Rights and Obligations of Between Husband and Wife

Garcia v Santiago (1928) supra

Goitia v Campos Rueda (1916)

- Luisa and Jose married
- Stayed for 1 month
o Husband demanded her to perform lascivious acts on his genitals
o She refused
o Husband maltreated her
- She was forced to leave the conjugal home and take refuge in her parents home
- Filed a complaint asking for support
- CFI held that he cannot be compelled to support her except in his own house
o Unless by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a divorce or separation

ISSUE
WON she is entitled to support outside the conjugal home

HELD
YES
- Art 149 is not absolute
o The law will not permit husband to not support wife who has been driven out by his wrongful
acts
o She can claim for maintenance even outside the conjugal home
o The marriage creates an obligation for husband to support wife
o Judgment for separate maintenance is a judgment calling for the performance of a duty
made specific by the mandate of the sovereign
Done to preserve public policy

Warren v State (1985)

- Georgia rape statute
- Warren was indicted for the rape and aggravated sodomy of his wife but because theyre married,
he says he is exempted from being convicted for the same
- He argues
o There is an implicit marital exclusion in the rape statute that makes it legally impossible for
husband to rape wife
Lord hales contractual theory, medieval time, unity of person theory, other
justifications such as preventing wives from using rape charges for revenge
o There is an implicit marital exclusion within the aggravated sodomy statute that makes it
legally impossible for a husband to be guilty of it
Sodomy was originally defined as the carnal knowledge and connection against
the order of nature by man with man or with woman
Consent is not an element of the offense
o If the Court says there are none, it would be a violation of due process as it is a new
interpretation of criminal law

ISSUE
WON there is an implicit marital exclusion in the rape and aggravated sodomy statutes
WON due process is violates
HELD
NO
- The statute reads: A person commits the offense of rape when he has carnal knowledge of a female
forcibly and against her will
o No unlawful which usually signifies the common law wife exception

- Short of homicide, it is the `ultimate violation of self.' No State would ever say that there is an implied

consent of such baseness in all marriage contracts, and would leave all wives with no protection from

rape

- Moreover, an implicit marital exclusion would be violative of the Constitutional guarantee of the non

deprivation of life liberty or property except through due process

 NO

- All that the Due Process Clause requires is that the law give sufficient warning so that men may

conduct themselves to avoid what is forbidden

People v Jumawan (2014)

- 1975 they got married
- She claims:
o They owned several businesses that she manages
o 1997, he became being brutal to her in bed by having sex w/o foreplay and would threaten
her to submission
o Oct 16, 1998, he raped her for the first time despite her abdominal pains from menstruation
Their daughter came to her to save her from him
o Oct 17, 1998, he raped her for the second time in front of their children in the childrens
bedroom
After, he went out of the room laughing telling her that thats what she gets for
being a flirt and fond of sex
- He claims:
o No rape happened because he was in Bukidnon
o She only wants revenge because he took over the business after she failed to account for
3M
o She had extramarital affairs w at least 10 men, some he knew
o Consent to copulation should be presumed unless the contrary is proven
Sexual community is a mutual right and obligation between husband and wife
- RTC gave credence to the prosecutions witnesses
o Convicted him of 2 counts of rape
- CA affirmed

ISSUE:
WON Jumawan is guilty of rape

HELD
YES
- Marital rape was supposed to be included in the Anti-Rape law
o But legislators decided it was unreasonable to classify as there was nothing in the RPC that
prevented a wife from charging husband w rape
- His view of consent to sexual relations is outdated
o PH is a signatory to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and
the UN Declaration on the Elimination on Violence Against Women
Latter includes sexual harm or suffering in private life
- Sexual intimacy has to be spontaneous, not a result of force and coercion
o When it is utilized to despoil marital union in order to advance a felonious urge for coitus by
force, violence or intimidation, the Court will step in to protect its lofty purpose, vindicate
justice and protect our laws and State policies
- Separating marital rape from non-marital rape is a violation of equal protection
- RA 8353 does not distinguish between the two and affords a protection to women regardless of civil
status

People v Liberta (1984)

- Married in 1978 and he started to beat denise at this same yr also
- 1980 Family Court issued temporary order of protection to her
o Mario was asked to move out and stay away from Denise, he can visit his son once every
weekend
- 1981 Mario asked to visit his son
o They agreed to meet at his motel provided that a friend of his would be with them at all
times
o He raped her in front of their son
o She went to the police station and swore out a felony against him
- He was indicted for rape and sodomy in the 1st degree
- He argues;
o Marital exemption
o Both statutes contravene the Equal Protection Clause by burdening only men and not
women
- State argues
 o 1978, legislators expanded the meaning of not married to include separation in accordance
to a court order
o females are subject to psychological, physical, and sociological problems unique to her
gender; only women get pregnant; and that women cant usually rape men

ISSUE
WON he was falsely charged for both in lieu of marital exemption
WON the statutes violate the Equal Protection Clause

HELD
NO
- Initially, the female in the statute was defined as those not married to the actor
o Eventually, legislation expanded not married to mean living apart pursuant to a court
o He falls within the definition of these situations
- There is no rational basis for distinguishing marital rape from non-marital rape
o A marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife
with impunity
o A married woman has the right to control her own body as single women

YES
- There is no basis for distinguishing marital rape from non-marital rape
- Rape disrupts the marriage, not the criminal prohibition against it
o A married women and single women have the right to control their own body
- This benefits female rapists who rape either male or female
o Penetration can happen even if the man is not aroused

Order of the Appellate Court is affirmed

Thurman v City of Turrington (1984)

- The couple had a violent separation
- Oct 1982
o He attacked her and took their son from the residence. She went to the police but they
refused to accept the complaint
- Nov 1982
o He broke the windshield of her car while she was in it
o He was convicted of breach of the peace
o Received a suspended sentence of 6 months in jail and a 2-yr conditional discharge (he was
to stay away from her and commit no further crimes)
- She called police several times because he was violating the terms but they refused to do anything
abt it
- Tracy kept on pursuing to get him arrested for violation of the terms, but to no avail
- June 1983
o He appeared at the residence she was staying in
o She called the police to ask them to arrest him for violation
o 15 mins later, she goes out to tell him to not hurt them
o he stabs her in the chest neck and throat
o 25 mins later, an officer arrived
o He kicked her head
o Dropped the child on his wounded mother, then kicked her in the head again
o 3 more officers arrive but they continue to let him wander about the crowd
o He approached tracey again (in a stretcher), and he was arrested and taken into custody

ISSUE
Did the conduct of the Torrignton Police deprive her the right to equal protection?

HELD
YES
- Tracey was discriminated against because the violence was a domestic dispute
- Police protection was fully provided to persons abused by someone with whom the victim had no
domestic relationship but afforded lesser protection when the victim was a woman abused or
assaulted by a spouse or boyfriend; or when a child was abused by a father or stepfather
- The equal is not only for discriminatory legislative action, but also discriminatory governmental action
in the administration and enforcement of the law
Garcia v Drilon and Jaype-Garcia (2013)
- Married. She was faithful and dutiful. He was controlling and demanded absolute respect from the
family
o She had a daughter when she met him. They had 2 more kids
o He was jealous, made her quit law school and her part time job
- He was abusive, and continued to threaten her and the kids. They also fought a lot, even physically
abused their kids
- He had an affair with a bank manager, the godmother of one of their sons, and he admitted to it in
2004
o He told her that she had to accept the affair
- She received 20k compared to his 60k a month. She was banned from the corporate offices of the
same company she helped build
- 2005
o She attempted to kill herself by slashing her wrists
o He fled the house and left her bleeding
o She was in the hosp for 7 days, no visits from husband
o She started taking anti-depressants after release
- 2006
o She filed a petition for TPO before the RTC against him for her and in behalf of the 3 kids
pursuant to RA 9262
- RTC granted a 30-day TPO
o He has to vacate the family home
o Not permitted within 1km from them
o No longer allowed to enter subdivision
o Guns confiscated
o Licenses revoked
o Ordered to give monthly support
- TPO was extended several times because of his violation of it
- He filed a petition to stop the renewals of the TPO, denied
o He was claiming that RA 9262 was unconstitutional because it violates due process and the
equal protection clause
- CA affirmed the denial

ISSUE
WON RA 9262 is unconstitutional

HELD
NO
- No concrete evidence was presented to warrant declaration of unconstitutionality
- Bernabe: the unequal power relationship bet men and women makes them more likely to be victims
of violence; the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences
justifying the classification under the law
- There is no reason to claim unconstitutionality
- Leonen: nothing but a cheap attempt to raise cherished fundamental constitutional principles to
escape legal responsibility for causing indignities to another
o The abuse of husbands may be an under-reported form of family violence
o Violence in the context of intimate relations is not a gender issue but rather a power issue
o In a future case more deserving of the Courts attention, we should be open to realities
which may challenge the dominant conception that ciolence in intimate relationships only
happends to women and children. This may be predominantly true, but even those in
marginal cases deserve fundamental constitutional and statutory protection
o Gracia case is not the correct case. He does not have legal standing to raise the
constitutional issue. Rosalie is the victim.

Go-Tan v Tan (2008)

- 1999 married w two daughters
- 2005
o She filed petition for TPO against him and her parents-in-law because they were causing
verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her (Sec 5(3)(2)(3)(4)(h)(5)(i) of RA 9262

ISSUE
WON parents-in-law may be included in the petition for TPO

HELD
YES
 - Sec 3, RA 9262 defines violence against women and children as
o Any act or series of acts committed by any person against his wife, former wife, or past
relationship, or mom of his child, against her child legit or illegit, within or without the family
abode, that results/or likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering. Or
economic abuse such as battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty
- Sec 5 says it may be committed by the offender through another
o Once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve it is shown, the act of one is the act of all
conspirators. They are all deemed to be principals
Petition granted

Pelayo v Lauron (1909)

- Pet was a physician residing in Cebu
- 1906
o He was called to the house of the defendants to render medical assistance to their daughter
in law who is about to give birth
o He charged 500 for just and equitable value of his services
o The def didnt pay
- He filed a complaint
- Def says:
o Their daughter in law died as a consequence of the said childbirth
o She lived w her husband and in a separate house w/o any relation whatever with them
o She only happened to be at their house when she gave birth due to fortuitous circumstances
o They should be absolved from paying
- LC absolved them

ISSUE:
WON defs have the obligation to pay for the medical fees

HELD
NO
- Art 1089, CC
o Obligations are created by law, contracts, quasi-contracts, and by illicit acts and omissions
or by those in which any kind fault or negligence occurs
- Art 142-143
o Rendering of medical assistance is comprised among the mutual obligations to which the
spouses are bound by way of mutual support
- The other is under the unavoidable obligation to furnish the necessary services of a physician in order
to restore health
- The party bound to such support is liable for all expenses, including the fees of the medical expert

Graham v Graham (1940)

- Margrethe plead Sidney to quit his work in a hotel so eh could accompany her in all her travels
- They made an agreement in 1932 for her to pay him 300 dollars per month until they no longer want
agreement to continue
- They divorced in 1933
- Upon non compliance, he sued her
o Unpaid amount of 25500 as of Nov 1939 w/ 5% interest per month
- She denies the allegations
o No agreement took place
o Never induced him to quit job and hated that he was unemployed
o She paid 9000 in lieu of all and any claims at the time of divorce
- She filed motion to dismiss on the grounds that
o Her promise was w/o consideration
o Contract was not the power of a married woman under Michigan law
o Divorce meant they no longer want the arrangement to continue

ISSUE
WON the contract is valid and binding

HELD
NO
- Michigan law states that married woman have no general power to contract and can contract only
in relation to her separate property
 - It also contravenes public policy. Marriage contract specifies that it is the husbands duty to support
and live with his wife and the wife must contribute her services to the husband and follow in his choice
of domicile
o Any attempt by persons in a marriage or about to be married to change the obligations of
the marriage contract as defined by law is contrary to public policy and unenforceable
Herein, the wife releases the husband from duty to support her

Bradwell v Illinois (1880)

- Illinois statute on admissions to the bar
o No one shall be permitted to practice as an attorney w/o obtaining a license for that
purpose from 2 justices of the SC
- Bradwell applied for a license and filed a pet that contained
o Certificate of good character
o She has all requisite qualifications
o An affidavit saying she was a citizen of Vermont but now a citizen of the US in Chicago
o A paper asserting she was entitled to the license by virtue of section 2 Art 4 of US Consti, and
the 14th amendment
- Application denied because
o A married woman would not be bound by either express contracts or implicit contracts that
the policy of law creates between attorney and client
o Admitting women would mean the courts would be exercising authority conferred upon
them in a manner that was never contemplated by the legislature
o God designed sexes to occupy diff spheres of action and this was a sphere for men

ISSUE
WON the decision is unconstitutional

HELD
NO
- The right to admission to practice in the courts of a State is not one of the privileges and immunities
belonging to citizens of the US
- The power to prescribe the qualifications for admission to the bar of its own courts is unaffected by the
14th amendment, and that they cannot inquire into the reasonableness or propriety of the rules it may
prescribe

Silverio v Republic

Dunn v Palermo (1975)

- 1973 Rose Palermo married Denty Cheatham (both Nashville lawyers)
- She retained her maiden name Palermo
- Rose lodged with the registrar a change of address; listing her name as Palermo
- Tennessee has a state-wide mandatory Registration Law (Section 2-206)
o The registration of a person shall be purged 90 days after he changes his name by
marriage or otherwise.
- Rose refused to register her husbands name
o Her name was purged from the registration list

ISSUE:
WoN the changing of her name is mandatory
HELD:
- NO.
- The Tennessee statue does not provide in haec verba (in these words) that a woman
automatically assumes her husbands surname upon marriage.
- Women have the option to choose if she wants to retain her surname or adopt the
surname of her husband.
- As long as there are no fraudulent intention in changing or retaining the name, the state
has no concern as to the name used.

Tolentino v CA (1988)
- Arturo Tolentino married Consuelo David 1931
 - Marriage dissolved in 1943 due to abandonment
- Arturo Married Pilar Adorable
o Pilar died soon after marriage
- Arturo Tolentino married Constancia (current wife) in 1945
o Had 3 kids
- Constancia Tolentino (current wife) filed a petition against Consuelo David (divorced wife)
to enjoin her from using the Tolentino surname
o Which is the surname of the husband
- 1972
o Consuelo filed an answer admitting that she has been and is currently using the
surname of her ex husband
o TC issued an order for Consuelo to stop using Tolentino
o Consuelo filed a motion for leave to file a 3rd party complain against Arturo
Tolentino (ex husband)
o Arturo filed his answer thereafter
o Consuelos motion was dismissed
- 1975
o CA reverse the decision of TC
o Pet filed a motion for reconsideration but was dismissed

ISSUE:
WON a woman who has been legally divorced may be enjoined by the subsequent wife
from using the surname of the previous husband.

HELD:
- Senator Tolentino states in his commentary on Article 370 of the Civil Code
o The wife cannot claim an exclusive right to use the husbands surname. She
cannot be prevented from using it; neither can she restrain others from using it
- Article 371 is not applicable because it refers annulment whereas the case is about
absolute divorce
- Court held that the grant of injuction would be an act of serious dislocation
o She used Tolentino in contracts with third persons and other legal relations
- There is no usurpation because the use of the surname is not injurious to the petitioner
o Elements of usurpation
There is an actual use of anothers name by defendant
The use is unauthorized
The intent is to designate personality or identity of person
o She did not claim to be Mrs. Tolentino but Mrs. Consuelo David Tolentino

Yasin v Sharia District Court

Remo v Secretary of Foreign Affairs (2010)

- Maria Remo (Filipina whose PH passport was expiring in 2000) married Francisco Rallonza
- PH passport details
o Surname: Rallonza
o Given name: Maria Virginia
o Middle name: Remo
- She applied for renewal in DFA Chicago
o W/ a request to revert back to her maiden name
o She was still married tho
- Request denied bitch

ISSUE
WON petitioner, who originally used her husbands surname, can revert to her maiden name in the
renewed passport despite the subsisting marriage
HELD
NO
- RA 8239 Section 5(d)
o Only a woman that has been divorced, annulled, or her marriage declared as void or her
spouse has died, may she revert back to her maiden name
- She can use her maiden name if she is to apply for the 1st time
- If RA 8239 conflict w the CC, the former shall supersede since it is a later and special law

Carlos v Abelardo (2002)

- 1989
o Petitioner issued a check worth 25k dollars to assist the spouses in conducting their married
life independently
o Seller acknowledged the receipt of full payment
- He tried to collect the money but was met w/ threats
- 1994
o He tried to make a formal demand but the spouses failed to comply
- Honorio eventually filed a pet for collection against Manuel
- They spouses were separated for 1 yr before the complaint, they filed diff answers to the complaint
o Resp says
That the amount was not a loan
It was his share of income on contracts obtained by him in the construction firm
and that pet can easily deduct his share in the profits
o Wife says
The loan was payable on staggered basis
- RTC ruled in favor of petitioner
- CA reversed for insufficiency of evidence

ISSUE
WON CA erred in dismissing the complaint
WON loan is liability of both spouses

HELD
YES. It is a loan
- Evidence presented by pet
o Check amounting to 25k
o It was received by the spouses and given to Pura Vallejo
o House and lot became conjugal swelling
o Wife of resp executed instrument acknowledging the loan
- Resp admitted to receiving the amount
o But that it wasnt a loan
- However, the cheque is from HL Carlos Construction whereas the 25k is from the petitioners personal
cheque
o He is not a stockholder, employee, or agent of the corporation

YES
- Because the family benefitted from the cheque and the wife acknowledged the loan, they are both
liable to pay
- Art 121
o The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated
administrator-spouse for the benefit of the CPG, or by both spouses or by one of
them with the consent of the other
Debts and obli contracted by either spouse w/o consent of the other to the extent
that the family may have benefitted
- They are jointly liable

Selanova v Mendoza (1975)

- Mendoza prepared and ratified a document extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of the
complainant and his wife Avelina
o Either spouse would withdraw complaint for adultery or concubinage which each had filed
against the other
o Waived the right to prosecute each other for whatever acts of infidelity
- Saturnino charged him of gross ignorance of the law
- Mendoza claims
o He was aware of the invalidity of the agreement
 o Ratified it on the assurance of the spouses that they would ask the CFI to approve the
agreement
o He relied on Art. 191, NCC

ISSUE
WON the document of extrajudicial liquidation of conjugal partnership ratified by the respondent is
void

HELD
YES
- It contravenes Art 221 NCC
o Makes void
Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife
Every extrajudicial agreement during the marriage for dissolution of the CPG/ACP
between husband and wife
- Reliance of resp on Art 191 is misplaced
o The Court had already ruled in an earlier case that judicial sanction for the dissolution of
CPG/ACP should be secured beforehand before ratification
- Concubinage and adultery remain crimes and a contract legalizing their commission is therefore void

Arriola v Arriola (2008)

- Fidel Arriola had 2 wives
- Petitioner Anthony is son with the 2nd wife also a petitioner, Vilma, respondent John is son with the 1st
- Fidel died
o RTC split the parcel of land among 3 parties
- A public auction was decided for the agreed land but petitioners refused to include the house on
land
- Resp filed a case for contempt but was denied by RTC

ISSUE
WON the house can be included in the sale

HELD
NO
- Article 159
o Family home shall continue despite death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head
of the family
For 10 yrs or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary
The heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons
therefor
No compelling reason has been suggested
This rule applies regardless of who owns the property or constituted the family home
Even if the home has passed by succession to the coownership of the
heirs, or has been willed, this fact cannot transform the home to an
ordinary property and dispel the protection cast upon it by the law
The rights of the coowner cannot subjugate the rights granted under Art
159 to the beneficiaries of the family home
- The house serves as the physical symbol of family love security and unity
o Art 159 is to avert the disintegration of the family unit following the death of the parents
- Fidel died in 2003, pwede na in 2013 or longer if there is a minor beneficiary residing therein

Republic v Toledano (1994)

- Alvin Clouse is a natural born US citizen married (1981) Evelyn Spouse (is naturalized in Guam (1988))
- From 1989 to 1994, they have had custody of him
- They wanna adopt Solomon Alcala, 12 yr old minor her brother
o Solomon also consented to this
o Their mom Nery also consented due to poverty and inability to support and educate
Solomon
- Court granted the petition Solomon Alcala Clouse
o Parental authority of Nery is dissolved
- OSG contends they are not qualified to adopt under PH law

ISSUE
WON the Clouses are qualified to adopt under PH Law
HELD
NO
- Article 184(3) of EO 209
o Enumerates persons who arent qualified to adopt: An alien, except:
A former fil citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity
One who seeks to adopt the legit child of his/her Filipino spouse
One who is married to a PH citizen and seeks to adopt jointly a relative of
consanguinity of the latter
- Article 185
o Requires both husband and wife to jointly adopt
o Alvin Clouse is not qualified, but Evelyn is

Johnston v Republic (1963)

- Petitioner filed a pet for adoption of Ana Isabel Georgiana (2 yrs 10 mos old)
o Petition contained
Her age and her husbands name
They are childless
She already got the consent of the Mother Superior of the orphanage and her
husband
- Petition was granted declaring the child to all legal intents and purposes the child of the petitioner
- Her surname became Valdes the surname of petitioner
- 1960, she filed petition to change her kids name to Valdes-Johnston
- Petition denied

ISSUE
WON the surname of the husband may be used given that he is not a co-petitioner to the adoption

HELD
NO
- Art 341(4), NCC
o Refers only to the adopters surname, not the surname acquired by virtue of marriage
o She made the adoption singly without the concurrence of husband
Not as a married woman
o Her name as adopter was her maiden name
o The consent of Raymond to the adoption by her individually does not have the effect of
making him an adopting father, so as to entitle the kid to the use of Johnstons surname