NORTH KOREAS STRATEGIC CULTURE AND THREAT

PERCEPTION: IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL

SECURITY COOPERATION
SOURCES OF NORTH KOREAN
STRATEGIC CULTURE
A. Geopolitical Factors
The Korean peninsula is strategically located in the heart of Northeast Asia
and surrounded by three powerful countries (China, Russia, and Japan).
Served as a bridge between powers in mainland Asia and those in the
wider Pacific.
China regards it as a hammer ready to strike at the head of China and a
lip to protect Chinas teeth.
Japan considers it as a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan.
Russia has keen interest in the peninsula because of its desire for an ice-
free port, open all-year round, somewhere in Korea Macdonald, 1990: 2-
7).
Picture of map.
A. Geopolitical Factors
This geopolitical setting forced Korea to pursue so-called policy of sadae
which literally means, serving the great. It pertains to the paternalistic
and hierarchical relationship between China and its much smaller
neighbors.
Under sadae, Korea sought to sustain friendly relations with China in
order to maintain its territorial integrity and survival.
This circumstances also explain Koreas traditional adoption of a passive
military strategy that strongly emphasizes defense over offense oriented
towards safeguarding integrity of existing territory rather than seeking the
acquisition of new land for strategic influence and living space.
B. Historical Experience
Throughout Koreas history, it has experienced more than 900 foreign invasions, partly because
of its geopolitical location.
These include the Mongol invasions of the 13th century, Japanese attack of the 16th century, and
the Ching invasions of the 17th century.
It was at the end of the twentieth century when the international contention over the Korean
peninsula became particularly acute.
The arrival of Western powers in East Asia in the 19th century, made Korea, the hermit
kingdom close its door to all outside contacts except China owing to the Confucian tributary
relationship it had with the country.
Meiji Japan was the first to penetrate Koreas isolation. They both won the Sino-Japanese War
(1894-1895) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905).
B. Historical Experience
The United States supported the Japanese partly because of its then pro-Japanese and anti-
Russian attitude and partly because of the concerns about the regional balance of power.
The US had acknowledge Japans control over Korea in exchange to a pledge that it (Japan) will
make no aggressive moves against the Philippines secretly affirmed in the Taft-Katsura
Agreement of July 1905. Great Britain also recognized Japans suzerainty over Korea in return for
exclusive rights to Singapore. Thus, Korea fell under full and monopolized Japanese control.
These precedents planted a deep Korean mistrust and hatred of foreigners.
This became even more complicated after the postwar division of Korea and the Korean War.
At the end of the Second World War, the US and the USSR decided to divide Korea along the 38th
parallel and occupy the southern and northern parts respectively in order to facilitate Japanese
surrender.
Meanwhile, domestic competition within Koreas left and right wing forces hardened into a
geographically distinct regions of the Korean nation.
B. Historical Experience
In the North, under the control of Kim Il-sung and the Workers
Party of Korea (WPK), the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea
(DPRK) established a political system largely fashioned after the
Soviet model, with Communist-style collectivization and
economic planning.
It adopted a distinctively offensive military posture, aspiring to
unify the Korean homeland under communist rule.
North Korea identified the Soviet Union as a potential liberator,
emphasizing Pyongyangs need to increase friendly relations with
Moscow.
Kim Il-sung regarded the US as an imperialist power who sought
to colonize Korea in a manner similar to what he felt had
happened to Japan.
B. Historical Experience
The Korean War deepened the Norths
antagonism towards the US.
North Korea suffered enormous destruction
owing to the heavy aerial bombardment by
the US.
The aerial and naval bombardment destroyed
between 66 to 75 per cent of DPRKs pre-war
industrial transportation and urban residential
infrastructure.
Moreover, Kim Il-sung believed that had it not
been for the American intervention,
unification would have been accomplished.
This only reinforced Kims anti-Americanism. Pyongyangs Central District after the Korean War, 1953.
(Korean Central News Agency)
C. Political Ideology
Emanates from the idea that North Koreans
can trust no one and that they must unite
to solve their problems in their own way, by
themselves.
Kim Il-sung first proclaimed it in 1955 when
he underlined the need for a Korea-
centered revolution.
Kim defined Juche as:
1. Self-reliance in ideology
2. Independence in politics
3. Self-sustenance in economy and;
4. Self-defense in national defense
Juche
According to Kim Il-sung, Juche means
approaching political revolution and the
construction of ones own country with the
attitude of a master.
It means rejecting dependence on others,
using ones own brains, believing in ones
own strength, and displaying revolutionary
spirit of self-reliance
Juche is linked to the concept of chawi or
the defense of people against imperialist
aggression, by using its own military and not
relying on others.
North Koreas Postwar Diplomacy and Strategy
A. The Cold War Era
Pyongyangs view of the US, reinforced by the
Korean War, continued throughout the Cold
War Era.
DPRK claimed that Washington had
unjustifiably divided the Korean peninsula in
order to perpetuate a Korean colonial state
and support a South Korean puppet regime.
DPRK views the US international relations as
imperialist and designed to suppress the
sovereignty and independence of all nations.
Pyongyang made efforts to form an anti-
American alliance with neutral countries in the
1960s.
1970s marked change in US-DPRK relations
influenced by rapprochement between the US
and China.
In 1974, DPRK suggested the initiation of
direct negotiations between DPRK and the US
without South Koreas participation.
This would have replaced the armistice
agreement still in force thirty years after the
Korean War with a formal peace treaty.
In spite of the seemingly warming of relations
between DPRK and the US, it did not change
DPRKs fundamental perception of the US.
A. The Cold War Era
When Washington suggested cross-Korea
recognition, Pyongyang countered by stating
that it would merely perpetuate the division of
Korea.
DPRK insisted that this proposal is a plot of the
Americans to maintain the colonization of the
South while preparing to attack the North.
In 1977, DPRK indicated that good bilateral
relations could be established if Washington
renounced its unfriendly attitude, that is the
withdrawal of troops from the South.
President Carter cancelled its withdrawal plan
after tunnels under the DMZ was discovered,
DPRKs animosity towards the US increased
again.
Reagans administration in 1981 put an
emphasis on American power, reinforced by
DPRK apprehensions. DPRK branded Reagan as
a devil anti-Communist.
DPRK argued that the annual US-ROK Team
Spirit military exercise was an act of
preemptive war.
This tougher stance of Washington appeared
to reap diplomatic success. In 1984, perceiving
an increased American threat, Kim Il-sung
proposed three-party talks with the US and
South Korea to discuss the conclusion of a
peace treaty and declaration of non-
aggression.
B. The Post-Cold War Era
The collapse of the socialist systems in the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe introduced
DPRK to a new strategic environment.
Pyongyang was increasingly required to
confront the American threat on its own.
Pyongyang sought to negotiate with
Washington more actively than it had during
the previous timeframes.
DPRK launched brinkmanship diplomacy
with a nuclear card via the development
of nuclear weapons that could eventually
reach the United States.
First bilateral dialogue with the US began in
1993 with a goal of obtaining guarantee that
the US would not use military force against
North Korea.
After series of difficult negotiations, DPRK and
the US finally concluded the Geneva
Agreement in 1994.
Through this agreement, Pyongyang achieved
security as well as political and economic
outcomes in return for its promise to freeze
and eventually dismantle its nuclear weapons
program.
Kim Jong-il obtained assurances from the
Clinton Administration that it will not use
nuclear weapons against the DPRK.
B. The Post-Cold War Era
Pyongyang sought to institutionalize peaceful
relations with Washington by demanding the
conclusion of formal peace agreement
between the US and the DPRK.
In the late 1990s, the DPRK was convinced that
US was increasingly threatening and that
counter-threats to US power was necessary.
DPRK tested its Taepodong missile in August
1998.
This posture coincided, though, by DPRKs
willingness to improve its overall relations with
the US under the Perry Process which
sought to offer DPRK a new way to forward
ties with the US.
In November 1999, DPRK agreed to suspend
its plan to test another ballistic missile in
return for Washingtons lifting of some of its
economic sanctions.
DPRK-US ties continued to improve in the
last two years of the Clinton Administration.
In October 2000, First Vice Marshall Jo
Myong Rok visited Washington as Kim Jong-
ils special envoy, leading to the
announcement of a US-DPRK Joint
Communique stating that neither
government would have hostile intent
towards each other.
B. The Post-Cold War Era
The inauguration of George W. Bush Bush subsequently emphasized the potential
administration in 2001 reversed this use of preemptive action against terrorist
conciliatory atmosphere groups and rogue states armed with WMD.

US-DPRK relations worsened when Bush Pyongyang viewed Bushs rhetoric about an
branded DPRK as an axis of evil along axis of evil as a declaration of war.
with Iran and Iraq following the The DPRK nuclear issue entered a new phase.
September 11 attacks.
Six-Party Talks were subsequently initiated to
In March 2002, it was revealed that the settle this latest nuclear crisis with DPRK
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) consistently insisting that the US renounce its
recommended that the US develop new antagonistic policy.
nuclear weapons which included a list of DPRK tested two nuclear devices in 2006 and
potential nuclear targets including the 2009 and shelled South Korean military and
DPRK. civilian components in 2010.
Conclusion: Perceiving
North Korea in
Comprehensive Security
Terms
Conclusion
The three sources of DPRKs strategic culture
have all played important roles in the
formation of North Koreas threat perception.
North Korean leaders have regarded the US as
an archenemy despite Kim Jong-ils
intermittent statements to the contrary while
fearing the formidable American power base
experienced during the Korean War.
It further strengthened DPRKs application of
the Juche ideology.
One theme about US-DPRK relationship
seemed to be maintained that is, North Korea-
US relations can improve should the US
abandon its anti-DPRK policy.
The North Korean issue might thus be
perceived and approached under the rubric of
comprehensive security. This approach
emphasizes the importance of incorporating
low politics that focus on those tasks and
issue-areas that can best command and
deepen mutual interdependence.
Departing from the old, narrowly defined,
high politics concept that traditionally rested
on military and strategic factors.
North Korean instability originates not just
from traditional strategic conditions but also
from internal and external problems, such as
economic hardship, food shortages, and
relative issues.
Conclusion
Solutions are not only confined to North To improve opportunities to cut through this
Korean and American policy-makers. Any North Korean nuclear maze Asia-Pacific
North Korean problem must be countries may take the following initiatives:
approached by promoting cooperation 1. energy assistance designed to meet the
DPRKs immediate energy needs and encourage
among the wide number of Asia-Pacific its return to cooperation with the outside world
countries confronting this issue. 2. development programs that build on
humanitarian assistance in order to help the
The key question here is how to North address persistent food shortages and
reconcile DPRKs still strong public health needs
preoccupation with survival and national 3. targeted economic assistance intended to
security with its ability to collaborate in nurture the gradual adoption of market
behavior.
identifying and observing region-wide
4. cultural, sports, educational, and scientific
norms of behavior. exchanges.
North Koreas ultimate security will be best achieved
by building more positive ties with the outside world
rather than adhering to strategic culture that
discourages such interaction must be undertaken
without delay if chances for conflict avoidance on the
peninsula are to be improved.

-Hong Yong-pyo
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