G.R. No.

157451 December 16, 2005

LETICIA VALMONTE ORTEGA, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, Respondent.

Civil Law; Wills; The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of its execution; The
burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud.Fraud is a trick,
secret device, false statement, or pretense, by which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is
misled or deceived as to the nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in
consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for the fraud, he would not have
made. We stress that the party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of its execution.
The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud. Unfortunately
in this case, other than the self-serving allegations of petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever presented.

Same; Same; The omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will.It is a settled doctrine that the omission
of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will. That the testator was tricked into signing it was not sufficiently
established by the fact that he had instituted his wife, who was more than fifty years his junior, as the sole beneficiary; and
disregarded petitioner and her family, who were the ones who had taken the cudgels of taking care of [the testator] in his twilight
years.

Same; Same; The conflict between the dates appearing on the will does not invalidate the document because the law does not
even require that a notarial will be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion.As correctly ruled by the appellate court,
the conflict between the dates appearing on the will does not invalidate the document, because the law does not even require that
a [notarial] will x x x be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion. More important, the will must be subscribed by the
testator, as well as by three or more credible witnesses who must also attest to it in the presence of the testator and of one another.
Furthermore, the testator and the witnesses must acknowledge the will before a notary public. In any event, we agree with the CA
that the variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation was satisfactorily and persuasively explained
by the notary public and the instrumental witnesses.

Same; Same; The testimonies of the three subscribing witnesses and the notary are credible evidence of its due execution.
Petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of a grand conspiracy in the commission of a fraud. There was no showing that the
witnesses of the proponent stood to receive any benefit from the allowance of the will. The testimonies of the three subscribing
witnesses and the notary are credible evidence of its due execution. Their testimony favoring it and the finding that it was executed
in accordance with the formalities required by law should be affirmed, absent any showing of ill motives.

Same; Same; To be considered of sound mind, things that the testator must have the ability to know.According to Article 799,
the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the natureJ of the
estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testators bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act. Applying this
test to the present case, we find that the appellate court was correct in holding that Placido had testamentary capacity at the time
of the execution of his will.

Same; Same; Testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of unsound mind.
Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and
that degrees of mental aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or
incapacity and while on one hand it has been held that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from
age, will not render a person incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may make a valid will, provided he has
understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his
property. To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by
disease or otherwise. It has been held that testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be
insane or of unsound mind.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The law favors the probate of a will. Upon those who oppose it rests the burden of showing why it should not be allowed. In the
present case, petitioner has failed to discharge this burden satisfactorily. For this reason, the Court cannot attribute any reversible
error on the part of the appellate tribunal that allowed the probate of the will.

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the December 12,
2002 Decision2 and the March 7, 2003 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 44296. The assailed Decision
disposed as follows:

Page 1 of 104
"WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED, and the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In its place judgment is
rendered approving and allowing probate to the said last will and testament of Placido Valmonte and ordering the issuance of letters
testamentary to the petitioner Josefina Valmonte. Let this case be remanded to the court a quo for further and concomitant
proceedings."4

The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The facts were summarized in the assailed Decision of the CA, as follows:

"x x x: Like so many others before him, Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the United States until he finally reached
retirement. In 1980, Placido finally came home to stay in the Philippines, and he lived in the house and lot located at #9200 Catmon
St., San Antonio Village, Makati, which he owned in common with his sister Ciriaca Valmonte and titled in their names in TCT
123468. Two years after his arrival from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old, in a
ceremony solemnized by Judge Perfecto Laguio, Jr. on February 5, 1982. But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido
died on October 8, 1984 of a cause written down as COR PULMONALE.

"Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of two (2) pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but
acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and a part of the attestation
clause, and was signed at the end or bottom of that page by the testator and on the left hand margin by the three instrumental
witnesses. The second page contains the continuation of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment, and was signed by the
witnesses at the end of the attestation clause and again on the left hand margin. It provides in the body that:

LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF PLACIDO VALMONTE IN THE NAME OF THE LORD AMEN:

I, PLACIDO VALMONTE, of legal age, married to Josefina Cabansag Valmonte, and a resident of 9200 Catmon Street, Makati, Metro
Manila, 83 years of age and being of sound and disposing mind and memory, do hereby declare this to be my last will and
testament:

1. It is my will that I be buried in the Catholic Cemetery, under the auspices of the Catholic Church in accordance with the rites and
said Church and that a suitable monument to be erected and provided my by executrix (wife) to perpetuate my memory in the
minds of my family and friends;

2. I give, devise and bequeath unto my loving wife, JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, one half (1/2) portion of the follow-described
properties, which belongs to me as [co-owner]:

a. Lot 4-A, Block 13 described on plan Psd-28575, LRC, (GLRO), situated in Makati, Metro Manila, described and covered by TCT No.
123468 of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro-Manila registered jointly as co-owners with my deceased sister (Ciriaca Valmonte),
having share and share alike;

b. 2-storey building standing on the above-described property, made of strong and mixed materials used as my residence and my
wife and located at No. 9200 Catmon Street, Makati, Metro Manila also covered by Tax Declaration No. A-025-00482, Makati,
Metro-Manila, jointly in the name of my deceased sister, Ciriaca Valmonte and myself as co-owners, share and share alike or equal
co-owners thereof;

3. All the rest, residue and remainder of my real and personal properties, including my savings account bank book in USA which is in
the possession of my nephew, and all others whatsoever and wherever found, I give, devise and bequeath to my said wife, Josefina
C. Valmonte;

4. I hereby appoint my wife, Josefina C. Valmonte as sole executrix of my last will and testament, and it is my will that said executrix
be exempt from filing a bond;

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 15th day of June 1983 in Quezon City, Philippines.

"The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia on the grounds that:

1. Petitioner failed to allege all assets of the testator, especially those found in the USA;

2. Petitioner failed to state the names, ages, and residences of the heirs of the testator; or to give them proper notice pursuant to
law;

3. Will was not executed and attested as required by law and legal solemnities and formalities were not complied with;

4. Testator was mentally incapable to make a will at the time of the alleged execution he being in an advance sate of senility;

Page 2 of 104
5. Will was executed under duress, or the influence of fear or threats;

6. Will was procured by undue and improper influence and pressure on the part of the petitioner and/or her agents and/or
assistants; and/or

7. Signature of testator was procured by fraud, or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of
affixing his signature thereto;

and she also opposed the appointment as Executrix of Josefina alleging her want of understanding and integrity.

"At the hearing, the petitioner Josefina testified and called as witnesses the notary public Atty. Floro Sarmiento who prepared and
notarized the will, and the instrumental witnesses spouses Eugenio Gomez, Jr. and Feliza Gomez and Josie Collado. For the
opposition, the oppositor Leticia and her daughter Mary Jane Ortega testified.

"According to Josefina after her marriage with the testator they lived in her parents house at Salingcob, Bacnotan, La Union but they
came to Manila every month to get his $366.00 monthly pension and stayed at the said Makati residence. There were times though
when to shave off on expenses, the testator would travel alone. And it was in one of his travels by his lonesome self when the
notarial will was made. The will was witnessed by the spouses Eugenio and Feliza Gomez, who were their wedding sponsors, and by
Josie Collado. Josefina said she had no knowledge of the existence of the last will and testament of her husband, but just
serendipitously found it in his attache case after his death. It was only then that she learned that the testator bequeathed to her his
properties and she was named the executrix in the said will. To her estimate, the value of property both real and personal left by the
testator is worth more or less P100,000.00. Josefina declared too that the testator never suffered mental infirmity because despite
his old age he went alone to the market which is two to three kilometers from their home cooked and cleaned the kitchen and
sometimes if she could not accompany him, even traveled to Manila alone to claim his monthly pension. Josefina also asserts that
her husband was in good health and that he was hospitalized only because of a cold but which eventually resulted in his death.

"Notary Public Floro Sarmiento, the notary public who notarized the testators will, testified that it was in the first week of June 1983
when the testator together with the three witnesses of the will went to his house cum law office and requested him to prepare his
last will and testament. After the testator instructed him on the terms and dispositions he wanted on the will, the notary public told
them to come back on June 15, 1983 to give him time to prepare it. After he had prepared the will the notary public kept it safely
hidden and locked in his drawer. The testator and his witnesses returned on the appointed date but the notary public was out of
town so they were instructed by his wife to come back on August 9, 1983, and which they did. Before the testator and his witnesses
signed the prepared will, the notary public explained to them each and every term thereof in Ilocano, a dialect which the testator
spoke and understood. He likewise explained that though it appears that the will was signed by the testator and his witnesses on
June 15, 1983, the day when it should have been executed had he not gone out of town, the formal execution was actually on
August 9, 1983. He reasoned that he no longer changed the typewritten date of June 15, 1983 because he did not like the document
to appear dirty. The notary public also testified that to his observation the testator was physically and mentally capable at the time
he affixed his signature on the will.

"The attesting witnesses to the will corroborated the testimony of the notary public, and testified that the testator went alone to the
house of spouses Eugenio and Feliza Gomez at GSIS Village, Quezon City and requested them to accompany him to the house of
Atty. Floro Sarmiento purposely for his intended will; that after giving his instructions to Atty. Floro Sarmiento, they were told to
return on June 15, 1983; that they returned on June 15, 1983 for the execution of the will but were asked to come back instead on
August 9, 1983 because of the absence of the notary public; that the testator executed the will in question in their presence while he
was of sound and disposing mind and that he was strong and in good health; that the contents of the will was explained by the
notary public in the Ilocano and Tagalog dialect and that all of them as witnesses attested and signed the will in the presence of the
testator and of each other. And that during the execution, the testators wife, Josefina was not with them.

"The oppositor Leticia declared that Josefina should not inherit alone because aside from her there are other children from the
siblings of Placido who are just as entitled to inherit from him. She attacked the mental capacity of the testator, declaring that at the
time of the execution of the notarial will the testator was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind. She knew whereof
she spoke because in 1983 Placido lived in the Makati residence and asked Leticias family to live with him and they took care of him.
During that time, the testators physical and mental condition showed deterioration, aberrations and senility. This was corroborated
by her daughter Mary Jane Ortega for whom Placido took a fancy and wanted to marry.

"Sifting through the evidence, the court a quo held that [t]he evidence adduced, reduces the opposition to two grounds, namely:

1. Non-compliance with the legal solemnities and formalities in the execution and attestation of the will; and

2. Mental incapacity of the testator at the time of the execution of the will as he was then in an advanced state of senility

"It then found these grounds extant and proven, and accordingly disallowed probate."5

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Page 3 of 104
Reversing the trial court, the appellate court admitted the will of Placido Valmonte to probate. The CA upheld the credibility of the
notary public and the subscribing witnesses who had acknowledged the due execution of the will. Moreover, it held that the testator
had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will. It added that his "sexual exhibitionism and unhygienic, crude and
impolite ways"6 did not make him a person of unsound mind.

Hence, this Petition. 7

Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:

"I.

Whether or not the findings of the probate court are entitled to great respect.

"II.

Whether or not the signature of Placido Valmonte in the subject will was procured by fraud or trickery, and that Placido Valmonte
never intended that the instrument should be his last will and testament.

"III.

Whether or not Placido Valmonte has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly executed the subject will."8

In short, petitioner assails the CAs allowance of the probate of the will of Placido Valmonte.

This Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Main Issue:

Probate of a Will

At the outset, we stress that only questions of law may be raised in a Petition for Review under Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. As an exception, however, the evidence presented during the trial may be examined and the factual matters resolved by this
Court when, as in the instant case, the findings of fact of the appellate court differ from those of the trial court.9

The fact that public policy favors the probate of a will does not necessarily mean that every will presented for probate should be
allowed. The law lays down the procedures and requisites that must be satisfied for the probate of a will.10 Verily, Article 839 of the
Civil Code states the instances when a will may be disallowed, as follows:

"Article 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:

(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;

(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its execution;

(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;

(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person;

(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;

(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing his
signature thereto."

In the present case, petitioner assails the validity of Placido Valmontes will by imputing fraud in its execution and challenging the
testators state of mind at the time.

Existence of Fraud in the

Execution of a Will

Page 4 of 104
Petitioner does not dispute the due observance of the formalities in the execution of the will, but maintains that the circumstances
surrounding it are indicative of the existence of fraud. Particularly, she alleges that respondent, who is the testators wife and sole
beneficiary, conspired with the notary public and the three attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is allegedly
reflected in the varying dates of the execution and the attestation of the will.

Petitioner contends that it was "highly dubious for a woman at the prime of her young life [to] almost immediately plunge into
marriage with a man who [was] thrice her age x x x and who happened to be [a] Fil-American pensionado,"11 thus casting doubt on
the intention of respondent in seeking the probate of the will. Moreover, it supposedly "defies human reason, logic and common
experience"12 for an old man with a severe psychological condition to have willingly signed a last will and testament.

We are not convinced. Fraud "is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretense, by which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of
such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it may
relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but
for the fraud, he would not have made."13

We stress that the party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of its execution. 14 The
burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud.15 Unfortunately in
this case, other than the self-serving allegations of petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever presented.

It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will.16 That the testator was tricked
into signing it was not sufficiently established by the fact that he had instituted his wife, who was more than fifty years his junior, as
the sole beneficiary; and disregarded petitioner and her family, who were the ones who had taken "the cudgels of taking care of [the
testator] in his twilight years."17

Moreover, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict between the dates appearing on the will does not invalidate the
document, "because the law does not even require that a [notarial] will x x x be executed and acknowledged on the same
occasion."18 More important, the will must be subscribed by the testator, as well as by three or more credible witnesses who must
also attest to it in the presence of the testator and of one another.19Furthermore, the testator and the witnesses must acknowledge
the will before a notary public.20 In any event, we agree with the CA that "the variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed
execution and attestation was satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary public and the instrumental witnesses."21

The pertinent transcript of stenographic notes taken on June 11, 1985, November 25, 1985, October 13, 1986, and October 21, 1987
-- as quoted by the CA -- are reproduced respectively as follows:

"Atty. Floro Sarmiento:

Q You typed this document exhibit C, specifying the date June 15 when the testator and his witnesses were supposed to be in your
office?

A Yes sir.

Q On June 15, 1983, did the testator and his witnesses come to your house?

A They did as of agreement but unfortunately, I was out of town.

xxxxxxxxx

Q The document has been acknowledged on August 9, 1983 as per acknowledgement appearing therein. Was this the actual date
when the document was acknowledged?

A Yes sir.

Q What about the date when the testator and the three witnesses affixed their respective signature on the first and second pages of
exhibit C?

A On that particular date when it was acknowledged, August 9, 1983.

Q Why did you not make the necessary correction on the date appearing on the body of the document as well as the attestation
clause?

A Because I do not like anymore to make some alterations so I put it in my own handwriting August 9, 1983 on the
acknowledgement. (tsn, June 11, 1985, pp. 8-10)

Eugenio Gomez:

Page 5 of 104
Q It appears on the first page Mr. Witness that it is dated June 15, 1983, whereas in the acknowledgement it is dated August 9, 1983,
will you look at this document and tell us this discrepancy in the date?

A We went to Atty. Sarmiento together with Placido Valmonte and the two witnesses; that was first week of June and Atty.
Sarmiento told us to return on the 15th of June but when we returned, Atty. Sarmiento was not there.

Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento on June 15, 1983, did you again go back?

A We returned on the 9th of August and there we signed.

Q This August 9, 1983 where you said it is there where you signed, who were your companions?

A The two witnesses, me and Placido Valmonte. (tsn, November 25, 1985, pp. 7-8)

Felisa Gomez on cross-examination:

Q Why did you have to go to the office of Atty. Floro Sarmiento, three times?

xxxxxxxxx

A The reason why we went there three times is that, the first week of June was out first time. We went there to talk to Atty.
Sarmiento and Placido Valmonte about the last will and testament. After that what they have talked what will be placed in the
testament, what Atty. Sarmiento said was that he will go back on the 15th of June. When we returned on June 15, Atty. Sarmiento
was not there so we were not able to sign it, the will. That is why, for the third time we went there on August 9 and that was the
time we affixed our signature. (tsn, October 13, 1986, pp. 4-6)

Josie Collado:

Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento in his house on June 15, 1983, what transpired?

A The wife of Atty. Sarmiento told us that we will be back on August 9, 1983.

Q And on August 9, 1983 did you go back to the house of Atty. Sarmiento?

A Yes, Sir.

Q For what purpose?

A Our purpose is just to sign the will.

Q Were you able to sign the will you mentioned?

A Yes sir. (tsn, October 21, 1987, pp. 4-5)"22

Notably, petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of a "grand conspiracy" in the commission of a fraud. There was no showing that
the witnesses of the proponent stood to receive any benefit from the allowance of the will. The testimonies of the three subscribing
witnesses and the notary are credible evidence of its due execution. 23 Their testimony favoring it and the finding that it was
executed in accordance with the formalities required by law should be affirmed, absent any showing of ill motives.24

Capacity to Make a Will

In determining the capacity of the testator to make a will, the Civil Code gives the following guidelines:

"Article 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the testator be of sound mind at the time of its execution.

"Article 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his
mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or shattered by disease, injury or other cause.

"It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the
proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.

"Article 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.

Page 6 of 104
"The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes
the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person
who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval."

According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered of sound mind are as
follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testators bounty, and (3) the character of the
testamentary act. Applying this test to the present case, we find that the appellate court was correct in holding that Placido had
testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his will.

It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of
his shares in them and even their locations. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as
sole beneficiary. As we have stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being
no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.

Worth reiterating in determining soundness of mind is Alsua-Betts v. CA, 25 which held thus:

"Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and
that degrees of mental aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or
incapacity and while on one hand it has been held that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from
age, will not render a person incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may make a valid will, provided he has
understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his
property. To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by
disease or otherwise. It has been held that testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be
insane or of unsound mind."26

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Page 7 of 104
G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27, 2006

DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila,
ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D.
SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D. SEANGIO, Respondents.

Succession; Wills; Disinheritance; Maltreatment; For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same
must be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified; Maltreatment of a parent by a child presents a
sufficient cause for the disinheritance of the latter.The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed
Segundos intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that he cited therein. In effect,
Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo. For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be
effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that
were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of
maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or
descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code.

Same; Same; Same; Holographic Wills; A holographic will must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator
himselfit is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.A holographic
will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself.
It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. Segundos document,
although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will
prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly
deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latters property, the
disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of
the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.

Same; Same; Same; Same; It is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within
the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession; Holographic wills, being usually prepared by
one who is not learned in the law, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator.It is a fundamental principle that
the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the
supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the
intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect. Holographic wills, therefore, being
usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the
ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of
the testator. In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was
intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic
will. Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The law favors testacy over intestacy, and testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the
decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings; The probate of a will cannot be dispensed with.Considering that the
questioned document is Segundos holographic will, and that the law favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be
dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may
be rendered nugatory. In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will to be probated. It
is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for
the same purpose.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari1 with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order seeking the nullification of the orders, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 21 (the RTC), dismissing the petition for probate on the ground of preterition, in the consolidated cases, docketed as SP.
Proc. No. 98-90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99-93396, and entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Segundo C. Seangio v. Alfredo
D. Seangio, et al." and "In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of Segundo C. Seangio v. Dy Yieng Seangio, Barbara D. Seangio and
Virginia Seangio."

The facts of the cases are as follows:

On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio,
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 9890870 of the RTC, and praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D. SeangioSantos as
special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.

Page 8 of 104
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very
healthy and in full command of her faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia
giving her the power to manage and exercise control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most
competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a certified public accountant; and, 4)
Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause.
In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the intestate
proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the will.

On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 9993396, was filed by
petitioners before the RTC. They likewise reiterated that the probate proceedings should take precedence over SP. Proc. No. 98
90870 because testate proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.2

The document that petitioners refer to as Segundos holographic will is quoted, as follows:

Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana

Tantunin ng sinuman

Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila at nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at
disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat at anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya
ay naging lapastangan sa akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia Seangio labis
kong kinasama ng loob ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at
siya nasa ibabaw.

Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para makapagutang na kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna
de los Reyes sa China Bangking Corporation na millon pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng
malaking kahihiya sa mga may-ari at stockholders ng China Banking.

At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r] ng Travel Center of the Philippines na
pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia.

Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong inaalisan ng lahat at anoman mana na si
Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi siya makoha mana.

Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng tatlong saksi. 3

(signed)

Segundo Seangio

Nilagdaan sa harap namin

(signed)

Dy Yieng Seangio (signed)

Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi

(signed)

ikatlong saksi

On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners motion, SP. Proc. No. 9890870 and SP. Proc. No. 9993396 were consolidated.4

On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings5 primarily on the ground that the
document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus
does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only shows an
alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not
named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition which would result to intestacy. Such being the case,
private respondents maintained that while procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is
not barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the
face of the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.

Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: 1) generally, the authority of the probate court is limited
only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the will; 2) private respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity

Page 9 of 104
of the will; 3) disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent; and, 4) the rule on preterition does not apply
because Segundos will does not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs. 6

On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the petition for probate proceedings:

A perusal of the document termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et al., clearly shows that there is preterition,
as the only heirs mentioned thereat are Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he other heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus
applies. However, insofar as the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not apply, she not being a compulsory heir in
the direct line.

As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for to do otherwise would amount to an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court
in the case of Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court [155 SCRA 100 (1987)] has made its position clear: "for respondents to have
tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when, on its face, the will appears to be intrinsically void would
have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have
denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic
validity of the will was resolved(underscoring supplied).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Special Proceedings No.
9993396 is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.7

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its order dated October 14, 1999.

Petitioners contend that:

THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF HER JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF LAW NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN ISSUING THE
QUESTIONED ORDERS, DATED 10 AUGUST 1999 AND 14 OCTOBER 1999 (ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B" HEREOF) CONSIDERING THAT:

THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE
PROPER PROCEDURE FOR SETTING THE CASE FOR INITIAL HEARING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JURISDICTIONAL FACTS,
DISMISSED THE TESTATE CASE ON THE ALLEGED GROUND THAT THE TESTATORS WILL IS VOID ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF THE
EXISTENCE OF PRETERITION, WHICH GOES INTO THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE
THAT THE AUTHORITY OF PROBATE COURTS IS LIMITED ONLY TO A DETERMINATION OF THE EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, I.E.,
THE DUE EXECUTION THEREOF, THE TESTATORS TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OR
SOLEMNITIES PRESCRIBED BY LAW;

II

EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO RULE UPON THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
WILL OF THE TESTATOR, IT IS INDUBITABLE FROM THE FACE OF THE TESTATORS WILL THAT NO PRETERITON EXISTS AND THAT THE
WILL IS BOTH INTRINSICALLY AND EXTRINSICALLY VALID; AND,

III

RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE INTESTATE CASE CONSIDERING THAT IT IS A
SETTLED RULE THAT TESTATE PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.

Petitioners argue, as follows:

First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which respectively mandate the court
to: a) fix the time and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and cause notice
of such time and place to be published three weeks successively previous to the appointed time in a newspaper of general
circulation; and, b) cause the mailing of said notice to the heirs, legatees and devisees of the testator Segundo;

Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as its title clearly states, Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis
ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a compulsory heir. Thus, there is no preterition in the decedents will and the
holographic will on its face is not intrinsically void;

Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private respondents alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo, to
inherit his estate. None of the compulsory heirs in the direct line of Segundo were preterited in the holographic will since there was
no institution of an heir;

Page 10 of 104
Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is both intrinsically and extrinsically valid,
respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the hearing of the testate case; and,

Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work injustice to petitioners, and will render nugatory the
disinheritance of Alfredo.

The purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented by petitioners was dated, signed and written by him in his own
handwriting. Except on the ground of preterition, private respondents did not raise any issue as regards the authenticity of the
document.

The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed Segundos intention of excluding his eldest son,
Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo.

For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be effected through a will wherein the legal
cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document,
the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo,
and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code:

Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children and descendants, legitimate as well as
illegitimate:

(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of the testator, his or her spouse,
descendants, or ascendants;

(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years
or more, if the accusation has been found groundless;

(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator;

(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes the testator to make a will or to
change one already made;

(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents or ascendant who disinherit such child or descendant;

(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant;8

(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life;

(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction.

Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.

A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the
testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.

Segundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a
holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis
causa[9] can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the
latters property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance
results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.10

Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within the limits
prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give
effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given
effect.11

Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as illustrated in the present case, should
be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of
the instrument and the intention of the testator.12 In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned
as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in
accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated, 13 the disinheritance cannot be given effect.14

With regard to the issue on preterition,15 the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the
will. It was, in the Courts opinion, Segundos last expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole
exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir16 to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of

Page 11 of 104
the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was
included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.1wphi1

Considering that the questioned document is Segundos holographic will, and that the law favors testacy over intestacy, the probate
of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property
unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to
dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory.17

In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will to be probated. It is settled that testate
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.18

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21, dated August 10, 1999 and
October 14, 1999, are set aside. Respondent judge is directed to reinstate and hear SP Proc. No. 99-93396 for the allowance of the
holographic will of Segundo Seangio. The intestate case or SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended until the termination of the
aforesaid testate proceedings.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Page 12 of 104
G.R. No. 129505 January 31, 2000

OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner,

vs.
PACITA DE LOS REYES PHILLIPS, respondent.

-----------------------------

G.R. No. 133359 January 31, 2000

OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FERNANDO V. GOROSPE, JR., in his Official Capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC-Makati, Branch 61, and
PACITA PHILLIPS as the alleged executrix of the alleged will of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, respondents.

Remedial Law; Courts; Wills; In cases for the probate of wills, it is well settled that the authority of the court is limited to
ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will.In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court is
limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the
testator, so much so that, after approving and allowing the will, the court proceeds to issue letters testamentary and settle the
estate of the testator. The cases cited by petitioner are of such nature. In fact, in most jurisdictions, courts cannot entertain a
petition for probate of the will of a living testator under the principle of ambulatory nature of wills.

Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; The different branches comprising each court in one judicial region do not possess jurisdictions
independent of and incompatible with each other.Indeed, the jurisdiction over probate proceedings and settlement of estates
with approximate value of over P100,000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or P200,000.00 (in Metro Manila) belongs to the regional trial
courts under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. The different branches comprising each court in one judicial region do not possess
jurisdictions independent of and incompatible with each other. It is noteworthy that, although Rule 73, 1 applies insofar as the
venue of the petition for probate of the will of Dr. De Santos is concerned, it does not bar other branches of the same court from
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the testator after his death. Necessarily, therefore, Branch 65 of the RTC of
Makati City has jurisdiction over Sp. Proc. No. M-4343.

Same; Same; Same; Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give bond may the court appoint
other persons to administer the estate.Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have been
preterited in the testators will. Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings based on his allegation that
he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the testator instituted or named an executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the Court to
respect the desires of the testator. Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give bond may the
court appoint other persons to administer the estate. None of these circumstances is present in this case.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

These are petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions of the Thirteenth and the Special Eighth Divisions of the Court of Appeals
which ruled that petitioner has no right to intervene in the settlement of the estate of Dr. Arturo de Santos. The cases were
consolidated considering that they involve the same parties and some of the issues raised are the same.

The facts which gave rise to these two petitions are as follows:

On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City, filed a petition for probate of his will1 in the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4223. In his petition, Dr. De Santos alleged that he had no compulsory
heirs; that he had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by his will his
properties with an approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were in the custody of the named
executrix, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. A copy of the will2 was annexed to the petition for probate.

On February 16, 1996, Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of RTC-Makati, Branch 61 issued an order granting the petition and allowing
the will. The order reads:

On 03 August 1995, the Court issued an Order setting the hearing of the petition on 12 September 1995, at 8:30 o'clock in
the morning, copies of which were served to Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc. and Ms. Pacita de los Reyes Phillips
(Officer's Return, dated 04 September 1995 attached to the records). When the case was called for hearing on the date set,
no oppositor appeared nor any written opposition was ever filed and on motion of petitioner, he was allowed to adduce his
evidence in support of the petition.

Petitioner personally appeared before this Court and was placed on the witness stand and was directly examined by the
Court through "free wheeling" questions and answers to give this Court a basis to determine the state of mind of the
Page 13 of 104
 petitioner when he executed the subject will. After the examination, the Court is convinced that petitioner is of sound and
disposing mind and not acting on duress, menace and undue influence or fraud, and that petitioner signed his Last Will and
Testament on his own free and voluntary will and that he was neither forced nor influenced by any other person in signing
it.

Furthermore, it appears from the petition and the evidence adduced that petitioner in his lifetime, executed his Last Will
and Testament (Exhs. "A", "A-1", "A-2", "A-4", "A-5") at his residence situated at 9 Bauhinia corner Intsia Streets, Forbes
Park, Makati City; said Last Will and Testament was signed in the presence of his three (3) witnesses, namely, to wit: Dr.
Elpidio Valencia (Exhs. "A-6", "A-7", "A-8", "A-16", "A-16-A"), Atty. Edward J. Berenguer (Exhs. "A-3", "A-3-A", "A-9", "A-10",
& "A-11"), and Atty. Victoria C. delos Reyes (Exhs. "A-12", "A-13", "A-14", "A-17", & "A-18"), who in turn, in the presence of
the testator and in the presence of each and all of the witnesses signed the said Last Will and Testament and duly notarized
before Notary Public Anna Melissa L. Rosario (Exh. "A-15"); on the actual execution of the Last Will and Testament, pictures
were taken (Exhs. "B" to "B-3").

Petitioner has no compulsory heirs and Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc., with address at No. 9 Bauhinia corner Intsia
Streets, Forbes Park, Makati City has been named as sole legatee and devisee of petitioner's properties, real and personal,
approximately valued at not less than P2 million, Ms. Pacita de los Reyes Phillips was designated as executor and to serve as
such without a bond.

From the foregoing facts, the Court finds that the petitioner has substantially established the material allegations contained
in his petition. The Last Will and Testament having been executed and attested as required by law; that testator at the time
of the execution of the will was of sane mind and/or not mentally incapable to make a Will; nor was it executed under
duress or under the influence of fear or threats; that it was in writing and executed in the language known and understood
by the testator duly subscribed thereof and attested and subscribed by three (3) credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of another; that the testator and all the attesting witnesses signed the Last Will and Testament freely and
voluntarily and that the testator has intended that the instrument should be his Will at the time of affixing his signature
thereto.

WHEREFORE, as prayed for by the petitioner (testator himself) the petition for the allowance of the Last Will and Testament
of Arturo de Santos is hereby APPROVED and ALLOWED.

Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died on February 26, 1996.

On April 3, 1996, petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos
(testator's sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise
alleged that he was a creditor of the testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration of the order allowing the will and the
issuance of letters of administration in his name.

On the other hand, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips, the designated executrix of the will, filed a motion for the
issuance of letters testamentary with Branch 61. Later, however, private respondent moved to withdraw her motion. This was
granted, while petitioner was required to file a memorandum of authorities in support of his claim that said court (Branch 61) still
had jurisdiction to allow his intervention.3

Petitioner filed his memorandum of authorities on May 13, 1996. On the other hand, private respondent, who earlier withdrew her
motion for the issuance of letters testamentary in Branch 61, refiled a petition for the same purpose with the Regional Trial Court,
Makati, which was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 and assigned to Branch 65.

Upon private respondent's motion, Judge Salvador Abad Santos of Branch 65 issued an order, dated June 28, 1996, appointing her as
special administrator of Dr. De Santos's estate.

On July 29, 1996, petitioner sought to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 and to set aside the appointment of private respondent as
special administrator. He reiterated that he was the sole and full blooded nephew and nearest of kin of the testator; that he came to
know of the existence of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 only by accident; that the probate proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223 before Branch
61 of the same court was still pending; that private respondent misdeclared the true worth of the testator's estate; that private
respondent was not fit to be the special administrator of the estate; and that petitioner should be given letters of administration for
the estate of Dr. De Santos.

On August 28, 1996, Judge Abad Santos ordered the transfer of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to Branch 61, on the ground that "[it] is related
to the case before Judge Gorospe of RTC Branch 61 . . ."

It appears, however, that in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223, Judge Gorospe had denied on August 26, 1996 petitioner's motion for
intervention. Petitioner brought this matter to the Court of Appeals which, in a decision 4 promulgated on February 13, 1998, upheld
the denial of petitioner's motion for intervention.

Page 14 of 104
Meanwhile, Judge Gorospe issued an order, dated September 4, 1996, returning the records of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to Branch 65
on the ground that there was a pending case involving the Estate of Decedent Arturo de Santos pending before said court. The order
reads:

Acting on the ORDER dated 28 August 1996 of Branch 65, this Court, transferring this case to this Branch 61 on the ground
that this case is related with a case before this Court, let this case be returned to Branch 65 with the information that there
is no related case involving the ESTATE OF DECEDENT ARTURO DE SANTOS pending before this Branch.

There is, however, a case filed by ARTURO DE SANTOS, as petitioner under Rule 76 of the Rules of Court for the Allowance
of his will during his lifetime docketed as SP. PROC. NO. M-4223 which was already decided on 16 February 1996 and has
become final.

It is noted on records of Case No. M-4223 that after it became final, herein Petitioner Pacita de los Reyes Phillips filed a
MOTION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY, which was subsequently withdrawn after this Court, during the
hearing, already ruled that the motion could not be admitted as the subject matter involves a separate case under Rule 78
of the Rules of Court, and movant withdrew her motion and filed this case (No. 4343).

Octavio de Santos Maloles [II] filed a MOTION FOR INTERVENTION before Case No. M-4223 and this motion was already
DENIED in the order (Branch 61) of 26 August 1996 likewise for the same grounds that the matter is for a separate case to
be filed under Rule 78 of the Rules of Court and cannot be included in this case filed under Rule 76 of the Rules of Court.

It is further noted that it is a matter of policy that consolidation of cases must be approved by the Presiding Judges of the
affected Branches.

Initially, in his decision dated September 23, 1996,5 Judge Abad Santos appeared firm in his position that " . . . it would be improper
for (Branch 65) to hear and resolve the petition (Sp. Proc. No. M-4343)," considering that the probate proceedings were commenced
with Branch 61. He thus ordered the transfer of the records back to the latter branch. However, he later recalled his decision and
took cognizance of the case "to expedite the proceedings." Thus, in his Order, dated October 21, 1996, he stated:

Considering the refusal of the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of Branch 61 to continue hearing this case notwithstanding the
fact that said branch began the probate proceedings of the estate of the deceased and must therefore continue to exercise
its jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others, until the entire estate of the testator had been partitioned and distributed as
per Order dated 23 September 1996, this branch (Regional Trial Court Branch 65) shall take cognizance of the petition if
only to expedite the proceedings, and under the concept that the Regional Trial Court of Makati City is but one court.

Furnish a copy of this order to the Office of the Chief justice and the Office of the Court Administrator, of the Supreme
Court; the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr.; Pacita De Los Reyes Phillips, Petitioner; and Octavio de Santos Maloles,
Intervenor.

On November 4, 1996, Judge Abad Santos granted petitioner's motion for intervention. Private respondent moved for a
reconsideration but her motion was denied by the trial court. She then filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals which, on
February 26, 1997, rendered a decision6 setting aside the trial court's order on the ground that petitioner had not shown any right or
interest to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343.

Hence, these petitions which raise the following issues:

1. Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court Makati, Branch 61 has lost jurisdiction to proceed with the probate
proceedings upon its issuance of an order allowing the will of Dr. Arturo de Santos.

2. Whether or not the Honorable (Regional Trial Court Makati, Branch 65) acquired jurisdiction over the petition for
issuance of letters testamentary filed by (private) respondent.

3. Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, has a right to intervene and oppose the
petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by the respondent.

4. Whether or not (private) respondent is guilty of forum shopping in filing her petition for issuance of letters testamentary
with the Regional Trial Court Makati, Branch 65 knowing fully well that the probate proceedings involving the same
restate estate of the decedent is still pending with the Regional Trial Court Makati, Branch 61.

First. Petitioner contends that the probate proceedings in Branch 61 of RTC-Makati did not terminate upon the issuance of the order
allowing the will of Dr. De Santos. Citing the cases of Santiesteban v. Santiesteban7 and Tagle v. Manalo,8 he argues that the
proceedings must continue until the estate is fully distributed to the lawful heirs, devisees, and legatees of the testator, pursuant to
Rule 73, 1 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, petitioner contends that Branch 65 could not lawfully act upon private respondent's
petition for issuance of letters testamentary.

The contention has no merit.

Page 15 of 104
In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the
will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.9

Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the testator, so much so that, after approving and allowing the
will, the court proceeds to issue letters testamentary and settle the estate of the testator. The cases cited by petitioner are of such
nature. In fact, in most jurisdictions, courts cannot entertain a petition for probate of the will of a living testator under the principle
of ambulatory nature of wills.10

However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a petition for probate of the will filed by the testator himself. It provides:

CIVIL CODE, ART. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with
the Rules of Court.

The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such case,
the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the testator's death shall govern.

The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court as may be necessary for the allowance of wills on petition
of the testator.

Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be
conclusive as to its due execution.

Rule 76, 1 likewise provides:

Sec. 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will. Any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person
interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the
will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.

The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition in the court for the allowance of his will.

The rationale for allowing the probate of wills during the lifetime of testator has been explained by the Code Commission thus:

Most of the cases that reach the courts involve either the testamentary capacity of the testator or the formalities adopted
in the execution of wills. There are relatively few cases concerning the intrinsic validity of testamentary dispositions. It is far
easier for the courts to determine the mental condition of a testator during his lifetime than after his death. Fraud,
intimidation and undue influence are minimized. Furthermore, if a will does not comply with the requirements prescribed
by law, the same may be corrected at once. The probate during the testator's life, therefore, will lessen the number of
contest upon wills. Once a will is probated during the lifetime of the testator, the only questions that may remain for the
courts to decide after the testator's death will refer to the intrinsic validity of the testamentary dispositions. It is possible, of
course, that even when the testator himself asks for the allowance of the will, he may be acting under duress or undue
influence, but these are rare cases.

After a will has been probated during the lifetime of the testator, it does not necessarily mean that he cannot alter or
revoke the same before his death. Should he make a new will, it would also be allowable on his petition, and if he should
die before he has had a chance to present such petition, the ordinary probate proceeding after the testator's death would
be in order.11

Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16, 1996, there was nothing else for Branch 61 to do except to
issue a certificate of allowance of the will pursuant to Rule 73, 12 of the Rules of Court. There is, therefore, no basis for the ruling of
Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 of RTC-Makati that

Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati having begun the probate proceedings of the estate of the deceased, it
continues and shall continue to exercise said jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others. It should be noted that probate
proceedings do not cease upon the allowance or disallowance of a will but continues up to such time that the entire estate
of the testator had been partitioned and distributed.

The fact that the will was allowed during the lifetime of the testator meant merely that the partition and distribution of the
estate was to be suspended until the latter's death. In other words, the petitioner, instead of filing a new petition for the
issuance of letters testamentary, should have simply filed a manifestation for the same purpose in the probate court.12

Petitioner, who defends the order of Branch 65 allowing him to intervene, cites Rule 73, 1 which states:

Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
Page 16 of 104
 settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not
be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record.

The above rule, however, actually provides for the venue of actions for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. In Garcia
Fule v. Court of Appeals, it was held:13

The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of the state," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule
indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes." It could not have been intended to define the
jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with
procedural matters. Procedure is one thing, jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or authority of the
court over the subject matter "existed was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is not
altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and justly
exercised. There are cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably with the provisions of the procedural law,
purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that
the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this
provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the
court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties.

Indeed, the jurisdiction over probate proceedings and settlement of estates with approximate value of over P100,000.00 (outside
Metro Manila) or P200,000.00 (in Metro Manila) belongs to the regional trial courts under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. The different
branches comprising each court in one judicial region do not possess jurisdictions independent of and incompatible with each
other.14

It is noteworthy that, although Rule 73, 1 applies insofar as the venue of the petition for probate of the will of Dr. De Santos is
concerned, it does not bar other branches of the same court from taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the testator
after his death. As held in the leading case of Bacalso v. Ramolote:15

The various branches of the Court of First Instance of Cebu under the Fourteenth Judicial District, are a coordinate and co-
equal courts, and the totality of which is only one Court of First Instance. The jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the
judges. And when a case is filed in one branch, jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the branch or judge alone, to
the exclusion of the other branches. Trial may be held or proceedings continue by and before another branch or judge. It is
for this reason that Section 57 of the Judiciary Act expressly grants to the Secretary of Justice, the administrative right or
power to apportion the cases among the different branches, both for the convenience of the parties and for the
coordination of the work by the different branches of the same court. The apportionment and distribution of cases does
not involve a grant or limitation of jurisdiction, the jurisdiction attaches and continues to be vested in the Court of First
Instance of the province, and the trials may be held by any branch or judge of the court.

Necessarily, therefore, Branch 65 of the RTC of Makati City has jurisdiction over Sp. Proc. No. M-4343.

Second. Petitioner claims the right to intervene in and oppose the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by private
respondent. He argues that, as the nearest next of kin and creditor of the testator, his interest in the matter is material and direct. In
ruling that petitioner has no right to intervene in the proceedings before Branch 65 of RTC-Makati City, the Court of Appeals held:

The private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under the will of the decedent Arturo de Santos. Neither is he a
compulsory heir of the latter. As the only and nearest collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter only
in case of intestacy. Since the decedent has left a will which has already been probated and disposes of all his properties the
private respondent can inherit only if the said will is annulled. His interest in the decedent's estate is, therefore, not direct
or immediate.

His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one, having been raised for the first time only in his reply to the
opposition to his motion to intervene, and, as far as the records show, not supported by evidence.

. . . . [T]he opposition must come from one with a direct interest in the estate or the will, and the private respondent has
none. Moreover, the ground cited in the private respondent's opposition, that the petitioner has deliberately misdeclared
the truth worth and value of the estate, is not relevant to the question of her competency to act as executor. Section 2,
Rule 76 of the Rules of Court requires only an allegation of the probable value and character of the property of the estate.
The true value can be determined later on in the course of the settlement of the estate.16

Rule 79, 1 provides:

Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary. Simultaneous petition for administration. Any person interested in a will
may state in writing the grounds why letters testamentary should not issue to the persons named therein as executors, or

Page 17 of 104
 any of them, and the court, after hearing upon notice, shall pass upon the sufficiency of such grounds. A petition may, at
the same time, be filed for letters of administration with the will annexed.

Under this provision, it has been held that an "interested person" is one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or
one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor, and whose interest is material and direct, not merely incidental or
contingent.17

Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be considered an "heir" of the testator. It is a fundamental
rule of testamentary succession that one who has no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will. Thus, Art.
842 of the Civil Code provides:

One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity
to succeed.

One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with
regard to the legitimate of said heirs.

Compulsory heirs are limited to the testator's

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code. 18

Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have been preterited in the testator's will.

Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings based on his allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased.
Since the testator instituted or named an executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the Court to respect the desires of the testator.
As we stated in Ozaeta v. Pecson:19

The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of his
property in the manner he wishes. It is natural that the testator should desire to appoint one of his confidence, one who
can be trusted to carry out his wishes in the disposal of his estate. The curtailment of this right may be considered a
curtailment of the right to dispose.

Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give bond may the court appoint other persons to
administer the estate.20 None of these circumstances is present in this case.

Third. Petitioner contends that private respondent is guilty of forum shopping when she filed the petition for issuance of letters
testamentary (Sp. Proc. No. M-4343) while the probate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. M-4223) were still pending. According to
petitioner, there is identity of parties, rights asserted, and reliefs prayed for in the two actions which are founded on the same facts,
and a judgment in either will result in res judicata in the other.

This contention has no merit. As stated earlier, the petition for probate was filed by Dr. De Santos, the testator, solely for the
purpose of authenticating his will. Upon the allowance of his will, the proceedings were terminated.1wphi1.nt

On the other hand, the petition for issuance of letters testamentary was filed by private respondent, as executor of the estate of Dr.
De Santos, for the purpose of securing authority from the Court to administer the estate and put into effect the will of the testator.
The estate settlement proceedings commenced by the filing of the petition terminates upon the distribution and delivery of the
legacies and devises to the persons named in the will. Clearly, there is no identity between the two petitions, nor was the latter filed
during the pendency of the former. There was, consequently, no forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decisions of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Page 18 of 104
G.R. No. L-20374 October 11, 1923

In re of Dolores Coronel, deceased.

LORENZO PECSON, applicant-appellee,
vs.
AGUSTIN CORONEL, ET AL., opponents-appellants.

WILLS; FREEDOM TO MAKE A WILL.Although family ties in this country are very strongly knit, the exclusion of relatives, who are
not forced heirs, from the inheritance is not an exceptional case. The inhabitants of the Archipelago do not appear to be averse to
the freedom to make a will enshrined by article 783 of the Civil Code, which has been in force in the Philippines since the year 1889.
But even if the appointment of a beneficiary do not seem to be the most usual and ordinary because the beneficiary is not a relative
of the testatrix who has relatives by blood, this alone will not render the appointment void per se.

ID.; CONTEST OF; BURDEN OF PROOF.Where the will is contested on the ground that the person who read the will to the testator,
following instructions from the heir named therein, read one thing for another, the party alleging such a fraud is bound to present
said person as witness for the purpose of proving the alleged fraud, and the omission not accounted for of said proof gives rise to a
presumption that, if it were presented, it would have been adverse to said party.

ID.; NAMING OF HEIR; His APPOINTMENT AS EXECUTOR; FUNCTIONS OF EXECUTOR.The fact that the only heir named in the will
is appointed executor is no proof that the testator's intention was that said executor should distribute the estate among the
relatives of the testator, and not that said executor, named as sole heir, should get all the estate; for to be an heir is not
incompatible with being an executor, inasmuch as the function of an executor is not limited merely to distributing the inheritance,
but he has other duties and powers, such as to preserve, defend, and liquidate the inheritance until it is delivered to the person
entitled to it.

ID.; ATTESTATION CLAUSE; CLERICAL OR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS; THE EVIDENT INTENTION PREVAILS.Clerical or grammatical
errors are ordinarily not considered of vital importance where the intention is manifest. Thus the expression "cada uno de nosotros
lo firmamos en presencia de otros" (each of us signed in the presence of others), which appears to be ambiguous on account of the
article "los" (the) being lacking before "otros" (others), will not vitiate the attestation clause where it is evident that its omission was
due to carelessness of the clerk or to lack of mastery of the language, and that what was meant is that the witnesses signed in the
presence of each other.

DECISION

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

On November 28, 1922, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga probated as the last will and testament of Dolores Coronel, the
document Exhibit A, which translated is as follows:

In the name of God, Amen:

I, Dolores Coronel, resident of Betis, Guagua, Pampanga, Philippine Islands, in the full exercise of my mental faculties, do
hereby make my last will and testament, and revoke all former wills by me executed.

I direct and order that my body be buried in conformity with my social standing.

That having no forced heirs, I will all my properties, both movable and immovable, to my nephew, Lorenzo Pecson, who is
married to my niece Angela Coronel, in consideration of the good services with he has rendered, and is rendering to me
with good will and disinterestedness and to my full satisfaction.

I name and appoint my aforesaid nephew, Lorenzo Pecson, executor of all that is willed and ordained in this my will,
without bond. Should he not be able to discharge his duties as such executor for any reason whatsoever, I name and
appoint as substitute executor my grandson Victor Pecson, a native and resident of the town of Betis, without requiring him
to give bond.

All my real and paraphernal property as well as my credits for I declare that I have no debts, are specified in an inventory.

In testimony whereof and as I do not know how to write my name, I have requested Vicente J. Francisco to write my name
at the foot hereof and on the left margin of each of its sheet before me and all the undersigned witnesses this July 1, 1918.

VICENTE J. FRANCISCO
"For the testatrix Dolores Coronel

The foregoing document was executed and declared by Dolores Coronel to be her last will and testament in our presence,
and as the testatrix does not know how to write her name, she requested Vicente J. Francisco to sign her name under her

Page 19 of 104
 express direction in our presence, at the foot, and on the left margin of each and every sheet, hereof. In testimony whereof,
each of us signed these presents in the presence of others and of the testatrix at the foot hereof and on the margin of each
and everyone of the two sheets of which this document is composed, which are numbered "one" and "two" on the upper
part of the face thereof.

(Sgd.) "MAXIMO VERGARA SOTERO DUMAUAL MARCOS DE LOS SANTOS

MARIANO L. CRISOSTOMO PABLO BARTOLOME MARCOS DE LA CRUZ DAMIAN CRISOSTOMO

On the left margin of the two sheets of the will the following signatures also appear:

Mariano L. Crisostomo, Vicente J. Francisco for the testatrix Dolores Coronel, M. Vergara, Pablo Bartolome, Sotero Dumaual
Crisostomo, Marcos de la Cruz, Marcos de los Santos.

The petitioner for the probate of the will is Lorenzo Pecson, husband of Angela Coronel, who is a niece of the deceased Dolores
Coronel.

The opponents are: Eriberto Coronel, Tito Coronel, Julian Gozum, Cirila Santiago, widow of the deceased Macario Gozum, in her own
behalf and that of her three minor children, Hilarion Coronel, Geronimo Coronel, Maria Coronel and her husband Eladio Gongco,
Juana Bituin, widow of the deceased Hipolito Coronel, in her own behalf and that of her three children, Generosa, Maria, and Jose,
all minors, Rosario Coronel, Agustin Coronel, Filomeno Coronel, Casimiro Coronel, Alejo Coronel, Maria Coronel, Severina Coronel,
Serapia Coronel, Maria Juana de Ocampo, widow of the deceased Manuel Coronel, Dionisia Coronel, and her husband Pantaleon
Gunlao.

The probate of this will is impugned on the following grounds: (a) That the proof does not that the document Exhibit A above copied
contains the last will of Dolores Coronel, and (b) that the attestation clause is not in accordance with the provisions of section 618 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645.

These are the two principal questions which are debated in this case and which we will now examine separately.

As to the first, which is the one raised in the first assignment of error, the appellants argue: First, that it was improbable and
exceptional that Dolores Coronel should dispose of her estate, as set forth in the document Exhibit A, her true being that the same
be distributed among her blood relatives; and second, that if such will not expressed in fact, it was due to extraneous illegal
influence.

Let us examine the first point.

The opponents contend that it was not, nor could it be, the will of the testatrix, because it is not natural nor usual that she should
completely exclude her blood relatives from her vast estate, in order to will the same to one who is only a relative by affinity, there
appearing no sufficient motive for such exclusion, inasmuch as until the death of Dolores Coronel, she maintained very cordial
relations with the aforesaid relatives who had helped her in the management and direction of her lands. It appears, however, from
the testimony of Attorney Francisco (page 71, transcript of the stenographic notes) that Dolores Coronel revealed to him her
suspicion against some of her nephews as having been accomplices in a robbery of which she had been a victim.

As to whether or not Lorenzo Pecson rendered services to Dolores Coronel, the opponents admit that he rendered them at least
from the year 1914, although there is proof showing that he rendered such services long before that time.

The appellants emphasize the fact that family ties in this country are very strongly knit and that the exclusion of relative one's estate
an exceptional case. It is true that ties of relationship in the Philippines are very strong, but we understand that cases of preterition
of relatives from the inheritance are not rare. The liberty to dispose of one's estate by will when there are no forced heirs is
rendered sacred by the civil Code in force in the Philippines since 1889. It is so provided in the first paragraph of article in the
following terms:

Any person who was no forced heirs may dispose by will of all his property or any part of it in favor of any person qualified
to acquire it.

Even ignoring the precedents of this legal precept, the Code embodying it has been in force in the Philippines for more than a
quarter of a century, and for this reason it is not tenable to say that the excercise of the liberty thereby granted is necessarily
exceptional, where it is not shown that the inhabitants of this country whose customs must have been take into consideration by the
legislator in adopting this legal precept, are averse to such a liberty.

As to preference given to Lorenzo Pecson, it is not purely arbitrary, nor a caprice or a whim of the moment. The proof adduced by
this appelle, although contradicted, shows by a preponderance of evidence that besides the services which the opponents admit had
been rendered by him to Dolores Coronel since the year 1914, he had also rendered services prior to that time and was the
administrator and manager of the affairs of said Dolores in the last years of her life. And that this was not a whim of the moment is

Page 20 of 104
shown by the fact that six years before the execution of the will in question, said Lorenzo Pecson was named and appointed by
Dolores Coronel as her sole heir in the document Exhibit B, which, translated, is as follows:

1. That my present property was acquired by me by inheritance from my parents, but a great part thereof was acquired by
me by my own efforts and exertions;

2. That I have made no inventory of my properties, but they can be seen in the title deeds in my possession and in the
declarations of ownership;

3. That I institute Lorenzo Pecson, married to Angela Coronel, and a known resident of the town, my heir to succeed to all
my properties;

4. That I appoint my said heir, Lorenzo Pecson, as executor, and, in his default, Victor Pecson, a resident of the same town;

5. That as to my burial and other things connected with the eternal rest of my soul, I leave them to the sound direction of
the aforesaid Lorenzo Pecson;

6. That as I cannot write I requested Martin Pangilinan, a native and resident of this town, to write this will in accordance
with my wishes and precise instructions.

In testimony whereof I had the said Martin Pangilinan write my name and surname, and affixed my mark between my name
and surname, and don Francisco Dumaual, Don Mariano Sunglao, Don Sotero Dumaual, Don Marcos de la Cruz and Don
Martin Pangilinan signed as witnesses, they having been present at the beginning of, during, and after, the execution of this
my last will.

(Sgd.) "DOLORES CORONEL

Witnesses:

(Sgd.) "MARIANO SUNGLAO

MARCOS DE LA CRUZ
FRANCISCO DUMAUAL
SOTERO DUMAUAL
MARTIN PANGILINAN"

The appellants find in the testament Exhibit B something to support their contention that the intention of Dolores Coronel was to
institute the said Pecson not as sole beneficiary, but simply as executor and distributor of all her estate among her heirs, for while
Lorenzo Pecson's contention that he was appointed sold beneficiary is based on the fact that he enjoyed the confidence of Dolores
Coronel in 1918 and administered all her property, he did not exclusively have this confidence and administration in the year 1912.
Although such administration and confidence were enjoyed by Pecson always jointly with others and never exclusively, this fact does
not show that the will of the testatrix was to appoint Pecson only as executor and distributor of her estate among the heirs, nor does
it prevent her, the testatrix, from instituting him in 1912 or 1918 as sole beneficiary; nor does it constitute, lastly, a test for
determining whether or not such institution in favor of Pecson was the true will of the testatrix.

We find, therefore, nothing strange in the preterition made by Dolores Coronel of her blood relatives, nor in the designation of
Lorenzo Pecson as her sole beneficiary. Furthermore, although the institution of the beneficiary here would not seem the most usual
and customary, still this would not be null per se.

In the absence of any statutory restriction every person possesses absolute dominion over his property, and may bestow it
upon whomsoever he pleases without regard to natural or legal claim upon his bounty. If the testator possesses the
requisite capacity to make a will, and the disposition of his property is not affected by fraud of undue influence, the will is
not rendered invalid by the fact that it is unnatural, unreasonable, or unjust. Nothing can prevent the testator from making
a will as eccentric, as injudicious, or as unjust as caprice, frivolity, or revenge can dictate. However, as has already been
shown, the unreasonable or unjustice of a will may be considered on the question of testamentary capacity. (40 Cyc., 1079.)

The testamentary capacity of Dolores Coronel is not disputed in this case.

Passing to the second question, to wit, whether or not the true last will of Dolores Coronel was expressed in the testament Exhibit A,
we will begin with expounding how the idea of making the aforesaid will here controverted was borne and carried out.

About the year 1916 or 1917, Dolores showed the document Exhibit B to Attorney Francisco who was then her legal adviser and
who, considering that in order to make the expression of her last will more legally valid, though it necessary that the statement be
prepared in conformity with the laws in force at time of the death of the testatrix, and observing that the will Exhibit B lacked the
extrinsic formalities required by Act No. 2645 enacted after its execution, advised Dolores Coronel that the will be remade. She
followed the advice, and Attorney Francisco, after receiving her instructions, drew the will Exhibit A in accordance therewith, and
brought it to the house of Dolores Coronel for its execution.
Page 21 of 104
Pablo Bartolome read Exhibit A to Dolores Coronel in her presence and that of the witnesses and asked her whether the will was in
accordance with her wishes. Dolores Coronel answer that it was, and requested her attorney, Mr. Francisco, to sign the will for her,
which the attorney accordingly did in the presence of the witnesses, who in turn signed it before the testatrix and in the presence of
each other.

Upon the filing of the motion for a rehearing on the first order allowing the probate of the will, the opponents presented an affidavit
of Pablo Bartolome to the effect that, following instructions of Lorenzo Pecson, he had informed the testatrix that the contents of
the will were that she entrusted Pecson with the distribution of all her property among the relatives of the said Dolores. But during
the new trial Pablo Bartolome, in spite of being present in the court room on the day of the trial, was not introduced as a witness,
without such an omission having been satisfactorily accounted for.

While it is true that the petitioner was bound to present Pablo Bartolome, being one of the witnesses who signed the will, at the
second hearing when the probate was controverted, yet we cannot consider this point against the appellee for this was not raised in
any of the assignments of error made by the appellants. (Art. 20, Rules of the Supreme Court.)

On the other hand, it was incumbent upon the opponents to present Pablo Bartolome to prove before the court the statement by
him in his affidavit, since it was their duty to prove what they alleged, which was that Dolores Coronel had not understood the true
contents of the will Exhibit A. Having suppressed, without explanation, the testimony of Pablo Bartolome, the presumption is against
the opponents and that is, that such a testimony would have been adverse had it been produced at the hearing of the case before
the court. (Sec 334, subsec. 5, Code of Civil Procedure.)

The opponents call our attention to the fourth clause of the document which says: "I name and appoint my aforesaid nephew,
Lorenzo Pecson, executor of all that is willed and ordained in this my will, without bond. Should he not be able to discharge his
duties as such executor for any reason whatsoever, I name and appoint as a substitute executor my grandson Victor Pecson, resident
of the town of Betis, without requiring him to give bond," and contend that this clause is repugnant to the institution of Lorenzo
Pecson as sole beneficiary of all her estate, for if such was the intention of the testatrix, there would have been no necessity of
appointing an executor, nor any reason for designating a substitute in case that the first one should not be able to discharge his
duties, and they perceived in this clause the idea which, according to them, was not expressed in the document, and which was that
Pecson was simply to be a mere executor entrusted with the distribution to the estate among the relatives of the testatrix, and that
should he not be able to do so, this duty would devolved upon his substitutes.

But it is not the sole duty of an executor to distribute the estate, which in estate succession, such as the instant case, has to be
distributed with the intervention of the court. All executor has, besides, other duties and general and special powers intended for
the preservation, defense, and liquidation of the estate so long as the same has not reached, by order of the court, the hands of
those entitled thereto.

The fact that Dolores Coronel foresaw the necessity of an executor does not imply a negation of her desire to will all her estate to
Lorenzo Pecson. It is to be noted, furthermore, that in the will, it was ordered that her body be given a burial in accordance with her
social standing and she had a perfect right to designate a person who should see to it that this order was complied with. One of the
functions of an executor is the fulfillment of what is ordained in the will.

It is argued that the will of the testatrix was to will her estate to her blood relatives, for such was the promise made to Maria
Coronel, whom Rosario Coronel tends to corroborate. We do not find such a promise to have been sufficiently proven, and much
less to have been seriously made and coupled with a positive intention on the part of Dolores Coronel to fulfill the same. In the
absence of sufficient proof of fraud, or undue influence, we cannot take such a promise into account, for even if such a promise was
in fact made, Dolores Coronel could retract or forget it afterwards and dispose of her estate as she pleased. Wills themselves, which
contain more than mere promises, are essentially revocable.

It is said that the true will of Dolores Coronel not expressed in the will can be inferred from the phrase used by Jose M. Reyes in his
deposition when speaking of the purpose for which Lorenzo Pecson was to receive the estate, to wit:

in order that the latter might dispose of the estate in the most appropriate manner

Weight is given to this phrase from the circumstance that its author was requested by Attorney Francisco to explain the contents of
Exhibit B and had acted as interpreter between Dolores Coronel and Attorney Francisco at their interviews previous to the
preparation of Exhibit A, and had translated into the Pampango dialect this last document, and, lastly, was present at the execution
of the will in question.

The disputed phrase "in order that the latter might dispose of the estate in the most appropriate manner" was used by the witness
Reyes while sick in a hospital and testifying in the course of the taking of his deposition.

The appellants interpret the expression "dispose in the most appropriate manner" as meaning to say "distribute it among the heirs."
Limiting ourselves to its meaning, the expression is a broad one, for the disposition may be effected in several and various ways,
which may not necessarily be a "distribution among the heirs," and still be a "disposition in the most appropriate manner." "To
dispose" is not the same as "to distribute."

Page 22 of 104
To judge correctly the import of this phrase, the circumstances under which it was used must be taken into account in this particular
instance. The witness Reyes, the author of the phrase, was not expressing his own original ideas when he used it, but was translating
into Spanish what Dolores Coronel had told him. According to the facts, the said witness is not a Spaniard, that is to say, the Spanish
language is not his native tongue, but, perhaps, the Pampango dialect. It is an admitted fact based on reason and experience that
when a person translates from one language to another, it is easier for him to express with precision and accuracy when the version
is from a foreign language to a native one than vice-versa. The witness Reyes translated from the Pampango dialect, which must be
more familiar to him, to the Spanish language which is not his own tongue. And judging from the language used by him during his
testimony in this case, it cannot be said that this witness masters the Spanish language. Thus is explained the fact that when asked
to give the reason for the appointment of an executor in the will, he should say at the morning session that "Dolores Coronel did
appoint Don Lorenzo Pecson and in his default, Victor Pecson, to act during her lifetime, but not after he death," which was explained
at the afternoon session by saying "that Dolores Coronel did appoint Don Lorenzo Pecson executor of all her estate during his lifetime
and that in his default, either through death or incapacity, Mr. Victor Pecson was appointed executor." Taking into account all the
circumstances of this witness, there is ground to attribute his inaccuracy as to the discharge of the duties of an executor, not to
ignorance of the elementary rule of law on the matter, for the practice of which he was qualified, but to a non-mastery of the
Spanish language. We find in this detail of translation made by the witness Reyes no sufficient reason to believe that the will
expressed by Dolores Coronel at the said interview with Attorney Francisco was to appoint Lorenzo Pecson executor and mere
distributor of her estate among her heirs.

As to whether or not the burden of proof was on the petitioner to establish that he was the sole legatee to the exclusion of the
relatives of Dolores Coronel, we understand that it was not his duty to show the reasons which the testatrix may have had for
excluding her relatives from her estate, giving preference to him. His duty was to prove that the will was voluntary and authentic
and he, who alleges that the estate was willed to another, has the burden of proving his allegation.

Attorney Francisco is charged with having employed improper means of making Lorenzo Pecson appear in the will as sole
beneficiary. However, after an examination of all the proceedings had, we cannot find anything in the behavior of this lawyer,
relative to the preparation and execution of the will, that would justify an unfavorable conclusion as to his personal and professional
conduct, nor that he should harbor any wrongful or fraudulent purpose.

We find nothing censurable in his conduct in advising Dolores Coronel to make a new will other than the last one, Exhibit B (in the
drawing of which he does not appear to her intervened), so that the instrument might be executed with all the new formalities
required by the laws then in force; nor in the preparation of the new will substantially in accordance with the old one; nor in the
selection of attesting witnesses who were persons other than the relatives of Dolores Coronel. Knowing, as he did, that Dolores was
excluding her blood relatives from the inheritance, in spite of her having been asked by him whether their exclusion was due to a
mere inadvertence, there is a satisfactory explanation, compatible with honorable conduct, why said attorney should prescind from
such relatives in the attesting of the will, to the end that no obstacle be placed in the way to the probating thereof.

The fact that this attorney should presume that Dolores was to ask him to sign the will for her and that he should prepare it
containing this detail is not in itself fraudulent. There was in this case reason so to presume, and it appears that he asked her,
through Pablo Bartolome, whom she wanted to sign the document in her stead.

No imputation can be made to this attorney of any interest in favoring Lorenzo Pecson in the will, because the latter was already his
client at the execution of said will. Attorney Francisco denied this fact, which we cannot consider proven after examining the
evidence.

The conduct observed by this attorney after the death of Dolores Coronel in connection with the attempted arrangement between
Lorenzo Pecson and the opponents, does not, in our opinion, constitute any data leading to the conclusion that an heir different
from the true one intended by the testatrix should have been fraudulently made to appear instituted in the will exhibit A. His
attitude towards the opponents, as can be gathered from the proceedings and especially from his letter Exhibit D, does not show
any perverse or fraudulent intent, but rather a conciliatory purpose. It is said that such a step was well calculated to prevent every
possible opposition to the probate of the will. Even admitting that one of his objects in entering into such negotiations was to avoid
every possible to the probate of the will, such object is not incompatible with good faith, nor does it necessarily justify the inference
that the heir instituted in the instrument was not the one whom the testatrix wanted appointed.

The appellants find rather suspicious the interest shown by the said attorney in trying to persuade Lorenzo Pecson to give them
some share of the estate. These negotiations were not carried out by the attorney out of his own initiative, but at the instance of the
same opponent, Agustin Coronel, made by the latter in his own behalf and that of his coopponents.

As to Lorenzo Pecson, we do not find in the record sufficient proof to believe that he should have tried, through fraud or any undue
influence, to frustrate the alleged intention of the testatrix to leave her estate to her blood relatives. The opponents insinuate that
Lorenzo Pecson employed Attorney Francisco to carry out his reproachable designs, but such depraved instrumentality was not
proven, nor was it shown that said lawyer, or Lorenzo Pecson, should have contrived or put into execution any condemnable plan,
nor that both should have conspired for illegal purposes at the time of the preparation and execution of the will Exhibit A.

Although Norberto Paras testified having heard, when the will was being read to Dolores Coronel, the provision whereby the estate
was ordered distributed among the heirs, the preponderance of the evidence is to the effect that said Norberto Paras was not
present at such reading of the will. Appellant do not insist on the probative force of the testimony of this witness, and do not oppose
its being stricken out.
Page 23 of 104
The data furnished by the case do not show, to our mind, that Dolores Coronel should have had the intention of giving her estate to
her blood relatives instead of to Lorenzo Pecson at the time of the execution of the will Exhibit A, nor that fraud or whatever other
illegal cause or undue influence should have intervened in the execution of said testament. Neither fraud nor evil is presumed and
the record does not show either.

Turning to the second assignment of error, which is made to consist in the will having been probated in spite of the fact that the
attestation clause was not in conformity with the provision of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No.
2645, let us examine the tenor of such clause which literally is as follows:

The foregoing document was executed and declared by Dolores Coronel to be her last will testament in our presence, and
as testatrix does not know how to write her name, she requested Vicente J. Francisco to sign her name under her express
direction in our presence at the foot and on the left margin of each and every sheet hereof. In testimony whereof, each of
us signed these presents in the presence of others of the testatrix at the foot hereof and on the margin of each and
everyone of the two pages of which this document is composed. These sheets are numbered correlatively with the words
"one and "two on the upper part of the face thereof.

(Sgd.) "Maximo Vergara, Sotero Dumaual, Marcos de los Santos, Mariano L. Crisostomo, Pablo Bartolome,
Marcos de la Cruz, Damian Crisostomo."

Appellants remark that it is not stated in this clause that the will was signed by the witnesses in the presence of the testatrix and of
each other, as required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, which on this particular point provides the
following:

The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator
signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the
presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the
testator and of each other.

Stress is laid on the phrase used in the attestation clause above copied, to wit:

each of us signed in the presence of others.

Two interpretations can absolutely be given here to the expression "of others." One, that insinuated by the appellants, namely, that
it is equivalent to "of other persons," and the other, that contended by the appellee, to wit, that the phrase should be held to
mean "of the others," the article "the" having inadvertently been omitted.

Should the first interpretation prevail and "other persons" be taken to mean persons different from the attesting witnesses, then
one of the solemnities required by law would be lacking. Should the second be adopted and "of others" construed as meaning the
other witnesses to the will, then the law would have been complied with in this respect.

Including the concomitant words, the controverted phrase results thus: "each of us signed these presents in the presence of others
and of the testatrix."

If we should omit the words "of others and," the expression would be reduced to "each of us signed these presents in the presence of
the testatrix," and the statement that the witnesses signed each in the presence of the others would be lacking. But as a matter of
fact, these words "of others and" are present. Then, what for are they there? Is it to say that the witnesses signed in the presence of
other persons foreign to the execution of the will, which is completely useless and to no purpose in the case, or was it for some
useful, rational, necessary object, such as that of making it appear that the witnesses signed the will each in the presence of the
others? The first theory presupposes that the one who drew the will, who is Attorney Francisco, was an unreasonable man, which is
an inadmissible hypothesis, being repugnant to the facts shown by the record. The second theory is the most obvious, logical and
reasonable under the circumstances. It is true that the expression proved to be deficient. The deficiency may have been caused by
the drawer of the will or by the typist. If by the typist, then it must be presumed to have been merely accidental. If by the drawer, it
is explainable taking into account that Spanish is not only not the native language of the Filipinos, who, in general, still speak until
nowadays their own dialects, but also that such language is not even the only official language since several years ago.

In Re will of Abangan (40 Phil., 476), this court said:

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should
be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the
fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an
interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more
requisite entirely unnecesary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.

We believe it to be more reasonable to construe the disputed phrase "of others" as meaning "of the other witnesses," and that a
grammatical or clerical error was committed consisting in the omission of the article "the".
Page 24 of 104
Grammatical or clerical errors are not usually considered of vital importance when the intention is manifest in the will.

The court may correct clerical mistakes in writing, and disregard technical rules of grammar as to the construction of the
language of the will when it becomes necessary for it to do so in order to effectuate the testators manifest intention as
ascertained from the context of the will. But unless a different construction is so required the ordinary rules of grammar
should be adhered to in construing the will. (40 Cyc., 1404).

And we understand that in the present case the interpretation we adopt is imperative, being the most adequate and reasonable.

The case of In the matter of the estate of Geronima Uy Coque (43 Phil., 405), decided by this court and invoked by the appellants,
refers so far as pertinent to the point herein at issue, to an attestation clause wherein the statement that the witnesses signed the
will in the presence of each other is totally absent. In the case at bar, there is the expression "in the presence of others" whose
reasonable interpretation is, as we have said, "in the presence of the other witnesses." We do not find any party between the
present case and that of Re Estate of Geronima Uy Coque above cited.

Finally, we will take up the question submitted by the opponents as to the alleged insufficiency of the evidence to show that the
attesting witnesses Damian Crisostomo and Sotero Dumaual were present at the execution of the will in controversy. Although this
point is raised in the first assignment of error made by the appellants, and not in the second, it is discussed in this place because it
refers to the very fact of attestation. However, we do not believe it necessary to analyze in detail the evidence of both parties on
this particular point. The evidence leads us to the conclusion that the two witnesses aforementioned were present at the execution
and signing of the will. Such is also the conclusion of the trial judge who, in this respect, states the following, in his decision:

As to the question of whether or not the testatrix and witnesses signed the document Exhibit A in accordance with the provisions of
law on the matter, that is, whether or not the testatrix signed the will, or caused it to be signed, in the presence of the witnesses,
and the latter in turn signed in her presence and that of each other, the court, after observing the demeanor of the witnesses for
both parties, is of the opinion that those for the petitioner spoke the truth. It is neither probable nor likely that a man versed in the
law, such as Attorney Francisco, who was present at the execution of the will in question, and to whose conscientiousness in the
matter of compliance with all the extrinsic formalities of the execution of a will, and to nothing else, was due the fact that the
testatrix had cancelled her former will (Exhibit B) and had new one (Exhibit A) prepared and executed, should have consented the
omission of formality compliance with which would have required little or no effort; namely, that of seeing to it that the testatrix
and the attesting witnesses were all present when their respective signatures were affixed to the will." And the record does not
furnish us sufficient ground for deviating from the line reasoning and findings of the trial judge.

In conclusion we hold that the assignments of error made by the appellants are not supported by the evidence of record.

The judgment appealed from if affirmed with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

Page 25 of 104
G.R. No. L-48840 December 29, 1943

ERNESTO M. GUEVARA, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
ROSARIO GUEVARA and her husband PEDRO BUISON, respondent-appellees.

Wills; Presentation of Will for Probate Is Mandatory; Settlement of Estate on Basis of Intestacy When Decedent Left a Will,
against the Law.We hold that under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and no debts and the
heirs and legatees desire" to make an extrajudi-cial partition of the estate, they must first present that will to the court for probate
and divide the estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those provisions are
contrary to law. Neither may they do away with the presentation of the will to the court for pro-bate, because such suppression of
the will is contrary to law and public policy. The law enjoins the probate of the will and public policy requires it, because unless the
will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered
nugatory, as is attempted to be done in the instant case. Absent legatees and devisees, or such of them as may have no knowledge
of the will, could be cheated of their inheritance thru the collusion of some of the heirs who might agree to the partition of the
estate among themselves to the exclusion of others.

Id.; Id.; Id.Even if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any question as to the authenticity and due execution of the will,
none of the heirs may sue for the partition of the estate in accordance with that will without first securing its allowance or probate
of the court: first, because the law expressly provides that "no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and
allowed in the proper court"; and, second, because the probate of a will, which is a proceeding in rem, cannot be dispensed with and
substituted by any other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without offending against public policy de-signed to effectuate the
testator's right to dispose of his property by will in accordance with law and to protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under the
will thru the means provided by law, among which are the publication and the personal notices to each and all of said heirs and
legatees. Nor may the court approve and allow the will presented in evidence in such an an action for partition, which is one in
personam, any more than it could decree the registration under the Torrens system of the land involved in an ordinary action for
reivindieacion or partition.

Torrens Registration; Registration Does Not Affect Rights of Partition between Legatees. It results that the interested parties
consented to the registration of the land in question in the name of E. M. G. alone subject to the implied trust on account of which
he is under obligation to deliver and convey to them their corresponding shares after all the debts of the origi-nal owner of said land
had been paid. Such finding does not constitute a reversal of the decision and decree of registration, which merely confirmed the
petitioner's title; and in the absence of any intervening innocent third party, the petitioner may be compelled to fulfil the promise by
virtue of which he acquired his title. That is authorized by section 70 of the Land Registration Act, cited by the Court of Appeals, and
by the decision of this Court in Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil., 343, and the cases there-in cited.

DECISION

OZAETA, J.:

Ernesto M. Guevarra and Rosario Guevara, ligitimate son and natural daughter, respectively, of the deceased Victorino L. Guevara,
are litigating here over their inheritance from the latter. The action was commenced on November 12, 1937, by Rosario Guevara to
recover from Ernesto Guevara what she claims to be her strict ligitime as an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased to
wit, a portion of 423,492 square meters of a large parcel of land described in original certificate of title No. 51691 of the province of
Pangasinan, issued in the name of Ernesto M. Guervara and to order the latter to pay her P6,000 plus P2,000 a year as damages
for withholding such legitime from her. The defendant answered the complaint contending that whatever right or rights the plaintiff
might have had, had been barred by the operation of law.

It appears that on August 26, 1931, Victorino L. Guevara executed a will (exhibit A), apparently with all the formalities of the law,
wherein he made the following bequests: To his stepdaughter Candida Guevara, a pair of earrings worth P150 and a gold chain
worth P40; to his son Ernesto M. Guevara, a gold ring worth P180 and all the furniture, pictures, statues, and other religious objects
found in the residence of the testator in Poblacion Sur, Bayambang, Pangasinan; "a mi hija Rosario Guevara," a pair of earrings worth
P120; to his stepson Piuo Guevara, a ring worth P120; and to his wife by second marriage, Angustia Posadas, various pieces of
jewelry worth P1,020.

He also made the following devises: "A mis hijos Rosario Guevara y Ernesto M. Guevara y a mis hijastros, Vivencio, Eduviges,
Dionisia, Candida y Pio, apellidados Guevara," a residential lot with its improvements situate in the town of Bayambang, Pangasinan,
having an area of 960 square meters and assessed at P540; to his wife Angustia Posadas he confirmed the donation propter
nuptias theretofore made by him to her of a portion of 25 hectares of the large parcel of land of 259-odd hectares described in plan
Psu-66618. He also devised to her a portion of 5 hectares of the same parcel of land by way of complete settlement of her
usufructurary right.1awphil.net

He set aside 100 hectares of the same parcel of land to be disposed of either by him during his lifetime or by his attorney-in-fact
Ernesto M. Guevara in order to pay all his pending debts and to degray his expenses and those of his family us to the time of his
death.

The remainder of said parcel of land his disposed of in the following manner:
Page 26 of 104
 (d). Toda la porcion restante de mi terreno arriba descrito, de la extension superficial aproximada de ciento veintinueve
(129) hectareas setenta (70) areas, y veiticinco (25) centiares, con todas sus mejoras existentes en la misma, dejo y
distribuyo, pro-indiviso, a mis siguientes herederos como sigue:

A mi hijo legitimo, Ernesto M. Guevara, ciento ocho (108) hectareas, ocho (8) areas y cincuenta y cuatro (54) centiareas,
hacia la parte que colinda al Oeste de las cien (100) hectareas referidas en el inciso (a) de este parrafo del testamento,
como su propiedad absoluta y exclusiva, en la cual extension superficial estan incluidas cuarenta y tres (43) hectareas,
veintitres (23) areas y cuarenta y dos (42) centiareas que le doy en concepto de mejora.

A mi hija natural reconocida, Rosario Guevara, veintiun (21) hectareas, sesenta y un (61) areas y setenta y un (71)
centiareas, que es la parte restante.

Duodecimo. Nombro por la presente como Albacea Testamentario a mi hijo Ernesto M. Guevara, con relevacion de
fianza. Y una vez legalizado este testamento, y en cuanto sea posible, es mi deseo, que los herederos y legatarios aqui
nombrados se repartan extrajudicialmente mis bienes de conformidad con mis disposiciones arriba consignadas.

Subsequently, and on July 12, 1933, Victorino L. Guevarra executed whereby he conveyed to him the southern half of the large
parcel of land of which he had theretofore disposed by the will above mentioned, inconsideration of the sum of P1 and other
valuable considerations, among which were the payment of all his debts and obligations amounting to not less than P16,500, his
maintenance up to his death, and the expenses of his last illness and funeral expenses. As to the northern half of the same parcel of
land, he declared: "Hago constar tambien que reconozco a mi referido hijo Ernesto M. guevara como dueo de la mitad norte de la
totalidad y conjunto de los referidos terrenos por haberlos comprado de su propio peculio del Sr. Rafael T. Puzon a quien habia
vendido con anterioridad."

On September 27, 1933, final decree of registration was issued in land registration case No. 15174 of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, and pursuant thereto original certificate of title No. 51691 of the same province was issued on October 12 of the same
year in favor of Ernesto M. Guevara over the whole parcel of land described in the deed of sale above referred to. The registration
proceeding had been commenced on November 1, 1932, by Victorino L. Guevara and Ernesto M. Guevara as applicants, with
Rosario, among others, as oppositor; but before the trial of the case Victorino L. Guevara withdrew as applicant and Rosario Guevara
and her co-oppositors also withdrew their opposition, thereby facilitating the issuance of the title in the name of Ernesto M.
Guevara alone.

On September 27, 1933, Victorino L. Guevarra died. His last will and testament, however, was never presented to the court for
probate, nor has any administration proceeding ever been instituted for the settlement of his estate. Whether the various legatees
mentioned in the will have received their respective legacies or have even been given due notice of the execution of said will and of
the dispositions therein made in their favor, does not affirmatively appear from the record of this case. Ever since the death of
Victorino L. Guevara, his only legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara appears to have possessed the land adjudicated to him in the
registration proceeding and to have disposed of various portions thereof for the purpose of paying the debts left by his father.

In the meantime Rosario Guevara, who appears to have had her father's last will and testament in her custody, did nothing judicially
to invoke the testamentary dispositions made therein in her favor, whereby the testator acknowledged her as his natural daughter
and, aside from certain legacies and bequests, devised to her a portion of 21.6171 hectares of the large parcel of land described in
the will. But a little over four years after the testor's demise, she (assisted by her husband) commenced the present action against
Ernesto M. Guevara alone for the purpose hereinbefore indicated; and it was only during the trial of this case that she presented the
will to the court, not for the purpose of having it probated but only to prove that the deceased Victirino L. Guevara had
acknowledged her as his natural daughter. Upon that proof of acknowledgment she claimed her share of the inheritance from him,
but on the theory or assumption that he died intestate, because the will had not been probated, for which reason, she asserted, the
betterment therein made by the testator in favor of his legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara should be disregarded. Both the trial
court and the Court of appeals sustained that theory.

Two principal questions are before us for determination: (1) the legality of the procedure adopted by the plaintiff (respondent
herein) Rosario Guevara; and (2) the efficacy of the deed of sale exhibit 2 and the effect of the certificate of title issued to the
defendant (petitioner herein) Ernesto M. Guevara.

We cannot sanction the procedure adopted by the respondent Rosario Guevara, it being in our opinion in violation of procedural law
and an attempt to circumvent and disregard the last will and testament of the decedent. The Code of Civil Procedure, which was in
force up to the time this case was decided by the trial court, contains the following pertinent provisions:

Sec. 625. Allowance Necessary, and Conclusive as to Execution. No will shall pass either the real or personal estate, unless
it is proved and allowed in the Court of First Instance, or by appeal to the Supreme Court; and the allowance by the court of
a will of real and personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution.

Sec. 626. Custodian of Will to Deliver. The person who has the custody of a will shall, within thirty days after he knows of
the death of the testator, deliver the will into the court which has jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will.

Page 27 of 104
 Sec. 627. Executor to Present Will and Accept or Refuse Trust. A person named as executor in a will, shall within thirty
days after he knows of the death of the testor, or within thirty days after he knows that he is named executor, if he
obtained such knowledge after knowing of the death of the testor, present such will to the court which has jurisdiction,
unless the will has been otherwise returned to said court, and shall, within such period, signify to the court his acceptance
of the trust, or make known in writing his refusal to accept it.

Sec. 628. Penalty. A person who neglects any of the duties required in the two proceeding sections, unless he gives a
satisfactory excuse to the court, shall be subject to a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars.

Sec. 629. Person Retaining Will may be Committed. If a person having custody of a will after the death of the testator
neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same to the court having jurisdiction, after notice by the court so to do, he
may be committed to the prison of the province by a warrant issued by the court, and there kept in close confinement until
he delivers the will.

The foregoing provisions are now embodied in Rule 76 of the new Rules of Court, which took effect on July 1, 1940.

The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, with notice by publication to the whole world and with personal notice to
each of the known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator (section 630, C. c. P., and sections 3 and 4, Rule 77). Altho not
contested (section 5, Rule 77), the due execution of the will and the fact that the testator at the time of its execution was of sound
and disposing mind and not acting under duress, menace, and undue influence or fraud, must be proved to the satisfaction of the
court, and only then may the will be legalized and given effect by means of a certificate of its allowance, signed by the judge and
attested by the seal of the court; and when the will devises real property, attested copies thereof and of the certificate of allowance
must be recorded in the register of deeds of the province in which the land lies. (Section 12, Rule 77, and section 624, C. C. P.)

It will readily be seen from the above provisions of the law that the presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and
its allowance by the court is essential and indispensable to its efficacy. To assure and compel the probate of will, the law punishes a
person who neglects his duty to present it to the court with a fine not exceeding P2,000, and if he should persist in not presenting it,
he may be committed to prision and kept there until he delivers the will.

The Court of Appeals took express notice of these requirements of the law and held that a will, unless probated, is ineffective.
Nevertheless it sanctioned the procedure adopted by the respondent for the following reasons:

The majority of the Court is of the opinion that if this case is dismissed ordering the filing of testate proceedings, it would
cause injustice, incovenience, delay, and much expense to the parties, and that therefore, it is preferable to leave them in
the very status which they themselves have chosen, and to decide their controversy once and for all, since, in a similar case,
the Supreme Court applied that same criterion (Leao vs. Leao, supra), which is now sanctioned by section 1 of Rule 74 of
the Rules of Court. Besides, section 6 of Rule 124 provides that, if the procedure which the court ought to follow in the
exercise of its jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by the Rules of Court, any suitable process or mode of procedure
may be adopted which appears most consistent to the spirit of the said Rules. Hence, we declare the action instituted by
the plaintiff to be in accordance with law.

Let us look into the validity of these considerations. Section 1 of Rule 74 provides as follows:

Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees
are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the
register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir or one
legatee, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. It
shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two years
after the death of the decedent.

That is a modification of section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as follows:

Sec. 596. Settlement of Certain Intestates Without Legal Proceedings. Whenever all the heirs of a person who died
intestate are of lawful age and legal capacity and there are no debts due from the estate, or all the debts have been paid
the heirs may, by agreement duly executed in writing by all of them, and not otherwise, apportion and divide the estate
among themselves, as they may see fit, without proceedings in court.

The implication is that by the omission of the word "intestate" and the use of the word "legatees" in section 1 of Rule 74, a summary
extrajudicial settlement of a deceased person's estate, whether he died testate or intestate, may be made under the conditions
specified. Even if we give retroactive effect to section 1 of Rule 74 and apply it here, as the Court of Appeals did, we do not believe it
sanctions the nonpresentation of a will for probate and much less the nullification of such will thru the failure of its custodian to
present it to the court for probate; for such a result is precisely what Rule 76 sedulously provides against. Section 1 of Rule 74
merely authorizes the extrajudicial or judicial partition of the estate of a decedent "without securing letter of administration." It
does not say that in case the decedent left a will the heirs and legatees may divide the estate among themselves without the
necessity of presenting the will to the court for probate. The petition to probate a will and the petition to issue letters of

Page 28 of 104
administration are two different things, altho both may be made in the same case. the allowance of a will precedes the issuance of
letters testamentary or of administration (section 4, Rule 78). One can have a will probated without necessarily securing letters
testamentary or of administration. We hold that under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and no
debts and the heirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first present that will to the court
for probate and divide the estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those
provisions are contrary to law. Neither may they so away with the presentation of the will to the court for probate, because such
suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy. The law enjoins the probate of the will and public policy requires it,
because unless the will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by
will may be rendered nugatory, as is attempted to be done in the instant case. Absent legatees and devisees, or such of them as may
have no knowledge of the will, could be cheated of their inheritance thru the collusion of some of the heirs who might agree to the
partition of the estate among themselves to the exclusion of others.

In the instant case there is no showing that the various legatees other than the present litigants had received their respective
legacies or that they had knowledge of the existence and of the provisions of the will. Their right under the will cannot be
disregarded, nor may those rights be obliterated on account of the failure or refusal of the custodian of the will to present it to the
court for probate.

Even if the decedent left no debts and nobdy raises any question as to the authenticity and due execution of the will, none of the
heirs may sue for the partition of the estate in accordance with that will without first securing its allowance or probate by the court,
first, because the law expressly provides that "no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the
proper court"; and, second, because the probate of a will, which is a proceeding in rem, cannot be dispensed with the substituted by
any other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without offending against public policy designed to effectuate the testator's right to
dispose of his property by will in accordance with law and to protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under the will thru the
means provided by law, among which are the publication and the personal notices to each and all of said heirs and legatees. Nor
may the court approve and allow the will presented in evidence in such an action for partition, which is one in personam, any more
than it could decree the registration under the Torrens system of the land involved in an ordinary action for reinvindicacion or
partition.

We therefore believe and so hold that section 1 of Rule 74, relied upon by the Court of Appeals, does not sanction the procedure
adopted by the respondent.

The case of Leao vs. Leao (25 Phil., 180), cited by the Court of Appeals, like section 1 of Rule 74, sanctions the extrajudicial
partition by the heirs of the properties left by a decedent, but not the nonpresentation of a will for probate. In that case one Paulina
Ver executed a will on October 11, 1902, and died on November 1, 1902. Her will was presented for probate on November 10, 1902,
and was approved and allowed by the Court on August 16, 1904. In the meantime, and on November 10, 1902, the heirs went ahead
and divided the properties among themselves and some of them subsequently sold and disposed of their shares to third persons. It
does not affirmatively appear in the decision in that case that the partition made by the heirs was not in accordance with the will or
that they in any way disregarded the will. In closing the case by its order dated September 1, 1911, the trial court validated the
partition, and one of the heirs, Cunegunda Leao, appealed. In deciding the appeal this Court said:

The principal assignment of error is that the lower court committed an error in deciding that the heirs and legatees of the
estate of Da. Paulina Ver had voluntarily divided the estate among themselves.

In resolving that question this Court said:

In view of the positive finding of the judge of the lower court that there had been a voluntary partition of the estate among
the heirs and legatees, and in the absence of positive proof to the contrary, we must conclude that the lower court had
some evidence to support its conclusion.

Thus it will be seen that as a matter of fact no question of law was raised and decided in that case. That decision cannot be relied
upon as an authority for the unprecedented and unheard of procedure adopted by the respondent whereby she seeks to prove her
status as an acknowledged natural child of the decedent by his will and attempts to nullify and circumvent the testamentary
dispositions made by him by not presenting the will to the court for probate and by claiming her legitime as an acknowledged
natural child on the basis of intestacy; and that in the face of express mandatory provisions of the law requiring her to present the
will to the court for probate.

In the subsequent case of Riosa vs. Rocha (1926), 48 Phil. 737, this Court departed from the procedure sanctioned by the trial court
and impliedly approved by this Court in the Leao case, by holding that an extrajudicial partition is not proper in testate succession.
In the Riosa case the Court, speaking thru Chief Justice Avancea, held:

1. EXTRAJUDICIAL PARTITION; NOT PROPER IN TESTATE SUCCESSION. Section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
authorizing the heirs of a person who dies intestate to make extrajudicial partition of the property of the deceased, without
going into any court of justice, makes express reference to intestate succession, and therefore excludes testate succession.

2. ID.; EFFECTS OF; TESTATE SUCCESSION. In the instant case, which is a testate succession, the heirs made an
extrajudicial partition of the estate and at the same time instituted proceeding for the probate of the will and the

Page 29 of 104
 administration of the estate. When the time came for making the partition, they submitted to the court the extrajudicial
partition previously made by them, which the court approved. Held: That for the purposes of the reservation and the rights
and obligations created thereby, in connection with the relatives benefited, the property must not be deemed transmitted
to the heirs from the time the extrajudicial partition was made, but from the time said partition was approved by the court.
(Syllabus.)

The Court of Appeals also cites section 6 of Rule 124, which provides that if the procedure which the court ought to follow in the
exercise of its jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by the Rules of Court, any suitable process for mode of proceeding may be
adopted which appears most conformable to the spirit of the said Rules. That provision is not applicable here for the simple reason
that the procedure which the court ought to follow in the exercise of its jurisdiction is specifically pointed out and prescribed in
detail by Rules 74, 76, and 77 of the Rules of Court.

The Court of Appeals also said "that if this case is dismissed, ordering the filing of testate proceedings, it would cause injustice,
inconvenience, delay, and much expense to the parties." We see no injustice in requiring the plaintiff not to violate but to comply
with the law. On the contrary, an injustice might be committed against the other heirs and legatees mentioned in the will if the
attempt of the plaintiff to nullify said will by not presenting it to the court for probate should be sanctioned. As to the
inconvenience, delay, and expense, the plaintiff herself is to blame because she was the custodian of the will and she violated the
duty imposed upon her by sections 2, 4, and 5 of Rule 76, which command her to deliver said will to the court on pain of a fine not
exceeding P2,000 and of imprisonment for contempt of court. As for the defendant, he is not complaining of inconvenience, delay,
and expense, but on the contrary he is insisting that the procedure prescribed by law be followed by the plaintiff.

Our conclusion is that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the action instituted by the plaintiff to be in accordance with law. It
also erred in awarding relief to the plaintiff in this action on the basis of intestacy of the decedent notwithstanding the proven
existence of a will left by him and solely because said will has not been probated due to the failure of the plaintiff as custodian
thereof to comply with the duty imposed upon her by the law.

It is apparent that the defendant Ernesto M. Guevara, who was named executor in said will, did not take any step to have it
presented to the court for probate and did not signify his acceptance of the trust or refusal to accept it as required by section 3 of
Rule 76 (formerly section 627 of the Code of Civil Procedure), because his contention is that said will, insofar as the large parcel of
land in litigation is concerned, has been superseded by the deed of sale exhibit 2 and by the subsequent issuance of the Torrens
certificate of title in his favor.

II

This brings us to the consideration of the second question, referring to the efficacy of the deed of sale exhibit 2 and the effect of the
certificate of titled issued to the defendant Ernesto M. Guevara. So that the parties may not have litigated here in vain insofar as
that question is concerned, we deem it proper to decide it now and obviate the necessity of a new action.

The deed of sale exhibit 2 executed by and between Victorino L. Guevara and Ernesto M. Guevara before a notary public on July 12,
1933, may be divided into two parts: (a) insofar as it disposes of and conveys to Ernesto M. Guevara the southern half of Victorino L.
Guevara's hacienda of 259-odd hectares in consideration of P1 and other valuable considerations therein mentioned; and (b) insofar
as it declares that Ernesto M. Guevara became the owner of the northern half of the same hacienda by repurchasing it with his own
money from Rafael T. Puzon.

A. As to the conveyance of the southern half of the hacienda to Ernesto M. Guevara in consideration of the latter's assumption of
the obligation to pay all the debts of the deceased, the Court of Appeals found it to be valid and efficacious because: "(a) it has not
been proven that the charges imposed as a condition is [are] less than the value of the property; and (b) neither has it been proven
that the defendant did not comply with the conditions imposed upon him in the deed of transfer." As a matter of fact the Court of
Appeals found" "It appears that the defendant has been paying the debts left by his father. To accomplish this, he had to alienate
considerable portions of the above-mentioned land. And we cannot brand such alienation as anomalous unless it is proven that they
have exceeded the value of what he has acquired by virtue of the deed of July 12, 1933, and that of his corresponding share in the
inheritance." The finding of the Court of Appeals on this aspect of the case is final and conclusive upon the respondent, who did not
appeal therefrom.

B. With regard to the northern half of the hacienda, the findings of fact and of law made by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

The defendant has tried to prove that with his own money, he bought from Rafael Puzon one-half of the land in question,
but the Court a quo, after considering the evidence, found it not proven; we hold that such conclusion is well founded. The
acknowledgment by the deceased, Victorino L. Guevara, of the said transactions, which was inserted incidentally in the
document of July 12, 1933, is clearly belied by the fact that the money paid to Rafael Puzon came from Silvestre P. Coquia,
to whom Victorino L. Guevara had sold a parcel of land with the right of repurchase. The defendant, acting for his father,
received the money and delivered it to Rafael Puzon to redeem the land in question, and instead of executing a deed of
redemption in favor of Victorino L. Guevara, the latter executed a deed of sale in favor of the defendant.

The plaintiff avers that she withdrew her opposition to the registration of the land in the name of the defendant, because
of the latter's promise that after paying all the debt of their father, he would deliver to her and to the widow their

Page 30 of 104
 corresponding shares. As their father then was still alive, there was no reason to require the delivery of her share and that
was why she did not insist on her opposition, trusting on the reliability and sincerity of her brother's promise. The evidence
shows that such promise was really made. The registration of land under the Torrens system does not have the effect of
altering the laws of succession, or the rights of partition between coparceners, joint tenants, and other cotenants nor does
it change or affect in any other way any other rights and liabilities created by law and applicable to unregistered land (sec.
70, Land Registration Law). The plaintiff is not, then, in estoppel, nor can the doctrine of res judicata be invoked against her
claim. Under these circumstances, she has the right to compel the defendant to deliver her corresponding share in the
estate left by the deceased, Victorino L. Guevara.

In his tenth to fourteenth assignments of error the petitioner assails the foregoing findings of the Court of Appeals. But the findings
of fact made by said court are final and not reviewable by us on certiorari. The Court of Appeals found that the money with which
the petitioner repurchased the northern half of the land in question from Rafael Puzon was not his own but his father's, it being the
proceeds of the sale of a parcel of land made by the latter to Silvestre P. Coquia. Said court also found that the respondent withdrew
her opposition to the registration of the land in the name of the petitioner upon the latter's promise that after paying all the debts
of their father he would deliver to her and to the widow their corresponding shares. From these facts, it results that the interested
parties consented to the registration of the land in question in the name of Ernesto M. Guevara alone subject to the implied trust on
account of which he is under obligation to deliver and convey to them their corresponding shares after all the debts of the original
owner of said land had been paid. Such finding does not constitute a reversal of the decision and decree of registration, which
merely confirmed the petitioner's title; and in the absence of any intervening innocent third party, the petitioner may be compelled
to fulfill the promise by virtue of which he acquired his title. That is authorized by section 70 of the Land Registration Act, cited by
the Court of Appeals, and by the decision of this Court in Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil., 343, and the cases therein cited.

Upon this phase of the litigation, we affirm the finding of the Court of Appeals that the northern half of the land described in the will
exhibit A and in original certificate of title No. 51691 still belongs to the estate of the deceased Victorino L. Guevara. In the event the
petitioner Ernesto M. Guevara has alienated any portion thereof, he is under obligation to compensate the estate with an equivalent
portion from the southern half of said land that has not yet been sold. In other words, to the estate of Victorino L. Guevara still
belongs one half of the total area of the land described in said original certificate of title, to be taken from such portions as have not
yet been sold by the petitioner, the other half having been lawfully acquired by the latter in consideration of his assuming the
obligation to pay all the debts of the deceased.

Wherefore, that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals which declares in effect that notwithstanding exhibit 2 and the issuance
of original certificate of title No. 51691 in the name of Ernesto M. Guevara, one half of the land described in said certificate of title
belongs to the estate of Victorino L. Guevara and the other half to Ernesto M. Guevara in consideration of the latter's assumption of
the obligation to pay all the debts of the deceased, is hereby affirmed; but the judgment of said court insofar as it awards any relief
to the respondent Rosario Guevara in this action is hereby reversed and set aside, and the parties herein are hereby ordered to
present the document exhibit A to the proper court for probate in accordance with law, without prejudice to such action as the
provincial fiscal of Pangasinan may take against the responsible party or parties under section 4 of Rule 76. After the said document
is approved and allowed by the court as the last will and testament of the deceased Victorino L. Guevara, the heirs and legatees
therein named may take such action, judicial or extrajudicial, as may be necessary to partition the estate of the testator, taking into
consideration the pronouncements made in part II of this opinion. No finding as to costs in any of the three instances.

Page 31 of 104
G.R. No. L-20234 December 23, 1964

PAULA DE LA CERNA, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
MANUELA REBACA POTOT, ET AL., and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Judgments; Probate courts; Error of law does not affect jurisdiction, of probate court nor conclusive effect of its decision.An
error of law committed in admitting a joint will to probate does not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court nor the conclusive
effect of its final decision.

Same; Same; Probate decree of joint will affects only share of deceased spouse.A final probate decree of a joint will of husband
and wife affects only the share of the deceased spouse and cannot include the disposition of said joint will, in so far as the estate of
the latter spouse is concerned, must be, on her death, reexamined and adjudicated de novo.

Wills; Effects of validity of joint will as to share of wife who dies later than the husband.Where a husband and wife executed a
joint will and upon the death of the husband said will was admitted to probate by a final decree of the court although erroneous,
and the wife dies later, it is held that said first decree of probate affects only the estate of the husband but cannot affect the estate
of the wife, considering that a joint will is a separate will of each testator; and a joint will being prohibited by law, the estate of the
wife should pass upon her death to her intestate heirs and not to the testamentary heir, unless some other valid will is shown to
exist in favor of the latter or unless the testamentary heir is the only heir of said wife.

DECISION

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal by Paula de la Cerna and others from a decision of the Court of Appeals, Sixth Division (C.A.-G.R. No. 23763-R) reversing that
of the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Civ. Case No. R-3819) and ordering the dismissal of an action for partition.

The factual background appears in the following portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals (Petition, Annex A, pp. 2-4):

It appears that on May 9, 1939, the spouses, Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last will and
testament in the local dialect whereby they willed that "our two parcels of land acquired during our marriage together with
all improvements thereon shall be given to Manuela Rebaca, our niece, whom we have nurtured since childhood, because
God did not give us any child in our union, Manuela Rebaca being married to Nicolas Potot", and that "while each of the
testators is yet living, he or she will continue to enjoy the fruits of the two lands aforementioned", the said two parcels of
land being covered by Tax No. 4676 and Tax No. 6677, both situated in sitio Bucao, barrio Lugo, municipality of Borbon,
province of Cebu. Bernabe dela Serna died on August 30, 1939, and the aforesaid will was submitted to probate by said
Gervasia and Manuela before the Court of First Instance of Cebu which, after due publication as required by law and there
being no opposition, heard the evidence, and, by Order of October 31, 1939; in Special Proceedings No. 499, "declara
legalizado el documento Exhibit A como el testamento y ultima voluntad del finado Bernabe de la Serna con derecho por
parte du su viuda superstite Gervasia Rebaca y otra testadora al propio tiempo segun el Exhibit A de gozar de los frutos de
los terranos descritos en dicho documents; y habido consideracion de la cuantia de dichos bienes, se decreta la distribucion
sumaria de los mismos en favor de la logataria universal Manuela Rebaca de Potot previa prestacion por parte de la misma
de una fianza en la sum de P500.00 para responder de cualesquiera reclamaciones que se presentare contra los bienes del
finado Bernabe de la Serna de los aos desde esta fecha" (Act Esp. 499, Testamentaria Finado Bernabe de la Serna) Upon
the death of Gervasia Rebaca on October 14, 1952, another petition for the probate of the same will insofar as Gervasia
was concerned was filed on November 6, 1952, being Special Proceedings No. 1016-R of the same Court of First Instance of
Cebu, but for failure of the petitioner, Manuela R. Potot and her attorney, Manuel Potot to appear, for the hearing of said
petition, the case was dismissed on March 30, 1954 Spec. Proc. No. 1016-R, In the matter of the Probate of the Will of
Gervasia Rebaca).

The Court of First Instance ordered the petition heard and declared the testament null and void, for being executed contrary to the
prohibition of joint wills in the Civil Code (Art. 669, Civil Code of 1889 and Art. 818, Civil Code of the Philippines); but on appeal by
the testamentary heir, the Court of Appeals reversed, on the ground that the decree of probate in 1939 was issued by a court of
probate jurisdiction and conclusive on the due execution of the testament. Further, the Court of Appeals declared that:

... . It is true the law (Art. 669, old Civil Code; Art. 818, new Civil Code). prohibits the making of a will jointly by two or more
persons either for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person. However, this form of will has long been
sanctioned by use, and the same has continued to be used; and when, as in the present case, one such joint last will and
testament has been admitted to probate by final order of a Court of competent jurisdiction, there seems to be no
alternative except to give effect to the provisions thereof that are not contrary to law, as was done in the case of Macrohon
vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267, wherein our Supreme Court gave effect to the provisions of the joint will therein mentioned,
saying, "assuming that the joint will in question is valid."

Whence this appeal by the heirs intestate of the deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna.

Page 32 of 104
The appealed decision correctly held that the final decree of probate, entered in 1939 by the Court of First Instance of Cebu (when
the testator, Bernabe de la Cerna, died), has conclusive effect as to his last will and testament despite the fact that even then the
Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint wills, whether in favor of the joint testators, reciprocally, or in favor of a third party
(Art. 669, old Civil Code). The error thus committed by the probate court was an error of law, that should have been corrected by
appeal, but which did not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its final decision, however
erroneous. A final judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon the whole world (Manalo vs. Paredes, 47
Phil. 938; In re Estates of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156); and public policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors
judgment of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. Interest rei publicae ut finis set litium (Dy Cay vs.
Crossfield, 38 Phil, 521, and other cases cited in 2 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court (1963 Ed., p. 322).

Petitioners, as heirs and successors of the late Bernabe de la Cerna, are concluded by the 1939 decree admitting his will to probate.
The contention that being void the will cannot be validated, overlooks that the ultimate decision on Whether an act is valid or void
rests with the courts, and here they have spoken with finality when the will was probated in 1939. On this court, the dismissal of
their action for partition was correct.

But the Court of Appeals should have taken into account also, to avoid future misunderstanding, that the probate decree in 1989
could only affect the share of the deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna. It could not include the disposition of the share of the
wife, Gervasia Rebaca, who was then still alive, and over whose interest in the conjugal properties the probate court acquired no
jurisdiction, precisely because her estate could not then be in issue. Be it remembered that prior to the new Civil Code, a will could
not be probated during the testator's lifetime.

It follows that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate of the wife was concerned, must be, on her death, reexamined and
adjudicated de novo, since a joint will is considered a separate will of each testator. Thus regarded, the holding of the court of First
Instance of Cebu that the joint will is one prohibited by law was correct as to the participation of the deceased Gervasia Rebaca in
the properties in question, for the reasons extensively discussed in our decision in Bilbao vs. Bilbao, 87 Phil. 144, that explained the
previous holding in Macrohon vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267.

Therefore, the undivided interest of Gervasia Rebaca should pass upon her death to her heirs intestate, and not exclusively to the
testamentary heir, unless some other valid will in her favor is shown to exist, or unless she be the only heir intestate of said
Gervasia.

It is unnecessary to emphasize that the fact that joint wills should be in common usage could not make them valid when our Civil
Codes consistently invalidated them, because laws are only repealed by other subsequent laws, and no usage to the contrary may
prevail against their observance (Art. 5, Civ. Code of 1889; Art. 7, Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950).

WITH THE FOREGOING MODIFICATION, the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 23763-R is affirmed. No Costs.

Page 33 of 104
G.R. No. L-29300 June 21, 1978

PEDRO D. H. GALLANOSA, CORAZON GRECIA-GALLONOSA and ADOLFO FORTAJADA, the deceased Pedro Gallanosa being
substituted by his legal heirs, namely his above-named widow and his children, ISIDRO GALLANOSA and LEDY GALLANOSA, and
grandchildren named IMELDA TECLA GALLANOSA and ROSARIO BRIGIDA GALLANOSA, children of the late SIKATUNA GALLANOSA,
son of Pedro D.H. GALLONOSA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. UBALDO Y. ARCANGEL, Judge of Branch I of the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon and FLORENTINO G. HITOSIS, CASIANO G.
HITOSIS, TEOTIMO G. HITOSIS, VICTORIO G. HITOSIS, EMILIA G. HITOSIS VDA. DE CRUZ, JOAQUIN R. HITOSIS VDA. DE CRUZ,
JOAQUIN R. HITOSIS, FLORENTINO R. HITOSIS, VIRGINIA R. MITOSIS, DEBORAH R. HITOSIS, EDILBERTO R. HITOSIS, LEONOR R.
HITOSIS, NORMA R. HITOSIS-VILLANUEVA, LEONCIO R. HITOSIS, minors ANGEL R. HITOSIS and RODOLFO R. HITOSIS, represented
by their legal guardian and mother LOURDES RELUCIO VDA. DE HITOSIS, PETRONA HITOSIS-BALBIDO, MODESTO HITOSIS-GACILO,
CLETO HITOSIS, AGUSTIN HITOSIS-FORTES, TOMASA HITOSIS-BANARES VDA. DE BORRAS, CONRADA HITOSIS-BANARES FRANCHE,
RESTITUTO HITOSIS-BANARES, DAMIAN HITOSIS-BANARES, FIDEL HITOSIS-BANARES, SUSANA HITOSIS-BANARES RODRIGUEZ,
JOSE HITOSIS, LOLITA HITOSIS-BANEGA, minors MILAGROS HITOSIS-BANEGA, ALICIA HITOSIS-BANEGA AND ELISA HITOSIS-
BANEGA, represented by their legal guardian and father ERNESTO BANEGA, FELICITAS HITOSIS-PENAFLOR, GENOVEVA HITOSIS-
ADRIATICO, MANUEL HITOSIS, PEDRO HITOSIS, LIBRATA HITOSIS-BALMES, JUANITA HITOSIS-GABITO VDA. DE GABAS, MAURA
HITOSIS-GABITO VDA. DE GANOLA and LEONA HITOSIS-GABITO GAMBA, respondents.

Settlement of Estate; Wills; Res Judicata; Prescription; An action instituted in 1967 for the annulment of a last will and testament
duly probated way back in 1939 will not prosper.What the plaintiffs seek is the annulment of a last will and testament duly
probated in 1939 by the lower court itself. The proceeding is coupled with an action to recover the lands adjudicated to the
defendants by the same court in 1943 by virtue of the probated will, which action is a resuscitation of the complaint of the same
parties that the same court dismissed in 1952. It is evident from the allegations of the complaint and from defendants motion to
dismiss that plaintiffs 1967 action is barred by res judicata, a double-barrelled defense, and by prescription, acquisitive and
extinctive, or by what are known in the jus civile and the jus gentium as usucapio, longi temporis possesio and praescriptio (See
Ramos vs. Ramos, L-19872, December 3, 1974 61 SCRA 284).

Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice. The Rules of Court does not sanction an action for annulment of a will.Our procedural
law does not sanction an action for the annulment of a will. In order that a will may take effect, it has to be probated, legalized or
allowed in the proper testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will is mandatory (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, formerly
sec. 1, Rule 76, Rules of Court; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479; Guevara vs. Guevara, 98 Phil. 249). The testamentary proceeding is
a special proceeding for settlement of the testators estate. A special proceeding is distinct and different from an ordinary action
(Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 2 and sec. 1, Rule 72. Rules of Court).

Same; Same; Res Judicata; Consequences of due probate of a will.The 1939 decree of probate is conclusive as to the due
execution or formal validity of the will (Sec. 625, Act 190, sec. 1, Rule 76, now sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court; Last par. of art. 828,
Civil Code). That means that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time when he executed the will and was not acting
under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence; that the will was signed by him in the presence of the required number of
witnesses, and that the will is genuine and is not a forgery. Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a subsequent
proceeding, not even in a criminal action for the forgery of the will. (3 Morans Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, p.
395; Manahan vs. Manahan, 58 Phil. 448). After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its
execution cannot be raised anymore (Santos vs. De Buenaventura, L-22797, September 22, 1966, 18 SCRA 47).

Same; Same; Same; Decree of adjudication in a testate proceeding is binding on the whole world.On the other hand, the 1943
decree of adjudication rendered by the trial court in the testate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Florentino Hitosis,
having been rendered in a proceeding in rem, is, under the abovequoted section 49(a), binding upon the whole world (Manalo vs.
Paredes, 47 Phil. 938; In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; De la Cerha vs. Potot, 120 Phil. 1361, 1364; McMaster vs. Henry
Reissmann & Co., 68 Phil. 142).

Same; Same; Same; Judgment; Grounds for annulment of judgment after period for filing petition for relief expires.After the
period for seeking relief from a final order or judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court has expired, a final judgment or order
can be set aside only on the grounds of (a) lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law or (b) that the judgment was obtained by
means of extrinsic or collateral fraud. In the latter case, the period for annulling the judgment is four years from the discovery of the
fraud (2 Morans Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pp. 245-246; Mauricio vs. Villanueva, 106 Phil. 1159).

Same; Same; Contracts; Prescription; The Civil Law rule that an action for declaration of inexistence of a contract does not
prescribe cannot be applied to last wills and testaments.To hurdle over the obstacle of prescription, the trial court, naively
adopting the theory of plaintiffs counsel, held that the action for the recovery of the lands had not prescribed because the rule in
Article 1410 of the Civil Code, that the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe,
applies to wills. That ruling is a glaring error. Article 1410 cannot possibly apply to last wills and testaments.

DECISION

AQUINO, J.:

Page 34 of 104
In this special civil action of certiorari, filed on July 29, 1968, the petitioners seek to annul the orders of respondent Judge dated May
3 trial June 17, 1968, wherein he reconsidered his order of January 10, 1968, dismissing, on the ground of prescription, the
complaint in Civil Case No. 2233 of the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon.

The case involves the sixty-one parcels of land in Sorsogon left by Florentino Hitosis, with an estimated value of P50,000, trial claims
for damages exceeding one million pesos. The undisputed facts are as follows:

1. Florentino Hitosis executed a will in the Bicol dialect on June 19, 1938 when he was eighty years old. He died on May 26, 1939 at
Irosin, Sorsogon. A childless widower, he as survived by his brother, Leon Hitosis. His other brothers, named Juan, Tito (Juancito),
Leoncio (Aloncio) trial Apolonio and only sister, Teodora, were all dead.

2. On June 24, 1939 a petition for the probate of his will was filed in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon (Special Proceeding No.
3171). The notice of hearing was duly published. In that will, Florentino bequeathed his one-half share in the conjugal estate to his
second wife, Tecla Dollentas, and, should Tecla predecease him, as was the case, his one-half share would be assigned to the
spouses Pedro Gallanosa and Corazon Grecia, the reason being that Pedro, Tecla's son by her first marriage, grew up under the care
of Florentino; he had treated Pedro as his foster child, and Pedro has rendered services to Florentino and Tecla. Florentino likewise
bequeathed his separate properties consisting of three parcels of abaca land and parcel of riceland to his protege (sasacuyang
ataman), Adolfo Fortajada, a minor.

3. Opposition to the probate of the will was registered by the testator's legal heirs, namely, his surviving brother, Leon, trial his
nephews trial nieces. After a hearing, wherein the oppositors did not present any evidence in support of their opposition, Judge
Pablo S. Rivera, in his decision of October 27, 1939, admitted the will to probate and appointed Gallanosa as executor. Judge Rivera
specifically found that the testator executed his last will "gozando de buena salud y facultades mentales y no obrando en virtud de
amenaza, fraude o influencia indebida."

4. On October 24, 1941, the testamentary heirs, the Gallanosa spouses trial Adolfo Fortajada, submitted a project of partition
covering sixty-one parcels of land located in various parts of Sorsogon, large cattle trial several pieces of personal property which
were distributed in accordance with Florentino's will. The heirs assumed the obligations of the estate amounting to P7,129.27 in the
portion of P2,376.42 for Adolfo Fortajada and P4,752.85 for the Gallanosa spouses. The project of partition was approved by Judge
Doroteo Amador in his order of March 13, 1943, thus confirming the heirs' possession of their respective shares. The testator's legal
heirs did not appeal from the decree of probate trial from the order of partition trial distribution.

5. On February 20, 1952, Leon Hitosis trial the heirs of Florentino's deceased brothers trial sisters instituted an action in the Court of
First Instance of Sorsogon against Pedro Gallanosa for the recovery of the said sixty-one parcels of land. They alleged that they, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in continuous possession of those lands en concepto de dueo trial
that Gallanosa entered those lands in 1951 trial asserted ownership over the lands. They prayed that they be declared the owners of
the lands trial that they be restored to the possession thereof. They also claimed damages (Civil Case No. 696).

6. Gallanosa moved to dismiss the above complaint for lack of cause of action trial on the ground of bar by the prior judgment in the
probate proceeding. Judge Anatolio C. Maalac dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicatain his order of August 14, 1952
wherein he said:

It also appears that the plaintiffs and/or their predecessors-in-interest had intervened in the testate proceedings in
Civil Case No. 3171 of this Court for- the purpose of contesting the probate of the will of (the) late Florentino
Hitosis; trial had their opposition prospered trial the will denied of probate, the proceedings would have been
converted into one of intestacy (Art. 960 Civil Code) and the settlement of the estate of the said deceased would
have been made in accordance with the provisions of law governing legal or intestate succession ... , in which case
the said plaintiffs, as the nearest of kin or legal heirs of said Florentino Mitosis, would have succeeded to the
ownership and possession of the 61 parcels of land in question forming part of his estate (art. 1003, Civil Code).

However, the derision of the Court was adverse to them, when it their opposition trial ordered the probate of his
will. From this decision (Annex K) legalizing the said will, the oppositors did not file any appeal within the period
fixed by law, despite the fact that they were duly notified thereof, so that the said decision had become final trial it
now constitutes a bar to any action that the plaintiffs may institute for the purpose of a redetermination of their
rights to inherit the properties of the late Florentino Hitosis.

In other words, the said decision of this Court in Civil Case special ) No. 3171, in which the herein plaintiffs or their
predecessors-in-interest had intervened as parties oppositors, constitutes a final judicial determination of the issue
that the said plaintiffs, as ordinary heirs, have no legal rights to succeed to any of the properties of the late
Florentino Hitosis; consequently, their present claim to the ownership trial possession of the 61 parcels of land in
question is without any legal merit or basis.

7. The plaintiffs did not appeal from that order of dismissal which should have set the matter at rest. But the same plaintiffs or
oppositors to the probate of the will, trial their heirs, with a persistence befitting a more meritorious case, filed on September 21,
1967, or fifteen years after the dismissal of Civil Case No. 696 trial twenty-eight years after the probate of the will another action in

Page 35 of 104
the same court against the Gallanosa spouses trial Adolfo Fortajada for the "annulment" of the will of Florentino Hitosis trial and for
the recovery of the same sixty-one parcels of land. They prayed for the appointment of a receiver.

8. As basis of their complaint, they alleged that the Gallanosa spouses, through fraud trial deceit, caused the execution trial
simulation of the document purporting to be the last will trial testament of Florentino Hitosis. While in their 1952 complaint the
game plaintiffs alleged that they were in possession of the lands in question, in their 1967 complaint they admitted that since 1939,
or from the death of Florentino Hitosis, the defendants (now the petitioners) have been in possession of the disputed lands (Par. XIV
of the complaint, p. 70, Rollo in Civil Case No. 555, Gubat Branch, which was transferred to Branch I in Sorsogon town where Special
Proceeding No. 3171 trial Civil Case No. 696 were decided trial which was re-docketed as Civil Case No. 2233).

9. As already stated, that 1967 complaint, upon motion of the defendants, now the petitioners, was dismissed by respondent Judge.
The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration Respondent Judge. granted it trial set aside the order of dismissal. He denied
defendants' motion for the reconsideration of his order setting aside that dismissal order.

The petitioners or the defendants below contend in this certiorari case that the lower court has no jurisdiction to set aside the 1939
decree of probate trial the 1952 order of dismissal in Civil Case No. 696 trial that it acted with grave abuse of discretion in not
dismissing private respondents' 1967 complaint.

The issue is whether, under the facts set forth above, the private respondents have a cause of action the "annulment" of the will of
Florentino Hitosis trial for the recovery of the sixty-one parcels of land adjudicated under that will to the petitioners.

We hold that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion in reconsideration its order of dismissal trial in ignoring the
1939 testamentary case trial the 1952 Civil Case No. 696 which is the same as the instant 1967 case.

A rudimentary knowledge of substantive law trial procedure is sufficient for an ordinary lawyer to conclude upon a causal perusal of
the 1967 complaint that it is baseless trial unwarranted.

What the plaintiffs seek is the "annulment" of a last will trial testament duly probated in 1939 by the lower court itself. The
proceeding is coupled with an action to recover the lands adjudicated to the defendants by the same court in 1943 by virtue of the
probated will, which action is a resuscitation of The complaint of the same parties that the same court dismissed in 1952.

It is evident from the allegations of the complaint trial from defendants' motion to dismiss that plaintiffs' 1967 action is barred by res
judicata, a double-barrelled defense, trial by prescription, acquisitive trial extinctive, or by what are known in the jus civile trial
the jus gentium as usucapio, longi temporis possesio and praescriptio (See Ramos vs. Ramos, L-19872, December 3, 1974, 61 SCRA
284).

Our procedural law does not sanction an action for the "annulment" of a will. In order that a will may take effect, it has to be
probated, legalized or allowed in the proper testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will is mandatory (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec.
1, Rule 75, formerly sec. 1, Rule 76, Rules of Court; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479; Guevara vs. Guevara, 98 Phil. 249).

The testamentary proceeding is a special proceeding for the settlement of the testator's estate. A special proceeding is distinct trial
different from an ordinary action (Secs. 1 trial 2, Rule 2 trial sec. 1, Rule 72, Rules of Court).

We say that the defense of res judicata, as a ground for the dismissal of plaintiffs' 1967 complaint, is a two-pronged defense because
(1) the 1939 trial 1943 decrees of probate trial distribution in Special Proceeding No. 3171 trial (2) the 1952 order of dismissal in Civil
Case No. 696 of the lower court constitute bars by former judgment, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 49. Effect of judgments. The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court or judge of the
Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will or the
administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or
status of a particular person or his relationship to another, the judgment or order is conclusive upon the title to the
thing the will or administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate of a
will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or
intestate;

(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter
that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties trial their successors in interest by
title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating of the same thing trial under
the same title trial in the same capacity;

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have
been adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually
trial necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.

Page 36 of 104
The 1939 decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity of the will (Sec. 625, Act 190, sec. 1, Rule 76, now
sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court; Last par. of art. 838, Civil Code).

That means that the testator was of sound trial disposing mind at the time when he executed the will and was not acting under
duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence; that the will was signed by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses, and
that the will is genuine trial is not a forgery. Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a subsequent proceeding, not
even in a criminal action for the forgery of the will. (3 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, p. 395; Manahan vs.
Manahan, 58 Phil. 448).

After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its execution cannot be raised anymore (Santos vs. De
Buenaventura, L-22797, September 22, 1966, 18 SCRA 47).

In Austria vs. Ventenilla, 21 Phil. 180, a "petition for annulment of a will" was not entertained after the decree of probate had
become final. That case is summarized as follows:

Wills; Probate; Alledged Fraudulent Will; Appeal. V. died. His will was admitted to probate without objection. No
appeal was taken from said order. It was admitted that due trial legal notice had been given to all parties. Fifteen
months after the date of said order, a motion was presented in the lower court to have said will declared null and
void, for the reason that fraud had been practised upon the deceased in the making of his will.

Held: That under section 625 of Act No. 190, the only time given parties who are displeased with the order
admitting to probate a will, for an appeal is the time given for appeals in ordinary actions; but without deciding
whether or not an order admitting a will to probate will be opened for fraud, after the time allowed for an appeal
has expired, when no appeal is taken from an order probating a will, the heirs can not, in subsequent litigation in
the same proceedings, raise questions relating to its due execution. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due
execution trial as to the testamentary capacity of The testator. (See Austria vs. Heirs of Ventenilla. 99 Phil. 1069).

On the other hand, the 1943 decree of adjudication rendered by the trial court in the testate proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of Florentino Hitosis, having been rendered in a proceeding in rem, is under the abovequoted section 49(a), binding upon the
whole world (Manalo vs. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938; In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; De la Cerna vs. Potot, 120 Phil. 1361, 1364;
McMaster vs. Hentry Reissmann & Co., 68 Phil. 142).

It is not only the 1939 probate proceeding that can be interposed as res judicata with respect to private respondents' complaint, The
1952 order of dismissal rendered by Judge Maalac in Civil Case No. 696, a judgment in personam was an adjudication on the merits
(Sec. 4, Rule 30, old Rules of Court). It constitutes a bar by former judgment under the aforequoted section 49(b) (Anticamara vs.
Ong, L-29689. April 14, 1978).

The plaintiffs or private respondents did not even bother to ask for the annulment of the testamentary proceeding trial the
proceeding in Civil Case No. 696. Obviously, they realized that the final adjudications in those cases have the binding force of res
judicata and that there is no ground, nor is it timely, to ask for the nullification of the final orders trial judgments in those two cases.

It is a fundamental concept in the organization of every jural system, a principle of public policy, that, at the risk of occasional errors,
judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litum. "The very object
for which the courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies." (Dy Cay vs. Crossfield and O'Brien, 38 Phil. 521: Pealosa
vs. Tuason, 22 Phil, 303; De la Cerna vs. Potot, supra).

After the period for seeking relief from a final order or judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court has expired, a final judgment or
order can be set aside only on the grounds of (a) lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law or (b) that the judgment was
obtained by means of extrinsic or collateral fraud. In the latter case, the period for annulling the judgment is four years from the
discovery of the fraud (2 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pp. 245-246; Mauricio vs. Villanueva, 106 Phil.
1159).

To hurdle over the obstacle of prescription, the trial court, naively adopting the theory of plaintiffs' counsel, held that the action for
the recovery of the lands had not prescribed because the rule in article 1410 of the Civil Code, that "the action or defense for the
declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe", applies to wills.

That ruling is a glaring error. Article 1410 cannot possibly apply to last wills trial testaments. The trial court trial plaintiffs' counsel
relied upon the case of Dingle vs. Guillermo, 48 0. G. 4410, allegedly decided by this Court, which cited the ruling in Tipton vs.
Velasco, 6 Phil. 6J7, that mere lapse of time cannot give efficacy to void contracts, a ruling elevated to the category of a codal
provision in article 1410. The Dingle case was decided by the Court of Appeals. Even the trial court did not take pains to verify the
misrepresentation of plaintiffs' counsel that the Dinglecase was decided by this Court. An elementary knowledge of civil law could
have alerted the trial court to the egregious error of plaintiffs' counsel in arguing that article 1410 applies to wills.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of May 3 trial June 17, 1968 are reversed trial set aside trial its order of dismissal dated
January 10, 1968 is affirmed. Costs against the private respondents.

Page 37 of 104
G.R. No. L-62952 October 9, 1985

SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA GOMEZ, OSCAR JUGO ANG, CARMELITA JUGO, respondents.

Succession; Wills; Jurisdiction; The fact that the probate court declared a devise made in a will null and void will be sustained
where no useful purpose will be served by requiring the filing of a separate civil action and restricting the court only to the issue of
extrinsic validity of the will.We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious
legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition f or probate (which the lower court assumed to have been filed with
the petitioner's authorization), the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity
had been established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where
practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should
meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare with Sumilang v. Ramagosa, L-23135, December 26, 1967, 21
SCRA 1369; Cacho v. Udan, L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693).

Same; Same; Same; Same.We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On
the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects
the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the
will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that
we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity 01 the provisions of the will in question. (Section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court.
Case, et al. v. Jugo, et al., 77 Phil. 517, 522). After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying f or solution.

Same; Same; A devise given by a married man estranged from his wife for 22 years prior to his death, to a woman with whom he
has been living for said period of time is void.Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a
donation between persons who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot give
even assuming that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he
was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside that portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals (now intermediate
Appellate Court) dated June 3, 1982, as amended by the resolution dated August 10, 1982, declaring as null and void the devise in
favor of the petitioner and the resolution dated December 28, 1982 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. He left a last Will and Testament duly signed by him at the end of the Will on
page three and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof in the presence of Celestina Alejandro, Myrna C. Cortez, and Leandro
Leano, who in turn, affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 of the Will in the
presence of the testator and of each other and the Notary Public. The Will was acknowledged before the Notary Public Romeo
Escareal by the testator and his three attesting witnesses.

In the said Will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his estate.
It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate
children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with
petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on December 5, 1952, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J.
Nepomuceno were married in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his
legal wife Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein petitioner. The
Will reads in part:

Art. III. That I have the following legal heirs, namely: my aforementioned legal wife, Rufina Gomez, and our son,
Oscar, and daughter Carmelita, both surnamed Jugo, whom I declare and admit to be legally and properly entitled
to inherit from me; that while I have been estranged from my above-named wife for so many years, I cannot deny
that I was legally married to her or that we have been separated up to the present for reasons and justifications
known fully well by them:

Art. IV. That since 1952, 1 have been living, as man and wife with one Sofia J. Nepomuceno, whom I declare and
avow to be entitled to my love and affection, for all the things which she has done for me, now and in the past;
that while Sofia J. Nepomuceno has with my full knowledge and consent, did comport and represent myself as her
own husband, in truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in the holy bonds of
matrimony because of my aforementioned previous marriage;

On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXIV, Caloocan City and asked for the issuance to her of letters testamentary.

Page 38 of 104
On May 13, 1975, the legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging inter alia that the
execution of the Will was procured by undue and improper influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of the execution
of the Will, the testator was already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in concubinage with the testator, she is
wanting in integrity and thus, letters testamentary should not be issued to her.

On January 6, 1976, the lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator admitted in his Will to
cohabiting with the petitioner from December 1952 until his death on July 16, 1974, the Will's admission to probate will be an Idle
exercise because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident.

The petitioner appealed to the respondent-appellate court.

On June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal denying the probate of the will.
The respondent court declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void pursuant to
Article 739 in relation with Article 1028 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision a quo is hereby set aside, the will in question declared valid except the devise in favor of
the appellant which is declared null and void. The properties so devised are instead passed on in intestacy to the
appellant in equal shares, without pronouncement as to cost.

On June 15, 1982, oppositors Rufina Gomez and her children filed a "Motion for Correction of Clerical Error" praying that the word
"appellant" in the last sentence of the dispositive portion of the decision be changed to "appellees" so as to read: "The properties so
devised are instead passed on intestacy to the appellees in equal shares, without pronouncement as to costs." The motion was
granted by the respondent court on August 10, 1982.

On August 23, 1982, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. This was denied by the respondent court in a resolution dated
December 28, 1982.

The main issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring
the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner.

The petitioner submits that the validity of the testamentary provision in her favor cannot be passed upon and decided in the probate
proceedings but in some other proceedings because the only purpose of the probate of a Will is to establish conclusively as against
everyone that a Will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator has the mental capacity to execute the
same. The petitioner further contends that even if the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 739 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
were applicable, the declaration of its nullity could only be made by the proper court in a separate action brought by the legal wife
for the specific purpose of obtaining a declaration of the nullity of the testamentary provision in the Will in favor of the person with
whom the testator was allegedly guilty of adultery or concubinage.

The respondents on the other hand contend that the fact that the last Will and Testament itself expressly admits indubitably on its
face the meretricious relationship between the testator and the petitioner and the fact that petitioner herself initiated the
presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the testator, which led private respondents to present
contrary evidence, merits the application of the doctrine enunciated in Nuguid v. Felix Nuguid, et al. (17 SCRA 449) and Felix
Balanay, Jr. v. Hon. Antonio Martinez, et al. (G.R. No. L- 39247, June 27, 1975). Respondents also submit that the admission of the
testator of the illicit relationship between him and the petitioner put in issue the legality of the devise. We agree with the
respondents.

The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the
intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void.

The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic
validity of the Will. The rule is expressed thus:

xxx xxx xxx

... It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the
testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last Will and testament, irrespective of whether its
provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise. (Fernandez v. Dimagiba, 21 SCRA 428)

The petition below being for the probate of a Will, the court's area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity
thereof. The testators testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities
prescribed by law are the only questions presented for the resolution of the court. Any inquiry into
the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature.

xxx xxx xxx

Page 39 of 104
 True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is one thing; the
validity of the testamentary provisions is another. The first decides the execution of the document and the
testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent and distribution (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21
SCRA 1369)

xxx xxx xxx

To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with the
formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the
proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625). The judgment in such proceedings
determines and can determine nothing more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any
provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one valid. ...
(Castaneda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426)

The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the
situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.

In Nuguid v. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the trial court, the testator instituted the petitioner as universal heir and completely
preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will of this nature, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, would be null and void.
Separate or latter proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions would be superfluous.

Even before establishing the formal validity of the will, the Court in Balanay .Jr. v. Martinez (64 SCRA 452) passed upon the validity of
its intrinsic provisions.

Invoking "practical considerations", we stated:

The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on
its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.

We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and
because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower court assumed to have been filed
with the petitioner's authorization) the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even
before its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an Idle ceremony if on its face
it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17 SCRA
449. Compare with Sumilang vs. Ramagosa L-23135, December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho v. Udan L-19996,
April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693).

There appears to be no more dispute at this time over the extrinsic validity of the Will. Both parties are agreed that the Will of
Martin Jugo was executed with all the formalities required by law and that the testator had the mental capacity to execute his Will.
The petitioner states that she completely agrees with the respondent court when in resolving the question of whether or not the
probate court correctly denied the probate of Martin Jugo's last Will and Testament, it ruled:

This being so, the will is declared validly drawn. (Page 4, Decision, Annex A of Petition.)

On the other hand the respondents pray for the affirmance of the Court of Appeals' decision in toto.

The only issue, therefore, is the jurisdiction of the respondent court to declare the testamentary provision in favor of the petitioner
as null and void.

We sustain the respondent court's jurisdiction. As stated in Nuguid v. Nuguid, (supra):

We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the
contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the record, in the event of
probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the
same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result, waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety.
These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of
the validity of the provisions of the will in question. (Section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court. Case, et al. v. Jugo, et al., 77
Phil. 517, 522). After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.

We see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the nullified provision to the proper court in a separate action for that
purpose simply because, in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.

Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:

The following donations shall be void:

Page 40 of 104
 (1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation;

(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in consideration thereof;

(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants, by reason of his office.

In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or
donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action.

Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:

The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions.

In Article III of the disputed Will, executed on August 15, 1968, or almost six years before the testator's death on July 16, 1974,
Martin Jugo stated that respondent Rufina Gomez was his legal wife from whom he had been estranged "for so many years." He also
declared that respondents Carmelita Jugo and Oscar Jugo were his legitimate children. In Article IV, he stated that he had been living
as man and wife with the petitioner since 1952. Testator Jugo declared that the petitioner was entitled to his love and affection. He
stated that Nepomuceno represented Jugo as her own husband but "in truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I could not
bind her to me in the holy bonds of matrimony because of my aforementioned previous marriage.

There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage when Martin Jugo executed his Will. There is also
no dispute that the petitioner and Mr. Jugo lived together in an ostensible marital relationship for 22 years until his death.

It is also a fact that on December 2, 1952, Martin Jugo and Sofia J. Nepomuceno contracted a marriage before the Justice of the
Peace of Victoria, Tarlac. The man was then 51 years old while the woman was 48. Nepomuceno now contends that she acted in
good faith for 22 years in the belief that she was legally married to the testator.

The records do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith. As argued by the private respondents:

First. The last will and testament itself expressly admits indubitably on its face the meretricious relationship
between the testator and petitioner, the devisee.

Second. Petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil status of
the testator, which led private respondents to present contrary evidence.

In short, the parties themselves dueled on the intrinsic validity of the legacy given in the will to petitioner by the
deceased testator at the start of the proceedings.

Whether or not petitioner knew that testator Martin Jugo, the man he had lived with as man and wife, as already
married, was an important and specific issue brought by the parties before the trial court, and passed upon by the
Court of Appeals.

Instead of limiting herself to proving the extrinsic validity of the will, it was petitioner who opted to present
evidence on her alleged good faith in marrying the testator. (Testimony of Petitioner, TSN of August 1, 1982, pp.
56-57 and pp. 62-64).

Private respondents, naturally, presented evidence that would refute the testimony of petitioner on the point.

Sebastian Jugo, younger brother of the deceased testator, testified at length on the meretricious relationship of his
brother and petitioner. (TSN of August 18,1975).

Clearly, the good faith of petitioner was by option of the parties made a decisive issue right at the inception of the
case.

Confronted by the situation, the trial court had to make a ruling on the question.

When the court a quo held that the testator Martin Jugo and petitioner 'were deemed guilty of adultery or
concubinage', it was a finding that petitioner was not the innocent woman she pretended to be.

xxx xxx xxx

3. If a review of the evidence must be made nonetheless, then private respondents respectfully offer the following
analysis:

Page 41 of 104
 FIRST: The secrecy of the marriage of petitioner with the deceased testator in a town in Tarlac where neither she
nor the testator ever resided. If there was nothing to hide from, why the concealment' ? Of course, it maybe
argued that the marriage of the deceased with private respondent Rufina Gomez was likewise done in secrecy. But
it should be remembered that Rufina Gomez was already in the family way at that time and it would seem that the
parents of Martin Jugo were not in favor of the marriage so much so that an action in court was brought
concerning the marriage. (Testimony of Sebastian Jugo, TSN of August 18, 1975, pp. 29-30)

SECOND: Petitioner was a sweetheart of the deceased testator when they were still both single. That would be in
1922 as Martin Jugo married respondent Rufina Gomez on November 29, 1923 (Exh. 3). Petitioner married the
testator only on December 5, 1952. There was a space of about 30 years in between. During those 30 years, could
it be believed that she did not even wonder why Martin Jugo did not marry her nor contact her anymore after
November, 1923 - facts that should impel her to ask her groom before she married him in secrecy, especially so
when she was already about 50 years old at the time of marriage.

THIRD: The fact that petitioner broke off from Martin Jugo in 1923 is by itself conclusive demonstration that she
new that the man she had openly lived for 22 years as man and wife was a married man with already two children.

FOURTH: Having admitted that she knew the children of respondent Rufina Gomez, is it possible that she would
not have asked Martin Jugo whether or not they were his illegitimate or legitimate children and by whom? That is
un-Filipino.

FIFTH: Having often gone to Pasig to the residence of the parents of the deceased testator, is it possible that she
would not have known that the mother of private respondent Oscar Jugo and Carmelita Jugo was respondent
Rufina Gomez, considering that the houses of the parents of Martin Jugo (where he had lived for many years) and
that of respondent Rufina Gomez were just a few meters away?

Such pretentions of petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno are unbelievable. They are, to say the least, inherently
improbable, for they are against the experience in common life and the ordinary instincts and promptings of
human nature that a woman would not bother at all to ask the man she was going to marry whether or not he was
already married to another, knowing that her groom had children. It would be a story that would strain human
credulity to the limit if petitioner did not know that Martin Jugo was already a married man in view of the
irrefutable fact that it was precisely his marriage to respondent Rufina Gomez that led petitioner to break off with
the deceased during their younger years.

Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation between persons who are living in
adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot give even assuming that the recipient may receive.
The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with
whom he had been living in concubinage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court, is
AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Page 42 of 104
G.R. No. L-22036 April 30, 1979

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE REVEREND FATHER PASCUAL RIGOR. THE PARISH PRIEST OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF
VICTORIA, TARLAC, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
BELINA RIGOR, NESTORA RIGOR, FRANCISCA ESCOBAR DE RIGOR and JOVITA ESCOBAR DE FAUSTO, respondents-appellees.

Settlement of Estate; Will of Testator is the first and principal law in the matter of Testaments.The will of the testator is the first
and principal law in the matter of testaments. When his intention is clearly and precisely expressed, any interpretation must be in
accord when it may certainly appear that his intention was different from that literally expressed (In re Estate of Caldero, 26 Phil.
237-8).

Same; Same.One canon in the interpretation of the testamentary provisions is that the testators intention is to be ascertained
from the words of the will, taking into consideration the circumstances as this intention (Art. 789, Civil Code of the Philippines).

Same; A bequest of land to the nearest male relative of the grantor who would study for the priesthood construed to mean the
grantors nearest male relative living at the time of his death and not any indefinite time thereafter.We hold that the said
bequest refers to the testators nearest male relative living at the time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. In
order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of
representation, when it is proper. The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or reasonably construed. To construe them
as referring to the testators nearest male relative at any time after his death would render the provisions difficult to apply and
create uncertainty as to the disposition of his estate. That could not have been his intention.

Same; Same.In 1935, when the testator died, his nearest legal heirs were his three sisters or second-degree relatives, Mrs.
Escobar, Mrs. Manaloto and Mrs. Quiambao. Obviously, when the testator specified his nearest male relative, he must have had in
mind his nephew or a son of his sister, who would be his third-degree relative, or possibly a grandnephew. But since he could not
prognosticate the exact date of his death or state with certitude what category of nearest male relative would be living at the time
of his death, he could not specify that his nearest male relative would be his nephew or grandnephew (the son of his nephew or
niece) and so he had to use the term nearest male relative.

Same; Evidence; Evidence aliunde has no probative value.Of course, Mrs. Gamalindas affidavit, which is tantamount to evidence
aliunde as to the testators intention and which is hearsay, has no probative value. Our opinion that the said bequest refers to the
testators nephew who was living at the time of his death, when his succession was opened and the successional rights to his estate
became vested, rests on a judicious and unbiased reading of the terms of the will.

Same; As the testator was not survived by a nephew who became a priest the bequest became inoperative and the administration
of the ricelands of the parish priest of Victoria, Tarlac also became inoperative.Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any
nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore,
the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the will, was likewise inoperative.

Same; Where the parish priest of Victoria, Tarlac, could, under the bequest, become a trustee only when any of the testators
nephews living at the time of his death had not yet entered the seminary or being a priest was excommunicated, and these
contingencies never arose, said parish priest cannot be deemed a substitute devisee.The appellant in contending that a public
charitable trust was constituted by the testator in his favor assumes that he was a trustee or substitute devisee. That contention is
untenable. A reading of the testamentary provisions regarding the disputed bequest does not support the view that the parish priest
of Victoria was a trustee or a substitute devisee in the event that the testator was not survived by a nephew who became a priest. It
should be underscored that the parish priest of Victoria could become a trustee only when the testators nephew living at the time
of his death, who desired to become a priest, had not yet entered the seminary or, having been ordained a priest, he was
excommunicated. Those two contingencies did not arise, and could not have arisen, in this case because no nephew of the testator
manifest any intention to enter the seminary or ever became a priest.

Same; Where a bequest is inoperative the same shall be merged, as a rule, to the testators estate.The Court of Appeals
correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888 of the Old Civil Code, now Article 956, which provides that if the bequest for
any reason should be inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution and those in which the right of
accretion exists. (el legado x x x por qualquier causa, no tenga efecto, se refundira en la masa de la herencia, fuera, de los cases de
sustitucion y derecho de acrecer).

Same; A person may die partly testate and partly intestate.The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and
partly intestate, or that there may be mixed succession. The old rule as to the indivisibility of the testators will is no longer valid.
Thus, if a conditional legacy does not take effect, there will be intestate succession as to the property covered by the said legacy
(Macrahon Ong Ham vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267).

DECISION

AQUINO, J.:

Page 43 of 104
This case is about the efficaciousness or enforceability of a devise of ricelands located at Guimba, Nueva Ecija, with a total area of
around forty- four hectares That devise was made in the will of the late Father Pascual Rigor, a native of Victoria Tarlac, in favor of
his nearest male relative who would study for the priesthood.

The parish priest of Victoria, who claimed to be a trustee of the said lands, appealed to this Court from the decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming the order of the probate court declaring that the said devise was inoperative (Rigor vs. Parish Priest of the Roman
Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac, CA-G.R. No. 24319-R, August 1, 1963).

The record discloses that Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on August 9, 1935, leaving a will executed on
October 29, 1933 which was probated by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in its order of December 5, 1935. Named as devisees in
the will were the testators nearest relatives, namely, his three sisters: Florencia Rigor-Escobar, Belina Rigor-Manaloto and Nestora
Rigor-Quiambao. The testator gave a devise to his cousin, Fortunato Gamalinda.

In addition, the will contained the following controversial bequest (paragraphing supplied to facilitate comprehension of the
testamentary provisions):

Doy y dejo como legado CUATRO (4) PARCELAS de terreno palayeros situados en el municipiooo de Guimba de la
provinciaaa de NUEVA ECIJA, cuyo num. de CERTIFICADO DE TRANSFERENCIA DE TITULO SON; Titulo Num. 6530,
mide 16,249 m. cuadrados de superficie Titulo Num. 6548, mide 242,998 m. cuadrados de superficie y annual
6525, mide 62,665 m. cuadrados de superficie; y Titulo Num. 6521, mide 119,251 m. cuadrados de superficie;
a cualquier pariente mio varon mas cercano que estudie la carrera eclesiatica hasta ordenarse de Presbiterado o
sea Sacerdote; las condiciones de estate legado son;

(1.a) Prohibe en absoluto la venta de estos terrenos arriba situados objectos de este legado;

(2.a) Que el legatario pariente mio mas cercano tendra derecho de empezar a gozar y administrar de este legado al
principiar a curzar la Sagrada Teologio, y ordenado de Sacerdote, hasta su muerte; pero que pierde el legatario
este derecho de administrar y gozar de este legado al dejar de continuar sus estudios para ordenarse de
Presbiterado (Sacerdote).

Que el legatario una vez Sacerdote ya estara obligado a celebrar cada ao VEINTE (20) Misas rezadas en sufragio
de mi alma y de mis padres difuntos, y si el actual legatario, quedase excomulgado, IPSO FACTO se le despoja este
legado, y la administracion de esto pasara a cargo del actual Parroco y sus sucesores de la Iglecia Catolica de
Victoria, Tarlac.

Y en intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario acondicionado segun lo arriba queda expresado, pasara la
administracion de este legado a cargo del actual Parroco Catolico y sus sucesores, de Victoria, Tarlac.

El Parroco administrador de estate legado, acumulara, anualmente todos los productos que puede tener estate
legado, ganando o sacando de los productos anuales el CINCO (5) por ciento para su administracion, y los derechos
correspondientes de las VEINTE (20) Misas rezadas que debiera el Parroco celebrar cada ao, depositando todo lo
restante de los productos de estate legado, en un banco, a nombre de estate legado.

To implement the foregoing bequest, the administratix in 1940 submitted a project containing the following item:

5. LEGACY OF THE CHURCH

That it be adjudicated in favor of the legacy purported to be given to the nearest male relative who shall take the
priesthood, and in the interim to be administered by the actual Catholic Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of
Victoria, Tarlac, Philippines, or his successors, the real properties hereinbelow indicated, to wit:

Title Lot Area in Tax Ass.

No. No. Has. Dec. Value

T- 3663 1.6249 18740 P 340.00

6530

T- 3445- 24.2998 18730 7,290.00

6548 C

T- 3670 6.2665 18736 1,880.00

6525

T- 3666 11.9251 18733 3,580.00

6521

Page 44 of 104
 Total amount and value 44.1163 P13,090.00

Judge Roman A. Cruz in his order of August 15, 1940, approving the project of partition, directed that after payment of the
obligations of the estate (including the sum of P3,132.26 due to the church of the Victoria parish) the administratrix should deliver to
the devisees their respective shares.

It may be noted that the administratrix and Judge Cruz did not bother to analyze the meaning and implications of Father Rigor's
bequest to his nearest male relative who would study for the priesthood. Inasmuch as no nephew of the testator claimed the devise
and as the administratrix and the legal heirs believed that the parish priest of Victoria had no right to administer the ricelands, the
same were not delivered to that ecclesiastic. The testate proceeding remained pending.

About thirteen years after the approval of the project of partition, or on February 19, 1954, the parish priest of Victoria filed in the
pending testate proceeding a petition praying for the appointment of a new administrator (succeeding the deceased administration
Florencia Rigor), who should deliver to the church the said ricelands, and further praying that the possessors thereof be ordered to
render an accounting of the fruits. The probate court granted the petition. A new administrator was appointed. On January 31, 1957
the parish priest filed another petition for the delivery of the ricelands to the church as trustee.

The intestate heirs of Father Rigor countered with a petition dated March 25, 1957 praying that the bequest be d inoperative and
that they be adjudged as the persons entitled to the said ricelands since, as admitted by the parish priest of Victoria, "no nearest
male relative of" the testator "has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record on Appeal). That petition was opposed by
the parish priest of Victoria.

Finding that petition to be meritorious, the lower court, through Judge Bernabe de Aquino, declared the bequest inoperative and
adjudicated the ricelands to the testator's legal heirs in his order of June 28, 1957. The parish priest filed two motions for
reconsideration.

Judge De Aquino granted the respond motion for reconsideration in his order of December 10, 1957 on the ground that the testator
had a grandnephew named Edgardo G. Cunanan (the grandson of his first cousin) who was a seminarian in the San Jose Seminary of
the Jesuit Fathers in Quezon City. The administrator was directed to deliver the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria as trustee.

The legal heirs appealed to the Court of Appeals. It reversed that order. It held that Father Rigor had created a testamentary trust for
his nearest male relative who would take the holy orders but that such trust could exist only for twenty years because to enforce it
beyond that period would violate "the rule against perpetuities. It ruled that since no legatee claimed the ricelands within twenty
years after the testator's death, the same should pass to his legal heirs, citing articles 888 and 912(2) of the old Civil Code and article
870 of the new Civil Code.

The parish priest in this appeal contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the testator created a public charitable
trust and in not liberally construing the testamentary provisions so as to render the trust operative and to prevent intestacy.

As refutation, the legal heirs argue that the Court of Appeals d the bequest inoperative because no one among the testator's nearest
male relatives had studied for the priesthood and not because the trust was a private charitable trust. According to the legal heirs,
that factual finding is binding on this Court. They point out that appellant priest's change of theory cannot be countenanced in this
appeal .

In this case, as in cases involving the law of contracts and statutory construction, where the intention of the contracting parties or of
the lawmaking body is to be ascertained, the primary issue is the determination of the testator's intention which is the law of the
case (dicat testor et erit lex. Santos vs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209, 215; Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, L-28734, March 28, 1969, 27
SCRA 546).

The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments. When his intention is clearly and precisely
expressed, any interpretation must be in accord with the plain and literal meaning of his words, except when it may certainly appear
that his intention was different from that literally expressed (In re Estate of Calderon, 26 Phil. 333).

The intent of the testator is the cardinal rule in the construction of wills." It is "the life and soul of a will It is "the first greatest rule,
the sovereign guide, the polestar, in giving effect to a will". (See Dissent of Justice Moreland in Santos vs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209,
223, 237-8.)

One canon in the interpretation of the testamentary provisions is that "the testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words
of the wilt taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was made", but excluding the testator's oral declarations as to
his intention (Art. 789, Civil Code of the Philippines).

To ascertain Father Rigor's intention, it may be useful to make the following re-statement of the provisions of his will.

1. that he bequeathed the ricelands to anyone of his nearest male relatives who would pursue an ecclesiastical career until his
ordination as a priest.

Page 45 of 104
2. That the devisee could not sell the ricelands.

3. That the devisee at the inception of his studies in sacred theology could enjoy and administer the ricelands, and once ordained as
a priest, he could continue enjoying and administering the same up to the time of his death but the devisee would cease to enjoy
and administer the ricelands if he discontinued his studies for the priesthood.

4. That if the devisee became a priest, he would be obligated to celebrate every year twenty masses with prayers for the repose of
the souls of Father Rigor and his parents.

5. That if the devisee is excommunicated, he would be divested of the legacy and the administration of the riceland would pass to
the incumbent parish priest of Victoria and his successors.

6. That during the interval of time that there is no qualified devisee as contemplated above, the administration of the ricelands
would be under the responsibility of the incumbent parish priest of Victoria and his successors, and

7. That the parish priest-administrator of the ricelands would accumulate annually the products thereof, obtaining or getting from
the annual produce five percent thereof for his administration and the fees corresponding to the twenty masses with prayers that
the parish priest would celebrate for each year, depositing the balance of the income of the devise in the bank in the name of his
bequest.

From the foregoing testamentary provisions, it may be deduced that the testator intended to devise the ricelands to his nearest
male relative who would become a priest, who was forbidden to sell the ricelands, who would lose the devise if he discontinued his
studies for the priesthood, or having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated, and who would be obligated to say annually
twenty masses with prayers for the repose of the souls of the testator and his parents.

On the other hand, it is clear that the parish priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands only in two situations: one, during the
interval of time that no nearest male relative of the testator was studying for the priesthood and two, in case the testator's nephew
became a priest and he was excommunicated.

What is not clear is the duration of "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario acondicionado", or how long after the testator's
death would it be determined that he had a nephew who would pursue an ecclesiastical vocation. It is that patent ambiguity that
has brought about the controversy between the parish priest of Victoria and the testator's legal heirs.

Interwoven with that equivocal provision is the time when the nearest male relative who would study for the priesthood should be
determined. Did the testator contemplate only his nearest male relative at the time of his death? Or did he have in mind any of his
nearest male relatives at anytime after his death?

We hold that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative living at the time of his death and not to any indefinite
time thereafter. "In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession
opens, except in case of representation, when it is proper" (Art. 1025, Civil Code).

The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or reasonably construed. To construe them as referring to the testator's nearest
male relative at anytime after his death would render the provisions difficult to apply and create uncertainty as to the disposition of
his estate. That could not have been his intention.

In 1935, when the testator died, his nearest leagal heirs were his three sisters or second-degree relatives, Mrs. Escobar, Mrs.
Manaloto and Mrs. Quiambao. Obviously, when the testator specified his nearest male relative, he must have had in mind his
nephew or a son of his sister, who would be his third-degree relative, or possibly a grandnephew. But since he could not
prognosticate the exact date of his death or state with certitude what category of nearest male relative would be living at the time
of his death, he could not specify that his nearest male relative would be his nephew or grandnephews (the son of his nephew or
niece) and so he had to use the term "nearest male relative".

It is contended by the legal heirs that the said devise was in reality intended for Ramon Quiambao, the testator's nephew and
godchild, who was the son of his sister, Mrs. Quiambao. To prove that contention, the legal heirs presented in the lower court the
affidavit of Beatriz Gamalinda, the maternal grandmother of Edgardo Cunanan, who deposed that after Father Rigor's death her own
son, Valentin Gamalinda, Jr., did not claim the devise, although he was studying for the priesthood at the San Carlos Seminary,
because she (Beatriz) knew that Father Rigor had intended that devise for his nearest male relative beloning to the Rigor family (pp.
105-114, Record on Appeal).

Mrs. Gamalinda further deposed that her own grandchild, Edgardo G. Cunanan, was not the one contemplated in Father Rigor's will
and that Edgardo's father told her that he was not consulted by the parish priest of Victoria before the latter filed his second motion
for reconsideration which was based on the ground that the testator's grandnephew, Edgardo, was studying for the priesthood at
the San Jose Seminary.

Page 46 of 104
Parenthetically, it should be stated at this juncture that Edgardo ceased to be a seminarian in 1961. For that reason, the legal heirs
apprised the Court of Appeals that the probate court's order adjudicating the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria had no more
leg to stand on (p. 84, Appellant's brief).

Of course, Mrs. Gamalinda's affidavit, which is tantamount to evidence aliunde as to the testator's intention and which is hearsay,
has no probative value. Our opinion that the said bequest refers to the testator's nephew who was living at the time of his death,
when his succession was opened and the successional rights to his estate became vested, rests on a judicious and unbiased reading
of the terms of the will.

Had the testator intended that the "cualquier pariente mio varon mas cercano que estudie la camera eclesiatica" would include
indefinitely anyone of his nearest male relatives born after his death, he could have so specified in his will He must have known that
such a broad provision would suspend for an unlimited period of time the efficaciousness of his bequest.

What then did the testator mean by "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario acondicionado"? The reasonable view is that he
was referring to a situation whereby his nephew living at the time of his death, who would like to become a priest, was still in grade
school or in high school or was not yet in the seminary. In that case, the parish priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands
before the nephew entered the seminary. But the moment the testator's nephew entered the seminary, then he would be entitled
to enjoy and administer the ricelands and receive the fruits thereof. In that event, the trusteeship would be terminated.

Following that interpretation of the will the inquiry would be whether at the time Father Rigor died in 1935 he had a nephew who
was studying for the priesthood or who had manifested his desire to follow the ecclesiastical career. That query is categorically
answered in paragraph 4 of appellant priest's petitions of February 19, 1954 and January 31, 1957. He unequivocally alleged therein
that "not male relative of the late (Father) Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record on Appeal).

Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in
question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged
in the wilt was likewise inoperative.

The appellant in contending that a public charitable trust was constituted by the testator in is favor assumes that he was a trustee or
a substitute devisee That contention is untenable. A reading of the testamentary provisions regarding the disputed bequest not
support the view that the parish priest of Victoria was a trustee or a substitute devisee in the event that the testator was not
survived by a nephew who became a priest.

It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a trustee only when the testator's nephew living at the time
of his death, who desired to become a priest, had not yet entered the seminary or, having been ordained a priest, he was
excommunicated. Those two contingencies did not arise, and could not have arisen in this case because no nephew of the testator
manifested any intention to enter the seminary or ever became a priest.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888 of the old Civil Code, now article 956, which provides
that if "the bequest for any reason should be inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution and
those in which the right of accretion exists" ("el legado ... por qualquier causa, no tenga efecto se refundira en la masa de la
herencia, fuera de los casos de sustitucion y derecho de acrecer").

This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960 (2), which provides that legal succession takes place
when the will "does not dispose of all that belongs to the testator." There being no substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands
the same should be distributed among the testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no disposition as to the said
ricelands.

The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly intestate, or that there may be mixed succession. The old
rule as to the indivisibility of the testator's win is no longer valid. Thus, if a conditional legacy does not take effect, there will be
intestate succession as to the property recovered by the said legacy (Macrohon Ong Ham vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267).

We find no merit in the appeal The Appellate Court's decision is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED

Page 47 of 104
G.R. No. L-23079 February 27, 1970

RUBEN AUSTRIA, CONSUELO AUSTRIA-BENTA and LAURO AUSTRIA MOZO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. ANDRES REYES, Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, PERFECTO CRUZ, BENITA CRUZ-MENEZ ISAGANI CRUZ, ALBERTO CRUZ
and LUZ CRUZ-SALONGA respondents.

Civil law; Succession; Testamentary succession; Institution of heir; Requisites for annulment of institution of heir for statement of
a false cause.Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under Article 850 of the Civil Code, the following requisites must
concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third,
it must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the
cause.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where will does not state cause for institution of heir.Where the decedents will does not state
in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of heirs, the will cannot be annulled under Article 850 of the Civil
Code. Such institution may be annulled only when it is clear, after an examination of the will that the testator clearly would not have
made the institution if he had known the cause for it to be false.

Same; Same; Same; Interpretation of will; Testacy favored.Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially
where the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate, as was done in this case.
Moreover, so compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator allowed to prevail, that we
could even vary the language of the will for the purpose of giving it effect.

Remedial law; Courts; Inherent powers; Power to amend and control processes.Every court has the inherent power to amend
and control its processes and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice. In this case, the lower court had power to
reverse its order of December 22, 1959 because the subsequent orders complained of served merely to clarify the firstan act
which the court could legally do.

Same; Civil procedure; Intervention; Power of court to limit extent of intervention.The court has the power to limit the extent of
a partys intervention in a probate case within its powers as articulated by the Rules of Court.

DECISION

CASTRO, J.:

On July 7, 1956 Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Special Proceedings 2457) a petition for
probate, ante mortem, of her last will and testament. The probate was opposed by the present petitioners Ruben Austria, Consuelo
Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria Mozo, and still others who, like the petitioner, are nephews and nieces of Basilia. This opposition
was, however, dismissed and the probate of the will allowed after due hearing.

The bulk of the estate of Basilia, admittedly, was destined under the will to pass on to the respondents Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-
Meez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz, and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom had been assumed and declared by Basilia as her own legally
adopted children.

On April 23, 1959, more than two years after her will was allowed to probate, Basilia died. The respondent Perfecto Cruz was
appointed executor without bond by the same court in accordance with the provisions of the decedent's will, notwithstanding the
blocking attempt pursued by the petitioner Ruben Austria.

Finally, on November 5, 1959, the present petitioners filed in the same proceedings a petition in intervention for partition alleging in
substance that they are the nearest of kin of Basilia, and that the five respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., had not in fact been adopted
by the decedent in accordance with law, in effect rendering these respondents mere strangers to the decedent and without any
right to succeed as heirs.

Notwithstanding opposition by the respondent Perfecto Cruz, as executor of the estate, the court a quo allowed the petitioners'
intervention by its order of December 22, 1959, couched in broad terms, as follows: "The Petition in Intervention for Partition filed
by the above-named oppositors [Ruben Austria, et al.,] dated November 5, 1959 is hereby granted."

In the meantime, the contending sides debated the matter of authenticity or lack of it of the several adoption papers produced and
presented by the respondents. On motion of the petitioners Ruben Austria, et al., these documents were referred to the National
Bureau of Investigation for examination and advice. N.B.I. report seems to bear out the genuineness of the documents, but the
petitioners, evidently dissatisfied with the results, managed to obtain a preliminary opinion from a Constabulary questioned-
document examiner whose views undermine the authenticity of the said documents. The petitioners Ruben Austria, et al., thus
moved the lower court to refer the adoption papers to the Philippine Constabulary for further study. The petitioners likewise located
former personnel of the court which appeared to have granted the questioned adoption, and obtained written depositions from two
of them denying any knowledge of the pertinent adoption proceedings.

Page 48 of 104
On February 6, 1963, more than three years after they were allowed to intervene, the petitioners Ruben Austria, let al., moved the
lower court to set for hearing the matter of the genuineness of the adoption of the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., by the late
Basilia. Before the date set by the court for hearing arrived, however, the respondent Benita Cruz-Meez who entered an
appearance separately from that of her brother Perfecto Cruz, filed on February 28, 1963 a motion asking the lower court, by way of
alternative relief, to confine the petitioners' intervention, should it be permitted, to properties not disposed of in the will of the
decedent.

On March 4, 1963, the lower court heard the respondent Benita's motion. Both sides subsequently submitted their respective
memoranda, and finally, the lower court issued an order on June 4, 1963, delimiting the petitioners' intervention to the properties of
the deceased which were not disposed of in the will.

The petitioners moved the lower court to reconsider this latest order, eliciting thereby an opposition, from the respondents. On
October 25, 1963 the same court denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

A second motion for reconsideration which set off a long exchange of memoranda from both sides, was summarily denied on April
21, 1964.

Hence this petition for certiorari, praying this Court to annul the orders of June 4 and October 25, 1963 and the order of April 21,
1964, all restricting petitioners' intervention to properties that were not included in the decedent's testamentary dispositions.

The uncontested premises are clear. Two interests are locked in dispute over the bulk of the estate of the deceased. Arrayed on one
side are the petitioners Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria Mozo, three of a number of nephews and nieces
who are concededly the nearest surviving blood relatives of the decedent. On the other side are the respondents brothers and
sisters, Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom heirs in the will of the
deceased Basilia, and all of whom claim kinship with the decedent by virtue of legal adoption. At the heart of the controversy is
Basilia's last will immaculate in its extrinsic validity since it bears the imprimatur of duly conducted probate proceedings.

The complaint in intervention filed in the lower court assails the legality of the tie which the respondent Perfecto Cruz and his
brothers and sisters claim to have with the decedent. The lower court had, however, assumed, by its orders in question, that the
validity or invalidity of the adoption is not material nor decisive on the efficacy of the institution of heirs; for, even if the adoption in
question were spurious, the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., will nevertheless succeed not as compulsory heirs but as testamentary
heirs instituted in Basilia's will. This ruling apparently finds support in article, 842 of the Civil Code which reads:

One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose of by will all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having
capacity to succeed.

One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this
Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs.

The lower court must have assumed that since the petitioners nephews and niece are not compulsory heirs, they do not possess
that interest which can be prejudiced by a free-wheeling testamentary disposition. The petitioners' interest is confined to properties,
if any, that have not been disposed of in the will, for to that extent intestate succession can take place and the question of the
veracity of the adoption acquires relevance.

The petitioners nephews and niece, upon the other hand, insist that the entire estate should descend to them by intestacy by reason
of the intrinsic nullity of the institution of heirs embodied in the decedent's will. They have thus raised squarely the issue of whether
or not such institution of heirs would retain efficacy in the event there exists proof that the adoption of the same heirs by the
decedent is false.

The petitioners cite, as the controlling rule, article 850 of the Civil Code which reads:

The statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be considered as not written, unless it appears
from the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of such cause.

Coming closer to the center of the controversy, the petitioners have called the attention of the lower court and this Court to the
following pertinent portions of the will of the deceased which recite:

III

Ang aking mga sapilitang tagapagmana (herederos forzosos) ay ang aking itinuturing na mga anak na tunay (Hijos
legalmente adoptados) na sina Perfecto, Alberto, Luz, Benita at Isagani, na pawang may apelyidong Cruz.

xxx xxx xxx

Kung ako ay bawian ng Dios ng buhay, ay aking ipinamamana ang aking mga ari-ariang maiiwan, sa kaparaanang
sumusunod:
Page 49 of 104
 A.Aking ipinamamana sa aking nabanggit na limang anak na sina Perfecto, Alberto, Luz, Benita at Isagani, na
pawang may apelyidong Cruz, na parepareho ang kaparti ng bawa't isa at walang lamangan (en partes iguales),
bilang kanilang sapilitang mana (legiti[ma]), ang kalahati () ng aking kaparti sa lahat ng aming ari-ariang
gananciales ng aking yumaong asawang Pedro Cruz na napapaloob sa Actuacion Especial No. 640 ng Hukumang
Unang Dulugan ng Rizal at itinutukoy sa No. 1 ng parafo IV ng testamentong ito, ang kalahati () ng mga lagay na
lupa at palaisdaan na nasa Obando at Polo, Bulacan, na namana ko sa aking yumaong ama na si Calixto Austria, at
ang kalahati () ng ilang lagay na lupa na nasa Tinejeros, Malabon, Rizal, na aking namana sa yumao kong kapatid
na si Fausto Austria.

The tenor of the language used, the petitioners argue, gives rise to the inference that the late Basilia was deceived into believing
that she was legally bound to bequeath one-half of her entire estate to the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. as the latter's legitime.
The petitioners further contend that had the deceased known the adoption to be spurious, she would not have instituted the
respondents at all the basis of the institution being solely her belief that they were compulsory heirs. Proof therefore of the falsity
of the adoption would cause a nullity of the institution of heirs and the opening of the estate wide to intestacy. Did the lower court
then abuse its discretion or act in violation of the rights of the parties in barring the petitioners nephews and niece from registering
their claim even to properties adjudicated by the decedent in her will?

Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code, the following requisites must concur: First, the
cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear
from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.

The petitioners would have us imply, from the use of the terms, "sapilitang tagapagmana" (compulsory heirs) and "sapilitang mana"
(legitime), that the impelling reason or cause for the institution of the respondents was the testatrix's belief that under the law she
could not do otherwise. If this were indeed what prompted the testatrix in instituting the respondents, she did not make it known in
her will. Surely if she was aware that succession to the legitime takes place by operation of law, independent of her own wishes, she
would not have found it convenient to name her supposed compulsory heirs to their legitimes. Her express adoption of the rules on
legitimes should very well indicate her complete agreement with that statutory scheme. But even this, like the petitioners' own
proposition, is highly speculative of what was in the mind of the testatrix when she executed her will. One fact prevails, however,
and it is that the decedent's will does not state in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of heirs. We cannot
annul the same on the basis of guesswork or uncertain implications.

And even if we should accept the petitioners' theory that the decedent instituted the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. solely
because she believed that the law commanded her to do so, on the false assumption that her adoption of these respondents was
valid, still such institution must stand.

Article 850 of the Civil Code, quoted above, is a positive injunction to ignore whatever false cause the testator may have written in
his will for the institution of heirs. Such institution may be annulled only when one is satisfied, after an examination of the will, that
the testator clearly would not have made the institution if he had known the cause for it to be false. Now, would the late Basilia
have caused the revocation of the institution of heirs if she had known that she was mistaken in treating these heirs as her legally
adopted children? Or would she have instituted them nonetheless?

The decedent's will, which alone should provide the answer, is mute on this point or at best is vague and uncertain. The
phrases, "mga sapilitang tagapagmana" and "sapilitang mana," were borrowed from the language of the law on succession and
were used, respectively, to describe the class of heirs instituted and the abstract object of the inheritance. They offer no absolute
indication that the decedent would have willed her estate other than the way she did if she had known that she was not bound by
law to make allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of the free portion of her estate (libre disposicion) which largely favored the
respondent Perfecto Cruz, the latter's children, and the children of the respondent Benita Cruz, shows a perceptible inclination on
her part to give to the respondents more than what she thought the law enjoined her to give to them. Compare this with the
relatively small devise of land which the decedent had left for her blood relatives, including the petitioners Consuelo Austria-Benta
and Lauro Mozo and the children of the petitioner Ruben Austria. Were we to exclude the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. from the
inheritance, then the petitioners and the other nephews and nieces would succeed to the bulk of the testate by intestacy a result
which would subvert the clear wishes of the decedent.

Whatever doubts one entertains in his mind should be swept away by these explicit injunctions in the Civil Code: "The words of a will
are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the
expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." 1

Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to
dispose of practically his whole estate,2 as was done in this case. Moreover, so compelling is the principle that intestacy should be
avoided and the wishes of the testator allowed to prevail, that we could even vary the language of the will for the purpose of giving
it effect.3 A probate court has found, by final judgment, that the late Basilia Austria Vda. de Cruz was possessed of testamentary
capacity and her last will executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence. In this situation, it becomes our duty to
give full expression to her will.4

At all events, the legality of the adoption of the respondents by the testatrix can be assailed only in a separate action brought for
that purpose, and cannot be the subject of a collateral attack.5

Page 50 of 104
To the petitioners' charge that the lower court had no power to reverse its order of December 22, 1959, suffice it to state that, as
borne by the records, the subsequent orders complained of served merely to clarify the first an act which the court could legally
do. Every court has the inherent power to amend and control its processes and orders so as to make them conformable to law and
justices.6 That the court a quo has limited the extent of the petitioners' intervention is also within its powers as articulated by the
Rules of Court.7

ACCORDINGLY, the present petition is denied, at petitioners cost.

Page 51 of 104
G.R. No. L-23445 June 23, 1966

REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant,

vs.
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.

Wills; Succession; Probate of will; Courts area of inquiry is limited to extrinsic validity of will; When Court may rule on intrinsic
validity.In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the courts area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and resolution on, the
extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrixs testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites
or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has
been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon,
even before it is probated, the Court should meet that issue.

Same; Preterition; Omission of forced heirs in the will.Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but
she left forced heirs in the direct ascending lineher parents, and her holographic will does not explicitly disinherit them but simply
omits their names altogether, the case is one of preterition of the parents, not a case of ineffective disinheritance.

Same; Preterition distinguished from disinheritance.Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs
or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor
are expressly disinherited. (Neri vs. Akutin, 72 Phil., 325). Disinheritance, in turn, is a testamentary disposition depriving any
compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. (Justice J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, An Outline of
Philippine Civil Law, 1966 ed., Vol. III, p. 8, citing cases.) Disinheritance is always voluntary; preterition, upon the other hand, is
presumed to be involuntary (Snchez Romn, Estudios de Derecho Civil, 2nd edition, Volumen 2.o, p. 1131).

Same; Effects flowing from preterition and disinheritance.The effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of
disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the New Civil Code shall annul the institution of heir. This annulment is in toto,
unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance
under Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also annul the institution of heirs, but only insofar as it may
prejudice the person disinherited, which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition (III Tolentino, Civil Code of the
Philippines, 1961 Edition, p. 172). Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the
disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.

Same; When institution of heirs is void.Where the onesentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal heir and
preterits the parents of the testatrix, and it contains no specif ic legacies or bequests, such universal institution of petitioner, by
itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues.

Same; When legacies and devises merit consideration.Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they are so expressly
given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854 of the New Civil Code suggests that the mere institution of a universal heir in a will
void because of preteritionwould give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent. There must
be, in addition to such institution, a testamentary disposition granting him bequests or legacies apart and separate from the nullified
institution of heir.

Same; Institution of heirs cannot be considered a legacy.If every case of institution of heirs may be made to fall into the concept
of legacies and betterments reducing the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of Articles 814 and 851 of the old Civil Code,
regarding total or partial nullity of the institution, would be absolutely meaningless and will never have any application at all. And
the remaining provisions contained in said articles concerning the reduction of inofficious legacies or betterments would be a
surplusage because they would be absorbed by Article 817 of the same Code.

DECISION

SANCHEZ, J.:

Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single, without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate.
Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo,
Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.

On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by
Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate
and that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her.

On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and mother of the deceased Rosario
Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of petitioner
Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending
line were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is void.

Page 52 of 104
On August 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for probate and objection thereto, oppositors moved to dismiss on the
ground of absolute preterition.

On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to the motion to dismiss.1wph1.t

The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the
estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition without costs.

A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner came to this Court on appeal.

1. Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The case is for the probate of a will. The court's area of inquiry
is limited to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix's
testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be
presented, and to be acted upon, by the court. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on
the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein.1

A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the question of whether or not the will should be allowed
probate. For them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes only after the court has declared that
the will has been duly authenticated.2 But petitioner and oppositors, in the court below and here on appeal, travelled on the issue of
law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a nullity?

We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation
will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists
that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time,
effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet
head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. 3 After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for
solution.

2. Petitioner's sole assignment of error challenges the correctness of the conclusion below that the will is a complete nullity. This
exacts from us a study of the disputed will and the applicable statute.

Reproduced hereunder is the will:

Nov. 17, 1951

I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby give,
devise, and bequeath all of the property which I may have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing with
me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one.

(Sgd.) Illegible

T/ ROSARIO NUGUID

The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part, provides:

ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the
time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises
and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. ...

Except for inconsequential variation in terms, the foregoing is a reproduction of Article 814 of the Civil Code of Spain of 1889, which
is similarly herein copied, thus

Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the
will or born after the death of the testator, shall void the institution of heir; but the legacies and betterments4 shall be valid,
in so far as they are not inofficious. ...

A comprehensive understanding of the term preterition employed in the law becomes a necessity. On this point Manresa comments:

La pretericion consiste en omitar al heredero en el testamento. O no se le nombra siquiera o aun nombrandole como padre,
hijo, etc., no se le instituya heredero ni se le deshereda expresamente ni se le asigna parte alguna de los bienes, resultando
privado de un modo tacito de su derecho a legitima.

Para que exista pretericion, con arreglo al articulo 814, basta que en el testamento omita el testador a uno cualquiera de
aquellos a quienes por su muerte corresponda la herencia forzosa.

Page 53 of 104
 Se necesita, pues, a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso. b) Que la omision sea completa; que el heredero
forzoso nada reciba en el testamento.

It may now appear trite bat nonetheless helpful in giving us a clear perspective of the problem before us, to have on hand a clear-cut
definition of the word annul:

To "annul" means to abrogate, to make void ... In re Morrow's Estate, 54 A. 342, 343, 204 Pa. 484.6

The word "annul" as used in statute requiring court to annul alimony provisions of divorce decree upon wife's remarriage
means to reduce to nothing; to annihilate; obliterate; blot out; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish. N.J.S.A.
2:50 38 (now N.J.S. 2A:34-35). Madden vs. Madden, 40 A. 2d 611, 614, 136 N..J Eq. 132. 7

ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with. Ex
parte Mitchell, 123 W. Va. 283, 14 S.E. 2d. 771, 774.8

And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left
forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will completely
omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they
expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. Such preterition in the words of Manresa "anulara siempre la institucion de
heredero, dando caracter absoluto a este ordenamiento referring to the mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code.9 The one-
sentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein
provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate. Says Manresa:

En cuanto a la institucion de heredero, se anula. Lo que se anula deja de existir, en todo o en parte? No se aade limitacion
alguna, como en el articulo 851, en el que se expresa que se anulara la institucion de heredero en cuanto prejudique a la
legitima del deseheredado Debe, pues, entenderse que la anulacion es completa o total, y que este articulo como especial
en el caso que le motiva rige con preferencia al 817. 10

The same view is expressed by Sanchez Roman:

La consecuencia de la anulacion o nulidad de la institucion de heredero por pretericion de uno, varios o todos los forzosos
en linea recta, es la apertura de la sucesion intestada total o parcial. Sera total, cuando el testador que comete la
pretericion, hubiese dispuesto de todos los bienes por titulo universal de herencia en favor de los herederos instituidos,
cuya institucion se anula, porque asi lo exige la generalidad del precepto legal del art. 814, al determinar, como efecto de la
pretericion, el de que "anulara la institucion de heredero." ... 11

Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping the conclusion that the universal institution of
petitioner to the entire inheritance results in totally abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of such institution of universal heir
without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully
worded and in clear terms, Article 854 offers no leeway for inferential interpretation. Giving it an expansive meaning will tear up by
the roots the fabric of the statute. On this point, Sanchez Roman cites the "Memoria annual del Tribunal Supreme, correspondiente
a 1908", which in our opinion expresses the rule of interpretation, viz:

... El art. 814, que preceptua en tales casos de pretericion la nulidad de la institucion de heredero, no consiente
interpretacion alguna favorable a la persona instituida en el sentido antes expuesto aun cuando parezca, y en algun caso
pudiera ser, mas o menos equitativa, porque una nulidad no significa en Derecho sino la suposicion de que el hecho o el
acto no se ha realizado, debiendo por lo tanto procederse sobre tal base o supuesto, y consiguientemente, en un
testamento donde falte la institucion, es obligado llamar a los herederos forzosos en todo caso, como habria que llamar a
los de otra clase, cuando el testador no hubiese distribudo todos sus bienes en legados, siendo tanto mas obligada esta
consecuencia legal cuanto que, en materia de testamentos, sabido es, segun tiene declarado la jurisprudencia, con
repeticion, que no basta que sea conocida la voluntad de quien testa si esta voluntad no aparece en la forma y en las
condiciones que la ley ha exigido para que sea valido y eficaz, por lo que constituiria una interpretacion arbitraria, dentro
del derecho positivo, reputar como legatario a un heredero cuya institucion fuese anulada con pretexto de que esto se
acomodaba mejor a la voluntad del testador, pues aun cuando asi fuese, sera esto razon para modificar la ley, pero no
autoriza a una interpretacion contraria a sus terminos y a los principios que informan la testamentifaccion, pues no porque
parezca mejor una cosa en el terreno del Derecho constituyente, hay razon para convereste juicio en regla de
interpretacion, desvirtuando y anulando por este procedimiento lo que el legislador quiere establecer. 12

3. We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that, annullment notwithstanding, "the devises and legacies shall be
valid insofar as they are not inofficious". Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they are so expressly given as such in a
will. Nothing in Article 854 suggests that the mere institution of a universal heir in a will void because of preterition would give
the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent. There must be, in addition to such institution, a
testamentary disposition granting him bequests or legacies apart and separate from the nullified institution of heir. Sanchez Roman,
speaking of the two component parts of Article 814, now 854, states that preterition annuls the institution of the heir "totalmente
por la pretericion"; but added (in reference to legacies and bequests) "pero subsistiendo ... todas aquellas otras disposiciones que no

Page 54 of 104
se refieren a la institucion de heredero ... . 13 As Manresa puts it, annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire
inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtud de legado, mejora o donacion. 14

As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the institution of petitioner as universal heir. That institution, by
itself, is null and void. And, intestate succession ensues.

4. Petitioner's mainstay is that the present is "a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of preterition". 15From this,
petitioner draws the conclusion that Article 854 "does not apply to the case at bar". This argument fails to appreciate the distinction
between pretention and disinheritance.

Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not
mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited." 16 Disinheritance, in
turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. " 17 In
Manresa's own words: "La privacion expresa de la legitima constituye la desheredacion. La privacion tacita de la misma se
denomina pretericion." 18 Sanchez Roman emphasizes the distinction by stating that disinheritance "es siempre voluntaria";
preterition, upon the other hand, is presumed to be "involuntaria". 19 Express as disinheritance should be, the same must be
supported by a legal cause specified in the will itself. 20

The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their names altogether. Said will
rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition.

On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of disinheritance. Preterition under
Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, "shall annul the institution of heir". This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in
addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same
Code, such disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs", put only "insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited",
which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. 21 Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of
the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. Manresa's expressive language, in commenting on the rights
of the preterited heirs in the case of preterition on the one hand and legal disinheritance on the other, runs thus:
"Preteridos, adquiren el derecho a todo; desheredados, solo les corresponde un tercio o dos tercios, 22 el caso. 23

5. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are entitled to receive their legitimes, but that the institution
of heir "is not invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes. 24

This is best answered by a reference to the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Moran in the Neri case heretofore cited, viz:

But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in favor of the children by the second marriage should
be treated as legado and mejora and, accordingly, it must not be entirely annulled but merely reduced. This theory, if
adopted, will result in a complete abrogation of Articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code. If every case of institution of heirs
may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and betterments reducing the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of
Articles 814 and 851 regarding total or partial nullity of the institution, would. be absolutely meaningless and will never
have any application at all. And the remaining provisions contained in said article concerning the reduction of inofficious
legacies or betterments would be a surplusage because they would be absorbed by Article 817. Thus, instead of construing,
we would be destroying integral provisions of the Civil Code.

The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a failure to distinguish institution of heirs from legacies
and betterments, and a general from a special provision. With reference to article 814, which is the only provision material
to the disposition of this case, it must be observed that the institution of heirs is therein dealt with as a thing separate and
distinct from legacies or betterments. And they are separate and distinct not only because they are distinctly and separately
treated in said article but because they are in themselves different. Institution of heirs is a bequest by universal title of
property that is undetermined. Legacy refers to specific property bequeathed by a particular or special title. ... But again an
institution of heirs cannot be taken as a legacy. 25

The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete nullity". Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn merely
nullifies "the institution of heir". Considering, however, that the will before us solely provides for the institution of petitioner as
universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is null.

Upon the view we take of this case, the order of November 8, 1963 under review is hereby affirmed. No costs allowed. So ordered.

Page 55 of 104
G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987

CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Special Cases Division), VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON,
respondents.

Civil Law; Succession; Preterition, meaning of; Article 854 of the Civil Code not applicable to the surviving spouse; Adoption makes
the adopted the legal heir of the adopter.Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of
them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 450 [1966]; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA [1982]. Insofar as the widow is
concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a
compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted
from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil Code) However, the same thing cannot be said of the other
respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner (Memorandum for
the Petitioner, pp. 8-9). Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted
person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the
adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and
the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is
a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.

Same; Same; Same; Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and creates intestate succession but legacies and devises are valid
and respected insofar as they are not inofficious.Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to
intestate succession the entire inheritance including la portion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtual de legado, mejora o
donation (Manresa, as cited in Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA [1982]). The only provisions which
do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected, except in so far as
the legitimes are concerned.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Institution of petitioner and his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance totally abrogates the
will.The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in
totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirswithout any other testamentary disposition
in the willamounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 of the Civil
Code offers no leeway for inferential interpretation (Nuguid v. Nuguid), supra. No legacies nor devises having been provided in the
will the whole property of the deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters. The effect of
annulling the institution of heirs will be, necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy (Neri v. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185 [1943]) except that
proper legacies and devises must, as already stated above, be respected.

Same; Same; Probate of a will; Petitioner has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will of the deceased, hence
Special Proceeding No. 591-A-CEB must be dismissed.In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding
he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the
estate and an interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate
like a creditor (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369/1967). Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee
there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real property he is called upon
to receive (Article 782, Civil Code). At the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir, defined under Article 782 of
the Civil Code as a person called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by operation of law. However, intestacy having
resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of
the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased and Special Proceedings No. 591-A-
CEB must be dismissed.

Same; Same; Same; Rule that probate Courts authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, not inflexible and
absolute; Court may pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will under exceptional circumstances.Special Proceedings No. 591-CEB
is for the probate of a will. As stated by respondent Court, the general rule is that the probate courts authority is limited only to the
extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testators testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites
or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally come only after the Court has declared that the will has
been duly authenticated. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of
the provisions of the will (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449 [1966]; Sumilang v. Ramagosa, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114
SCRA 478 [1982]; Cayetano v. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 522 [1984]); and Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 206 [1985]). The
rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the
situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra). In Nuguid v.
Nuguid the oppositors to the probate moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preterition. The probate court acting on the
motion held that the will in question was a complete nullity and dismissed the petition without costs. On appeal the Supreme Court
upheld the decision of the probate court, induced by practical considerations.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Trial Court could have denied outright the probate of the will or have passed upon its intrinsic validity
where on its face it appears to be intrinsically void.For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed
the case to progress when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and his brothers and sisters were
instituted as universal heirs coupled with the obvious fact that one of the private respondents had been preterited would have been
an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have denied its
Page 56 of 104
probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the
will was resolved (Cayetano v. Leonidas, supra; Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra). The remedies of certiorari and prohibition were properly
availed of by private respondents.

Certiorari; Remedy of Certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal, exception.As a general rule certiorari cannot be a substitute
for appeal, except when the questioned order is an oppressive exercise of judicial authority (People v. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465
[1981]; Vda. de Caldito v. Segundo, 117 SCRA 573 [1982]; Co Chuan Seng v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 308 [1984]; and Bautista v.
Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587 [1985]). It is axiomatic that the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are not available where the
petitioner has the remedy of appeal or some other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law (D.D. Comendador
Construction Corporation v. Sayo (118 SCRA 590 [1982]). They are, however, proper remedies to correct a grave abuse of discretion
of the trial court in not dismissing a case where the dismissal is founded on valid grounds (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of Appeals, 125
SCRA 137 [1983]).

Same; Same; Certiorari may be entertained where appeal will not afford a speedy and adequate relief.Thus, this Court ruled
that where the grounds for dismissal are indubitable, the defendants had the right to resort to the more speedy, and adequate
remedies of certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, committed by the trial
court in not dismissing the case, (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of Appeals, supra) and even assuming the existence of the remedy of
appeal, the Court harkens to the rule that in the broader interests of justice, a petition for certiorari may be entertained, particularly
where appeal would not afford speedy and adequate relief.

DECISION

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of respondent. Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No. 05744 promulgated on
August 30, 1985 (Rollo, p. 108) ordering the dismissal of the petition in Special Proceedings No, 591 ACEB and its Resolution issued
on October 23, 1985 (Rollo, p. 72) denying respondents' (petitioners herein) motion for reconsideration.

The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and respondent Regional Trial Court of the Seventh Judicial Region,
Branch XIII (Cebu City), is hereby ordered to dismiss the petition in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB No special
pronouncement is made as to costs.

The antecedents of the case, based on the summary of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, (Rollo, pp. 108-109)
are as follows:

On May 29, 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch XIII, a petition for the probate of
the will of the late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters testamentary, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 591 ACEB (Rollo, p. 29), on the premise that Nemesio Acain died leaving a will in which petitioner and his brothers
Antonio, Flores and Jose and his sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs. The will allegedly executed by
Nemesio Acain on February 17, 1960 was written in Bisaya (Rollo, p. 27) with a translation in English (Rollo, p. 31) submi'tted by
petitioner without objection raised by private respondents. The will contained provisions on burial rites, payment of debts, and the
appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor of the testament. On the disposition of the testator's property,
the will provided:

THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our properties. house, lands and money which I earned jointly with
my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be given by me to my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN Filipino, widower, of legal age and
presently residing at 357-C Sanciangko Street, Cebu City. In case my brother Segundo Acain pre-deceased me, all
the money properties, lands, houses there in Bantayan and here in Cebu City which constitute my share shall be
given to me to his children, namely: Anita, Constantino, Concepcion, Quirina, laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose, all
surnamed Acain.

Obviously, Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it is the children of Segundo who are claiming to be heirs, with Constantino as the
petitioner in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB

After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court on June 25, 1984 the oppositors (respondents herein Virginia A. Fernandez,
a legally adopted daughter of tile deceased and the latter's widow Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain filed a motion to dismiss on the
following grounds for the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the
widow and the adopted daughter have been pretirited. (Rollo, p. 158). Said motion was denied by the trial judge.

After the denial of their subsequent motion for reconsideration in the lower court, respondents filed with the Supreme Court a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate
Court by Resolution of the Court dated March 11, 1985 (Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 3; Rollo, p. 159).

Page 57 of 104
Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents' petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition
for the probate of the will of Nemesio Acain in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this present petition for the review of respondent Court's
decision on December 18, 1985 (Rollo, p. 6). Respondents' Comment was filed on June 6, 1986 (Rollo, p. 146).

On August 11, 1986 the Court resolved to give due course to the petition (Rollo, p. 153). Respondents' Memorandum was filed on
September 22, 1986 (Rollo, p. 157); the Memorandum for petitioner was filed on September 29, 1986 (Rollo, p. 177).

Petitioner raises the following issues (Memorandum for petitioner, p. 4):

(A) The petition filed in AC-G.R. No. 05744 for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction is not the
proper remedy under the premises;

(B) The authority of the probate courts is limited only to inquiring into the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be
probated and it cannot pass upon the intrinsic validity thereof before it is admitted to probate;

(C) The will of Nemesio Acain is valid and must therefore, be admitted to probate. The preterition mentioned in
Article 854 of the New Civil Code refers to preterition of "compulsory heirs in the direct line," and does not apply
to private respondents who are not compulsory heirs in the direct line; their omission shall not annul the
institution of heirs;

(D) DICAT TESTATOR ET MERIT LEX. What the testator says will be the law;

(E) There may be nothing in Article 854 of the New Civil Code, that suggests that mere institution of a universal
heir in the will would give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance but there is a definite distinct intention
of the testator in the case at bar, explicitly expressed in his will. This is what matters and should be in violable.

(F) As an instituted heir, petitioner has the legal interest and standing to file the petition in Sp. Proc. No. 591 ACEB
for probate of the will of Nemesio Acain and

(G) Article 854 of the New Civil Code is a bill of attainder. It is therefore unconstitutional and ineffectual.

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not private respondents have been pretirited.

Article 854 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living
at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir;
but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not; inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall he effectual, without prejudice
to the right of representation.

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not
mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17
SCRA 450 [1966]; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]). Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil
Code may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even
if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in
the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil code) however, the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose
legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner (.Memorandum for the Petitioner, pp. 8-9). Under Article 39 of
P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he
were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she has
totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their
legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally
adopted child.

Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance including "la
porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtual de legado mejora o donacion" Maniesa as cited in Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra;
Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA [1982]). The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises
made in the will for they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.

The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally
abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs-without any other testamentary disposition in the
will-amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 of the Civil Code offers
no leeway for inferential interpretation (Nuguid v. Nuguid), supra. No legacies nor devises having been provided in the will the whole
Page 58 of 104
property of the deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters. The effect of annulling the
"Institution of heirs will be, necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy (Neri v. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185 [1943]) except that proper
legacies and devises must, as already stated above, be respected.

We now deal with another matter. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an
interest iii the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an
interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor
(Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369/1967). Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being no
mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real property he is called upon to receive
(Article 782, Civil Code). At the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir, defined under Article 782 of the Civil
Code as a person called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by operation of law. However, intestacy having resulted
from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the
testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased and Special Proceedings No. 591 A-CEB
must be dismissed.

As a general rule certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal, except when the questioned order is an oppressive exercise of j judicial
authority (People v. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465 [1981]; Vda. de Caldito v. Segundo, 117 SCRA 573 [1982]; Co Chuan Seng v. Court of
Appeals, 128 SCRA 308 [1984]; and Bautista v. Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587 [1985]). It is axiomatic that the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition are not available where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or some other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the course of law (DD Comendador Construction Corporation v. Sayo (118 SCRA 590 [1982]). They are, however, proper remedies to
correct a grave abuse of discretion of the trial court in not dismissing a case where the dismissal is founded on valid grounds (Vda. de
Bacang v. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 137 [1983]).

Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB is for the probate of a will. As stated by respondent Court, the general rule is that the probate
court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity
and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after
the Court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule
on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449 [1966]; Sumilang v. Ramagosa, supra;
Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]; Cayetano v. Leonides, 129 SCRA 522 [1984]; and Nepomuceno v. Court of
Appeals, 139 SCRA 206 [1985]).

The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what
the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra). In Nuguid v.
Nuguid the oppositors to the probate moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preteriton The probate court acting on the
motion held that the will in question was a complete nullity and dismissed the petition without costs. On appeal the Supreme Court
upheld the decision of the probate court, induced by practical considerations. The Court said:

We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the
contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if
the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of
the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the
practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of
the provisions of the will in question. After all there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.

In Saguimsim v. Lindayag (6 SCRA 874 [1962]) the motion to dismiss the petition by the surviving spouse was grounded on
petitioner's lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings which was fully substantiated by the evidence during the hearing held
in connection with said motion. The Court upheld the probate court's order of dismissal.

In Cayetano v. Leonides, supra one of the issues raised in the motion to dismiss the petition deals with the validity of the provisions
of the will. Respondent Judge allowed the probate of the will. The Court held that as on its face the will appeared to have preterited
the petitioner the respondent judge should have denied its probate outright. Where circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions be passed upon even before the extrinsic validity of the will is resolved, the probate court should meet the
issue. (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra; Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra).

In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in Sp. Proceedings No. 591 ACEB of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu on the following grounds: (1) petitioner has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal
heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited (Rollo, p. 158). It was denied by the trial court in an order
dated January 21, 1985 for the reason that "the grounds for the motion to dismiss are matters properly to be resolved after a
hearing on the issues in the course of the trial on the merits of the case (Rollo, p. 32). A subsequent motion for reconsideration was
denied by the trial court on February 15, 1985 (Rollo, p. 109).

For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when on its face the will appears
to be intrinsically void as petitioner and his brothers and sisters were instituted as universal heirs coupled with the obvious fact that
one of the private respondents had been preterited would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time,
effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic
validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved (Cayetano v. Leonides, supra; Nuquid v.
Nuguid, supra. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition were properly availed of by private respondents.
Page 59 of 104
Thus, this Court ruled that where the grounds for dismissal are indubitable, the defendants had the right to resort to the more
speedy, and adequate remedies of certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction,
committed by the trial court in not dismissing the case, (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of Appeals, supra) and even assuming the existence
of the remedy of appeal, the Court harkens to the rule that in the broader interests of justice, a petition for certiorari may be
entertained, particularly where appeal would not afford speedy and adequate relief. (Maninang Court of Appeals, supra).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the questioned decision of respondent Court of Appeals
promulgated on August 30, 1985 and its Resolution dated October 23, 1985 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Page 60 of 104
G.R. No. L-47799 May 21, 1943

Administration of the estate of Agripino Neri y Chavez. ELEUTERIO NERI, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
IGNACIA AKUTIN AND HER CHILDREN, respondents.

Descent and Distribution; Effect of Preterition.According to the findings of fact in this case, the testator left all his property by
universal title to the children by his second marriage, and that without expressly disinheriting the children by his first marriage, he
left nothing to them. Held: That this is a case of preterition govern by article 814 of the Civil Code, which provides that the institution
of heirs shall be annulled and intestate succession should be declared.

Id.; Id.; Respective Scope of Articles 814, 817, and 851 of the Civil Code.The folliwing example will make the question clearer: The
testator has two legistimate sons, A and B, and in his will he leaves all his property to A, with total preterition of B. Upon these facts,
shall the court annul entirely the institution of heir in favor of A and declare a total intestacy, or shall it merely refuse the bequest
left to A. giving him two-thirds, that is, one-third of free disposal and one-third of betterments, plus one-half of the other third as
strict legitime, and awarding B only the remaining one-half of the strict legitime? If the court does the first, it applies article 814; if
the second, it applies article 851 or 817. But article 851 applies only in case of unfounded disinheritance, and all are agreed that the
present case is not one of disinheritance but of preterition. Article 817 is merely a general rule inapplicable to specific cases
provided by law, such as that of pretertion or disinheritance.

Id.; Id.; Id.; Legacies and Betterments Should be Respected in so Far as They are not Inofficious or Excessive.The annulment of
the institution of heirs in cases of pretetion does not always carry with it the ineffictiveness of the whole will. Neither Manresa nor
Sanchez Roman northis court has ever said so. If, aside from the institution of heirs, there are in the will provisions leaving to the
heirs so instituted or to other persons some specific properties in the form of legacies or mejoras, such testamentary provisions
shall be effective and the legacies and mejoras shall be respected in so far as they are not inofficious or excessive, according to
article 814. in the instant case, however, no legacies or mejoras are provided in the will, the whole property of the deceased having
been left by universal title to the children of the second marriage. The effect, therefore, of annulling the institution of heirs will be
necessaroly the opening of a total intestacy.

Id.; Id.; Id.; Institution of heirs Distinguished from Legacies and Betterments.The theory is advaced that the bequest made by
universal title in favor of the children by the second marraige should be treated as legado and majora and, accordingly, it must not
be entirely annulled but merely reduced. This theory, if adopted, will result in a complete abrogation of article 814 and 851 of the
Civil Code. If every case of institution of heirs maybe made to fall into the concept of legacies and betterments reducing the bequest
accordingly, then the provisions of article 814 and 815 regarding total or partial nullity of the institution, would be absolutely
meaningless and will never have any application at all. And the remaining provisions contained in said article concerning the
reduction of inofficious legacies or betterments would be absorbed by article 817. This, instead of construing, this visions of the Civil
Code.

Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.The distructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a failure to distinguish institution of heirs from
legacies and betterments, and a general from a special provision. With reference to article 814, which is the only provition material
to the disposition of this case, it must be observed that the institution of heirs is therein dealt with as a thing separate and distinct
from legacies or betterment. And they are separate and distinct not only because they are distinctly and separately treated in said
article but beacuase they are in themselves different. Institution of heirs is a bequest by universal title of property that is
undetermined. Legacy refers to pacific property bequeathed by a particular or special title. The first is also different from a
betterment which whould be made expressly as such (article 828). The only instance of implied betterment recognized by law is
wher legacies are made which cannot be included in the free portion (article 828). But again an institution of heirs cannot be taken
as a legacy.

Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.It is clear, therefore, that article 814 referes to two different things which are the two different objects of it s two
different provisions. One of these objects cannot be made to merge in the other without mutilating the whole article with all its
multifarious connections with a great number of provisions spread throughout the Civil Code on the matter of succession. It should
be borne in mind, further, that althought article 814 contains two different provisions, its special purpose is to establich a specific
rule concerning a specific testamentary provision; namely, the institution of heirs in a case of preterition. Its other provision
regarding the validity of legacies and betterments if not inofficious is a mere reiteration of the general rule contained in order
provisions (article 815 and 817) and signifies merely that it also applies in case of preterition.

Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.; Statutory Construction.As regards testamentary dispositions in general, the general rule is that all "testamentary
dispositions which dimmish the legitime of the forced heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same in so far as they are inofficious
or excessive" (article 817). But this general rule does not apply to the specific instance of a testamentary disposition containing an
institution of heirs in a case of preterition, which is made the main and specific subject of article 814. In such instance, according to
article 814, the testamentary disposition containing the institution of heirs should be not only reduced but annulled in its entirely
and all the forced heirs, including the omitted ones, are entitled to inherit in accordance with the law of intestate succession. It is
thus evident that, if, in construing arcticle 814, the institution of heirs therein dealt with is to be treated as legacies or betterments,
the special object of said article would be destroyed, its specific purpose completely defeated, and in that wise the special rule
therein established would be rendered nugatory. And this is contrary to the most elementary rule of statutory construction. In
construing several provisions of a particular statute, such construction shall be adopted as will give effect to all, and when general
and particular provisions are consistent the latter shall over the former. (Act No. 190, secs. 287 and 288.)
Page 61 of 104
Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.; "Heredero" under the Civil Code and "Heir" under the Code of Civil Procedure.It is maintained that the word
"heredero" under the Civil Code, is not synonymous with the term "heir" under the Code of Civil Procedure, and that the "heir"
under the latter Code is no longer personally liable for the debts of the deceased as was the "heredero" under the Civil Code, should
his acceptance be pure and simple, and from all these the conclusion is drawn that the provisions of article 814 of the Civil Code
regarding the total nullity of the institution of heirs has become obsolete. This conclusion is erroneous. It confuses form with
substance. It must be observed, in this connection, that in construing and applying a provision of the Civil Code, such meaning of its
words and phrases as has been intended by the framers thereof shall be adopted. If thus construed it is inconsistent with the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, then it shall be deemed repealed; otherwise it is in force. Repeals by implication are not
favored by the court and when there are two acts upon the same subject, effect should be given to both if possible (Posadas vs.
National City Bank, 296 U. S., 497).

Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.The word "heir" as used in article 814 of the Civil Code may not have the meaning that it has under the Code
of Civil Procedure, but this in no wise can prevent a bequest from being made by univesal title as is in substance the subject matter
of article 814 of the Civil Code. Again, it may also be true that heirs under the Code of Civil Procedure may recieve the bequest only
after payment of debts left by the deceased and not before as under the Civil Code, but this may have a bearing only upon the
question as to when succession becomes effective and can in no way destroy the fact that succession may still be by universal or
special title. Since a bquest may still be made by universal title and with pretetion of forced heirs, its nullity as provided in article 814
still applies there being nothing inconsistent with it in the Code of Civil Procedure. What is imporatant and is the basis for its nullity
is the nature and effect of the bequest and not its possible name nor the moment of its effectiveness under the Code of Civil
Procedure.

DECISION

MORAN, J.:

This is a case where the testator in his will left all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage, the herein
respondents, with preterition of the children by his first marriage, the herein petitioner. This Court annulled the institution of heirs
and declared a total intestacy.

A motion for reconsideration has been filed by the respondents on the ground (1) that there is no preterition as to the children of
the first marriage who have received their shares in the property left by the testator, and (2) that, even assuming that there has
been a preterition, the effect would not be the annulment of the institution of heirs but simply the reduction of the bequest made to
them.

1. The findings of the trial court and those of the Court of Appeals are contrary to respondents' first contention. The children of the
first marriage are Eleuterio, Agripino, Agapita, Getulia (who died a little less than eight years before the death of her father Agripino
Neri, leaving seven children), Rosario and Celerina.

As to Eleuterio, the trial court said that "it is not, therefore, clear that Eleuterio has received his share out of the properties left by
his father." It is true that Eleuterio appears to have received, as a donation from his father, parcel of land No. 4, but the question of
whether there has been a donation or not is apparently left for decision in an independent action, and to that effect Ignacia Akutin
has been appointed special administratrix for the purpose of instituting such action.

With respect to Agripino and Agapita, the parcels of land which they have occupied, according to the trial Court, "are a part of public
land which had been occupied by Agripino Neri Chaves, and, therefore, were not a part of the estate of the latter."

Concerning Getulia who died about eight years before the death of her father Agripino Neri, the trial Court found that "neither
Getulia nor her heirs received any share of the properties."

And with respect to Rosario and Celerina, the trial Court said that "it does not appear clear, therefore, that Celerina and Rosario
received their shares in the estate left by their father Agripino Neri Chaves."

This is in connection with the property, real or personal, left by the deceased. As to money advances, the trial Court found:

It is contented, furthermore, that the children of Agripino Neri Chaves in his first marriage received money from their
father. It appears that Nemesio Chaves is indebted in the amount of P1,000; Agripino, in the amount of P500 as appears in
Exhibits 14 and 15; Getulia, in the amount of P155 as appears in Exhibit 16, 17, and 18; Celerina in the amount of P120 as
appears in Exhibit 19, 19-A and 19-B.

From these findings of the trial Court it is clear that Agapita, Rosario and the children of Getulia had received from the testator no
property whatsoever, personal, real or in cash.

But clause 8 of the will is invoked wherein the testator made the statement that the children by his first marriage had already
received their shares in his property excluding what he had given them as aid during their financial troubles and the money they had
borrowed from him which he condoned in the will. Since, however, this is an issue of fact tried by the Court of First Instance, and we
Page 62 of 104
are reviewing the decision of the Court of Appeals upon a question of law regarding that issue, we can rely only upon the findings of
fact made by the latter Court, which are as follows:

Since all the parcels that corresponded to Agripino Neri y Chaves are now in the administrator's possession, as appears in
the inventory filed in court, it is clear that the property of the deceased has remained intact and that no portion thereof has
been given to the children of the first marriage.

xxx xxx xxx

It is stated by the court and practically admitted by the appellants that a child of the first marriage named Getulia, or her
heirs after her death, did not receive any share of the property of her father.

It is true that in the decision of the Court of Appeals there is also the following paragraphs:

As regards that large parcel of land adjoining parcel No. 1, it is contended that after the court had denied the registration
thereof. Agripino Neri y Chaves abandoned the said land and that later on some of the children of the first marriage
possessed it, thereby acquiring title and interest therein by virtue of occupation and not through inheritance. It is not true
that this parcel containing 182.6373 hectares is now assessed in the names of some of the children of the first marriage, for
as shown on Tax Declaration No. 9395, Exhibit 11-g, the owners of the property are Agapita Neri de Chaves y Hermanos.
Apparently, the said land is still claimed to be the property not only of the children of the first marriage but also of those of
the second marriage.

This paragraph is but a corroboration of the finding made by the Court of Appeals that no property has ever been advanced by the
testator to the children by his first marriage. The large parcel of land adjoining parcel No. 1 was alleged by the children of the second
marriage to have been advanced by the testator to the children by his first marriage; but the Court of Appeals belied this claim. "It is
not true," says that Court, "that this parcel containing 182.6373 hectares is now assessed in the names of some of the children of the
first marriage, for as shown on Tax Declaration No. 9395, Exhibit 11-g, the owners of the property are Agapita Neri de Chaves y
Hermanos," that is, the children of both marriages. And the Court of Appeals added that "apparently, the said land is still claimed to
be the property not only of the children of the first marriage but also of those of the second marriage," which is another way of
stating that the property could not have been advanced by the testator to the children by the first marriage would not lay a claim on
it.

We conclude, therefore, that according to the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals, the testator left all his property by
universal title to the children by his second marriage, and that without expressly disinheriting the children by his first marriage, he
left all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage, he left nothing to them or, at least, some of them. This
is, accordingly, a case of preterition governed by article 814 of the Civil Code, which provides that the institution of heirs shall be
annulled and intestate succession should be declared open.

2. Upon the second question propounded in the motion for reconsideration, respondents seem to agree that article 814 of the Civil
Code is the law applicable but, in their discussion as to the effect of preterition, they confuse article 814 with articles 817 and 851
and other articles of the Civil Code. These three articles read:

ART. 814. The preterition of one or of all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether living at the execution of the will or
born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heirs; but the legacies and betterments shall be valid in so
far as they are not inofficious.

The preterition of the widower or widow does not annul the institution; but the person omitted shall retain all the rights
granted to him by articles 834, 835, 836, and 837 of this Code.

ART. 817. Testamentary dispositions which diminish the legitimate of the forced heirs shall be reduced on petition of the
same in so far as they are inofficious or excessive.

ART. 851. Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause, or for a cause the truth of which, if contested, is not
shown, or which is not one of those stated in the four following articles, shall annul the institution of heirs in so far as it is
prejudicial to the disinherited person; but the legacies, betterments, and other testamentary dispositions shall be valid in so
far as they are not prejudicial to said legitime.

The following example will make the question clearer: The testator has two legitimate sons, A and B, and in his will he leaves all his
property to A, with total preterition of B. Upon these facts, shall we annul entirely the institution of heir in favor of A and declare a
total intestacy, or shall we merely refuse the bequest left A, giving him two-thirds, that is one third of free disposal and one-third of
betterments, plus one-half of the other third as strict legitime, and awarding B only the remaining one-half of the strict legitime? If
we do the first, we apply article 814; if the second, we apply articles 851 or 817. But article 851 applies only in cases of unfounded
disinheritance, and all are agreed that the present case is not one of disinheritance but of preterition. Article 817 is merely a general
rule inapplicable to specific cases provided by law, such as that of preterition or disinheritance. The meaning of articles 814 and 851,
their difference and philosophy, and their relation to article 817, are lucidly explained by Manresa in the following manner:

Page 63 of 104
 Cuando la legitima no es usufructuria, como ocurre en los demas casos, la pretericion no puede menos de alterar
esencialmente la institucion de heredero. Esta ha de anularse, pero en todo o en parte, esto es, solo en cuanto perjudique
el derecho del legitimario preterido? El articulo 814 opta por la primer solucion, ya que hemos de atenermos estrictmente
al testo de la ley; mientras que el articulo 851, en casos anlogos, opta por la segunda.

En efecto; la desheredacion sin justa causa no produce el efecto de desheredar. El heredero conserva derecho a su
legitima, pero nada mas que a su legitima. Los legados, las merjoras, si las hay, y aun la institucion de heredero, son validas
en cuanto no perjudiquen al heredero forzoso.

La diferencia se notara perfectamente con un ejemplo. Un solteron, sin decendientes ni ascendientes legitimos, hace
testamento instituyendo por heredero a un pariente lejano. Despues reconoce un hijo natural, o se casa y tiene
descendencia, y muere sin modificar su disposicion testamentaria. A su muerte, el hijo natural, o los legitimos, fundadose
en la nulidad total de la institucion, con arreglo al articulo 814, piden toda la herencia. En el caso del articulo 851 solo
podrian podrian pedir su legitima. Preterdos, adquieren derecho a todo; desheredados, solo les corresponde un tercio o dos
tercios, segun el caso.

En el fondo la cuestion es indentica. El testador puede siempre disponer a su arbitrio de la parte libre. El legitimario, contra
la voluntad expresa del testdor, solo tiene derecho a su legitima. Preterido o desheredado sin justa causa la legitima.
Preterido o desheredado sin justa causa la legitma es suya. Desheredado o preterido, la porcion libre no le corresponde,
cuando el testador la asigna a otro. Logicamente no cabe que el legitmario, en caso de pretericion, reciba todos los bienes
cuando el testador haya dispuesto de ellos a titulo de herencia, y no cuando haya dispuesto del tercio lebre a titulo de
legado.

Cual es la razon de esta differencia? En la generalidad de los casos puede fundarse el precepto en la presunta voluntad del
testador. Este, al desheredar, revela que existe alguna razon a motivo que le impulsa a obrar asi; podra no ser bastante para
privar al heredero de su legitima, pero siempre ha de estimarse sufficiente para privarle del resto de la herencia, pues sobre
esta no puede pretender ningun derecho el desheredad. El heredero preterido no ha sido privado expresamente de nada;
el testador, en los casos normales, obra si por descuido o por error. Hemos visto un testamento en el que no se institula
heredera a una hija monja, por creer la testadora que no podia heredar. En otros caos se ignora la existencia de un
descendiente o de un ascendiente. Cuando el preterido es una persona que ha nacido despues de muerto el testador o
despues de hecho el testamento, la razon es aun mas clara; la omision ha de presumirse involuntaria; el testador debe
suponerse que hubiera instituido heredero a esa persona si hubiera existido al otorgarse el testamento, y no solo en cuanto
a la legitima, sino en toda la herencia, caso de no haber otros herederos forzosos, y en iguales terminos que los demas
herederos no mejorados de un mode expreso.

La opinion contraria puede tambien defederse, suponiendo que la ley anula el titulo de heredero, mas no en absoluto la
participacion en el caudal; que asi como al exceptuar la mejora se refiere a todo el tercio o a la parte de el que haya
distribuido el causante, al exceptuar los legados se refierse a la parte libre de que haya dispuesto el mismo testador,
considerando como un simple legatario de esa porcion a la persona a quien el testador designo como heredero. Abonaria
esta solucion el articulo 817, al declarar que las disposiciones testamentaria que menguan la legitima de los herederos
forzosos han de reducirse en cuanto fueren inoficiosas, pues amparado en este articulo el heredero voluntario, puede
pretender que la disposicion a su favor sea respetada en cuato no perjudique a las legitimas.

La jurisprudencia no ha resuelto de frente esta cuestion, porque no se le ha presentado en los terminos propuestos; pero
ha demonstrado su criterio.

Hemos citado las Resoluciones de la Direccion de 30 de octubre de 1896 y de 20 de mayo de 1893. En la primera se decide
con valentia, con arreglo al texto expreso del articulo 814; la institucion de heredero se anula en absoluto, y se abre para
toda la herencia la succesion intestada. En la segunda se rehuye la cuestion, fundandose en circunstancias secundarias. En
el articulo siguiente examinaremos la sentencia de 16 de enero de 1895.

La interpretacion que rectamente se deprende del art 814, es la de que solo valen, y eso en cuanto no sean inoficiosas, las
disposiciones hechas a titulo de legado a mejora. En cuanto a la institucion de heredero, se anula. Lo que se anula deja de
existir, en todo, o en parte? No se aade limitacion alguna, como en el articulo 851, en el que se expresa que se anulara a
institucion de heredero en cuanto perjudique a la legitima del desheredado. Debe, pues, entenderse que la anulacion es
completa o total, y que este articulo, como especial en el caso que le motiva, rige con preferencia al 817. (6 Manresa, 3.a
ed., pags. 351-353.) (Emphasis supplied).

The following opinion of Sanchez Roman is to the same effect and dispels all possible doubt on the matter:

La consecuencia de la anulacion o nulidad de la institucion de heredero por pretericion de uno, varios o todos los forzosos
en linea recta, es la apertura de la sucesion entestada, total o parcial. Sera total, cuando el testador que comete la
pretericion, hubiere dispuesto de todos los bienes por titulo universal de herencia en favor de los hrederos instituidos, cuya
institucion se anula, porque asi lo exige la generalidad del precepto legal del articulo 814, al determinar, como efecto de la
pretericion, el de que "anularia la institucion de heredero". Cierto es que la preericion esta intorducida, como remedio
juridico, por sus efectos, en nombre y para garantia de la intergridad de la legitima de los herederos forzosos y como

Page 64 of 104
 consecuencia del precepto del 813, de que "el testador no podra privar a los herederos de su legitima, sino en los casos
expresamente determinados por la ley", que son los de desheredacion con justa causa.

Cierto es, tambien, que en la desheredacion es muy otro el criterio del Codigo y que su formula legal, en cuanto a sus
efectos, es de alcance mas limitado, puesto que, conforme al articulo 851, la desheredacion hecha sin condiciones de
validez, "anulara la institucion de heredero", lo mismo que la pretericion, pero solo "en cuanto perjudique la desheredado
de modo ilegal e ineficaz; salvedad o limitacion de los efectos de nulidad de la institucion de los efectos de nulidad de la
institucion hecha en el testmento, que no existe, segun se ha visto en el 814, por el que se declara, en forma general e
indistinta, que anulara la institucion de heredero sin ninguna atencuacion respecto de que perjudique o no, total o
parcialmente, la cuantia de la legitima del heredero forzoso en linea recta, preterido.

El resultado de ambos criterios y formulas legales, manifestamente distintas, tiene que ser muy diverso. En el caso de la
pretericion, propiamente tal o total pues si fuera parcial y se la dejara algo al heredero forzoso por cualquier titulo,
aunque see algo no fuere suficiente al pago de sus derechos de legitima, no seria caso de pretericion, regulado por el
articulo 814, sino de complemento, regido por el 815 y la institucion no se anularia sino que se modificaria o disminuiria en
lo necesario para dicho complente o de institucion de heredero en toda la herencia, al anularse la institucion, por efecto
de la preterido o preteridos, respecto de toda la herencia, tambien; mientras qeu en el caso de desheredacion y de
institucion en la totalidad de la herencia, tambien; mientras que en el caso de desheredacion y de institucion en la totalidad
de la herencia a favor de otra persona, solo se anulara en parte precisa pra no perjudicar la legitima del deshersado, que
aun siendo en este caso la lata, si no hubo mejoras, porque no se establecieron o porque los intituidos eran herederos
voluntarios, dejaria subsistente la institucion en la poarte correspoondiente al tercio de libre disposicion. Asi es que los
preteridos, en el supuesto indicado, suceden abintestato en todo, en concurrencia conlos demas herederos forzosos o
llamados pro la ley al abintestato; los desheredados, unicamente en dos tercios o en uno o en uno tan solo, en la hipotesis
de haberse ordernado mejoras.

En cambio, ni por la desheredacion ni por la pretericion pierde su fuerza el testamento, en cuanto a dicho tercio libre, is se
trata dedescendientes; o la mitad, si se trata de ascendientes, ya desheredados, ya preteridos, proque, ni por el uno ni por
el otro medio, se anula mas que la institucion de heredero, en general, y totalmente por la pretericion, y solo en cuanto
perjudique a la legitima del desheredado por la desheredacion; pero subsistiendo, en ambos casos, todas acquellas otras
disposiciones que no se refeiren a la institucion de heredero y se hallen dentro del limite cuantitativo del tercio o mitad de
libre disposicion, segun que se trate de descendientes o ascendientes, preteridos o desheredados.

La invocacion del articulo 817 para modificar estos efectos de la pretericion, procurando limitar la anulacion de la
institucion de herederos solo en cuanto perjudique a la legitima, fundadose en que dicho articulo establece que "las
disposiciones testamentarias que menguan la legitma de los herederos forzosos se reduciran, a peticion de estos, en lo que
fueren inoficiosas o excesivas," no es aceptable ni puede variar acquellos resultados, porque es un precepto de caracter
general en toda otra clase de dsiposiciones testamentarias que produzcan el efecto de menguar la legitima, que no puede
anteponerse, en su aplicacion, a las de indole especial para sealar los efectos de la pretericion o de la desheredacion,
regulados privativa y respectivamente por los articulos 814 y 851.

No obstante la pretericion, "valdran las mandas y legados en cuanto no sean inoficiosas." El texto es terminante y no
necesita mayor explicacion, despues de lo dicho, que su propia letra, a no ser para observar que constituye una confimacion
indudable de los efectos de la pretericion, en cuanto alcanzan solo, pero totalmente, a la anulacion de la institucion de
heredero, pero no a la de las mandas y mejoras en cuanto no sean preteridos; calficativo de tales, como sinonimo legal
de excessivas, que en otros articulos, como el 817, establece la ley. (6 Sanchez Roman, Volumen 2.o pags. 1140-1141.)

These comments should be read with care if we are to avoid misunderstanding. Manresa, for instance, starts expounding the
meaning of the law with an illustration. He says that in case of preterition (article 814). the nullity of the institution of heirs is total,
whereas in case of disinheritance (article 851), the nullity is partial, that is, in so far as the institution affects the legitime of the
disinherited heirs. "Preteridos, adquieren derecho atodo; desheredados, solo les corresponde un tercio o dos tercios, segun el caso."
He then proceeds to comment upon the wisdom of the distinction made by law, giving two views thereon. He first lays the view
contrary to the distinction made by law, then the arguments in support of the distinction, and lastly a possible defense against said
arguments. And after stating that the Spanish jurisprudence has not as yet decided squarely the question, with an allusion] to two
resolutions of the Spanish Administrative Direction, one in favor of article 814 and another evasive, he concludes that the
construction which may rightly be given to article 814 is that in case of preterition, the institution of heirs is null in toto whereas in
case of disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the legitime of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.
He further makes it clear that in cases of preterition, the property bequeathed by universal titled to the instituted heirs should not
be merely reduced according to article 817, but instead, intestate succession should be opened in connection therewith under
article 814, the reason being that article 814, "como especial en el caso que le motiva, rige con preferencia al 817." Sanchez Roman
is of the same opinion when he said: "La invocacion del articulo 817 para modificar estos efectos de la pretecion, procurando limitar
la anulacion de la institucion de heredero solo en cuanto perjudque a la legitima, fundandose en que dicho articulo establece que
"las disposiciones testmentarias que menguan la legitima de los herederos forzosos se fueren inoficisosas o excesivas," no es
aceptable ni puede variar aquellos resultados, porque es un precepto de caracter general en toda otra clase de disposiciones
testmentarias que produzcan el efecto de menguar la legitima, que no puede anteponerse, en su aplicacion, a las de indole
especial para sealar los efectos de la pretericon o de la desheredacion, regulados privativa y respectivamente por los articulos 814 y
851.

Page 65 of 104
Of course, the annulment of the institution of heirs in cases of preterition does not always carry with it the ineffectiveness of the
whole will. Neither Manresa nor Sanchez Roman nor this Court has ever said so. If, aside from the institution of heirs, there are in
the will provisions leaving to the heirs so instituted or to other persons some specific properties in the form of legacies or mejoras,
such testamentary provisions shall be effective and the legacies and mejoras shall be respected in so far as they are not inofficious or
excessive, according to article 814. In the instant case, however, no legacies or mejoras are provided in the will, the whole property
of the deceased having been left by universal title to the children of the second marriage. The effect, therefore, of annulling the
institution of heirs will be necessarily the opening of a total intestacy.

But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal titled in favor of the children by the second marriage should be
treated as legado and mejora and, accordingly, it must not be entirely annulled but merely reduced. This theory, if adopted, will
result in a complete abrogation of articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code. If every case of institution of heirs may be made to fall into
the concept of legacies and betterments reducing the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of articles 814 and 851 regarding
total or partial nullity of the institution, would be absolutely meaningless and will never have any application at all. And the
remaining provisions contained in said article concerning the reduction of inofficious legacies or betterments would be a surplusage
because they would be absorbed by article 817. Thus, instead of construing, we would be destroying integral provisions of the Civil
Code.

The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a failure to distinguish institution of heirs from legacies and
betterments, and a general from a special provision. With reference to article 814, which is the only provision material to the
disposition of this case, it must be observed that the institution of heirs is therein dealt with as a thing of separate and distinct from
legacies or betterment. And they are separate and distinct not only because they are distinctly and separately treated in said article
but because they are in themselves different. Institution of heirs is a bequest by universal title of property that is undetermined.
Legacy refers to specific property bequeathed by a particular or special title. The first is also different from a betterment which
should be made expressly as such (article 828). The only instance of implied betterment recognized by law is where legacies are
made which cannot be included in the free portion (article 828). But again an institution of heirs cannot be taken as a legacy.

It is clear, therefore, that article 814 refers to two different things which are the two different objects of its two different provisions.
One of these objects cannot be made to merge in the other without mutilating the whole article with all its multifarious connections
with a great number of provisions spread throughout the Civil Code on the matter of succession. It should be borne in mind, further,
that although article 814 contains who different provisions, its special purpose is to establish a specific rule concerning a specific
testamentary provision, namely, the institution of heirs in a case of preterition. Its other provision regarding the validity of legacies
and betterments if not inofficious is a mere reiteration of the general rule contained in other provisions (articles 815 and 817) and
signifies merely that it also applies in cases of preterition. As regards testamentary dispositions in general, the general rule is that all
"testamentary disposition which diminish the legitime of the forced heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same in so far as they
are inofficous or excessive" (article 817). But this general rule does not apply to the specific instance of a testamentary disposition
containing an institution of heirs in a case of preterition, which is made the main and specific subject of article 814. In such instance,
according to article 814, the testamentary disposition containing the institution of heirs should be not only reduced but annulled in
its entirety and all the forced heirs, including the omitted ones, are entitled to inherit in accordance with the law of intestate
succession. It is thus evident that, if, in construing article 814, the institution of heirs therein dealt with is to be treated as legacies or
betterments, the special object of said article would be destroyed, its specific purpose completely defeated, and in that wise the
special rule therein established would be rendered nugatory. And this is contrary to the most elementary rule of statutory
construction. In construing several provisions of a particular statute, such construction shall be adopted as will give effect to all, and
when general and particular provisions are inconsistent, the latter shall prevail over the former. (Act No. 190, secs. 287 and 288.)

The question herein propounded has been squarely decided by the Supreme Court of Spain in a case wherein a bequest by universal
title was made with preterition of heirs and the theory was advanced that the instituted heirs should be treated as legatarios. The
Supreme Court of Spain said:

El articulo 814, que preceptua en tales casos de pretericion la nulidad de la institucion de heredero, no consiente
interpretacion alguna favorable a la persona instituida en el sentido antes expuesto, aun cuando parezca, y en algun caso
pudiera ser, mas o menos equitativa, porque una nulidad no significa en Derecho sino la suposicion de que el hecho o el
acto no se ha realizado, debiendo, por lo tanto, procederse sobre tal base o supuesto, y consiguientemente, en un
testmento donde fate la institucion, es obligado llamar a los herederos forzosos en todo caso, como habria que llamar a los
de otra clase, cuando el testador no hubiese distribuido todos sus bienes en legados, siendo tanto mas obligada esta
consecuencia legal cuanto que, en materia de testamentos, sabido es, segun tiene declarado la jurisprudencia, con
repeticion, que no basta que sea conocida la voluntad de quein testa si esta voluntad no aparece en la forma y en las
condiciones que la ley ha exigido para que sea valido y eficaz, por lo que constituiria una interpertacion arbitraria, dentro
del derecho positivo, reputar como legatario a un heredero cuya institucion fuese anulada con pretexto de que esto se
acomodaba mejor a la voluntad del testador, pues aun cuando asi fuese, sera esto razon para modificar la ley, peo que no
autoriza a una interpretacion contraria a sus terminos y a los principios que informan la testamnetificaion, pues no porque
parezca mejor una cosa en el terreno del Derecho constituyente, hay rason para convertir este juico en regla de
interpretacion, desvirtuando y anulando por este procedimiento lo que el legislator quiere establecer. (6 Sanchez Roman,
Volumen 2.o, p. 1138.)

It is maintained that the word "heredero" under the Civil Code, is not synonymous with the term "heir" under the Code of Civil
Procedure, and that the "heir" under the latter Code is no longer personally liable for the debts of the deceased as was the
"heredero" under the Civil Code, should his acceptance be pure and simple, and from all these the conclusion is drawn that the

Page 66 of 104
provisions of article 814 of the Civil Code regarding the total nullity of the institution of heirs has become obsolete. This conclusion is
erroneous. It confuses form with substance. It must be observed, in this connection, that in construing and applying a provision of
the Civil Code, such meaning of its words and phrases as has been intended by the framers thereof shall be adopted. If thus
construed it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, then it shall be deemed repealed; otherwise it is in
force. Repeals by implication are not favored by the courts and when there are two acts upon the same subject, effect should be
given to both if possible (Posadas vs. National City Bank, 296 U. S., 497). The word "heir" as used in article 814 of the Civil Code may
not have the meaning that it has under the Code of Civil Procedure, but this in no wise can prevent a bequest from being made by
universal title as is in substance the subject-matter of article 814 of the Civil Code. Again, it may also be true that heirs under the
Code of Civil Procedure may receive that bequest only after payment of debts left by the deceased and not before as under the Civil
Code, but this may have a bearing only upon the question as to when succession becomes effective and can in no way destroy the
fact that succession may still be by universal or special title. Since a bequest may still be made by universal title and with preterition
of forced heirs, its nullity as provided in article 814 still applies there being nothing inconsistent with it in the Code of Civil
Procedure. What is important and is the basis for its nullity is the nature and effect of the bequest and not its possible name nor the
moment of its effectiveness under the Code of Civil Procedure.

Furthermore, there were in the Code of Civil Procedure sections Nos. 755 and 756 which read:

SEC. 755. Share of child born after making will. When a child of a testator is born after the making of a will, and no
provision is therein made for him, such child shall have the same share in the estate of the testator as if he had died
intestate; and share of such child shall be assigned to him as in cases of intestate estates, unless it is apparent from the will
that it was the intention of the testator that no provision should be made for such child.

SEC. 756. Share of child or issue of child omitted from will. When a testator omits to provide in his will for any of his
children, or for issue of a deceased child, and it appears that such omission was made by mistake, or accident, such child, or
the issue of such child, shall have the same share in the estate of the testator as if he had died intestate, to be assigned to
him as in the case of intestate estates.

It is these provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure that have affected substantially articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code, but they
have been expressly repealed by Act No. 2141, section 1 of which read as follows:

Sections seven hundred and fifty-five, seven hundred and fifty-six, seven hundred and fifty-seven, seven hundred and fifty-
eight, and seven hundred and sixty of Act Numbered One hundred and ninety, entitled `An Act providing a Code of
Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands are hereby repealed and such provisions of the
Civil Code as may have been amended or repealed by said sections are hereby restored to full force and effects. (Emphasis
ours.)

Among the provisions of the Civil Code which are thus expressly restored to full force are undoubtedly articles 814 and 851. There
can be no possible doubt, therefore, that those two articles are in force.

Article 1080 of the Civil Code that is also invoked deserves no consideration except for the observation that it has no relevancy in the
instant case.

Our attention is directed to the case of Escuin vs. Escuin (11 Phil., 332). We have never lost sight of the ruling laid down in that case
which has been reiterated in Eleazar vs. Eleazar (37 Off. Gaz., p. 1782). In the Escuin case, the deceased left all his property to his
natural father (not a forced heir) and his wife with total preterition of his father and wife. Without reconsidering the correctness of
the ruling laid down in these two cases, we will note that the doctrine stands on facts which are different from the facts in the
present case. There is certainly a difference between a case of preterition in which the whole property is left to a mere friend and a
case of preterition in which the whole property is left to one or some forced heirs. If the testamentary disposition be annulled totally
in the first case, the effect would be a total deprivation of the friend of his share in the inheritance. And this is contrary to the
manifest intention of the testator. It may fairly be presumed that, under such circumstances, the testator would at leave give his
friend the portion of free disposal. In the second case, the total nullity of the testamentary disposition would have the effect, not of
depriving totally the instituted heir of his share in the inheritance, but of placing him and the other forced heirs upon the basis of
equality. This is also in consonance with the presumptive intention of the testator. Preterition, generally speaking, is due merely to
mistake or inadvertence without which the testator may be presumed to treat alike all his children.

And specially is this true in the instant case where the testator omitted the children by his first marriage upon the erroneous belief
that he had given them already more shares in his property than those given to the children by his second marriage. It was,
therefore, the thought of the testator that the children by his first marriage should not receive less than the children by his second
marriage, and to that effect is the decision of this Court sought to be reconsidered. Motion for reconsideration is hereby denied.

Page 67 of 104
G.R. No. 137287 February 15, 2000

REBECCA VIADO NON, JOSE A. NON and DELIA VIADO, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALICIA N. VIADO, CHERRI VIADO and FE FIDES VIADO,respondents.

Succession; Partition; Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees would be a partition
although it would purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, a donation or an extrajudicial settlement.When Virginia P.
Viado died intestate in 1982, her part of the conjugal property, the Isarog property in question included, was transmitted to her
heirsher husband Julian and their children Nilo Viado, Rebecca Viado, Leah Viado and Delia Viado. The inheritance, which vested
from the moment of death of the decedent, remained under a co-ownership regime among the heirs until partition. Every act
intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees would be a partition although it would purport to be a
sale, an exchange, a compromise, a donation or an extrajudicial settlement.

Same; Same; The fact alone that two deeds were registered five years after the date of their execution does not adversely affect
their validity nor would such circumstance alone be indicative of fraud.The fact alone that the two deeds were registered five
years after the date of their execution did not adversely affect their validity nor would such circumstance alone be indicative of
fraud. The registration of the documents was a ministerial act and merely created a constructive notice of its contents against all
third persons. Among the parties, the instruments remained completely valid and binding.

Same; Same; Preterition; Where the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the
preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her.The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a
retardate, from the deed of extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This kind of preterition, however, in the
absence of proof of fraud and bad faith, does not justify a collateral attack on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 373646. The relief, as
so correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, instead rests on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that where the
preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value
of the share pertaining to her. Again, the appellate court has thus acted properly in ordering the remand of the case for further
proceedings to make the proper valuation of the Isarog property and ascertainment of the amount due petitioner Delia Viado.

DECISION

VITUG, J.:

Petitioners, in their petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seek a reversal of the 29th May 1996
decision of the Court of Appeals, basically affirming that rendered on 30 April 1991 by the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Queron
City, Branch 23, adjudicating the property subject matter of the litigation to respondents. The case and the factual settings found by
the Court of Appeals do not appear to deviate significantly from that made by the trial court.

During their lifetime, the spouses Julian C. Viado and Virginia P. Viado owned several pieces of property, among them a house and
lot located at 147 Isarog Street, La Loma, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42682. Virginia P. Viado died on 20
October 1982. Julian C. Viado died three years later on 15 November 1985. Surviving them were their children Nilo Viado, Leah
Viado Jacobs, and herein petitioners Rebecca Viado, married to Jose Non, and Delia Viado. Nilo Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs both
died on 22 April 1987. Nilo Viado left behind as his own sole heirs herein respondents his wife Alicia Viado and their two children
Cherri Viado and Fe Fides Viado.

Petitioners and respondents shared, since 1977, a common residence at the Isarog property. Soon, however, tension would appear
to have escalated between petitioner Rebecca Viado and respondent Alicia Viado after the former had asked that the property be
equally divided between the two families to make room for the growing children. Respondents, forthwith, claimed absolute
ownership over the entire property and demanded that petitioners vacate the portion occupied by the latter. On 01 February 1988,
petitioners, asserting co-ownership over the property in question, filed a case for partition before the Quezon City RTC (Branch
93).1wphi1.nt

Respondents predicated their claim of absolute ownership over the subject property on two documents a deed of donation
executed by the late Julian Viado covering his one-half conjugal share of the Isarog property in favor of Nilo Viado and a deed of
extrajudicial settlement in which Julian Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs (through a power of attorney in favor of Nilo Viado) and petitioner
Rebecca Viado waived in favor of Nilo Viado their rights and interests over their share of the property inherited from Virginia Viado.
Both instruments were executed on 26 August 1983 and registered on 07 January 1988 by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 42682 was cancelled and new Transfer Certificate of Title No. 373646 was issued to the heirs of Nilo Viado.

Petitioners, in their action for partition, attacked the validity of the foregoing instruments, contending that the late Nilo Viado
employed forgery and undue influence to coerce Julian Viado to execute the deed of donation. Petitioner Rebecca Viado, in her
particular case, averred that her brother Nilo Viado employed fraud to procure her signature to the deed of extrajudicial settlement.
She added that the exclusion of her retardate sister, Delia Viado, in the extrajudicial settlement, resulted in the latter's preterition
that should warrant its annulment. Finally, petitioners asseverated that the assailed instruments, although executed on 23 August
1983, were registered only five years later, on 07 January 1988, when the three parties thereto, namely, Julian Viado, Nilo Viado and
Leah Viado Jacobs had already died.

Page 68 of 104
Assessing the evidence before it, the trial court found for respondents and adjudged Alicia Viado and her children as being the true
owners of the disputed property.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification by ordering the remand of the records of
the case to the court a quo for further proceedings to determine the value of the property and the amount respondents should pay
to petitioner Delia Viado for having been preterited in the deed of extrajudicial settlement.

Petitioners are now before the Supreme Court to seek the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The appellate court ruled correctly.

When Virginia P. Viado died intestate in 1982, her part of the conjugal property, the Isarog property in question included, was
transmitted to her heirs her husband Julian and their children Nilo Viado, Rebecca Viado, Leah Viado and Delia Viado. The
inheritance, which vested from the moment of death of the decedent,1 remained under a co-ownership regime2 among the heirs
until partition.3 Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees would be a partition although
it would purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, a donation or an extrajudicial settlement.4

In debunking the continued existence of a co-ownership among the parties hereto, respondents rely on the deed of donation and
deed of extrajudicial settlement which consolidated the title solely to Nilo Viado. Petitioners assail the due execution of the
documents on the grounds heretofore expressed.

Unfortunately for petitioners, the issues they have raised boil down to the appreciation of the evidence, a matter that has been
resolved by both the trial court and the appellate court. The Court of Appeals, in sustaining the court a quo, has found the evidence
submitted by petitioners to be utterly wanting, consisting of, by and large, self-serving testimonies. While asserting that Nilo Viado
employed fraud, forgery and undue influence in procuring the signatures of the parties to the deeds of donation and of extrajudicial
settlement, petitioners are vague, however, on how and in what manner those supposed vices occurred. Neither have petitioners
shown proof why Julian Viado should be held incapable of exercising sufficient judgment in ceding his rights and interest over the
property to Nilo Viado. The asseveration of petitioner Rebecca Viado that she has signed the deed of extrajudicial settlement on the
mistaken belief that the instrument merely pertained to the administration of the property is too tenuous to accept. It is also quite
difficult to believe that Rebecca Viado, a teacher by profession, could have misunderstood the tenor of the assailed document.

The fact alone that the two deeds were registered five years after the date of their execution did not adversely affect their validity
nor would such circumstance alone be indicative of fraud. The registration of the documents was a ministerial act5 and merely
created a constructive notice of its contents against all third persons.6 Among the parties, the instruments remained completely
valid and binding.

The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from the deed of extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect
of preterition. This kind of preterition, however, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith, does not justify a collateral attack on
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 373646. The relief, as so correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, instead rests on Article 1104
of the Civil Code to the effect that where the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded
but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her. Again, the appellate court has thus acted properly in
ordering the remand of the case for further proceedings to make the proper valuation of the isarog property and ascertainment of
the amount due petitioner Delia Viado.1wphi1.nt

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the decision, dated 29 May 1996, in CA-G.R. No. 37272 of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. No special pronouncement on costs.

SO ORDERED.

Page 69 of 104
G.R. No. L-31703 February 13, 1930

CARMEN G. DE PEREZ, trustee of the estate of Ana Maria Alcantara, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIANO GARCHITORENA, and JOSE CASIMIRO, Sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Manila,defendants-appellants.

WILLS; INSTITUTION OF HEIRS; FIDEICOMMISSARY HEIR.The institution of heirs made in the will in question is in the nature of a
fideicommissum: there is an heiress primarily called to enjoy the estate; an obligation clearly imposed upon her to preserve and
transmit the whole of the estate to certain third persons; and there are secondary heirs.

ID.; ID.; ID.; DISTINCTION BETWEEN FIDEICOMMISSUM AND TRUST.The heir instituted, or fideicommissioner, as article 783 of the
Civil Code has it, is entitled to the enjoyment of the estate. The fideicommissum thus arising from a fideicommissary substitution,
which is of Roman origin, is not exactly equivalent to, and should not be confused with, the English "trust."

DECISION

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

The amount of P21,428.58 is on deposit in the plaintiff's name with the association known as La Urbana in Manila, as the final
payment of the liquidated credit of Ana Maria Alcantara, deceased, whose heiress is said plaintiff, against Andres Garchitorena, also
deceased, represented by his son, the defendant Mariano Garchitorena.

And as said Mariano Garchitorena held a judgment for P7,872.23 against Joaquin Perez Alcantara, husband of the plaintiff, Carmen
G. de Perez, the sheriff pursuant to the writ of execution issued in said judgment, levied an attachment on said amount deposited
with La Urbana.

The plaintiff, alleging that said deposit belongs to the fideicommissary heirs of the decedent Ana Maria Alcantara, secured a
preliminary injunction restraining the execution of said judgment on the sum so attached. The defendants contend that the plaintiff
is the decedent's universal heiress, and pray for the dissolution of the injunction.

The court below held that said La Urbana deposit belongs to the plaintiff's children as fideicommissary heirs of Ana Maria Alcantara,
and granted a final writ of injunction.

The defendants insist in their contentions, and, in their appeal from the decision of the trial court, assign the following errors:

1. The lower court erred in holding that a trust was created by the will of Doa Ana Maria Alcantara.

2. The lower court erred in concluding and declaring that the amount of P21,428.58 deposited with La Urbana is the
property of the children of the plaintiff as "herederos fidei-comisarios."

3. The lower court erred in making the injunction permanent and condemning defendant to pay the costs.

The question here raised is confined to the scope and meaning of the institution of heirs made in the will of the late Ana Maria
Alcantara already admitted to probate, and whose legal force and effect is not in dispute.

The clauses of said will relevant to the points in dispute, between the parties are the ninth, tenth, and eleventh, quoted below:

Ninth. Being single and without any forced heir, to show my gratitude to my niece-in-law, Carmen Garchitorena, of age,
married to my nephew, Joaquin Perez Alcantara, and living in this same house with me, I institute her as my sole and
universal heiress to the remainder of my estate after the payment of my debts and legacies, so that upon my death and
after probate of this will, and after the report of the committee on claims and appraisal has been rendered and approved,
she will receive from my executrix and properties composing my hereditary estate, that she may enjoy them with God's
blessing and my own.

Tenth. Should my heiress Carmen Garchitorena die, I order that my whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her surviving
children; and should any of these die, his share shall serve to increase the portions of his surviving brothers (and sisters) by
accretion, in such wise that my estate shall never pass out of the hands of my heiress or her children in so far as it is legally
possible.

Eleventh. Should my aforesaid heiress, Carmen Garchitorena, die after me while her children are still in their minority, I
order that my estate be administered by my executrix, Mrs. Josefa Laplana, and in her default, by Attorney Ramon Salinas
and in his default, by his son Ramon Salinas; but the direction herein given must not be considered as an indication of lack
of confidence in my nephew Joaquin Perez Alcantara, whom I relieve from the duties of administering my estate, because I
recognize that his character is not adapted to management and administration.

Page 70 of 104
The appellants contend that in these clauses the testatrix has ordered a simple substitution, while the appellee contends that it is a
fideicommissary substitution.

This will certainly provides for a substitution of heirs, and of the three cases that might give rise to a simple substitution (art. 774,
Civil Code), only the death of the instituted heiress before the testatrix would in the instant case give place to such substitution,
inasmuch as nothing is said of the waiver of inheritance, or incapacity to accept it. As a matter of fact, however, clause XI provides
for the administration of the estate in case the heiress instituted should die after the testatrix and while the substitute heirs are still
under age. And it is evident that, considering the nature of simple substitution by the heir's death before the testator, and the fact
that by clause XI in connection with clause X, the substitution is ordered where the heiress instituted dies after the testatrix, this
cannot be a case of simple substitution.

The existence of a substitution in the will is not and cannot be denied, and since it cannot be a simple substitution in the light of the
considerations above stated, let us now see whether the instants case is a fideicommissary substitution.

In clause IX, the testatrix institutes the plaintiff herein her sole and universal heiress, and provides that upon her death (the
testatrix's) and after probate of the will and approval of the report of the committee on claims and appraisal, said heiress shall
receive and enjoy the whole hereditary estate. Although this clause provides nothing explicit about substitution, it does not contain
anything in conflict with the idea of fideicommissary substitution. The fact that the plaintiff was instituted the sole and universal
heiress does not prevent her children from receiving, upon her death and in conformity with the express desire of the testatrix, the
latter's hereditary estate, as provided in the following (above quoted) clauses which cannot be disregarded if we are to give a
correct interpretation of the will. The word sole does not necessarily exclude the idea of substitute heirs; and taking these three
clauses together, such word means that the plaintiff is the sole heiress instituted in the first instance.

The disposition contained in clause IX, that said heiress shall receive and enjoy the estate, is not incompatible with a fideicommissary
substitution (it certainly is incompatible with the idea of simple substitution, where the heiress instituted does not receive the
inheritance). In fact the enjoyment of the inheritance is in conformity with the idea of fideicommissary substitution, by virtue of
which the heir instituted receives the inheritance and enjoys it, although at the same time he preserves it in order to pass it on the
second heir. On this point the illustrious Manresa, in his Civil Code (Vol. 6, pp. 142 and 143, 5th ed.), says:

Or, what amounts to the same thing, the fideicommissary substitution, as held in the Resolution of June 25, 1895, February
10, 1899, and July 19, 1909, requires three things:

1. A first heir called primarily to the enjoyment of the estate.

2. An obligation clearly imposed upon him to preserve and transmit to a third person the whole or a part of the estate.

3. A second heir.

To these requisites, the decision of November 18, 1918 adds another, namely that the fideicommissarius be entitled to the
estate from the time the testator dies, since he is to inherit from the latter and not from the fiduciary. (Emphasis ours.)

It appears from this quotation that the heir instituted or the fiduciary, as referred to in articles 783 of the Civil Code, is entitled to
enjoy the inheritance. And it might here be observed, as a timely remark, that the fideicommissum arising from a fideicommissary
substitution, which is of Roman origin, is not exactly equivalent to, nor may it be confused with, the English "trust."

It should also be noted that said clause IX vests in the heiress only the right to enjoy but not the right to dispose of the estate. It
says, she may enjoy it, but does not say she may dispose of it. This is an indication of the usufruct inherent in fideicommissary
substitution.

Clause X expressly provides for the substitution. It is true that it does not say whether the death of the heiress herein referred to is
before or after that of the testatrix; but from the whole context it appears that in making the provisions contained in this clause X,
the testatrix had in mind a fideicommissary substitution, since she limits the transmission of her estate to the children of the heiress
by this provision, "in such wise that my estate shall never pass out of the hands of my heiress or her children in so far as it is legally
possible." Here it clearly appears that the testatrix tried to avoid the possibility that the substitution might later be legally declared
null for transcending the limits fixed by article 781 of the Civil Code which prescribed that fideicommissary substitutions shall be
valid "provided they do not go beyond the second degree."

Another clear and outstanding indication of fideicommissary substitution in clause X is the provision that the whole estate shall pass
unimpaired to the heiress's children, that is to say the heiress is required to preserve the whole estate, without diminution, in order
to pass it on in due time to the fideicommissary heirs. This provision complies with another of the requisites of fideicommissary
substitution according to our quotation from Manresa inserted above.

Lastly, clause XI more clearly indicates the idea of fideicommissary substitution, when a provision is therein made in the event the
heiress should die after the testatrix. That is, said clause anticipates the case where the instituted heiress should die after the
testatrix and after receiving and enjoying the inheritance.

Page 71 of 104
The foregoing leads us to the conclusion that all the requisites of a fideicommissary substitution, according to the quotation from
Manresa above inserted, are present in the case of substitution now under consideration, to wit:

1. At first heir primarily called to the enjoyment of the estate. In this case the plaintiff was instituted an heiress, called to
the enjoyment of the estate, according to clause IX of the will.

2. An obligation clearly imposed upon the heir to preserve and transmit to a third person the whole or a part of the estate.
Such an obligation is imposed in clause X which provides that the "whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her (heiress's)
surviving children;" thus, instead of leaving the heiress at liberty to dispose of the estate by will, or of leaving the law to
take its course in case she dies intestate, said clause not only disposes of the estate in favor of the heiress instituted, but
also provides for the disposition thereof in case she should die after the testatrix.

3. A second heir. Such are the children of the heiress instituted, who are referred to as such second heirs both in clause X
and in clause XI.

Finally, the requisite added by the decision of November 18, 1918, to wit, that the fideicommissarius or second heir should be
entitled to the estate from the time of the testator's death, which in the instant case, is, rather than a requisite, a necessary
consequence derived from the nature of the fideicommissary substitution, in which the second heir does not inherit from the heir
first instituted, but from the testator.

By virtue of this consequence, the inheritance in question does not belong to the heiress instituted, the plaintiff herein, as her
absolute property, but to her children, from the moment of the death of the testatrix, Ana Maria Alcantara.

Therefore, said inheritance, of which the amount referred to at the beginning, which is on deposit with the association known as La
Urbana in the plaintiff's name, is a part, does not belong to her nor can it be subject to the execution of the judgment against
Joaquin Perez, who is not one of the fideicommissary heirs.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant, Mariano Garchitorena. So ordered.

Page 72 of 104
G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS, Administratrix, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors- appellants.

Testate Succession, The testator cannot impose any lien, substitution, or condition on his widows legitime.The appellants do
not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-half of the estate in full ownership. They adroit that the testators dispositions
impaired his widows legitime. Indeed, under Art. 900 of the Civil Code If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall
be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate. And since Marcelle alone survived the deceased, she is entitled to one-half of his
estate over which he could impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever. (Art. 904, par. 2, Civil
Code.)

Same; The proposed creation by the administratrix in favor of the testators widow of a usufruct over 113 of the free portion of
the testators estate cannot be made where it will run counter to testators express will.It is the one-third usufruct over the free
portion which the appellants question and justifiably so. It appears that the court a quo approved the usufruct in favor of Marcelle
because the testament provides for a usufruct in her favor of one-third of the estate. The court a quo erred for Marcelle who is
entitled to one-half of the estate en pleno dominio as her legitime and which is more than what she is given under the will is not
entitled to have any additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter to the testators
intention for as stated above his dispositions even impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.

Same; A vulgar substitution of heirs is valid even if the heir designated survives the testator inasmuch us vulgar substitution can
take place also by refusal or incapacity to inherit of the first heir.They allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect is void
because Wanda survived the testator or stated differently because she did not predecease the testator. But dying before the
testator is not the only case for vulgar substitution for it also includes refusal or incapacity to accept the inheritance as provided in
Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra. Hence, the vulgar substitution is valid.

Same; A fideicommissary substitution is void if first heir is not related in the 1st degree to the second heir.As regards the
substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants are correct in their claim that it is void for the following reasons: The
substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art 863 of the Civil
Code validates a fideicommissary substitution provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally
instituted.

Same; Constitutional Law; The Constitutional provision which allows aliens to acquire lands by succession does not apply to
testamentary succession.We are of the opinion that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands
does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would be
able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land.

Same; Same; An alien may be bestowed usufructuary rights over a parcel of land in the Philippines.We uphold the usufruct in
favor of Wanda because a usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title
to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.

DECISION

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

The main issue in this appeal is the manner of partitioning the testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez among the principal
beneficiaries, namely: his widow Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez; his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his
companion Wanda de Wrobleski.

The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris, while the companion Wanda is an Austrian
who lives in Spain. Moreover, the testator provided for substitutions.

Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was
admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed
administratrix of the estate. In due time she submitted an inventory of the estate as follows:

INVENTARIO

Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de un te

rreno, con sus mejoras y edificaciones, situadoen

la Escolta, Manila............................................................. P500,000.00

Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de dos

Page 73 of 104
 parcelas de terreno situadas en Antipolo, Rizal................... 658.34

Cuatrocientos noventa y uno (491) acciones

de la 'Central Azucarera de la Carlota a P17.00

por accion ................................................................................8,347.00

Diez mil ochocientos seize (10,806) acciones

de la 'Central Luzon Milling Co.', disuelta y en

liquidacion a P0.15 por accion ..............................................1,620.90

Cuenta de Ahorros en el Philippine Trust

Co.............................................................................................. 2,350.73

TOTAL.............................................................. P512,976.97

MENOS:

Deuda al Banco de las Islas Filipinas, garan-

tizada con prenda de las acciones de La Carlota ......... P 5,000,00

VALOR LIQUIDO........................................... P507,976.97

The testamentary dispositions are as follows:

A.En nuda propiedad, a D. Roberto y D. Jorge Ramirez, ambas menores de edad, residentes en Manila, I.F., calle
'Alright, No. 1818, Malate, hijos de su sobrino D. Jose Ma. Ramirez, con sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus
respectivos descendientes, y, en su defecto, con sustitucion vulgar reciprocal entre ambos.

El precedente legado en nuda propiedad de la participacion indivisa de la finca Santa Cruz Building, lo ordena el
testador a favor de los legatarios nombrados, en atencion a que dicha propiedad fue creacion del querido padre
del otorgante y por ser aquellos continuadores del apellido Ramirez,

B.Y en usufructo a saber:

a. En cuanto a una tercera parte, a favor de la esposa del testador, Da. Marcelle Ramirez, domiciliada en IE PECO,
calle del General Gallieni No. 33, Seine Francia, con sustitucion vulgar u fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de
Wrobleski, de Palma de Mallorca, Son Rapina Avenida de los Reyes 13,

b.Y en cuanto a las dos terceras partes restantes, a favor de la nombrada Da. Wanda de Nrobleski con
sustitucion vulgar v fideicomisaria a saber:

En cuanto a la mitad de dichas dos terceras partes, a favor de D. Juan Pablo Jankowski, de Son Rapina Palma de
Mallorca; y encuanto a la mitad restante, a favor de su sobrino, D. Horace V. Ramirez, San Luis Building, Florida St.
Ermita, Manila, I.F.

A pesar de las sustituciones fideiconiisarias precedentemente ordinadas, las usufiructuarias nombradas

conjuntamente con los nudo propietarios, podran en cualquier memento vender a tercero los bienes objeto
delegado, sin intervencion alguna de los titulares fideicomisaarios.

On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of the deceased is to be divided into
two parts. One part shall go to the widow 'en pleno dominio" in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall go
to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en nuda propriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the widow's
usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.

Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that the provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda
de Wrobleski with respect to the widow's usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with respect to
Wanda's usufruct are invalid because the first heirs Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator; (b) that the provisions for
fideicommissary substitutions are also invalid because the first heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first
degree, as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code; (c) that the grant of a usufruct over real property in the Philippines in favor of
Page 74 of 104
Wanda Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates Section 5, Article III of the Philippine Constitution; and that (d) the proposed partition of
the testator's interest in the Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building between the widow Marcelle and the appellants, violates the testator's
express win to give this property to them Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project of partition in its order dated May 3,
1967. It is this order which Jorge and Roberto have appealed to this Court.

1. The widow's legitime.

The appellant's do not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-half of the estate in full ownership. They admit that the testator's
dispositions impaired his widow's legitime. Indeed, under Art. 900 of the Civil Code "If the only survivor is the widow or widower,
she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate." And since Marcelle alone survived the deceased, she is entitled to
one-half of his estate over which he could impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever. (Art.
904, par. 2, Civil Code.)

It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants question and justifiably so. It appears that the court a
quo approved the usufruct in favor of Marcelle because the testament provides for a usufruct in her favor of one-third of the estate.
The court a quo erred for Marcelle who is entitled to one-half of the estate "en pleno dominio" as her legitime and which is more
than what she is given under the will is not entitled to have any additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more than her
legitime will run counter to the testator's intention for as stated above his dispositions even impaired her legitime and tended to
favor Wanda.

2. The substitutions.

It may be useful to recall that "Substitution is the appoint- judgment of another heir so that he may enter into the inheritance in
default of the heir originally instituted." (Art. 857, Civil Code. And that there are several kinds of substitutions, namely: simple or
common, brief or compendious, reciprocal, and fideicommissary (Art. 858, Civil Code.) According to Tolentino, "Although the Code
enumerates four classes, there are really only two principal classes of substitutions: the simple and the fideicommissary. The others
are merely variations of these two." (111 Civil Code, p. 185 [1973].)

The simple or vulgar is that provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code which reads:

ART. 859. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the heir or heirs instituted in case such
heir or heirs should die before him, or should not wish, or should be incapacitated to accept the inheritance.

A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it refers, shall comprise the three mentioned in
the preceding paragraph, unless the testator has otherwise provided.

The fideicommissary substitution is described in the Civil Code as follows:

ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir instituted is entrusted with
the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of inheritance, shall be valid and shall
take effect, provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted, and
provided further that the fiduciary or first heir and the second heir are living at time of the death of the testator.

It will be noted that the testator provided for a vulgar substitution in respect of the legacies of Roberto and Jorge Ramirez, the
appellants, thus: con sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus respectivos descendientes, y, en su defecto, con substitution vulgar reciprocal
entre ambos.

The appellants do not question the legality of the substitution so provided. The appellants question the sustitucion vulgar y
fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de Wrobleski" in connection with the one-third usufruct over the estate given to the widow
Marcelle However, this question has become moot because as We have ruled above, the widow is not entitled to any usufruct.

The appellants also question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria in connection with Wanda's usufruct over two thirds of the
estate in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace v. Ramirez.

They allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect as void because Wanda survived the testator or stated differently because she
did not predecease the testator. But dying before the testator is not the only case for vulgar substitution for it also includes refusal
or incapacity to accept the inheritance as provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra. Hence, the vulgar substitution is valid.

As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants are correct in their claim that it is void for the following
reasons:

(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of
the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir
originally instituted."

What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino as follows:
Page 75 of 104
 Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree" as designation, substitution, or transmission. The Supreme Court
of Spain has decidedly adopted this construction. From this point of view, there can be only one tranmission or
substitution, and the substitute need not be related to the first heir. Manresa, Morell and Sanchez Roman,
however, construe the word "degree" as generation, and the present Code has obviously followed this
interpretation. by providing that the substitution shall not go beyond one degree "from the heir originally
instituted." The Code thus clearly indicates that the second heir must be related to and be one generation from the
first heir.

From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of the first heir. These are the
only relatives who are one generation or degree from the fiduciary (Op. cit., pp. 193-194.)

(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the
Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits "that the testator contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary substitution when he
permits the properties subject of the usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the naked owners."
(Brief, p. 26.)

3. The usufruct of Wanda.

The appellants claim that the usufruct over real properties of the estate in favor of Wanda is void because it violates the
constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by aliens.

The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows:

SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
(Art. XIII.)

The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground that the Constitution covers not only succession by
operation of law but also testamentary succession. We are of the opinion that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to
acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless.
Any alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece
of land.

This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to
the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered distributed as follows:

One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;

One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de
Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.

The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. No special pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Page 76 of 104
[G.R. No. L-45425. March 27, 1992.]

CELSA L. VDA. DE KILAYKO, ENCARNACION L. VDA. DE PANLILIO and REMEDIOS L. VDA. DE GUINTO, Petitioners, v. HON. JUDGE
ERNESTO TENGCO of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch IV and RODOLFO LIZARES and AMELO
LIZARES, as Judicial Administrators of the Estate of the late EUSTAQUIA LIZARES, Respondents.

[G.R. No. L-45965. March 27, 1992.]

RODOLFO LIZARES and AMELO LIZARES, as Judicial Administrators of the ESTATE OF EUSTAQUIA LIZARES, Petitioners, v. HON.
JUDGE ERNESTO TENGCO, CELSA D. VDA. DE KILAYKO, ENCARNACION L. VDA. DE PANLILIO and REMEDIOS VDA. DE
GUINTO, Respondents.

Dominador R. Santiago for Rodolfo and Amelo Lizares.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for C. Vda. de Kilayko, E. Vda. de Panlilio and R.L. Vda. de Guinto.

Civil Law; Succession; Partition; In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated.In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated. The law
enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world,
the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other
question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the
law prescribes for the validity of a will.

Same; Same; Same; The probate court has the jurisdiction to settle the claims of an heir and the consequent adjudication of the
properties.Some decisions of the Court pertinent to the issue that the probate court has the jurisdiction to settle the claims of an
heir and the consequent adjudication of the properties, are worth mentioning. In the cases of Arroyo v. Gerona, and Benedicto v.
Javellana, this Court said: x x x any challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to the authentication thereof, and every demand
or claim which any heir, legatee or party interested in a testate or intestate succession may make, must be acted upon and decided
within the same special proceedings, not in a separate action, and the same judge having jurisdiction in the administration of the
estate shall take cognizance of the question raised, inasmuch as when the day comes he will be called upon to make distribution and
adjudication of the property to the interested parties x x x. (Italics supplied)

Same; Same; Same; The probate court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to distribute the estate has the power to determine the
proportion or parts to which each distributee is entitled.The probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to distribute the
estate, has the power to determine the proportion or parts to which each distributee is entitled x x x. A project of partition is merely
a proposal for the distribution of the hereditary estate which the court may accept or reject. It is the court that makes that
distribution of the estate and determines the persons entitled thereto.

Same; Same; Same; Where the court has validly issued a decree of distribution and the same has become final, the validity or
invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant.A final decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the
title to the land of the estate in the distributees. If the decree is erroneous, it should be corrected by opportune appeal, for once it
becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Where
the court has validly issued a decree of distribution and the same has become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of
partition becomes irrelevant.

Same; Same; Same; The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is
when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to
negligence.It is a fundamental concept in the origin of every jural system, a principle of public policy, that at the risk of occasional
errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite time fixed by law, interest rei publicae ut finis sit litum. The very
object of which the courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies. The only instance where a party interested in a
probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or
through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.

Remedial Law; Res judicata; The fundamental principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties ought not to be
permitted to litigate the same issue more than once.The fundamental principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is
that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once, that, when a right or fact has been judicially tried
and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so
long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.

Same; Lis pendens; A notice of lis pendens may be cancelled after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting
the adverse party or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.The cancellation of
such a precautionary notice, being a mere incident in an action, may be ordered by the court having jurisdiction over it at any given
time. Under Sec. 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled after proper showing that the notice is
for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be
recorded. In this case, the lower court ordered the cancellation of said notice on the principal reason that the administrators of the
properties involved are subject to the supervision of the court and the said properties are under custodia legis.

Page 77 of 104
 DECISION

ROMERO, J.:

These consolidated cases seek to annul the orders 1 dated September 20, 1978, January 7, 1977 and January 31, 1977 of the then
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch IV, respectively, cancelling the notice of lis pendens filed by Celsa L. Vda. de
Kilayko, Et. Al. with the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental, denying the motion for reconsideration of the order dated
September 20, 1976 filed by Celsa L. Vda. de Kilay ko, Et Al., and holding in abeyance the resolution of defendants motion to
dismiss.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On November 20, 1962, the late Maria Lizares y Alunan executed a "Testamento" 2 which contains among its provisions, the
following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

DECIMA Asimismo, ordeno y dispongo que mi participacion consistente en una tercera parte (1/3) de una catorce (1/14) avas
partes proindivisas de la Hda. Minuluan, que he adquirido mediante permuta de mi hermano Dr. Antonio A. Lizares, se adjudique,
como por el presente se adjudica, a mi sobrina Eustaquia Lizares; ENTENDIENDOSE, sin embargo, que en el caso de que mi citada
sobrina Eustaquia Lizares muera soltera o sin descendientes legitimos, mi referida participacion en la Hda. Minuluan se adjudicara a
mi hermano Antonio A. Lizares que me sobrevivan.

UNDECIMA Tambien ordeno y dispongo que el resto de todas mis propiendades, incluyendo mis participaciones, derechos e
intereses (no dispuestos mas arriba) en las Haciendas "Minuluan" (Lotes Nos. 439, 403, 1273, 1274, 1278, 1279 y 1280 del Catastro
de Talisay, Negros Occidental) y "Matab-ang" (Lotes Nos. 514, 550, 552, 553 y 1287-C del Catastro de Talisay, Negros Occidental),
situadas en el Municipio de Talisay, Provincia de Negros Occidental, I.F., el resto de mis acciones en la Central Talisay-Silay Milling
Co., Inc. (unas 2,860 acciones) y de la Financing Corporation of the Philippines (unas 53,636 acciones), registradas a mi nombre y no
heredadas de mi difunta madre Da. Enrica A. Vda. de Lizares, mis acciones en la Central Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., Negros
Navigation Co. y otras Compaas Mineras, y todos los demas bienes no mencionados en este testamento y que me pertenezcan en
la fecha de mi muerte, se adjudiquen, como por el presente adjudico, a mi sobrina Srta. Eustaquia Lizares, hija de mi difunto
hermano Don Simplicio Lizares, en reconocimiento de los valiosos servicios y cuidados que mi citada sobrina me ha prestado y signe
prestandome hasta ahora. Ordeno, sin embargo, a mi referida sobrina, Srta. Eustaquia Lizares, que ella se haga cargo de pagar todas
las obligaciones que tengo y que gravan sobre las propriedades adjudicadas a la misma. Asimismo ordeno a mi citada sobrina que
ella mande celebrar una Misa Gregoriana cada ao en sufragio de mi alma, y misas ordinarias en sufragio de las almas de mi difunto
Padre y de mi difunta Madre, el 6 de Marzo y 17 de Deciembre de cada ao, respectivamente, y mande celebrar todos los aos la
fiesta de San Jose en Talisay como lo hago hasta ahora. En el caso de que mi citada sobrina, Srta. Eustaquia Lizares, falleciere sin
dejar descendientes legitimos, ordeno y dispongo que mi participacion consistente en una sexta parte (1/6) de la Hda. Matab-ang,
con su correspondiente cuota de azucar y otros mejoras, se adjudique a mis hermanas y hermano antes mencionados y que me
sobrevivan (Emphasis supplied).

On January 28, 1968, Maria Lizares y Alunan died without any issue leaving said "testamento" in the possession and custody of her
niece, Eustaquia Lizares. 3 On February 6, 1968, Eustaquia filed a petition for the settlement of the testate estate of Maria Lizares y
Alunan, before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch IV, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 8452. 4

The required publication of the notice of hearing of the petition having been made, in due course, the probate court issued an order
declaring the will probated and appointing Estaquia as the executrix of the estate of Maria Lizares. 5

On July 10, 1968, Eustaquia filed a project of partition 6 which was granted by the probate court in an order dated January 8, 1971.
Simultaneously, said court declared the heirs, devisees, legatees and usufructuaries mentioned in the project of partition as the only
heirs, devisees, legatees and usufructuaries of the estate; adjudicated to them the properties respectively assigned to each and
every one of them, and ordered the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental and Bacolod City to effect the corresponding transfer of
the real properties to said heirs as well as the transfer of shares, stocks, and dividends in different corporations, companies and
partnerships in the name of Maria Lizares to the heirs and legatees, and the closure of the testate proceedings of Maria Lizares. 7

Thereafter, Eustaquia filed an urgent motion to reopen the testate proceedings in order that some properties of Maria Lizares which
had been omitted in the partition be adjudicated to her. 8 The Court granted the motion and correspondingly reopened the testate
proceedings. It adjudicated to Eustaquia certain shares of stocks, a revolving fund certificate, plantation credits and sugar quota
allocations, and real or personal properties of Maria Lizares which were not given by her to any other person in her last will and
testament. 9

On November 28, 197Z, the heirs of Maria Lizares, namely: Encarnacion L. Vda. de Panlilio, Remedios L. Vda. de Guinto, Felicidad
Paredes Llopez, Rosario Paredes Mendoza and Eustaquia Lizares executed an agreement of partition and subdivision, thereby
terminating their co-ownership over Lots Nos. 550, 514, 553, 1287-C of plan SWO-7446, and 552, all of the Cadastral Survey of
Talisay covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-65004, T-65005; T-65006, T-65007, and T-65008. 10

A year later or on November 23, 1973, Eustaquia Lizares died single without any descendant. 11 In due time, Rodolfo Lizares and
Amelo Lizares were appointed joint administrators of Eustaquias intestate estate.
Page 78 of 104
On the strength of the testamentary provisions contained in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the will of Maria Lizares, which were allegedly
in the nature of a simple substitution, Celsa Vda. de Kilayko, Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio, and Remedios Vda. de Guinto (hereinafter
collectively referred to as Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, Et. Al.) filed a motion in Special Proceedings No. 8452 to reopen once again the
testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares. They prayed among others that a substitute administrator be appointed; that the order
dated January 8, 1971 be reconsidered and amended by declaring them as heirs to 1/3 of 1/14 of Hda. Minuluan and to 1/6 of Hda.
Matab-ang, both of which form an aggregate area of 33 hectares; that the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental, after such
amendment, be ordered to register at the back of their respective certificates of title, the order of probate and a "declaration" that
movants are the heirs of said properties, and correspondingly issue new certificates of title in their names. 12

Two (2) sets of intestate heirs of the deceased Eustaquia Lizares namely: Socorro L. Vda. de Escario, Rodolfo Lizares, Mario Lizares,
Lucrecia Gustilo, and Aurora Lizares Wagner opposed the aforesaid motion. They alleged that the court had no more jurisdiction to
reopen the testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares as the order of closure had long become final and that the testamentary
provisions sought to be enforced are null and void. 13

On April 6, 1974, the Court issued an order denying the motion to reopen the testate proceedings and holding that inasmuch as the
settlement of an estate is a proceeding in rem, the judgment therein is binding against the whole world. It observed that inspite of
the fact that the movants knew that the court had jurisdiction over them, they did not take part in the proceedings nor did they
appeal the order of January 8, 1871. Thus, the court concluded, even if the said order was erroneous, and since the error was not
jurisdictional, the same could have been corrected only by a regular appeal. The period for filing a motion for reconsideration having
expired, the court opined that the movants could have sought relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, but
unfortunately for the movants, the period for filing such remedy had also elapsed. 14

Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, Et. Al. then filed a motion for reconsideration of said order. It was denied on June 17, 1974. 15 Hence, on
October 14, 1974, the said movants filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of real property against the joint
administrators of the estate of Eustaquia Lizares, Rodolfo and Amelo Lizares. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 11639 with the then
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch IV. 16 On the same date, they availed of their rights under Rule 14, Section 24 of
Rules of Court by filing a notice of lis pendens with the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. 17

As duly appointed judicial joint administrators of the estate of the late Eustaquia Lizares, Rodolfo Lizares and Amelo Lizares (the joint
administrators for brevity), filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of
the case; the cause of action was barred by prior judgment, and the complaint stated no cause of action. 18 This motion was
opposed by the plaintiffs.

On January 23, 1975, the joint administrators filed a motion for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on the contentions that
there existed exceptional circumstances which justified the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens and that no prejudice would be
caused to the plaintiffs. 19 The latter opposed said motion. The defendants having filed a reply thereto, the plaintiffs filed a
rejoinder reiterating their arguments in their opposition to the motion for cancellation of notice of lis pendens. 20

On September 20, 1976, respondent judge issued an order granting the motion for cancellation of notice of lis pendens. 21 The court
simultaneously held in abeyance the resolution of the motion to dismiss the complaint.

The joint administrators filed their answer to the complaint in Civil Case No. 11639. 22 Thereafter, they filed a motion for
preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses. 23 Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, Et. Al. vigorously opposed said motion. 24

On November 3, 1976, Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, Et. Al. filed a motion praying for the reconsideration of the order dated September
20, 1976. 25 The joint administrators having filed an opposition thereto, 26 on January 7, 1977 the lower court denied the aforesaid
motion for reconsideration. 27 It held that while a notice of lis pendens would serve as notice to strangers that a particular property
was under litigation, its annotation upon the certificates of title to the properties involved was not necessary because such
properties, being in custodia legis, could not just be alienated without the approval of the court. Moreover, the court added, a
notice of lis pendens would prejudice any effort of the estate to secure crop loans which were necessary for the viable cultivation
and production of sugar to which the properties were planted.

Upon receipt of a copy of said order, Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, Et. Al. filed in this Court a motion for extension of time to file a petition
for review on certiorari. Docketed as G.R. No. L-45425, the petition contends that the grounds of lis pendens, namely, that the
properties are in custodia legis and the lending institutions would not grant crop loans to the estate, are not the legal grounds
provided for under Sec. 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court for the cancellation of a notice of lis pendens.

Meanwhile, on January 31, 1977, the lower court issued an order stating that since on September 21, 1976 it had held in abeyance
the resolution of the motion to dismiss, it was also proper to suspend the resolution of the affirmative defenses interposed by the
defendants until after trial on the merits of the case. Accordingly, the court set the date of pre-trial for March 24, 1977. 28

On April 13, 1977, the joint administrators filed before this Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus with prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction. It was docketed as G.R. No. L-45965. Petitioners contend that the lower court had no jurisdiction
over Civil Case No. 11639 as it involves the interpretation of the will of Maria Lizares, its implementation and/or the adjudication of
her properties. They assert that the matter had been settled in Special Proceedings No. 8452 which had become final and
unappealable long before the complaint in Civil Case No. 11639 was filed, and therefore, the cause of action in the latter case was
barred by the principle of res judicata. They aver that the claim of Celsa, Encarnacion and Remedios, sisters of Maria Lizares, over

Page 79 of 104
the properties left by their niece Eustaquia and which the latter had inherited by will from Maria Lizares, was groundless because
paragraphs 10 and 11 of Marias will on which Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, Et. Al. base their claim, conceived of a fideicommissary
substitution of heirs. Petitioners contend that said provisions of the will are not valid because under Article 863 of the Civil Code,
they constitute an invalid fideicommissary substitution of heirs.

On April 26, 1977, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the lower court from further proceeding with the trial of
Civil Case No. 11839. 29 After both G.R. Nos. L-45425 and L-45965 had been given due course and submitted for decision, on January
20, 1986, the two cases were consolidated.

The petition in G.R. No. L-45965 is impressed with merit.

In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated. 30 The law enjoins the
probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of
a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. 31 The authentication of a will decides no other question than
such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes
for the validity of a will. 32

Pertinent to the issue interposed by the petitioners in G.R. No. L-45965 is Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court which
reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Section 1. When order for distribution of residue made. When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the
allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on
application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the
residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and
such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the
same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above-mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the
distributees, or any of them give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within
such time as the court directs."cralaw virtua1aw library

Applying this rule, in the cases of De Jesus v. Daza, 33 and Torres v. Encarnacion, 34 the Court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . (T)he probate court, having the custody and control of the entire estate, is the most logical authority to effectuate this
provision, within the estate proceeding, proceeding being the most convenient one in which this power and function of the court
can be exercised and performed without the necessity of requiring the parties to undergo the inconvenience and litigate an entirely
different action."cralaw virtua1aw library

Some decisions of the Court pertinent to the issue that the probate court has the jurisdiction to settle the claims of an heir and the
consequent adjudication of the properties, are worth mentioning. In the cases of Arroyo v. Gerona, 35 and Benedicto v. Javellana, 36
this Court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . any challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to the authentication thereof, and every demand or claim which any heir,
legatee or party interested in a testate or intestate succession may make, must be acted upon and decided within the same special
proceedings, not in a separate action, and the same judge having jurisdiction in the administration of the estate shall take
cognizance of the question raised, inasmuch as when the day comes he will be called upon to make distribution and adjudication of
the property to the interested parties . . ." (Emphasis supplied).

The probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to distribute the estate, has the power to determine the proportion or parts to
which each distributee is entitled . . . 37 A project of partition is merely a proposal for the distribution of the hereditary estate which
the court may accept or reject. It is the court that makes that distribution of the estate and determines the persons entitled thereto.
38

In the instant case, the records will show that in the settlement of the testate estate of Maria Lizares, the executrix, Eustaquia
Lizares submitted on January 8, 1971, a project of partition in which the parcels of land, subject matters of the complaint for
reconveyance, were included as property of the estate and assigned exclusively to Eustaquia as a devisee of Maria Lizares. In
accordance with said project of partition which was approved by the probate court, Encarnacion Lizares Vda. de Panlilio, Remedios
Lizares Vda. de Guinto, Felicidad Paredes Llopez, Rosario Paredes Mendoza and Eustaquia Lizares executed an Agreement of
Partition and Subdivision on November 28, 1972, whereby they agreed to terminate their co-ownership over Lots Nos. 550, 514,
553, 1287-C of SWO-7446 and 552 covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-65004, T-65005, T-65006, T-65007 and T-65008.
These facts taken altogether show that the Lizares sisters recognized the decree of partition sanctioned by the probate court and in
fact reaped the fruits thereof.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

Hence, they are now precluded from attacking the validity of the partition or any part of it in the guise of a complaint for
reconveyance. A party cannot, in law and in good conscience be allowed to reap the fruits of a partition, agreement or judgment and
repudiate what does not suit him. 39 Thus, where a piece of land has been included in a partition and there is no allegation that the
inclusion was effected through improper means or without petitioners knowledge, the partition barred any further litigation on said

Page 80 of 104
title and operated to bring the property under the control and jurisdiction of the court for its proper disposition according to the
tenor of the partition. 40 The question of private respondents title over the lots in question has been concluded by the partition and
became a closed matter.

The admission made by Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, Et. Al. in their complaint, Civil Case No. 11639, that Eustaquia had been in
possession of the questioned lots since March 2, 1971 up to the time of her death indicates that the distribution pursuant to the
decree of partition has already been carried out. Moreover, it cannot be denied that when Celsa L. Vda. de Kilay ko, Et. Al. moved for
the reopening of the testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares, the judicial decree of partition and order of closure of such
proceedings was already final and executory, the then reglementary period of thirty (30) days having elapsed from the time of its
issuance, with no timely appeal having been filed by them. Therefore, they cannot now be permitted to question the adjudication of
the properties left by will of Maria Lizares, by filing an independent action for the reconveyance of the very same properties subject
of such partition.

A final decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees. If the
decree is erroneous, it should be corrected by opportune appeal, for once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other
judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Where the court has validly issued a decree of distribution
and the same has become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant. 41

It is a fundamental concept in the origin of every jural system, a principle of public policy, that at the risk of occasional errors,
judgments of courts should become final at some definite time fixed by law, interest rei publicae ut finis sit litum. "The very object of
which the courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies." 42 The only instance where a party interested in a probate
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through
mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to secure relief is the opening of the same by
proper motion within the reglementary period, instead of an independent action, the effect of which if successful, would be for
another court or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and
disposed of. 43

The fundamental principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same
issue more than once, that, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an
opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the
parties and those in privity with then in law or estate. 44

All the requisites for the existence of res judicata are present. Thus, the order approving the distribution of the estate of Maria
Lizares to the heirs instituted in said will has become final and unappealable; the probate court that rendered judgment had
jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties; the judgment or orders had been rendered on the merits; the special
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Maria Lizares was a proceeding in rem that was directed against the whole world
including Celsa L. Vda. de Kilay ko, Et Al., so that it can be said that there is a similarity of parties in Special Proceedings No. 8452 and
Civil Case No. 11639, the judicial administrators of Eustaquia being privy to Celsa L. Vda. de Kilay ko, et al; there is identity of subject
matter involved in both actions, namely, the properties left by Maria Lizares; there is identity of causes of action because in the first
action there was a declaration of the probate court in its order dated April 6, 1974, that although the testatrix intended a
fideicommissary substitution in paragraphs 10 and 11 of her will, the substitution can have no effect because the requisites for it to
be valid, had not been satisfied. 45

Granting that res judicata has not barred the institution of Civil Case No. 11639, the contention of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilay ko Et. Al.
that they are conditional substitute heirs of Eustaquia in the testate estate of Maria Lizares 46 is not meritorious. While the
allegation of the joint administrators that paragraphs 10 and 11 of Maria Lizares last will and testament conceives of a
fideicommissary substitution under Article 863 of the Civil Code is also baseless as said paragraphs do not impose upon Eustaquia a
clear obligation to preserve the estate in favor of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilay ko, Et Al., neither may said paragraphs be considered as
providing for a vulgar or simple substitution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

It should be remembered that when a testator merely names an heir and provides that if such heir should die a second heir also
designated shall succeed, there is no fideicommissary substitution. The substitution should then be construed as a vulgar or simple
substitution under Art. 859 of the Civil Code but it shall be effective only if the first heir dies before the testator. 47 In this case, the
instituted heir, Eustaquia, survived the testatrix, Maria Lizares. Hence, there can be no substitution of heirs for, upon Maria Lizares
death, the properties involved unconditionally devolved upon Eustaquia. Under the circumstances, the sisters of Maria Lizares could
only inherit the estate of Eustaquia by operation of the law of intestacy.

With respect to the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on the properties involved, there is no merit in the contention of Celsa
L. Vda. de Kilay ko, Et Al., that the lower court acted contrary to law and/or gravely abused its discretion in cancelling the notice of lis
pendens. The cancellation of such a precautionary notice, being a mere incident in an action, may be ordered by the court having
jurisdiction over it at any given time. 48 Under Sec. 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled "after
proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of
the party who caused it to be recorded" 49 In this case, the lower court ordered the cancellation of said notice on the principal
reason that the administrators of the properties involved are subject to the supervision of the court and the said properties are
under custodia legis. Therefore, such notice was not necessary to protect the rights of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilay ko, Et. Al. More so in this
case where it turned out that their claim to the properties left by Eustaquia is without any legal basis.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in L-45425 is hereby DENIED but the petition for certiorari and prohibition and/or

Page 81 of 104
mandamus in L-45965 is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order of April 26, 1977 which was issued by the Court in L-45965 is
made PERMANENT. Costs against the petitioners in L-45425.

SO ORDERED.

Page 82 of 104
G.R. No. L-13386 October 27, 1920

SEGUNDA MARIA NIEVA with her husband ANGEL ALCALA, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
MANUELA ALCALA and JOSE DEOCAMPO, defendants-appellees.

RESERVABLE RIGHTS IN PROPERTY; INHERITANCE BY RELATIVES WITHIN THE THIRD DEGREE; ILLEGITIMATE RELATIVES.Article
811 of the Civil Code which provides that "any ascendant who inherits Nieva and from his descendant any property acquired by the
latter gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such of the property as he may have
acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property
came," does not apply to illegitimate relatives.

DECISION

JOHNSON, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tayabas, absolving the defendants from all liability
under the plaintiff's complaint, without any finding as to costs.

Juliana Nieva, the alleged natural mother of the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva, married Francisco Deocampo. Of said marriage Alfeo
Deocampo was born.

Julian Nieva died intestate on April 19, 1889, and her said son, Alfeo Deocampo, inherited from her, ab intestate, the parcels of land
described in Paragraphs V and X of the complaint.

Alfeo Deocampo died intestate and without issue on July 7, 1890. Thereupon the two parcels of land above-mentioned passed to his
father, Francisco Deocampo, by intestate succession. Thereafter Francisco Deocampo married the herein defendant Manuela Alcala,
of which marriage was born Jose Deocampo, the other defendant herein.

Francisco Deocampo died on August 15, 1914, whereupon his widow and son, the defendants herein, took possession of the parcels
of land in question, under the claim that the said son, the defendant Jose Deocampoo (a minor) had inherited the same, ab
intestate, from his deceased father.

On September 30, 1915, the plaintiff herein, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter of the said Juliana Nieva, instituted
the present action for the purposes of recovering from the defendants the parcels of land in question, particularly described in
Paragraphs V and X of the complaint, invoking the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.

The lower court held that, even granting, without deciding, that the plaintiff was an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva,
she was not entitled to the property here in question because, in its opinion, an illegitimate relative has no right to the reserva
troncal under the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.

The first question presented by this appeal is, whether or not the plaintiff is an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased
Juliana Nieva. It appears from the record that the said Juliana Nieva, while unmarried, gave birth to the plaintiff on March 29, 1882,
and that the plaintiff was duly baptized as her natural daughter, of unknown father (Exhibit C, baptismal certificate); that the said
Juliana Nieva nourished and reared her said child, the plaintiff herein; that the plaintiff lived with her said mother until the latter was
married to Francisco Deocampo; that the said mother treated the plaintiff, and exhibited her publicly, as a legitimate daughter.
(See testimony of Antero Gala, pp. 5-6; Prudencio de la Cuesta, pp. 16-17; and Mamerto Palabrica, pp. 26-27, sten. notes.)

The foregoing facts, which are not controverted, are analogous to the facts in the case of Llorente vs. Rodriguez (3 Phil., 697, 699).
Under the decision of this court in that case we are of the opinion and so decide, without rediscussing here the law and legal
principles involved, that the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva is an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva. (See also In
re estate of Enriquez and Reyes, 29 Phil., 167.)

The other and more important question presented by this appeal is, whether or not an illegitimate relative within the third degree is
entitled to the reserva troncal provided for by article 811 of the Civil Code. That article reads as follows:

Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by the latter gratuitously from some other
ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such of the property as he may have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came.

The property here in question was inherited, by operation by law, by Francisco Deocampo from his son Alfeo Deocampo, who, in
turn, had inherited it, in the same manner, from his mother Juliana Nieva, the natural mother of the plaintiff. The plaintiff is
the natural sister of Alfeo Deocampo, and she belongs to the same line from which the property in question came. Was Francisco
Deocampo obliged by law to reserve said property for the benefit of the plaintiff, an illegitimate relative within the third degree of
Alfeo Deocampo? If he was, then, upon his death, the plaintiff, and not his son the defendant Jose Deocampo, was entitled to the
said property; if he was not, the plaintiff's action must fail.1awph!l.net
Page 83 of 104
There can be no question whatever but that, under said article 811 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff would be entitled to the property
in question if she were a legitimate daughter of Julian Nieva. (Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil., 295.) But in said article 811 the legislator
uses the generic terms "ascendant," "descendant," and "relatives," without specifying whether or not they have to be legitimate.
Does the legislator, then, refer to legitimate as well as to illegitimate relatives? Counsel for the appellant, in a lengthy and carefully
prepared brief, attempts to maintain the affirmative.

This question, so far as our investigation shows, has not been decided before by any court or tribunal. However, eminent
commentators on the Spanish Civil Code, who have devoted their lives to the study and solution of the intricate and difficult
problems that may arise under the provisions of that Code, have dealt with the very question now before us, and are unanimous in
the opinion that the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code apply only to legitimate relative. One of such commentators,
undoubtedly the best known of them all, is Manresa. We believe we can do no better than to adopt his reasons and conclusions, in
deciding the question before us. In determining the persons who are obliged to reserve under article 811, he says:

Is every ascendant, whether legitimate or not, obliged to reserve? Should the natural father or grandfather reserve the
properties proceeding from the mother or other natural ascendant? Article 811 does not distinguish; it speaks of the
ascendant, without attaching the qualification of legitimate, and, on the other hand, the same reason that exists for
applying the provision to the natural family exists for applying it to the legitimate family. Nevertheless, the article in
referring to the ascendant in an indeterminate manner shows that it imposes the obligation to reserve only upon the
legitimate ascendant.

Let us overlook for the moment the question whether the Code recognizes or does not recognize the existence of the
natural family, or whether it admits only the bond established by acknowledgement between the father or mother who
acknowledges and the acknowledged children. However it may be, it may be stated as an indisputable truth, that in said
Code, the legitimate relationship forms the general rule and the natural relationship the exception; which is the reason why,
as may be easily seen, the law in many articles speaks only of children or parents, of ascendants or descendants, and in
them reference is of course made of those who are legitimate; and when it desires to make a provision applicable only to
natural relationship, it does not say father or mother, but natural father or natural mother; it does not say child, but natural
child; it does not speak of ascendants, brothers or parents in the abstract, but of natural ascendants, natural brothers or
natural parents. (See, for example, articles 294, 302, 809, 810, 846, 935, to 938, 944 and 945 and 946 to 955.)

Articles 809 and 810 themselves speak only of ascendants. Can it in any way be maintained that they refer to legitimate as
well as to natural ascendants? They evidently establish the legitime of the legitimate ascendants included as forced heirs in
number 2 of article 807. And article 811, and as we will see also article 812, continues to treat of this same legitime.
The right of the natural parents and children in the testamentary succession in wholly included in the eighth section and is
limited to the parents, other ascendants of such class being excluded in articles 807, No. 3, and 846. Therefore, the place
which article 811 occupies in the Code of proof that it refers only to legitimate ascendants. And if there were any doubt, it
disappears upon considering the text of article 938, which states that the provisions of article 811 applies to intestate
succession, which is just established in favor of the legitimate direct ascending line, the text of articles 939 to 945, which
treat of intestate succession of natural parents, as well as that of articles 840 to 847, treating of their testamentary
succession, which do not allude directly or indirectly to that provision.

Lastly, the principle which underlies the exception which article 811 creates in the right to succeed neither admits of any
other interpretation. Whether the provision is due to the desire that the properties should not pass, by reason of new
marriage, out of the family to which they belonged, or is directly derived from the system of the so-called "reserva troncal,"
and whether the idea of reservation or that of lineal rights (troncalidad) predominate the patrimony which is intended to be
preserved is that of the legitimate family. Only to legitimate ascendants and descendants do article 968 et seq. of the Code
refer, arising as they do from the danger of second or subsequent marriage; only to legitimate parents do the special laws
of Navarra, Aragon, Vizcaya and Catalua concede the right to succeed with respect to lineal properties (bienes troncales);
only to the legitimate ascendants does article 811 impose the duty to reserve.

The convenience of amplifying the precept to natural parents and ascendants may be raised just as the question whether it
would be preferable to suppress it altogether may be raised; but in the realm of the statute law there is no remedy but to
admit that article 811, the interpretation of which should on the other hand be strict was drafted by the legislator with
respect only to legitimate ascendants. (Manresa, Codigo Civil, vol. 6, 3d ed., pp. 249-250.)

The same jurist, in determining the persons in whose favor the reservation is established, says:

Persons in whose favor the reservation is established. This is one of the most delicate points in the interpretation of
article 811. According to this article, the reservation is established in favor of the parents who are within the third degree
and belong to the line from which the properties came.

It treats of blood, relationship, which is applicable to questions on succession, according to articles 915 to 920. It could not
be otherwise, because relationship by affinity is established between each spouse and the family of the other, by marriage,
and to admit it, would be to favor the transmission of the properties of the family of one spouse to that of the other, which
is just what this article intends to prevent.

Page 84 of 104
 It also treats of legitimate relationship. The person obliged to reserve it a legitimate ascendant who inherits from a
descendant property which proceeds from the same legitimate family, and this being true, there can be no question,
because the line from which the properties proceed must be the line of that family and only in favor of that line is the
reservation established. Furthermore, we have already said, the object is to protect the patrimony of the legitimate family,
following the precedents of the foral law. And it could not be otherwise. Article 943 denies to legitimate parents the right to
succeed the natural child and viceversa, from which it must be deduced that natural parents neither have the right to
inhering from legitimate ones; the law in the article cited established a barrier between the two families; properties of the
legitimate family shall never pass by operation of law to the natural family. (Ibid. pp. 251-252.)

Scvola, after a very extended discussion of this same subject, arrives at the same conclusion as Manresa. "La reserva del
articulo 811 es privilegio de la familia legitima. (The reservation in article 811 is a privilege of the legitimate family.)"
(See Scvola, Codigo Civil, Vol. 14, pp. 211-224, 3401-305.)

Article 943, above referred to by Manresa, provides as follows:

A natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate children and relatives of the father or
mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives so inherit from the natural or legitimated child.

To hold that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her natural brother, Alfeo Deocampo, by operation of law, would be a
fragrant violate of the express provision of the foregoing article (943).

For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, without any finding as to costs. So ordered.

Page 85 of 104
G.R. No. L-28032 September 24, 1986

FRANCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA, MANUEL TIOCO, NICOLAS TIOCO and JANUARIO PAPA, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
DALISAY TONGKO CAMACHO, PRIMO TONGKO and GODOFREDO CAMACHO, defendants-appellants.

Succession; In reserva troncal, the successional rights of the relatives of the praepositus within the 3rd degree are determined by,
and subject to, the rules of intestate succession; so as to exclude uncles and aunts of the descendant from the reservable property
by his niece or nephew.That question has already been answered in Padura vs. Baldovino, where the reservatario was survived by
eleven nephews and nieces of the praepositus in the line of origin, four of whole blood and seven of half blood, and the claim was
also made that all eleven were entitled to the reversionary property in equal shares. This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, declared the principles of intestacy to be controlling, and ruled that the nephews and nieces of whole blood were each
entitled to a share double that of each of the nephews and nieces of half blood in accordance with Article 1006 of the Civil Code.

Same; Same.Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are relatives of the descendant within the
third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person holding it subject to
reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the
one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the
line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal
and for the exclusive benefit of designated persons who are within the third degree of the person from whom the reservable
property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law
does not recognize them as such.

Same; Same.Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate succession, the plaintiffs-appellees
must be held without any right thereto because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the praepositus), they are
excluded from the succession by his niece, the defendant-appellant, although they are related to him within the same degree as the
latter. To this effect is Abellana vs. Ferraris where Arts. 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code were cited and applied.

Same; Same.Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition
to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession. This was also and more clearly the case under the
Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that immediately preceded the Civil Code now in force (R.A. 386).

Same; Same.We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedents uncles and aunts may not succeed
ab intestate so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.

Same; Same.Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus, there is no doubt that the plaintiffs-appellees
would have been excluded by the defendant-appellant under the rules of intestate succession. There is no reason why a different
result should obtain simply because the transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva; i.e., the
property took a detour through an ascendantthereby giving rise to the reservationbefore its transmission to the reservatario.

DECISION

NARVASA, J.:

This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal, was submitted for judgment in the lower
court by all the parties on the following "Stipulation of Facts and Partial Compromise":

1. They stipulate that the defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the plaintiffs, Francisco Tioco de Papa,
Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, are legitimate relatives, plaintiffs being said defendant's grandaunt and
granduncles.

2. They stipulate that plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongo-Camacho have as a common ancestor the late
Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by the name of Romana Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great grandfather of
defendant. The family relationship of the parties is as shown in the chart attached hereto as Annex 'A' and made
an integral part of this stipulation.

3. They stipulate that Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously donated four (4) parcels of land to her niece
Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of plaintiffs), which parcels of land are presently covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. A-64165, 64166 and 64167 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached to this
stipulation as Annexes 'B', 'B-l', and 'B-2'.

4. They stipulate that Toribia Tioco died intestate in l9l5, survived by her husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two
legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay D, Tongko-Camacho) and
leaving the afore-mentioned four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance of her said two children in equal pro-
indiviso shares.

Page 86 of 104
 5. They stipulate that in 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his legitimate children by his wife Marciana
Felix (among them plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the partition of his
estate, three (3) parcels of land now covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 16545 and 16554 of the Registry
of Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached hereto as Annexes 'C' and 'C-l', were adjudicated as the
inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco, but as she had predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco, the said three (3)
parcels of land devolved upon her two legitimate children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon in equal pro-indiviso
shares.

6. They stipulate that in 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2)
pro-indiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of land above-mentioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole
intestate heir, who received the said property subject to a reserva troncal which was subsequently annotated on
the Transfer Certificates of Title Annexes 'B', 'B-l', 'B-2', 'C' and 'C-l'.

7. They stipulate that in 1939 Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her rights and interests in the parcels of
land abovementioned were inherited by her only legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho, subject
to the usufructuary right of her surviving husband, defendant Primo Tongko.

8. They stipulate that on June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died intestate, survived his only legitimate descendant,
defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho.

9. The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7)
parcels of land abovementioned as her inheritance from her mother, Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.

10. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal advice, the other half of the said seven (7)
parcels of land abovementioned by virtue of the reserva troncal imposed thereon upon the death of Faustino
Dizon and under the laws on intestate succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon legal advice, oppose her said claim
because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of land, which interest
was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virtue of
their being also third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon.

11. The parties hereby agree to submit for judicial determination in this case the legal issue of whether defendant
Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the whole of the seven (7) parcels of land in question, or whether the
plaintiffs, as third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon are reservatarios (together with said defendant) of the one-
half pro-indiviso share therein which was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from his son Faustino Dizon, and entitled to
three-fourths (3/4) of said one-half pro-indiviso share, or three eights (3/8) of said seven (7) parcels of land, and,
therefore, to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected by defendant Dalisay P. Tongko
Camacho from the tenants of said parcels of land, minus the expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to
plaintiffs' share in the rentals.

12. In view of the fact that the parties are close blood relatives and have acted upon legal advice in pursuing their
respective claims, and in order to restore and preserve harmony in their family relations, they hereby waive all
their claims against each other for damages (other than legal interest on plaintiffs' sore in the rentals which this
Honorable Court may deem proper to award), attorney's fees and expenses of litigation which shall be borne by
the respective parties. 1

On the basis thereof, the lower Court declared the plaintiffs Francisco Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, as well as the
defendant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho, entitled, as reservatarios, to one-half of the seven parcels of land in dispute, in equal
proportions, rendering judgment as follows:

... . Resolving, therefore, the legal question submitted by the parties, the court holds that plaintiffs Francisca Tioco,
Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco are entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso shares or three-
eights (3/8) of the seven (7) parcels of land involved in this action. Consequently, they are, likewise, entitled to
three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected by the defendant Dalisay D. Tioco-Camacho from the
tenants of the said parcels of land, minus the expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share
in the rentals.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and inasmuch as the parties expressly waived all their claims against each other for
damages including attorney's fees and expenses of litigation other than the legal interests on plaintiffs' share in the
rentals, the court renders judgment adjudging the plaintiffs entitled to three-eights (3/8) of the seven (7) parcels of
land described in Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-64165, T-64166, T-64167, T-16546 and T-16554 of the Registry
of Deeds of Manila. The defendant Dalisay D. Tioco-Camacho is hereby ordered to make an accounting of all rents
received by her on the properties involved in this action for the purpose of determining the legal interests which
should be paid to the plaintiffs on their shares in the rentals of the property in question.

SO ORDERED. 2

Page 87 of 104
Not satisfied, the defendant appealed to this Court.

The issue raised is whether, as contended by the plaintiffs-appellees and ruled by the lower Court, all relatives of
thepraepositus within the third degree in the appropriate line succeed without distinction to the reservable property upon the death
of the reservista, as seems to be implicit in Art. 891 of the Civil Code, which reads:

Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by
gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have
acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the
line from which said property came. (811),

or, as asserted by the defendant-appellant, the rights of said relatives are subject to, and should be determined by, the rules on
intestate succession.

That question has already been answered in Padura vs. Baldovino, 3 where the reservatario was survived by eleven nephews and
nieces of the praepositus in the line of origin, four of whole blood and seven of half blood, and the claim was also made that all
eleven were entitled to the reversionary property in equal shares. This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, declared the
principles of intestacy to be controlling, and ruled that the nephews and nieces of whole blood were each entitled to a share double
that of each of the nephews and nieces of half blood in accordance with Article 1006 of the Civil Code. Said the Court:

The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a case of reserva troncal, where the
only reservatarios (reservees) surviving the reservista, and belonging to the fine of origin, are nephews of the
descendant (prepositus), but some are nephews of the half blood and the others are nephews of the whole blood,
should the reserved properties be apportioned among them equally, or should the nephews of the whole blood
take a share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half blood?

xxx xxx xxx

The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish commentators on the subject. After mature
reflection, we have concluded that the position of the appellants is correct. The reserva troncal is a special rule
designed primarily to assure the return of the reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the
line from which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the
inheriting ascendant (reservista).

xxx xxx xxx

The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property has devolved to the specified relatives of the
line of origin. But from this time on, there is no further occasion for its application. In the relations between
one reservatario and another of the same degree there is no call for applying Art. 891 any longer; wherefore, the
respective share of each in the reversionary property should be governed by the ordinary rules of intestate
succession. In this spirit the jurisprudence of this Court and that of Spain has resolved that upon the death of the
ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass, not to all the reservatarios as a class but only to those
nearest in degree to the descendant (prepositus), excluding those reservatarios of more remote degree (Florentino
vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 489-490; T.S. 8 Nov. 1894; Dir. Gen. de los Registros, Resol. 20 March 1905). And within the
third degree of relationship from the descendant (prepositus), the right of representation operates in favor of
nephews (Florentino vs. Florentino, supra).

Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession when there are relatives of the descendant within
the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatarios over the property which the reservista
(person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote. The right of
representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not
among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the
right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of
designated persons who are within the third degree of the person from whom the reservable property came.
Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the
law does not recognize them as such.

In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of one alleging his right
as reservatario who is not within the third degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on
the part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the
deceased person from whom the reservable property came. ... . (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489-490)
(Emphasis supplied) See also Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and de Ocampo, 41 Phil. 915)

Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule
that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews of half blood.
If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the right of representation of

Page 88 of 104
 nephews are made to apply, the rule of double share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should be
likewise operative.

In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives reservatarios to whom the property
should be returned; but within that group, the individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable
rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. This conclusion is strengthened by
the circumstance that the reserva being an exceptional case, its application should be limited to what is strictly
needed to accomplish the purpose of the law. As expressed by Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol. 6, 6th Ed., p.
250):

... creandose un verdadero estado excepcional del derecho, no debe ampliarse, sino mas bien restringirse, el
alcance del precepto, manteniendo la excepcion mientras fuere necesaria y estuviese realmente contenida en la
disposicion, y aplicando las reglas generales y fundamentales del Codigo en materia de sucesi6n, en aquehos
extremes no resueltos de un modo expreso, y que quedan fuera de la propia esfera de accion de la reserva que se
crea.

The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the new Civil Code's hostility to
successional reservas and reversions, as exemplified by the suppression of the reserva viudal and the reversion
legal of the Code of 1889 (Art. 812 and 968-980).

Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate succession, the plaintiffs-appellees must be held
without any right thereto because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the praepositus), they are excluded from the
succession by his niece, the defendant-appellant, although they are related to him within the same degree as the latter. To this
effect is Abellana vs. Ferraris4 where Arts. 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code were cited and applied:

Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy nephews and nieces of the de
cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. This is readily apparent
from Articles 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that provide as follows:

Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be
entitle to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares.

Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and nieces who are the children of the
decedent's brothers and sisters of the full blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stirpes.

Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers and sisters, the other collateral
relatives shall succeed to the estate.

Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a
precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession. This was also and more
clearly the case under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that immediately preceded the Civil Code now in force (R.A.
386). Thus, Articles 952 and 954 of the Code of 1889 prescribed as follows:

Art. 952. In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews or nieces, children of the former, whether of the
whole blood or not, the surviving spouse, if not separated by a final decree of divorce shall succeed to the entire
estate of the deceased.

Art. 954. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, nor a surviving spouse,
the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate of deceased.

The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of the whole blood.

It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and nephews and nieces inheritedab intestato
ahead of the surviving spouse, while other collaterals succeeded only after the widower or widow. The present
Civil Code of the Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and brothers and
sisters of the deceased, but without altering the preferred position of the latter vis a vis the other collaterals.

xxx xxx xxx

We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not
succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to
succeed. ...

Page 89 of 104
This conclusion is fortified by the observation, also made in Padura, supra, that as to the reservable property, thereservatarios do
not inherit from the reservista, but from the descendant praepositus:

... . It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of the reservista, who may not dispose of
it by will, as long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 237). The latter, therefore, do not
inherit from the reservista, but from the descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis
causa, subject to the condition that they must survive the reservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI, Tomo 2, p. 286;
Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310) ... .

To the same effect is Cano vs, Director of Lands 5, where it was ruled that intestacy proceedings to determine the right of
a reservatario are not necessary where the final decree of the land court ordering issuance of title in the name of the reservista over
property subject to reserva troncal Identifies the reservatario and there are no other claimants to the latter's rights as such:

The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests upon the assumption that thereservatario win
succeed in, or inherit, the reservable property from the reservista. This is not true. The reservatario is not
the reservista's successor mortis causa nor is the reservable property part of thereservista's estate;
the reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant (prepositus), said property merely
reverting to the line of origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed during
the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the reservista,
the matter must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a life interest in the reservable property.

It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of the reservista, the reservatario nearest to
the prepositus (the appellee in this case) becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the
reservable property. As already stated, that property is no part of the estate of the reservista, and does not even
answer for the debts of the latter. ... .

Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus, there is no doubt that the plaintiffs-appellees would have been
excluded by the defendant-appellant under the rules of intestate succession. There is no reason why a different result should obtain
simply because "the transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva;" 6 i.e., the property took a
"detour" through an ascendant-thereby giving rise to the reservation before its transmission to the reservatario.

Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the defendant-appellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to
the entirety of the reversionary property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower Court is reversed and set aside and the complaint is dismissed, with costs against
the plaintiffs-appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Page 90 of 104
G.R. No. 68843-44 September 2, 1991

MARIQUITA O. SUMAYA and LAGUNA AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COCONUT COOPERATIVE, INC., petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and AMADEO, SANCHO, DONATO, LUIS, ERASTO, LUISA, JOSE and DOLORES, all
surnamed BALANTAKBO, respondents.

Succession; Reserva troncal; Petitioners not innocent purchasers for value and in good faith.Petitioners would want this Court to
reverse the findings of the court a quo, which the appellate court affirmed, that they were not innocent purchasers for value, xxx xxx
The court a quo found otherwise. Upon the death of the propositus, Raul Balantakbo, the reservista, Consuelo vda. de Balantakbo
caused the registration of an affidavit of self-adjudication of the estate of Raul, wherein it was clearly stated that the properties
were inherited by Raul from his father Jose, Sr., as regards the subject matter of Civil Case No. SC-956 and from his maternal
grandmother, Luisa Bautista, as regards the subject matter of Civil Case No. SC-957. The court a quo further ruled that said affidavit
was, in its form, declaration and substance, a recording with the Registry of Deeds of the reservable character of the properties. xxx
xxx.

Same; Same; Property registration decree; Constructive notice of reservable character of property.It was admitted that the
certificates of titles covering the properties in question show that they were free from any liens and encumbrances at the time of
the sale. The fact remains however, that the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo stating the source of the properties
thereby showing the reservable nature thereof was registered with the Register of Deeds of Laguna, and this is sufficient notice to
the whole world in accordance with Section 52 of the Property Registration Decree.

Same; Same; Same; Obligation to annotate reservable character of property in the Registry of Property.Consistent with the rule
in reserva viudal where the person obliged to reserve (the widowed spouse) had the obligation to annotate in the Registry of
Property the reservable character of the property, in reserva troncal, the reservor (the ascendant who inherited from a descendant
property which the latter inherited from another ascendant) has the duty to reserve and therefore, the duty to annotate also. The
jurisprudential rule requiring annotation in the Registry of Property of the right reserved in real property subject of reserva viudal
insofar as it is applied to reserva troncal stays despite the abolition of reserva viudal in the New Civil Code. This rule is consistent
with the rule provided in the second paragraph of Section 51 of P.D. 1529, which provides that: The act of registration shall be the
operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned x x x. (italics supplied)

Same; Same; Prescription; When cause of action commenced.The respondent appellate court did not err in finding that the cause
of action of the private respondents did not prescribe yet. The cause of action of the reservees did not commence upon the death of
the propositus Raul Balantakbo on June 13, 1952 but upon the death of the reservor Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo on June 3, 1968.
Relatives within the third degree in whose favor the right (or property) is reserved have no title of ownership or of fee simple over
the reserved property during the lifetime of the reservor; Only when the reservor should die before the reservees will the latter
acquire the reserved property, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their place in the succession of the
descendant of whom they are relatives within the third degree.

DECISION

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in C.A. G.R. No.
CV-01292-93, which affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Laguna in the consolidated
cases in Civil Case No. SC-9561 and Civil Case No. SC-957.2

The parties entered into a stipulation of facts in the court a quo, which is summarized as follows:

Raul Balantakbo inherited from two (2) different ascendants the two (2) sets of properties subject of this case: 1) A one-third (1/3)
interest, pro-indiviso in a parcel of land situated in Dita, Lilio (Liliw) Laguna and described in paragraph 7 of the complaint in Civil
Case No. SC-956 from his father Jose, Sr., who died on January 28, 1945; and 2) A one-seventh (1/7) interest pro-indiviso in ten (10)
parcels of registered lands described in paragraph 6 of the complaint in Civil Case No. SC-957 from his maternal grandmother, Luisa
Bautista, who died on November 3, 1950.

On June 13, 1952, Raul died intestate, single, without any issue, and leaving only his mother, Consuelo Joaquin Vda. de Balantakbo,
as his sole surviving heir to the real properties above-mentioned.

On November 3, 1952, Consuelo adjudicated unto herself the above described properties in an Affidavit entitled "Caudal
Herederario del finado Raul Balantakbo" which provided, among others:

I. Que de mi legitimo matrimonio con mi difunto esposo, Jose Balantakbo, he tenido varios hijos, entre ellos si difunto hijo,
llamado Raul Balantakbo.

II. Que mi referido hijo Raul Balantakbo, fallencio el 13 de Junio de 1952, en la Ciudad de Pasay, durante su minolia de edad
sin dejar testamento alguno.

Page 91 of 104
 III. Que el finado Raul Balantakbo al morir no ha dejado descendiente alguno.

IV. Que soy la unica ascendiente superviviento de mi referido hijo Raul Balantakbo y por lo tanto su unica heredera
formosa, legitima y universal.

V. Que el finado Raul Balantakbo murio sin dejar deuda alguna.

VI. Que el finado al morir dejo propiedades consistentes en bienes inmuebles situados en la Provincia de Laguna.

VII. Que dichas propriedades fueron a su vez adquiridas por el finado Raul Balantakbo per herencia de su difunto padre,
Jose Balantakbo, y de su tia abuela Luisa Bautista.

xxx xxx xxx

(Rollo, p. 29)

On December 21, 1959, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo sold the property described in Civil Case No. SC-956 to Mariquita H.
Sumaya. The sale was evidenced by a deed attached as Annex "C" to the complaint. The same property was subsequently sold by
Mariquita Sumaya to Villa Honorio Development Corporation, Inc., on December 30, 1963. On January 23, 1967, Villa Honorio
Development Corporation transferred and assigned its rights over the property in favor of Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc.
The documents evidencing these transfers were registered in the Registry of Deeds of Laguna and the corresponding certificates of
titles were issued. The properties are presently in the name of Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc., 2/3 share and the
remaining 1/3 share is in the name of Sancho Balantakbo.

Also on December 30, 1963, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo sold the properties described in the complaint in Civil Case No. SC-
957 to Villa Honorio Development Corporation, Inc. The latter in turn transferred and assigned all its rights to the properties in favor
of Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. which properties are presently in its possession.

The parties admit that the certificates of titles covering the above described properties do not contain any annotation of its
reservable character.

On June 3, 1968, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo died.

On March 4, 1970, Amadeo, Sancho, Donato, Luis, and Erasto, all surnamed Balantakbo, brothers in full blood of Raul Balantakbo
and Luisa, Jose and Dolores, also all surnamed Balantakbo, surviving children of deceased Jose Balantakbo, Jr., another brother of
the first named Balantakbos, filed the above mentioned civil cases to recover the properties described in the respective complaints
which they claimed were subject to a reserva troncal in their favor.

The court a quo found that the two (2) cases varied only in the identity of the subject matter of res involved, the transferees, the
dates of the conveyances but involve the same legal question of reserva troncal. Hence, the consolidation of the two (2) cases.

After trial, the court a quo rendered a joint decision in favor of the Balantakbos, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in both Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and SC-957, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendants, as follows:

1. Ordering the defendant Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. to convey to the plaintiffs

a) In Civil Case No. SC-956 the one-third (1/3) interest and ownership, pro-indiviso, in and over the parcel of land
described in paragraph three (3) sub-paragraph 1, of pages one (1) and two (2) of this decision;

b) In Civil Case No. SC-957 the one-seventh (1/7) interest and ownership, pro-indiviso, in and over the ten (10)
parcels of land described in paragraph three (3), sub-paragraph 2, of pages two (2) and three (3) of this decision;

c) The plaintiffs are to share equally in the real properties herein ordered to be conveyed to them by the
defendants with plaintiffs Luisa, Jose and Dolores, all surnamed Balantakbo, receiving one-third (1/3) of the one
share pertaining to the other plaintiffs who are their uncles:

2. Ordering the Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. to account for and pay to the plaintiffs the value of the
produce from the properties herein ordered to be returned to the plaintiffs, said accounting and payment of income being
for the period from January 3, 1968 until date of reconveyance of the properties herein ordered:

3. In each of Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and SC-957, defendants are to pay plaintiffs

a. One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos in litigation expenses.

Page 92 of 104
 b. Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos in attorney's fees.

4. Defendants are to pay the costs in each of Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and 957.

xxx xxx xxx

(p. 46, Rollo)

This decision was appealed to the appellate court which affirmed the decision of the court a quo in toto. The motion for
reconsideration was denied (p. 65, Rollo) by the appellate court which found no cogent reason to reverse the decision.

This petition before Us was filed on November 12, 1984 with the petitioners assigning the following errors allegedly committed by
the appellate court:

I. The trial court erred in not finding defendants an (sic) innocent purchaser for value and in good faith of the properties
covered by certificates of title subject of litigation.

II. The trial court erred in finding it unnecessary to annotate the reservable interest of the reservee in the properties
covered by certificates of title subject of litigation.

III. The trial court erred in finding that the cause of action of the plaintiffs (private respondents) has not yet prescribed.

IV. The trial court erred in awarding moral and actual damages in favor of the plaintiffs by virtue of the institution of Civil
Cases Nos. 956 and 957.

Petitioners would want this Court to reverse the findings of the court a quo, which the appellate court affirmed, that they were not
innocent purchasers for value. According to petitioners, before they agreed to buy the properties from the reservor (also
called reservista), Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo, they first sought the legal advice of their family consultant who found that
there was no encumbrance nor any lien annotated on the certificate of title coveting the properties.

The court a quo found otherwise. Upon the death of the propositus, Raul Balantakbo, the reservista, Consuelo vda. de Balantakbo
caused the registration of an affidavit of self-adjudication of the estate of Raul, wherein it was clearly stated that the properties
were inherited by Raul from his father Jose, Sr., as regards the subject matter of Civil Case No. SC-956 and from his maternal
grandmother, Luisa Bautista, as regards the subject matter of Civil Case No. SC-957. The court a quo further ruled that said affidavit
was, in its form, declaration and substance, a recording with the Registry of Deeds of the reservable character of the properties. In
Spanish language, the affidavit clearly stated that the affiant, Consuelo, was a lone-ascendant and heir to Raul Balantakbo, her son,
who died leaving properties previously inherited from other ascendants and which properties were inventoried in the said affidavit.

It was admitted that the certificates of titles covering the properties in question show that they were free from any liens and
encumbrances at the time of the sale. The fact remains however, that the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo stating
the source of the properties thereby showing the reservable nature thereof was registered with the Register of Deeds of Laguna,
and this is sufficient notice to the whole world in accordance with Section 52 of the Property Registration Decree (formerly Sec. 51
of R.A. 496) which provides:

Sec. 52. CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE UPON REGISTRATION. Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien attachment, order,
judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the Office of the Register of
Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of
such registering, filing or entering.

Thus, in Gatioan v. Gaffud, G.R. No. L-21953, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 706, 712-713, cited in People v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 74226-27,
July 27, 1989, 175 SCRA 597; Garcia v. CA and PNB v. CA, et al., G.R. Nos. L-48971 and L-40911, both dated January 22, 1980, 95
SCRA 380 and Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 600, We held:

When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and
equitable, included therein . . .

Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record affecting the title. Such
presumption is irrebuttable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact
which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or
good faith. Otherwise, the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption
cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any more than one may be permitted to
show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the
public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute, any variation would lead to endless confusion and useless
litigation. . . .

Page 93 of 104
In the case of Bass v. De la Rama, 73 Phil. 682, 685, the rule was laid down that the mere entry of a document in the day book
without noting it on the certificate of title is not sufficient registration. However, that ruling was superseded by the holding in the
later six cases of Levin v. Bass, 91 Phil. 420. As explained in Garcia v. CA, et al., G.R. Nos. L-48971 and 49011, January 20, 1980, 95
SCRA 380, 388, which is the prevailing doctrine in this jurisdiction.

That ruling was superseded by the holding in the later six cases of Levin v. Bass, 91 Phil. 420, where a distinction was made
between voluntary and involuntary registration, such as the registration of an attachment, levy upon execution, notice of lis
pendens, and the like. In cases of involuntary registration, an entry thereof in the day book is a sufficient notice to all
persons even if the owner's duplicate certificate of title is not presented to the register of deeds.

On the other hand, according to the said cases of Levin v. Bass, in case of voluntary registration of documents an innocent
purchaser for value of registered land becomes the registered owner, and, in contemplation of law the holder of a
certificate of title, the moment he presents and files a duly notarized and valid deed of sale and the same is entered in the
day book and at the same time he surrenders or presents the owner's duplicate certificate of title covering the land sold
and pays the registration fees, because what remains to be done lies not within his power to perform. The register of deeds
is duty bound to perform it. (See Potenciano v. Dineros, 97 Phil. 196).

In this case, the affidavit of self adjudication executed by Consuelo vda. de Balantakbo which contained a statement that the
property was inherited from a descendant, Raul, which has likewise inherited by the latter from another ascendant, was registered
with the Registry of Property. The failure of the Register of Deeds to annotate the reservable character of the property in the
certificate of title cannot be attributed to Consuelo.

Moreover, there is sufficient proof that the petitioners had actual knowledge of the reservable character of the properties before
they bought the same from Consuelo. This matter appeared in the deed of sale (Exhibit "C") executed by Consuelo in favor of
Mariquita Sumaya, the first vendee of the property litigated in Civil Case No. SC-956, as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

That, I (Consuelo, vendor) am the absolute and exclusive owner of the one-third (1/3) portion of the above described parcel
of land by virtue of the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition executed by the Heirs of the deceased Jose Balantakbo dated
December 10, 1945 and said portion in accordance with the partition above-mentioned was adjudicated to Raul
Balantakbo, single, to (sic) whom I inherited after his death and this property is entirely free from any encumbrance of any
nature or kind whatsoever, . . . (p. 42, Rollo)

It was admitted though that as regards the properties litigated in Civil Case SC-957, no such admission was made by Consuelo to put
Villa Honorio Development on notice of the reservable character of the properties. The affidavit of self-adjudication executed by
Consuelo and registered with the Registry would still be sufficient notice to bind them.

Moreover, the Court a quo found that the petitioners and private respondents were long time acquaintances; that the Villa Honorio
Development Corporation and its successors, the Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative Inc., are family corporations of the
Sumayas and that the petitioners knew all along that the properties litigated in this case were inherited by Raul Balantakbo from his
father and from his maternal grandmother, and that Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo inherited these properties from his son Raul.

The obligation to reserve rests upon the reservor, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo. Article 891 of the New Civil Code on reserva
troncal provides:

Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous
title from another ascendant or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by
operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said
property came. (Emphasis supplied)

We do not agree, however, with the disposition of the appellate court that there is no need to register the reservable character of
the property, if only for the protection of the reservees, against innocent third persons. This was suggested as early as the case
of Director of Lands v. Aguas, G.R. No. 42737, August 11, 1936, 63 Phil. 279. The main issue submitted for resolution therein was
whether the reservation established by Article 811 (now Art. 891 of the New Civil Code) of the Civil Code, for the benefit of the
relatives within the third degree belonging to the line of the descendant from whom the ascendant reservor received the property,
should be understood as made in favor of all the relatives within said degree and belonging to the line above-mentioned, without
distinction legitimate, natural and illegitimate ones not having the legal status of natural children. However, in an obiter dictum this
Court stated therein:

The reservable character of a property is but a resolutory condition of the ascendant reservor's right of ownership. If the
condition is fulfilled, that is, if upon the ascendant reservor's death there are relatives having the status provided in Article
811 (Art. 891, New Civil Code), the property passes, in accordance with this special order of succession, to said relatives, or
to the nearest of kin among them, which question not being pertinent to this case, need not now be determined. But if this
condition is not fulfilled, the property is released and will be adjudicated in accordance with the regular order of succession.
The fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the resolutory condition, the efficacy or cessation of the reservation, the acquisition of

Page 94 of 104
 rights or loss of the vested ones, are phenomena which have nothing to do with whether the reservation has been noted or
not in the certificate of title to the property. The purpose of the notation is nothing more than to afford to the persons
entitled to the reservation, if any,
due protection against any act of the reservor, which may make it ineffective . . . (p. 292, Ibid)

Likewise, in Dizon and Dizon v. Galang, G.R. No. 21344, January 14, 1926, 48 Phil. 601, 603, this Court ruled that the reservable
character of a property may be lost to innocent purchasers for value. Additionally, it was ruled therein that the obligation imposed
on a widowed spouse to annotate the reservable character of a property subject of reserva viudal is applicable to reserva troncal.
(See also Edrozo v. Sablan, G.R. No. 6878, September 13, 1913, 25 Phil. 295).

Since these parcels of land have been legally transferred to third persons, Vicente Galang has lost ownership thereof and
cannot now register nor record in the Registry of Deeds their reservable character; neither can he effect the fee simple,
which does not belong to him, to the damage of Juan Medina and Teodoro Jurado, who acquired the said land in good faith,
free of all incumbrances. An attempt was made to prove that when Juan Medina was advised not to buy the land he
remarked, "Why did he (Vicente Galang) not inherit it from his son?" Aside from the fact that it is not clear whether this
conservation took place in 1913 or 1914, that is, before or after the sale, it does not arise that he had any knowledge of the
reservation. This did not arise from the fact alone that Vicente Galang had inherited the land from his son, but also from the
fact that, by operation of law, the son had inherited it from his mother Rufina Dizon, which circumstance, so far as the
record shows, Juan Medina had not been aware of. We do not decide, however, whether or not Juan Medina and Teodoro
Jurado are obliged to acknowledge the reservation and to note the same in their deeds, for the reason that there was no
prayer to this effect in the complaint and no question raised in regard thereto.

Consistent with the rule in reserva viudal where the person obliged to reserve (the widowed spouse) had the obligation to annotate
in the Registry of Property the reservable character of the property, in reserva troncal, the reservor (the ascendant who inherited
from a descendant property which the latter inherited from another descendant) has the duty to reserve and therefore, the duty to
annotate also.

The jurisprudential rule requiring annotation in the Registry of Property of the right reserved in real property subject of reserva
viudal insofar as it is applied to reserva troncal stays despite the abolition of reserva viudal in the New Civil Code. This rule is
consistent with the rule provided in the second paragraph of Section 51 of P.D. 1529, which provides that: "The act of registration
shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned . . ." (emphasis supplied)

The properties involved in this case are already covered by a Torrens title and unless the registration of the limitation is effected
(either actual or constructive), no third persons shall be prejudiced thereby.

The respondent appellate court did not err in finding that the cause of action of the private respondents did not prescribe yet. The
cause of action of the reservees did not commence upon the death of the propositus Raul Balantakbo on June 13, 1952 but upon the
death of the reservor Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo on June 3, 1968. Relatives within the third degree in whose favor the right (or
property) is reserved have no title of ownership or of fee simple over the reserved property during the lifetime of the reservor. Only
when the reservor should die before the reservees will the latter acquire the reserved property, thus creating a fee simple, and only
then will they take their place in the succession of the descendant of whom they are relatives within the third degree (See Velayo
Bernardo v. Siojo, G.R. No. 36078, March 11, 1933, 58 Phil. 89). The reserva is extinguished upon the death of the reservor, as it then
becomes a right of full ownership on the part of the reservatarios, who can bring a reivindicatory suit therefor. Nonetheless, this
right if not exercised within the time for recovery may prescribe in ten (10) years under the old Code of Civil Procedure (see Carillo v.
De Paz, G.R. No. L-22601, October 28, 1966, 18 SCRA 467, 473) or in thirty years under Article 1141 of the New Civil Code. The
actions for recovery of the reserved property was brought by herein private respondents on March 4, 1970 or less than two (2) years
from the death of the reservor. Therefore, private respondents' cause of action has not prescribed yet.

Finally, the award of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) for actual litigation expenses and two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) for
attorney's fees is proper under Article 2208(2) of the New Civil Code. Private respondents were compelled to go to court to recover
what rightfully belongs to them.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is AFFIRMED, except for the
modification on the necessity to annotate the reversable character of a property subject of reserva troncal.

SO ORDERED.

Page 95 of 104
G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000

JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,1 petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA2 COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS, respondents.

Civil Law; Succession; Wills; Successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and compulsory heirs
are called to succeed by operation of law.It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted
from the moment of death of the decedent and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children
and descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs. Thus, the petitioner, his
mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without
need of further proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted to them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla.

Same; Same; Same; Inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by
his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at
the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the
obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his
death.

Same; Same; Same; Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first
instituted.Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first
instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the designation of another heir to whom the
property shall pass in case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in
a simple substitution, or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to
another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution.

Same; Same; Same; In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of
incapacity, predecease or renunciation.In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by
reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation. In the case under consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide
that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrixs near descendants would
substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the
Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrixs near descendants.

Same; Same; Same; In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the property and to transmit
the same later to the second heir; Without the obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will, there is no
fideicommissary substitution.In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the property and to
transmit the same later to the second heir. In the case under consideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to
alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important
element of a fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the
property and its transmission to the second heir. Without this obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will,
there is no fideicommissary substitution. Also, the near descendants right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The property
will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of the usufruct to private
respondent.

Same; Same; Same; A fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not related by first degree to the second
heir.Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here. Under Article 863, the second heir or the
fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A
fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not related by first degree to the second heir. In the case under
scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.

Same; Same; Same; Distinction between modal institution and conditional testamentary disposition.The institution of an heir in
the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a
modal institution, the testator states (1) the, object of the institution, the purpose or application of the property left by the testator,
or the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. A mode imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect
the efficacy of his rights to the succession. On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen
or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate; and the
mode obligates but does not suspend. To some extent, it is similar to a resolutory condition.

Same; Same; Same; In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not conditional.Then too, since
testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition
unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be
considered as modal and not conditional.

Same; Same; Same; In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, the testators intention is to
be ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was made.In the
Page 96 of 104
interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to the application of any of its provisions, the testators
intention is to be ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was made. Such
construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts must be adopted.

Same; Same; Same; A Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person disposes of his property, to take effect
after his death.Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person disposes of his
property, to take effect after his death. Since the Will expresses the manner in which a person intends how his properties be
disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of a compromise
agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose of making a Will.

DECISION

PURISIMA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals,3 dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555, which set
aside the decision of Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, and ordered the defendants-appellees (including herein
petitioner), as heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of
Aleja Belleza.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the
herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot
No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil, which was duly probated and admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046 before
the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, contained the following provisions:

"FIRST

I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla resident of 141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City:

(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), which is registered in
my name according to the records of the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental.

(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned property and the rights which I shall set forth
hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged by the children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.

xxx

FOURTH

(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die and Jorge Rabadilla shall have already received the
ownership of the said Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), and also at
the time that the lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies,
every year to give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and Twenty Five (25) piculs of
Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies.

FIFTH

(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shall have the obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph of his
testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of December of each year.

SIXTH

I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the event that the one to whom I have left and bequeathed, and
his heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage this said Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect and
deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, on each month of December, SEVENTY
FIVE (75) piculs of Export and TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic, until Maria Marlina shall die, lastly should the buyer, lessee or
the mortgagee of this lot, not have respected my command in this my addition (Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall
immediately seize this Lot No. 1392 from my heir and the latter's heirs, and shall turn it over to my near desendants, (sic) and the
latter shall then have the obligation to give the ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until Maria Marlina shall die. I further command
in this my addition (Codicil) that my heir and his heirs of this Lot No. 1392, that they will obey and follow that should they decide to
sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others than my near descendants and my sister."4

Page 97 of 104
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No.
44498 thereto issued in his name.

Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all
surnamed Rabadilla.

On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 5588, before
Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the
provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil, in that:

1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the Republic Planters Bank in disregard of the testatrix's
specific instruction to sell, lease, or mortgage only to the near descendants and sister of the testatrix.

2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one hundred (100) piculs of sugar (75 piculs export sugar
and 25 piculs domestic sugar) to plaintiff Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of
the complaint as mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated demands for compliance.

3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil which provided that in case of the sale, lease, or
mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar
per crop year to herein private respondent.

The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving
heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance
of a new certificate of title in the names of the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.

On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in default but on March 28, 1990 the Order of Default was lifted, with
respect to defendant Johnny S. Rabadilla, who filed his Answer, accordingly.

During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:

On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a certain Alan Azurin, son-in-law of the herein petitioner who was
lessee of the property and acting as attorney-in-fact of defendant-heirs, arrived at an amicable settlement and entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar, to the following effect:

"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry No. 49074 of TCT No. 44489 will be delivered not later than January of
1989, more specifically, to wit:

75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then existing in any of our names, Mary Rose Rabadilla y Azurin or Alan Azurin,
during December of each sugar crop year, in Azucar Sugar Central; and, this is considered compliance of the annuity as mentioned,
and in the same manner will compliance of the annuity be in the next succeeding crop years.

That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986-87, and 1987-88, will be complied in cash equivalent of the number of
piculs as mentioned therein and which is as herein agreed upon, taking into consideration the composite price of sugar during each
sugar crop year, which is in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P105,000.00).

That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on a staggered cash installment, payable on or before the end of
December of every sugar crop year, to wit:

For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1988-
89;

For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1989-
90;

For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1990-
91; and

For 1988-89, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1991-
92."5

However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement except for a partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of
sugar corresponding to sugar crop year 1988 -1989.

On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision, dismissing the complaint and disposing as follows:

Page 98 of 104
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, the Court finds that the action is prematurely filed as no cause of action against
the defendants has as yet arose in favor of plaintiff. While there maybe the non-performance of the command as mandated exaction
from them simply because they are the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in question, does not warrant
the filing of the present complaint. The remedy at bar must fall. Incidentally, being in the category as creditor of the left estate, it is
opined that plaintiff may initiate the intestate proceedings, if only to establish the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and in order to give full
meaning and semblance to her claim under the Codicil.

In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint being prematurely filed is DISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED."6

On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court; ratiocinating and ordering
thus:

"Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellant's right to receive 100 piculs of sugar annually out of the
produce of Lot No. 1392; defendants-appellee's obligation under Aleja Belleza's codicil, as heirs of the modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to
deliver such amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant; defendants-appellee's admitted non-compliance with said obligation since 1985;
and, the punitive consequences enjoined by both the codicil and the Civil Code, of seizure of Lot No. 1392 and its reversion to the
estate of Aleja Belleza in case of such non-compliance, this Court deems it proper to order the reconveyance of title over Lot No.
1392 from the estates of Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja Belleza. However, plaintiff-appellant must institute separate
proceedings to re-open Aleja Belleza's estate, secure the appointment of an administrator, and distribute Lot No. 1392 to Aleja
Belleza's legal heirs in order to enforce her right, reserved to her by the codicil, to receive her legacy of 100 piculs of sugar per year
out of the produce of Lot No. 1392 until she dies.

Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one entered ordering defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge
Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.

SO ORDERED."7

Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of Appeals, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present petition,
contending that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of the testatrix Aleja Belleza on the
basis of paragraph 6 of the Codicil, and in ruling that the testamentary institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a modal institution within
the purview of Article 882 of the New Civil Code.

The petition is not impressed with merit.

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving the appeal in accordance with Article 882 of the New Civil Code on
modal institutions and in deviating from the sole issue raised which is the absence or prematurity of the cause of action. Petitioner
maintains that Article 882 does not find application as there was no modal institution and the testatrix intended a mere simple
substitution - i.e. the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to be substituted by the testatrix's "near descendants" should the
obligation to deliver the fruits to herein private respondent be not complied with. And since the testatrix died single and without
issue, there can be no valid substitution and such testamentary provision cannot be given any effect.

The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for the reason that the substituted heirs are not definite, as
the substituted heirs are merely referred to as "near descendants" without a definite identity or reference as to who are the "near
descendants" and therefore, under Articles 8438 and 8459 of the New Civil Code, the substitution should be deemed as not written.

The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to his supposition that the Court of Appeals deviated from the issue posed
before it, which was the propriety of the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prematurity of cause of action, there was no
such deviation. The Court of Appeals found that the private respondent had a cause of action against the petitioner. The disquisition
made on modal institution was, precisely, to stress that the private respondent had a legally demandable right against the petitioner
pursuant to subject Codicil; on which issue the Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with law.

It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent10 and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to
their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs.11 Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as
compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need of further
proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted to them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.

Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by
his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at
the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the
obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his
death.

Page 99 of 104
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the condition that the usufruct
thereof would be delivered to the herein private respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs
succeeded to his rights and title over the said property, and they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the
lot involved to herein private respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the right of private
respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of which is now being demanded by the latter through the institution
of the case at bar. Therefore, private respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing the
complaint below.

Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions is not applicable because what the testatrix
intended was a substitution - Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was to be substituted by the testatrix's near descendants should there be
noncompliance with the obligation to deliver the piculs of sugar to private respondent.

Again, the contention is without merit.

Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under
substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in
case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple
substitution,12 or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or
others, as in a fideicommissary substitution.13 The Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of the two.

In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or
renunciation.14 In the case under consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil
provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall
be seized and turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.

Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point, petitioner is correct. In a fideicommissary substitution, the
first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the property and to transmit the same later to the second heir.15 In the case under
consideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the
near descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the
obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the property and its transmission to the second heir. "Without this
obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary substitution."16 Also, the near
descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The property will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his
heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of the usufruct to private respondent.

Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here. Under Article 863, the second heir or the
fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A
fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not related by first degree to the second heir.17 In the case under
scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.

The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is in the nature of a modal
institution and therefore, Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the provision of law in point. Articles 882 and 883 of the New Civil
Code provide:

Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the application of the property left by the testator, or the charge imposed
on him, shall not be considered as a condition unless it appears that such was his intention.

That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that the instituted heir or his heirs give security for
compliance with the wishes of the testator and for the return of anything he or they may receive, together with its fruits and
interests, if he or they should disregard this obligation.

Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the preceding article cannot take effect in the exact manner
stated by the testator, it shall be complied with in a manner most analogous to and in conformity with his wishes.

The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession as an institucion sub
modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or application
of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir.18 A "mode" imposes an obligation upon
the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession.19 On the other hand, in a conditional
testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The
condition suspends but does not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend. 20 To some extent, it is similar to a
resolutory condition.21

From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended that subject property be
inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and
his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza,
during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his

Page 100 of 104

institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not
complied with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting
the efficacy of such institution.

Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir should not be
considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the
institution should be considered as modal and not conditional.22

Neither is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that the private respondent has only a right of usufruct but not the
right to seize the property itself from the instituted heir because the right to seize was expressly limited to violations by the buyer,
lessee or mortgagee.

In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to the application of any of its provisions, the
testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was
made.23 Such construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts must be adopted. 24

Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver One Hundred (100) piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena
Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation is imposed on the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or
mortgagee should they sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise negotiate the property involved. The Codicil further provides that in the
event that the obligation to deliver the sugar is not respected, Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall seize the property and turn it over to
the testatrix's near descendants. The non-performance of the said obligation is thus with the sanction of seizure of the property and
reversion thereof to the testatrix's near descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly imposed by the testatrix, not only on the
instituted heir but also on his successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed by the testatrix in case of non-fulfillment of said
obligation should equally apply to the instituted heir and his successors-in-interest.

Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of the amicable settlement, the said obligation imposed by the
Codicil has been assumed by the lessee, and whatever obligation petitioner had become the obligation of the lessee; that petitioner
is deemed to have made a substantial and constructive compliance of his obligation through the consummated settlement between
the lessee and the private respondent, and having consummated a settlement with the petitioner, the recourse of the private
respondent is the fulfillment of the obligation under the amicable settlement and not the seizure of subject property.

Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person disposes of his property, to take effect
after his death.25 Since the Will expresses the manner in which a person intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and
desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement which would
thereby defeat the very purpose of making a Will.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No.
CV-35555 AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs

SO ORDERED.

Page 101 of 104

G.R. No. L-11386 March 31, 1917

EMILIO NATIVIDAD, administrator of the estate of the deceased Tiburcio Salvador y Reyes, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
BASILIA GABINO, respondent-appellee.

WILLS; TESTAMENTARY PROVISIONS.Under the law the testator enjoys full liberty to make such testamentary dispositions as he
pleases, provided that they conform to the law and fulfill all its requirements. N

ID.; ID.; CONDITIONS.The testator may impose a condition in his will touching either the institution of heirs or the designation of
legatees, and, when the conditions imposed upon the latter do not fall within the provisions of the articles of the Civil Code relative
to heirs and legatees, such conditions shall be governed by the rules established for conditional obligations. (Civ. Code, arts. 790 and
791.)

ID.; CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION.All testamentary provisions shall be construed according to the literal meaning of the
words employed, unless it appears that the will of the testator is clearly and manifestly otherwise. The wishes of the testator must
be complied with literally, as they are the law in the matter of wills and last testaments. (Civ. Code, art. 675.)

ID.; TESTAMENTARY PROVISIONS.All conditions imposed in a will must be observed in accordance with the express wishes of the
testator, if they are neither impossible to fulfill and not contrary to law and morality. (Civ. Code, arts. 1114 and 1116.)

DECISION

TORRES, J.:

This is an appeal, filed by the administrator of the estate of the decedent Tiburcio Salvador y Reyes, from the order of August 21,
1915, by which the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, interpreting the true wishes of the testator, expressed the opinion
that the ownership and dominion of the property mentioned in clause 6 of the will should be awarded to Basilia Gabino, subject to
the reservation made in behalf of Lorenzo Salvador and Emilio Natividad. Therefore the trial court ordered an amendment made to
the fourth basis for the proposed partition of the decedent's estate, presented by the testamentary executor, and, as soon as such
be made, a day set for the hearing and approval of the proposed amended partition.

The testator Salvador y Reyes contracted a valid and legal marriage with Anselma Nicasio, who died in 1868, leaving a daughter
named Higinia who married Clemente Natividad. Higinia Salvador died in 1913, survived by two children Emilio and Purificacion,
both surnamed Natividad y Salvador. Tiburcio Salvador disposed of all his property in the manner recorded in the will executed in
legal form on November 9, 1914, instituting as sole heirs his grandchildren Emilio and Purificacion, both surnamed Natividad y
Salvador. In the sixth clause of this will the testator left to Basilia Gabino the legacy mentioned therein. Literally, this clause is as
follows:

I bequeath to Doa Basilia Gabino the ownership and dominion of the urban property, consisting of a house and lot
situated on Calle Lavezares of the said district of San Nicolas and designated by No. 520, and in addition eleven meters by
two meters of the lot designated by No. 419, situated on Calle Madrid. This portion shall be taken from that part of the lot
which is adjacent to the rear of said property No. 520. If the said legatee should die, Lorenzo Salvador shall be obliged to
deliver this house, together with the lot on which it stands, to my grandson Emilio Natividad, upon payment by the latter to
the former of the sum of four thousand pesos (P4,000), Philippine currency.

The executor of the estate of the decedent is the decedent's own heir, Emilio Natividad, who in due season and by counsel
presented to the court for its approval a proposed partition of the property pertaining to the estate, setting forth in the fourth basis
the following relative to the legacy made to Basilia Gabino:

Summarizing the statements made in respect to this matter, we are of the opinion that the sixth clause expresses in itself a
right of usufruct, in favor of Doa Basilia Gabino, of the house at No. 520 Calle Lavezares, and a general legacy in favor of
Lorenzo Salvador of the sum of P4,000 whenever Basilia should die; but that the ownership of the property upon which this
right and legacy are established belongs to the heir Emilio Natividad who, by the express will of the testator, had been
made liable for these encumbrances.

By a writing of August 5, 1915, counsel for the legatee Basilia Gabino opposed the approval of the proposed partition with regard to
the adjudication to the legatee of the usufruct only of the property at No. 520 Calle Lavezares, claiming that said legatee ought to be
recognized as entitled to the dominion and ownership of the same. For this and the other reasons set forth, her counsel requested
that the testamentary executor be ordered to amend the fourth basis of the proposed partition in order that ownership and
dominion, instead of usufruct only, of said property be adjudicated to the objector-legatee, Basilia Gabino.

After proper legal steps had been taken and the written briefs of the parties and the schedule of the proposed partition filed by the
testamentary executor had been examined, the trial judge issued the order aforementioned. Appeal was taken by counsel for the
executor to this court, and a transcript of the record of the proceedings below was forwarded to the clerk of this court.

Page 102 of 104

The only question raised by this appeal and submitted to us for decision is: What construction must be given to the above-quoted
sixth clause of the will executed by Tiburcio Salvador?

A person is entirely free to make his will in such manner as may best please him, provided the testamentary provisions conform to
law and meet its requirements. He may impose conditions, either with respect to the institution of heirs or to the designation of
legatees, and, when the conditions imposed upon the former or the latter do not fall within the provisions of those articles of the
Civil Code touching heirs and legatees, they shall be governed by the rules therein prescribed for conditional obligations, (Civ. Code,
arts. 790 and 791.)

In the sixth clause of the will executed by the decedent Tiburcio Salvador y Reyes, he bequeathed to Basilia Gabino the ownership
and dominion of the property therein specified as to its location and other circumstances, on condition that if the legatee should die
Lorenzo Salvador would be obliged, upon the payment of P4,000 by the testator's grandson and heir Emilio Natividad, to hand over
this property to the latter.

The condition imposed by the testator in the double legacy mentioned depends upon the happening of the event constituting the
condition, to wit, the death of the legatee Basilia Gabino, a perfectly legal condition according to article 1114 of the Civil code, as it is
not impossible of performance and is not contrary to law or public morals, as provided in article 1116 of said code.

The moment the legatee Gabino dies the other legatee, Lorenzo Salvador, is obliged to deliver the property to the heir Emilio
Natividad who, in his turn and in exchange, must pay the legatee Salvador the sum of P4,000, thereby fulfilling the double legacy
contained in the said sixth clause of the will, the first of these legacies being the voluntary reservation to Basilia Gabino of the
ownership of the said house, and the second, the conditional legacy of P4,000 to Lorenzo Salvador.

Making use of his right, the testator provided in his will that the dominion, that is, the ownership and possession of his house
situated on Calle Lavezares, No. 520 together with a part of the lot at No. 419, should be delivered as a legacy, provided that if the
legatee should die, this property instead of passing to the successor, would revert to the testator's grandson and heir, provided that
he in turn would pay to Lorenzo Salvador the sum of P4,000. It cannot be understood that the legacy conveyed only the usufruct of
the property because the plain and literal meaning of the words employed by the testator in the said clause sixth clearly shows
beyond all doubt the express wished of the testator who, establishing a voluntary reservation of the ulterior and final disposition of
the bequeathed property, ordered that the legatee's right of dominion should end at her death, and that on this occurrence his wish
was that the ownership of the property should pass to Emilio Natividad, provided the latter in turn delivered said P4,000 to Lorenzo
Salvador who appears to be the son of the legatee Gabino.

If the provisions of article 675 of the Civil Code are to be complied with, it cannot be understood that the testator meant to
bequeath to Basilia Gabino the mere usufruct of the property, inasmuch as, by unmistakable language employed in the said sixth
clause, he bequeathed her the ownership or dominion of the said property language which expresses without the slightest doubt
his wishes which should be complied with literally, because it is constant rule or jurisprudence that in matters of last wills and
testaments the testator's will is the law.

It is true that the legatee could not make any disposal of the bequeathed real property to be effective after her death, nor could the
property be acquired from her by her heir through testate or intestate succession; but if we take into account that the institution of
donations and legacies depends on the full free will of the testator, and that if the testator intended no more than that Basilia
Gabino should enjoy the ownership of the property during her lifetime, this testamentary provisions is not contrary to law or to
public morals, inasmuch as the testator thereby intended that the property should revert to its lawful heir, the latter being obliged
to make a monetary compensation to Lorenzo Salvador who appears to be the successor of the legatee Gabino.

For the foregoing reasons, considering that the order appealed from is in accordance with law and that the several features of the
sole assignment of error made thereto are without merit, the said order of August 21, 1915, must be affirmed, with the costs against
the appellant. So ordered.

Page 103 of 104

G.R. No. L-3891 December 19, 1907

ELENA MORENTE, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
GUMERSINDO DE LA SANTA, respondent-appellee.

Construction of Wills; Conditional Legacies.A testator may insert conditional provisions in his will, as prescribed by article 790 of
the Civil Code. Under article 793, a prohibition against another marriage may also be imposed, in certain cases, upon the widow or
widower. But, in order to make a testamentary provision conditional, such condition must fairly appear from the language used in
the will. It will not be presumed.

WILLARD, J.:

The will of Consuelo Morente contains the following clauses:lawphil.net

1. I hereby order that all real estate which may belong to me shall pass to my husband, Gumersindo de la Santa.

2. That my said husband shall not leave my brothers after my death, and that he shall not marry anyone; should my said
husband have children by anyone, he shall not convey any portion of the property left by me, except the one-third part
thereof and the two remaining thirds shall be and remain for my brother Vicente or his children should he have any.

3. After my death I direct my husband to dwell in the camarin in which the bakery is located, which is one of the properties
belonging to me.

Her husband, Gumersindo de la Santa, married again within four months of the death of the testatrix. Elena Morente, a sister of the
deceased, filed a petition in the proceeding relating to the probate of the will of Consuelo Morente pending in the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Tayabas in which she alleged the second marriage of Gumersindo de la Santa and asked that the legacy
to him above-mentioned be annulled. Objection was made in the court below by the husband to the procedure followed by the
petitioner. The court below, however, held that the proceeding was proper and from that holding the husband did not appeal. From
the judgment of the court below, the petitioner, Elena Morente, appealed.

In its judgment the court denied the petition. It was said, however, in the decision, as we understand it, that the husband having
married, he had the right to the use of all the property during his life and that at his death two-thirds thereof would pass to Vicente,
a brother of the testatrix, and one-third thereof could be disposed of by the husband. The construction given to the will by the court
below is not accepted by the appellant. She claims that by the mere act of marriage the husband at once lost all rights acquired by
the will. It is neither alleged nor proven that any children have been born to the husband since the death of the testatrix. lawphil.net

Article 790 of the Civil Code provides that testamentary provisions may be made conditional and article 793 provides that a
prohibition against another marriage may in certain cases be validly imposed upon the widow or widower. But the question in this
case is, Did the testatrix intend to impose a condition upon the absolute gift which is contained in the first clauses of the will? It is to
be observed that by the second clause she directs that her husband shall not leave her sisters. It is provided in the third clause that
he must continue to live in a certain building. It is provided in the second clause that he shall not marry again. To no one of these
orders is attached the condition that if he fails to comply with them he shall lose the legacy given to him by the first clause of the
will. It is nowhere expressly said that if he does leave the testatrix's sisters, or does not continue to dwell in the building mentioned
in the will he shall forfeit the property given him in the first clause; nor is it anywhere expressly said that if he marries again he shall
incur such a loss. But it is expressly provided that if one event does happen the disposition of the property contained in the first
clause of the will shall be changed. It is said that if he has children by anyone, two-thirds of that property shall pass to Vicente, the
brother of the testatrix.

We are bound to construe the will with reference to all the clauses contained therein, and with reference to such surrounding
circumstances as duly appear in the case, and after such consideration we can not say that it was the intention of the testatrix that if
her husband married again he should forfeit the legacy above mentioned. In other words, there being no express condition attached
to that legacy in reference to the second marriage, we can not say that any condition can be implied from the context of the will. In
the case of Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Jaime Vano (8 Phil. Rep., 119), we held that the legacy contained in the will therein mentioned was not
conditional. It is true that case arose under article 797 of the Civil Code, which perhaps is not strictly applicable to this case, but we
think that it may be argued from what is said in article 797 that, in order to make a testamentary provision conditional, such
condition must fairly appear from the language used in the will.

Whether the children mentioned in the second clause of the will are natural children or legitimate children we do not decide, for no
such question is before us, the contingency mentioned in that part of the clause not having arisen, and we limit ourselves to saying
merely that by the subsequent marriage of the husband he did not forfeit the legacy given to him by the first part of the will. That
was the only question before the court below. the judgment of that court, denying the petition, is accordingly affirmed, with the
costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.

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