Cases for Quiz No.

13 on October 4, 2017 (Wednesday)

(Art. 163 182, Family Code)
1. Rodriguez vs. CA, et al. 245 SCRA 150, 61 SCAD 896
2. Fernandez, et al. vs. CA, et al. 230 SCRA 130, February 16,
1994 48 SCAD 333
3. Macadangdang vs. CA, 100 SCRA 73 (1980)
4. Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar, 102 Phil. 1050 (1958)
5. Berciles vs. Systems, 128 SCRA 53 (1984)
6. People vs. Tumimpad 235 SCRA 483, August 19, 1994
7. Janice Marie Jao vs. CA, 152 SCRA 359 (1987)
8. Tan vs. Trocio, 191 SCRA 764
9. Baluyot vs. Baluyot, 186 SCRA 506 [1990]
10. Constantino vs. Mendez, et al., 209 SCRA 18 [1992]
11. Carmelo Cabatana vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 124814, October
21, 2004)
12. Jison vs. CA, 350 Phil. 138 [1998]
13. Liyao, Jr. vs. Liyao, et al., 428 Phil. 628 [2002]
14. Potenciano vs. Reynoso, G.R. No. 140707, April 22, 2003
15. Andal and Dueas vs. Macaraig, 89 Phil. 165
16. De Aparicio vs. Paraguya, L-29771, May 29, 1987
17. Federico Suntay vs. Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, et. al., G.R.
No. 132524, December 29, 1998, 101 SCAD 1161
18. Alberto vs. CA, G.R. No. 86639, June 2, 1994, 52 SCAD 67
19. Raymond Pe Lim vs. CA, et. al., G.R. No. 112229, March 18,
1997, 80 SCAD 685

Rodriguez vs. CA, et al. 245 SCRA 150, 61 SCAD 896

G.R. No. L-29264 August 29, 1969

BARBARA RODRIGUEZ, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division, composed of
JUSTICES JUAN P. ENRIQUEZ, HERMOGENES CONCEPCION, JR.
and EDILBERTO SORIANO), ATANACIO VALENZUELA, MAXIMINA
VICTORIO, LIBERATA SANTOS, NIEVES CRUZ, substituted by her
heirs, ARSENIO, JAYME, ANDRES, NELO and AMANDA, all
surnamed NERY, and CARMEN and ARSENIA, both surnamed
MENDOZA, respondents.

Fortunato de Leon for petitioner.

Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo and Feliciano for respondent Atanacio
Valenzuela.
San Juan, Africa, Gonzales and San Agustin for respondent Nieves
Cruz.

CASTRO, J.:

For a clear understanding of the issues posed by the present petition

for mandamus and certiorari with preliminary injunction, we hereunder
quote the statement of the case and the findings of fact made by the
Court of Appeals in its decision dated October 4, 1967 in CA-G.R.
35084-R, as well as the dispositive portion of the said decision:

On December 31, 1958, in Paraaque, Rizal, by virtue of a

document denominated "Kasunduan" written in the vernacular and
ratified before Notary Public Lazaro C. Ison of that locality, Nieves
Cruz, now deceased, authorized the spouses Atanacio Valenzuela,
and Maximina Victorio and Liberate Santos to sell a certain parcel
of land of about 44,634 square meters belonging to her and
situated in Sitio Matatdo, Barrio San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal,
the identity of which is not now in dispute. Among, the anent
conditions of this authority were that the price payable to Nieves
Cruz for the land would be P1.60 per square meter and any
overprice would pertain to the agents; that Nieves Cruz would
receive from said agents, by way of advance payment on account
of the purchase price to be paid by whomsoever may buy the land,
the sum of P10,000.00 upon the execution of the agreement
aforesaid, and another P10,000.00 on January 5, 1959; that the
balance on the total purchase price would be payable to Nieves
Cruz upon the issuance of the Torrens title over the property, the
obtention of which was undertaken by the agents who also were
bound to advance the expense therefor in the sum of P4,000.00
which would be deductible from the last amount due on the
purchase price; and that should the agent find no buyer by the time
that Torrens title is issued, Nieves Cruz reserved the right to look
for a buyer herself although all sums already received from the
agents would be returned to them without interest.

As confirmed by Nieves Cruz in a "recibo", Exhibit 2, bearing the

date "... ng Enero ng 1959," the stipulated "advance payment
(paunang bayad)" of P20,000.00 was duly made to her. Contrary to
the agreement that the balance on the purchase price would be
paid upon the issuance of the Torrens title over the land
(September 9, 1960), Nieves Cruz and her children, however,
collected from the agents, either thru Maximina Victorio or thru
Salud G. de Leon, daughter of Liberate Santos, various sums of
money during the period from July 3, 1959 up to September 3,
1961, all of which were duly receipted for by Nieves Cruz and/or
her children and in which receipts it is expressly stated that said
amounts were "bilang karagdagan sa ipinagbili naming lupa sa
kanila (additional payments for the land we sold to them)", Exhibits
12, 12-a to 12-z-1. These totalled P27,198.60 which with the
P20,000.00 previously paid amounted to P47,198.60.

Meanwhile, proceedings to place the land under the operation of

the Torrens system were initiated. In due season, the registration
court finding a registrable title in the name of the applicants,
Emilio Cruz and Nieves Cruz, but that

"... the applicant Nieves Cruz has likewise sold her one-half
(1/2) undivided share to the spouses Atanacio Valenzuela
and Maxima (Maximina) Victorio and to Liberata Santos from
whom she had received partial payments thereof in the sum
of P22,000.00;" (Exhibit 4-a).

decreed, on July 15, 1960, the registration of the land in the names
of the applicants aforesaid

"Subject ... to the rights of the spouses Atanacio Valenzuela

and Maximina Victorio and to Liberata Santos over the one-
half share of Nieves Cruz of the parcel of land for which the
 latter was paid P22,000.00 as partial payment thereof."
(Exhibit 4).

The judgment aforesaid having become final, the corresponding

Original Certificate of Title No. 2488 of the Registry of Deeds of
Rizal was, on September 9, 1960, duly entered and issued to the
applicants aforesaid, subject, amongst others, to the limitation
heretofore stated.

Eventually, pursuant to a partition between Nieves Cruz and her

brother, Emilio Cruz, by virtue of which the entire land was
subdivided into two lots of 48,260 square meters each, Original
Transfer of Title No. 2488 was cancelled and superseded by two
new transfer certificates respectively covering the two sub-divided
lots, that which pertained to Nieves Cruz, Lot A (LRC) Psd-13106,
being covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 80110 issued on
October 3, 1960. Said title carried over the annotation heretofore
mentioned respecting the rights of Atanacio Valenzuela and
Maximina Victorio and Liberata Santos over the portion covered
thereby. (Exhibits 6 and 6-a).

Then, on September 15, 1961, Nieves Cruz sold the property in

question to Barbara Lombos Rodriguez, her "balae" because the
latter's son was married to her daughter, for the sum of P77,216.00
(Exhibit J). In consequence, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 80110
in the name of Nieves Cruz was cancelled and, in lieu thereof,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 91135 was issued in the name of
Barbara Lombos Rodriguez (Exhibit I) which likewise carried over
the annotation respecting the rights of Atanacio Valenzuela,
Maximina Victorio and Liberata Santos over the property covered
thereby.

Forthwith, on September 16, 1961, Nieves Cruz, through counsel,

gave notice to Atanacio Valenzuela, Maximina Victorio and
Liberata Santos of her decision to rescind the original agreement
heretofore adverted to, enclosing with said notice Bank of America
check for P48,338.60, representing sums advanced by the latter
which were tendered to be returned. Atanacio Valenzuela,
Maximina Victorio and Liberata Santos, through counsel, balked at
the attempt at rescission, denying non-compliance with their
undertaking inasmuch as, per agreement, the balance on the
purchase price for the land was not due until after the 1962
harvest. They, accordingly, returned Nieves Cruz' check.

Thus rebuffed, plaintiff Nieves Cruz hailed defendants Atanacio

Valenzuela, Maximina Victorio and Liberate Santos before the
Rizal Court in the instant action for rescission of the "Kasunduan"
heretofore adverted to, the cancellation of the annotation on the
title to the land respecting defendant's right thereto, and for
damages and attorney's fees. In their return to the complaint,
defendants traversed the material averments thereof, contending
principally that the agreement sought to be rescinded had since
been novated by a subsequent agreement whereunder they were
to buy the property directly. They also impleaded Barbara Lomboa
Rodriguez on account of the sale by the plaintiff to her of the
subject property and interposed a counterclaim against both
plaintiff and Rodriguez for the annulment of the sale of the land to
the latter, as well as the transfer certificate of title issued in her
favor consequent thereto and the reconveyance of the land in their
favor, and also for damages and attorney's fees.

Pending the proceedings below, plaintiff Nieves Cruz died and

was, accordingly, substituted as such by her surviving children, to
wit: Arsenio, Nelo, Jaime, Andres and Amanda, all surnamed Nery,
and Carmen and Armenia both surnamed Mendoza.

In due season, the trial court finding for plaintiff Nieves Cruz and
her buyer, Barbara Lombos Rodriguez, and against defendants
rendered judgment thus

"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby

rendered (1) Ordering the cancellation at the back of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 91135 of the Register of Deeds of
Rizal, stating that the land covered thereby was sold to the
defendants; (2) Ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiff,
jointly and severally the sum of P67,564.00 as actual
damages and P5,000.00 by way of attorney's fees; (3)
 Dismissing the defendants counterclaim; and (4) Ordering the
defendants to pay the costs of this suit jointly and severally."

xxx xxx xxx

We find no obstacle to appellants' purchase of the land in the

prohibition against an agent buying the property of his principal
entrusted to him for sale. With the agreement of Nieves Cruz to sell
the land directly to said appellants, her agents originally, it cannot
seriously be contended that the purchase of the land by appellants
was, without the express consent of the principal Nieves Cruz.
Accordingly, that purchase is beyond the coverage of the
prohibition.

By and large, we are satisfied from a meticulous assay of the

evidence at bar that the contract of sale over the land subsequently
made by Nieves Cruz in favor of appellants was duly and
satisfactorily proved. No showing having been made by appellees
to warrant the rescission of that contract, the attempt of such
rescission is legally untenable and necessarily futile. The specific
performance of that contract is under the circumstances, legally
compellable.

Considering that the rights of appellants, as such purchasers of the

portion corresponding to Nieves Cruz, is a matter of official record
in the latter's certificate of title over the land the annotation of
which was authorized by the decision of the registration court and
which annotation was duly carried over in the subsequent titles
issued therefor, including that issued in the name of appellee
Rodriguez said appellee must be conclusively presumed to
have been aware, as indeed she was, of the prior rights acquired
by appellants over the said portion. Said appellee's acquisition of
the land from Nieves Cruz remains subject, and must yield, to the
superior rights of appellants. Appellee Rodriguez cannot seek
refuge behind the protection afforded by the Land Registration Act
to purchasers in good faith and for value. Aware as she was of the
existence of the annotated prior rights of appellants, she cannot
now be heard to claim a right better than that of her grantor, Nieves
 Cruz. Her obligation to reconvey the land to the appellants is thus
indubitable.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby

REVERSED in toto, and, in lieu thereof, another is hereby
rendered:

(1) Setting aside and annulling the deed of sale, Exhibit J,

executed by plaintiff in favor of Barbara Lombos Rodriguez;

(2) Declaring defendant-appellee Barbara Lombos Rodriguez

divested of title over the property covered by TCT No. 91135 of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal and title thereto vested in defendants-
appellants upon payment of the latter to appellee Rodriguez of the
sum of P28,877.40, representing the balance of the agreed
purchase price due on the property minus P13,000.00 awarded
under paragraph (4) within 90 days after this decision shall have
become final, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel
TCT No. 91135 and issue in lieu thereof a new certificate of title in
favor of appellants, upon payment of corresponding fees;

(3) Ordering plaintiffs and defendant Barbara Lombos Rodriguez to

deliver to the defendants-appellants possession of the property
aforementioned; and

(4) Ordering appellees jointly and severally to pay to defendants-

appellants the sum of P5,000.00 as temperate damages,
P3,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00 as attorney's fees
plus costs. These amounts shall be deducted from the P28,877.40
appellants are required to pay to Rodriguez under paragraph (2)
hereof.

This case is before us for the second time. In L-28462, the heirs of
Nieves Cruz and the present petitioner (Barbara Lombos Rodriguez)
filed a joint petition for certiorari as an original action under Rule 65
and, simultaneously, as an appeal under Rule 45. As the former, it
sought redress against the refuse of the respondent Court of Appeals to
consider a motion for reconsideration filed beyond the reglementary
period. As the latter, it sought a review of the respondent Court's findings
of fact and conclusions of law. On January 3, 1968 we denied the joint
petition; the joint petition was thereafter amended, and this amended
petition we likewise denied on January 26, 1968; on February 20, 1968
we denied the motion for reconsideration filed solely by Rodriguez.

On July 20, 1968, Rodriguez alone filed the present petition for
mandamus and certiorari. She prays for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the respondents from enforcing the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 35084-R and from entering
into any negotiation or transaction or otherwise exercising acts of
ownership over the parcel of land covered by transfer certificate of title
91135 issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal. She also prays that
preliminary injunction issue to restrain the Register of Deeds of Rizal
from registering any documents affecting the subject parcel of land. No
injunction, however, was issued by us.

The petition in the present case, L-29264, while again assailing the
findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the respondent Court,
adds two new grounds. The first is the allegation that the land involved in
CA-G.R. 35084-R has a value in excess of P200,000. The petitioner
complains that the Court of Appeals should have certified the appeal to
us, pursuant to section 3 of Rule 50 in relation to section 17(5) of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, 1 as she had asked the said Court to do in her
supplemental motion of June 14, 1968. The second ground is the claim
that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in denying her
May 14, 1968 motion for new trial, based on alleged newly discovered
evidence.

In their answer, Atanacio Valenzuela, Maximina Victorio and Liberata

Santos allege that the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals in its
decision of October 4, 1967 are substantiated by the record and the
conclusions of law are supported by applicable laws and jurisprudence,
and, moreover, that these findings are no longer open to review
inasmuch as the said decision has become final and executory, the
period of appeal provided in Rule 45 having expired. Atanacio
Valenzuela, et al. also maintain that the land in litigation had a value of
less than P200,000, according to the records of the case, when their
appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in civil
case 6901 was perfected; that the petitioner's motion for new trial in the
Court of Appeals was filed out of time; and that the petitioner is estopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in the matter of
the value of the land in controversy. Two grounds for the defense of
estoppel are offered by Atanacio Valenzuela, et al. One is that the
petitioner speculated in obtaining a favorable judgment in the Court of
Appeals by submitting herself to the jurisdiction of the said Court and
she cannot now therefore be allowed to attack its jurisdiction when the
judgment turned out to be unfavorable. The other is that the petitioner's
laches made possible the sale in good faith by Atanacio Valenzuela, et
al., of the land in litigation to Emilio and Isidro Ramos, in whose names
the land is at present registered under transfer certificate of title 229135
issued on September 25, 1968 by the Register of Deeds of Rizal.

The heirs of Nieves Cruz filed an answer unqualifiedly admitting the

basic allegations of the petition, except as to the value of the land, as to
which they are non-committal.

It is our considered view that the petitioner's claim of grave abuse by the
respondent Court in denying her motion for new trial is devoid of merit. It
is not disputed that, on the assumption that the respondent Court had
jurisdiction over the appeal, the petitioner had already lost her right to
appeal from the decision of October 4, 1967 when the petition in L-
28462 was filed in January 1968. It logically follows that the case had
passed the stage for new trial on newly discovered evidence when the
petitioner filed her motion for new trial on May 14, 1968.

Two issues remain, to wit, (1) the value of the land in controversy; and
(2) estoppel.

At the time appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals. section 17(5) of
the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, provided:

The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise,

reverse modify or affirm on appeal, certiorari or writ of error, as the law
or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior
courts as herein provided, in
 xxx xxx xxx

(5) All civil cases in which the value in controversy exceeds two
hundred thousand pesos, exclusive of interests and costs or in
which the title or possession of real estate exceeding in value the
sum of two hundred thousand pesos to be ascertained by the oath
of a party to the cause or by other competent evidence, is involved
or brought in question. The Supreme Court shall likewise have
exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals in civil cases, even though
the value in controversy, exclusive of interests and costs, is two
hundred thousand pesos or less, when the evidence involved in
said cases is the same as the evidence submitted in an appealed
civil case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as
provided herein.

The petitioner would have us believe that, other than a realtor's sworn
statement dated June 14, 1968, which was filed with the respondent
Court together with her supplemental motion, there is nothing in the
records that would indicate the value of the litigated parcel. We disagree.
The "Kasunduan" (annex A to the petition) dated December 31, 1958
executed by and between Nieves Cruz and Atanacio Valenzuela, et al.
fixed the value of the land (of an area of 44,634 square meters) at P1.60
per square meter. The decision (annex B) of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal dated August 12, 1964 assessed the value of the land at P3.00
per square meter. The decision (annex D) dated October 4, 1967 of the
respondent Court of Appeals pointed out that the consideration stated in
the deed of sale of the land executed by Nieves Cruz in favor of
Rodriguez, the petitioner herein, is P77,216. Moreover, until June 14,
1968, no party to the cause questioned the valuation of P3.00 per
square meter made by the trial court. The records, therefore,
overwhelmingly refute the petitioner's allegation. They also prove that
the value of the entire parcel of land had been impliedly admitted by the
parties as being below P200,000.

Granting arguendo, however, that the value of the land in controversy is

in excess of P200,000, to set aside at this stage all proceedings had
before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 35084-R, and before this Court
in L-28462, would violate all norms of justice and equity and contravene
public policy. The appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal was pending before the respondent Court during the period from
1964 until October 4, 1967, when on the latter date it was decided in
favor of the appellants and against the petitioner herein and the heirs of
Nieves Cruz. Yet, the appellees therein did not raise the issue of
jurisdiction. The joint petition in L-28462 afforded the petitioner herein
the opportunity to question the jurisdiction of the respondent Court.
Again, the value of the land in controversy, was not questioned by the
petitioners, not even in their amended joint petition. It was not until June
14, 1968 that the petitioner herein filed with the respondent Court a
supplemental motion wherein she raised for the first time the issue of
value and questioned the validity of the final decision of the respondent
Court on the jurisdictional ground that the real estate involved has a
value in excess of P200,000. That the petitioner's present counsel
became her counsel only in May, 1968 provides no excuse for the
petitioner's failure to exercise due diligence for over three years to
discover that the land has a value that would oust the respondent Court
of jurisdiction. The fact remains that the petitioner had allowed an
unreasonable period of time to lapse before she raised the question of
value and jurisdiction, and only after and because the respondent Court
had decided the case against her. The doctrine of estoppel by laches
bars her from now questioning the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.

The learned disquisition of Mr. Justice Arsenio P. Dizon, speaking for

this Court in Serafin Tijam, et al. vs. Magdaleno Sibonghanoy, et al. (L-
21450, April 15, 1968), explained, in unequivocal terms, the reasons
why, in a case like the present, a losing party cannot be permitted to
belatedly raise the issue of jurisdiction.

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in

different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of
estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel
by laches.

Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an

unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it
is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon
grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society,
the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of
limitation is not a mere question of time but is principally a question
of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be
enforced or asserted.

It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a

court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A. L. R. 79). In
the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said
that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the
subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in
such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not
because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive
as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot
be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting

a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is
too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the
court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones, etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715,
37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis, etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed.
659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo 58, the Court said that it
is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction
of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to
afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.

Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases

mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20,
1963 (supra) to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable
practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then
accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack
of jurisdiction, when adverse as well as in Pindagan etc. vs.
Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et
al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men
Labor Union, etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relations, et al., G.R.
 No.
L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965; and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.

We do not here rule that where the pleadings or other documents in the
records of a case state a value of a real estate in controversy, a party to
the cause may not show that the true value thereof is more or is less
than that stated in the records. Section 17(5) of the Judiciary Act of 1948
precisely allows a party to submit a sworn statement of such higher or
lower value. This is not to say, of course, that the court is bound by a
party's sworn statement, for where more than one party submit materially
differing statements of value, or where a party's sworn statement
conflicts with other competent evidence, the true value is to be
determined by the trial court as an issue of fact before it.

The time when the issue of the value of a real estate in controversy is to
be resolved is prior to, or simultaneously with, the approval of the record
on appeal and appeal bond, for it is upon the perfection of the appeal
that the appellate court acquires jurisdiction over the case (Rule 41,
section 9). It is at this time that a party to the cause, be he the intended
appellant or the intended appellee, must raise the issue of value before
the trial court, for said court to allow appeal involving a question of fact
either to this Court or to the Court of Appeals, depending on its finding
on the value of the realty. Failure to raise this issue before the trial court
amounts to a submission of the issue solely on the basis of the
pleadings and evidence a quo and is equivalent to a waiver of the right
to present the statement under oath or to adduce the other competent
evidence referred to in section 17(b) of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

A contrary rule would be disastrous. For one thing, to allow a party to

present proof of value before an appellate court would be to convert the
said court to a trial court. For another thing, the value of real estate may
change between the perfection of an appeal and the receipt of the record
or the payment of the appellate court docket fee; hence, it is best, for
stability, to have the value determined at the precise instant when the
trial court must decide to which appellate court the appeal should be
made and not at some uncertain time thereafter. Worse yet, to permit a
party to prove before the Court of Appeals or before us, after a decision
on the merits has been rendered, that a real estate in controversy
exceeds, or does not exceed P200,000 in value, would be to encourage
speculation by litigants; for, a losing party can be expected to raise the
issue of value of the realty to show that it is in excess of P200,000 if the
unfavorable judgment is rendered by the Court of Appeals, or to show
that it does not exceed P200,000 if the unfavorable judgment is rendered
by this Court, in an attempt to litigate the merits of the case all over
again. 2

In the case at bar, the records as of the perfection of the appeal on

August 12, 1964 show that the litigated real estate had a value not in
excess of P200,000. Conformably with the Judiciary Act of 1948,
therefore, the appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal in civil case 6901 was within the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals.

Other issues, both of fact and of law, are raised in the pleadings.
Considering our conclusion that the respondent Court had jurisdiction
over the appeal, it is not necessary to discuss, much less resolve, any of
those other issues. However, because the petitioner and the heirs of
Nieves Cruz have hammered on the twin issues of the existence of an
oral contract of sale and of the efficacy of an oral novatory contract of
sale, a brief discussion of these issues would not be amiss.

The agency agreement of December 31, 1958 is not impugned by any of

the parties. Nieves Cruz, however, asserted that the agency remained in
force until she rescinded it on September 16, 1961 by notice to that
effect to Atanacio Valenzuela, et al., tendering with the said notice the
return, in check, of the sum of P48,338.60 which she had received from
Atanacio Valenzuela, et al. The defendants, upon the other hand,
contend that the agency agreement was novated by a contract of sale in
their favor and that the balance of the purchase price was not due until
after the 1962 harvest. Rodriguez, when impleaded by Atanacio
Valenzuela, et al., denied that she was a buyer in bad faith from Nieves
Cruz.

The parties and the lower courts are agreed that Nieves Cruz had
received P20,000 from Atanacio Valenzuela, et al., by January 5, 1959
and that the payment of this total sum was in accordance with the
agency agreement. The parties and the lower courts, however, are at
variance on the basis or reason for the subsequent payments. The
petitioner herein, the heirs of Nieves Cruz and the Court of First Instance
of Rizal take the position that the payments after January 5, 1959 were
received by Nieves Cruz as partial or installment payments of the
purchase price on the representations of Atanacio Valenzuela, et al., that
they had a buyer for the property from whom these payments came, all
pursuant to the agency agreement. The respondents Atanacio
Valenzuela, et al., on the other hand, assert that those amounts were
paid by them, as disclosed buyers, to Nieves Cruz and her children,
pursuant to a novatory verbal contract of sale entered into with Nieves
Cruz, subsequent to the agency agreement and prior to the issuance of
the decree of registration of July 15, 1960.

It is thus clear that the decisive issues are (a) whether or not Nieves
Cruz did agree to sell to Atanacio Valenzuela, et al., the litigated parcel
of land sometime after January 5, 1959, and (b) whether or not the said
agreement is enforceable or can be proved under the law. The fact that
Atanacio Valenzuela, et al. were agents of Nieves Cruz under the
agency agreement of December 31, 1958 is not material, for if it is true
that Nieves Cruz did agree to sell to her agents the real estate subject of
the agency, her consent took the transaction out of the prohibition
contained in article 1491(2) of the Civil Code. Neither are articles 1874
and 1878(5) and (12) of the Civil Code relevant, for they refer to sales
made by an agent for a principal and not to sales made by the owner
personally to another, whether that other be acting personally or through
a representative.

Was there a novatory oral contract to sell entered into by Nieves in favor
of Atanacio Valenzuela, et al.? In resolving this question, the respondent
Court pointed to significant facts and circumstances sustaining an
affirmative answer.

Cited by the Court of Appeals is the testimony of Andres Nery, a

successor-in-interest of Nieves Cruz and a substitute plaintiff upon
Nieves Cruz' death, to the effect that after they had gone to the
defendants several times, they were told that the buyer was Salud de
Leon. This witness also said, according to the transcript cited by the
respondent Court, that they were paid little by little and had been paid a
grand total of P48,000. The respondent Court likewise adverted to the
receipts (exhibits L-12 to L-22, exhibit L-24, exhibit L-26, and exhibits 12,
12-a to 12-z-1) signed by Nieves Cruz and/or her children and concluded
that on the faces of these receipts it is clear that the amounts therein
stated were in payment by Atanacio Valenzuela, et al. of the land which
the recipients had sold to them ("ipinagbile naming lupa sa kanila"). Of
incalculable significance is the notation in the original certificate of title
and in the transfer certificate of title in the name of Nieves Cruz which, in
unambiguous language, recorded Nieves Cruz' sale of her interest in the
land to Atanacio Valenzuela, et al. If that notation were inaccurate or
false, Nieves Cruz would not have remained unprotesting for over a year
after the entry of the decree of registration in July, 1960, nor would she
and her children have received 13 installment payments totalling
P19,963 during the period from September 9, 1960 to September 3,
1961.

Salud de Leon, it should be borne in mind, is the husband of Rogaciano

F. de Leon and the daughter of the defendant Liberata Santos. It should
likewise be remembered that, as remarked by the trial court, Salud de
Leon testified that it was she who had the oral agreement with Nieves
Cruz for the purchase by Atanacio Valenzuela, et al. of the litigated
property and, as found by the respondent Court, Salud de Leon was the
representative of Atanacio Valenzuela, et al., not of Nieves Cruz.

We conclude, therefore, that there is substantial evidence in the record

sustaining the finding of the respondent Court that the parties to the
agency agreement subsequently entered into a new and different
contract by which the landowner, Nieves Cruz, verbally agreed to sell
her interest in the litigated real estate to Atanacio Valenzuela, et al.

A legion of receipts there are of payments of the purchase price signed

by Nieves Cruz. True, these receipts do not state all the basic elements
of a contract of sale, for they do not expressly identify the object nor fix a
price or the manner of fixing the price. The parties, however, are agreed
at least the plaintiff has not questioned the defendants' claim to this
effect that the object of the sale referred to in the receipts is Nieves
Cruz' share in the land she co-owned with her brother Emilio and that the
price therefor is P1.60 per square meter. At all events, by failing to object
to the presentation of oral evidence to prove the sale and by accepting
from the defendants a total of P27,198.60 after January 5, 1959, the
plaintiff thereby ratified the oral contract, conformably with article 1405 of
the Civil Code, and removed the partly executed agreement from the
operation of the Statute of Frauds. And, finally, the sale was established
and recognized in the land registration proceedings wherein the land
court, in its decision, categorically stated:

[T]he applicant Nieves Cruz has likewise sold her one-half ()

undivided share to the spouses Atanacio Valenzuela and Maximina
Victorio and Liberata Santos from whom she had received partial
payment thereof in the sum of P22,000.00.

The pertinent certificates of title bear the annotation of the aforesaid right
of Atanacio Valenzuela, et al. The final decision of the land court to
the effect that Nieves Cruz had sold her undivided share to Atanacio
Valenzuela, et al., and had received a partial payment of P22,000 is
now beyond judicial review, and, because a land registration case is a
proceeding in rem, binds even Rodriguez.

Rodriguez nevertheless insist that despite the rescission by the Court of

Appeals of her purchase from Nieves Cruz, the said respondent Court
did not order Nieves Cruz to return the P77,216 which she had received
from her. While mutual constitution follows rescission of a contract
(article 1385, Civil Code), the respondent Court should not be blamed for
omitting to order Nieves Cruz to restore what she had received from the
petitioner on account of the rescinded contract of sale. In the first place,
in the pleadings filed before the trial court, Rodriguez made no claim for
restitution against Nieves Cruz or her heirs. In the second place, Nieves
Cruz died in the course of the proceedings below and was substituted by
her heirs who, necessarily, can be held individually liable for restitution
only to the extent that they inherited from her.

Nevertheless, inasmuch as rescission of the contract between Nieves

Cruz and the petitioner herein was decreed by the respondent Court, the
latter should be entitled to restitution as a matter of law. It is of no
moment that herein petitioner did not file any cross-claim for restitution
against the plaintiff, for her answer was directed to the defendants' claim
which was in the nature of a third-party complaint. She was neither a co-
defendant nor a co-third-party defendant with Nieves Cruz; nor were
Nieves Cruz and the herein petitioner opposing parties a quo, for they
joined in maintaining the validity of their contract. Section 4 of Rule 9,
therefore, has no application to the petitioner's right to restitution.

We declare, consequently, that the estate of Nieves Cruz is liable to

Barbara Lombos Rodriguez for the return to the latter of the sum of
P77,216, less the amount which Atanacio Valenzuela, et al. had
deposited with the trial court in accordance with the decision of
respondent Court. We cannot order the heirs of Nieves Cruz to make the
refund. As we observed above, these heirs are liable for restitution only
to the extent of their individual inheritance from Nieves Cruz. Other
actions or proceedings have to be commenced to determine the liability
accruing to each of the heirs of Nieves Cruz.

ACCORDINGLY, the present petition for mandamus and certiorari is

denied, at petitioner's cost.

1wph1.t
Fernandez, et al. vs. CA, et al. 230 SCRA 130, February 16, 1994 48
SCAD 333

G.R. No. 108366 February 16, 1994

JOHN PAUL E. FERNANDEZ, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and CARLITO S.
FERNANDEZ, respondents.

Erlinda B. Espejo for petitioners.

C.B. Carbon & Associates for private respondent.

PUNO, J.:

The legal dispute between the parties began when the petitioners filed
Civil Case No. Q-45567 for support against the private respondent
before the RTC of Quezon City. The complaint was dismissed on
December 9, 1986 by Judge Antonio P. Solano,1 who found that "(t)here
is nothing in the material allegations in the complaint that seeks to
compel (private respondent) to recognize or acknowledge (petitioners)
as his illegitimate children," and that there was no sufficient and
competent evidence to prove the petitioners filiation.2

Petitioners plodded on. On February 19, 1987, they file the case at
bench, another action for recognition and support against the private
respondent before another branch of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch
87. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-50111.

The evidence shows that VIOLETA P. ESGUERRA, single, is the mother

and guardian ad litem of the two petitioners, CLARO ANTONIO
FERNANDEZ and JOHN PAUL FERNANDEZ, met sometime in 1983, at
the Meralco Compound tennis courts. A Meralco employee and a tennis
enthusiast, Carlito used to spend his week-ends regularly at said courts,
where Violeta's father served as tennis instructor.

Violeta pointed to Carlito as the father of her two sons. She claimed that
they started their illicit sexual relationship six (6) months after their first
meeting. The tryst resulted in the birth of petitioner Claro Antonio on
March 1, 1984, and of petitioner John Paul on not know that Carlito was
married until the birth of her two children. She averred they were married
in civil rites in October, 1983. In March, 1985, however, she discovered
that the marriage license which they used was spurious.

To bolster their case, petitioners presented the following documentary

evidence: their certificates of live birth, identifying respondent Carlito as
their father; the baptismal certificate of petitioner Claro which also states
that his father is respondent Carlito; photographs of Carlito taken during
the baptism of petitioner Claro; and pictures of respondent Carlito and
Claro taken at the home of Violeta Esguerra.

Petitioners likewise presented as witnesses, Rosario Cantoria,3 Dr.

Milagros Villanueva,4 Ruby Chua Cu,5 and Fr. Liberato Fernandez.6 The
first three witnesses told the trial court that Violeta Esguerra had, at
different times,7introduced the private respondent to them as her
"husband". Fr. Fernandez, on the other hand, testified that Carlito was
the one who presented himself as the father of petitioner Claro during
the latter's baptism.
In defense, respondent Carlito denied Violeta's allegations that he sired
the two petitioners. He averred he only served as one of the sponsors in
the baptism of petitioner Claro. This claim was corroborated by the
testimony of Rodante Pagtakhan, an officemate of respondent Carlito
who also stood as a sponsor of petitioner Claro during his baptism. The
Private respondent also presented as witness, Fidel Arcagua, a waiter of
the Lighthouse Restaurant. He disputed Violeta's allegation that she and
respondent Carlito frequented the said restaurant during their affair.
Arcagua stated he never saw Violeta Esguerra and respondent Carlito
together at the said restaurant. Private respondent also declared he only
learned he was named in the birth certificates of both petitioners as their
father after he was sued for support in Civil Case No.
Q-45567.

Based on the evidence adduced by the parties, the trial court ruled in
favor of petitioners, viz.:

In view of the above, the Court concludes and so holds that

the plaintiffs minors (petitioners herein) are entitled to the
relief's prayed for in the complaint. The defendant (herein
private respondent) is hereby ordered to recognize Claro
Antonio Carlito Fernandez, now aged 6, and John Paul
Fernandez, now aged 41/2 as his sons. As the defendant has
admitted that he has a supervisory job at the Meralco, he
shall give the plaintiffs support in the amount of P2,000 each
a month, payment to be delivered to Violeta Esguerra, the
children's mother and natural guardian, with arrears reckoned
as of the filing of the complaint on February 19, 1987.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the decision was set aside and petitioners complaint

dismissed by the respondent Court of Appeals8 in its impugned decision,
dated October 20, 1992. It found that the "proof relied upon by the (trial)
court (is) inadequate to prove the (private respondent's) paternity and
filiation of (petitioners)." It further held that the doctrine of res
judicata applied because of the dismissal of the petitioners complaint in
Civil Case No. Q-45567. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was
denied on December 22, 1992.
Petitioners now contend that the respondent appellate court erred in: (1)
not giving full faith and credit to the testimony in of Violeta Esguerra; (2)
not giving weight and value to the testimony of Father Liberato
Fernandez; (3) not giving probative value to the numerous pictures of
respondent Carlito Fernandez taken during the baptismal ceremony and
inside the bedroom of Violeta Esguerra; (4) not giving probative value to
the birth certificates of petitioners; (5) giving so much credence to the
self-serving and incredible testimony of respondent Carlito Fernandez;
and (6) holding that the principle of res judicata is applicable in the case
at bar.

We find no merit in the petition.

The rule is well-settled that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals may
be reviewed by this court only under exceptional circumstances. One
such situation is when the findings of the appellate court clash with those
of the trial court as in the case at bench. It behooves us therefore to
exercise our extraordinary power, and settle the issue of whether the
ruling of the appellate court that private respondent is not the father of
the petitioners is substantiated by the evidence on record.

We shall first examine the documentary evidence offered by the

petitioners which the respondent court rejected as insufficient to prove
their filiation. Firstly, we hold that petitioners cannot rely on the
photographs showing the presence of the private respondent in the
baptism of petitioner Claro (Exh. "B-8", Exh. "B-12", Exh. "H" and Exh.
"I"). These photographs are far from proofs that private respondent is the
father of petitioner Claro. As explained by the private respondent, he
was in the baptism as one of the sponsors of petitioner Claro. His
testimony was corroborated by Rodante Pagtakhan.

Secondly, the pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing private

respondent showering affection to Claro fall short of the evidence
required to prove paternity (Exhibits "B", "B-1", "B-2", "B-7", "B-14" and
"B-15"). As we held in Tan vs. Trocio, 192 SCRA 764, viz:

. . . The testimonies of complainant and witness Marilou

Pangandaman, another maid, to show unusual closeness
between Respondent and Jewel, like playing with him and
 giving him paternity. The same must be said of . . . (the)
pictures of Jewels and Respondent showing allegedly their
physical likeness to each other. Said evidence is inconclusive
to prove paternity and much less would prove violation of
complaint's person and honor. (Emphasis supplied)

Thirdly, the baptismal certificates (Exh. "D") of petitioner Claro naming

private respondent as his father has scant evidentiary value. There is no
showing that private respondent participated in its preparation. On this
score, we held in Berciles vs. Systems, et al. 128 SCRA 53 (1984):

As to the baptismal certificates, Exh. "7-A", the rule is that

although the baptismal record of a natural child describes her
as a child of the record the decedent had no intervening, the
baptismal record cannot be held to be a voluntary recognition
of parentage. . . . The reason for this rule that canonical
records do not constitute the authentic document prescribed
by Arts. 115 and 117 to prove the legitimate filiation of a child
is that such canonical record is simply proof of the only act to
which the priest may certify by reason of his personal
knowledge, an act done by himself or in his presence, like the
administration of the sacrament upon a day stated; it is no
proof of the declarations in the record with respect to the
parentage of the child baptized, or of prior and distinct facts
which require separate and concrete evidence.

In Macandang vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 (1980), we also ruled

that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents,
they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments
on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence
of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child's paternity.

Fourth, the certificates of live birth (Exh. "A"; Exh. "B") of the petitioners
identifying private respondent as their father are not also competent
evidence on the issue of their paternity. Again, the records do no show
that private respondent had a hand in the preparation of said certificates.
In rejecting these certificates, the ruling of the respondent court is in
accord with our pronouncement in Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar, 102
Phil. 1050 (1958), viz:
 . . . Section 5 of Act No. 3793 and Article 280 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines explicity prohibited, not only the
naming of the father or the child born outside wedlock, when
the birth certificates, or the recognition, is not filed or made by
him, but, also, the statement of any information or
circumstances by which he could be identified. Accordingly,
the Local Civil Registrar had no authority to make or record
the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a
third person and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child,
when signed only by the mother of the latter, is incompetent
evidence of fathership of said child. (Emphasis supplied)

We reiterated this rule in Berciles, op. cit., when we held that "a birth
certificate no signed by the alleged father therein indicated is not
competent evidence of paternity."

We have also reviewed the relevant testimonies of the witnesses for the
petitioners and we are satisfied that the respondent appellate court
properly calibrated their weight. Petitioners capitalize on the testimony of
Father Liberato Fernandez who solemnized the baptismal ceremony of
petitioner Claro. He declared on the witness stand:

Q Do you recall Father, whether on that occasion

when you called for the father and the mother of
the child, that both father and mother were
present?

A Yes.

Q Would you able to recognized the father and

the mother who were present at that time?

A Yes.

Q Please point to the court?

A There (witness pointing to the defendant, Carlito

Fernandez).
 Q For instance, just give us more specifically what
question do you remember having asked him?

A Yes, like for example, do you renounce Satan

and his works?

Q What was the answer of Fernandez?

A Yes, I do.

Q I just want to be sure, Father, will you please

look at the defendant again. I want to be sure if he
is the person who appeared before you on that
occasion?

A I am sure.

(TSN, May 23, 1986, pp. 14-16)

However, on cross examination, Father Fernandez admitted that he has

to be shown a picture of the private respondent by Violeta Esguerra to
recognize the private respondent, viz:

Q When was the, approximately, when you were

first shown this picture by Violeta Esguerra?

A I cannot recall.

Q At least the month and the year?

A It must be in 1986.

Q What month in 1986.

A It is difficult. . .

Q When was the first time you know you are going
to testify here?

A Let us see, you came there two times and first

one was you want to get a baptismal certificate
 and then the second time was I asked you for
what is this? And you said it is for the court.

Q On the second time that Ms. Violeta Esguerra

went to your place, you were already informed
that you will testify here before this Honorable
Court?

A Yes.

Q And you were informed by this Ms. Violeta

Esguerra that this man wearing the blue T-shirt is
the father?

A Yes, sir.

Q So, it was Violeta Esguerra who. . .

A Yes.

(TSN, May 23, 1986, pp. 18 to 22)

Indeed, there is no proof that Father Fernandez is a close friend of

Violeta Esguerra and the private respondent which should render
unquestionable his identification of the private respondent during
petitioner Claro's baptism. In the absence of this proof, we are not
prepared to concede that Father Fernandez who officiates numerous
baptismal ceremonies day in and day out can remember the parents of
the children he has baptized.

We cannot also disturb the findings of the respondent court on the

credibility of Violeta Esguerra. Her testimony is highly suspect as it is
self-serving and by itself, is insufficient to prove the paternity of the
petitioners.

We shall not pass upon the correctness of the ruling of the respondent
appellate court applying the doctrine of res judicata as additional reason
in dismissing petitioners action for recognition and support. It is
unnecessary considering our findings that petitioners evidence failed to
substantiate their cause of action.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED and the Decision of the
respondent court in CA-G.R. CV No. 29182 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Macadangdang vs. CA, 100 SCRA 73 (1980)

Subject:

Presumption of Legitimacy in Accordance with the Law (Presumption is

Quasi-Conclusive); Rebutting the Quasi-Conclusive Resumption; There
was No Physical Impossibility of Access between Respondent and her
Spouse; Rolando is Conclusively Presumed to the Legitimate Son of
Respondent and Crispin; Baptismal Certificates do not Prove the
Veracity of the Declarations Made; It Must be Shown beyond
Reasonable Doubt that there was Physical Impossibility of Access;
Impotence as a Cause of Physical Impossibility of Access; Separation
between the Spouses as a Cause of Physical Impossibility of Access;
Illness of the Husband as a Cause of Physical Impossibility of Access;
Only the Husband can Contest the Legitimacy of a Child Born to his
Wife; In Case of Doubt, all Presumptions Favor the Legitimacy of
Children

Facts:

Respondent Elizabeth Mejias was married to Crispin Anahaw. She

allegedly had intercourse with petitioner Antonio Macadangdang
sometime in March 1967. She pointed out that due to the affair, she and
her husband separated in 1967. Thereafter, on October 30, 1967, she
gave birth to a baby boy named Rolando.
Elizabeth filed a complaint for the recognition and support against
petitioner with the Court of First Instance of Davao. The lower court
dismissed the complaint. It ruled that Elizabeth cannot validly question
the legitimacy of her son by a collateral attack without joining her legal
husband as a party in the case,

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the assailed decision and

declared Rolando as the illegitimate son of Antonio. The latter went
before the Supreme Court. The issues boiled down to whether or not the
child was conclusively presumed the legitimate issue of the spouses
Elizabeth and Crispin and whether or not the wife may institute an action
that would bastardize her child without giving her husband, the legally
presumed father, an opportunity to be heard.

Held:

Presumption of Legitimacy in Accordance with the Law

(Presumption is Quasi-Conclusive)

1. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the
celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its
dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be
legitimate. (par. 1, Article 255, Civil Code)

2. Against the presumption, no evidence shall be admitted other than

that of the physical impossibility of the husband's having access to his
wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred
which preceded the birth of the child. (par. 2, id)

Rebutting the Quasi-Conclusive Resumption

3. The presumption is actually quasi-conclusive and may be rebutted or

refuted by only one evidence - the physical impossibility of access
between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 which
preceded the birth of the child.

4. This physical impossibility of access may be caused by any of these:

(1) Impotence of the husband; (2) Living separately in such a way that
access was impossible; and (3) Serious illness of the husband.

There was No Physical Impossibility of Access between

Respondent and her Spouse

5. The Supreme Court found that from the evidence presented and the
fact that respondent and her husband continued to live in the same
province, there was always the possibility of access to each other. As
has already been pointed out, respondent's self-serving statements were
never corroborated nor confirmed by any other evidence.

Rolando is Conclusively Presumed to the Legitimate Son of

Respondent and Crispin
6. The baby boy was born on October 30, 1967, only 7 months after
March 1967 when the first illicit intercourse between respondent and
petitioner took place, and also, seven months from the separation of
respondent and Crispin. The birth of Rolando came more than one
hundred eighty 180 days following the celebration of the respondent and
Crispins marriage and before 300 days following the alleged separation
between the spouses.

Baptismal Certificates do not Prove the Veracity of the Declarations

Made

7. Rolando has no birth certificate nor any other official record of birth.
His birth is attested to merely by oral declarations of witnesses and by a
Certificate of Baptism, which was prepared in the absence of the alleged
father, the petitioner.

8. The Court reiterated the ruling that while baptismal and marriage
certificates may be considered public documents, they are evidence only
to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein
specified - but not the veracity of the states or declarations made therein
with respect to his kinsfolk and/or citizenship.

It Must be Shown beyond Reasonable Doubt that there was

Physical Impossibility of Access
9. It must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access
as could have enabled the husband to be the father of the child. Sexual
intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved,
unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary; where
sexual intercourse is presumed or proved, the husband must be taken
be the father of the child.

Impotence as a Cause of Physical Impossibility of Access

10. Impotency is the physical inability to have sexual intercourse. It is not

synonymous with sterility. Sterility refers to the inability to procreate,
whereas, impotence refers to the physical inability to perform the act of
sexual intercourse. (Menciano vs. San Jose)

11. It has been held or recognized that the evidence or proof to prove
impotency must be clear or satisfactory: clear, satisfactory and
convincing, irresistible or positive.

Separation between the Spouses as a Cause of Physical

Impossibility of Access

12. The separation between the spouses must be such as to make

sexual access impossible. This may take place when they reside in
different countries or provinces, and they have never been together
during the period of conception. (Estate of Benito Marcelo)
Illness of the Husband as a Cause of Physical Impossibility of
Access

13. The illness of the husband must be of such a nature as to exclude

the possibility of his having sexual intercourse with his wife; such as,
when because of a sacroiliac injury, he was placed in a plaster cast, and
it was inconceivable to have sexual intercourse without the most severe
pain.

Only the Husband can Contest the Legitimacy of a Child Born to his
Wife

14. It must be pointed out that only the husband can contest the
legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly confronted
with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces;
and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in
view of the moral or economic interest involved.

15. The right to repudiate or contest the legitimacy of a child born in

wedlock belongs only to the alleged father, who is the husband of the
mother and can be exercised only by him or his heirs, within a fixed time,
and in certain cases, and only in a direct suit brought for the purpose.

16. The mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is

never uncertain; she can only contest the identity of the child.
In Case of Doubt, all Presumptions Favor the Legitimacy of
Children

17. The Court ruled that as between the paternity by the husband and
the paternity by the paramour, all the circumstances being equal, the law
is inclined to follow the former. Hence, the child is thus given the benefit
of legitimacy.

18. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the

family. Thus, every intendment of law or fact, leans toward the validity of
marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of
children, the community of property during marriage, the authority of
parents over the children, and the validity of defense for any member of
family in case of unlawful aggression.

Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar, 102 Phil. 1050 (1958)

G.R. No. L-10598 February 14, 1958

In the petition to rectify the Certificate of Birth entered under

Registry No. 845 (e45) of the LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAROF MANILA.
JOAQUIN P. ROCES, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR, respondent-appellee.
RICARDO JOAQUIN V. ROCES, represented by the natural guardian
and mother Carmen O. Valdellon,intervenor-appellee.

Ignacio M. Orendain for appellant.

Alcero Law Offices and Eliseo Alampay for appellee.

CONCEPCION, J.:

On January 7, 1956, appellant Joaquin P. Roces filed, with the Court of

FirstInstance of Manila, a petition alleging that he is married to Pacita
Carvajal; that on November 4, 1955, he came to know of the existence
of abirth certificate registered with the Locakl Civil Registrar of Manilsa,
certified true copy of which is attached to said complaint, mentioning him
as the father of one Ricardo V. Roces, an illegitimate child; that said
birthcertificate shows, on its face, that it had been executed which
neither the knowledge nor the consent of the petitioner; and that said
information with regard to the alleged party of Ricardo Joaquin V. Roces
is false, andcontrary to the provisions of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of
the Civil Codeof the Philippines. The prayer in said petition is of the
following tenor:

WHEREFORE, in accordance with the provision of Article 412 of

the Civil Code, it is respectfully prayed unto this Honorable Court
that an order beissued directing the Local Civil Registrar of the City
of Manila to certifythe original Certificate of Birth represented by
Annex 'A' of this petition and the entry made under Registry No.
845 (E-52) of his office, by striking out from the said documents all
informations having reference to the herein petitioner as the father
of the child mentioned therein, and that the surname 'ROCES'
appended to the name 'Ricardo Joaquin V. Roces' be also striken
from the aforesaid records.

Petitioner further prays for any other and further relief which this
Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in the premises.

The Local Civil Registrar of Manila filed an answer stating that he had no
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth af the
averments contrained in the petition by the court, pursuant to Article
412of said Code, he would effect the correction prayed for in the petition.

Later on, Ricardo Joaquin V. Roces, represented by his mother and

natural guardian, Carmen O. Valdellon, intervened and opposed the
petition upon theground that it "involve, not merely correction of clerical
errors, butcontroversial matters" and that "there is another pending
action involvingthe name question." After appropriate proceedings, the
lower court subsequently issued an order, dated February 11, 1956,
dismissing the petition upon the authority of Ty Kin Kong Tin vs.
Republic of the Philippines, 94 Phil. 321 50 Off. 1077. A reconsideration
of said order having been denied, petitioner now seeks a review thereof
by record on appeal.
The Ty Kong Tin case is not in point. Ty Kong Tin sought an amendment
of theentry in the record of birth of his children relative to his and their
political status, so that it may state that all of them are citizens of the
Philippines instead of "Chinese as set forth in the birth certificate of said
children and in the records of the local cicivil registrar. On appeal, we
reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila granting
this relief, upon the ground that the corrections authorized under Article
412of the Civil Code of the Philippines are purely "clerical in nature", not
those "which may affect the civil status of the nationality or citizenship of
the persons involved, and that "the procedure contemplated" in said
Article 412 "is summary in nature" and "cannot cover cases involving
controversial issues." Indeed, the point in controversy in the Ty Kong Tin
case was whetheror not petitioner and his children were Chinewe
citizens, as stated in the corresponding certificate of birth and record of
birth, or Filipino citizens,as contended by Ty Kong Tin.

The issue in the case at bar, however, entirely different in nature.

Thelegal status of Ricardo Joaquin V. Roces is not in dispute. The
pleadings andhis birth certificate show that he was born outside wedlock.
The only question before Us are whether the statements in said birth
certificate identifying the alleged father of said child are valid and
whether the LocalCivil Registrar was justified in making the
corresponding entry in the records of his office.

It should be noted, in this connection, that according to said birth

certificate, the mother Ricardo Joaquin V. Roces, is one Carmen O.
Valdellon,is said to be "single". The certificate is signed by the physician
of a local hospital and, apart from naming Joaquin P. Roces as the
father of the child, it states that said petitioner is "married". On the back
of the instrument there is a sworn statement of Carmen O. Valdellon
about the truth of the data therein contained. Petitioner Joaquin P.
Roces did not subscribe either the birth certificate or the aforementioned
verified statement or ally otherdeclaration of similar import. Upon the
other hand, section 5 of Act No. 3753, specifically ordains, in the
penultimate paragraph thereof, that:

In the case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be

signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only by
the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be
 permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the
father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any
information by which such father could be identified.

Similarly, Article, 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:

When the father or the mother makes the recognition separately,

he or she shall not reveal the name of the person with whom he or
she had the child; neither shall he or she state any circumstance
whereby the other parent may be identified.

Thus, both legal provisions explicitly prohibit, not only the naming of the
father of a child born outside wedlock when the birth certificate, or the
recognition, is not filed or made by him, but, also, the statement of "any
information" or "circumstance" by which he "could be
identified."Accordingly, in Crisolo vs. Macadaeg * (G.R. No. L-7017,
decided April 29, 1954), we held that "the Local Civil Registrar had no
authority to make of record the paternity of an illegitimate child "upon the
information of aperson"; that "records of public officers which are
admissible 'are limited to those matters which the public officer has
authority to record,"; that "it is essential authorize admission of a copy of
the record of a privateinstrument that such instrument 'be made in
accordance with statutory requirement"' (see also, 20 Am. Jur., p. 880);
was signed by the mother of and that the certificate of birth of an
illegitimate was signed by the mother of the latter, "is undoubtedly
incompetent evidence of fathership of said child."

It appearing on the face of the birth cwtificate of Ricardo Joaquin V.

Roces, that the alleged father of child has not signed the instrument, it is
clear that statements therein relative to the identity of the father of said
child were, and are, an open violation of the law. Consequently,the local
civil registrarwho is duty bound to comply with said law and is partly
charged with its enforcementhad no authority to incorporate said
unlawful statements in the corresponding entry made by him in the
records of his office, and that the entry, insofar as the identity of the
father of Ricardo Joaquin V. Roces,is null and void, and should be
cancelled or corrected.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed and the relief for in
appellant's petition hereby granted, without special pronouncement as to
costs. It so ordered.

Berciles vs. Systems, 128 SCRA 53 (1984)

ILUMINADA PONCE BERCILES, ILONA BERCILES ALVAREZ,

ELLERY P. BERCILES, ENGLAND P. BERCILES and IONE P.
BERCILES, petitioners, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, PASCUAL VOLTAIRE BERCILES, MARIA LUISA
BERCILES VILLAREAL, MERCY BERCILES PATACSIL and RHODA
BERCILES, respondents.
G.R. No. L-57257 | 1984-03-05
Tagged under keywords

DECISION

GUERRERO, J p:

The disposition made by respondent GSIS of the retirement benefits

under Republic Act 910, as amended, due the heirs of the late Judge of
Court of First Instance Pascual G. Berciles whereby the GSIS
considered said retirement benefits in the total amount of P311,460.00
as partly conjugal and partly exclusive in nature and thus divided the
same in the following proportion:

77/

134 for the surviving spouse, Iluminada Ponce Berciles;

 each for the legitimate children, Ilona Berciles Alvarez,

10/ Ellery P. Berciles, England P. Berciles and Ione P.

134 Berciles;

5/ for the acknowledged natural child Pascual Voltaire

134 Berciles;

4/ each for the illegitimate children, namely, Maria Luisa

134 Berciles, Mercy Berciles and Rhoda Berciles

is erroneous in view of the rule We laid down in Re: Claims for Benefits
of the Heirs of the Late Mario V. Chanliongco, et al., 79 SCRA 364; Vda.
de Consuegra, et al. vs. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315 that retirement benefits
shall accrue to his estate and will be distributed among his legal heirs in
accordance with the law on intestate succession, as in the case of a life
insurance if no beneficiary is named in the insurance policy, and that the
money value of the unused vacation and sick leave, and unpaid salary
form part of the conjugal estate of the married employee.

Moreover, We find grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent

GSIS, acting through its Board of Trustees, in resolving under its
Resolution No. 431 to approve the recommendation of the Committee on
Claims Settlement that private respondent Pascual Voltaire Berciles is
an acknowledged natural child and that the other private respondents
Maria Luisa Berciles Villareal, Mercy Berciles Patacsil and Rhoda
Berciles are illegitimate children of the late Judge Pascual G. Berciles in
the absence of substantial evidence through competent and admissible
proof of acknowledgment by and filiation with said deceased parent as
required under the law.
Judge Pascual G. Berciles of the Court of First Instance of Cebu died in
office on August 21, 1979 at the age of sixty-six years, death caused by
"cardiac arrest due to cerebral vascular accident." Having served the
government for more than thirty-four (34) years, twenty-six (26) years in
the judiciary, the late Judge Berciles was eligible for retirement under
Republic Act No. 910, as amended by Republic Act No. 5095 so that his
heirs were entitled to survivors benefits amounting to P311,460.00 under
Section 2 of said Act. Other benefits accruing to the heirs of the
deceased consist of the unpaid salary, the money value of his terminal
leave and representation and transportation allowances, computed at
P60,817.52, all of which are to be paid by this Court as the deceased's
last employer, and the return of retirement premiums paid by the retiree
in the amount of P9,700.00 to be paid by the GSIS. Such benefits are
now being claimed by two families, both of whom claim to be the
deceased's lawful heirs.

Iluminada Ponce of Tagudin, Ilocos Sur, and her four children, Ilona,
Ellery, England and Ione, filed with Us an application for survivors
benefits under Republic Act 910, as amended by R.A. No. 5095 effective
August 21, 1979 as the legal spouse and legitimate children of the late
Judge Pascual G. Berciles, duly supported by the required documents.

The other set of claimants are Flor Fuentebella, and her four children,
namely Pascual Voltaire, Maria Luisa, Mercy and Rhoda, all surnamed
Berciles, the latter filing her family's claim by means of a letter dated
November 10, 1979 and supporting documents were also submitted with
their claim. The matter of these two (2) conflicting claims was first
docketed before this Court as Administrative Matter No. 1337-Ret. and in
a Resolution of the Court En Banc dated April 10, 1980, We resolved to
APPROVE the application of Ms. Iluminada P. Berciles for survivor's
benefits under the above-cited law, effective August 21, 1979, subject to
(a) the proper determination of the rightful beneficiaries and their
corresponding shares in accordance with law, it appearing that there are
two claimant families thereto, and (b) the usual clearance requirements.

In pursuance to the foregoing resolution, the Office of the Court

Administrator recommended in a memorandum report dated November
11, 1980 that (a) the transmittal to the GSIS of the retirement papers of
the late Judge Pascual Berciles be held in abeyance until the payment to
the rightful heirs of the unpaid salary, money value of terminal leave and
representation and transportation allowances of the deceased Judge,
and (b) that an investigator be designated to determine the respective
claims of the supposed heirs of the late Judge. The aforesaid
recommendation was approved by the Chief Justice on November 27,
1980 and Atty. Renato G. Quilala of the Office of the Court Administrator
was designated on December 15, 1980 as Court Investigator to help
determine the rightful beneficiaries of the subject benefits.

Thereupon, Atty. Quilala sent on December 22, 1980 to all the alleged
heirs a notice of hearing set for January 26, 1981 and the following days
thereafter for the reception of evidence in support of their respective
claims. None of the parties, however, appeared. Records from the
Retirement Section, Administrative Services Office of this Court show
that the claim of Iluminada Ponce and her children was already
approved by the GSIS as of October 9, 1980 and that in fact, the five
years lump sum equivalent to P301,760.00 (gratuity less the retirement
premiums paid under R.A. 910, as amended, which was to be returned
to the retiree by the GSIS) under Check No. 04824308 as retirement
gratuity of the deceased had been remitted by the Budget and Finance
Office of this Court to the GSIS for payment to the heir-beneficiaries on
October 15, 1980.

On February 4, 1981, Atty. Cecilia T. Berciles, daughter-in-law of the

deceased Judge, and Mrs. Iluminada Ponce Berciles submitted to the
Court Investigator additional documents in support of the claim of Mrs.
Iluminada P. Berciles and her children, consisting of (A) Evaluation
Report, as approved by the GSIS, under P.D No. 626 with the following
recommendations, to wit:

"1. It is recommended that the death benefits under PD 626 due to the
death of the deceased of a compensable contingency, be awarded to
Iluminada Ponce having established her marriage to the deceased and
had been living with the deceased up to the time of the latter's death.

"2. In the same light, the claim of Flor Fuentebella be denied for two
reasons: (a) She has not clearly established her legitimate relationship
with the deceased and, (b) She was not living with the deceased at the
time of his death as required by the rules and regulation of P.D. 626, as
amended. (Rule XIV, Section 1(b), No. 1 the legitimate spouse living with
the employee at the time of employee's death . . .)."

and (B) Certified Xerox copies of the late Judge Berciles' Income Tax
Returns for 1975, 1976 and 1979 where he listed Mrs. Iluminada P.
Berciles as his wife or spouse; also submitted in addition to the foregoing
documents, is a certified xerox copy of the application for optional
insurance filed with the GSIS by the late Judge Berciles, dated
November 19, 1956, wherein the deceased listed as his beneficiaries
therein the following persons:.

ILONA BERCILES 11 years old daughter;

ELLERY BERCILES 10 years old son;

ENGLAND BERCILES 8 years old son;

IONE BERCILES 1 year old - daughter; and

ILUMINADA P. BERCILES 33 years old wife.

The above documents were noted in the Memorandum to the Chief

Justice dated March 11, 1981 by the Deputy Court Administrator. And
notwithstanding the telegram sent to them on February 5, 1981 requiring
them to submit their evidence of filiation with the deceased Judge
Berciles, no such evidence was submitted by the Fuentebellas.

Accordingly, it was recommended in said Memorandum that

"the alleged marital relationship between the late Judge Berciles and Ms.
Flor Fuentebella Berciles has no leg to stand on. It should be stated in
this connection that there was no marriage contract submitted by Miss
Rhoda F. Berciles in her claim-letter, dated October 29, 1979, nor was
there any certification from the Local Civil Registrar certifying to the fact
that the deceased Judge was actually married to Miss Flor Fuentebella.
It can, therefore, be assumed that Miss Flor Fuentebella was not legally
married to the late Judge Pascual Berciles. Necessarily, it follows that
the innocent children that came into being out of the alleged marital
union of the deceased Judge and Ms. Flor Fuentebella Berciles are
spurious and have no established family filiation with the said Judge. We
can, therefore, rule that the attached papers/documents in the letter of
Miss Rhoda F. Berciles, dated October 29, 1979 relative to their claim as
the surviving heirs of the late CFI Judge Pascual Berciles are mere
scrap of papers unworthy of credence, there being no substantiating
evidence to corroborate the same, especially so in the face of the
adverse claim of Mrs. Iluminada Ponce Berciles as the rightful surviving
spouse and with whom the deceased Judge was living with at the time of
his untimely demise."

The same memorandum, therefore, recommended that since "(a)ll the

documents presented amply corroborate and fully substantiate what
were previously submitted to the office by Mrs. Iluminada Ponce Berciles
and her children. We find, therefore, the evidence presented and
submitted in favor of Mrs. Iluminada Ponce Berciles as sufficient to
establish the fact that she is the lawfully wedded wife of the deceased
Judge Berciles. This finding is fully supported by the certification issued
by the Local Civil Registrar of Bocaue, Bulacan, dated August 24, 1977,
attesting to the marriage between the deceased Judge and Iluminada
Ponce which took place on January 20, 1941 before the then Justice of
the Peace of the place. This being the case, the four (4) children
(ILONA, ELLERY, ENGLAND and IONE) begotten by the said spouses
during their marital union are all legitimate, . . . that the unpaid salary,
money value of terminal leave and representation and transportation
allowances of the late District Judge Pascual G. Berciles be awarded
and correspondingly distributed to his lawful heirs, namely, MRS.
ILUMINADA PONCE BERCILES (surviving spouse); MRS. ILONA
BERCILES ALVAREZ (daughter); ELLERY BERCILES (son); ENGLAND
P. BERCILES (son); and IONE P. BERCILES (daughter)."

As recommended in the said memorandum. We approved the following

Resolution dated March 17, 1981:

"Re: Claim of the heirs of the late Pascual G. Berciles, former District
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Cebu City, for the unpaid
salary, money value of terminal leave and representation and
transportation allowances of the deceased Judge. - Considering the
memorandum of Deputy Court Administrator Leo D. Medialdea,
recommending that the unpaid salary, money value of terminal leave and
representation and transportation allowances of the late District Judge
Pascual G. Berciles be awarded and correspondingly distributed to his
lawful heirs, the Court Resolved to AWARD and CORRESPONDINGLY
DISTRIBUTE aforesaid benefits to his lawful heirs, namely: Mrs.
Iluminada Ponce Berciles, surviving spouse; Mrs. Ilona Berciles Alvarez,
daughter; Ellery Berciles, son; England P. Berciles, son; and Ione P.
Berciles, daughter."

Pursuant to the above Resolution, the amount of P60,817.52 was paid to

Iluminada Ponce and her four children on April 2, 1981.

On April 23, 1981, Flor Fuentebella and her four children, Pascual
Voltaire, Ma. Luisa, Mercy, and Rhoda, through counsel, filed a Motion
for Reconsideration praying that the resolution of March 17, 1981 be set
aside; that they be allowed to present their evidence; and that, after due
hearing, the benefits be awarded and distributed to them as lawful heirs.
In support of their motion, the movants alleged that they did not receive
the Resolution of March 17, 1981 nor the letter or notice of hearing sent
by Atty. Quilala on December 22, 1980, the same having been sent to
their old address at 6069-B, Palma St., Makati; that all of the movants
have left the Philippines to reside in the United States of America and
that the aunts and cousins residing at the old address moved to a new
address at GSIS Village, Project 8, Quezon City; that before they moved
to the new address, these relatives left a forwarding address at the
Makati Post Office; and, that they did not receive the aforementioned
mail. The fact of non-receipt was confirmed by one Domingo P. Raiz,
letter carrier of the Post Office of Makati, who executed an affidavit to
that effect, which affidavit We admitted in Our resolution of July 9, 1981.
The matter of the Fuentebella Motion for Reconsideration is docketed
before Us as Administrative Matter No. 10468-CFI.

Acting on the aforesaid motion for reconsideration, We adopted the

following resolution dated July 2, 1981, to wit:
"Administrative Matter No. 10468-CFI Re Terminal Leave Pay, Unpaid
Salary and Allowance of the late CFI Judge Pascual G. Berciles: Flor
Fuentebella and her four children, all surnamed Berciles vs. Iluminada
Ponce and her four children, all surnamed Berciles. - Judge Pascual G.
Berciles of the Court of First Instance of Cebu died in office on August
21, 1979 at the age of sixty-six years. He was a native of Lapuz Norte,
La Paz, Iloilo City.

Iluminada Ponce of Tagudin, Ilocos Sur, who claimed to be the

decedent's widow, and her four children, Ilona, Ellery, England and Ione,
filed a claim dated May 2, 1980 for survivors' benefits. Iluminada
executed an affidavit of heir ship dated September 19, 1979.

On the other hand, Rhoda F. Berciles, 6069-B Palma Street, Makati,

Rizal in a verified statement dated November 19, 1979, claimed that the
deceased judge was survived by Flor Fuentebella, as widow, and their
four children named Voltaire, Luisa, Mercy and Rhoda. Judge Berciles
allegedly married Flor Fuentebella on March 28, 1937 in Iloilo City before
City Judge Vicente Mapa.

Rhoda, in a letter to the Judicial Administrator dated October 29, 1979,

requested the Judicial Administrator to hold the processing of the claim
filed by Iluminada Ponce and her four children pending the filing of
Rhoda's formal complaint.

Iluminada Ponce claimed that she was married to Judge Berciles at

Bocaue, Bulacan on January 20, 1941.

This Court in its resolution of April 10, 1980 approved the grant of
survivors' benefits subject to the proper determination of the rightful
beneficiaries and their corresponding shares in accordance with law, it
appearing that there are two claimant families. (Adm. Matter No. 1337 -
Ret. re Gratuity of Judge Berciles).

Pursuant to that resolution, the five-year lump sum gratuity amounting to

P301,760 due to the heirs of Judge Berciles was remitted to the GSIS on
October 15, 1980. The said amount up to this time has not yet been
distributed in view of the controversy between the families of Flor
Fuentebella and Iluminada Ponce as to who are the legal heirs of Judge
Berciles.

In a letter dated October 9, 1980, Ellery P. Berciles requested the Chief

Justice for the payment to Iluminada Ponce of the terminal leave pay of
Judge Berciles, which, together with his unpaid salary and allowance,
amounted to P74,884.52, or to P60,817.52 after deducting the
withholding tax of P14,067.

Upon the recommendation of Court Administrator Lorenzo Relova and

Deputy Court Administrator Leo D. Medialdea, the said amount of
P60,817.52 was paid to Iluminada Ponce and her four children on April
2, 1981 pursuant to this Court's resolution of March 17, 1981. Payment
was made to them on the assumption that they are the only legal heirs of
Judge Berciles.

Atty. Luzel D. Demasu-ay, counsel for Flor Fuentebella and her four
children, in his motion for reconsideration dated April 21, 1981, alleged
that his clients were not heard before that payment was made. He said
that the payment was being capitalized upon by Iluminada Ponce and
her children in the GSIS as the basis for the payment to them of the
retirement gratuity of Judge Berciles.

Considering that the issue as to who are the legal heirs of Judge
Berciles is still being litigated in the Social Security Services of the GSIS
(according to Atty. Felicisimo Fernandez of that unit), and the survivors'
benefits have not yet been paid to Iluminada Ponce and her children,
and considering that the children of Flor Fuentebella, even as illegitimate
children of Judge Berciles, would be entitled to a share in his terminal
leave pay, allowance and unpaid salary (In re Chanliongco, Adm. Matter
No. 190-Ret., October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 364), the Court Resolved (1)
to require Iluminada Ponce and her children, c/o Ione P. Berciles, 9
Jersey Street, Toro Hills, Project 8, Quezon City, to COMMENT on the
said motion for reconsideration within ten (10) days from notice and (2)
to direct Atty. Juan P. Enriquez, Jr., Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief of
the Administrative Division, to advise the GSIS that, should Flor
Fuentebella and her children be ultimately adjudged as legal heirs of
Judge Berciles, their share in the sum of P60,817.50 (terminal leave pay,
etc.) would be taken from the survivors' benefits amounting to P301,760,
already remitted to the GSIS and, consequently, the shares of Iluminada
Ponce and her children in the said gratuity would answer for the portions
due to Flor Fuentebella, et al. in the terminal leave pay, etc., if adjudged
entitled thereto.

A copy of this resolution should be furnished the GSIS."

In a subsequent Resolution dated July 21, 1981, We noted the Comment

filed by Iluminada Ponce and in the same resolution, clarified Our
resolution of April 10, 1980 in Administrative Matter No. 1337-Ret., to
wit:

"As may be seen from this Court's resolution of April 10, 1980 in
Administrative Matter No. 1337-Ret. regarding the gratuity of Judge
Berciles, this Court has not finally and conclusively decided that the
children of Flor Fuentebella are not the heirs of the late Judge Berciles.

The question of whether the four children of Flor Fuentebella should

share in the gratuity amounting to P301,760.00 is still being litigated in
the GSIS. Should it be finally decided by the GSIS that the children of
Flor Fuentebella are entitled to share in that gratuity or survivors'
benefits, then they are also entitled to share in the terminal leave pay,
unpaid salary and allowances and their share should be deducted from
the shares in the said gratuity of Iluminada Ponce and her four children.

This incident should, therefore, await the outcome of a final decision of

competent authority on who are the heirs of Judge Berciles, as
contemplated in this Court's resolution of April 10, 1980 in Administrative
Matter No. 1337-Ret."

In the meantime, pursuant to Our Resolution of April 10, 1980, the

papers were transmitted to the GSIS under the advertisement that the
approval of the application of Iluminada Ponce was subject to the proper
determination of the rightful beneficiaries.

The records of this Court, as adverted to earlier, disclose that on

October 9, 1980, the GSIS approved the claim of Iluminada Ponce and
so, the five (5) years lump sum retirement gratuity of the deceased
Judge, in the net amount of P301,760.00, was remitted by our Budget
and Finance Office to the GSIS on October 15, 1980 under Check No.
04824308 for payment to Iluminada and her four children. The GSIS,
however, in its Memorandum dated June 25, 1982 in G.R. No. 57257
denied having approved the claim of Iluminada Ponce Berciles and her
children saying that no such approval was made. The records in G.R.
No. 57257 disclose Annex "A" attached to the petition on pp. 14-15 of
the Rollo the following evaluation report evaluated by Carmelo C.
Garcia, Legal Evaluator; reviewed by Lorenzo Sanchez, Legal Evaluator;
approved by Felicisimo A. Fernandez, Manager, Survivorship Benefits
Dept.; and confirmed by Juanito S. Santamaria, Vice President, SSS-II,
to wit:

"PASCUAL G. BERCILES ANNEX "A"

Judge, CFI, Branch XV, Cebu City

Died August 21, 1979, Cause: CVA.

Evaluation on compensability under

PD 626, as amended.

I Medical Evaluation -.

Medically compensable for payment of such benefits as per

Medical evaluation dated December 24, 1979.

II Legal Evaluation

A. Documents Submitted:

It appears that there are two claimants - both surviving spouse namely
FLOR FUENTEBELLA and ILUMINADA PONCE, who alleged to have
been married to the deceased.
(1.) Documents submitted by Flor Fuentebella:

(a) Cert. from Census and Statistics of no record of marriage of Flor

Fuentebella and Pascual Berciles alleged to have been solemnized on
March 28, 1937.

(b) Affidavit of Pascual Berciles dated May 22, 1972 that he and Flor
were married by the late Judge J. Vicente Mapa.

(c) Affidavit of Coronacion Berciles, sister-in-law of Pascual Berciles as

to the marriage of Flor and Pascual.

(d) Affidavit of Judge Rafael Lavente as to his being invited in the

wedding of Flor and Pascual.

(e) Birth certificate of Pascual Voltaire Berciles - Aug. 30, 1938; Maria
Luisa, June 27, 1943; Mercy, July 23, 1947; Rhoda, Feb. 7, 1949.

(f) Xerox copy of Income Tax Return for 1972 of Pascual showing Flor
as the wife.

(2) Documents submitted by Iluminada Ponce

(a) Marriage certificate from Bocaue, Bulacan, showing marriage of

Iluminada and Paquito Berciles on January 20, 1941.

(b) Birth certificate of Ilona May 15, 1945; Ellery - Sept. 21, 1946;
England Nov. 14, 1948; Ione Ainee Aug. 25, 1955.

(c) GSIS IMI on C-20297 dated Dec. 1, 1956 of Pascual Berciles.

(d) IMI on 0-26030 dated Jan. 1, 1957

(e) Affidavit of Pascual Berciles dated April 21, 1978 mentioning Ione
and Iluminada as his daughter and wife respectively.

(f) Affidavit of four (4) relatives of Pascual as to their personal knowledge

of the marriage of Iluminada and Pascual.
(g) Affidavit of Santiago Medina (former Fiscal), denying of having
notarized an affidavit of Pascual the latter's marriage to Flor.

(3.) Clarifying documents

(a) Affidavit dated Feb. 14, 1980, of City Judge Rafael Lavente rectifying
his previous affidavit that he was not present in the wedding of Flor and
Pascual.

(b) Certification dated Feb. 4, 1980, from Ministry of Justice that there is
no record of one J. Mapa as Municipal Judge of Iloilo from 1935 to 1945.

B. Findings

After a careful study and appraisal of the documents above enumerated

we cannot find merit on the claim of Flor Fuentebella because.

2. Flor has been living abroad since 1972.

3. Iluminada and the deceased were living together at the time of the
latter's death (August 21, 1979).

Recommendation

1. It is recommended that the death benefits under PD 626 due to the

death of the deceased of a compensable contingency, be awarded to
Iluminada Ponce for having established her marriage to the deceased
and had been living with the deceased up to the time of the latter's
death.

2. In the same light, the claim of Flor Fuentebella be denied for two
reasons:

(a) She has not clearly established her legitimate relationship with the
deceased and,
(b) She was not living with the deceased at the time of his death as
required by the rules and regulation of PD 626, as amended. (Rule XIV,
Section 1(b), No. 1 the legitimate spouse living with the employee at the
time of employee's death . . .).

EVALUATED BY: REVIEWED BY:

S/T CARMELO C. GARCIA S/T LORENZO SANCHEZ

Legal Evaluator Legal Evaluator

APPROVED:

S/T FELICISIMO A. FERNANDEZ

Manager, Survivorship Benefits Dept.

CONFIRMED:

S/T JUANITO A. SANTAMARIA

Vice-President, SSS II"

In denying the above approval, the GSIS in its Memorandum claims that
the matter was elevated sometime in October 1980 to the Committee on
Claims Settlement for the proper determination of the legal heirs of the
late Judge Berciles. The two sets of claimants having failed to reach an
amicable settlement, the GSIS advised the parties to submit the
necessary documents to prove their relationship or filiation to the
deceased.

Thereafter, based on their respective documents and proofs of filiation,

the Board of Trustees approved the findings and recommendations of
the Committee on Claims Settlement under its Resolution No. 431
adopted on June 3, 1981, the dispositive portion of which states:

"After due deliberation, considering the foregoing, the Board RESOLVED

TO APPROVE the recommendation of the Committee on Claims
Settlement that the retirement benefits under R.A. 910, as amended, due
the late Judge Pascual G. Berciles in the total amount of P311,460.00
which is partly conjugal and partly exclusive in nature, be divided in the
following proportion:

77/ 134 for the surviving spouse, Iluminada Ponce Berciles;

\
10/ 134 each for the legitimate children, Ilona Berciles
Alvarez, Ellery P. Berciles, England P. Berciles and Ione P.
Berciles;
5/ 134 for the acknowledged natural child Pascual Voltaire
Berciles;4/134each for the illegitimate children, namely,
Maria Luisa Berciles, Mercy Berciles and Rhoda Berciles.

(Arts. 148 (2), 153 (2), 895, 983, 999, New Civil Code)
xxx xxx xxx"

Only the above dispositive portion of the aforementioned Resolution was

communicated to Iluminada Ponce Berciles by the GSIS in the letter
signed by Felicisimo A. Fernandez, Manager, Survivorship Benefits
Department, in his letter dated June 18, 1981 (Annex "D", Petition in
G.R. No. 57257, Rollo, p. 22). Not satisfied with the disposition of their
claim, Iluminada Ponce Berciles and her four children now come to this
Court on appeal by certiorari, citing Section 25 of Presidential Decree
No. 1146, otherwise known as the "Revised Government Service
Insurance Act of 1977" which took effect on May 31, 1977, which appeal
is docketed as G.R. No. 57257.

As prayed for in the petition, We issued a temporary restraining order on

July 13, 1981 enjoining the respondents from enforcing or executing the
GSIS Board of Trustees Resolution No. 431 dated June 3, 1981 and
also required the respondents to file their respective Comments to the
Petition. Only the private respondents filed their Comment. Thereupon,
acting on the merits of the pleadings filed, We resolved to give due
course to the petition in Our Resolution of April 14, 1981. Considering
Our Resolution of July 21, 1981, the disposition of Administrative Matter
No. 1337-Ret. and Administrative Matter No. 10468-CFI rests on Our
decision in the present petition.
The primary issue raised in the herein petition for certiorari is the validity
of the GSIS decision contained in its Resolution No. 431 finding private
respondent Pascual Voltaire Berciles as an acknowledged natural child
of the late Judge Pascual G. Berciles and the other private respondents
namely Maria Luisa Berciles Villareal, Mercy Berciles Patacsil and
Rhoda Berciles as illegitimate children of the deceased, and thus, upon
this finding, disposed the retirement benefits in the manner and
proportion set forth in said resolution after considering said benefits as
partly conjugal and partly exclusive. Petitioners contend that on the basis
of the documents and testimony submitted by private respondents, the
conclusion of respondent GSIS is erroneous and unfounded and that
respondent GSIS erred grossly in its resolution. The correctness of the
legal conclusion drawn by the respondent GSIS or its appreciation of the
undisputed state of facts obtaining in the present controversy is thus
squarely raised by petitioners.

We note that private respondents in their Comment dated July 27, 1981
to the petition herein, while pointing out that the Supreme Court is not
the proper forum for the original determination of the legal heirs of a
deceased judge who is covered by R.A. 910 as amended and that the
determination of the question of heirship can be appropriately
considered only in our regular courts of justice where private
respondents actually did file a Special Civil Action No. 13966 for
"Mandamus with Prayer for a Restraining Order" in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, Branch III, a copy of which is attached to the Comment
as Annex "A", raised the same issue of illegality as may be seen clearly
in par. 8 of the petition as follows:

"8. That clearly from the foregoing adjudication rendered by the

respondent Board of Trustees, petitioner Flor Fuentebella Berciles and
her children were unlawfully excluded from their lawful right to the death
benefit of the late Judge Pascual G. Berciles as his only lawful heirs;"

And like the petitioners herein, private respondents contend that the
GSIS patently and gravely abused its discretion in denying the latter's
claim to the death benefits of the late Judge Pascual Berciles as the
legal and lawful heirs as may also be clearly seen in par. 10 of the
Mandamus Petition in the aforementioned Civil Case No. 13966, which
reads thus:

"10. That in denying petitioners claim on the death benefit of the late
Judge Pascual Berciles of whom petitioners are the legal and lawful
heirs and in neglecting and refusing to issue forthwith a resolution
adjudicating the death benefit amounting to P311,460.00 in favor of the
petitioners as legal heirs, the respondent Board of Trustees of the GSIS
patently and gravely abused its discretion and unlawfully neglected the
performance of an act which is specifically enjoined upon it by Sec. 5 of
R.A. 910, as amended by R.A. 1057, R.A. 1797, R.A. 2614, R.A. 4627
and R.A. 5095;

In other words, both families, raising grave abuse of discretion, question

the legality of the GSIS Resolution based on the same undisputed facts,
the petitioners herein claiming they are the legal heirs, whereas,
according to private respondents, they are the ones legally entitled to the
retirement benefits. The issue here then is one of law which the
contending parties concede in their respective pleadings and thus
correctible by certiorari.

But to set the records straight, We quote hereunder the findings of the
Committee on Claims Settlement which the GSIS Board of Trustees
adopted and approved under its Resolution No. 431:

"A brief summary of the evidence submitted by the contending parties

appears necessary for the proper disposition of this case. As proof of her
marriage to Judge Pascual Berciles, claimant Iluminada Ponce Berciles
submitted a certificate of marriage (Exh. "A") indicating that she was
married to one Paquito Berciles in Bocaue, Bulacan on January 20, 1941
before Judge Bonifacio Enriquez, Justice of the Peace of the said
municipality. The Committee noted that the husband's name appearing
in the certificate is 'Paquito Berciles' and not 'Pascual Berciles'.

"The discrepancy was explained in the sworn statement of Atty.

Fortunato A. Padilla (Exh. "R") and in his deposition dated February 27,
1981 taken by Atty. Hilarion Palma, Branch Attorney of our GSIS Iloilo
City Branch Office. In both documents, Atty. Padilla, a high school
classmate and college companion of the late Judge Berciles, stated that
Pascual Gayta Berciles, Paquito Berciles or Paking Berciles all refer to
one and the same person who was the deceased Judge Pascual G.
Berciles. In the deposition of Concepcion M. Gonzales (Exh. "31-A") who
was a witness for Flor Fuentebella, she also declared that Pascual
Berciles was called Paking or Paquito and that a brother Francisco was
called Pako.

"Submitted also to the Committee by Iluminada Ponce are the birth

certificates of her children: Ilona Berciles (Exh. "E"); Ellery Berciles (Exh.
"C"); England Joseph Berciles (Exh. "D-1"); Aiene Berciles (Exh. "B").
The other documents submitted such as the Information for Membership
Insurance (Exh. "F" and Exh. "G"), Income Tax Returns for the years
1975 (Exh. "U") and 1976 (Exh. "V"), individual sworn statements of
persons who knew or were related to the deceased corroborate the filial
affinity of Iluminada Ponce and her children to the late Judge Berciles.

"Based on these documents, there is no question that Iluminada Ponce

was married to Pascual Berciles, alias Paquito, on January 20, 1941 at
Bocaue, Bulacan. From this union, they begot the following children,
namely: Ilona, Ellery, England and Ione.

"The evidence for claimant Flor Fuentebella Berciles and her children
may also be briefly described as follows: She claims to have been
married to the late Judge Pascual Berciles on March 28, 1937 in Iloilo
City before Justice of the Peace Jose Vicente Mapa. In other words, she
professes to be the first wife of the deceased Judge. Flor Fuentebella
was, however, not able to present her marriage contract or certificate of
marriage. Instead she submitted a certification of the Local Civil Registar
of Iloilo City (Exh. "1") attesting to the loss or destruction of the records
of marriage for the year 1944 and previous years and another
certification issued by the Office of Civil Registrar General of the
National Census and Statistics Office (Exh. "2") stating the non-
availability of the record of marriage between Pascual Berciles and Flor
Fuentebella.

"In concrete support of her claim of marriage to the late Judge Berciles,
Flor Fuentebella presented to the Committee sworn statements of
several persons. Of the several sworn statements, at least two or three
deserve serious consideration. The first is the one executed by
Concepcion M. Gonzales (Exh. "31") of 46 South Mapa, Philam Homes,
Quezon City, who stated that she knew for a fact that Flor Fuentebella
was married to Pascual Berciles in 1937 at Iloilo City. It was represented
to the Committee that she was present as a guest in the marriage
ceremony. Due to importance of her testimony, the Committee
requested her actual presence in the hearing. However, due to her
advanced age of 89 years and her other physical infirmity, her
attendance at the hearing was dispensed with instead, the Committee
directed the Manager, Survivorship Department to secure her deposition
on questions prepared in advance by the Committee. In his report to the
Committee, the Manager stated that the old lady is already blind, quite
hard of hearing and her memory already weak. In the Answers (Exh.
"31-A") to the questions written by the Manager, Survivorship
Department, Concepcion Gonzales declared that she was present during
the marriage ceremony of Pascual Berciles and Flor Fuentebella which
was held in the Municipal Hall of Iloilo City. She described the wedding
as attended by only the members of the family and that after the
ceremony they went to the house of Pascual's parents where a small
party was held.

"The Committee finds the testimony of Concepcion Gonzales quite

deficient in important detail. Flor Fuentebella had not been presented in
person for the proper identification of the witness. Was the Flor
Fuentebella who allegedly married Pascual Berciles on March 28, 1937
the same Flor Fuentebella who is cited by Concepcion Gonzales? At any
rate, assuming that a confrontation did occur, Concepcion Gonzales
would not be able to properly identify Flor Fuentebella, by reason of her
blindness.

"The other sworn statements which merit particular discussion are those
executed by Coronacion Berciles (Exhs. "10 and 31") a sister-in-law of
the late Judge Berciles. Coronacion was presented before the
Committee as a witness for Flor Fuentebella. In her testimony, she
stated facts and circumstances about the marital relations between
Pascual Berciles and Flor Fuentebella. She declared that her husband
was the younger brother of the late Judge Berciles; that even before
Pascual Berciles became a lawyer in 1938, he and Flor Fuentebella
were introduced to her by her husband; that after she was married to her
husband, they lived together with the family of Pascual Berciles and his
wife Flor Fuentebella; that their two families had lived closely enough
during the Japanese Occupation and even after. She further stated that
the immediate members of the family with whom the spouses Pascual
Berciles and Flor Fuentebella had lived before and during the war were
his mother Evarista, his two aunts Luisa Berciles and Eusebia Gayta and
a sister Susana Berciles. These testimonial and other declarations were
latter transcribed into a sworn statement which Coronacion executed on
December 5, 1980 and submitted to the Committee. (Exh. "32").

"At its best, Coronacion Berciles testified on the cohabitation as husband

and wife of Pascual Berciles and Flor Fuentebella. But cohabitation is
not solid proof that a marriage had in fact taken place, especially in this
case when such marriage is contested. Coronacion could not state
positively since she was not present in the alleged marriage ceremony.

"The third sworn statement which deserves the Committee's attention is

the one executed by Judge Rafael Lavente, Presiding Judge of Branch
III, City Court of Iloilo, on February 14, 1980 (Exh. "N" for Iluminada
Ponce, Exh. "35" for Flor Fuentebella). In this document, Judge Lavente
denied having been present in the wedding of Pascual Berciles and Flor
Fuentebella; although he declared that the 'late Judge Berciles was
married here in Iloilo City and that after his marriage he left Iloilo City.
xxx.' (Exh. "35-A"), he did not state with whom Pascual Berciles was
married.

"Of course the affidavit of Flor F. Berciles herself (Exh. "5") was
submitted wherein she stated that she was the legal wife of the late
Pascual G. Berciles and that she was married to him in Iloilo City on
March 28, 1937. The affidavit is nothing more than a self-serving
statement. Flor Fuentebella was not presented to the Committee as a
material witness. On the other hand, the sworn statement of Pascual
Berciles (Exh. "4") commands no evidentiary value at all. Mr. Santiago
Medina, former Provincial Fiscal of Cebu, who appears to have
administered the oath, in a subsequent sworn statement (Exh. "M")
denied his signature on the document (Exh. "4").
"The letters written by Judge Berciles to her daughters with Flor
Fuentebella especially the one sent to daughter Mercy Berciles (Exh.
"22") wherein he vigorously affirmed that it's only her mother, Flor
Fuentebella, and no other woman who was recognized as his wife and
loved by her parents deserve scant consideration. Pascual Berciles
could not be expected to admit the existence of his other family. This
would be disastrous to his efforts at preventing one family from knowing
the other.

"Flor Fuentebella likewise submitted to the Committee the birth or

baptismal certificates of her children begotten with the late Judge
Berciles; the birth certificates of Pascual Voltaire Berciles (Exh. "6");
baptismal certificate of Maria Luisa Berciles (Exh. "7-A"); birth certificate
of Mercy Berciles (Exh. "8"); birth certificates of Rhoda Berciles (Exh.
"9"). The other evidence consist of family pictures (Exhs. "30 to 30-M")
which have been identified by witness Coronacion Berciles both in her
oral testimony before the Committee and in her affidavit. (Exh. "32", par.
15). The pictures, however, do not indicate that the marriage took place.
If at all, the said pictures show the presence of a family with or without
the sanction of marriage.

"After a careful evaluation of these documents, the Committee believes

that there is no sufficient evidence that Pascual Berciles and Flor
Fuentebella were married to each other on March 28, 1937 in Iloilo City;
however, certain relationship did exist and from such relationship were
begotten the following children, namely: Pascual Voltaire Berciles, Maria
Luisa Berciles, Mercy Berciles and Rhoda Berciles.

"Furthermore, the Committee entertains doubt on the authority of the

officer who solemnized the marriage between Pascual Berciles and Flor
Fuentebella. It is true that the Official Roster of Officers and Employees
in the Civil Service (Exhs. "3" and "3-A") include the name Jose Vicente
Mapa, Justice of the Peace for Iloilo. The listings, however, do not
indicate the exact date of employment of any particular employee. The
year 1935 indicated in the cover of the Roster may not be interpreted to
mean that all those listed were already in the service in 1935. It is
possible that the Roster included those appointed as early as 1935 and
those appointed at much later date. This assumption deserves some
degree of validity when considered in relation with the record of service
furnished by the Civil Service Commission (Exh. "T") indicating that Jose
Vicente Mapa was Acting Municipal Judge of Iloilo City effective July 16,
1937. It further appears in the service record that he was Acting
Municipal Judge pursuant to a Designation by letter of the Secretary to
President, dated June 30, 1937. If Jose Vicente Mapa was already a
Municipal Judge prior to July 16, 1937, he could have been assigned to
a different municipality other than Iloilo, in which case he did not have
the authority to solemnize marriage in Iloilo on March 28, 1937. At any
event, a serious uncertainty did exist as to whether Jose Vicente Mapa
was already the Justice of the Peace of Iloilo on the date the alleged
marriage was contracted.

"The Committee therefore concludes that Judge Pascual Berciles was

legally married to Iluminada Ponce. His alleged marriage to Flor
Fuentebella was not sufficiently proved and therefore the children
begotten with her are either natural or illegitimate children depending on
whether they have been born before or after the marriage of Iluminada
Ponce. Consequently, the legal heirs of the late Judge Berciles entitled
to share in the distribution of his retirement benefits are the following:
Iluminada Ponce, surviving spouse; Ilona Berciles Alvarez, Ellery
Berciles, England P. Berciles and Ione P. Berciles, legitimate children;
Pascual Voltaire Berciles, natural child; Maria Luisa Berciles, Mercy
Berciles, and Rhoda Berciles, illegitimate children."

From the above recital, We can readily summarize the following three (3)
conclusions therein made and arrived at by the Committee which were
approved and adopted in toto by respondent GSIS through Board of
Trustees Resolution No. 431, to wit:

1. "(T)hat Iluminada Ponce was married to Pascual Berciles, alias

Paquito, on January 20, 1941 at Bocaue, Bulacan. From this union, they
begot the following children namely: Ilona, Ellery, England and Ione."

2. "(T)hat there is no sufficient evidence that Pascual Berciles and Flor

Fuentebella were married to each other on March 28, 1937 in Iloilo
City."
3. "(H)owever, certain relationship did exist and from such relationship
were begotten the following children, namely: Pascual Voltaire Berciles,
Maria Luisa Berciles, Mercy Berciles and Rhoda Berciles." . . . " The
children begotten with her are either natural or illegitimate children
depending on whether they have been born before or after the marriage
of Iluminada Ponce."

As pointed out earlier, petitioners assail the validity of the third

conclusion or finding that Pascual Voltaire Berciles is an acknowledged
natural child and that Maria Luisa Berciles, Mercy Berciles and Rhoda
Berciles are illegitimate children of the late Judge Pascual Berciles,
petitioners being in complete accord and conformity with the first two
conclusions summarized above.

Petitioners contend that the evidence submitted by private respondents

with respect to the status of respondent Pascual Voltaire Berciles show
that he was not acknowledged by the late Judge Pascual Berciles in a
birth certificate, in a will, in a statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic writing, as required under Art. 278, New Civil Code, or much
less, in a final judgment as provided in Art. 283, New Civil Code.

The evidence considered by the Committee on Claims Settlement as

basis of its finding that Pascual Voltaire Berciles is an acknowledged
natural child of the late Judge Pascual Berciles is the birth certificate of
said Pascual Voltaire Berciles marked Exh. "6". We have examined
carefully this birth certificate and We find that the same is not signed by
either the father or the mother; We find no participation or intervention
whatsoever therein by the alleged father, Judge Pascual Berciles. Under
our jurisprudence, if the alleged father did not intervene in the birth
certificate, the putting of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is
null and void. Such registration would not be evidence of paternity.
(Joaquin P. Roces et al. vs. Local Civil Registrar of Manila, 102 Phil.
1050). The mere certificate by the registrar without the signature of the
father is not proof of voluntary acknowledgment on his part (Dayrit vs.
Piccio, 92 Phil. 729). A birth certificate does not constitute recognition in
a public instrument. (Pareja vs. Pareja, et al., 95 Phil. 167). A birth
certificate, to evidence acknowledgment, must, under Section 5 of Act
3753, bear the signature under oath of the acknowledging parent or
parents. (Vidaurrazaga vs. Court of Appeals and Francisco Ruiz, 91 Phil.
492). In the case of Mendoza, et al. vs. Mella, 17 SCRA 788, the
Supreme Court speaking through Justice Makalintal who later became
chief Justice, said:

"It should be noted, however, that a Civil Registry Law was passed in
1930 (Act No. 3753) containing provisions for the registration of births,
including those of illegitimate parentage; and the record of birth under
such law, if sufficient in contents for the purpose, would meet the
requisites for voluntary recognition even under Article 131. Since
Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the
question here really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1),
which is merely a certified copy of the registry record, may be relied
upon as sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. No
such reliance, in our judgment, may be placed upon it. While it contains
the names of both parents, there is no showing that they signed the
original, let alone swore to its contents as required in Section 5 of Act
No. 3753 (Vidaurrazaga vs. Court of Appeals, 91 Phil. 493; In re
Adoption of Lydia Duran, 92 Phil. 729). For all that might have
happened, it was not even they or either of them who furnished the data
to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that in any event the
birth certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein voluntary
recognition of a natural child may also be made, according to the same
Article 131. True enough, but in such a case there must be a clear
statement in the document that the parent recognizes the child as his or
her own (Madridejo vs. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1); and in Exhibit 1 no such
statement appears. The claim of voluntary recognition is without basis."

With respect to the Committee's finding that the other private

respondents are illegitimate children of the deceased Judge Berciles,
We find that the evidentiary basis of such finding are the baptismal
certificate of Maria Luisa Berciles, Exh. "7-A"; birth certificate of Mercy
Berciles, Exh. "8"; and birth certificate of Rhoda Berciles, Exh. "9". We
have also examined the above exhibits and We find that Exh. "7" is a
mere certification that all the Civil Registry records of birth filed in the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar for the year 1944 and previous years
were either burned, destroyed or lost during the last war and hence, the
office could not furnish the birth certificate of Maria Luisa Berciles who
claim to have been born to the spouses Pascual Berciles and Flor
Fuentebella on June 27, 1943 at Iloilo City. The same is true with Exh.
"7-B" attesting to the non-availability of the Register of Births for Iloilo,
Iloilo in the year 1943 in the files of the National Archives. Exh. "7-A and
7-B" are, therefore, of no value.

As to the baptismal certificate, Exh. "7-A", the rule is that although the
baptismal record of a natural child describes her as a child of the
decedent, yet, if in the preparation of the record the decedent had no
intervention, the baptismal record cannot be held to be a voluntary
recognition of parentage. (Canales vs. Arrogante, et al., 91 Phil. 6;
Adriano vs. De Jesus, 23 Phil. 350; Samson vs. Corrales Tan, 48 Phil.
401; Madridejo vs. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1; Malonda vs. Infante Vda. de
Malonda, 81 Phil. 149). The reason for this rule that canonical records
do not constitute the authentic document prescribed by Arts. 115 and
117 to prove the legitimate filiation of a child is that such canonical
record is simply proof of the only act to which the priest may certify by
reason of his personal knowledge, an act done by himself or in his
presence, like the administration of the sacrament upon a day stated; it
is no proof of the declarations in the record with respect to the parentage
of the child baptized, or of prior and distinct facts which require separate
and concrete evidence. (Adriano vs. De Jesus, 23 Phil. 350).

In the recent case of Republic vs. Workmen's Compensation

Commission, 13 SCRA 272, the Supreme Court speaking again through
Justice Makalintal, held:

"This Court, construing the various pertinent provisions of the Civil Code
concerning illegitimate children, has held that an illegitimate (spurious)
child, to be entitled to support and successional rights from his parents,
must prove his filiation and that this may be done by means of voluntary
or compulsory recognition of the relationship. For this purpose, the
provisions concerning natural children are held applicable, thus,
recognition is voluntary when made in the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing (Article
278); and compulsory when made by means of a court action in the
cases enumerated in Articles 283 and 284 (Paulino vs. Paulino, L-
15091, Dec. 28, 1961).

Discrediting the above certificate (birth and baptismal) of the illegitimate

spurious children which do not constitute proof of filiation with the
deceased Judge Berciles, what remains are the sworn statements of
Coronacion Berciles, Exh. 10 and 31, sister-in-law of the late Judge
Berciles wherein she stated that after she was married to her husband,
they lived together with the family of Pascual Berciles and his wife, Flor
Fuentebella; that their two families had lived closely enough during the
Japanese Occupation and even after. These statements, however, does
not prove the filiation of the children to the late Judge Pascual Berciles.

Neither are the family pictures, Exhs. 30 to 30-M, which, according to the
Committee, do not indicate that the marriage (between Judge Berciles
and Flor Fuentebella) took place and that if at all, the said pictures show
the presence of a family with or without the sanction of marriage. We
agree and We add that said pictures do not constitute proof of filiation.

We also agree with the finding of the Committee that "(t)he letters written
by Judge Berciles to her daughters with Flor Fuentebella especially the
one sent to daughter Mercy Berciles (Exh. "22") wherein he vigorously
affirmed that it's only her mother, Flor Fuentebella, and no other woman
who was recognized as his wife and loved by her parents deserve scant
consideration. Pascual Berciles could not be expected to admit the
existence of his other family. This would be disastrous to his efforts at
preventing one family from knowing the other." Not only do they deserve
scant consideration but also, there is jurisprudence that a typewritten
letter signed by the father is not an authentic writing. (Decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain of Feb. 27, 1923 and Dec. 7, 1927 cited in 3
Castan, 6th ed., 25; see Caguioa, Comments and Cases on Civil Law,
Vol. I, p. 379).

As to the other exhibits of private respondents, We affirm the

Committee's finding that the Flor Fuentebella Affidavit (Exh. "5") is self-
serving; that the testimony of Concepcion Gonzales (Exh. "31-A"), being
blind, is deficient; and that the affidavit of Judge Rafael Lavente (Exh.
"35") has been repudiated. Indeed, the above evidence are, to Our view,
very insignificant, insufficient, and insubstantial to prove the filiation of
private respondents to the alleged father, Judge Pascual Berciles.

The records disclose that all the private respondents have left the
Philippines and are now residing in the United States. They have not
appeared at the hearing before the Committee on Claims Settlement to
testify in support of their claim of filiation and acknowledgment. And We
find no clear and competent proof, no positive and substantial evidence
presented by private respondents that their alleged father had admitted
or recognized his paternity of the private respondents Maria Luisa
Berciles, Mercy Berciles and Rhoda Berciles.

Under the law, Article 287, New Civil Code, illegitimate children other
than natural in accordance with Art. 269 are entitled to support and such
successional rights as are granted in the Code, but for this Article to be
applicable, there must be admission or recognition of the paternity of the
illegitimate child. (Paterno, et al. vs. Paterno, 20 SCRA 585, citing Noble
vs. Noble, G.R. No. L-17742, Dec. 17, 1966, 18 SCRA 1104; Paulino vs.
Paulino, G.R. No. L-15091, Dec. 28, 1961, 113 Phil. 697). Article 887,
N.C.C., defining who are compulsory heirs, is clear and specific that "(i)n
all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved." And
in the Noble case, supra, the Supreme Court laid down this ruling:

"The filiation of illegitimate children, other than natural, must not only be
proven but it must be shown that such filiation was acknowledged by the
presumed parent. If the mere fact of paternity is all that needs to be
proven, that interpretation would pave the way to unscrupulous
individuals to take advantage of the death of the presumed parent, who
would no longer be in a position to deny the allegation, to present even
fictitious claims and expose the life of the deceased to inquiries affecting
his character." (emphasis supplied).

In fine, We hold and rule that the respondent GSIS committed grave
abuse of discretion in approving Resolution No. 431 which adopted the
erroneous recommendation of the Committee on Claims Settlement, a
recommendation which has no legal or factual basis to stand on.
Accordingly, the disposition made by respondent GSIS of the retirement
benefits due the heirs of the late Judge Pascual G. Berciles is
consequently erroneous and not in accordance with law. Petitioners are
the lawful heirs entitled to the distribution of the benefits which shall
accrue to the estate of the deceased Judge Berciles and will be
distributed among the petitioners as his legal heirs in accordance with
the law on intestate succession. (Re: Mario vs. Chanliongco, 79 SCRA
364; Vda. de Consuegra vs. GSIS, 37 SCRA 325).

According to Article 996 of the New Civil Code which provides that "If a
widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the
surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each
of the children," and Article 980 which provides that "The children of the
deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the
inheritance in equal shares," the retirement benefits shall be distributed
equally to the five (5) heirs: Iluminada Ponce Berciles, Ilona Berciles
Alvarez, Ellery P. Berciles, England P. Berciles and Ione P. Berciles.

As to the retirement premiums totalling P9,700.00, the same is

presumed conjugal property, there being no proof that the premiums
were paid from the exclusive funds of the deceased Judge (Article 160,
New Civil Code). Such being the case, one-half of the amount belongs to
the wife as her property in the conjugal partnership and the other half
shall go to the estate of the deceased Judge which shall in turn be
distributed to his legal heirs.

With respect to the terminal leave pay, unpaid salary and allowances
accruing to the deceased, since petitioners are the only lawful heirs of
the deceased Judge, only they are entitled to share thereto. There is no
need to disturb Our Resolution of March 17, 1981.

One final point, the issue raised by respondents that Section 25 of P.D.
1146, otherwise known as "The Revised Government Service Insurance
Act of 1977", cannot be invoked by petitioners in taking the present
appeal for the reason that the dispute between the parties have arisen
under the Judiciary Retirement Law, Republic Act No. 910, as amended
and not under P.D. 1146, and that the determination of the legal heirs of
a deceased judge covered by Republic Act 910 as amended, is vested in
the regular courts of justice.
Section 25 of P.D. 1146 provides:

"Sec. 25. Appeals. Within fifteen days from receipt of notice of decision
or award, the aggrieved party may appeal the same to the Court of
Appeals on questions of law and facts following the procedures for
appeals from the Court of First Instance to the Court of Appeals as far as
practicable and consistent with the purposes of this Act. If the appeal is
only on questions of law, the same shall be brought directly to the
Supreme Court on certiorari. No appeal bond shall be required. The
appeal shall take precedence over all other cases except criminal cases
wherein the penalty of life imprisonment or death has been imposed by
the trial court. Appeal shall not stay the decision of the Board unless so
ordered by the Board, by the Court of Appeals, or by the Supreme
Court."

Respondents' position is untenable. We hold that Sec. 25 of P.D. 1146

quoted above may be availed of by petitioners.

Republic Act 910, as amended, is a special statute governing and

granting retirement benefits to members of the judiciary. While Section 5
of the Act provides that the GSIS shall take charge of the enforcement
and operation of the Act, there is no provision therein setting forth the
procedure or remedy for the final determination of the legal heirs of the
deceased Judge in case a dispute arises between the opposing
claimants. Even under the old GSIS Act, Commonwealth Act No. 186 as
amended, there is no express provision on appeal from the award or
decisions of the GSIS. In both cases, the decision or the award made by
the GSIS which affects property rights as well as the legitimate or
illegitimate status of the claimants is brought to and assailed in the
regular courts of justice under the general power and jurisdiction of the
courts to review decisions of administrative bodies and this is where the
litigation becomes not only delayed or protracted but also expensive and
cumbersome, to the great prejudice and detriment of the parties.

As may be gleaned from the "whereas clauses" of P.D. 1146 which,

among others, recognize that "provisions of existing laws . . . have
prejudiced, rather than benefitted, the government employee; restricted
rather than broadened, his benefits, prolonged, rather than facilitated the
payment of benefits, must now yield to his paramount welfare," P.D.
1146 is a remedial legislation, which are "those which afford a remedy,
or improve or facilitate remedies already existing for the enforcement of
rights and the redress of injuries, and statutes intended for the correction
of defects, mistakes and omissions in the civil institutions and the
administration of the state." (Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Vol. III,
p. 31). And being remedial statutes relating to procedure as
distinguished from those relating to substantive rights, they are given a
liberal interpretation. (Sutherland, supra, p. 39).

Accordingly, We hold and rule that Section 25 of P.D. 1146 specifically

laying down the procedure whereby the party aggrieved by the decision
of the GSIS may appeal the same to the Court of Appeals, now the
Intermediate Appellate Court, on questions of law and facts following the
procedures for appeals from the Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) to the I.A.C. and if the appeal is only on questions of law, the
same shall be brought directly to the Supreme Court on certiorari, which
abbreviated procedure was designed to facilitate, and not to prolong, the
payment of benefits, may be invoked by the petitioners.

That P.D. 1146, Sec. 35 is applicable to disputes arising under the

Judiciary Retirement Act and all other acts administered by the GSIS
may also be construed from Sec. 23 of the Decree which provides that
the "System shall prescribe such rules and regulations to facilitate
payment of benefits, proceeds and claims under the Act and any other
laws administered by the System.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, We AFFIRM the

finding in Resolution No. 431 that petitioner Iluminada Ponce
Berciles is the surviving spouse of the late Judge Pascual G.
Berciles and that petitioners Ilona Berciles Alvarez, Ellery P.
Berciles, England P. Berciles, and Ione P. Berciles are the
legitimate children of the said deceased Judge. We REVERSE and
SET ASIDE its finding that Pascual Voltaire Berciles is an
acknowledged natural child and that Maria Luisa Berciles, Mercy
Berciles, and Rhoda Berciles are illegitimate children of the
deceased CFI Judge Pascual G. Berciles. The claims of the
petitioners as legal heirs are hereby APPROVED and the GSIS is
hereby ordered to pay immediately to each and every petitioner the
various sums hereunder indicated opposite their names, as
follows:

1. ILUMINADA PONCE BERCILES.

A. Her 1/5 share of retirement gratuity

P60,352.00

B. Her share from the return of the retirement premiums

(1) as her conjugal share

4,850.00

(2) as a legal heir

970.00

Total Amount Due Her

P66,1172.00

=========

2. ILONA BERCILES ALVAREZ.

A. Her 1/5 share of retirement Gratuity

P60,352.00

B. Her share from the return of retirement premiums

970.00

Total Amount Due Her

P61,322.00

========

3. ELLERY P. BERCILES.
A. His 1/15 share of retirement Gratuity
P60,352.00

B. His share from return of retirement premiums

970.00

Total Amount Due Him

P61,322.00

=========

4. ENGLAND P. BERCILES.

A. His 1/5 share of retirement Gratuity

P60,352.00

B. His share from return of retirement premiums

970.00

Total Amount Due Him

P61,322.00

========

5. IONE P. BERCILES.

A. Her 1/5 share of retirement Gratuity

P60,352.00

B. Her share from return of retirement premiums

970.00

Total Amount Due Her

P61,322.00

=========
The temporary restraining order issued herein per Our Resolution dated
July 13, 1981 is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, (Actg. C.J.), Concepcion, Jr., De Castro, Melencio-Herrera,

Plana, Escolin, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Fernando, C.J. and Teehankee, J., are on leave.

Aquino, J., took no part.

Abad Santos, J., I reserve my vote.

People vs. Tumimpad 235 SCRA 483, August 19, 1994

G.R. No. 109144 August 19, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MORENO L. TUMIMPAD, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Miguel M. Lingating for accused-appellant.

KAPUNAN, J.:

Accused-appellant Constable Moreno L. Tumimpad and co-accused

Constable Ruel C. Prieto were charged with the crime of rape committed
against a 15-year old Mongoloid child in a complaint dated on May 24,
1991, signed by her mother, Mrs. Pastora L. Salcedo, which reads:

That during the period between the last week of March 1989
and the first week of April 1989, in Barangay Lower Lamac,
Oroquieta City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have (sic) carnal
 knowledge with Sandra Salcedo, complainant's daughter, a
woman who is a mongoloid and so weak of mind and in
intellect as to be capable of giving rational and legal
consent. 1

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime

charged and due trial ensued.

The facts as established by evidence are as follows:

Sandra Salcedo at the time of the incident was a 15-year old Mongoloid
and daughter of Lt. Col. Teofisto Salcedo and Pastora Salcedo. She had
a mind of a five-year old child, who still needed to be fed and dressed
up. Her vocabulary was limited and most of the time she expressed
herself by motions.

Col. Teofisto Salcedo was then Provincial Commander of Misamis

Occidental. Four security men were assigned to him, two of whom were
accused Constable Ruel Prieto and accused-appellant Moreno
Tumimpad.

The Salcedo family, composed of Col. Salcedo, his wife Pastora, his son
Alexander and wife and daughter Sandra, lived in a two-storey officers'
quarters inside Camp Lucas Naranjo, Provincial Headquarters, in
Oroquieta City. The upper storey of the house was occupied by Col.
Salcedo, his wife and Sandra while the lower storey had two (2) rooms,
one of which was occupied by the four security men and the other by
Alexander Salcedo and his wife.

It was on August 7, 1989, when Sandra complained of constipation. Mrs.

Salcedo then brought her to a doctor in Oroquieta City for a checkup.
Medication was given to Sandra but her condition did not improve.
Sandra became irritable and moody. She felt sick and unhappy.

The following day, August 8, 1989, Sandra saw Moreno Tumimpad

coming out from the kitchen and told her mother, "Mama, patayin mo
'yan, bastos." 2

Mrs. Pastora Salcedo, worried of her daughter's condition, brought her to

Regina Hospital. Sandra was able to relieve herself the following day but
still remained moody and irritable. She refused to take a bath in spite of
scoldings from her mother. She did not want to eat and whenever she
did, she would vomit.

Sandra was brought to a doctor in Oroquieta City for a second checkup.

Dr. Conol, the examining physician, ordered a urinalysis. Jose C. Lim, a
Medical Technologist, conducted the urinalysis. The result revealed that
Sandra was pregnant. 3 Mrs. Pastora Salcedo could not believe that her
daughter was pregnant and so she brought Sandra to Madonna and
Child Hospital in Cagayan de Oro City. Dr. Kho, and OB-GYNE
Specialist, examined Sandra and subjected her to a pelvic ultra-sound
examination. The results were positive. The fetus' gestational age was
equivalent to 17.1 weeks. 4 Another ultra-sound examination at the
United Doctors Medical Center (UDMC) at Quezon City on September
11, 1989 confirmed that she was indeed pregnant. 5

On January 11, 1990, Sandra gave birth to a baby boy who was named
Jacob Salcedo. Hence, the filing of the complaint 6 by Mrs. Pastora
Salcedo.

During the investigation conducted by the CIS, about thirty (30) pictures
of different persons were laid on the table and Sandra was asked to pick
up the pictures of her assailants. Sandra singled out the pictures of
Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto. 7 Later, Sandra was brought out of
the investigation room to a police line-up of ten people, including Moreno
Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto. She was again asked to point to her
assailants. Without hesitation, Sandra fingered Moreno Tumimpad and
Ruel Prieto.8

Mrs. Pastora Salcedo testified that she requested her two daughters-in-
law, Joy Salcedo and Celsa Salcedo, to ask Sandra the identity of the
persons who sexually molested her. 9

Joy confirmed in her testimony that she asked Sandra who sexually
molested her. Sandra revealed that Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto
were the ones who raped her. Sandra demonstrated how she was
raped. First, her thighs were touched, then she was hugged and her
panty was taken off. A push and pull movement followed. 10Celsa
testified that she was present when the victim demonstrated how she
was sexually abused by the two accused, including the way her nipples
were touched saying "dito hawak," and holding her breasts to
emphasize. She likewise went through the motion of removing her panty,
uttering at the same time "hubad panty."

Sandra identified in open court accused Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel

Prieto as the persons who raped her and said she wished them dead, as
they did something bad to her. 11 She once again demonstrated how she
was sexually abused. She held her two thighs with her two hands next to
her sexual organ saying, "panty" and then placed her hand on her breast
and gestured as if she were sucking. She also touched her private organ
and made a push and pull movement. 12

During the trial, the accused moved that a blood test, both "Major Blood
Grouping Test" and "Pheno Blood Typing" be conducted on the offended
party, her child Jacob and the two accused. The result of the test
conducted by the Makati Medical Center showed that Jacob Salcedo has
a type "O" blood, Sandra Salcedo type "B", accused Ruel Prieto type "A"
and accused-appellant type "O".

Both accused anchored their defense on mere denial contending that it

was impossible for them to have committed the crime of rape.

After trial on the merits, the trial court convicted Moreno Tumimpad of
the crime charged but acquitted the other accused, Ruel Prieto, on
reasonable doubt, stating that he "has a different type of blood with (sic)
the child Jacob Salcedo as his type of blood is "A", while that of child
Jacob Salcedo is
type "O".

The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the

accused, PO1 Moreno Tumimpad, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Rape, as charged in the information,
and pursuant to the provisions of Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, there being no aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance attendant in the commission of the
crime, said accused Moreno Tumimpad is hereby sentenced
 to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA; to
indemnify the offended girl, Sandra Salcedo, in the amount of
P20,000.00; and to suffer the other accessory penalties
provided for by laws; and to pay the costs of the proceedings.

On reasonable doubt, accused Ruel Prieto is hereby declared

ACQUITTED from the charge.

SO ORDERED. 13

Accused-appellant assigns the following as errors of the lower court:

1. The lower court erred in not appreciating the impossibility

of committing the offense charged without detection.

2. The lower court erred in convicting the accused-appellant

base on major blood grouping test known as ABO and RHS
test, not a paternal test known as chromosomes or HLA test.

The appeal is devoid of merit.

Accused-appellant argues that it was impossible for him to have

committed the crime of rape because most of the time he and his co-
accused Ruel Prieto were together with Col. Salcedo on inspection tours
while the victim was always in the company of her mother. He further
contends that it was likewise impossible for Sandra, if she had really
been molested, not to have shouted out of pain, she being a virgin. As if
adding insult to injury, accused-appellant suggests that it was Sandra's
brother, Cristopher Salcedo, allegedly a drug user, who could have
raped her.

We are not convinced.

It is true that the accused usually went with Col. Salcedo during
inspection tours but sometimes they were left behind and would play
pingpong or card games with Sandra at the ground floor of the house.
While Sandra was always with her mother, there were times when she
was left alone in the house with the accused. 14

Mrs. Pastora Salcedo testified:

Q How many security men remain if you can recall
when your husband reported for work?

A Two (2).

Q Who were these security men who remained?

A Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto.

Q How about the 2 other security men Tanggan

and Colaljo?

A My husband sent (sic) them for an errand and

sometime they used to go with my husband to the
office.

Q Every time when your husband is out what they

do while they were (sic) at the headquarter?

A I saw them sleeping and sometime they were

playing at the porch with my daughter Sandra
playing pingpong and sometime they were
listening music.

Q Where did they play usually take place?

A Living room. 15

xxx xxx xxx

Q By the say, (sic) Mrs. Salcedo, you said a while

ago when you were at the headquarters you were
able to do your choirs, (sic) doing laundry jobs in
the second storey of your house. Do you know
where is your daughter Sandra at that time?

A Yes, she spent her time at the second floor.

Q What part of the ground floor she used (sic) to

stay?
 A Because she is found (sic) of music she stay in
the living room.

Q Did she has (sic) any playmates?

A Moreno and Prieto.

Q Have you seen actually the 2 accused playing

with your daughter?

A Yes, playing pingpong and playing cards. 16

The victim more than once positively identified accused-appellant

Moreno Tumimpad as one of the perpetrators of the crime. First, during
the investigation conducted by the CIS, Sandra singled out accused-
appellant and his co-accused from among the thirty (30) pictures of
different persons shown to her. Second, at the police lineup of several
persons, likewise conducted by the CIS, Sandra once again unerringly
pointed accused-appellant and his co-accused as the ones who raped
her. Third, in open court, Sandra without hesitation, pointed to accused-
appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.

The following is the victim's own testimony:

PROS. RAMOS:

Will you please demonstrate before this

Honorable Court what Moreno and Ruel did to
you?

RECORD:

The witness when she stood up held both her

thighs (sic) with her two hand (sic) down to her
sexual organ saying a word "panty" and she
placed her hand on her breast and did something
as if sucking and held her private part (sic) and
did a push and pull movement and she cried.
Q When you said that there was a push and pull
movement of the body and when this was being
done did you feel pain?

A Yes pain.

Q What part of your body is painful?

RECORD:

The witness touching her private parts.

Q Did you also see blood on your sexual organ?

A Yes.

Q Where did you see these blood?

RECORD:

The witness touching her private parts.

Q When this push and pull movement was being

made, did you see a man's organ?

A Yes sir.

Q Where did you see this male organ?

A Witness touching her private part.

Q Who did this to you, who removed your panty?

A Moreno and Ruel.

Q Did you see Moreno taking off his pants?

A Yes.

Q Did you see his sex organ?

A The witness touching her private parts.

Q How about this Ruel, did you see if he taken

(sic) off his pants?

A Yes.

Q Did you see his sex organ?

A Yes, witness again touching her private part.

Q Both of them?

A Yes.

Q Where did Moreno and Ruel removed (sic) your

panty?

A Moreno.

Q In your house?

A Yes.

Q What part of your house did Moreno and Ruel

remove your panty?

A Downstairs Moreno and Ruel remove panty.

Q What part of the ground floor, was it outside or

inside the room?

A In the room.

Q When (sic) Moreno and Ruel are inside the

courtroom now, can you point to them?

A Yes.

Q Will you please point to them?

 PROS. RAMOS:

May we request the accused to stand up your

honor?

RECORD:

Both accused stood up from where they were

sitting inside the courtroom.

PROS. RAMOS:

Who is that person (prosecutor Ramos point to

accused Moreno Tumimpad)?

A Moreno.

RECORD:

The witness pointing to a certain person who is

standing and when asked what is his name, he
readily answered that he is Moreno Tumimpad.

PROS. RAMOS:

Who is that person standing besides Moreno?

A Joel.

PROS. RAMOS:

If your honor please, she could not pronounced

(sic) well the word Ruel but the way she called this
name is Joel which refers to the same person who
is one of the accused in this case. 17

Melinda Joy Salcedo, the victim's sister-in-law, testified that Sandra

demonstrated to her how she was ravished by the two accused, thus:

Q Now, will you please tell us what did Sandra

Salcedo told (sic) you as to how she was abused?
A By what she had stated there were also actions
that she made.

Q Will you please demonstrate to this Honorable

Court how did Sandra Salcedo was abused as
narrated or demonstrated to you by Sandra
Salcedo?

A According to her she was held in her thigh and

then she was hugged and then the panty was
taken off and making a push and pull movement
(witness demonstration by holding her thigh)?

Q Now, after Sandra Salcedo told you and

demonstrated to you how she was abused. What
else did Sandra Salcedo tell you if she had told
you any more matter?

A She did not say anything more.

Q Now, when Sandra Salcedo refused to talk or

say anything else. What happened next?

A Then it was Celsa who asked her.

Q Where were you when Celsa asked Sandra

Salcedo?

A I was just beside her.

Q You said that after Sandra Salcedo refused to

talk, Celsa did the questioning, did you hear the
question being asked by Celsa to Sandra
Salcedo?

A Yes.

Q And what was the question being asked by

Celsa to Sandra Salcedo?
 A Celsa asked Sandra Salcedo as to what other
things that these two had done to her?

Q And what if any did Sandra Salcedo tell you as

to what was done to her?

A By way of talking and action.

Q And what was the answer of Sandra Salcedo?

A He (sic) answered it by action and talking.

Q And what was the answer of Sandra Salcedo as

related by her to Celsa through words and action?

RECORD:

The witness demonstrated by holding his (sic)

nipple going down to her thigh.

Q What else had transpired next?

A No more.

Q Now, whenever Sandra Salcedo mentioned the

names of accused Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel
Prieto, have you observed whose names was
usually mentioned first by Sandra Salcedo?

A She mentioned first the name of Moreno

Tumimpad and Ruel.

Q And what happened after that?

A I informed my mother-in-law of what Sandra

Salcedo had told us.

Q When did you tell your mother-in- law about

what Sandra Salcedo told you and Celsa?

A That very evening sir. 18

Accused-appellant simplistically and quite erroneously argues that his
conviction was based on the medical finding that he and the victim have
the same blood type "O".

Accused-appellants' culpability was established mainly by testimonial

evidence given by the victim herself and her relatives. The blood test
was adduced as evidence only to show that the alleged father or any
one of many others of the same blood type may have been the father of
the child. As held by this Court in Janice Marie Jao vs. Court of
Appeals 19:

Paternity Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of

blood samples of the mother, the child, and the alleged
father, it can be established conclusively that the man is not
the father of a particular child. But group blood testing cannot
show only a possibility that he is. Statutes in many states,
and courts in others, have recognized the value and the
limitations of such tests. Some of the decisions have
recognized the conclusive presumption of non-paternity
where the results of the test, made in the prescribed manner,
show the impossibility of the alleged paternity. This is one of
the few cases in which the judgment of the Court may
scientifically be completely accurate, and intolerable results
avoided, such as have occurred where the finding is allowed
to turn on oral testimony conflicting with the results of the
test. The findings of such blood tests are not admissible to
prove the fact of paternity as they show only a possibility that
the alleged father or any one of many others with the same
blood type may have been the father of the child.

WHEREFORE, accused-appellant's guilt of the crime of rape having

been proven beyond reasonable doubt, the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., is on leave.

Janice Marie Jao vs. CA, 152 SCRA 359 (1987)

G.R. No. L-49162 July 28, 1987

JANICE MARIE JAO, represented by her mother and guardian ad

litem, ARLENE S. SALGADO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V.
JAO, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

Appeal by certiorari from the decision* of the Court of Appeals in CA-

G.R. No. 51078-R, dated 29 August 1978, which dismissed petitioner"s
action for recognition and support against private respondent, and from
the respondent Court"s resolution, dated 11 October 1978, denying
petitioner"s motion for reconsideration of said decision.

On 28 October 1968, petitioner Janice Marie Jao, then a minor,

represented by her mother and guardian-ad-litemArlene Salgado, filed a
case for recognition and support with the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court against private respondent Perico V. Jao. The latter
denied paternity so the parties agreed to a blood grouping test which
was in due course conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) upon order of the trial court. The result of the blood grouping test,
held 21 January 1969, indicated that Janice could not have been the
possible offspring of Perico V. Jao and Arlene S. Salgado.1

The trial court initially found the result of the tests legally conclusive but
upon plaintiff"s (herein petitioner"s) second motion for reconsideration, it
ordered a trial on the merits, after which, Janice was declared the child
of Jao, thus entitling her to his monthly support.

Jao appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial court"s failure
to appreciate the result of the blood grouping tests. As there was no
showing whatsoever that there was any irregularity or mistake in the
conduct of the tests, Jao argued that the result of the tests should have
been conclusive and indisputable evidence of his non-paternity.
The Court of Appeals upheld Jao"s contentions and reversed the trial
court"s decision. In its decision, the Court of Appeals held:

From the evidence of the contending parties, it appears undisputed

that JAO was introduced to ARLENE at the Saddle and Sirloin, Bay
Side Club, by Melvin Yabut. After this meeting, JAO dated and
courted ARLENE. Not long thereafter, they had their first sexual
intercourse and subsequently, they lived together as husband and
wife. ...

It further appears undisputed that in April 1968, JAO accompanied

ARLENE to the Marian General Hospital for medical check-up and
her confinement was with JAO"s consent. JAO paid the rentals
where they lived, the salaries of the maids, and other household
expenses. ...

The record discloses that ARLENE gave birth to JANICE on

August 16, 1968, after completing 36 weeks of pregnancy, which
indicates that ARLENE must have conceived JANICE on or about
the first week of December, 1967. "Thus, one issue to be resolved
in this appeal is whether on or about that time, JAO and ARLENE
had sexual intercourse and were already living with one another as
husband and wife.

In this connection, ARLENE contends that she first met JAO

sometime in the third or fourth week of November, 1967 at the
Saddle and Sirloin, Bayside Club; that after several dates, she had
carnal knowledge with him at her house at 30 Long beach,
Merville, Paranaque. Rizal in the evening of November 30, 1967,
and that he started to live with her at her dwelling after December
16, 1967, the date they finished their cruise to Mindoro Island.

On the other hand, JAO, albeit admitting that he met ARLENE at

the Saddle and Sirloin, Bayside Club, however, maintains that this
was on December 14, 1967 because the day following, he and his
guests: ARLENE, Melvin Yabut, Didi Crescini and Charlie Litonjua
went to Mindoro by boat. He dated ARLENE four times in January,
1968. He remembered he had carnal knowledge of her for the first
time on January 18, 1968, because that was a week after his
birthday and it was only in May, 1968 that he started cohabiting
with her at the Excelsior Apartments on Roxas Boulevard.

These conflicting versions of the parties emphasize, in resolving

the paternity of JANICE, the role of the blood grouping tests
conducted by the NBI and which resulted in the negative finding
that in a union with ARLENE, JAO could not be the father of
JANICE.

We cannot sustain the conclusion of the trial court that the NBI is
not in a position to determine with mathematical precision the issue
of parentage by blood grouping test, considering the rulings of this
Court ... where the blood grouping tests of the NBI were admitted;
especially where, in the latter case, it was Dr. Lorenzo Sunico who
conducted the test and it appears that in the present case, the
same Dr. Sunico approved the findings and report. ... In Co Tao vs.
Court of Appeals, 101 Phil. 188, the Supreme Court had given
weight to the findings of the NBI in its blood grouping test. Thus, it
cannot be gainsaid that the competency of the NBI to conduct
blood grouping tests has been recognized as early as the 1950"s.

The views of the Court on blood grouping tests may be stated as

follows:

Paternity Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of

blood samples of the mother, the child, and the alleged
father, it can be established conclusively that the man is not
the father of the child. But group blood testing cannot show
that a man is the father of a particular child, but at least can
show only a possibility that he is. Statutes in many states,
and courts in others, have recognized the value and the
limitations of such tests. Some of the decisions have
recognized the conclusive presumption of non-paternity
where the results of the test, made in the prescribed manner,
show the impossibility of the alleged paternity. This is one of
the few cases in which the judgment of the Court may
scientifically be completely accurate, and intolerable results
avoided, such as have occurred where the finding is allowed
 to turn on oral testimony conflicting with the results of the
test.

The findings of such blood tests are not admissible to prove

the fact of paternity as they show only a possibility that the
alleged father or any one of many others with the same blood
type may have been the father of the child. But the Uniform
Act recognizes that the tests may have some probative value
to establish paternity where the blood type and the
combination in the child is shown to be rare, in which case
the judge is given discretion to let it in (I Jones on Evidence,
5th Ed., pp. 193-194).

In one specific biological trait, viz, blood groups, scientific

opinion is now in accord in accepting the fact that there is a
causative relation between the trait of the progenitor and the
trait of the progeny. In other words, the blood composition of
a child may be some evidence as to the child"s paternity. But
thus far this trait (in the present state of scientific discovery as
generally accepted) can be used only negativelyi.e. to
evidence that a particular man F is not the father of a
particular child C. (I Wigmore on Evidence 3rd Ed., pp. 610-
611).

In a last ditch effort to bar the admissibility and competency of the

blood test, JANICE claims that probative value was given to blood
tests only in cases where they tended to establish paternity; and
that there has been no case where the blood test was invoked to
establish non-paternity, thereby implying that blood tests have
probative value only when the result is a possible affirmative and
not when in the negative. This contention is fallacious and must be
rejected. To sustain her contention, in effect, would be recognizing
only the possible affirmative finding but not the blood grouping test
itself for if the result were negative, the test is regarded worthless.
Indeed, this is illogical. .... As an admitted test, it is admissible in
subsequent similar proceedings whether the result be in the
negative or in the affirmative. ...
The Court of Appeals also found other facts that ran contrary to
petitioner"s contention that JAO"s actions before and after JANICE was
born were tantamount to recognition. Said the respondent appellate
court:

On the contrary, after JANICE was born, JAO did not recognize her
as his own. In fact, he filed a petition that his name as father of
JANICE in the latter"s certificate of live birth be deleted, evidencing
his repudiation, rather than recognition. The mere acts of JAO in
cohabiting with ARLENE, the attention given to her during her
pregnancy and the financial assistance extended to her cannot
overcome the result of the blood grouping test. These acts of JAO
cannot be evaluated as recognizing the unborn JANICE as his own
as the possession of such status cannot be founded on
conjectures and presumptions, especially so that, We have earlier
said, JAO refused to acknowledge JANICE after the latter"s birth.

JAO cannot be compelled to recognize JANICE based on

paragraph 2 of Article 283 in relation to Article 289 of the New Civil
Code which provides: "When the child is in continuous possession
of status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the
latter.

Nor can there be compulsory recognition under paragraphs 3 or 4

of said article which states:

(3) When the child was conceived during the time when the
mother cohabited with the supposed father;

(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that
the defendant is his father.

As aptly appreciated by the court below, JANICE could have been

conceived from November 20, 1967 to December 4, 1967. Indeed,
ARLENE claims that her first sexual intercourse with JAO was on
November 30, 1967 while the latter avers it was one week after
January 18, 1968. However, to satisfy paragraph 3 as above-
quoted, JANICE must have been conceived when ARLENE and
JAO started to cohabit with one another. Since ARLENE herself
 testified that their cohabitation started only after December 16,
1967, then it cannot be gainsaid that JANICE was not conceived
during this cohabitation. Hence, no recognition will lie. Necessarily,
recognition cannot be had under paragraph 4 as JANICE has no
other evidence or proof of her alleged paternity.

Apart from these, there is the claim of JAO that, at the critical time
of conception, ARLENE had carnal knowledge with two other men:
"Oying" Fernandez and Melvin Yabut, which was not even
rebutted; and considering that it was Melvin Yabut, who introduced
ARLENE to JAO at the Bayside Club. Moreover, the testimony of
ARLENE is not wholly reliable. When the trial court said that "the
Court is further convinced of plaintiff"s cause by ARLENE"s
manner of testifying in a most straight-forward and candid manner,"
the fact that ARLENE was admittedly a movie actress may have
been overlooked so that not even the trial court could detect, by
her acts, whether she was lying or not.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside

and a new one entered dismissing plaintiff-appellee"s complaint.
Without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

The petitioner now brings before this Court the issue of admissibility and
conclusiveness of the result of blood grouping tests to prove non-
paternity.

In this jurisdiction, the result of blood tests, among other evidence,

to, affirm paternity was dealt with in Co Tao v. Court of Appeals,2 an
action for declaration of filiation, support and damages. In said case, the
NBI expert"s report of the blood tests stated that "from their blood groups
and types, the defendant Co Tao is a possible father of the child." From
this statement the defendant contended that the child must have been
the child of another man. The Court noted: "For obvious reasons, the
NBI expert cannot give assurance that the appellant was the father of
the child; he can only give his opinion that he is a "possible father." This
possibility, coupled with the other facts and circumstances brought out
during the trial, tends to definitely establish that appellant Co Tao is the
father of the child Manuel."3
Where the issue is admissibility and conclusiveness of blood grouping
tests to disprove paternity, rulings have been much more definite in their
conclusions. For the past three decades, the use of blood typing in
cases of disputed parentage has already become an important legal
procedure. There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood
grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive
as to paternity that is, the fact that the blood type of the child is a
possible product of the mother and alleged father does not conclusively
prove that the child is born by such parents; but, if the blood type of the
child is not the possible blood type when the blood of the mother and
that of the alleged father are crossmatched, then the
child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father.4

In jurisdictions like the United States, the admissibility of blood tests

results to prove non-paternity has already been passed upon in several
cases. In Gilpin v. Gilpin5 the positive results of blood tests excluding
paternity, in a case in which it was shown that proper safeguards were
drawn around the testing procedures, were recognized as final on the
question of paternity. In Cuneo v. Cuneo6 evidence of non-paternity
consisting of the result of blood grouping tests was admitted despite a
finding that the alleged father had cohabited with the mother within the
period of gestation. The Court said that the competent medical testimony
was overwhelmingly in favor of the plaintiff, and to reject such testimony
would be tantamount to rejecting scientific fact. Courts, it was stated,
should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of
situations presented, since to reject said result was to deny
progress.7 This ruling was also echoed in Clark v. Rysedorph,8 a filiation
proceeding where an uncontradicted blood grouping test evidence,
excluding paternity, was held conclusive.9 Legislation expressly
recognizing the use of blood tests is also in force in several
states.10 Tolentino,11 affirms this rule on blood tests as proof of non-
paternity, thus

Medical science has shown that there are four types of blood in
man which can be transmitted through heredity. Although the
presence of the same type of blood in two persons does not
indicate that one was begotten by the other, yet the fact that they
are of different types will indicate the impossibility of one being the
child of the other. Thus, when the supposed father and the alleged
 child are not in the same blood group, they cannot be father and
child by consanguinity. The Courts of Europe today regard a blood
test exclusion as an unanswerable and indisputable proof of non-
paternity. 12

Moreover,

The cohabitation between the mother and the supposed father

cannot be a ground for compulsory recognition if such cohabitation
could not have produced the conception of the child. This would be
the case, for instance, if the cohabitation took place outside of the
period of conception of the child. Likewise, if it can be proved by
blood tests that the child and the supposed father belong to
different blood groups, the cohabitation by itself cannot be a
ground for recognition. 13

Petitioner has attempted to discredit the result of the blood grouping

tests in the instant case by impugning the qualifications of the NBI
personnel who performed the tests and the conduct of the tests
themselves. Her allegations, in this regard, appear to be without merit.
The NBI"s forensic chemist who conducted the tests is also a serologist,
and has had extensive practice in this area for several years. The blood
tests were conducted six (6) times using two (2) scientifically recognized
blood grouping systems, the MN Test and the ABO System,14 under
witness and supervision.15

Even the allegation that Janice was too young at five months to have
been a proper subject for accurate blood tests must fall, since nearly two
years after the first blood test, she, represented by her mother, declined
to undergo the same blood test to prove or disprove their allegations,
even as Jao was willing to undergo such a test again.16 1avvphi1

Accordingly, the Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals and
holds that the result of the blood grouping tests involved in the case at
bar, are admissible and conclusive on the non-paternity of respondent
Jao vis-a-vis petitioner Janice. No evidence has been presented
showing any defect in the testing methods employed or failure to provide
adequate safeguards for the proper conduct of the tests. The result of
such tests is to be accepted therefore as accurately reflecting a scientific
fact.

In view of the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals, as

heretofore quoted, which are binding on this Court, we do not find it
necessary to further pass upon the issue of recognition raised by
petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is hereby denied. Without

pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Tan vs. Trocio, 191 SCRA 764 (1990)

Subject:

The Court Found Insufficient Basis to Sustain the Charges against Atty.
Trecio; Continuous Support of the Child for Several Years as the Reason
for Desisting from Charging has not been Substantiated; The Credibility
of the Witness of Tan is in Issue; Testimonies showing Unusual
Closeness between Trocio and Jewel are not Convincing to Prove
Paternity; Child Born During Wedlock is Presumed to be Legitimate

Facts:

Complainant Felicidad Tan sought the disbarment of respondent Atty.

Galileo Trocio for immorality and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. Tan
alleged that she was married, with eight children and the owner of a
vocational school in Lanao del Norte and Trocio was its legal counsel. In
1971, Trocio succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her and as a
result, a child was born named Jewel.

At first, Trocio supported Jewel but subsequently lost interest in doing

so. Because of threats, Tan remained quiet. After several years, Tan
finally had the courage to file the administrative complaint. Trocio
vehemently denied that he had sexually assaulted Tan and argued that
the charge was made just to get even with him after he declined her
request to commit a breach of trust.

The Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Norte, who conducted the

investigation, found prima facie evidence to hold Trocio administratively
liable. The Solicitor General recommended the disbarment of Trocio for
gross immoral conduct. A formal complaint was thereafter filed before
the Supreme Court.

Held:

The Court Found Insufficient Basis to Sustain the Charges against

Trecio

1. The outrage allegedly took place during the last week of April 1971.
Yet, no criminal charge was filed. It was only about eight years later that
an administrative complaint was presented before the Supreme Court.
2. The complainant's explanation that Trocios threat to cause the
deportation of her alien husband should she report to anyone made her
desist from filing a charge is not credible as she had admitted having lost
contact with her husband when he learned of respondent's transgression
that very same evening.

3. Another factor that engenders doubt in the mind of the Supreme Court
is the fact that after the alleged incident, she continued having dealings
with Trocio as if nothing had happened.

Continuous Support of the Child for Several Years as the Reason

for Desisting from Charging has not been Substantiated

4. Complainant's contention that Trocios continued supporting the child

for several years for which reason she desisted from charging him
criminally, has not been substantiated.

5. The fact that she kept her peace for so many years can even be
construed as a condonation of his alleged immoral conduct.

6. The Court found it strange that an unwanted son, as the child would
normally have been, should, of all names, be called "Jewel."

The Credibility of the Witness of Tan is in Issue

7. Eleuteria Garcia testified that she heard Tan shouting for help and that
Trocio came out from the office. Thereafter, she saw her crying and
trying to fix her dress after telling to her that she was sexually abused by
Trocio.

8. The court doubted the credibility of Garcia because her distance to the
crime scene, considering that such happened in the school premises,
was not established.

Testimonies showing Unusual Closeness between Trocio and

Jewel are not Convincing to Prove Paternity

9. The testimonies of Tan and witness Marilou Pangandaman, another

maid, to show unusual closeness between Respondent and Jewel, like
playing with him and giving him toys, are not convincing enough to prove
paternity

10. Pictures submitted by Tan showing allegedly their physical likeness

to each other are also not convincing evidence of paternity. Such
evidence is inconclusive to prove paternity, and much less would it prove
violation of Complainant's person and honor.

Child Born During Wedlock is Presumed to be Legitimate

11. Jewel was born during wedlock of Tan and her husband and
the presumption should be in favor of legitimacy unless physical access
between the couple was impossible.

12. From the evidence on hand, the presumption has not been
overcome by adequate and convincing proof. In fact, Jewel was
registered in his birth certificate the legitimate child of the Tan and her
husband

Baluyot vs. Baluyot, 186 SCRA 506 [1990]

G.R. No. L-33659 June 14, 1990

VICTORIA U. BALUYUT, MA. THERESA U. BALUYUT and MA.

FLORDELIZA U. BALUYUT, all minors, represented by their mother
and guardian ad litem, NORMA URBANO, petitioners,
vs.
FELICEDAD S. BALUYUT and HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

Note: The family name Baluyut appears as Baluyot is some pleadings.

Donald E. Asis for the Administratrix

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari filed by Victoria and Ma. Flordeliza, all
surnamed Baluyot, then minors, represented by their mother and
guardian ad litem, Norma Urbana which seeks the reversal of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 38069-R entitled
"Felicidad S. Baluyut, Administratrix-Appellant v. Victoria U. Baluyut, et
al., Intervenors-Appellees." The decision brought to this court for review
reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (now
Regional Trial Court) and dismissed the petition for intervention filed by
petitioners in the trial court.
In Special Proceedings No. 1835, entitled "Intestate Estate of Deceased
Enrique Baluyut,' filed before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga,
herein petitioners filed on April 29, 1965 a petition for intervention. The
petition alleged that petitioners have a legal interest in the estate of the
deceased Enrique M. Baluyut; that petitioners-minors are the illegitimate
children of the deceased, begotten out of wedlock by said deceased and
petitioners' mother and guardian ad litem Norma Urbano; that petitioners
were conceived and born at the time when Norma Urbano cohabited
with the deceased while the latter was already married to Felicidad S.
Baluyut; that they were in continuous possession and enjoyment of the
status of children of the deceased during his lifetime by direct overt acts
of said deceased having supported and maintained them. The
petitioners also alleged that they were deliberately excluded from the
estate of Enrique M. Baluyut (pp. 10-18, Record on Appeal).

Felicidad S. Baluyut, widow of Enrique and appointed administratrix of

his estate, opposed the petition for intervention (p. 20, Record on
Appeal). On May 8, 1965 (pp. 18-19, Record on Appeal), the trial court
issued an order allowing the petitioners to intervene.

After trial, a decision (pp. 24-31, Record on Appeal) was rendered

declaring the intervenors Victoria, Ma. Theresa and Ma. Flordeliza the
forced heirs of deceased Enrique Baluyut and ordering administratrix
Felicidad Vda. de Baluyut to pay P150.00 monthly support to Norma
Urbano, guardian ad litem for the three minor children. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders:

1) FELICIDAD VDA. DE BALUYUT, the administratrix to pay

P150.00 as monthly support out of the Estate of Enrique
Baluyut to Norma Urbano guardian ad litem for the three
minor children, Victoria, Theresa and Flordeliza Baluyut.

2) That under Art. 887, (5) New Civil Code said children are
forced heirs of the late Enrique Baluyut.
 3) That they are entitled to their hereditary rights in said
Estate of Enrique Baluyut under the provisions of the New
Civil Code (pp. 29-30, Record on Appeal).

On February 15, 1966, the administratrix filed a Notice of Appeal from

the trial court's decision. On February 22, 1966, the intervenors filed their
Objection to Appeal and Motion for Execution. The latter motion was
based on the pronouncement in Salazar v. Salazar, L-5823, April 29,
1953, that an order granting support pendente lite is final and executory.

On May 4,1986, the trial court issued an order (p. 37, Record on Appeal)
declaring that it considers intervenors' motion for execution as a motion
for reconsideration and amended the decision to the effect that it granted
the minors Victoria, Theresa and Flordeliza monthly support pendente
lite in the amount of P150.00 payable every first day of the month to their
guardian ad litem Norma Urbano.

On April 22, 1971, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment (pp. 19-
41, Rollo) reversing the decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion
of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby reversed

and the intervenors' petition in intervention is hereby declared
dismissed, without costs. The order granting
alimony pendente lite to the intervenors is hereby set aside.
(p. 41, Rollo)

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of respondent Court of Appeals'

decision was denied on May 24, 1971 (p. 53, Rollo). Hence, the instant
petition for review on certiorari filed on June 19, 1971.

On June 23, 1971, We gave due course to the petition (p. 57, Rollo). On
July 1, 1971, We required the petitioners to file their brief (p. 58, Rollo).
Respondents, on the other hand, filed their brief on October 28, 1971 (p.
85, Rollo). On December 17, 1971, the petition was considered
submitted for decision (p. 87, Rollo).

On June 3, 1975, petitioners filed a "Motion and Manifestation" praying

for the reinstatement of the order of the trial court to grant the petitioners
monthly support during the pendency of the case. The said order for
monthly support granted by the trial court in its decision of May 4, 1966
was terminated in the early part of 1971 (p. 90, Rollo). When asked to
comment on the manifestation and motion of petitioners, respondents
opposed said motion in view of respondent Court of appeals' finding that
petitioners were not the recognized spurious children of deceased
Baluyut (p. 113, Rollo).

On November 25, 1976, We granted petitioner's motion for continuation

of their monthly support pendente lite effective June 1975 until further
orders (p. 141, Rollo). After an exchange of pleadings by the parties
regarding the order of this court on the matter of the continuation of
petitioners' support pendente lite, and after a motion filed by petitioners
to cite administratrix for contempt, private respondents filed a
manifestation on January 6,1978, informing this Court that: 1) the former
administratrix Felicidad S. Baluyut was substituted by one of her
daughters, Milagros B. Villar, as Special Administratrix; and that 2) they
have complied with the September 13, 1977 resolution of the court
requiring them to show cause why they should not be dealt with as in
contempt for failing to obey the order to pay petitioners a monthly
support pendente lite. Private respondents also manifested their
compliance by depositing with the then Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, Branch 1, a Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank
check in the amount of P4,350.00 representing the required support until
October, 1977. Another PCIB check in the amount of P300.00
representing support pendente lite for November and December, 1977
was also deposited with the trial court (p. 335, Rollo).

On February 19, 1980, petitioners, assisted by their guardian ad

litem and private respondent Administratrix Milagros B. Villar, both
parties assisted by their respective counsel, filed a Joint Motion to
Dismiss the petition in view of petitioners 'filing of a "Petition for
Withdrawal of Intervention" with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
taking cognizance of the Intestate Estate of Enrique Baluyut. The petition
for withdrawal was based on a waiver by petitioners of any right or
interest they may have on the estate of the deceased in consideration of
the financial assistance granted them by the administratrix of the estate
(p. 371, Rollo). The petition for withdrawal of intervention was approved
by the intestate court on February 14, 1980 (p. 369, Rollo), while the
Joint Motion to Dismiss the instant petition was noted by this court on
April 3, 1981 (p. 372, Rollo).

The withdrawal of intervention in consideration of the financial

assistance extended to petitioners by the administratrix of the estate of
the deceased Enrique M. Baluyut (p. 37, Rollo) is in the nature of a
compromise settlement of the instant petition (p. 371, Rollo).
Considering, however, that the issue involved in this case is whether or
not petitioners, Victoria, Ma. Theresa and Ma. Flordeliza, all surnamed
Baluyut are the acknowledged, spurious children of the deceased,
Enrique M. Baluyut, the Joint Motion to Dismiss the instant petition
cannot be granted, acknowledgment, affecting as it does the civil status
of persons and of future support cannot be the subject of a compromise
(pars. 1 and 4, Article 2035 of the Civil Code). (See Advincula v.
Advincula, L-19065, January 31, 1964).

The trial court found that petitioners are the illegitimate children of the
deceased Enrique M. Baluyut. This finding was shared by respondent
Court of Appeals:

... the testimony of Norma Urbana supported by that of

Liberata Vasquez on the one hand as against that of the
administratrix who declared that she and her late husband
were always together and that of Cecilia Waters who testified
that Norma had a suitor named Lieut. Alex on the other, leads
us to give credence to the proof of the intervenors specifically
the testimony of Norma that the intervenors are in fact her
illegitimate children with the late Enrique M. Baluyut (p.
35, Rollo).

However, proof of filiation of the petitioners to the late Enrique M.

Baluyut is not sufficient to confer upon them any hereditary right in the
estate of the deceased. What is necessary to be established by an
illegitimate not natural child in order that he may be entitled to
successional rights under Article 887 of the New Civil Code, is not the
fact of his bare filiation but a filiation acknowledged by the putative
parent. This has been the consistent pronouncement of this Court since
the reversal of the pronouncement in Reyes, et al. v. Zuzuarregui, et
al., 102 Phil. 346 by the pronouncement in the case of Paulino v.
Paulino, 113 Phil. 697, 700, 701, 702. In the Paulino case, it was held:

An illegitimate (spurious) child to be entitled to support and

successional rights from his putative or presumed parents
must prove his filiation to them. Filiation may be established
by the voluntary or compulsory recognition of the illegitimate
(spurious) child. Recognition is voluntary when "made in the
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or
in any authentic writing." It is compulsory when by court
action the child brings about his recognition. ...

xxx xxx xxx

It is true that by their motion to dismiss the appellees are

deemed to have admitted that the appellant is the illegitimate
spurious, not natural child of the deceased Marcos Paulino.
Such an admission, however, does not entitle her to inherit
from her alleged putative father. It is necessary to allege that
her putative father had acknowledged and recognized her as
such. Such acknowledgment is essential and is the basis
other right to inherit. There being no allegation of such
acknowledgment the action becomes one to compel
recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the
putative father.

This was reiterated in the case of Republic v. Workmen's Compensation

Commission, 121 Phil. 261, where this Court held that:

... the illegitimate (spurious) child, to be entitled to support

and successional rights from his parents, must prove his
filiation and this may be done by means of voluntary or
compulsory recognition of the relationship. For this purpose,
the provisions concerning natural children are held
applicable. ...

There are two modes of acknowledgment provided in the New Civil

Code; one, by the voluntary recognition by the putative parent made in
the record of birth, a statement before the court of record, or in any
authentic writing (Art. 278, New Civil Code) and two, by compulsory
recognition under Article 283 of the same law.

Were the petitioners voluntarily recognized by the late Enrique M.

Baluyut as his illegitimate spurious children?

There is no evidence as required by Article 278 which proves that the

petitioners were recognized by the deceased during his lifetime as his
spurious children. The petitioners' records of birth, although in the name
of Enrique Baluyut, were not signed by the latter. There was no authentic
writing presented nor any statement in a court of record which would
prove that the petitioners were recognized by the deceased.

With regard to compulsory recognition, Article 283 enumerates the cases

where the father is obliged to recognize the child as his, namely: a) in
cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense
coincides more or less with that of the conception; b) when the child is in
continuous possession of the status of a child of the alleged father by the
direct acts of the latter or his family; c) when the child was conceived
during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father; d)
when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant
is his father.

The grounds relied upon by petitioners for compelling the heirs of

Baluyut to recognize them as the heirs of the deceased were the alleged
possession by the petitioners of the status of recognized illegitimate
spurious children and that they were conceived at the time when their
mother cohabited with the deceased. Since the petitioners were still
minors at the time of the death of Enrique M. Baluyut, the action for
compulsory recognition was correctly filed by petitioners' guardian ad
litem and mother, Norma Urbano. However, as correctly pointed out by
respondent appellate court, since the recognition sought in the case is
compulsory, strictness in the application of the rules applies. We agree
with respondent appellate court that the evidence presented by
petitioners failed to satisfy the high standard of proof required for the
success of their action for compulsory recognition. Respondent court
held:
The combined testimony of Norma Urbano and her witness
Liberata Vasquez insofar as the issue of recognition is
concerned tends to show that Norma was kept by the late
Enrique M. Baluyut as his mistress first in the house of
Liberata and then in a house supposedly rented from one
Lacuna. But this Lacuna was not even presented to testify in
support of the claim of Norma and Liberate that Baluyut
rented his house for Norma. And, according to Norma and
Liberata, Baluyut visited Norma some twice a week in the
house where she kept her as his mistress; that Baluyut paid
the hospital bills for the delivery of the two younger children
of Norma. But, according to Liberata herself, it was not
Baluyut who personally paid the hospital bills but he gave the
money for the payment of the hospital bills to Liberato and he
requested her to pay the money to the hospital. This only
shows that Baluyut was hiding his Identity as the father of the
children of Norma, an act which is inconsistent with
recognizing such children as his own.

If Enrique did not want to hide being the father of the

intervenors who were born at the Ortanez hospital, there was
no need for him to ask Liberata to pay the hospital bill of
Norma for the delivery of her youngest child as Baluyut could
have easily done this himself. There is not even evidence
showing that he visited Norma at the hospital when she
delivered there. Coupled with the circumstance that Enrique
tried to hide his being the father of the intervenors, there is
absence of positive and convincing proof that Enrique treated
the intervenors as his children in all relations in society and in
life. Far from treating them in society as his children, he was
hiding Norma and the intervenors from society and visited
them only once in a while evidently only to satisfy his sexual
urge with Norma but with no genuine desire to have and treat
the intervenors so as to confer on them the continuous
possession of the status of recognized illegitimate (not
natural) children. There is not even any proof that he had
brought out these intervenors to show them publicly as his
children. With the single exception of Liberata Vasquez, not a
single neighbor of Norma in the rather populous area of
Project 4, Quezon City, was produced to testify on any act of
Enrique to show his genuine desire to treat the intervenors as
his very own in his actual relations. The foregoing
deficiencies in the intervenors' proof is fatal to their case.

In order to prove the continuous possession of the

status of a natural child, the acts must be of such
a nature that they reveal, not only the conviction
of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have
and treat the child as such in all relations in
society and in life, not accidentally, but
continuously' (Igar, et al. vs. Vda. de Balingkit,
CA, 60 O.G. 7792; Onos, et al. vs. Vda. de Onos,
CA-G.R. No. 24646-R, July 22, 1964).

The birth certificates Exhibits 'A,' 'B' and 'C' of the intervenors
do not help their case for these are not evidence of
recognized filiation by the deceased Enrique Baluyut
because, firstly, they were admitted in evidence by the lower
court merely as part of the of the witnesses who referred to
them in the course of said witnesses' testimony and hence,
they are not evidence of the facts stated in them. Secondly,
they are merely evidence of the fact that gave rise to their
execution, that is, the fact of birth and nothing else, much
leas of recognition as they are not signed by Enrique Baluyut.

In an action for compulsory acknowledgment

under paragraph 4, Article 283 of the Civil Code, a
birth certificate which, on its face, was not signed
by the supposed natural father is incompetent
evidence on paternity, being in violation of oration
5 of Act 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil Code'
(Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar, 54 O.G. 4950;
Crisolo va. Macadaong, No. L-7017, April 19,
1964; Bernabe, etc. vs. Lacodin, CA, 59 O.G.
3178).

If birth certificates, which are unsigned by the

presumed father as required by section 5 of Act
 No. 3752 and Article 280 of the Civil Code, are
incompetent evidence even to prove paternity
alone, with more reason are birth certificates
incompetent evidence to prove recognized
filiation. (pp. 36-39, Rollo)

Petitioners would have Us relax Our rule on strictness of the application

of law regarding compulsory recognition as first laid down in
the Javellana v. Monteclaro, 74 Phil. 393. They opined that the said case
was in fact the forerunner of the liberal view that has found its way into
the present provisions of the New Civil Code governing paternity and
recognition.

Petitioners failed to grasp the import of this Court's ruling in

the Javellana case. That the case was the forerunner of the liberal view
that has found its way into our statute books, is true. But, the rule of
liberality enunciated therein applied only to case involving voluntary
recognition specifically in a public document and not to cases of
compulsory recognition. Thus,

Upon the second point, whether a voluntary acknowledgment

may be done incidentally in a public document, a distinction
must be made between the two kinds of acknowledgment: (1)
voluntary, and (2) compulsory. In the former, recognition may
be incidental, but in the latter, it must be direct and express.

In actions to compel the alleged father to acknowledge his

natural child, based upon recognition in an indubitable
writing, article 135, par. 1, of the Civil Code, requires that the
father must expressly recognize his paternity. This provision
has been strictly construed by Spanish and Philippine
jurisprudence against the alleged natural child. Thus, in the
Sentence of July 5,1906, the Supreme Tribunal of Spain held
in an action to compel acknowledgment under article 135,
that a mere allusion, more or leas clear, by the alleged father
to his supposed child, if there is no express recognition of his
paternity, is not sufficient. In the Sentence of April 8,1915,
that same Tribunal declared that there should be an
indubitable documentary proof or uninterrupted on of the
 status of a natural child, excluding deductions and
conjectures. As to Philippine cases, the same rule has been
adhered to in several decisions by this court. Thus, in
Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 4 Phil., 746, an action was filed to
compel recognition of a natural child, based in part on a letter
of defendant telling the mother of his affection toward her and
asking her to take care of the child. This court held that the
letter did not expressly recognize the child, under article 135.
In Buenaventura vs. Urbano, 5 Phil. 1, the alleged father
wrote the child a letter advising him how to conduct himself.
This court held that the letter did not contain an-express
recognition under article 135.

But while in actions to compel recognition the foregoing

principle is true with respect to indubitable writings according
to article 135, par. 1 of the Civil Code, however, in cases of
voluntary acknowledgment in a public document under article
131, the law is more liberal and permits an incidental
recognition. ... (Javellana, et al. v. Monteclaro, et al., 74 Phils.
393)

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Constantino vs. Mendez, et al., 209 SCRA 18 [1992]

Subjects:

Abuse of Rights, Breach of promise to marry, Action for

Recognition

Facts:
Amelita Constantino alleges that she met Ivan Mendez at Tony's
Cocktail Lounge where she worked as a waitress. A day after
their first meeting, Ivan succeeded Amelita inside his hotel room
and, through a promise of marriage, succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her. Afterwards, Ivan confessed to Amelita that
he is a married man. Nevertheless, they continued to have sexual
relations whenever Ivan is in Manila, and Amelita got pregnant.

Despite her pleas, Ivan refused to acknowledge the child she

bore (Michael Constantino) and to provide support. Hence.
Amelita filed an action for acknowledgment, support and
damages against Ivan Mendez.

Held:

Action for Recognition

1. An order for recognition and support may create an

unwholesome atmosphere or may be an irritant in the family or
lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or
filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.

2. The burden of proof is on Amelita to establish her affirmative

allegations that Ivan is the father of her son.

3. Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing

evidence her claim that Ivan Mendez is the father of her son
Michael Constantino.

4. Michael Constantino is a full-term baby born on August 3,

1975. Considering that the average duration of pregnancy
counting from the day of conception must be close to 267 days,
the conception of the Michael must have taken place sometime in
the second week of November, 1974.

5. While Amelita testified that she had sexual contact with Ivan in
November, 1974, nevertheless said testimony is contradicted by
her own evidence- a letter dated February 11, 1975 informing
Ivan that Amelita is four months pregnant so that applying the
period of the duration of actual pregnancy, the child was
conceived on or about October 11, 1974.

Breach of Promise to Marry (Damages under Article 19 and

21)

6. Mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for

recovery. Damages could only be awarded if sexual
intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual
desire. Amelita admitted that she was attracted to Ivan and her
attraction to Ivan is the reason why she surrendered her
womanhood. Had she been induced or deceived because of a
promise of marriage, she could have immediately severed her
relation with Ivan when she was informed after their first sexual
contact that he was a married man. Their repeated sexual
intercourse only indicates that passion and not the alleged
 promise of marriage was the moving force that made her submit
herself to Ivan.

Carmelo Cabatana vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 124814, October 21, 2004)

G.R. No. 124814 October 21, 2004

CAMELO CABATANIA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CAMELO REGODOS, respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules

of Court assailing the March 15, 1996 decision1 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. 36708 which in turn affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60 in Spec. Proc. No. 88-C which
compelled petitioner Camelo Cabatania to acknowledge private
respondent Camelo Regodos as his illegitimate son and to give support
to the latter in the amount of 500 per month.

This controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition and support

filed by Florencia Regodos in behalf of her minor son, private respondent
Camelo Regodos.

During the trial, Florencia testified that she was the mother of private
respondent who was born on September 9, 1982 and that she was the
one supporting the child. She recounted that after her husband left her in
the early part of 1981, she went to Escalante, Negros Occidental to look
for work and was eventually hired as petitioners household help. It was
while working there as a maid that, on January 2, 1982, petitioner
brought her to Bacolod City where they checked in at the Visayan Motel
and had sexual intercourse. Petitioner promised to support her if she got
pregnant.

Florencia claimed she discovered she was carrying petitioners child 27

days after their sexual encounter. The sexual intercourse was repeated
in March 1982 in San Carlos City. Later, on suspicion that Florencia was
pregnant, petitioners wife sent her home. But petitioner instead brought
her to Singcang, Bacolod City where he rented a house for her. On
September 9, 1982, assisted by a hilot in her aunts house in Tiglawigan,
Cadiz City, she gave birth to her child, private respondent Camelo
Regodos.

Petitioner Camelo Cabatanias version was different. He testified that he

was a sugar planter and a businessman. Sometime in December, 1981,
he hired Florencia as a servant at home. During the course of her
employment, she would often go home to her husband in the afternoon
and return to work the following morning. This displeased petitioners
wife, hence she was told to look for another job.

In the meantime, Florencia asked permission from petitioner to go home

and spend New Years Eve in Cadiz City. Petitioner met her on board
the Ceres bus bound for San Carlos City and invited her to dinner. While
they were eating, she confided that she was hard up and petitioner
offered to lend her save money. Later, they spent the night in San Carlos
City and had sexual intercourse. While doing it, he felt something jerking
and when he asked her about it, she told him she was pregnant with the
child of her husband. They went home the following day.

In March 1982, Florencia, then already working in another household,

went to petitioners house hoping to be re-employed as a servant there.
Since petitioners wife was in need of one, she was re-hired. However
petitioners wife noticed that her stomach was bulging and inquired about
the father of the unborn child. She told petitioners wife that the baby was
by her husband. Because of her condition, she was again told to go
home and they did not see each other anymore.

Petitioner was therefore surprised when summons was served on him by

Florencias counsel. She was demanding support for private respondent
Camelo Regodos. Petitioner refused, denying the alleged paternity. He
insisted she was already pregnant when they had sex. He denied going
to Bacolod City with her and checking in at the Visayan Motel. He
vehemently denied having sex with her on January 2, 1982 and renting a
house for her in Singcang, Bacolod City.
After trial, the court a quo gave more probative weight to the testimony of
Florencia despite its discovery that she misrepresented herself as a
widow when, in reality, her husband was alive. Deciding in favor of
private respondent, the trial court declared:

The child was presented before the Court, and if the Court is to
decide this case, based on the personal appearance of the child
then there can never be a doubt that the plaintiff-minor is the child
of the defendant with plaintiff-minors mother, Florencia Regodos.

xxx xxx xxx

In view of the evidence presented by the plaintiff, the Court finds

the evidence of the plaintiff in support of the claim to "be
meritorious; defendant admitted having a sexual intercourse with
the plaintiffs mother, Florencia Regodos, but denied paternity to
the child. The child was presented before the Court, and if the
Court is to decide this case, based on the personal appearance of
the child, then there can never be a doubt that the plaintiff-minor is
the child of the defendant with plaintiff-minors mother, Florencia
Regodos."2

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC:

The misrepresentation made by Florencia in the petition that she

was a widow should not prejudice the right of petitioner-appellee.
As held by the Supreme Court, even where a witness has been
found to have deliberately falsified the truth in some particulars, it
is not required that the whole of her testimony be rejected (People
vs. Bohol, 170 SCRA 585). It is perfectly reasonable to believe the
testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve it
with respect to other facts (People vs. Delas, 199 SCRA 574, 575).
There is therefore no reason to disbelieve Florencia that her first
intercourse with appellant occurred on January 2, 1982 and nine
(9) months later or on September 9, 1982, she gave birth to
appellee (TSN, Hearing of June 10, 1991 and Exhibit "A").

In the absence of arbitrariness in the evaluation of the evidence

adduced before the trial court and there being no evidence that the
 latter had overlooked or misappreciated, we find no cogent reason
to disturb the trial courts findings.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.3

Hence this petition which assigns the following errors:

A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF

ARTICLE 283 OF THE CIVIL CODE ON THE COMPULSORY
RECOGNITION AND AWARD OF SUPPORT IN FAVOR OF
RESPONDENT-APPELLEE CAMELO REGODOS;

B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS DECISION BASED

ON THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY RESPONDENT CAMELO
REGODOS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.4

Clearly, this petition calls for a review of the factual findings of the two
lower courts. As a general rule, factual issues are not within the province
of this Court. Factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and
confirmed by the Court of Appeals, become final and conclusive and
may not be reviewed on appeal except (1) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave
abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court
of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings
of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, goes beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of
the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooks certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if
properly considered, justifies a different conclusion, and (10) when the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. The Court is
convinced that this case falls within one of the exceptions.5
The trial courts finding of a paternal relationship between petitioner and
private respondent was based on the testimony of the childs mother and
"the personal appearance of the child."

Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is
required to establish paternity and filiation.6 An order for recognition and
support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to
the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if
paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.7

The applicable provisions of the law are Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil
Code:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of

the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final

judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or

a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation

shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a

legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and

special laws.

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation

in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.

xxx xxx xxx

Private respondent presented a copy of his birth and baptismal

certificates, the preparation of which was without the knowledge or
consent of petitioner. A certificate of live birth purportedly
 identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of
paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a
hand in the preparation of said certificate. The local civil registrar
has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on
the information of a third person.8

In the same vein, we have ruled that, while a baptismal certificate may
be considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity
of the entries with respect to the childs paternity.9 Thus, certificates
issued by the local civil registrar and baptismal certificates are per
se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be
admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.10

Aside from Florencias self-serving testimony that petitioner rented a

house for her in Singcang, Bacolod City, private respondent failed to
present sufficient proof of voluntary recognition.

We now proceed to the credibility of Florencias testimony. Both the trial

court and the appellate court brushed aside the misrepresentation of
Florencia in the petition for recognition that she was a widow. Both
courts dismissed the lie as minor which did not affect the rest of her
testimony. We disagree. The fact that Florencias husband is living and
there is a valid subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the
presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even
though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress.11 The presumption of legitimacy does
not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad
principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The
presumption is grounded on the policy to protect innocent offspring from
the odium of illegitimacy.12

In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis,

the extremely subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of
features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity and filiation before
the courts of law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The assailed decision of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 36708 dated March 15, 1996, affirming
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60, in
Spec. Proc. No. 88-C is reversed and set aside. Private respondents
petition for recognition and support is dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Jison vs. CA, 350 Phil. 138 [1998]

Subject:

The Family Code Governs the Present Case (Retroactive Effect Unless
there is Impairment of Rights); How Legitimate or Illegitimate Filiation is
Established; High Standard is Required to Prove Open and Continuous
Possession of the Status of an Illegitimate Child; He who Alleges the
Affirmative of the Issue has the Burden of Proof; Unlawful Intercourse
will not be Presumed merely from the Proof of an Opportunity of Such
Indulgence; The Totality of the Testimonial Evidence offered by Monina
plus the Testimonies of her other Witnesses Sufficiently Prove that she
is the Illegitimate Daughter of Francisco; Certificate of Live Birth is not
Competent Evidence as to the Issue of Paternity when the Putative
Father had no Hand in the Preparation of such Document; The Lack of
Participation of Francisco in the Preparation of Documents Presenetd
render such as Incompetent to Prove Paternity; The Excluded Evidence
Cannot be Considered as Circumstantial Evidence; Family Reputation or
Tradition Regarding Pedigree (Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court); The Enumeration in the Second Part of Section 40 of Rule 130 is
Limited to Family Possessions; The Affidavit Signed by Monina does not
Disprove the Fact that Francisco is her Father; Moninas Evidence
Hurdled the High Standard of Proof Required for Establishing Illegitimate
Filiation; Francisco Failed to Prove the Existence of Laches

Facts:
Private respondent, Monina Jison, instituted a complaint against
petitioner, Francisco Jison, for recognition as illegitimate child of the
latter. The case was filed 20 years after her mothers death and when
she was already 39 years of age.

Petitioner was married to Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940 and sometime in
1945, he impregnated Esperanza Amolar, Moninas mother. Monina
alleged that since childhood, she had enjoyed the continuous, implied
recognition as the illegitimate child of petitioner by his acts and that of
his family. It was likewise alleged that petitioner supported her and spent
for her education such that she became a CPA and eventually a Central
Bank Examiner. Throughout the duration of the trial, Monina was able to
present total of 11 witnesses.

After the trial, the trial court ruled against Monina. Before the Court of
Appeals, Monina seasonably appealed and sought the reversal of the
decision. The appellate court reversed the decision and ruled that
Monina was able to prove illegitimate filiation as regards Francisco.

Held:

The Family Code Governs the Present Case (Retroactive Effect

Unless there is Impairment of Rights)

1. The Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209)

governs the present controversy. As correctly cited by the Court of
Appeals, Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals served as a judicial
confirmation of Article 256 of the Family Code regarding its retroactive
effect unless there be impairment of vested rights, which does not hold
true in the case, it appearing that neither the putative parent nor the child
has passed away and the former having actually resisted the latter's
claim below.

How Legitimate or Illegitimate Filiation is Established

2. Illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and on the

same evidence as that of legitimate children. (Article 175, Family Code)

3. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the

following: (1) Therecord of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or (2) Anadmission of legitimate filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.
(par. 1, Article 172, Family Code)

4. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall

be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws.(par. 1, Article 172, Family Code)

High Standard is Required to Prove Open and Continuous

Possession of the Status of an Illegitimate Child

5. To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an

illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the
permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his,
by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care,
which cannot be attributed to pure charity.

6. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the
conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the
child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but
continuously.

7. By "continuous" is meant uninterrupted and consistent, but does not

require any particular length of time.

8. The standard of proof required to establish one's filiation is founded on

the principle that an order for recognition and support may create an
unwholesome atmosphere or may be an irritant in the family or lives of
the parties, so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is
established by clear and convincing evidence.

He who Alleges the Affirmative of the Issue has the Burden of Proof

9. The party who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of
proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never
parts.

10. In the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima
facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to
defendant to controvert plaintiff's prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict
must be returned in favor of plaintiff.

11. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a
preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
defendant's.

12. The concept of "preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence

which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in
opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.

Unlawful Intercourse will not be Presumed merely from the Proof of

an Opportunity of Such Indulgence

13. It has been observed that unlawful intercourse will not be presumed
merely from proof of an opportunity for such indulgence. However, such
observation does not favor Franciso.

14. Akin to the crime of rape where, in most instances, the only
witnesses to the felony are the participants in the sexual act
themselves, in deciding paternity suits, the issue of whether sexual
intercourse actually occurred inevitably redounds to the victim's or
mother's word, as against the accused's or putative father's
protestations.
15. Even if Moninas mother had long passed away before the institution
of the complaint, Monina can still prove her filiation. The fact of her birth
and her parentage may be established by evidence other than the
testimony of her mother.

The Totality of the Testimonial Evidence offered by Monina plus the

Testimonies of her other Witnesses Sufficiently Prove that she is
the Illegitimate Daughter of Francisco

16. The Court readily concludes that the testimonial evidence offered by
Monina, woven by her narration of circumstances and events that
occurred through the years, concerning her relationship with Franciso,
coupled with the testimonies of her witnesses, overwhelmingly
established that he is his father and that the latter recognized Monina
through his overt acts, consistently shown and manifested throughout
the years publicly and spontaneously.

Certificate of Live Birth is not Competent Evidence as to the Issue

of Paternity when the Putative Father had no Hand in the
Preparation of such Document

17. It is settled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the

putative father is not competent evidence as to the issue of paternity,
when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the
preparation of said certificates, and the Local Civil Registrar is devoid of
authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the
information of a third person.
18. If the alleged father did not intervene in the birth certificate, e.g.,
supplying the information himself, the inscription of his name by the
mother or doctor or registrar is null and void; the mere certificate by the
registrar without the signature of the father is not proof of voluntary
acknowledgment on the latter's part.

The Lack of Participation of Francisco in the Preparation of

Documents Presenetd render such as Incompetent to Prove
Paternity

19. Franciscos lack of participation in the preparation of the baptismal

certificates and school records renders these documents incompetent to
prove paternity, the former being competent merely to prove the
administration of the sacrament of baptism on the date so specified.

20. However, despite the inadmissibility of the school records per se to

prove paternity, they may be admitted as part of Moninas testimony to
corroborate her claim that Francisco spent for her education.

The Excluded Evidence Cannot be Considered as Circumstantial

Evidence

21. The Supreme Court disagrees with the ruling of the Court of Appeals
that the certificates issued by the Local Civil Registrar and the baptismal
certificates may be taken as circumstantial evidence to prove Moninas
filiation.
22. Since they are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of such
filiation, they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to
prove the same.

Family Reputation or Tradition Regarding Pedigree (Section 40,

Rule 130 of the Rules of Court)

23. The provision may be divided into 2 parts: the portion containing the
first clause which pertains to testimonial evidence, under which the
documents in question (the letters written by Franciscos relatives) may
not be admitted as the authors thereof did not take the witness stand;
and the section containing the second phrase regarding entries in family
bibles or other family books, and the like.

The Enumeration in the Second Part of Section 40 of Rule 130 is

Limited to Family Possessions

24. The scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of the
provision, in light of the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects
which are commonly known as "family possessions," or those articles
which represent, in effect, a family's joint statement of its belief as to the
pedigree of a person.

25. These have been described as objects openly exhibited and well
known to the family, or those which, if preserved in a family, may be
regarded as giving a family tradition.
26. The private documents presented by Monina cannot be regarded as
family possessions and may not be admitted on the basis of Section 40
of Rule 130.

27. The weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is

the general repute, the common reputation in the family, and not the
common reputation in community, that is a material element of evidence
going to establish pedigree.

The Affidavit Signed by Monina does not Disprove the Fact that
Francisco is her Father

28. Even the affidavit which Francisco had foisted on the trial court does
not hold sway in the face of Moninas logical explanation that she at first
did agree to sign the affidavit which contained untruthful statements. In
fact, she promptly complained to him who, however explained to her that
the affidavit was only for the consumption of his spouse.

29. At any rate, if Monina was not his illegitimate daughter, it would have
been uncalled for, if not absurd, for him or his lawyer to have secured
her sworn statement. In asking her to sign the said affidavit at the cost of
P15,000, he clearly betrayed his intention to conceal or suppress his
paternity of Monina.

Moninas Evidence Hurdled the High Standard of Proof Required

for Establishing Illegitimate Filiation

30. Moninas evidence hurdled the high standard of proof required for
the success of an action to establish one's illegitimate filiation when
relying upon the provisions regarding open and continuous possession
or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Moreover, she proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of
evidence.

Francisco Failed to Prove the Existence of Laches

31. As Francisco set up laches as an affirmative defense, it was

incumbent upon him to prove the existence of its elements. However, he
only succeeded in showing Moninas delay in asserting her claim, but
miserably failed to prove the last element, which was that injury will be
done to him in the event that relief is accorded to Monina.

32. The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the

court, and since it is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by
equitable considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat justice or to
perpetuate fraud and injustice.

33. Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if
illegitimate, Moninna filed her action well within the period granted her by
a positive provision of law. A denial then of her action on ground of
laches would clearly be inequitable and unjust.

Liyao, Jr. vs. Liyao, et al., 428 Phil. 628 [2002]

G.R. No. 138961 March 7, 2002

WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented by his mother Corazon

Garcia, petitioner,
vs.
JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, PEARL MARGARET L. TAN, TITA ROSE
L. TAN AND LINDA CHRISTINA LIYAO,respondents.

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision

dated June 4, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.V. No.
453941 which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 167 in declaring William Liyao, Jr. as the
illegitimate (spurious) son of the deceased William Liyao and ordering
Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and
Linda Christina Liyao to recognize and acknowledge William Liyao, Jr.
as a compulsory heir of the deceased William Liyao and entitled to all
successional rights as such and to pay the costs of the suit.

On November 29,1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother

Corazon G. Garcia, filed Civil Case No. 24943 before the RTC of Pasig,
Branch 167 which is an action for compulsory recognition as "the
illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William Liyao" against herein
respondents, Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L.
Tan and Linda Christina Liyao.2 The complaint was later amended to
include the allegation that petitioner "was in continuous possession and
enjoyment of the status of the child of said William Liyao," petitioner
having been "recognized and acknowledged as such child by the
decedent during his lifetime."3

The facts as alleged by petitioner are as follows:

Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon

M. Yulo for more than ten (10) years at the time of the institution of the
said civil case. Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965
up to the time of Williams untimely demise on December 2, 1975. They
lived together in the company of Corazons two (2) children from her
subsisting marriage, namely:

Enrique and Bernadette, both surnamed Yulo, in a succession of rented

houses in Quezon City and Manila. This was with the knowledge of
William Liyaos legitimate children, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina
Liyao-Ortiga, from his subsisting marriage with Juanita Tanhoti Liyao.
Tita Rose and Christina were both employed at the Far East Realty
Investment, Inc. of which Corazon and William were then vice president
and president, respectively.

Sometime in 1974, Corazon bought a lot from Ortigas and Co. which
required the signature of her husband, Ramon Yulo, to show his consent
to the aforesaid sale. She failed to secure his signature and, had never
been in touch with him despite the necessity to meet him. Upon the
advice of William Liyao, the sale of the parcel of land located at the Valle
Verde Subdivision was registered under the name of Far East Realty
Investment, Inc.

On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. at the Cardinal
Santos Memorial Hospital. During her three (3) day stay at the hospital,
William Liyao visited and stayed with her and the new born baby,
William, Jr. (Billy). All the medical and hospital expenses, food and
clothing were paid under the account of William Liyao. William Liyao
even asked his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez, to secure
a copy of Billys birth certificate. He likewise instructed Corazon to open
a bank account for Billy with the Consolidated Bank and Trust
Company4 and gave weekly amounts to be deposited therein.5 William
Liyao would bring Billy to the office, introduce him as his good looking
son and had their pictures taken together.6

During the lifetime of William Liyao, several pictures were taken

showing, among others, William Liyao and Corazon together with Billys
godfather, Fr. Julian Ruiz, William Liyaos legal staff and their wives
while on vacation in Baguio.7 Corazon also presented pictures in court to
prove that that she usually accompanied William Liyao while attending
various social gatherings and other important meetings.8 During the
occasion of William Liyaos last birthday on November 22, 1975 held at
the Republic Supermarket, William Liyao expressly acknowledged Billy
as his son in the presence of Fr. Ruiz, Maurita Pasion and other friends
and said, "Hey, look I am still young, I can still make a good looking
son."9 Since birth, Billy had been in continuous possession and
enjoyment of the status of a recognized and/or acknowledged child of
William Liyao by the latters direct and overt acts. William Liyao
supported Billy and paid for his food, clothing and other material needs.
However, after William Liyaos death, it was Corazon who provided sole
support to Billy and took care of his tuition fees at La Salle, Greenhills.
William Liyao left his personal belongings, collections, clothing, old
newspaper clippings and laminations at the house in White Plains where
he shared his last moments with Corazon.

Testifying for the petitioner, Maurita Pasion declared that she knew both
Corazon G. Garcia and William Liyao who were godparents to her
children. She used to visit Corazon and William Liyao from 1965-1975.
The two children of Corazon from her marriage to Ramon Yulo, namely,
Bernadette and Enrique (Ike), together with some housemaids lived with
Corazon and William Liyao as one family. On some occasions like
birthdays or some other celebrations, Maurita would sleep in the
couples residence and cook for the family. During these occasions, she
would usually see William Liyao in sleeping clothes. When Corazon,
during the latter part of 1974, was pregnant with her child Billy, Maurita
often visited her three (3) to four (4) times a week in Greenhills and later
on in White Plains where she would often see William Liyao. Being a
close friend of Corazon, she was at the Cardinal Santos Memorial
Hospital during the birth of Billy. She continuously visited them at White
Plains and knew that William Liyao, while living with her friend Corazon,
gave support by way of grocery supplies, money for household
expenses and matriculation fees for the two (2) older children,
Bernadette and Enrique. During William Liyaos birthday on November
22, 1975 held at the Republic Supermarket Office, he was carrying Billy
and told everybody present, including his two (2) daughters from his
legal marriage, "Look, this is my son, very guapo and healthy."10 He then
talked about his plan for the baptism of Billy before Christmas. He
intended to make it "engrande" and "make the bells of San Sebastian
Church ring."11 Unfortunately, this did not happen since William Liyao
passed away on December 2, 1975. Maurita attended Mr. Liyaos funeral
and helped Corazon pack his clothes. She even recognized a short
sleeved shirt of blue and gray12 which Mr. Liyao wore in a
photograph13 as well as another shirt of lime green14 as belonging to the
deceased. A note was also presented with the following inscriptions: "To
Cora, Love From William."15 Maurita remembered having invited the
couple during her mothers birthday where the couple had their pictures
taken while exhibiting affectionate poses with one another. Maurita knew
that Corazon is still married to Ramon Yulo since her marriage has not
been annulled nor is Corazon legally separated from her said husband.
However, during the entire cohabitation of William Liyao with Corazon
Garcia, Maurita had not seen Ramon Yulo or any other man in the house
when she usually visited Corazon.

Gloria Panopio testified that she is the owner of a beauty parlor and that
she knew that Billy is the son of her neighbors, William Liyao and
Corazon Garcia, the latter being one of her customers. Gloria met Mr.
Liyao at Corazons house in Scout Delgado, Quezon City in the
Christmas of 1965. Gloria had numerous occasions to see Mr. Liyao
from 1966 to 1974 and even more so when the couple transferred to
White Plains, Quezon City from 1974-1975. At the time Corazon was
conceiving, Mr. Liyao was worried that Corazon might have another
miscarriage so he insisted that she just stay in the house, play mahjong
and not be bored. Gloria taught Corazon how to play mahjong and
together with Atty. Brillantes wife and sister-in-law, had mahjong
sessions among themselves. Gloria knew that Mr. Liyao provided
Corazon with a rented house, paid the salary of the maids and food for
Billy. He also gave Corazon financial support. Gloria knew that Corazon
is married but is separated from Ramon Yulo although Gloria never had
any occasion to see Mr. Yulo with Corazon in the house where Mr. Liyao
and Corazon lived.

Enrique Garcia Yulo testified that he had not heard from his father,
Ramon Yulo, from the time that the latter abandoned and separated from
his family. Enrique was about six (6) years old when William Liyao
started to live with them up to the time of the latters death on December
2, 1975. Mr. Liyao was very supportive and fond of Enriques half
brother, Billy. He identified several pictures showing Mr. Liyao carrying
Billy at the house as well as in the office. Enriques testimony was
corroborated by his sister, Bernadette Yulo, who testified that the various
pictures showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy could not have been
superimposed and that the negatives were in the possession of her
mother, Corazon Garcia.

Respondents, on the other hand, painted a different picture of the story.

Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga stated that her parents, William Liyao and
Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally married.16Linda grew up and lived
with her parents at San Lorenzo Village, Makati, Metro Manila until she
got married; that her parents were not separated legally or in fact and
that there was no reason why any of her parents would institute legal
separation proceedings in court. Her father lived at their house in San
Lorenzo Village and came home regularly. Even during out of town
business trips or for conferences with the lawyers at the office, her father
would change his clothes at home because of his personal hygiene and
habits. Her father reportedly had trouble sleeping in other peoples
homes. Linda described him as very conservative and a strict
disciplinarian. He believed that no amount of success would compensate
for failure of a home. As a businessman, he was very tough, strong,
fought for what he believed in and did not give up easily. He suffered two
strokes before the fatal attack which led to his death on December 2,
1975. He suffered a stroke at the office sometime in April-May 1974 and
was attended by Dr. Santiago Co. He then stayed in the house for two
(2) to three (3) months for his therapy and acupuncture treatment. He
could not talk, move, walk, write or sign his name. In the meantime,
Linda and her sister, Tita Rose Liyao-Tan, ran the office. She handled
the collection of rents while her sister referred legal matters to their
lawyers. William Liyao was bedridden and had personally changed. He
was not active in business and had dietary restrictions. Mr. Liyao also
suffered a milder stroke during the latter part of September to October
1974. He stayed home for two (2) to three (3) days and went back to
work. He felt depressed, however, and was easily bored. He did not put
in long hours in the office unlike before and tried to spend more time with
his family.

Linda testified that she knew Corazon Garcia is still married to Ramon
Yulo. Corazon was not legally separated from her husband and the
records from the Local Civil Registrar do not indicate that the couple
obtained any annulment17of their marriage. Once in 1973, Linda chanced
upon Ramon Yulo picking up Corazon Garcia at the company garage.
Immediately after the death of Lindas father, Corazon went to Lindas
office for the return of the formers alleged investments with the Far East
Realty Investment, Inc. including a parcel of land sold by Ortigas and
Company. Linda added that Corazon, while still a Vice-President of the
company, was able to take out documents, clothes and several
laminated pictures of William Liyao from the office. There was one
instance when she was told by the guards, "Mrs. Yulo is leaving and
taking out things again."18 Linda then instructed the guards to bring Mrs.
Yulo to the office upstairs but her sister, Tita Rose, decided to let
Corazon Garcia go. Linda did not recognize any article of clothing which
belonged to her father after having been shown three (3) large suit cases
full of mens clothes, underwear, sweaters, shorts and pajamas.

Tita Rose Liyao-Tan testified that her parents were legally married and
had never been separated. They resided at No. 21 Hernandez Street,
San Lorenzo Village, Makati up to the time of her fathers death on
December 2, 1975.19Her father suffered two (2) minor cardio-vascular
arrests (CVA) prior to his death. During the first heart attack sometime
between April and May 1974, his speech and hands were affected and
he had to stay home for two (2) to three (3) months under strict
medication, taking aldomet, serpadil and cifromet which were prescribed
by Dr. Bonifacio Yap, for high blood pressure and cholesterol level
control.20 Tita Rose testified that after the death of Mr. Liyao, Corazon
Garcia was paid the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(100,000.00) representing her investment in the Far East Realty
Investment Inc. Tita Rose also stated that her family never received any
formal demand that they recognize a certain William Liyao, Jr. as an
illegitimate son of her father, William Liyao. After assuming the position
of President of the company, Tita Rose did not come across any check
signed by her late father representing payment to lessors as rentals for
the house occupied by Corazon Garcia. Tita Rose added that the
laminated photographs presented by Corazon Garcia are the personal
collection of the deceased which were displayed at the latters office.

The last witness who testified for the respondents was Ramon Pineda,
driver and bodyguard of William Liyao from 1962 to 1974, who said that
he usually reported for work at San Lorenzo Village, Makati to pick up
his boss at 8:00 oclock in the morning. At past 7:00 oclock in the
evening, either Carlos Palamigan or Serafin Villacillo took over as night
shift driver. Sometime between April and May 1974, Mr. Liyao got sick. It
was only after a month that he was able to report to the office.
Thereafter, Mr. Liyao was not able to report to the office regularly.
Sometime in September 1974, Mr. Liyao suffered from another heart
attack. Mr. Pineda added that as a driver and bodyguard of Mr. Liyao, he
ran errands for the latter among which was buying medicine for him
like capasid and aldomet. On December 2, 1975, Mr. Pineda was called
inside the office of Mr. Liyao. Mr. Pineda saw his employer leaning on
the table. He tried to massage Mr. Liyaos breast and decided later to
carry and bring him to the hospital but Mr. Liyao died upon arrival
thereat. Mrs. Liyao and her daughter, Linda Liyao-Ortiga were the first to
arrive at the hospital.

Mr. Pineda also declared that he knew Corazon Garcia to be one of the
employees of the Republic Supermarket. People in the office knew that
she was married. Her husband, Ramon Yulo, would sometimes go to the
office. One time, in 1974, Mr. Pineda saw Ramon Yulo at the office
garage as if to fetch Corazon Garcia. Mr. Yulo who was also asking
about cars for sale, represented himself as car dealer.

Witness Pineda declared that he did not know anything about the claim
of Corazon. He freely relayed the information that he saw Mr. Yulo in the
garage of Republic Supermarket once in 1973 and then in 1974 to Atty.
Quisumbing when he went to the latters law office. Being the driver of
Mr. Liyao for a number of years, Pineda said that he remembered having
driven the group of Mr. Liyao, Atty. Astraquillo, Atty. Brillantes, Atty.
Magno and Atty. Laguio to Baguio for a vacation together with the
lawyers wives. During his employment, as driver of Mr. Liyao, he does
not remember driving for Corazon Garcia on a trip to Baguio or for
activities like shopping.

On August 31, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and

against the defendants as follows:

(a) Confirming the appointment of Corazon G. Garcia as the

guardian ad litem of the minor William Liyao, Jr.;
 (b) Declaring the minor William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate
(spurious) son of the deceased William Liyao;

(c) Ordering the defendants Juanita Tanhoti Liyao, Pearl Margaret

L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Christian Liyao, to recognize, and
acknowledge the minor William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory heir of
the deceased William Liyao, entitled to all succesional rights as
such; and

(d) Costs of suit.21

In ruling for herein petitioner, the trial court said it was convinced by
preponderance of evidence that the deceased William Liyao sired
William Liyao, Jr. since the latter was conceived at the time when
Corazon Garcia cohabited with the deceased. The trial court observed
that herein petitioner had been in continuous possession and enjoyment
of the status of a child of the deceased by direct and overt acts of the
latter such as securing the birth certificate of petitioner through his
confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez; openly and publicly
acknowledging petitioner as his son; providing sustenance and even
introducing herein petitioner to his legitimate children.

The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the ruling of the trial court
saying that the law favors the legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of
the child and "the presumption of legitimacy is thwarted only on ethnic
ground and by proof that marital intimacy between husband and wife
was physically impossible at the period cited in Article 257 in relation to
Article 255 of the Civil Code." The appellate court gave weight to the
testimonies of some witnesses for the respondents that Corazon Garcia
and Ramon Yulo who were still legally married and have not secured
legal separation, were seen in each others company during the
supposed time that Corazon cohabited with the deceased William Liyao.
The appellate court further noted that the birth certificate and the
baptismal certificate of William Liyao, Jr. which were presented by
petitioner are not sufficient to establish proof of paternity in the absence
of any evidence that the deceased, William Liyao, had a hand in the
preparation of said certificates and considering that his signature does
not appear thereon. The Court of Appeals stated that neither do family
pictures constitute competent proof of filiation. With regard to the
passbook which was presented as evidence for petitioner, the appellate
court observed that there was nothing in it to prove that the same was
opened by William Liyao for either petitioner or Corazon Garcia since
William Liyaos signature and name do not appear thereon.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the
present petition.

It must be stated at the outset that both petitioner and respondents have
raised a number of issues which relate solely to the sufficiency of
evidence presented by petitioner to establish his claim of filiation with the
late William Liyao. Unfortunately, both parties have consistently
overlooked the real crux of this litigation: May petitioner impugn his own
legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father,
William Liyao?

We deny the present petition.

Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid
marriage is presumed to be legitimate.22 The presumption of legitimacy
of children does not only flow out from a declaration contained in the
statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the
supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy
to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.23

The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive

and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary.
Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code24 provides:

Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following
the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following
its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be
legitimate.

Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that

of the physical impossibility of the husband having access to his wife
within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which
preceded the birth of the child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:

 1) By the impotence of the husband;

2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such
a way that access was not possible;

3) By the serious illness of the husband.

Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had been living
separately for ten (10) years from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time
that she cohabited with the late William Liyao and it was physically
impossible for her to have sexual relations with Ramon Yulo when
petitioner was conceived and born. To bolster his claim, petitioner
presented a document entitled, "Contract of Separation,"25 executed and
signed by Ramon Yulo indicating a waiver of rights to any and all claims
on any property that Corazon Garcia might acquire in the future.26

The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her
husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and born is
of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to have
sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the
legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning
the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may
only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the
conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code.27 Impugning the
legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in
exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one
directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his
wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal
that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest
involved.28 It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to
contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs -
can impugn legitimacy; that would amount o an insult to his memory.29

It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia

as guardian ad litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel
recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the
illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that
a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though
the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress.30 We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his
present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the
husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the
legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child
himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be
the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of
the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his
mothers alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of
legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot elect the paternity of the
husband who successfully defeated the presumption.31

Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children of

Corazon Garcia with Ramon Yulo, in testifying for herein petitioner
amount to impugnation of the legitimacy of the latter?

We think not. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the

heirs of the husband are allowed to contest the legitimacy of the child.
There is nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has already
passed away at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor at the time of
the initiation of this proceedings. Notably, the case at bar was initiated by
petitioner himself through his mother, Corazon Garcia, and not through
Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled that the legitimacy of the child
can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the
proper parties and within the period limited by law.1wphi1

Considering the foregoing, we find no reason to discuss the sufficiency

of the evidence presented by both parties on the petitioners claim of
alleged filiation with the late William Liyao. In any event, there is no
clear, competent and positive evidence presented by the petitioner that
his alleged father had admitted or recognized his paternity.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45394 is hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Potenciano vs. Reynoso, G.R. No. 140707, April 22, 2003

G.R. No. 140707 April 22, 2003

NORGENE POTENCIANO and Spouses MANUEL JAYME and

NATIVIDAD ZAFRA-JAYME, petitioners,
vs.
DWIGHT "IKE" B. REYNOSO, CARLOS B. REYNOSO, MA.
LOURDES B. REYNOSO, FELIPE B. REYNOSO, CLAREBELO B.
REYNOSO, VERONICA B. NEBRES and the COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The basic issue in this case revolves around the authenticity of the
signatures of the alleged vendor. Upholding the regional trial court, the
Court of Appeals opted to give credence to the testimonies of the
handwriting expert and other witnesses presented by private
respondents, as against the testimony of the attorney who had notarized
the Deeds of Sale. After due deliberation, this Court finds no cogent
reason to reverse the two lower courts finding of fact.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court, assailing the May 7, 1999 Decision1 and the October 20,
1999 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 39121.
The decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, [there being] no error in the decision appealed

from, the same is AFFIRMED."3

The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.4

The Facts

The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:

"Sometime in 1961, the late Felipe B. Pareja former Cebu City

Treasurer was convicted of the crime of murder and sentenced to
life imprisonment with the accessory penalties attendant thereto
including civil interdiction. Felipe Pareja was granted a conditional
pardon by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on 2 August 1971.
On 19 October 1979, Felipe Pareja executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale covering a parcel of land and all improvements thereon
situated at Juana Osmea Ext., Capitol Site, Cebu City containing
an area of four hundred ninety three (493) square meters in favor
of his illegitimate son herein defendant-appellant Manuel Jayme
who later claimed that the said sale was made to cover the
payments he had made for the hospitalization expenses of his
father, he having been constrained to borrow money from several
people for the purpose. Before Felipe Pareja died on August 6,
1981, he executed a Last Will and Testament dated June 24, 1976
wherein he bequeathed to herein appellees and appellant Manuel
Jayme the lot in question while at the same time recognizing them
as his illegitimate children. On 29 October 1979 or ten (10) days
after the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor by
Felipe Pareja, spouses Manuel and Natividad Jayme executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale covering the property in favor of defendant-
appellant Norgene Potenciano who eventually filed an ejectment
case against plaintiff-appellee Dwight Reynoso.

"[Plaintiff]-appellees Dwight Ike B. Reynoso, Carlos B. Reynoso,

Ma. Lourdes B. Reynoso, Felipe Harry B. Reynoso filed the
instant suit as likewise illegitimate children with another woman of
the late Felipe B. Pareja while plaintiff-appellee Veronica B. Nebres
aunt of the other plaintiffs, claims to be the owner of a residential
house on the said property. The subject property is now covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 77221 in the name of defendant
Norgene Potenciano after cancellation of the Transfer Certificates
of Title in the name of the former registered owners Rosa and
Milagros Cuenco, Felipe Pareja and finally Manuel Jayme before
registration in the name of Potenciano. Plaintiffs assailed the sale
made by their father contending that the latter was already senile
and still suffering from the accessory penalty of civil interdiction at
the time of the sale. They also raise the issue of forgery of their late
fathers signature on the Deed of Sale."5 (Citations omitted)

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which
ruled that the signatures of Felipe B. Pareja on the subject Deeds of
Sale had been forged.6 Both courts gave more weight to the testimony of
the expert witness, who had testified that the signatures were indeed
forgeries as opposed to the testimony of the notary public who had
notarized the questioned documents.

The RTC explained that the expert witness had examined the forgery
scientifically; while the notary public, who was the counsel of Petitioner
Norgene Potenciano, was an interested party.7 Consequently, the forged
Deeds of Absolute Sale did not transfer any rights from Pareja to the
Jayme spouses or from the spouses to Potenciano.8

The CA also agreed with the RTC that Potenciano was a buyer in bad
faith for not having sufficiently investigated the property at the time he
bought it, when it was then in the possession of people other than the
seller.9

Accepted by the appellate court as sufficient proof of filiation was the

will, in which respondents were recognized by their father, even if it had
not yet been probated.10 Moreover, the CA ruled that petitioners were
bound by a Joint Affidavit executed by Manuel Jayme and Dwight
Reynoso declaring that, together with the other parties, they were
recognized illegitimate children of Pareja.11

Hence, this Petition.12

The Issues

In their Memorandum,13 petitioners submit the following issues for our

consideration:

"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in

concluding that the documents of sale are null and void ab initio. A
sub-issue would be whether or not Felipe B. Pareja was still
suffering from the accessory penalty of civil interdiction when he
sold the lot and house to Petitioner-Spouses Jayme.

"II. Whether or not the Decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals

is contrary to law and jurisprudence. It is contrary to Article 278 of
 the New Civil Code, and ignored the case of Genato vs. Genato
Commercial Corporation, CA-G.R. No. 22374-R, April 20, 1960; 56
O.G. 6211, requiring proof to be submitted or offered to prove the
due execution of a will.

"III. Whether or not the Decision of the Court of Appeals is contrary

to Article 434 of the New Civil Code.

"IV. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred

in ignoring the clear, direct and personal testimony of the notary
public, Atty. Ronald Duterte, who categorically testified that Felipe
Pareja signed the documents of sale in his presence and who
ignored the well-settled jurisprudence that a notary public is
presumed to have performed his duties according to law.

"V. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in giving

credence to the findings of Mr. Romeo Varona, alleged document
expert, when his testimony and competence has been thoroughly
impugned.

"VI. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in

concluding that Petitioner Norgene Potenciano is a buyer in bad
faith.

"VII. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in awarding

damages to private respondents for the simple reason that private
respondents miserably failed to prove their claims as alleged in
their Complaint."14

Simply stated, the issues to be resolved are as follows: (1) whether the
sale of the subject property by Pareja to the Jayme spouses and, in turn,
by the spouses to Potenciano was valid and binding; (2) whether
Potenciano was a buyer in good faith; (3) whether private respondents
have the personality to demand the reconveyance of the property in
question; and (4) whether private respondents are entitled to damages.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is unmeritorious.

 First Issue:
Validity of the Deeds of Sale

Petitioners argue that the Deed of Sale dated October 19,

1979,15 between Pareja and the Jayme spouses; and that which was
dated October 29, 1979,16 this time between the Jayme spouses and
Potenciano, are both valid and enforceable. They contend that Pareja,
being the absolute owner, had the right to dispose of the house and lot in
question. They dispute the finding of forgery, claiming that the notary
public is more credible than the expert witness. Further, at the time of
the disposition, Pareja was supposedly no longer suffering the accessory
penalty of civil interdiction, because he had already served the full term
of his commuted sentence.

Forgery of Parejas Signature

on the Deeds of Sale

The most crucial question to be resolved in this case is the authenticity

of Parejas alleged signature on the Deed of Sale transferring the subject
property to the Jayme spouses. Once the validity of this transfer is
established, then the succeeding one -- this time from the Jayme
spouses to Potenciano, in which Pareja allegedly signed as a witness --
can also be evaluated.

Preliminarily, we should stress that the remedy of appeal by certiorari

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court contemplates only questions of law,
not of fact.17 A question of law exists when there is doubt or controversy
as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. On the other hand, there
is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or
the falsity of the statement of facts.18

It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over
again, unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are
totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute
palpable error or grave abuse of discretion.19

The theory of forgery advanced by petitioners involves a question of fact

previously raised and satisfactorily ruled upon by the two lower courts.
As a rule, the findings of fact of the CA, affirming those of the RTC, are
final and conclusive. The Supreme Court cannot review those findings
on appeal, especially when they are borne out by the records or are
based on substantial evidence.20

This application of this rule can be controverted only by the exceptions

set forth in a long line of jurisprudence,21none of which is available in the
instant case. The CA competently ruled upon the issues raised by
petitioners and laid down the proper legal as well as factual bases for its
Decision. Petitioners have not given any cogent reason to question its
findings that the signatures were forged.

Although Atty. Ronald Duterte, the notary public, testified to the

genuineness of the signatures of Pareja on the questioned Deeds of
Sale, both the trial and the appellate courts still ruled against petitioners.
Generally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred
upon it with respect to its due execution. Thus, a document
acknowledged before a notary public has in its favor the presumption of
regularity.22

However, this presumption is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear

and convincing evidence to the contrary.23To show that the signatures of
Pareja were forged on the questioned Deeds of Sale, petitioners
presented Dwight Reynoso, who was familiar with his handwriting; and
Romeo Varona, a handwriting expert of the National Bureau of
Investigation.

Varona reported fundamental divergencies between the two sets of

sample signatures as follows:

"Comparative examination and analysis of the questioned

signatures marked Q-1, Q-2, Q-3 and the standard specimen
signatures marked S-1 to S-10 inclusive reveal fundamental
divergencies in letter formation, construction, skill and other
individual handwriting characteristics."24

From these findings, he concluded that the "signatures of Felipe Pareja

appearing on the Deed of Absolute Sale marked Q-1, Q-2 and Q-3
were forged."25
However, we are not unmindful of the rule that a finding of forgery does
not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts; the judge
is still required to conduct an independent examination of the questioned
signature.26The CA did exactly this. It conducted its own independent
examination of the signatures and concluded that the striking differences
between the questioned signatures and those admitted as genuine were
readily noticeable upon inspection.27

On the other hand, Atty. Duterte testified that Pareja had personally
appeared before him and signed the two instruments himself. The former
made these categorical statements on the signature of the latter, both as
the vendor in the October 19, 1979 Deed and as a witness in that which
was dated October 29, 1979.

However, Atty. Dutertes testimony as to the latter Deed of Sale was

completely belied by the other witnesses, who testified that Pareja had
signed as a witness in the latters own residence and not in the presence
of the notary public. Petitioner Potenciano himself admitted that Pareja --
being already sickly at the time -- had signed in the latters own house
and not in the presence of Notary Public Duterte.28

Equally telling is the doubt expressed by the RTC on the notary publics
motives:

"x x x. However, the Court is inclined to give more weight [to] the
testimony of the expert witness, not only because the latter
explained the forgery scientifically but also for the reason that the
notary public who notarized the questioned documents was the
former counsel of defendant Potenciano."29

Thus, considering the testimonies of the various witnesses and a plain

comparison of the questioned signatures with admittedly genuine ones,
the Court finds no reason to reverse the findings of the two lower courts.
Although the Deeds of Sale were public documents having in their favor
the presumption of regularity, such presumption was adequately refuted
by competent witnesses and the appellate courts visual analysis of the
documents.
Since the signature of the alleged vendor was a forgery, no rights were
transferred from him to the alleged vendees. In turn, the Jayme spouses
could not have conveyed ownership of the property to Petitioner
Potenciano. It is a well-settled principle that no one can give what one
does not have.30 Accordingly, one can sell only what one owns or is
authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more than what the
seller can transfer legally.31

Civil Interdiction

Having ruled that the signatures of Pareja on the questioned Deeds of

Sale were forged, we hold that the question of whether he was still
suffering civil interdiction at the time he allegedly sold the property now
becomes irrelevant to the determination of the validity of the
transactions.

Parenthetically, this Court notes that in their narration of facts, both the
RTC and the CA automatically ascribed the accessory penalty of civil
interdiction to Pareja as a result of his conviction for murder and the
consequent life imprisonment imposed upon him by the Court of First
Instance of Cebu.32 We shall not rule on the correctness of the penalty,
since the criminal case in which it was imposed is not the subject of this
appeal. However, we remind the lower courts that life imprisonment
and reclusion perpetua are distinct penalties.

Reclusion perpetua entails an imprisonment of at least thirty years, after

which the convict becomes eligible for pardon.33 It carries accessory
penalties including civil interdiction.34 Life imprisonment, on the other
hand, has no fixed duration and carries no accessory penalties.35 Hence,
to say that Pareja was civilly interdicted by reason of the life
imprisonment imposed on him would be inaccurate.

Second Issue:
Buyer in Good Faith

Petitioners also argue that Potenciano was an innocent purchaser in

good faith and for value. He was allegedly approached by Petitioner
Manuel Jayme, who wanted to sell the property in question.36 Before
buying it, the former supposedly exhausted efforts to verify the
muniments of the latters title.37 Also, even if it was still in the name of its
original owners [the Cuencos], Jayme was able to show to Potenciano
the Deed of Sale that had transferred the property from the Cuencos to
Pareja and, subsequently, from Pareja to the Jayme spouses. These
circumstances allegedly showed Potencianos good faith.

We disagree. The burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good

faith lies upon one who asserts that status.38In discharging the burden, it
is not enough to invoke the ordinary presumption of good faith.39

A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the property of
another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in
it, and who pays therefor a full and fair price at the time of the purchase
or before receiving such notice.40

The whole evidence in this case points to the absolute lack of good faith
on the part of Potenciano. At the time he allegedly bought the property in
question, no certificate of title was ever presented to him. If we are to
believe petitioners position, there were two transfers before the alleged
sale to him. The first was from the Cuencos to Pareja, while the second
was from Pareja to the Jayme spouses. As Potenciano himself stated in
his testimony, when they executed the Deed of Sale on October 29,
1979, there was no certificate of title in the name of the Jayme spouses
or of Pareja41 or of the alleged original owners, the Cuencos.42 There
was simply a lot to be sold, and an ocular inspection thereof
conducted.43

The glaring lack of good faith on the part of Potenciano is more than
apparent in his testimony, which we reproduce in part hereunder:

"ATTY. GUERRERO:

Q In other words, you relied only on the Deed of Sale from

Rosa and Milagros Cuenco to Felipe B. Pareja and from Felipe
Pareja to Manuel Jayme, a duly notarized deed of sale?

WITNESS:

A Yes, sir."
 xxx xxx xxx

"ATTY. GUERRERO:

Q So you only based it on the three deeds of sale?

WITNESS:

A Yes, sir.

ATTY. GUERRERO:

Q Now, in your deed of sale dated October 29, 1979 you also
bought a house of strong materials? which was included in the
sale?

WITNESS:

A Yes, sir.

ATTY. GUERRERO:

Q Now, when you knew that there was no certificate of title in

the name of Manuel Jayme or when you were not shown a
certificate of title in the name of Manuel Jayme did you verify from
the Register of Deeds about it?

WITNESS:

A No, sir.

ATTY. GUERRERO:

Q Before October 29, 1979, you did not verify about it in the
office of the Register of Deeds?

WITNESS:

A No.

ATTY. GUERRERO:
Q After October 29, 1979 did you go to the Register of
Deeds?

WITNESS:

A I did not go to the Register of Deeds also.

ATTY. GUERRERO:

Q Now, what did you rely as a basis in buying the house?

WITNESS:

A Because I trusted Ronie Duterte. He was the one who

facilitated everything, on the transaction.

ATTY. GUERRERO:

Q Because you relied on those three deeds of sale of Cuenco

to Pareja and Pareja to Jayme, you bought the property on
installment basis?

WITNESS:

A Yes, sir.

ATTY. GUERRERO:

Q When did you fully pay the consideration, the price of the
Deed of Sale?

WITNESS:

A I do not know whether it was fully paid because they were

the ones who computed it.

ATTY. GUERRERO:

Q Who are you referring to when you said they?

WITNESS:
A My father.

ATTY. GUERRERO:

Q In other words Mr. Witness, the money used to pay the land
came from your father?

WITNESS:

A Yes. If Mr. Jayme transact business with my father, then my

father will be the one to pay.

ATTY. GUERRERO:

Q You said Mr. Witness that when you filed your answer to
the complaint in this case, in paragraph 23 thereof, you caused to
be verified the existence of the certificates of title in the Office of
the Register of Deeds, that is in paragraph 23 of your answer to
the complaint. Which is true now, did you verify or did you not
verify about it?

WITNESS:

A It is only now.

ATTY. GUERRERO:

Q What particular date?

WITNESS:

A I could not remember the exact date.

ATTY. GUERRERO:

Q But only this year?

WITNESS:

A No.
 ATTY. GUERRERO:

Q Was it after the price was fully paid?

WITNESS:

A After we received [the] title of the land we discovered that

there was somebody who is occupying the lot.

ATTY. GUERRERO:

Q So, you verified in the Office of the Register of Deeds only

after you were given the title?

WITNESS:

A Yes, sir."44

Obviously, Potenciano was shown no muniment of title covering the

property he was buying, but merely three Deeds of Sale tracing its
transfer from three alleged owners, whom he did not even know. Neither
did he verify its ownership with the Register of Deeds. What utterly
aggravated the situation was the fact that he did not even care whom he
was dealing with. He simply trusted a certain Ronie Duterte, who
facilitated "everything" without ascertaining the authority or legal right of
the persons he was dealing with.

Equally significant is the fact that even before executing the alleged
Deed of Sale, Potenciano never checked who was in possession of the
property. He testified as follows:

"ATTY. GUERRERO:

Q Now, after you executed the Deed of Sale or after October

29, 1979, you were informed by Mr. Manuel Jayme that the
property which you bought was possessed by third persons, one of
whom was Ike Reynoso and his family, is that correct?

WITNESS:
A Yes, sir.

ATTY. GUERRERO:

Q It was only after the signing of the deed of sale?

WITNESS:

A Yes, sir, after the execution of the deed of sale.

ATTY. GUERRERO:

Q What did you do upon learning of the fact that it was

possessed by third persons, one of whom was Ike Reynoso and
his family?

WITNESS:

A Mr. Jayme said to me that there is nothing wrong with it

because the occupants there will just vacate the premises.

ATTY. GUERRERO:

Q In other words, you did not pay attention to the information

given to you by Mr. Jayme that the property was possessed by
third persons?

WITNESS:

A Yes, because he said that the occupants will just vacate the
premises, so I did not mind. I trusted them.

ATTY. GUERRERO:

Q When Manuel Jayme told you that the occupants of the

property will just vacate, you did not have a certificate of title in
your name yet?

WITNESS:

A Not yet.
 ATTY. GUERRERO:

Q Neither was there any title in the name of Jayme yet?

WITNESS:

A Yes, sir."45

Settled is the rule that a buyer of real property that is in the possession
of a person other than the seller must be wary. A buyer who does not
investigate the rights of the one in possession46 can hardly be regarded
as a buyer in good faith.

To be sure, we cannot ascribe good faith to those who have not shown
any diligence in protecting their rights. Having ruled thus, we also hold
that Potencianos right to the property he allegedly bought must fail. He
cannot take cover under the protection the law accords to purchasers in
good faith and for value.

Potenciano cannot now claim that he has already acquired a valid title to
the property. To be effective, the inscription in the registry must have
been made in good faith.47 The defense of indefeasibility of a Torrens
title does not extend to a transferee who takes it with notice of a flaw.48 A
holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is not entitled to the protection of
the law, for the law cannot be used as a shield for fraud.49

Third Issue:
Personality to Sue

Petitioners argue that the suit against them cannot be maintained by

private respondents, because the latter have not established their
filiation to Pareja as their father. Petitioners further contend that Felipe B.
Parejas unprobated Last Will and Testament,50 dated June 24, 1976,
cannot be used to establish respondents filiation.

Again, we disagree with this contention. The way to prove the filiation of
illegitimate children is provided by the Family Code thus:
 "Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children."51

In turn, Article 172 of the Family Code states:

"Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of

the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final

judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a

private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation

shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a

legitimate child, or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws."52

These provisions in relation to those in the Civil Code have been

explained by this Court as follows:

"The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a

will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing
is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child,
and no further court action is required."53

Justice Jose C. Vitug clarifies in unequivocal terms the process of

proving filiation: "under this [Family] Code, filiation may likewise be
established by holographic as well as notarial wills, except that they no
longer need to be probated or to be strictly in conformity with the
formalities thereof for purposes of establishing filiation."54
Petitioners argument on the need for probate loses force when weighed
against its purpose. In probate proceedings, all that the law requires is
the courts declaration that the external formalities have been complied
with. The will is then deemed valid and effective in the eyes of the
law.55 Thus, probate proceedings merely determine the extrinsic validity
of the will56 and do not affect its contents.

Moreover, the appellate court correctly noted the following:

"x x x [P]laintiff Dwight Reynoso and defendant Manuel Jayme had

executed a joint affidavit declaring that they together with the other
plaintiffs [were] recognized illegitimate children of Felipe B. Pareja
as embodied in the latters Will. This affidavit which binds Jayme as
affiant is proof of the existence of Parejas Will and effectively
demolishes Jaymes posture that the plaintiffs have no personality
to institute the instant suit. x x x"57

Petitioners are mistaken in assuming that this Joint Affidavit58 is being

used by private respondents to prove the latters filiation as illegitimate
children of Pareja. The document cannot be used for that purpose,
because the children were the ones who recognized their father and not
the other way around. However, its importance lies in the fact that it
prevents petitioners from denying private respondents standing to
institute the case against them.

Having admitted that Private Respondent Reynoso was indeed an

illegitimate son of Pareja just like him, Manuel Jayme cannot now claim
otherwise. An admission is rendered conclusive upon the person making
it and cannot be denied as against the person relying on it.59 Neither can
petitioners argue that such acknowledgment applies only to Jayme.
Since Potenciano claims to have derived his right from the Jayme
spouses, then he is bound by Jaymes admission.

Final Issue:
Damages

Finally, petitioners contend that private respondents have no cause of

action against them. Therefore, the latter are not entitled to any award of
damages.
We rule otherwise. Since the Deeds of Sale upon which petitioners
based their ownership of the questioned property are invalid, private
respondents have a cause of action for moral and exemplary damages.
Likewise, they are entitled to attorneys fees and litigation expenses for
having gone through this process to protect their rights from petitioners
wrongful claim of ownership of the subject property. We find that the
amounts awarded by the RTC and subsequently affirmed by the CA are
reasonable and justified under the circumstances obtaining in this case.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed

Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales,

JJ., concur.

Andal and Dueas vs. Macaraig, 89 Phil. 165

G.R. No. L-2474 May 30, 1951

MARIANO ANDAL, assisted by mother Maria Dueas as

guardian ad litem, and MARIA DUEAS, plaintiffs,
vs.
EDUVIGIS MACARAIG, defendant.

Reyes and Dy-Liaco for appellants.

Tible, Tena and Borja for appellees.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Dueas, as

guardian ad litem, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur for the recovery of the ownership and possession of a
parcel of land situated in the barrio of Talacop, Calabanga, Camarines
Sur.

The complaint alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of

Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueas; that Emiliano Andal died on
September 24, 1942; that Emiliano Andal was the owner of the parcel of
land in question having acquired it from his mother Eduvigis Macaraig by
virtue of a donation propter nuptias executed by the latter in favor of the
former; that Emiliano Andal had been in possession of the land from
1938 up to 1942, when Eduvigis Macaraig, taking advantage of the
abnormal situation then prevailing, entered the land in question.

The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (a) declaring
Mariano Andal the legitimate son of Emiliano Andal and such entitled to
inherit the land in question; (b) declaring Mariano Andal owner of said
land; and (c) ordering the defendant to pay the costs of suit. Defendant
took the case to this Court upon the plea that only question of law are
involved.

It appears undisputed that the land in question was given by Eduvigis

Macaraig to her son Emiliano Andal by virtue of a donation propter
nuptias she has executed in his favor on the occasion of his marriage to
Maria Dueas. If the son born to the couple is deemed legitimate, then
he is entitled to inherit the land in question. If otherwise, then the land
should revert back to Eduvigis Macaraig as the next of kin entitled to
succeed him under the law. The main issue, therefore, to be determined
hinges on the legitimacy of Mariano Andal in so far as his relation to
Emiliano Andal is concerned. The determination of this issue much
depends upon the relationship that had existed between Emiliano Andal
and his wife during the period of conception of the child up to the date of
his birth in connection with the death of the alleged father Emiliano
Andal.

The following facts appear to have been proven: Emiliano Andal became
sick of tuberculosis in January 1941. Sometime thereafter, his brother,
Felix, went to live in his house to help him work his house to help him
work his farm. His sickness became worse that on or about September
10, 1942, he became so weak that he could hardly move and get up
from his bed. On September 10, 1942, Maria Duenas, his wife, eloped
with Felix, and both went to live in the house of Maria's father, until the
middle of 1943. Since May, 1942, Felix and Maria had sexual
intercourse and treated each other as husband and wife. On January 1,
1943, Emiliano died without the presence of his wife, who did not even
attend his funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria Dueas gave birth to a boy,
who was given the name of Mariano Andal. Under these facts, can the
child be considered as the legitimate son of Emiliano?

Article 108 of the Civil Code provides:

Children born after the one hundred and eighty days next following
that of the celebration of marriage or within the three hundred days
next following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall
be presumed to be legitimate.

This presumption may be rebutted only by proof that it was

physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his
wife during the first one hundred and twenty days of the three
hundred next preceding the birth of the child.

Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal died on
January 1, 1943, that boy is presumed to be the legitimate son of
Emiliano and his wife, he having been born within three hundred (300)
days following the dissolution of the marriage. This presumption can only
be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to
have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 next
preceding the birth of the child. Is there any evidence to prove that it was
physically impossible for Emiliano to have such access? Is the fact that
Emiliano was sick of tuberculosis and was so weak that he could hardly
move and get up from his bed sufficient to overcome this presumption?

Manresa on this point says:

Impossibility of access by husband to wife would include (1)

absence during the initial period of conception, (2) impotence
which is patent, continuing and incurable, and (3) imprisonment,
unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place through corrupt
violation of prison regulations. Manresa, 492-500, Vol. I, cited by
Dr. Arturo Tolentino in his book "Commentaries and Jurisprudence
on the Civil Code, Vol. 1, p.90)."

There was no evidence presented that Emiliano Andal was absent

during the initial period of conception, specially during the period
comprised between August 21, 1942 and September 10, 1942, which is
included in the 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child
Mariano Andal. On the contrary, there is enough evidence to show that
during that initial period, Emiliano Andal and his wife were still living
under the marital roof. Even if Felix, the brother, was living in the same
house, and he and the wife were indulging in illicit intercourse since May,
1942, that does not preclude cohabitation between Emiliano and his
wife. We admit that Emiliano was already suffering from tuberculosis and
his condition then was so serious that he could hardly move and get up
from bed, his feet were swollen and his voice hoarse. But experience
shows that this does not prevent carnal intercourse. There are cases
where persons suffering from this sickness can do the carnal act even in
the most crucial stage because they are more inclined to sexual
intercourse. As an author has said, "the reputation of the tuberculosis
towards eroticism (sexual propensity) is probably dependent more upon
confinement to bed than the consequences of the disease." (An
Integrated Practice of Medicine, by Hyman, Vol. 3, p.2202). There is
neither evidence to show that Emiliano was suffering from impotency,
patent, continuous and incurable, nor was there evidence that he was
imprisoned. The presumption of legitimacy under the Civil Code in favor
of the child has not, therefore, been overcome.

We can obtain the same result viewing this case under section 68, par.
(c) of Rule 123, of the Rules of Court, which is practically based upon
the same rai'son d'etre underlying the Civil Code. Said section provides:

The issue of a wife cohabiting with the husband who is not

impotent, is indisputably presumed to be legitimate, if not born
within one hundred eighty days immediately succeeding the
marriage, or after the expiration of three hundred days following its
dissolution.

We have already seen that Emiliano and his wife were living together, or
at least had access one to the other, and Emiliano was not impotent, and
the child was born within three (300) days following the dissolution of the
marriage. Under these facts no other presumption can be drawn than
that the issue is legitimate. We have also seen that this presumption can
only be rebutted by clear proof that it was physically or naturally
impossible for them to indulge in carnal intercourse. And here there is no
such proof. The fact that Maria Dueas has committed adultery can not
also overcome this presumption (Tolentino's Commentaries on the Civil
Code, Vol. I, p. 92).

In view of all the foregoing, we are constrained to hold that the lower
court did not err in declaring Mariano Andal as the legitimate son of the
spouses Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueas.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without

pronouncement as to costs.

Paras, C. J., Feria, Pablo, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes and Jugo,

JJ., concur.

De Aparicio vs. Paraguya, L-29771, May 29, 1987

G.R. No. L-29771 May 29, 1987

CONSOLACION LUMAHIN DE APARICIO, Accompanied by her

husband BENITO APARICIO, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
HIPOLITO PARAGUYA, defendant-appellant.

GANCAYCO, J:

Trinidad Montilde, a young lass of Tubigon, Bohol had a love affair with a
priest, Rev. Fr. Felipe Lumain and in the process she conceived. When
she was almost four (4) months pregnant and in order to conceal her
disgrace from the public she decided to marry Anastacio Mamburao.
Father Lumain solemnized their marriage on March 4, 1924. 1 They
never lived together as man and wife. On September 12, 1924, 192 days
after the marriage, Trinidad gave birth to Consolacion Lumain. As shown
by her birth certificate her registered parents are Trinidad and
Anastacio. 2 On October 31, 1936, Fr. Lumain died but he left a last will
and testament wherein he acknowledged Consolacion as his daughter
and instituted her as the sole and universal heir of all his property rights
and interests.3 This was duly probated in the Court of First Instance of
Bohol on June 11, 1938 and on appeal it was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. 4

Soon after reaching the age of majority Consolacion filed an action in the
Court of First Instance of Bohol against Hipolito Paraguya for the
recovery of certain parcels of land she claims to have inherited from her
father Fr. Lumain and for damages. After trial on the merits a decision
was rendered on July 6, 1962, the dispositive part of which reads as
follows:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court renders judgment:

(a) Declaring that plaintiff is entitled to the possession of the

third parcel of land described in the 6th amended complaint,
with all the improvements. If defendant Hipolito Paraguya is
possessing this property, he is hereby ordered to vacate it
and deliver its possession to plaintiff;

(b) Declaring defendant Hipolito Paraguya owner of the

second parcel of land described in the 6th amended
complaint, with all the improvements. If plaintiff is possessing
this land or any portion thereof, she is hereby ordered to
vacate said property and to deliver its possession to
defendant Paraguya;

(c) Declaring defendant Hipolito Paraguya owner of Portions

B and A of the sketch Exhibit E-1, with all the improvements.
If plaintiff is possessing these portions or any part thereof,
she is hereby ordered to vacate the same and to deliver its
possession to defendant Hipolito Paraguya;

(d) Declaring that plaintiff shall be entitled to the possession

of Portions H, F and G, of Sketch Exhibit E-1, with all the
improvements. If defendant is possessing these portions or
any part thereof, he is hereby ordered to vacate them and to
deliver the possession thereto plaintiff Consolacion Lumain
Aparicio; and
 (e) Sentencing plaintiff to pay the Court the docketing fees
and all other legal expenses.

The present judgment is rendered without special

pronouncement as to costs.5

Not satisfied therewith, the defendant now interposed this appeal to the
Court of Appeals alleging the trial court committed the following errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE IS ENTITLED TO THE
POSSESSION OF PORTION G OF THE SKETCH EXHIBIT
"E-I," WITH ALL THE IMPROVEMENTS.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT

PLAINTIFF- APPELLEE IS A NATURAL CHILD OF THE
LATE REV. FR. FELIPE LUMAIN.

III

THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING

THAT THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE IS LIABLE TO PAY THE
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT FOR MORAL DAMAGES AS
ALLEGED IN THE COUNTER-CLAIM. 6

In a resolution of September 27, 1968, the Court of Appeals forwarded

the records of this case to this Court as appellant does not question the
findings of facts of the court a quo but only the correctness of the
conclusions drawn therefrom.7

The undisputed findings of facts of the trial court are:

It is a fact admitted in the evidence of both parties that the

spouses Roman Lumain and Filomena Cosare were the
owners of the parcels of land Identified as first, second and
third parcels in the sixth amended complaint.
The testimonial evidence has established the following facts.

The spouses Roman Lumain and Filomena Cosare and their

children Rev. Fr. Felix Lumain and Macario Lumain are dead.
This fact is corroborated by the following death certificates:

(a) Exhibit I death certificate showing that on August 20,

1929 Roman Lumain, husband of Filomena Cosare, was
buried in the Catholic Cemetery of Tubigon, Bohol;

(b) Exhibit J death certificate showing that Filomena

Cosare, wife of Roman Lumain, was buried on October 6,
1934 in the Catholic Cemetery of Tubigon, Bohol;

(c) Exhibit K death certificate showing that Rev. Fr. Felipe

Lumain, son of Roman Lumain and Filomena Cosare, was
buried on November 3, 1936 in the Catholic Cemetery of
Tubigon, Bohol;

(d) Exhibit L death certificate showing that Macario

Lumain, husband of Ceferina Falcon and son of the spouses
Roman Lumain and Filomena Cosare, was buried on May 20,
1941 in the Catholic Cemetery of Tubigon, Bohol.

It appears proven at the same time that Ceferina Falcon de

Lumain died on June 29, 1953, as shown by Exhibit M.

Several witnesses had declared that the spouses Roman

Lumain and Filomena Cosare were possessing as owners
and enjoying the products of the three parcels of land
described in the complaint; that after their death, it was their
two children Rev. Fr. Felipe Lumain and Macario Lumain who
succeeded them in the possession of the same property.

Defendant Paraguya disclaims no right over the third parcel

of land described in the 6th amended complaint. As a matter
of fact, in the course of the trial the Court rendered judgment
declaring plaintiff Consolacion Lumain Aparicio owner of said
property. This judgment, however, was set aside because
plaintiff's counsel manifested that he would present evidence
for damages, in connection with this property which,
according to plaintiff, had been possessed by defendant
Paraguya.

Defendant claims right over the second parcel of land

described in the 6th amended complaint, alleging that he had
bought it from the late Roman Lumain, the admitted original
owner. In support of his contention, defendant offered in
evidence Exhibit 7 which is a deed of pacto de retro sale for
the sum of P l 70. The parcel of land sold in this document is
described as follows:

Por el Noreste linda con el terreno del vendedor,

por el Sureste con el de Macario Lumain, por
Suroeste con el del vendedor y por el Noroeste
con el del mismo vendedor y con el rio Bateria.

If the boundaries of the land mentioned in Exhibit 7 were

compared with the boundaries of the second parcel of land
described in the 6th amended complaint, one would not
hesitate to conclude that this parcel of land described in the
complaint is the same property sold to defendant Hipolito
Paraguya on August 1, 1928, for the sum of Pl70.00, by
means of Exhibit 7.

It is true that vendor Roman Lumain reserved the right to

repurchase the property at any time, but in the light of the
provisions of Article 1508 of the old Civil Code which is the
law applicable to the case, it is obvious that Roman Lumain
and his heirs have lost the right to redeem the property.
Article 1508 of the old Civil Code provides:

The right referred to in the next preceding article,

in default of an express agreement shall endure
four years, counted from the date of the contract.

Should there be an agreement, the period shall

not exceed ten years.
Although the area of the land mentioned in Exhibit 7 is 13,000
square meters, while the area of the land described as Parcel
2 is 14 ares and 64 centares or 1,464 square meters, we
think that this discrepancy is just a result of mistake. Our
Supreme Court ruled that the correct boundaries of a land
prevail over the discrepancy as regards its area.

We, therefore, conclude that the property described as

second parcel of land in the 6th amended complaint belongs
to defendant Hipolito Paraguya.

Although Exhibit 7 is a private document we entertain no

doubt as to its authenticity established by testimonial
evidence of defendant. Moreover, Macario Lumain, son of
Roman Lumain, had signed as instrumental witness to this
document and if we compared his signature on Exhibit 7 with
his signatures on the documents Exhibits C- 1, C-2, C-3, C-4
and C-5 offered in evidence by plaintiff, there would be no
doubt that the signature affixed on Exhibit 7 is the authentic
signature of Macario Lumain.

In connection with this case, the Court issued on August 7,

1952 the following order (Exh. D):

When this case was called today, Atty. Diosdado

R. Delima and Conrado D. Marapao, counsel for
the parties, submitted the following agreement:

Comes the undersigned attorney and respectfully

proposes for an appointment of a Commissioner
of the Court for the following purposes:

1. To localize Parcel II of the Second Amended

Complaint under Tax No. 6862 superseded by
Tax No. 20836 in the name of Roman Lumain;

2. To localize all the portions in the said parcel

which are claimed by Hipolito Paraguya and to
make a sketch of the portions showing its relative
 positions with one another, showing its
dimensions in meters, and showing its relative
position in relation to the whole parcel;

3. To localize the portion in same parcel which are

claimed by Ceferina Falcon and to make a sketch
of the said portion showing its dimensions in
meters and showing further its relative position in
relation to the whole parcel.

The expenses of the Commission of the court to

be shared pro rata by Consolacion Lumain
Vallesteros, Ceferina Falcon and Hipolito
Paraguya.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the

above enumerated proposals be granted by the
Court and a Commissioner duly appointed to carry
out.

Tagbilaran, Bohol, August 7,1952.

(Sgd.)
DIOSDADO
REYES DELIMA

Attor
ney
for
the
Plain
tiff

I AGREE:

(Sgd.) CONRADO MARAPAO

Attorney for the Defendants

Ceferina Falcon and Hipolito

Paraguya

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the court hereby appoints Mr. Genaro

Galon as Commissioner in charge to localize the properties in
accordance with the foregoing agreement. Mr. Galon shall
submit his report within the period of fifteen days. Before
making this localization, Mr. Galon shall notify the attorneys
of both parties two weeks in advance.

By agreement of the parties, the trial of this case is hereby

postponed until further assignment.

SO ORDERED.

Given in open Court, Tagbilaran, Bohol, August 7, 1952.

(Sgd.
)
HIPO
LITO
ALO

Judg
e,
14th
Judic
ial

D
i
s
t
r
i
c
t

In compliance with this order, the appointed commissioner

Genaro Galon submitted his report (Exhibit E); and attached
thereto is the sketch marked Exhibit E-1.
According to the report (Exhibit E), the land covered by tax
declaration No. 20836-which is the first parcel of land
described in the 6th amended complaint is represented in the
sketch Exhibit E-1 by the space enclosed within the black
lines. For clarification purposes the Court had marked with
letters H, B, A, G and F the portions enclosed within the black
lines.The space marked letter C, outside the black lines,
represents the land of Macario Lumain, acquired later by
defendant Hipolito Paraguya.

Defendant Paraguya offered in evidence Exhibit 5, a deed of

pacto de retro sale executed in his favor by the late Macario
Lumain on December 6, 1937. This document describes the
following parcel of land:

El citado terreno es parte de la Declaracion No.

20836 a nombre de mi difunto padre Roman
Lumain y linda por el Noreste con el del vendedor
y mide 39.30 metros; por el Sureste finda con el
del mismo vendedor y mide 67.90 metros; por el
Suroeste linda con la carretera provincial y mide
27.00 metros y por el Noroeste que tiene cinco
lados linda con el del mismo vendedor y mide por
dichos cinco lados 81-60 metros.

If we linked the land described in Exhibit 5 with Portion A of

the sketch Exhibit E-1, which portion, according to the report
of Commissioner Galon, was indicated by defendant
Paraguya as property belonging to him, we would find that
the land described in Exhibit 5 is the same Portion A of the
sketch Exhibit E-1, taking into account the length of the sides
of Portion A and the length of the sides of the land sold under
Exhibit 5. Portion A is precisely the portion claimed by
defendant, according to Commissioner's report.

The authenticity of the signature of Macario Lumain on

Exhibit 5 has been established by witnesses, and
corroborated by documents Exhibits C- 1, C- 2, C-3, C-4 and
C-5 offered in evidenced by plaintiff.
The includible conclusion, therefore, is that Portion A of the
sketch Exhibit E-1 was bought by defendant Hipolito
Paraguya from Macario Lumain. Let us not lose sight of the
fact that the land described in Exhibit 5 and Portion A of the
sketch Exhibit E-I have Identical descriptions: On the NE is
bounded by the land of Macario Lumain which was inherited
by him from his father; on the SE by the same vendor
Macario Lumain and provincial road; and on the NW by the
same vendor. Macario Lumain has also lost the right to
repurchase.

The report of the commissioner Exhibit E also states that

defendant Hipolito Paraguya claimed to be the owner of
Portion B of the sketch Exhibit E-1. During the trial, Hipolito
Paraguya maintained that on August 28, 1948 he bought
from Raymundo Garduque a parcel of land by means of
Exhibit 6- A. This document describes the property as
follows:

Este terreno es parte de la Declaracion No. 20836

a nombre del difunto Roman Lumain. Y linda por
el Norte, con el del difunto Macario Lumain; por el
Este con el del difunto Roman Lumain; por el Sur,
con la Carretero Provincial; y por el Oeste, con el
del mismo difunto Roman Lumain.

Defendant Paraguya further maintains that Raymundo

Garduque had bought this property from Roman Lumain by
means of Exhibit 6 which is translated into English in Exhibit
6-1. Exhibit 6-1 describes the property sold by Roman
Lumain to Raymundo Garduque as follows:

On the North, it is bounded by the rice field of

Macario Lumain which adjoins the parcel of rice
field of the vendor; on the East, land of vendor; on
the South, is Provincial Road; and on the West, it
is bounded by the land of the vendor.
If we link the description of Exhibit 6-1 with the description of
Portion B of the sketch Exhibit E-I, there would be no doubt
that this Portion B is the same land sold by Roman Lumain to
Raymundo Garduque, by means of Exhibit 6, bearing in mind
that the boundaries of Portion B tally with the boundaries of
the land described in Exhibit 6. We, therefore, conclude that
Portion B also belongs to defendant Hipolito Paraguya.

The report of the commissioner Exhibit E reads as follows:

En complimiento a la orden de este Juzgado de

fecha 7 de Agosto, 1952 en la causa arriba
titulada el que subscribe como commissionado en
dicho asunto, previa notificacion por escrito a
ambas partes y a sus respectivos Abogados, se
contituyo al barrio de Tangnan, Tubigon, Bohol
para localizar el terreno bajo declaracion Tax No.
20836 a nombre de Roman Lumain y de las
porciones reclamadas por Hipolito Paraguya y
Ceferina Falcon Vda. de Lumain, y con asistencia
de las partes se prodedio la localizacion de los
mismos, de cuyo resultado, tiene la honra de
someter a Su Senoria el adjurito croquis con los
siguientes:

1. que la porcion limitada con lineas de tinta negra

representa el terreno indicado por la demandante
Consolacion M. Vallesteros, como terreno de
Roman Lumain, bajo declaracion Tax No. 20836.

2. Que la pintada con lapiz encarnado representa

la reclamada por Hipolito Paraguya bajo
declaraciones Tax Nos. 13497 y 13919 de
Hipolito Paraguya.

3. Que la pintada con lapiz azul, representation el

terreno reclamado por Ceferino Falcon Vda. de
Lumain.
 4. Que la manchada con puntitos de lapiz azul,
representa la porcion reclamada por Hipolito
Paraguya, que segun el lo adquirio de Pelagio
Torrefranca.

5. Que la porcion comprendida entre lineas de

tinta negra angulos, A, B y C, representation el
terreno descrito en la declaracion Tax No. 6862
en nombre de Roman Lumain de Acuerdo con su
croquis correspondiente.

Es todo lo que al que subscribe puede informar a

Su Senoria para su consideracion y efectos
procedentes.

Respetuosamente sometido.

Tagbilaran, Bohol. 22 de Septiembre, 1952.

(
F
d
o
.
)

G
E
N
A
R
O

G
A
L
O
N
Defendant Hipolito Paraguya claims right over portion G of
the Sketch Exhibit E-1, which portion is within the space
enclosed within the black lines of the sketch Exhibit E-1.

Hipolito Paraguya maintains that he had bought this Portion

G from Pelagio Torrefranca by means of a document which
was lost. He offered, however, in evidence Exhibits 8 and 9,
statements of the sister and brother of the deceased Pelagio
Torrefranca to the effect that the latter had sold a parcel of
land to Hipolito Paraguya.

But if we examine the sketch Exhibit E-1 we will find that the
land of Pelagio Torrefranca is outside the land of Roman
Lumain enclosed within the black lines. The land of Pelagio
Torrefranca is even intercepted by other lands belonging to
Juan Acidillo and Valerio Roba. If we also examine the plan
Exhibit 1 1 of the land of Roman Lumain sureyed by a
survevor, we will find that the land of Roman Lumain is
bounded on the North by Valerio Roba and Jorge Acidillo.
The land of Pelagio Torrefranca is not mentioned and
possibly it is on the North of the lands of Valerio Roba and
Jorge Acidillo.

Consequently, the land bought by defendant Hipolito

Paraguya from Pelagio Torrefranca is outside the land of
Roman Lumain described in the plan Exhibit 11. It must not
be forgotten that this plan was offered in evidence by
defendant.

In the light of the foregoing, we conclude that out of the first

parcel of land described in the 6th amended complaint
defendant had only acquired Portions A and B described in
the plan Exhibit E-1.

We do not overlook the fact that Macario Lumain, as co-

owner of the first parcel of land described in the 6th amended
complaint could not select any portion thereof as his own, as
long, as there was no actual partition of the property. We
believe, however, that it would be more advantageous to the
plaintiff to disregard this procedure, since a partition would be
more costly for her, for in such case defendant would claim
reimbursements for necessary and useful expenses.
Moreover, the sales took place almost 10 years before the
filing of the complaint, and it would be unjust for defendant
Paraguya to suffer the adverse effects of the laches
committed by plaintiff.

Plaintiff maintains that she is entitled to inherit the property of

the deceased Rev. Fr. Felipe Lumain on the ground that she
had been recognized as daughter of the latter in his
testament Exhibit A-1 which has been duly probated by this
Court and the Court of Appeals, as shown from Exhibit A- 2.

Defendant, on the other hand, maintains that plaintiff is not

entitled to inherit the property of the deceased Rev. Fr. Felipe
Lumain for the reason that she is an adulterous child. He
further maintains that the acknowledgment of plaintiff by the
late Fr. Felipe Lumain is null and void she being not a natural
child of the latter. In support of this contention, defendant
offered in evidence Exhibit 2 which is the marriage certificate
of Anastacio Mamburao and Trinidad Montilde, mother of
plaintiff. According to this certificate, the marriage of both
spouses took place on March 4, 1924. Defendant also offered
in evidence Exhibit I showing that plaintiff was born on
September 12, 1924. Taking into account both documents, it
can be said that plaintiff was born six months after her
mother's marriage to Anastacio Mamburao. During the trial
Trinidad Montilde declared that she had never lived together
with her husband and at present the latter is living with
another woman.

Bearing in mind the date of the birth of plaintiff, it is evident

that her mother Trinidad Montilde was still single at the time
she was conceived. It is a legal presumption that plaintiff is
the daughter of the spouses Anastacio Mamburao and
Trinidad Montilde, but bearing in mind that this presumption is
disputable and was successfully overcome by Trinidad
Montilde, plaintiff's mother, we find no other avenue than to
declare that plaintiff is a natural child of the late Rev. Fr.
Felipe Lumain. Consequently, she can be acknowledged by
the latter as his own child.

But in the remote possibility that plaintiff is not a natural child

of the deceased Fr. Felipe Lumain, we still maintain that,
under the latter's will (Exhibit A-1), she is entitled to claim the
disputed property, she having been instituted in the will as
universal heir. This document contains the following
provisions:

4. Dono tambien a la mencionada nina,

Consolacion M. Lumain, mi homestead
consistentente en una parcela de terreno de 24
hect. situada en el barrio de Calatrava, Carmen,
Bohol, con todas sus mejoras; todas Acciones e
interesesen la JAGNA ELECTRIC SERVICE CO.,
Jagna Bohol; todos los bienes muebles e
inmuebles que me corespondan de la herencia de
mis padres; y todoes los bienes e intereses que
yo consiga en lo futuro (The following words are
written in pencil without initial of the testator: Estoy
asegurado por la Insular Life Assurance Co. en la
cantidad de Dos Mil Pesos, y la beneficiaria de mi
Poliza es la misma consolacion.)
Is plaintiff entitled to claim the entire first parcel of land
described in the 6th amended complaint? Let us not forget
that the spouses Roman Lumain and Filomena Cosare died
leaving two legitimate children: Rev. Fr. Felipe Lumain and
Macario Lumain. Let us not either forget that Fr. Lumain died
ahead of Macario Lumain. Under the circumstances,
therefore, Fr. Lumain did not become the owner of the share
of Macario Lumain, he having died ahead of the latter.
Macario Lumain could not either inherit the share of his
brother, because the latter had instituted the plaintiff as his
legal heir. Plaintiff, on the other hand, cannot inherit the
property of the deceased Macario Lumain in view of the
following provisions of Article 943 of the old Civil Code:

A natural or a legitimated child has no right to

succeed ab intestate the legitimate children and
relatives of the father or mother who has
acknowledged it; nor shall such children or
relatives so inherit from the natural or legitimated
child.

In the light of the foregoing, it is obvious that, after the death

of Fr. Felipe Lumain, plaintiff and Macario Lumain became
co-owners of all the properties left by their deceased parents.
Consequently, plaintiff is only an owner of one-half (1/2)
undivided share of said properties and the remaining
undivided half belongs to the heirs of the late Macario Lumain
who took no intervention in this case. And because of this
fact, the Court can not render a judgment determining the
ownership of the property in question, on account of the fact
that the heirs of the deceased Macario Lumain are not parties
to this case.

Considering, nevertheless, that a co-owner can file an action

to recover the possession of a property from any stranger,
the Court believes that this aspect can be determined by the
Court in its judgment.
 It appears from the record that plaintiff was exempted from
payment of legal fees on account of her alleged poverty. But
it appears from the evidence that she is not a pauper, she
having several properties not involved in the present action.
She shall therefore, be sentenced to pay the Court the
docketing fees and all other legal expenses.

Plaintiff's evidence regarding damages is insufficient, for the

reason that this court can not determine exactly the source of
those damages. As may be seen from this decision, plaintiff
had filed six complaints and had been changing the lands she
was claiming, as well as the defendants, thus showing that
she had filed at random her actions. Because of this, the
Court cannot determine what property shall be the basis of
damages and who are the persons liable. 8

Under the first assigned error appellant contends that portion G of the
sketch Exhibit E-1 with all the improvements belongs to him and that he
is entitled to its possession. In support thereof appellant argues

This particular portion of land known as portion G of the

sketch Exhibit 'E-1' declared in the name of the real owner of
the defendant-appellant herein under Tax Dec. No. R-13497,
(Exhibit '9-b') formerly under Tax Dec. No. 23216 (Exhibit '9-
a') in the name of the former owner Rev. Father Pelagio
Torrefranca is outside the land in question. (See IV last
paragraph of p. 23 & 24; letter B last paragraph of p. 31 and
letter C lst paragraph of p. 32, Record on Appeal; (See also
IV 2nd paragraph of p. 41, Record on Appeal).

We find support in this contention from the report of the

Commissioner (Exhibit "E") in paragraph 2 and 4 of said
report: (See Record on Appeal, pp. 59-60).

Par. 2 of the Commissioner's Report (Exhibit "E") states:

Que la pintada con lapiz encarnado, representa la

reclamada por Hipolito Paraguya bajo
 declaraciones Tax Nos. 13497 y 13919 de
Hipolito.' (p. 60, Record on Appeal)

Par. 4 of the said Commissioner's Report (Exhibit'E') states:

Que la manchada con puntitos de lapiz azul,

representa la porcion reclamada por Hipolito
Paraguya, que segun el lo adquirio de Pelagio
Torrefranca (P. 60, Record on Appeal)

The name of Pelagio Torrefranca or the land of Pelagio

Torrefranca is not mentioned because the Blueprint (Exh.:
"11") was made long time ago in 1910 before Pelagio
Torrefranca bought the land from Valerio Roba. (the former
owner).

Exh.: "11" is offered in evidence by the defendant Hipolito

Paraguya to show to the Court that the land of Pelagio
Torrefranca, Identified as G (in Exh. "E-l") is outside the land
of Roman Lumain as can be seen by comparing the blueprint
(Exh. "11") and the sketch (Exh. "E-l").

If the land of Pelagio Torrefranca which is now owned by the

defendant Hipolito Paraguya (Letter G in Exh. "E-l") is outside
the land of Roman Lumain (outside of heavy lines of Blueprint
Exh. "11" and sketch of Galon Exh. "E-l") then the plaintiff
can not be given such land for she is only claiming interest in
and to that parcel of land of Roman Lumain bearing Tax No.
20836. In the original complaint as well as the several
amended complaints, the six amended complaint and
supplemental complaint Tax Dec. No. 23216 of the late Rev.
Father Pelagio Torrefranca (now owned by defendant-
appellant Paraguya, Letter G in Exh. "E-l") is not included.
Tax No. 23216 has been revised to R-13497 in defendant-
appellant's name. Still this land Identified as Letter G in Exh.
"E-1" now under Tax Dec. No. R-13497 is not included in all
the plaintiffs' complaint (see Exhibits "9-a" and "9-b," 10 and
10-a to 10-g).
In the Blueprint (Exh. "11") the name of Valerio Roba
appeared as the owner of that parcel known as Portion G (as
shown in Exh. "E-1") for at that time in 1910 Valerio Roba
was still the owner. The blueprint (Exh. "11") was made and
surveyed in 1910. But after 1910 Pelagio Torrefranca
acquired this land (Portion G) from Valerio Roba. This
particular Portion G is now declared under Tax Dec. No. R-
13497 in the name of defendant-appellant Hipolito Paraguya
and formerly declared under Tax Dec. No. 23216 in the name
of the former owner Pelagio Torrefranca (See Exhibits "9-a",
"9-b", "l0" and "10-a" to "10-g" and Exhibits "8" and "9").

The Court should take notice that the land in the name of
former owner Valerio Roba (known as Portion G in Exhibit "E-
l") is the land acquired and owned by Rev. Father Pelagio
Torrefranca and later sold by Rev. Father Pelagio
Torrefranca to the defendant-appellant Hipolito Paraguya is
outside the land (outside the Black Lines of Exhibits "11" and
"E-1") of the late Roman Lumain as shown in the blue print
(Exhibit "ll") a map of the land of the late Roman Lumain
made and surveyed in 1910. There is no question therefore
that this Portion G (shown in Exh. "E-l") is not the land of the
late Roman Lumain, hence outside the land in question. The
Court has no jurisdiction over this land Portion G as shown in
Exhibit "E- l" for it is not a part of the land of Roman Lumain
whose properties are the ones in question (See Exhibits "11"
and "E-1" These two Exhibits "11" and "E-1" should be
compared as they are closely connected to each other.)

This is supported by the findings of the Lower Court found on

page 61, lst Sentence of the 3rd Paragraph of the Decision,
(p. 61 Record on Appeal) which states: 'But if we examine the
sketch Exhibit 'E-l' we will find the land of Pelagio Torrefranca
is outside the land of Roman Lumain enclosed within the
black lines.' And on page 62, 1st Sentence of the 1st
Paragraph of the Decision (p. 62, Record on Appeal) which
states: 'Consequently, the land bought by defendant Hipolito
Paraguya from Pelagio Torrefranca is outside the land of
Roman Lumain described in the plan Exhibit 11. 9
We find the contention to be well-taken. Appellees confirmed that said
portion G of Exhibit E-1 which appellant bought from Pelagio Torrefranca
is outside the land of Roman Lumain enclosed with black lines of Exhibit
E- I, and thus is outside the land of Roman Lumain as described in
Exhibit 11. 10

Under the second assigned error appellant points out that appellee
Consolacion Lumain is the legitimate child of spouses Anastacio
Mamburao and Trinidad Montilde as she was born on September 12,
1924, 192 days after the marriage of said spouses citing the provision of
Article 255 of the Civil Code (then Article 108 of the Spanish Civil Code)

ART. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days
following the celebration of the marriage and before three
hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the
spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.

Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other

than that of the physical impossibility of the husband's having
access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty
days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the
child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:

(1) By the impotence of the husband;

(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living
separately in such a way that access was not possible;

(3) By the serious illness of the husband.

Appellant further argues there is no evidence of physical impossibility on

the part of husband Anastacio to have access to his wife Trinidad in the
first 120 days of the 300 days which preceded the birth of the child.
Under Article 115 of the Spanish Civil Code, now Article 265 of the Civil
Code, it is provided that:
 The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of
birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic
document or a final judgment. (Italics supplied.)

Appellant concludes appellee Consolacion is the legitimate child of said

Mamburao spouses as shown by the birth certificate. 11

Appellant also avers that the declarations of Trinidad Montilde against

the legitimacy of appellee Consolacion cannot prevail over the
presumption of legitimacy under the provisions of Article 109 of the
Spanish Civil Code, now Article 256 of the Civil Code.

However, the Court finds it unnecessary to determine the paternity of

appellee Consolacion in this case. In the last will and testament of Fr.
Lumain he not only acknowledged appellee Consolacion as his natural
daughter but designated her as his only heir. Said will was duly probated
in Court. As Fr. Lumain died without any compulsory heir, appellee
Consolacion is therefore his lawful heir as duly instituted in his
will. 12 One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his
estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to
succeed.13

The third assigned error wherein appellant contends appellee should pay
him moral damages is obviously without merit. Appellee merely pursued
an honest claim to the property in question. No bad faith had been
imputed nor had the alleged damages suffered been established. The
essential ingredient of moral damages is proof of bad faith and the fact
that moral damages was suffered as shock, mental anguish, or anxiety
although the amount of damages suffered need not be shown. 14

WHEREFORE, with the only modification that portion G of sketch Exhibit

E-1 and its improvement of the questioned property is hereby declared
to be owned by appellant who is entitled to its possession, the judgment
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects without
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Sarmiento, JJ.,
concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave

Federico Suntay vs. Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, et. al., G.R. No.

132524, December 29, 1998, 101 SCAD 1161

G.R. No. 132524 December 29, 1998

FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, petitioner,

vs.
ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY * and HON. GREGORIO S.
SAMPAGA, Presiding Judge, Branch 78, Regional Trial Court,
Malolos, Bulacan, Respondents

MARTINEZ, J.:

Which should prevail between the ratio decidendi and the fallo of a
decision is the primary issue in this petition forcertiorari under Rule 65
filed by petitioner Federico C. Suntay who opposes respondent Isabel's
petition for appointment as administratrix of her grandmother's estate by
virtue of her right of representation.

The suit stemmed from the following:

On July 9, 1958, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (son of petitioner Federico

Suntay) and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay were married in the Portuguese
Colony of Macao. Out of this marriage, three children were born namely:
Margarita Guadalupe, Isabel Aguinaldo and Emilio Aguinaldo all
surnamed Cojuangco Suntay. After 4 years, the marriage soured so that
in 1962, Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay filed a criminal case 1 against her
husband Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay. In retaliation, Emilio Aguinaldo filed
before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) 2 a complaint for legal
separation against his wife, charging her, among others, with infidelity
and praying for the custody and care of their children who were living
with their mother. 3 The suit was docketed as civil case number Q-7180.
On October 3, 1967, the trial court rendered a decision the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the marriage celebrated between Emilio

Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay on July 9,
1958 is hereby declared null and void and of no effect as
between the parties. It being admitted by the parties and
shown by the record that the question of the case and
custody of the three children have been the subject of
another case between the same parties in another branch of
this Court in Special Proceeding No. 6428, the same cannot
be litigated in this case.

With regard to counterclaim, in view of the manifestation of

counsel that the third party defendants are willing to pay
P50,000.00 for damages and that defendant is willing to
accept the offer instead of her original demand for
P130,000.00, the defendant is awarded said sum of
P50,000.00 as her counterclaim and to pay attorney's fees in
the amount of P5.000.00.

SO ORDERED. 4 (Emphasis supplied).

As basis thereof, the CFI said:

From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was

confined in the Veterans Memorial Hospital. Although at the
time of the trial of parricide case (September 8, 1967) the
patient was already out of the hospital he continued to be
under observation and treatment.

It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the

plaintiffs mental aberration classified as schizophernia (sic)
had made themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that
the disease worsened with time, until 1965 when he was
actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrist (sic)
treatment; that even if the subject has shown marked
progress, the remains bereft of adequate understanding of
right and wrong.
 There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties
was effected on July 9, 1958, years after plaintiffs mental
illness had set in. This fact would justify a declaration of
nullity of the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which
provides:

Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for nay of the

following causes after (sic) existing at the time of the
marriage:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless

such party, after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband or wife.

There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage

defendant knew about the mental condition of plaintiff; and
there is proof that plaintiff continues to be without sound
reason. The charges in this very complaint add emphasis to
the findings of the neuro-psychiatrist handling the patient, that
plaintiff really lives more in fancy than in reality, a strong
indication of schizophernia (sic). 5 (Emphasis supplied).

On June 1, 1979, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay predeceased his

mother, the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay. The latter is
respondent Isabel's paternal grandmother. The decedent died on
June 4, 1990 without leaving a will. 6

Five years later or on October 26, 1995, respondent Isabel Aguinaldo

Cojuangco Suntay filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) 7 a petition
for issuance in her favor of Letters of Administration of the Intestate
Estate of her late grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay which case
was docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. In her petition,
she alleged among others, that she is one of the legitimate grandchildren
of the decedent and prayed that she be appointed as administratrix of
the estate. 8
On December 15, 1995, petitioner filed an Opposition claiming that he is
the surviving spouse of the decedent, that he has been managing the
conjugal properties even while the decedent has been alive and is better
situated to protect the integrity of the estate than the petitioner, that
petitioner and her family have been alienated from the decedent and the
Oppositor for more than thirty (30) years and thus, prayed that Letters of
Administration be issued instead to him. 9

On September 22, 1997 or almost two years after filing an opposition,

petitioner moved to dismiss the special proceeding case alleging in the
main that respondent Isabel should not be appointed as administratrix of
the decedent's estate. In support thereof, petitioner argues that under
Article 992 of the Civil Code an illegitimate child has no right to succeed
by right of representation the legitimate relatives of her father or mother.
Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, respondent Isabel's father predeceased his
mother, the late Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay and thus, opened succession
by representation. Petitioner contends that as a consequence of the
declaration by the then CFI of Rizal that the marriage of respondent
Isabel's parents is "null and void," the latter is an illegitimate child, and
has no right nor interest in the estate of her paternal grandmother the
decedent. 10 On October 16, 1997, the trial court issued the assailed
order denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. 11 When his motion for
reconsideration was denied by the trial court in an order dated January
9, 1998, 12 petitioner, as mentioned above filed this petition.

Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondent court in

denying his motion to dismiss as well as his motion for reconsideration
on the grounds that: (a) a motion to dismiss is appropriate in a special
proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person; (b) the
motion to dismiss was timely filed; (c) the dispositive portion of the
decision declaring the marriage of respondent Isabel's parents "null and
void" must be upheld; and (d) said decision had long become final and
had, in fact, been executed.

On the other hand, respondent Isabel asserts that petitioner's motion to

dismiss was alte having been filed after the opposition was already filed
in court, the counterpart of an answer in an ordinary civil action and that
petitioner in his opposition likewise failed to specifically deny respondent
Isabel's allegation that she is a legitimate child of Emilio Aguinaldo
Suntay, the decedent's son. She further contends that petitioner
proceeds from a miscomprehension of the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-
7180 and the erroneous premise that there is a conflict between the
body of the decision and its dispositive portion because in an action for
annulment of a marriage, the court either sustains the validity of the
marriage or nullifies it. It does not, after hearing declare a marriage
"voidable" otherwise, the court will fail to decide and lastly, that the
status of marriages under Article 85 of the Civil Code before they are
annulled is "voidable."

The petition must fail.

Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of only if there is

concurrence of the essential requisites, to wit: (a) the tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction, and (b) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of
annulling or modifying the
proceeding. 13 There must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical
exercise of power for it to prosper. 14

A reading of the assailed order, however, shows that the respondent

court did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to
dismiss, pertinent portions of which are quoted thereunder, to wit:

The arguments of both parties judiciously and objectively

assessed and the pertinent laws applied, the Court finds that
a motion to dismiss at this juncture is inappropriate
considering the peculiar nature of this special proceeding as
distinguished from an ordinary civil action. At the outset, this
proceeding was not adversarial in nature and the petitioner
was not called upon to assert a cause of action against a
particular defendant. Furthermore, the State has a vital
interest in the maintenance of the proceedings, not only
because of the taxes due it, but also because if no heirs
qualify, the State shall acquire the estate by escheat.

xxx xxx xxx

 The court rules, for the purpose of establishing the
personality of the petitioner to file and maintain this special
proceedings, that in the case bench, the body of the decision
determines the nature of the action which is for annulment,
not declaration of nullity.

The oppositor's contention that the fallo of the questioned

decision (Annex "A" Motion) prevails over the body thereof
is not without any qualification. It holds true only when the
dispositive portion of a final decision is definite, clear and
unequivocal and can be wholly given effect without need of
interpretation or construction.

Where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the opinion or body

of the decision may be referred to for purposes of construing
the judgment (78 SCRA 541 citing Morelos v. Go Chin Ling;
and Heirs of Juan Presto v. Galang). The reason is that the
dispositive portion must find support from the decision's ratio
decidendi.

Per decision of the Court of First Instance Branch IX of

Quezon City, marked as Annex "A" of oppositor's motion, the
marriage of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-
Suntay was annulled on the basis of Art. 85 par. 3 of the Civil
Code which refers to marriages which are considered
voidable. Petitioner being conceived and born of a voidable
marriage before the decree of annulment, she is considered
legitimate (Art. 89, par. 2, Civil Code of the Phils.). 15

The trial court correctly ruled that "a motion to dismiss at this juncture is
inappropriate." The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governs the procedure
to be observed in actions, civil or criminal and special
proceedings. 16 The Rules do not only apply to election cases, land
registration, cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and
other cases not therein provided for.

Special proceedings being one of the actions under the coverage of the
Rules on Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss filed thereunder would fall
under Section 1, Rule 16 thereof. Said rule provides that the motion to
dismiss may be filed "within the time for but before filing the answer to
the complaint." Clearly, the motion should have been filed on or before
the filing of petitioner's opposition 17 which is the counterpart of an
answer in ordinary civil actions.

Not only was petitioner's motion to dismiss filed out of time, it was filed
almost two years after respondent Isabel was already through with the
presentation of her witnesses and evidence and petitioner had presented
two witnesses. The filing of the motion to dismiss is not only improper
but also dilatory.

The respondent court, far from deviating or straying off course from
established jurisprudence on this matter, as petitioner asserts, had in
fact faithfully observed the law and legal precedents in this case. In fact,
the alleged conflict between the body of the decision and the dispositive
portion thereof which created the ambiguity or uncertainty in the decision
of the CFI of Rizal is reconcilable. The legal basis for setting aside the
marriage of respondent Isabel's parents is clear under paragraph 3,
Article 85 of the New Civil Code, the law in force prior to the enactment
of the Family Code.

Petitioner, however, strongly insists that the dispositive portion of the CFI
decision has categorically declared that the marriage of respondent
Isabel's parents is "null and void" and that the legal effect of such
declaration is that the marriage from its inception is void and the children
born out of said marriage are illegitimate. Such argument cannot be
sustained. Articles 80, 81, 82 and 83 18 of the New Civil Code classify
what marriages are void while Article 85 enumerates the causes for
which a marriage may be annulled. 19

The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that

a void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. The effects
of void marriages, with respect to property relations of the spouses are
provided for under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of such
marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same
status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children under
Article 89 20 irrespective of whether or not the parties to the void
marriage are in good faith or in bad faith.
On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and
produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a
competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the annulment of
a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered
into but the law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the
marriage from being totally wiped out. The status of children born in
voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89
which provides that:

Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree

of annulment shall be considered legitimate; and children
conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and
obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also
called natural children by legal fiction. 21(Emphasis supplied).

Stated otherwise, the annulment of "the marriage by the court

abolishes the legal character of the society formed by the putative
spouses, but it cannot destroy the juridical consequences which
the marital union produced during its continuance." 22

Indeed, the terms "annul" and "null and void" have different legal
connotations and implications, Annul means to reduce to nothing;
annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to
do away with 23 whereas null and void is something that does not exist
from the beginning. A marriage that is annulled presupposes that it
subsists but later ceases to have legal effect when it is terminated
through a court action. But in nullifying a marriage, the court simply
declares a status or condition which already exists from the very
beginning.

There is likewise no merit in petitioner's argument that it is the dispositive

portion of the decision which must control as to whether or not the
marriage of respondent Isabel's parents was void or voidable. Such
argument springs from a miscomprehension of the judgment in Civil
Case No. Q-7180 and the erroneous premise that there is a conflict
between the body of the decision and its dispositive portion.

Parenthetically, it is an elementary principle of procedure that the

resolution of the court in a given issue as embodied in the dispositive
part of a decision or order is the controlling factor as to settlement of
rights of the parties and the questions presented, notwithstanding
statement in the body of the decision or order which may be somewhat
confusing, 24 the same is not without a qualification. The foregoing rule
holds true only when the dispositive part of a final decision or order is
definite, clear and unequivocal and can be wholly given effect without
need of interpretation or construction-which usually is "the case where
the order or decision in question is that of a court not of record which is
not constitutionally required to state the facts and the law on which the
judgment is based." 25

Assuming that a doubt or uncertainty exists between the dispositive

portion and the body of the decision, effort must be made to harmonize
the whole body of the decision in order to give effect to the intention,
purpose and judgment of the court. In Republic v. de los Angeles 26 the
Court said:

Additionally, Article 10 of the Civil Code states that "[i]n case

of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice
to prevail." This mandate of law, obviously cannot be any less
binding upon the courts in relation to its judgments.

. . .The judgment must be read in its entirety, and must be

construed as a whole so as to bring all of its parts into
harmony as far as this can be done by fair and reasonable
interpretation and so as to give effect to every word and part
if possible, and to effectuate the intention and purpose of the
Court, consistent with the provisions of the organic law. (49
C.J.S., pp. 863-864) [Emphasis supplied].

Thus, a reading of the pertinent portions of the decision of the CFI of

Rizal quoted earlier shows that the marriage is voidable:

It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the

plaintiffs mental aberration classified as schizophernia (sic)
had made themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that
the disease worsened with time, until 1965 when he was
actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrict (sic)
 treatment; that even if the subject has shown marked
progress, he remains bereft of adequate understanding of
right and wrong.

There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties

was effected on July 9, 1958, years after plaintiff's mental
illness had set in. This fact would justify a declaration of
nullity of the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which
provides:

Art. 95 (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the

following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party,
after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;

xxx xxx xxx

There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage

defendant knew about the mental condition of plaintiff; and
there is proof that plaintiff continues to be without sound
reason. The charges in this very handling the patient, that
plaintiff really lives more in fancy than in reality, a strong
indication of schizophernia (sic). 27

Inevitably, the decision of the CFI of Rizal declared null and void
the marriage of respondent Isabel's parents based on paragraph 3,
Article 85 of the New Civil Code. The legal consequences as to the
rights of the children are therefore governed by the first clause of
the second paragraph of Article 89. A contrary interpretation would
be anathema to the rule just above-mentioned. Based on said
provision the children of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay who were conceived and born prior to the
decree of the trial court setting aside their marriage on October 3,
1967 are considered legitimate. For purposes of seeking
appointment as estate administratrix, the legitimate grandchildren,
 including respondent Isabel, may invoke their successional right of
representation the estate of their grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo
Suntay after their father, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, had
predeceased their grandmother. This is, however, without
prejudice to a determination by the courts of whether the Letters of
Administration may be granted to her. Neither do the Court
adjudged herein the successional rights of the personalities
involved over the decedent's estate.

It would not therefore be amiss to reiterate at this point what the Court,
speaking through Chief Justice Ruiz Castro, emphasized to "all
magistrates of all levels of the judicial hierarchy that extreme degree of
care should be exercised in the formulation of the dispositive portion of a
decision, because it is this portion that is to be executed once the
decision becomes final. The adjudication of the rights and obligations of
thoe parties, and the dispositions made as well as the directions and
instructions given by the court in the premises in conformity with the
body of the decision, must all be spelled out clearly, distinctly and
unequivocally leaving absolutely no room for dispute, debate or
interpretation. 28

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion, the instant petition

is DISIMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Alberto vs. CA, G.R. No. 86639, June 2, 1994, 52 SCAD 67

G.R. No. 86639 June 2, 1994

MA. THERESA R. ALBERTO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, INTESTATE ESTATE OF JUAN M. ALBERTO,
and YOLANDA R. ALBERTO, respondents.

Martiniano P. Vivo for petitioner.

M.M. Lazaro & Associates for respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

When a putative father manifests openly through words and deeds his
recognition of a child, the courts can do no less than confirm said
acknowledgment. As the immortal bard Shakespeare perspicaciously
said: "Let your own discretion be your tutor; suit the action to the word,
the word to the action." Herein deceased father cannot possibly be
charged with indecisiveness or vacillation for he suited his action to his
word and his word to his action.

In the instant case, we have, therefore, affirmed the decision of the

probate court declaring petitioner as having acquired the status of a
natural child of the deceased Juan M. Alberto and, as such, entitled to
participate in the latter's estate.

On September 18, 1953, a child named Ma. Theresa Alberto was born
out of wedlock to one Aurora Reniva with Juan M. Alberto as the alleged
father. Accordingly, she used "Alberto" as her surname in all her school
records and correspondences.

On September 18, 1967, Juan M. Alberto, felled by a bullet from an

assassins gun, died intestate.

His widow, Yolanda R. Alberto, filed a petition for the administration of

his estate on January 10, 1968. After the publication of notices, she was
appointed as the administratrix of the estate. After the Inventory and
Appraisal and the Administratrix' Accounting were approved on August
1, 1970 and on April 29, 1971 respectively, the proceedings were
ordered closed and terminated.

On September 15, 1978, Ma. Theresa Alberto filed a motion for leave to
intervene as oppositor and to re-open the proceedings praying that she
be declared to have acquired the status of a natural child and as such,
entitled to share in the estate of the deceased. The motion was granted
by the probate court.

Upon the presentation by the parties of their respective evidence during

the trial, the probate court was convinced that indeed, Ma. Theresa
Alberto had been in continuous possession of the status of a natural
child. Thereupon, it rendered a decision compelling the decedents heirs
and estate to recognize her as a natural daughter and to allow her to
participate in the estate proceedings. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of

oppositor and against the estate of the deceased Juan M.
Alberto

(a) Declaring oppositor Ma. Theresa R. Alberto as having

acquired the status of a natural child of the late Gov. Juan M.
Alberto;

(b) Ordering the administratrix and widow of the deceased

and their children, namely, Mary Joy, Maria Rebecca, Juan,
Jr., Juan III, Maria Yolanda and Juan IV, all surnamed
Alberto, to recognize and acknowledge oppositor as an
acknowledged natural child of the late Gov. Alberto;

(c) Declaring oppositor as one of the heirs of the late Gov.

Juan M. Alberto;

(d) Ordering the administratrix to partition the deceaseds

estate and turn over to oppositor her participation therein
equivalent to one-half (1/2) of the share of each legitimate
child; and

(e) Ordering the administratrix to pay oppositor the sum of

P10,000.00 as attorneys fees and expenses of litigation.

Costs against the administratrix.

SO ORDERED. 1

The probate courts findings are quoted hereunder, to wit:

1) In the case at bar, the Court believes, and so holds, that

the oppositor has been in continuous possession of the
status of a child of Juan Alberto by his direct acts as well as
the acts of his family, as follows:

(a) The deceased gave the oppositor sums of money for her
schooling;

(b) The deceased made known to his friends and relatives

that she was his daughter; and

(c) He made known to the personnel of the International

School where oppositor was enrolled that she was his
daughter.

2) The following incidents would show the direct acts of the

family of the deceased.

(a) When the deceaseds younger sister, Mrs. Aurita Alberto

Solidum asked that the oppositor be sent to her house in her
Sunday best to meet her father for the first time;

(b) When Fr. Arcilla brought the oppositor to the bedside of

the deceased in the hospital and Fr. Arcilla asked the guard
to give way to her as she was a member of the family;

(c) When the step-mother of the deceased, during the wake,

introduced the oppositor to her youngest sister as an elder
sister.

3) Prescinding from the foregoing, there is sufficient evidence

to prove that the oppositor is the child of the deceased.

1. Oppositors mother, Aurora Reniva, testified:

(a) of an indiscretion that led to the conception of and giving

birth to the oppositor;

(b) that Mrs. Aurita Solidum arranged the meeting between

the oppositor and the deceased at the MOPC; (This particular
testimony was corroborated by Cristeta Andaya, former maid
of Mrs. Solidum, and by the oppositor) and
(c) that Juan Alberto had been sending her money from time
to time.

2) Oppositor also testified that:

(a) She had her first meeting with her father at the MOPC
where he gave her P500.00 personally and two telephone
numbers where he could be contacted and where they talked
about her name, age and other matters.

(b) She had other meetings with her father at the MOPC on
which occasions her father also gave her money.

(c) The deceased visited her two times at the International

School whose rules on visitors were strict and when her
father visited her, the secretary of the principal told her that
her father was waiting for her. This showed that the deceased
had identified himself to the personnel of the school that he
was the father of the oppositor.

(d) He promised to see her in her school during her birthday

on September 18, 1968 but was not able to do so because of
his untimely death.

(e) The deceased promised to bring the oppositor to

Catanduanes but failed likewise because of his death.

(f) When oppositor and her mother went to the PGH on the
occasion of her fathers death, Fr. Arcilla held her by the hand
and asked the guard to make way for her because she was a
child of Juan Alberto.

(g) After the wake for her deceased father, the deceaseds
step-mother, Saturnina Alberto, introduced her as a sister to
Joy Alberto her half-sister.

(h) Congressman Jose Alberto allowed her associates, upon

her representations, to use the ballroom of the Regent of
Manila for practice purposes. Congressman Alberto was the
owner of the Regent of Manila.
 (i) Her uncles and aunts, i.e., brothers and sisters of her
father, regarded her as their niece and introduced her to
others as the eldest daughter of Juan Alberto.

(j) The children of the brothers and sisters of Juan Alberto

recognized her as their cousin.

3) Jose Tablizo testified that:

(a) There was a strong physical resemblance between the

deceased and the oppositor.

(b) The deceased and the oppositor wrote similarly.

(c) It was known among the friends of the deceased,

particularly the Breeze Gang, composed of the witness, Jose
Tablizo, the deceased and 4 others.

(d) Sometime in 1967, the deceased showed him the report

card of the Oppositor and boasted of her high grades.

(e) The friends of the deceased had a party in Virac,

Catanduanes for the oppositor whom they considered as the
deceaseds daughter. (This was corroborated by Silverio
Taberara.)

4) Atty. Martiniano Vivo testified that Commissioner of

Immigration Edmundo Reyes, as lawyer for the deceased,
made an appointment with him (Atty. Vivo) for a conference,
at which they discussed the latters letter to the deceased
regarding the oppositor. In said conference, Com. Reyes said
that the deceased was not denying that he was the father of
the oppositor. And because of his marital status and the fact
that he was a public official, he wanted to avoid public
scandal with the promise to support the oppositor quietly
through a cousin, Fr. Arcilla. 2

The Court of Appeals reversed the above decision of the probate court
on the strength of the following observations:
Assuming the foregoing to be true, we do not believe they
satisfy the degree of proof to establish that oppositor was in
continuous possession of the status of a natural child of the
deceased.

In one case, the following facts were proved; that

two nurses took care of the children at the
expense of the defendant; that said defendant
kissed the children, called them sons, and ordered
that they be taken care of very well; that he gave
the money for the necessities of the mother and
the six children, the oldest of whom called the
father; that he visited the mother, complained of
his big family, and was publicly regarded as the
father of the children. It was held that these were
not sufficient to be a basis for a declaration of
paternity. They may show that the defendant was
convinced of his paternity in relation to the
children; but they do not show any intent on his
part to place such children in the possession of
status of natural children. The continued
possession of such
status cannot be founded on conjectures and
presumption. So, also, the mere fact that
defendants mother used to visit the child, cannot
be considered as conduct of his family sufficient to
confer
the uninterrupted possession of the status of a
natural child.
(1 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1983
ed., pp. 604-605, citing, Sentencia, 12 October
1907; Gustilo vs. Gustilo, et al., 14 SCRA 149;
Sentencia, 9 May 1921; Potot vs. Ycong, No.
6651, 22 March 1941, 40 O.G. No. 4, 26 July
1941, p. 748)

We find the evidence of oppositor-appellee even weaker than

that proven in the aforequoted citation. As a matter of fact,
oppositor's Exhibit W-1, a letter written by oppositor to Jose
 Tablizo after the death of the deceased, betrays a lack of
association between the deceased and oppositor such as
normally characterizes the relationship between father and
child. It gives the impression that the deceased studiously
distanced himself from the oppositor and had no intention
whatsoever of recognizing oppositor as his child. The
pertinent portion of the letter reads:

I have always been proud to be JMAs eldest

daughter, and I feel even prouder after I heard
from people like you. You were the ones that
knew him most, shared his dreams as a young
man, and witnessed his struggle from Palmeras
slums to Forbes Park. You saw him rise from
cargador to lawyer and, finally, to governor; I only
heard about them through Mama. His life was a
novel, and if I were to help write it, I would be able
to contribute but a few pages, for I knew him only
as a Big Man. It is YOU who had a part in the first
adventures of that same novel, and I envy you. (p.
35, Folder of Exhibits) 3

Hence this petition.

May the estate and heirs of deceased Juan M. Alberto be ordered to

recognize petitioner as the deceaseds natural daughter on the basis of
the evidence presented by petitioner to establish her claim that she has
been in continuous possession of the status of a natural child?

We rule in the affirmative.

In the probate court, the following have been established:

1) that prior to Juan M. Alberto's marriage to Yolanda Reyes, herein

private respondent, Juan M. Alberto and Aurora Reniva, mother of
herein petitioner, were sweethearts;
2) that as a consequence of an indiscretion, Aurora Reniva conceived
and gave birth to herein petitioner Ma. Theresa Alberto on September
18, 1953;

3) that petitioner used 'Alberto' as her surname in all her school records
and Juan M. Alberto was known to be her father;

4) that through Fr. Arcilla, a first cousin of Juan M. Alberto, money was
given to Aurora Reniva;

5) that when petitioner was about nine (9) years old, Mrs. Aurita
Solidum, the youngest sister of Juan M. Alberto, arranged the first
meeting between petitioner and Juan M. Alberto at the MOPC and
during said meeting, they talked about petitioner, the deceased gave
petitioner P500.00 and two telephone numbers;

6) that Juan M. Alberto would have visited petitioner on her birthday in

her school, International School, if not for his untimely death on
September 18, 1967;

7) that when petitioner and her mother went to the PGH on the occasion
of Juan M. Albertos death, Fr. Arcilla held her by the hand and asked
the guard to make way for her as she was a daughter of Juan M.
Alberto;

8) that after the wake for deceased Juan M. Alberto, his step mother,
Saturnina Alberto introduced petitioner to Joy Alberto as the latters
sister;

9) that the siblings of Juan M. Alberto regarded petitioner as their niece

and introduced her to their children as the eldest daughter of Juan M.
Alberto;

10) that the children of Juan M. Albertos siblings regarded her as their
cousin;

11) that petitioner was known by Juan M. Albertos friends as his

daughter;
12) that Juan M. Alberto showed Jose Tablizo the grades of petitioner
and remarked that those were the grades of his daughter.

Private respondent, Yolanda Alberto, the sole witness for private

respondents, denied that Juan M. Alberto ever recognized Ma. Theresa
Alberto as his daughter. She presented in evidence Aurora Renivas
letters to Juan M. Alberto dated December 23, 1955, September 27,
1954 and March 15, 1960; Aurora Renivas letter to Fr. Arcilla dated
December 23, 1955; letter of Zenaida Reniva to Juan M. Alberto dated
September 16, 1953, to prove that Juan M. Alberto refused to recognize
Ma. Theresa Alberto as his own. 4

However, these letters do not prove that Juan M. Alberto refused to

recognize Ma. Theresa Alberto. All that the letters stated was that Aurora
Reniva was having a difficult time raising a child by her own self and
therefore, she was seeking the assistance of Juan M. Alberto. Private
respondent quoted as Exhibit "3-B" the portion of Aurora Renivas letter
dated March 15, 1960 which says:

. . . I am just wondering why after all those years of patient

waiting, you still do not give a damn to her. 5

The full text of the paragraph, however, reads as follows:

On the 23rd of this month, Maria Theresa P. Alberto will

graduate from the Prep School of Holy Ghost College. I am
just wondering why after all those years of patient waiting,
you still do not give a damn to her. I thought, as I was told
before by Fr. Arcilla, that I just pray and wait because he said
pretty soon you will be sending her money for support. So far,
only the 300 pesos was received by us last October, 1959.
For it, I am very grateful because it helped me a lot in our
wants. 6

The letter itself shows that Juan M. Alberto was not completely
indifferent towards Ma. Theresa Alberto. He did provide her support
whenever he could.
The latest letter that was presented in evidence was dated March 15,
1960. At the time, petitioner and Juan M. Alberto had not yet met. About
two years later, when petitioner was nine years old, Mrs. Aurita Solidum
arranged the first meeting between petitioner and the deceased. This
initial meeting was followed by many more. Moreover, it is noteworthy
that Juan M. Alberto never took any step to stop petitioner from using his
surname. The testimony of Jose Tablizo established his recognition of
Ma. Theresa Alberto as his daughter. He testified that Juan M. Alberto
showed him two report cards of Ma. Theresa which showed straight
"A's." He said "Boy! Great!" and Juan M. Alberto said that those were the
grades of his daughter. 7 This testimony is now being discredited for
being hearsay. This Court holds that the same falls within the exceptions
to the hearsay rule. Sec. 38, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides as
follows:

Sec. 38. Declaration Against Interest. The declaration

made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the
interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted at the declaration
was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's
own interest that a reasonable man in his position would not
have made his declaration unless he believed it to be true,
may be received in evidence against himself or his
successors in interest and against third persons.

As found by the trial court, recognition of petitioner's status as a natural

daughter of Juan M. Alberto was made, not only by the latter, but by his
relatives as well Fr. Cipriano Arcilla, Jose Alberto, Aurita Solidum and
Saturnina Alberto, among others. Private respondent only had to present
any one of those relatives to negate petitioner's testimony that she had
been acknowledged by them as the eldest daughter of the deceased.
Her failure to do so baffles this Court. If indeed Ma. Theresa Alberto
were fabricating her testimony, the family of the deceased would have
been more than willing to destroy the claims of an intruder. Under the
circumstances, it is safe for us to assume that had any of the relatives
mentioned by petitioner been presented as witness for private
respondent, their testimonies would be detrimental to the latter's cause.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that petitioner has been in continuous
possession of the status of a natural child of the deceased in accordance
with Article 283 of the Civil Code which provides, inter alia:

Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to

recognize the child as his natural child:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a

child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or his
family.

The Court of Appeals, in reversing the decision of the probate court,

stated as follows:

We find the evidence of oppositor-appellee even weaker than

that proven in the aforequoted citation. As a matter of fact,
oppositor's Exhibit W-1, a letter written by oppositor to Jose
Tablizo after the death of the deceased, betrays a lack of
association between the deceased and oppositor such as
normally characterizes the relationship between father and
child. It gives the impression that the deceased studiously
distanced himself from the oppositor and had not intention
whatsoever of recognizing oppositor as his child. The
pertinent portion of the letter reads:

I have always been proud to be JMAs eldest daughter, and I

feel even prouder after I heard from people like you. You
were the ones that knew him most, shared his dreams as a
young man, and witnessed his struggle from, palmeras
slums to Forbes Park. You saw him rise from cargador to
lawyer and, finally, to governor; I only heard about them
through Mama. His life was a novel, and if I were to help write
it, I would be able to contribute but a few pages, for I knew
him only as a Big Man. It is YOU who had a part in the first
adventures of that same novel, and I envy you. 8
What a poignant novel this daughter could well author as she now seeks
to establish indubitable parental links with a father who sired her some
forty-one years ago. Why he desisted from marrying the mother of this
girl at a time when no impediment blocked the way is a matter one can
merely conjecture at.

While he did contract marriage subsequently with another woman, it was

only too clear that he had no intentions of closing definitively that chapter
in his life when he begat his first-born. Of the different categories of
illegitimate children under the old Civil Code, the natural child occupies
the highest position, she being the child of parents who, at the time of
her conception, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each
other and could, therefore, have contracted a valid marriage. Often the
fruit of first love, she is ensconced firmly in her parent's hearts. No
subsequent liaisons, though blessed with legitimate offspring, can
completely obliterate those early memories.

A shared past intimacy between the putative parents and the clear
marks of heredity stamped on the brow of their offspring are not to be
denied. Thus, whether openly or furtively, a father in the situation of Juan
M. Alberto could not have resisted manifesting signs of concern and care
insofar as his firstborn is concerned. If, at an early age, the child shows
much talent and great promise as petitioner in this case apparently did, it
is understandable, and even to be expected, that the father would
proudly step forward to claim paternity either through his direct acts or
those of his family, or both, as in instant case.

In the case at bench, evidence is not wanting from which it may logically
be concluded that the deceased Juan M. Alberto took no pains to
conceal his paternity. No less than his younger sister, his stepmother,
his priest-cousin, several relatives and close friends were categorically
informed of the relationship and they accepted the same as fact.

Understandably, considering the strait-laced mores of the times and the

social and political stature of Juan M. Alberto and his family, those who
were privy to the relationship observed discreetness. But he himself
openly visited his daughter in school, had meetings with her at the
MOPC on which occasions he gave her money and introduced her
proudly to his gangmates.
Where the daughter admits to envy in a letter to her fathers friend
because the latter played a greater role in her fathers life, this is but the
natural expression of a wistful longing of a child to reach out to her
biological father. Far be it for us to interpret such sentiment as a betrayal
of "a lack of association between the deceased and oppositor such as
normally characterizes the relationship between father and child." In this
instance, the lack of association cannot be helped for the relationship
was far from normal.

Much less do we take it as giving the impression that the deceased

"studiously distanced himself from the oppositor and had no intention
whatsoever of recognizing oppositor as his child." On the contrary,
during his lifetime, Juan M. Alberto acted in such a manner as to evince
his intent to recognize Ma. Theresa Alberto, herein oppositor, as his
flesh and blood, first, by allowing her from birth to use his family name;
second, by giving her and her mother sums of money by way of support
and lastly, by openly introducing her to members of his family, relatives
and friends as his daughter. Supplementing such unmistakable acts of
recognition were those of his kin and gangmates manifesting open
acceptance of such relationship. Taken altogether, the claimed filiation
would be hard to disprove.

Since the oppositor seeks a judicial declaration that she be recognized

as a natural child to enable her to participate in the estate of the
deceased, Article 285 of the Civil Code prescribing the period when such
action should be brought governs. It provides:

Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children

may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed
parents, except in the following cases:

(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child,
in which case the latter may file the action before the
expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority.

xxx xxx xxx

The oppositor's case falls clearly under the above exception.

Juan M. Alberto died during the minority of petitioner, that is, on
September 18, 1967 the day petitioner turned fourteen. As such,
petitioner had four years from the time she reached twenty-one on
September 18, 1974, which was then the age of majority, within which to
bring the aforesaid action. Thus, petitioner had until September 18, 1978
within which to file the action for recognition. Petitioner filed her motion
for leave to intervene as oppositor and to re-open the proceedings with
the prayer that she be declared to have acquired the status of a natural
child and as such, entitled to share in the estate of the deceased, on
September 15, 1978. Said motion was, therefore, seasonably filed three
days before the expiration of the four-year period.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby

GRANTED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and that
of the probate court AFFIRMED.

Raymond Pe Lim vs. CA, et. al., G.R. No. 112229, March 18, 1997, 80
SCAD 685

G.R. No. 112229 March 18, 1997

RAYMOND PE LIM, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JOANNA ROSE C. PE LIM, Minor
represented by her Natural Mother and Guardian, MARIBEL CRUZ y
TAYAG, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

All too often, immature men who allow their emotions to hold sway over
their rational minds come to grief when their passions cool off, but not
before inflicting irreparable psychic and spiritual damage on their victims
and the fruits of their wanton acts. As they sow the proverbial "wild oats,"
they are heedless of the dire consequences they heap on their heads.
When the inevitable confrontation explodes and they are helpless to
extricate themselves from the messy situation arising from their
wrongdoing, eventually they invoke the help of the courts as their final
arbiter.

Before us is one of those cases where a man woos a maid, succeeds in

seducing and impregnating her, only to disclaim the paternity of the child
when made to account for his misdeeds.

DNA,1 being a relatively new science, it has not as yet been accorded
official recognition by our courts. Paternity will still have to be resolved
by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating acts, verbal
and written, by the putative father.

This petition for review on certiorari sprang from a complaint filed by

Maribel Cruz for child support on behalf of her daughter, private
respondent Joanna Rose C. Pe Lim, against petitioner Raymond Pe Lim
who, Maribel claims, is Joanna's father.

Maribel's story unfolds, thus:

Maribel was sixteen years old in 1978 and a part-time student. She also
worked as a receptionist at Tonight's Club and Resthouse along Roxas
Blvd., Manila. She met petitioner during her first night on the job.
Petitioner wooed her and Maribel reciprocated his love. They soon lived
together, with petitioner paying the rentals in a succession of apartments
in Cubao, Quezon City, Tambo, Paranaque and Makati, Metro Manila.
Maribel left for Japan in July 1981, already pregnant, and returned to
Manila in October of the same year.

The couple never married because petitioner claimed that he was not
financially stable. On January 17, 1982, Maribel gave birth to their
daughter at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital. The bills for
Maribel's three-day confinement at the hospital were paid for by
Raymond and he also caused the registration of the name Joanna Rose
C. Pe Lim on the child's birth certificate. After Joanna Rose's birth, the
love affair between Maribel and petitioner continued.

Towards the latter part of 1983, Maribel noted that petitioner's feelings
toward her started to wane. He subsequently abandoned her and
Joanna Rose. Maribel tried to support herself by accepting various jobs
and with occasional help from relatives, but it was never enough. She
asked petitioner for support but, despite promises to do so, it was never
given. Maribel then filed a complaint against petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila for support.

Petitioner, on the other hand, has a different version: He claims that in

1978, he went to Tonight's Club and Resthouse along Roxas Boulevard,
Manila to relax after a hard day's work. There he met Maribel, a pretty
and aggressive hospitality girl. Raymond observed that while she had a
pleasing personality, she seemed to be quite experienced because she
started to kiss him on the cheeks and neck, whispering to him that they
could go anywhere and rest. Raymond declined to take Maribel up on
her offer saying that he only wanted someone to talk to. They became
friends after that first meeting, and while he often saw her, there was no
intimacy between them. He did admit giving Maribel sizeable tips
because she confided in him that she needed money.

Raymond alleged that he was not Maribel's only customer at the club. In
1980, she left for Japan to work as an entertainer.

In 1981, she returned to Manila pregnant, and appealed to Raymond for

help because she claimed that she could not face her relatives in her
condition. Raymond got her an apartment and paid its rentals until she
gave birth to a baby girl on January 17, 1982. Raymond admits paying
the hospital bills but claims that Maribel was supposed to pay him back
for it. When she failed to do so, Raymond stopped seeing her.

Raymond denies being the father of Maribel's child, claiming that they
were only friends and nothing more.

The trial court rendered a decision on June 10, 1971, the dispositive
portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

plaintiff and against the defendant ordering herein defendant,
Raymond Pe Lim to give support to his natural daughter,
minor Joanna Rose Pe Lim in the amount of Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00). Philippine Currency, per month for the
support, maintenance, education and well-being of said child,
 the same to be paid on or before the 5th day of each month
and monthly thereafter starting June, 1991, until the said
minor Joanna Rose Pe Lim, shall have reached the age of
majority.

The defendant is further ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum

of Seven Thousand Five Hundred (P7,500.00) Pesos,
Philippine Currency, for attorney's fees and other litigation
expenses.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner then elevated his case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the trial court's findings.

Petitioner now argues before the Court that there is no clear and
convincing evidence on record to show that there was actual
cohabitation between him and Maribel. In fact, petitioner infers that
Maribel became pregnant only when she went to Japan. In short, he
denies that he is the father of Joanna Rose. He further questions the
awarded support of P10,000.00 per month, saying that the same is
beyond his means, considering that he has a family to support.

We find no merit in this petition.

In Alberto v. Court of Appeals,2 we said:

When a putative father manifests openly through words and

deeds his recognition of a child, the courts can do no less
than confirm said acknowledgment. As the immortal bard
Shakespeare perspicaciously said: "Let your own discretion
be your tutor; suit the action to the word, the word to the
action."

The evidence in the instant case shows that petitioner considered

himself to be the father of Joanna Rose as shown by the hand-written
letter he wrote to Maribel:
Hi Love,

I wrote you this letter because I would like to erase from your
mind the thought of why I can not ever [sic] you marriage
right now is because I have no longer love or care for
both Joanna & you.

Last night when we talked things over, I was in a stage

wherein everything was happening so fast that I was running
out of time & works (sic) to make you understand me through
this letter I would like to explain my side in a more detailed
way and I hope you could understand.

You know love, the main root of the problem of why marriage
is impossible for us right now is not what my parents or my
family circle will say about you, but the financial side of it.
Okay, let say I did marry you right now disregarding my
financial stability. Sooner or later they will come to know of it
and I am sure that they will not consent it. I have no
alternative but to leave them & to stick it up with you. This is
where the financial side comes in. I can't allow myself walking
away from my family making them think that I can stand on
my own two feet but the truth of the matter is not and seeing
both of you suffer for only one stupid mistake which is I was
not yet financially ready to face the consequence.

My plan is that if you could only stick it out with me until I am

ready to face whatever consequence that might occur during
our life or relation as husband and wife. You have already
tried it before, why can't you stress it a little longer. In return, I
promise to be a loving & caring husband & father to both of
you.

Love, I really don't want you to be taken away from me by

anyone, whether he be single or married. This is the reason
why I am still trying to convince you. But if you really have
decided things up and really determined to push through with
it. I guess I just have to respect your decision. Just remember
 I wish you the best of luck and take extra-care of yourself &
Joanna.

Remember, if the time comes when things get rough for you
and you have no one to turn to, don't hesitate to call on me. I
am very much willing to be at your side to help you.

I love you very much!

Love,

Ray
mon
d
(Emp
hasis
suppl
ied
by
Ray
mon
d
hims
elf)

From the tenor of the letter and the statements petitioner made therein it
is clear that, contrary to his vehement assertion that he and Maribel were
just friends, they were actually lovers.

In an earlier letter, this time sent to Maribel while she was in Japan,
petitioner lovingly told her to take care of herself because of her
"situation," obviously referring to the state of pregnancy of Maribel:

A
u
g
.

1
 1
,

1
9
8
1

Hi Love,

Do you know how glad I was to receive a letter from you

yesterday? At least now I'm a little bit at ease to know that
everything is fine with you.

Love, in your letter you seem so much concern (sic) about my

situation once here. I really appreciate it, but please don't
give too much thought about it because I'm physically o.k.
here. The important thing is that don't think too much and
have a lot of rest during your spare time especially in the
situation you're in now. If you are feeling homesick just go out
with your friends and try to enjoy yourself to the fullest while
you are there.

Love, you said in your letter that you regret very much your
going there & wishes (sic) that you have not left anymore. I
understand your feelings to what had happened after you told
me about it in the telephone.

xxx xxx xxx

Love, I miss you so much that I always re-read those letters

you had send me very often. At night I always think of you
and the times we're together before going to sleep.

xxx xxx xxx (Empahsis supplied)

It was only after petitioner separated from Maribel that he started to deny
paternity of Joanna Rose. Until he got married to another woman, he did
not object to being identified as Joanna Rose's father as disclosed in the
Certificate of Live Birth. The evidence on record reveals that he even got
a copy of the said Certificate when Joanna Rose started schooling, as
shown by a receipt in his name from the San Juan Municipal Office. His
belated denial cannot outweigh the totality of the cogent evidence which
establishes beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner is indeed the father
of Joanna Rose. 3

Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be

established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.

Article 172 of the Family Code states:

The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the

following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final

judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or

a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate

filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a

legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and

special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a).

This article adopts the rule in Article 283 of the Civil Code that filiation
may be proven by "any evidence or proof that the defendant is his
father."4

Petitioner has never controverted the evidence on record. His love

letters to Maribel vowing to be a good father to Joanna Rose; pictures of
himself on various occasions cuddling Joanna Rose and the Certificate
of Live Birth say it all. Accordingly, his suit must fail.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the Court
of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Mendoza, J., took no part.