve the interest of his patients with the
greatest solicitude, giving them always his best talent and skill,"44 but also of Article 19 of the Civil Code
which requires a person, in the performance of his duties, to act with justice and give everyone his due.

2) Dr. Gutierrez claim of lack of negligence on her part is belied by the records of the case. It has been
sufficiently established that she failed to exercise the standards of care in the administration of
anesthesia on a patient. Dr. Gutierrez omitted to perform a thorough preoperative evaluation on Erlinda.
Further, there is no cogent reason for the Court to reverse its finding that it was the faulty intubation on
Erlinda that caused her comatose condition. There is no question that Erlinda became comatose after Dr.
Gutierrez performed a medical procedure on her.

3) After a careful consideration of the arguments raised by DLSMC, the Court finds that respondent
hospitals position on this issue is meritorious. There is no employer-employee relationship between
DLSMC and Drs. Gutierrez and Hosaka which would hold DLSMC solidarily liable for the injury suffered by
petitioner Erlinda under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. urther, no evidence was adduced to show that
the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda was due to a failure on the part of respondent DLSMC to provide
for hospital facilities and staff necessary for her treatment. For these reasons, the Supreme Cord reverse
the finding of liability on the part of DLSMC for the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda.

. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby modified as follows:

(1) Private respondent De Los Santos Medical Center is hereby absolved from liability arising from the
injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda Ramos on June 17, 1985;

(2) Private respondents Dr. Orlino Hosaka and Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez are hereby declared to be solidarily
liable for the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda on June 17, 1985 and are ordered to pay petitioners

(a) P1,352,000.00 as actual damages;

(b) P2,000,000.00 as moral damages;

(c) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;

(d) P100,000.00 as attorneys fees; and

(e) the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.

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