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American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Inc.

State and County Incarceration Rates: The Direct and Indirect Effects of Race and
Inequality
Author(s): Thomas M. Arvanites and Martin A. Asher
Source: The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 57, No. 2 (Apr., 1998), pp.
207-221
Published by: American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3487495
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State and County Incarceration Rates:
The Direct and Indirect Effects of Race and Inequality

By THOMAS M. ARVANITES, PH.D.and MARTIN A. ASHER, PH.D.*

ABSTRACT. This study examines the direct and indirect effects of race and
income inequality on imprisonment rates across states. The analysis is de-
signed to: 1) investigate whether race and income inequality are signifi-
cantly related to imprisonment when controlling for crime, 2) assess the
relative magnitudes of the direct and indirect effects; and 3) assess the
relative magnitudes of race and income inequality. Crime is found to be
the strongest predictor of incarceration rates in five of the six equations
estimated. Income inequality is significantly related to incarceration rates
in two of the six equations. There was no clear evidence of a direct race
effect. The indirect effect of race was greater than the direct effect in four
of the six equations.

Introduction

WITHIN THE LAST DECADE there has been a tremendous increase in the lev
of incarceration in the United States. Between 1988 and 1993, the impris-
onment rate (number of adults incarcerated per 100,000 civilian adult pop
ulation) increased from 244 (BJS, 1989) to 351 (BJS, 1994a) -an increase
of 44%. This increase far exceeded the increase in crime. According to the
FBI (Uniform Crime Reports, 1989 and 1994) the Index Crime Rate1 in-
creased by two percent during the same period. Other researchers also
have reported that in the United States during the 1980s, the increases in
crime lagged far behind the increases in imprisonment rates.2 Thus, th
increase in the level of crime alone is insufficient to explain the increas
in imprisonment.
The impact of race and income inequality on punishment levels is sup-
ported by competing sociological theories. Durkheimian theory holds that

* Thomas M. Arvanites, Ph.D. is associate professor of sociology at Villanova University


Villanova, PA 19085, Martin A. Asher, Ph.D. is Adjunct Associate Professor of Finance
the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, 19104.
American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 57, No. 2 (April, 1998).
? 1998 American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Inc.

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208 American Journal of Economics and Sociology

racial discrimination and income inequality indirectly affect imprisonment


through crime. This is grounded on the assumption that racial discrimina-
tion and/or lower socio-economic status (both of which reduce legitimate
economic opportunities) leads to criminal activity which, in turn, leads to
imprisonment. In contrast, conflict theory suggests that these variables have
both direct and indirect effects. That is, racial composition and income
inequality will have a significant effect on imprisonment when controlling
for crime. This latter effect is attributed to the response of the economically
and politically powerful to the real or perceived threat posed by culturally
dissimilar groups (cultural conflict theory). The present study analyzes the
existence and magnitudes of the direct and indirect effects of race and
income inequality on the level of imprisonment.

II

Prior Research

DESPITE DECADES OF RESEARCH, the impact that extra-legal variables such a


race and income inequality have on the imprisonment rate remains unclea
Dominant sociological theories offer conflicting explanations of imprison
ment. The first, which can be described as the consensus perspective, hold
that imprisonment is a direct response to crime. Incarceration, therefore
should be greatest in areas where crime is the greatest (Arvanites, 1993
Carroll and Doubet, 1983; Colvin, 1990; Joubert, et al., 1981; Michalowsk
and Pearson, 1990).
Other sociological theories suggest that when controlling for the level o
serious crime, incarceration rates are directly affected by extra-legal factors
The Cultural Conflict and Neo-Marxist theories suggest that the existin
social structure produces a culturally dissimilar class of individuals (viz.
the impoverished, the unemployed and the oppressed minorities) wh
pose a threat, whether real or perceived, to the interests of the economically
and politically powerful (Quinney, 1977; Spitzer, 1975; Turk, 1969). Whi
the term "interests" has never been clearly defined (Liska, 1987), it gener
ally is meant to refer to those aspects of the current economic and politic
order that are disproportionately beneficial to economically or politically
powerful groups in society. From this perspective, imprisonment is a fun
tion of economic inequality as well as of crime. This is grounded on the

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Incarceration Rates 209

assumption that the poor represent a th


interests of the economically elite.

The Cultural Conflict Theory

As with the economically deprived, racial minorities often have been


viewed as threatening to the white majority. Swigert and Farrell (1976)
reported that whites and social control authorities often view nonwhites
as being more involved in crime. The presence of nonwhites is viewed
as an indicator of a crime problem (Lizotte and Bordua, 1980) and the
fear of crime is positively related to the presence of nonwhites (Liska,
et al., 1982). As a result, cultural conflict theorists argue that law en-
forcement officials are more likely to incarcerate minorities than others.
In terms of incarceration, Petersilia reported that minorities were "more
likely to receive prison sentences, more likely to get longer sentences
and more likely to serve longer in prison than whites," even when con-
trolling for offense, prior record and prison record (1983:93). At the end
of 1993, African-Americans were seven times more likely to be impris-
oned than whites (BJS, 1995a). Based on this research, it is plausible to
predict that minority population, independent of crime, is related to
imprisonment. As discussed below, research on the effects of race and
economic inequality on imprisonment have yielded inconsistent results.
The relationship between race and incarceration has received consid-
erable attention in the last fifteen years. Joubert et al. (1981) reported that
the percentage of the population comprised by blacks was the most im-
portant determinant of imprisonment rates. Carroll and Doubet (1983) have
criticized the specification of this model. Using violent crime rates instead
of the total crime rate, and including region and education variables, they
report that percent black has no effect. Examining state imprisonment rates
in 1970 and 1980, Michalowski and Pearson reported "exceptionally high
correlations" between region (southern versus nonsouthern states) and
race, which raises "some questions about findings such as those by Carroll
and Doubet" (1990:63).
In one of the first studies that included jail data, McCarthy (1990) ex-
amined the effect of race on the rate of state-level incarceration (state pris-
ons) and county-level incarceration (county jails) in California. McCarthy
found that percent nonwhite was a significant predictor of sentences to
county jail but not sentences to state prison. Using state-level data,

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210 American Journal of Economics and Sociology

Arvanites (1993) investigated the effect of race on imprisonment in 1980


and 1988. Regressing incarceration rates on percent black, percent of the
population living below the poverty line, unemployment and index crime
rate, Arvanites reported that percent black was the strongest predictor of
incarceration rates in both years.

Variables

A number of different variables have been used to measure the effect of


economically deprived populations on imprisonment rates. These include
unemployment rates, economic inequality and poverty rates. The results
are inconclusive. The most frequently examined variable has been unem-
ployment. A number of studies have reported a significant direct positive
relationship between unemployment and imprisonment (Box and Hale,
1982; Greenberg, 1977; Inverarity and McCarthy, 1988; Jankovic, 1977;
Meyers and Inverarity, 1992; Yeager, 1979). However, several other studies
did not find an unemployment effect (Arvanites, 1993; Colvin, 1990; Galste
and Scaturo, 1985; Michalowski and Pearson, 1990; Parker and Horo-
witz, 1986).
Studies investigating the effect of poverty also have reported inconsistent
results. Colvin (1990) reported that when controlling for crime, the per-
centage of persons living in poverty was positively related to state impris-
onment rates. Arvanites and Asher (1995) reported that across the 50 states,
poverty was positively related to state imprisonment rates. McCarthy (1990)
reported that poverty was a significant predictor of sentences to state prison
but not of sentences to county jail.
Bridges, Crutchfield and Simpson (1987) and Arvanites and Asher (1995)
both examined the effect of economic inequality. Examining arrest and
imprisonment rates in the State of Washington, Bridges et al. reported that
economic inequality was a significant predictor of arrest rates when con-
trolling for crime rates but was not a significant predictor of imprisonment
rates when controlling for crime and arrest rates. Examining incarceration
rates across the United States, Arvanites and Asher (1995) found that when
controlling for arrest rates, economic inequality was a significant predictor
of state imprisonment rates.

Unresolved Issues

Two issues relevant to research in this area remain unresolved. Firs


when examining the effect of race on imprisonment, it is critical to exam

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Incarceration Rates 211

the relationship between percent blac


son reported that the high correlatio
violent crime-.769 in 1970 and .628
termine whether race does or does
imprisonment" (1990:67). The strong
makes the investigation of indirect eff
Only two studies have investigated in
inconsistent. Bridges et al. (1987) repo
and a negligible (.034) indirect effect
ment (1987:354). In contrast, Arvanit
nonwhite and economic inequality ex
imprisonment rates" (1995:42). Clearl
(through crime), which is crucial to th
swered.
The second issue pertains to the man
ation is measured. With the exception
separate analyses for sentences to bot
researchers have limited their analyses
it is true that the majority of individ
facilities, those studies ignore the sig
fined in city and county jails. The om
jails significantly underestimates the
given state. For example, in 1993, sta
States confined 970,444 individuals (B
confined an additional 459,804 individ
accounted for 32 percent of all indiv
+ 459,804). Thus, studies excluding ja
much as one-third the actual number
time. Given the variations in crime ra
and jail incarceration rates across the
inclusion of the additional 459,804 ind
a change in the relative effects of rac

The Hypotheses Tested

It is our premise that research on factors affecting incarceration rates


should include all forms of incarceration. As a result, the present study
examines the direct and indirect effects of extra-legal variables on the

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212 American Journal of Economics and Sociology

interstate variations in both prison and jail incarceration rates. This is the
first multi-state study that examines both types of incarceration. It tests the
following hypotheses: controlling for crime, interstate variations in incar-
ceration rates are: (1) positively related to the percent of the population
that is nonwhite, and (2) positively related to income inequality. Addition-
ally, the relative magnitudes between the direct and indirect effects are to
be assessed, as are the relative effect among the extra-legal variables. The
analysis will further investigate the sensitivity of findings to alternative
specifications of imprisonment and crime.

III

Methodology

A CROSS-SECTIONAL DATA SET for all 50 states and the District of Columbia
for 1993 was used for this analysis. This year was selected because it is the
most recent year for which state-level jail census data are available. Incar-
ceration rate is defined as the number of adults incarcerated per 100,000
adult civilian population. Since McCarthy reported that the effects of the
extra-legal variables "vary with the type of confinement" (1990:322), sep-
arate analyses were conducted for incarceration rates in federal and state
prisons (PRATE) and for the rate of incarceration in county jails (JRATE).
These data were collected from Prisoners in 1993 (BJS, 1994a) and Census
of LocalJails 1993 (BJS, 1994b). Further, a total incarceration rate (TRATE)
for each state was calculated by summing JRATE and PRATE.
According to the theories presented, imprisonment is a function of crime
and extra-legal variables such as race and economic inequality. The partic-
ular variables included in the analysis are described below. Existing studies
have employed differing measures of crime. To determine the sensitivity
of the findings to the choice of the crime measure, we examine separately
the effect of all index offenses and violent crime (homicide, rape, assault,
and robbery).3 Crime data were extracted from the Uniform Crime Reports
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1989 and 1994) and are expressed in rates
per 100,000 population.
Two extra-legal variables were examined. First was the racial composi-
tion of each state. The percent of the nonwhite population was collected
from the Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1992(U.S. Census Bureau,
1993). Second, a measure of economic inequality was included. According

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Incarceration Rates 213

to Neo-Marxist theory, it is not the relati


tant, but the degree of income inequality
ceived) to the economic elite is greatest
income inequality. A state-level Gini coe
level of economic inequality ($INEQ) pres
to the inequality measure used by Arvani
et al. (1987). Because of the detailed natu
Bureau collects it every ten years. As a
1990 data. While the level may vary slightl
that the proportional differences betwee
the differences between states in 1993.
As discussed earlier, a number of econo
previous studies. Income inequality w
provides a better measure of income dif
below the poverty line. McCarthy sugge
the poverty line may be too gross a mea
useful" (1990:335). Income inequality w
because recent research concerning the la
researchers have reported significant une
Inverarity, 1992; Inverarity and McCart
others have failed to do so (Arvanites, 19
turo, 1985; Michalowski and Pearson, 199
Two additional control variables were inclu
inal activity decreases with age, it is quite
may be influenced by the proportion of
the percent of the population comprised
was included in the analysis. Second, a "pe
included. This is the percentage of each s
urban area (as defined by the U.S. Census
Bridges et al. (1987) and McCarthy (1990)
significant factor in their studies. These dat
Abstract of the United States (U.S. Census

IV

Results

THE PRINCIPAL TASK of the empirical analysis was to test whether two extra-
legal variables-minority populations (PNW) and economic inequality

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214 American Journal of Economics and Sociology

Table 1
Zero Order Correlationsa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

1 TRATE - .969 .656 .798 .891 .846 .610 .623 .438

2 PRATE .629 - .450 .740 .863 .767 .534 .562 .389

3 JRATE b b - .627 .589 .716 .578 .536 .396

4 TCRIME .525 .724 b - .892 .820 .468 .530 .688

5 VCRIME .517 .861 b .868 - .870 .586 .620 .606

6 PNW .582 .644 b .775 .723 - .647 .660 .517

7 $INEQ .618 .498 b .425 .561 .459 - .244 .047

8 PCP .549 .528 b .515 .575 .601 .133 - .461

9 URBAN .320 .352 b .652 .549 .534 .038 .417

a Because 6 jurisdictions do not report separate jail data, JRATE equations were
states. The values below the diagonal are based on 51 observations and those abov
b JRATE correlations, based on 45 cases, are reported above the diagonal.

($INEQ)-contribute to the explanation of imprisonment rat


after controlling for crime rates. To perform this test, mu
techniques were utilized. Three alternative models predictin
rates were examined: (1) state and county incarceration ra
state imprisonment rate (PRATE); and (3) county jail incar
(RATE). The models predicting TRATE and PRATE were es
51 jurisdictions (the 50 states and the District of Columbia) w
estimating JRATE were estimated on 45 jurisdictions. Thi
six smallest jurisdictions do not separate prison and jail dat
Zero-order correlation coefficients for all variables are re
1. The values below the diagonal are based on 51 cases w
above the diagonal are based on 45 cases. As is evident in T
is a moderate-to-strong relationship between both PNW a
the three imprisonment rates. The correlations between PN
prisonment variables range from .582 to .846, while the c
tween $INEQ and imprisonment range from .498 to 618.

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Incarceration Rates 215

Table 2
Regression Results, Direct Effects
TRATE PRATE JRATE TRATE PRATE JRATE
EQ 1 EQ2 EQ3 EQ4 EQ 5 EQ 6

TCRIME .575 .589** .124 - -


(4.06) (3.47) (.56)
VCRIME - - - .791** .922** .369
(6.84) (6.70) (1.57)
PNW -.039 .030 .239 .056 .103 .514*
(-.281) (.176) (0.93) (.54) (0.88) (2.10)
$ NEQ .360*** .208 .313 .143 -.061 .397*
(3.79) (1.82) (1.95) (1.60) (-0.62) (2.44)
PCP .257* .245* .199 .083 .037 .221
(2.61) (2.08) (1.33) (.97) (0.38) (151)
URBAN -1.02 .157 .080 -.131 .222* .233
(-.94) (1.20) (0.49) (-1.5) (2.28) (1.56)

ADJUSTED R2 .707 .581 .513 .804 .746 .538


N of CASES 51 51 45 51 51 45

* p< .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001

Of special interest are the values in bold type. These are the
coefficients for the independent variables used in each equatio
pected, there was a strong correlation between PNW and TCRIM
and VCRIME (.775 and .723 across the 51 cases and .820 and .870 across
the 45 cases). Given the strength of this relationship, it is very difficult to
disentangle the separate effects of race and crime on incarceration. As a
result, an examination of the indirect effect of race (through crime) on
incarceration is critical.
The correlation between $INEQ and the two crime indicators was not
problematic. It ranged from a low of .425 to a high of .586. The correlation
between TCRIME and VCRIME is not a problem because the regression
equations reported below include either total crime or violent crime.
Table 2 reports six equations explaining each of the three incarceration
rates, controlling for either the total crime rate or the violent crime rate.
Consistent with Durkheimian theory, crime rate was significantly related to

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216 American Journal of Economics and Sociology

each incarceration rate. With two exceptions, it was also the strongest pre-
dictor of incarceration. The two exceptions were the models predicting
JRATE (equations 3 and 6). Because of the high correlation between the
crime variables and PNW across the sample with 45 cases, it is very possible
that the PNW variable is "stealing" some of the effect of the crime variables.
The results reported here provide no support for the cultural conflict per-
spective, which suggests that minority populations directly influence incar-
ceration rates when controlling for crime. With one exception (equation 6),
PNW is not significantly related to incarceration rates. Given the level of
multicollinearity existing between PNW and VCRIME in this model (.870),
no definitive conclusion should be drawn from this equation. The data also
provide weak support for the Neo-Marxist hypothesis which predicts that,
when controlling for crime, income inequality is positively related to incar-
ceration. In two equations (1 and 6), income inequality was a significant
predictor of incarceration. In one of the two equations examining the total
incarceration rate, $INEQ was a significant predictor (equation 1).
Each of the control variables was significant in one or more equations.
Percent crime-prone (PCP) was positively related to TRATE and PRATE
(equations 1 and 2), and percent urban (URBAN) was a significant predictor
of PRATE (equation 5). These variables are not relevant to the two theories
examined here. Their significance demonstrates the need to control for
them in future studies of incarceration rates.
In order to examine indirect effects, auxiliary regressions were per-
formed in which total and violent crime were regressed separately on per-
cent nonwhite and income inequality. These results are reported in Ap-
pendices A and B. The indirect effects of the extra-legal variables were
calculated by taking the product of the beta coefficients linking the effect
of crime on imprisonment with: (1) the effect of percent nonwhite on crime;
and (2) the effect of inequality on crime. Table 3 reports the direct and
indirect effects of PNW and $INEQ.
Two comparisons must be made in order to fully assess the impact of
indirect effects. First is the comparison of the total effect of the extra-legal
variables (direct and indirect) with the effect of crime. In all four cells ex-
amining TRATE and PRATE, the effect of crime was greater than the total
effect of PNW and $INEQ. In the two JRATE equations, however, the total
effect of PNW and $INEQ exceeded the effect of crime. This, most likely,
is the result of the multicollinearity that exists in these models.

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Incarceration Rates 217

Table 3
Indirect Effects

TRATE PRATE JRATE

Direct Indir. Total Direct Indir. Total Direct Indir. Total

TCRIME .575 - .575 .589 - .589 .124 - .124

PNW -.039 .253 .214 .030 .260 .290 .239 .078 .317

$INEQ .363 .114 .477 .208 .117 .325 .313 .008 .321

VCRIME .791 - .791 .922 - .922 .369 - .369

PNW .056 .159 .215 .103 .185 .288 .514 .197 .711

$INEQ .143 .333 .476 -.060 .388 .328 .397 .076 .473

A second important comparison is the magnitude of


effect versus its indirect effect. In four of the six cells
TCRIME and VCRIME), the indirect effect of PNW excee
This is contrary to cultural conflict theory which posits a

Conclusion

THE INCARCERATION "BINGE" in the United States shows no signs of dim


ishing. Between the end of 1993 and the end of 1994, the number o
dividuals incarcerated in state and federal prisons increased by 83,294
1995a). If these inmates were confined two per cell, the United States w
need to build 800 new prison cells per weekto accommodate these inm
As society deals with such staggering prospects, it is imperative to ha
full understanding of the influences affecting imprisonment.
Different sociological theories offer competing explanations. The Du
heimian (traditional) view posits that imprisonment is a function of cr
Conflict theories (both cultural and Neo-Marxist) argue that extra-lega
tors such as minority populations and economic inequality will direc
affect incarceration when controlling for crime. The fact that the inca
ation rate of blacks is seven times greater than the incarceration of w
and is increasing faster than that of whites may be interpreted as p
facia evidence of the race effect.

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218 American Journal of Economics and Sociology

Total Incarceration Rate

The goal of this study was to investigate whether race and income
equality were significantly related to imprisonment when controlling f
crime. While the impact of these variables has been the focus of a cons
erable amount of research, two areas have not received adequate inves
gation. First, prior research has focused on either state imprisonmen
county (jail) incarceration. Most other studies have focused only on th
number of people incarcerated in state and federal facilities, thereby u
derestimating by as much as one-third the actual level of imprisonment th
exists in the U.S. This is the first multi-state study to examine the effect
extra-legal variables on the states' total incarceration rate (in prisons
jails). Second, most of the previous research has ignored the indirecteff
of race and economic inequality. That is, racial discrimination and/or lo
socio-economic status contributes to crime which, in turn, contributes
imprisonment.
The data reported here clearly support the Durkheimian view over
conflict view. Crime rate across states was significantly related to state
prisonment rates in four of the six equations estimated. The only mo
in which crime was not related to incarceration were the equations es
mated for county jail incarceration rates. These were the two equations
which percent nonwhite and crime were highly correlated. Definitive c
clusions should not be drawn from these results because the level of multi
collinearity present biases the t-statistics downward.
There was very little support for the hypothesis that extra-legal fact
are significant predictors of incarceration when controlling for crime.
nomic inequality was a significant predictor in only two of the six eq
tions. Percent nonwhite was significant in one equation, but because it
the one with the highest level of multi-collinearity, this finding must
viewed with caution.
The present study was also the first to examine the indirect effects of
race and income inequality (through crime) on the state's total incarceration
rate. Percent nonwhite appears to have a greater indirect than direct effect.
The indirect effect of percent nonwhite was greater than the direct effect
in four of the six equations. This suggests that research on the effect of race
must examine indirect as well as direct effects. Unlike percent nonwhite,
the indirect effect of economic inequality was weaker than the direct effect.

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Incarceration Rates 219

Because the increase in incarceration has far exceeded the increase in


crime, it is clear that factors other than crime itself are contributing to the
record high level of incarceration. The research presented here clearly dem-
onstrates that race and economic inequality are not significant determinants
of incarceration independent of crime. Additional research is necessary to
determine what factor or factors are responsible for the record-setting level
of incarceration in the United States each year.

Notes

1. Index crimes are identified by the Federal Bureau of Investigation as the most se-
rious. These include homicide, rape, assault, robbery, burglary, arson, larceny and motor
vehicle theft. The rate is the number of offenses per 100,000 population.
2. Michalowski and Pearson (1990) reported that between 1970 and 1980, the rate of
imprisonment increased 50 percent while the official crime rate increased only 39 percent.
In terms of violent crime and incarceration, Steffensmeier and Harer (1993) reported that
between 1981 and 1984, the incarceration rate increased 25 percent while the violent
crime rate actually decreased 9 percent, and when the crime rate increased 42 percent
(between 1985 and 1992), the incarceration rate increased 78 percent.
3. Several studies (Michalowski and Pearson, 1990; Bridges, et al. 1987; Galster and
Scaturo, 1985) included only the violent crime rate, while Colvin (1990) used total crime
rate. In studies where only violent crime was included, it was argued that violent crime
is the most relevant because it is comprised of the most serious crimes and thus, is the
most likely to result in state imprisonment. Clearly, jails confine less serious offenders.
While the majority of state prison inmates (55 percent) were arrested for a violent offense
(BJS, 1988), less than one-quarter (22 percent) of the jail inmates were arrested for a
violent crime (BJS, 1991). Further, 23 percent of jail inmates were arrested for a public
order crime while only 5 percent of state prison inmates were arrested for similar offenses.
Since this study includes jail data, total crime data, which includes these less serious
offenders, are more relevant.

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220 American Journal of Economics and Sociology

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