Proceedings of the

International Colloquium
on

THE PORTUGUESE AND

THE PACIFIC
University of California, Santa Barbara
October 1993

edited by
Francis A. Dutra
and
Joo Camilo dos Santos

Center for Portuguese Studies

University of California, Santa Barbara
1995
 Contents
Joo Camilo dos Santos, Foreword
"Francis A. Dutra, Introduction 3
Martin Torodash, Magellan Historiography: Some Twenty
Years Later 11
Alfredo Pinheiro Marques, New Light on the Problem of
Cabrillo's Origin 17
Anthony Disney, Contrasting Models of "Empire": The Estado
da ndia in South Asia and East Asia in the Sixteenth and
Early Seventeenth Centuries 26
Manuel Lobato, The Moluccan Archipelago and East Indonesia
in the Second Half of the 16th Century in the Light
of Portuguese and Spanish Accounts 38
Maria da Conceio Flores, Portuguese Relationships with Siam
in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries 64
Maria Ana Marques Guedes, D. Martini, an Arakanese Prince at
the Service of the Estado da ndia and Portugal's Designs

Jacques Npote, The Portuguese, Cambodia and the Mekong

Valley: The Logic of Discovery 113
Leonard Y. Andaya, The Portuguese Tribe in the Malay-
Indonesian Archipelago in the Seventeenth and
Eighteenth Centuries 129
Roderich Ptak, Asian Trade in Cloves circa 1500: Quantities
and Trade RoutesA Synopsis of Portuguese and Other
Sources 149
George Winius, Embassies from Malacca and the "Shadow
Empire" t7fl
R.J. Barendse, Kraton and Castello: European Trade and Asian
Influences in the Indonesian Archipelago 1500-1650 179
Kenneth McPherson, Enemies or Friends* the Portuguese,
the British and the Survival of Portuguese Commerce in
the Bay of Bengal and Southeast Asia from the Late
Seventeenth to the Late Nineteenth Century 211
Bill M. Donovan, Rio de Janeiro and Portugal's Trans Oceanic
Empire, 1700-1750 ' 238
Teotonio R. de Souza, The Portuguese Discovery and lhe Jesuit
"Conquest" of Japan 250
Elsa Macedo de Lima Penalva, The Letters of the Jesuits: The
Economy of the Jesuit Missions in Japan (1614-1639) 261
Eugnio Lisboa, Triunfo, Medo e Silncio 272
lohn Kelly, The Impact of the Portuguexe on Japan as Reflected
in the Japanese Art of the 16th and 17th Centuries 279
Francis A. Dutra, The Order of Santiago and the Estado
da ndia, 1498-1750 287
Jorge Manuel dos Santos Alves, The First Decade of
Sino-Portugaese Diplomatic Relations Following the
Founding of Macau 305
W.A.R. Richardson, A Cartographical NightmareManuel
Godinho de Eiedia's Search for ndia Meridional 314
Jaap R. Bruijn, The Dutch Role in Charting the Pacific 349
Haraprasad Ray, The Eastern Ocean and the Western Ocean
Chinese Involvement in the Geopolitics of the Pacific
and the Indian Ocean Region Prior to the Advent of
Portuguese Power 364
Ng Chin-keong, Trade, the Sea Prohibition and the
"Fo-lang-chi", 1513-1550 381
Deng Kaisong and Yang Renfei, The Historical Role Played
by the Portuguese in China Before the Middle of the
Nineteenth Century 425
 The Moluccan Archipelago and
Eastern Indonesia in the Second Half
of the 16th Century in the Light of
Portuguese and Spanish Accounts1

Manuel Lobato
Instituto as, Investigao Cientifica Tropical,
Lisbon

From about 1580, Portugal and Spain began to coordinate tbeir

overseas policies under King Philip II. Portuguese settlements in
Tidore and Ambon (Central Maluku) began to be supported by
Spanish authorities in Manila against attacks from the Sultan of
Ternate. Between 1581 and 1606, the Portuguese and the Spanish
were compelled to fight the Ternatian "empire" from the Phil-
ippines, in the north, to the Lesser Sunda Islands, in the south. The
Iberian condominium over the Spice Islands ended by 1607, when
the Dutch, settled in the region, engaged with Ternate in the clove
trade on friendly terms.
The main purpose of this paper is to examine the Portuguese and
Spanish involvement in the Moluccan archipelago, focusing on the
political history of the Temate Sultanate in the second half of the
16th century, based on accounts written by Iberian crown representa-
tives. Fortunately, many of these European accounts about the
Moluccan archipelago are available. Permanent wars and a large num-
ber of Christian missions attracted the attention of many contem-
porary writers. Among them, one can find letters from governors, the
voluminous Jesuit correspondence and a few narratives from 16th and
17th century chroniclers, such as the Portuguese Diogo do Couto,
Friar Paulo da Trindade and Father Francisco de Sousa, on the one
hand, and the Spanish Bartolome Leonardo de Argensola, Dr. Antnio
de Morga, Diego Aduane and Gaspar de San Agustn. Some accounts
concerning military expeditions sent from Manila and Melaka
respectively the Spanish and Portuguese capitals in Southeast Asia
against the Dutch and the eastern Indonesian kingdoms, are also
available.
 THE MOLUCCAN ARCHIPELAGO 39

The decline of the Portuguese influence in Maluku

The Portuguese had settled in the island of Ternate by 1522, the
year in which they built a fortress there. Two decades after its
foundation, their domination over Maluku was considerable. From
the very beginning they tried to create a sort of protectorate over the
Ternate Sultanate, which they considered to be a very faithful ally.
Meanwhile, rivalry between the Portuguese and the Castilians fes-
tered until a diplomatic solution was found in 1529, when the Treaty
of Saragossa was signed. Even then, the Portuguese continued to dis-
pute control over the Spice Islands with the Spaniards. The Spaniards
were allied to the Tidore Sultanate, a traditional rival of Ternate. In
1542, Rui Lopez Villalobos, chief of a Spanish expedition, founded a
few Castilian settlements in Jailolo, Morotai and Tidore islands.
However, the Portuguese took advantage of the Castilian failure to
make theii way back to America on this occasion, and of. their lack oi
access to Indian textiles for the trade in cloves in Maluku.z
Once the Spaniards withdrew from the region, the Ternate
Sultanate tried to counter the Portuguese hegemony. This attitude,
when added to some internal disputes among the Portuguese, created
a highly ambiguous relationship between Asians and Europeans in the
region.
The period dealt with in this paper begins around the late 1530s,
the second part of the interrupted reign of Sultan Hairun. In the early
period, the Portuguese had successfully reinforced their protectorate
in Ternate. They thought they could control events through the
device of a puppet ruler, as they had done formerly with other kings.
They assured the new Sultan an uncontested power over his subjects,
as well as a comfortable hegemony for the Ternate Sultanate over the
other Maluku kingdoms. Hairun played their game, taking advantage
of the situation as opportunities came his way. During the Castilian
offensive in the 1540s, Sultan Hairun did not commit himself in the
conflict, nor did he fight the local allies of the Spaniards, who, theo-
retically, were also his enemies.3 Tematians showed a great ability to
moderate the Portuguese hegemony. After the definitive rupture
between Tematian and Portuguese authorities, in 1570, a similar pol-
icy was followed by Tidore's rulers to secure the balance of power.
To consolidate Hairun on the throne, Antnio Galvo, the
Portuguese governor, promoted a marriage between Hairun and a
daughter of the Sultan of Tidore. Initially, Hairun seemed to be recep-
tive to the proselytising proposals of the Portuguese. He divorced his
Christian wife according to the Jesuit design to separate Christians
from Muslims. Hairun also promised that his son would receive
40 MANUEL LOBATO

baptism on the condition that he should be enthroned by the

Portuguese as the king of all Christian people of Maluku.4 In this way,
the Sultan tried to circumvent the Portuguese strategy of the 1540s
and 1550s, which consisted in the creation of two blocs in Maluku:
one composed of all the Christian communities, the other made up of
Muslims. This new Christian state would have its centre at Moro, a
fertile region tha: included Morotai island and Morotia in northern
Halmahera island. In this particular region, animist and Christian
people, converted by Prancis Xavier, outnumbered the Muslims. In
this way, the Portuguese tried to ensure that they had a solid basis for
the control of Maluku, since Moro was the main supplier of foodstuffs
to the other regions which specialized in clove production. On the
other hand, Hairun made a great effort to preserve his influence in
Moro.s He appointed Christian members of his own family to rule
Christian zones in Moro, but at the same time, he made war on them
in order to extinguish Christian influence.6
In the 17th century, Father Francisco de Sousa disputed the pro-
file of Hairun drawn by Gabriel Rebelo, a Portuguese settler at
Maluku and a friend of the Sultan.7 Sousa criticised the two-faced pol-
icy of Hairun: the Sultan invoked his lack of authority over his sub-
jects who were carrying out anti-Portuguese activities, hut, he argued,
the king himself was its major instigator.8 Thus, the situation evolved
from a limited influence of Hairun over the course of events to a com-
plete manipulation by him of the Portuguese alliance. As a conse-
quence, the Sultan increased his power and independence in the
whole Maluku area. The Portuguese, or at least some of them, had
realised the waste of their efforts in dismissing kings and promoting
new ones, because local elites could always choose among a large
number of candidates for king. Where the Temate Sultanate was con-
cerned, constitutional dispositions acted as a tool used by Tcrnatian
elites to prevent their king from becoming a puppet in the hands of
the Portuguese authorities. Although the Portuguese failed to manip-
ulate the succession system, the anti-Portuguese faction succeeded in
this task after 1570.
However, it was not until the 1550s that the increasing power of
the Sultan became a threat to the Portuguese.9 The Sultanate no
longer cooperated with Christian proselytism. The era of Muslim tol-
erance was over as Temate strengthened its links with Japara, the
Javanese kingdom allied to Aceh. Thenceforth, Portuguese decline in
Maluku also became apparent.
By 1557, the king of Bacan accepted baptism. Like Jailolo, Tidore
and Temate, Bacan belonged to the group of four legendary "pillar"
kingdoms of Maluku, failolo disappeared as an independent kingdom
 THE MOLUCCAN ARCHIPELAGO 41

in 1550, when the Castilians and their allies were defeated.10

Thereafter, Hairun reinforced his position against the Christian faith
by sending a few military expeditions to attack Christian villages in
Moro and Eacan. Sultan Hairun and the Javanese community settled
at Ambon also inspired a Muslim rebellion against the local Christian
people. In reaction, the Portuguese governor arrested Hairun, but
some Portuguese casados from Temate set him free to avoid a general
revolt in all the Maluku islands. From now on, Hairun proved to be a
skilful strategist. He did not permit his influence to be weakened by
Christian expansion. At the same time, he made an effort to please
the Portuguese authorities, above all the viceroy at Goa, for fear of
major military interference from Goa or Melaka. In 1562, in a solemn
but largely symbolic act, he granted his kingdom to the Portuguese
crown. In 1563, he pre-empted a Jesuit mission in northern Sulawesi
and the Syao islands, by forcing local rulers, still animists, to embrace
Islam, avoiding in this way the expansion of Portuguese influence
into the western and northwestern regions. He showed the same
determination concerning the eastward regions. "The king of the
Papua people, Emperor of Banggai", sent his son and heir as ambas-
sador to Ternate to choose between Islam and Christianity. The
ambassadors chose the Christian faith but Hairun, the most presti-
gious ruler of the region, changed their minds by promising to marry a
daughter of the Papuan king.11
The Goa authorities, taking cognisance of the growing reli-
gious conflict in Maluku, decided to reinforce their military presence.
The Portuguese plan included the promotion of Christian communi-
ties in both number and strength to secure Portuguese rule in the
islands.12 The lower classes' reluctance to change their ancestral
beliefs for the Muslim faith encouraged early missionaries and gave
them excessive hope. In fact, initiatives of Christian proselytism
often provoked Hainan's reaction. As a consequence, the animist
communities of the most distant islands were forced to choose
between the Christian and Islamic faiths. Some rulers and chieftain-
cies of the eastern Archipelago accepted the Christian religion to flat-
ter the Portuguese and obtain advantages from them, but the kings
depended on traditional and Islamic conceptions to legitimise and
keep effective power.13

Expeditions to Maluku (1563-1569)

The Muslim revolt inspired by Ternate and the Javanese, in the
later 1550s, encouraged a Portuguese project to establish clear
suzerainty over Maluku. In 1562, the viceroy D. Francisco Coutinho
42 MANUEL LOBATO

ordered Antnio Pais to build a new fort at Rocanive, on Ambon

island. The Portuguese authorities also wished to prevent the
Javanese trade in spices. This plan failed due to the obstruction of
Hairun. Antnio Pais's expedition to Ambon, in 1563-64, could not
force southern Maluku to submit. Pais tried to obtain support from
some independent chieftaincies, but Hairun pre-empted him by mak-
ing some raids on Ambon, and attacking Christian people and local
communities who were supporting the Portuguese. The latter, at the
command of Henrique de S, governor of Ternate, withdrew from
Ambon."
Once news of this defeat was known in Goa, the new viceroy D.
Anto de Noronha ordered a stronger expedition. The fleet led by
Gonalo Pereira Marramaque left Goa around April 1566. Marra-
maque was charged with a large number of tasks in the Malay-
Indonesian seas.15 He was ordered to relieve Melaka from a possible
siege by Aceh; resolve conflicts between the Portuguese governors of
Ternate and Sultan Hairun; and force the surrender of Ambon, where,
besides the Javanese traffic in cloves, the Muslim authorities encour-
aged by the Ternatian representatives continued a sanguinary repres-
sion of Christian communities.1* However, from the beginning, the
plan did not succeed. Aceh did not besiege Melaka that year. The
fleet, sailing along the northern coast of Borneo, had to come to terms
with the recent Spanish settlement in the Philippines. Miguel Lopez
de Legazpi had fortified himself in Cebu, with the Portuguese being
impotent to expel the Spaniards. So, Marramaque had to quit the
Philippines, arriving at Maluku in 1567.
Meanwhile, Portuguese settlers from Ternate had begun to fight
the Castilian presence in the Philippines, disturbing trade in Bohol and
other islands. Marramaque's expedition was the most powerful fleet
that had been sent by the Portuguese to Maluku in many years. It was
made up of three galleons, two galleys, six foists and some five hun-
dred soldiers, reinforced by the usual galleon of trade (gaeo da car-
reira). However, the expedition was depleted in terms of personnel and
vessels as a result of battles with the Castilians in Ceb. As we have
noted, Marramaque intended to force the East-Central Archipelago to
submit. A fort was to be built in Ambon, the strategic port of call in
the sea route followed by galleons to and from Maluku. Marramaque
carried out a few military campaigns against the Javanese and their
allies at Ambon and other neighbouring islands in south-central
Maluku. The Javanese left Ambon after a fleet sent from Japara to the
rescue of Hitu, the Muslim headquarters at Ambon, was defeated. The
ambitious project, which included, besides the new fort, the provision-
ing of a fleet to secure the coasts of Maluku, failed after a few years.i7
 THE MOLUCCAN ARCHIPELAGO 43

The murder of the Sultan and the fall of Ternate fort

The Portuguese community in Maluku was concentrated at
Ternate, It was composed of some 40 to 50 settlers (vizinhas] living in
a separate compound next to the fort.18 They were not a harmonious
community united in the same political and economic aims. Most of
them were not on good terms with the natives. However, a few of
them, rich and influential people, were linked by kinship ties to local
elites, hi fact, by the late 1560s, a group of powerful casados acted as
counsellors of Sultan Hainan, while most of the Portuguese settlers
were persecuted by the Muslim authorities throughout the islands.19
To the first group belonged, for instance, Paulo de Lima, probably a
half-caste "headman" married to a Christianised niece of the Sultan
of Tidore. Because of this marriage, Paulo de Lima became landlord of
a few villages in Motiel island and a relative of Hairun.20 These rich
casados were second-generation settlers of European origin. The first
generation had been settled by governor Antnio Galvo in early
times. They played a decisive role in supporting Hairun. In other
words, the usual alliances, through marriage, between regional elites
and Maluku rulers, was enlarged to include the Portuguese communi-
ty. To the first generation of casados belonged Henrique de Lima and
Manuel da Silva, to whom M. A. Lima Cruz adds Gonalo Fernandes
Bravo and Baltazar Veloso, both married Hairun's sisters, and Antnio
Ribeiro and Lopo Ribaldo, also linked by kinship ties to the Sultan of
Ternate.21
By 1575, the Portuguese withdrew from Ternate, after a long
conflict with the local Sultanate. Contemporary writers condemned
the governor Diogo Lopes de Mesquita for his tactlessness, because he
ordered the murder of Sultan Hairun in 1570, despite his being a
"trusted ally" of the Portuguese. But, in fact, the Sultan was far from
being a faithful vassal of the Portuguese crown, and followed an
ambiguous policy vis-a-vis the Portuguese. This attitude become
more marked in his latter years. Mutual relations worsened after
Hairun increased his persecution of Christian communities in Moro.
This region includes, as we have said, Morotai, in northwestern
Halmahera, the Morotia island, located northwards, and a few small
islands, of which the most important was Rau. Christian communi-
ties in these islands included some eighty thousand souls and twenty-
nine villages. Moro was the main exporter of rice and sago. The fertil-
ity of its soil, especially in Morotai, is the result of its being a plain,
while most of the other neighbouring islands were mountainous. For
several centuries, Moro had been coveted by all the kings of Maluku.
Its possession conferred the right and the power to demand foodstuffs
44 MANUEL LOBATO

and to impose tributes. Continuous disputes and wars led natives to

seek the protection of missionaries and the Portuguese, who could
also gain access to provisions in Moro. In early times, the [esuit mis-
sion in Moro and local Christian people were persecuted by the Sultan
of Jailolo, ruler of Central Halmahera, immediately south o Moro.
Defeated by the Portuguese in 1550-51, Jailolo responded by attacking
Moro in 1558 with the support of Hairun. From 1562 to 1566 there
were some signs of appeasement, so that missionary work could go
forward. But in 1566 the Sultan of Ternate ordered unprecedented vio-
lent persecutions, which became quite regular from 1569- Something
similar had already been practised in Ambon. Perhaps the Sultan
sought, by these means, to balance the influence achieved by Gonalo
Pereira Marramaque in south-central Maluku.22
The strategy oi Hairun against the Portuguese was finally under-
stood by Marramaque. After some hesitation, he decided to arrest the
Sultan and thus recover the influence that the Portuguese had lost.
Some casados, relatives of the Sultan, tipped him off, so that he could
easily elude Marramaque's design." In 1570, Hairun was also
informed about another plan for his murder, presented by the gover-
nor of Ternate, Diogo Lopes de Mesquita. This secret affair was leaked
out from the council by some of the most prominent Portuguese resi-
dents. In that meeting, Francisco de Sousa attributes to the governor a
speech, pronounced before his compatriots, summarising all Hairun's
treacheries.24 Despite complicities and kinship ties between the Portu-
guese community and the Sultan, he was killed by order of the gover-
nor. Because of Hairun's murder, the Sultanate of Ternate, earlier the
chief "vassal" and "ally" of the Portuguese, became their most power-
ful enemy.25 Local authorities fought the Portuguese for five years,
finally expelling them from the island. The late P. R. Abdurachman
has argued that the jihad or holy war against the Portuguese was
declared just after the death of Hairun.26 However, a different version
is given by Argensola. According to him it was not until 1572 that a
confederation of all kings and sengaji of Maluku was built up against
the Portuguese, the leadership of which none of Hairun's sons had the
courage to take over, but which was accepted by Baab Ullah, the new
Sultan of Ternate,27 On the other hand, the Portuguese and mission-
ary sources refer to a rebellion all over the Eastern Archipelago,
putting an end to the internecine disputes. A similar event had
occurred in 1557, when the Portuguese governor arrested Hairun.z*
Some cultural and ideological explanations have been found to justify
these social and political reactions. Firstly, the kings of Ternate and
Tidore claimed to be of divine origin.29 Secondly, Ternate island was a
partthe chief one, because it was said to be the centreof a much
 THE MOLUCCAN ARCHIPELAGO 45

wider sacred area, extending beyond Maluku itself. The Portuguese

insisted on the geopolitical division of the region, ignoring mythical
ties between kingdoms. They only knew the intricate kinship links
among royal families that offered them an inconsistent political pat-
tern.30 Regicide perpetrated by foreigners was a violation of the idea,
deeply rooted in tradition, that the Sultan of Ternate was the king of
kings of Maluku and that his person was sacred and inviolable.
On the other hand, Spanish writers, namely Gaspar de San
Agustn, clearly note that the killing of Hairun was invoked by the
Tematians as a pretext to turn things against the Portuguese. Inside
the royal family itself, there was a faction inclined to a stronger resis-
tance against the Portuguese. The Sultan's murder was very conve-
nient to this political faction which gained power and encroached on
the legitimate royal lineage. This fact partially influenced the subse-
quent Portuguese policy.31
From that time on, the old faction which had lost its power
moved into "opposition", clustered around the legitimate lineage.
This group agreed to make some concessions to the Portuguese,
including, after 1575, to give them back the fortress, in exchange for
support to recover the crown. This domestic opposition in Ternate
also conspired with Tidorian authorities. According to Couto, the
Sultan of Ternate, Baab Ullah, ordered the killing of the presumptive
heir who was also his own brother. The governor of Maluku, Duarte
Pereira, now resident at Tidore, found this the propitious moment to
recover Ternate, hatching a scheme with Kachil Tulo, "Regent of the
Kingdom", and brother of the Sultan. Pereira appealed to the right of
succession of Kachil Tulo, taking advantage of the general indignation
in Maluku caused by the prince's murder ordered by the Sultan.32
Argensola presents a different version. According to him, after the
death of Hairun, the new governor, Nuno Pereira de Lacerda, offered
the throne of Ternate to Kachil Guarate, the eldest son of Hairun.33
Meanwhile, after the Marramaque expedition had withdrawn
from Maluku, Asians achieved naval supremacy over the seas of the
Eastern Archipelago. In Ternate, the Portuguese depended on the
acquiescence of the Sultan to gain access to foodstuffs from Moro. The
Sultan, for his part, often disrupted the supply lines.34 The fortress had
not fallen earlier because the king of Tidore, breaking his alliance with
Ternate, discreetly supplied the Portuguese encircled behind the
walls.35 During the siege, both sides kept alive negotiations for peace.
Finally, when the garrison was surrendered, Sultan Baab Ullah kept
the fortress in the name of the king of Portugal, an unprecedented and
surprising event.36 Reinforcement troops sent from Goa arrived too
late and were of insufficient strength to recover it.37
46 MANUEL LOBATO

Goa abandoned Maluku to its fate, just as governors neglected

the defence of a "conquest" that was also a place for exiled and con-
victed people.^ On the other hand, at the same time, Portuguese pos-
sessions in India suffered several attackssieges of Goa, Chaul and
Chaliyamthat inhibited adequate aid from the viceroys.39 A fleet
composed of four vessels left Goa in 1574, bui arrived at Ternate just
after the fortress surrendered.40 Altogether, three rescue expeditions
were sent to Maluku in a seven-year period, without any positive
results." Though the Portuguese showed some interest in recovering
their influence in Maluku,42 one may conclude that the Portuguese
showed relatively little inclination towards conquest, giving priority
to commerce over military enterprises. This was in contrast to the
Spaniards: "The first thing the Castilians do when they conquer [a
land] is to kill prominent people and to convert to the Christian faith
the other people, unlike us [for] the first thing we pursue is the clove
trade and [only] secondly Christianity."43 For the Jesuit priests, after
the fall of the Ternate fortress, Maluku lost its value as a mission
area. So they turned their eyes more and more to Japan."
In 1574, just before the fall of Ternate, the Portuguese also expe-
rienced some troubles in the Banda islands. Their loss of prestige gave
the Bandanese courage enough to escape their influence and attack
them.45 In Maluku the Portuguese had a royal factory and a fortress,
but their presence in Banda presented a different pattern. Here, the
Portuguese presence was reduced to a seasonal visit by the Crown's
agents and private traders, though there were some resident traders at
Neira island, A similar pattern could also be found in the Solor
islands in the early days.46 In the mid-1570s two political blocs
emerged in the Archipelago: the first one led by Temate, the other
one combining Tidore and Banda. However, though some members of
the royal family of Tidore were convinced they should help Banda to
fight the Portuguese, the Sultan had a different opinion. Because
Tidore's policy was an ambiguous one, Banda moved eventually to
Ternate's side, especially after the Portuguese built a fort at Tidore
with the Sultan's permission. Thenceforth, the Portuguese presence
in Banda depended on the surrender of Ternate: "If this Maluku sur-
renders, so will Banda."47
After 1575, Ternate's authorities multiplied fortifications on
their own island, as well in their overseas possessions. The Sultanate
received supplies, including artillery, from Johor, which was also
allied to Banda.4 This means that the difficulties experienced by the
Portuguese in Maluku were not isolated from the conflicts they had
in the western Malay world. In some sense, such problems at Ternate
were an extension of the war between the Portuguese and rival
 THE MOLUCCAN ARCHIPELAGO 47

Sultanates. These events brought to light the existence of an anti-

Portuguese coalition linking Muslim power throughout the Indian
Ocean. Aceh was the connection to the Western Indian Ocean, while
Johor was the link of a Muslim chain to Java and the Eastern
Archipelago.49
Expelled from Ternate, the Portuguese found themselves in a
very we^k position, despite their new bases at Ambon and Tidore.
The foundation of a fort at Tidore was due to the fears of the local
Sultan regarding Ternate's hegemony. The Sultan of Tidore personal-
ly rendered tribute to the Portuguese governor of Ambon, reviving an
old lost practice. Until then, neither party went back on the alliances
and mutual attitudes that had been in place for some ten years or even
more .so Besides this ambiguous alliance with Tidore, the coalition led
by Temate left to the Portuguese a few villages of little significance.
The Sultan of Ternate, Baab Ullah, intended to banish the Portuguese
presence without harming the commercial links. Thus he continued
to secure supplies of cloves for ships coming from India and Melaka.
This policy on the part of Ternate remained unchanged until the
Dutch arrival at Maluku at the end of the century.51

The Portuguese in Ambon:

War and Islamization and Christianity
From 1501, Ternate claimed political suzerainty over Ambon.
According to local sources, the Pati of Hitu made a defensive agree-
ment with Sultan Zainal Abidin from Ternate. Hitu was a town or, to
be exact, a confederation of some thirty Muslim villages, and the
strongest political formation on the northern coast of Ambon.52
P. Abdurachman, who extracted this information from a late Hituan
chronicle named Nadah, thinks the agreement served Ternate's
claims for political paramountcy over Bum, Ceram, Ambon, Lease
and Banda islands. The Hitu authorities adopted the Islamic faith in
the late 15th or early 16th century, but most common people
remained attached to animism till the next century.53
By 1525, a Portuguese settlement was created at Hitu. As in
Maluku, the governor Antnio Galvo also introduced Christianity in
Ambon about 1538. To protect Christian people and to prevent the
clove trade to Java, the governor Jordo de Freitas built, around 1544,
a stockade at Ative, then the most important Christian centre. From
1557, the Muslim authorities from Ambon, supported by Hainan and
Japara, fought the Christian influence. In the early 1560s, several re-
bellions arose against Christian communities and Jesuit missionaries,
48 MANUEL LOBATO

followed by persecutions.54 This period set off an increasingly fierce

offensive in Hitu. According to missionary figures, Christian commu-
nities in the Ambon, Lease, Ceram and Bum islands, amounted to
some seventy thousand souls by 1565. The persecutions of which
they had been victims were a reason for Goa to send the Marramaque
expedition, as we have seen. He was ordered to built a new fort at
Ambon, but the Portuguese settlers did not wait for him and they
were forced to withdraw from the island as soon as 1565.55 This par-
ticular year saw the rise of a new geopolitical framework in the
region: the Portuguese left Ambon, abandoning local Christians to
their fate,- in the southeastern extremity of the Archipelago, the
Portuguese settlement on Solor island was ravaged by a Javanese fleet
initially directed against Portuguese positions in Ambon; and finally a
change in the structure of alliances oi Hitu occurred. This micro-state
set up close relations with Gresik, in Java. However, Japara, passing
through an obscure phase, continued to support Hitu until a new king
ascended the throne in Java.56 Marramaque forced Hituwhere he
built a new stockadeas well as other populous centres in neighbour-
ing islands to submit. Sancho de Vasconcelos, the Portuguese com-
mander, of the fort, moved it tram Hitu, on ^he northern coast, to
Gelala, on the southern shore, and, afterwards, to Batumerah. In
1576 it was rebuilt in stone and lime at the place where Ambon town
today stands, deep inside the bay formed by the Hitu and Lcitimur
peninsulas.57
When the Portuguese, expelled from Ternate, returned to their
old settlement in Ambon island, they found a large and influential
Javanese community there, whose members were mostly, from [apara
and Tuban. The Javanese contributed in good measure to Hituan
resistance against the Portuguese conquerors. These efforts were
based on an anti-Portuguese agreement for the defence of Hitu, ally-
ing Japara and, probably, Tuban. It had been celebrated in the early
1570s after the Javanese, expelled from Ambon by the Marramaque
expedition, moved into Saparua. This island was ruled by a Tematian
governor who was also a close relative of Sultan Baab Ullah. Junks
from Java usually came there for cloves. Despite their limited forces,
Portuguese continued to patiol the seas and to attack small Javanese
ships in the Spice Islands.58
The Portuguese had been settled in Ambon for a long time. In
fact, some of them married women from Ative, a native group
inhabiting the neighbourhood of the port where the galleons win-
tered, awaiting the monsoon, on their way to Maluku or back to
India.59 The Portuguese survived at Ambon, after 1575, taking advan-
tage of the internal conflict between Ulilimathe union of five
 THE MOLUCCAN ARCHIPELAGO

Muslim villagesand the Ulisiwa, the union of nine villages whose

members weii; animist people, resistant to Islam and favourably
inclined to the Portuguese. The Siwa also were considered to be a
"foreign" people according to mythical and sacred geography.60 The
conflict at Ambon, due to the increasing religious proselytism, took
the appearance of a war between Christian and Muslim people. The
advent of new political forces and new religions exacerbated the ritual
nature of regional antagonisms, which emhodied opposed forces, each
one allied to a foreign people who were also political-religious repre-
sentatives. So, the Siwa from Leitimur peninsula, on the southern
shore of Ambon, were allied to the Christiansfirst to the
Portuguese, and later on, to the Dutch. On the other hand, the Lima,
from northern Hitu peninsula, adopted Islam and sought an alliance
with Ternate.61 Defeated by the Portuguese, the Hituan people took
refuge in the mountainous hinterland of the island, earlier a deserted
area.''2
Before 1580 the Portuguese had directed their attacks at targets
in Ambon and its neighbouring islands, all areas rich in cloves. At the
same time, Christian communities from distant islands, such as
northeastern Sulawesi, Syao, Moro or Bacan, were waiting for
Portuguese help to revolt against Ternatian rule.63 In the 1580s,
Ternatian military operations in the Ambon archipelago were con-
ducted by Rubuhongi, a member of the royal family of Ternate. This
prestigious warrior besieged Ambon on at least one occasion in that
decade. Later on, the same situation occurred twice, in 1593 and 1598.
The last attack counted on the support of a Javanese fleet,64 The
Sultan of Ternate, informed of the weakness of the Portuguese settle-
ment on Ambon, tried to make use of a cunning strategy. He sought
out an alliance with the Saparua island authorities and, at the same
time, he made a peaceful and commercial agreement with the
Portuguese from Ambon fort in prejudice of the Javanese settled at
Saparua.fi5 In the very late 16th century, Hitu was no longer the main
trading centre in southern Maluku. Its role was transferred to the
Hoamal (or Veranula) peninsula in southern Ceram, in which Luhu,
Kambelo and Lisidi ports were sheltered from Portuguese raids.66
The Jesuit priests at Maluku soon TcaLised the need G militaiy
efforts to stop Islamization and to give some chance to their mission-
ary project. Often, they felt the obligation to finance military struc-
tures and to pay salaries to soldiers and even to governors, as
happened with Nuno Pereira de Lacerda.*7 New converts were recruit-
ed among opponents to Ternatian expansionism. Argensola states
that many communities accepted the Christian faith to escape
Ternatian suzerainty. Religious motives played little or no role in
50 MANUEL LOBATO

their decisions.68 When the arrival of a strong fleet was expected,

many opponents of Ternate moved to the Portuguese side. The king of
Syao, an old enemy of Ternate, became Christian and preserved his
autonomy through military means. But the Christian king of Bacan
was forced to embrace Islam. The single exception to this trend
occurred in Bum island, where two Christian factions, fighting each
other, were supported one by the Portuguese and the other by
Temate. In fact, the adoption of a new faith was not enough to do
away with old and deep-rooted political rivalries.''*
Extra-cultural reasons also influenced the rejection of the
Christian faith. Often, Christianity interfered with the internal struc-
ture of insular communities, provoking authority crises or conflicts.
We can observe this at Maluku, Ambon and Solor, Local rulers,
becoming Christians, fell under the jurisdiction of Portuguese or
ecclesiastical authorities. Their Asian subjects, previously judged
according to traditional procedures, often were punished by European
authorities. Thus, the prerogatives of native authorities tended to dis-
appear.70
Retraction in local Christian adherence was due, above all, to
the Portuguese loss of political influence. This fact led to the defec-
tion of a large number of their followers.71 Until 1575, important
Christian communities were to be found at Ternate, Bacan, Jailolo
and Moro. But in Maluku, as everywhere in Southeast Asia, power
and wealth consisted in controlling people, not land. Thus, the
depopulation of Christian areas, not their conquest, was a Ternatian
strategy. Massacres and dispersion of Christian communities became
very common at Bacan. According to missionary accounts, about
1588, after three decades of continuous war and persecution, the pop-
ulation of Bacan was reduced to twenty percent of what it had
been.71 In Ternate, people converted to the Christian faith were fugi-
tive slaves of the sultan, freed by the Jesuits. They were forbidden to
follow the Portuguese when they left the island, in 1575, and were
taken back into slavery as oarsmen in the war fleet.73 However, a
great number of them could run away to Tidore and, later on, to
Ambon where they formed an important community. The
Portuguese, in their turn, made iew slaves in the Maluku wars. They
preferred to attract slaves from th enemy, thus avoiding raids, the
usual method in the Eastern Archipelago. This policy failed when the
Portuguese, losing their influence, were no longer in a position to
sustain and give protection to a great number of dependent people.
As the Portuguese and, with them, Christianity declined,
Temate increased Islamization through a coordinated policy. The
sons of the most important rulers, especially if they were Christians
 THE MOLUCCAN ARCHIPELAGO 51

or rebels, were compelled to learn Arabic and study to become

ulama.74 By forcing young men of royal blood to quit their lands, the
Sultan made them hostages and used religious faith as an imperialis-
tic ideology to reinforce his power and to consolidate people from dif-
ferent origins, hi the early 17th century, there were more than forty
Christian communities spread throughout the Ambon archipelago,
inhabiting, for defensive reasons, gunnong or fortified hillocks.7*

The Spanish period

The Portuguese inability to gain control over Maluku led them
to fear a Spanish offensive in the archipelago. A plan to conquer
Maluku was put into effect by the latter, using as their pretext its
abandonment by the Portuguese/6 Later on, the Spaniards believed
that Iberian influence in Maluku was lost because their presence in
Philippines was not consolidated in the early period.77 Just before the
Dutch arrival at Maluku, they wrote, the Portuguese had fallen in
absolute discredit among Asian people.78
In 1578, before the Union of Crowns, the Spaniards, helped by
the people of Luzon, dominated Bruneia Sultanate politically and
economically influential in the Maluku areaand Mindanao, an
Islamized political formation allied to Ternate. The Spaniards were
well positioned to take over Portuguese commercial interests at
Maluku, after 1580. However, Spain had no access to Indian cloth,
needed for trade, nor to Asian markets where cloves were in demand.
But during the northern monsoon, the distance between the
Philippines and Maluku could be sailed in 15-20 days. Due to Spanish
interference in Maluku it became possible to guarantee Iberian influ-
ence till the end of the century: in ten years, the Portuguese settle-
ment in Tidore saw the number of casados increase to some sixty
families under the protection of a Spanish garrison.79 According to
San Agustin, King Philip II decided to conquer Maluku during his
journey to Portugal for his coronation. At Lisbon he received an
embassy from Ternate. Sultan Baab Ullah realised that the Iberian
union was a threat to him due to reinforcements from the Philippines,
and hence sent KacViil Naik as ambassaoi to Lisbon. Naik took the
Borneo route, sojourning there and at the Bintan (Johor) and Aceh
Sultanates, trying to bring their rulers to orchestrate an action against
the Spaniards and the Portuguese.80
Official contacts between the Philippines and the Portuguese
authorities at Maluku began in 1581. It was a very difficult moment
for the Portuguese. By 1582, no galleon from India had arrived in the
last three years. They felt totally powerless to "stop the war against
52 MANUEL LOBATO

the King of Ternate, together with that of Tidore, because they can-
not sustain it any more".81 Argensola states that the Philippines
brought financial losses to the Spanish crown, because of the contin-
uous silver flow into Chinese hands. This was a reason why the
Crown seriously considered the possibility of abandoning it and con-
centrating its efforts on the conquest and maintenance of the Malu-
ku archipelago. However, private interests already consolidated in
the Philippineswhich dealt with trade as well with native en-
comiendasinsisted on its preservation. This policy, aiming at ship-
ping a great volume of valuable Asian goods to Europe through the
Philippines, was prejudicial to the Portuguese East-West searoute.82
Meanwhile, in 1580, Francis Drake, the famous English corsair,
visited Maluku and Banda, gaining friendship and protection from
the Sultan of Ternate.83 According to Spanish sources, initially
Drake was not welcomed because he purchased a certain amount of
cloveswithouttke. Sultan's permission. However the Englishman
appeased him by offers and promises of military support against the
Portuguese.84 Thus, after the intra-Iberian struggle for Maluku in
the first half of the 16th century, the larger European rivalry reached
the political and commercial scene of the Malay-Indonesian
Archipelago.
The decline of Portuguese influence in Maluku is often attrib-
uted to the arduous and lengthy Melaka-Maluku searoute. However,
by 1526, Jorge de Meneses discovered a shorter way along the north-
ern coast of Borneo. Sailing from Melaka, it was possible to reach
Maluku after two months of navigation. Only Portuguese sailors
made use of the northern Borneo route in the 16th century. They did
it in a single direction, from Melaka to Maluku. On their way back,
they needed to call at Ambon and Java. Thus, Maluku could be rapid-
ly reached from Melaka, although the political will to do so was not
strong enough. Like Malay and Gujarati merchants, the Portuguese
did not use the Borneo route in general. Instead, they gave preference
to the Java searoute due to the very profitable trade of the Javanese
ports of call.85 On the other hand, the private interests of some Crown
representatives were among the motives behind the lack of support
given by the Melaka authorities to the Portuguese settlements in the
Eastern Archipelago. Just as Goa provided soldiers, ships and supplies
to Melaka, Maluku, in turn, had to be supported from Melaka. To that
end, royal orders were often sent from Lisbon. However, as the royal
monopoly in cloves came to an end, Javanese traders brought increas-
ing amounts of Indonesian spices to Melaka. Therefore, Melaka's gov-
ernors often neglected human, material and financial supplies to the
Tidore and Ambon fortresses, since most of the spices brought to
 THE MOLUCCAN ARCHIPELAGO 53

Melaka by Asian merchants came into the governor's hands at very

cheap prices anyway.86
Since the Philippines lay not far from Maluku, contacts between
these archipelagos were suddenly increased.87 Just after the Iberian
crowns' unification, the Spanish committed themselves to the
retrieval of Ternate and to the establishment of a joint Hispanic
dominion over Maluku. They never completely succeeded. Reasons
for this must be found in the skilful policy of Ternate, and in the
impossibility of locally supporting large fleets during the lengthy time
required for military operations. The islands had suffered the effects
of continuous wars, which had led to the abandonment of a large
number of villages. Some native rulers lost their own wealth and
became resourceless. In a situation of general scarcity, logistical sup-
port to the war fleets was reduced to assistance brought from the
Philippines. From 1582 to 1585, the Spanish sent three expeditions to
recovei the ioitiess of Ternate.88 On the other hand, Maluku and the
Philippines remained two separate administrative areas to avoid com-
merce in cloves to Europe through Manila and America. Thus, naviga-
tion between the two never became a regular feature, contributing to
the failure of the Spanish efforts to gain paramountcy over Maluku in
the 1580s. Military expeditions did not promote colonisation or real
administrative structures. As no solid trace remained after each expe-
dition, their role was self-defeating, leading to discredit for the
Spanish and the Portuguese. Passing over their own responsibility in
the matter, later Portuguese texts insist that firearms supplied by the
Dutch to the Asians rulers, namely to the Sultan of Ternate and his
allies, were mainly responsible. In contrast, Spanish sources blame
the Portuguese for flooding Maluku with all kinds of firearms. This
particular fact sheds some Light on the attitude of Ternate and Tidore
to the Portuguese during these decades. Such arms provided the Asian
rulers the means to spread influence and consolidate power, as well as
the means and a motive to resist the Portuguese and the Spanish
offensives.89
Among the causes for the Iberian military failure, one can also
point to dissensions among the Portuguese,90 as well as the rivalry
between them and the Spaniards for the hegemony over the Spice
Islands.91 By 1583, the inclusion of Maluku in the jurisdiction of the
Philippines was being advocated. This was the answer to the threat
created by an unprecedentedly strong alliance, including Ternate and
Tidore, plus several Javanese eities, against the Portuguese fort in
Maluku. The Javanese contributed the major war effort. The Iberian
attack on Ternate, in 1585-86, was successfully repelled by three
thousand Javanese soldiers, most of them supplied with guns. The
54 MANUEL LOBATO

Portuguese tried to solve the conflictcentered, in their minds, on

the retrieval of Ternate fortby diplomatic means. An embassy sent
from Lisbon was, however, a complete failure. The war intensified
and the Portuguese remained dependent on the assistance coming
from the Philippines. As a result of unsuccessful campaigns, the
Spanish reputation emerged seriously damaged.9* Temate enlarged its
power and area of influence, threatening even the Philippines, where
the Spanish presence was not yet consolidated.9*
In the wake of the Spanish interference, the conflict opposing
the Portuguese and the Muslim people of Maluku tended to spread
out to the Philippines. From the 1580s, as the Spanish enlarged their
sphere of influence in the Philippines, the seas of this archipelago
began to be infested by Javanese and Japanese piracy."4 On the eve of
the entry of the Northern European nations, a general conflict, even if
a latent one, existed all over Southeast Asia, opposing the Portuguese
and the Spaniards to Islam. By 1590, the whole of South and Central
Maluku, including Ceram and Buru, joined the war against the
Portuguese. This spread the conflict southwards. The Banda islands
were chosen to lead the Muslim confederation and to coordinate the
holy war. This Asian choice, not a very obvious one, was possibly due
to the missionary and Portuguese presence at Solor and, generally, in
the Lesser Sunda Islands. Probably the Bandanese leadership of the
Islamic confederation was due to the need to attract new forces to the
common cause. The grant of nominal leadership to a small and decen-
tralised potentate would appease disputes for pre-eminence inside the
alliance. The decision to opt for this form of weak leadership reflects
the geopolitical realities in the Eastern Archipelago, with Saparua
island being the strongest supporter of Ternatian power in Central
and Southern Maluku. The union around the rising Islamic ideal was
not enough to solve differences among the Sultanates. On the other
hand, Banda lay in a peripheral area where the Portuguese had little
influence.95
About 1592, the Muslim confederation had brought together a
large fleet to carry on the holy war. From 1591, the Sultan SaidBerkat
of Ternate and his allies were decided on the expulsion of the
Portuguese from the positions they held- At the same time, with the
arrival of a new governor in Ambon, Antnio Pereira Pinto, the local
casados increased in number and strength.96 Spanish assistance in
Maluku reassured Portuguese authorities in Goa, while Ambon did
not cause great concern to Lisbon or Goa.97 In 1593, the Spanish failed
in the last 16th century attempt to conquer Ternate, when the
Chinese oarsmen from a powerful fleet revolted against the governor
oi the Philippines and killed him.98 Thus, Ambon became a major
 THE MOLUCCAN ARCHIPELAGO 55

source of trouble for the Portuguese in Southeast Asia, after Aceh,

while the Tidore settlement was abandoned to the sphere of influence
of the Philippines." In 1596, a great fleet from Ternate, on its way to
help several kingdoms that had revolted against Spanish rule, was
defeated by Juan de Ronquillo in the seas of the Philippines, hi 1597
Ambon was besieged by a powerful "Javanese and Moorish" fleet.100

Dutch interference and the new balance of power

The already weak position of the Portuguese in the Eastern
Archipelago worsened with the arrival of the Dutch. They were deter-
mined to expel the Portuguese and the Spaniards from the Spice
Islands and to sign monopolistic agreements with local rulers. The
Dutch soon acquired a very accurate political and commercial per-
spective on the Indonesian Archipelago. By 1599, Wijbrand van
Warwijk and Jacob van Heemskerck had signed treaties with the
native rulers of Ambon and Banda, later on confirmed by the Sultan
Said Berkat of Ternate. The Muslims of Maluku and the Javanese
joined the Dutch to attack Ambon fortress. Ternate was ready to
exchange its Portuguese trade-partnership for one with the Dutch, in
exchange for help against the Portuguese from Ambon. But van
Warwijk and van Heemskerck decided not to face the Portuguese and
their allies from Tidore, despite the insistence of Said Berkat and his
allies. The commercial agreements of the Dutch with Ternate and the
Eastern Javanese cities placed in jeopardy the acquisition of cloves by
the Portuguese.101 The Dutch built factories at Banda and Temate.102
Next year van Neck and Steven van der Hagen unsuccessfully
attacked Tidore and Ambon forts.IQ3 The Dutch brought to their
Asian allies a great advance in access to firearms and the Javanese
increased their activities in Central Maluku.104
At Ambon, where no Spanish military presence existed, the
Portuguese found themselves in a desperate situation. The Goa
authorities gave priority to the rescue of Ambon by sending three
galleons there in 1600. However they did not appeal to the Spaniards
for fear of losing jurisdiction over Maluku.105 In 1602, another fleet
commanded by the general Andr Furtado de Mendona, failing to
conquer the Javanese port of Banten, sailed for Ambon. Mendona
forced all the Muslim potentates in the area that recognised Ternatian
paramountcy to submit. Several populous and important trading cen-
tres were ravaged, including Hitu, where the Dutch held a fortified
factory. Mendona also attacked Veranula in western Ceram, where
an English factory lay.106 The authorities from Veranula sent an
embassy to Banten asking for Dutch help, promising to give them
56 MANUEL LOBATO

exclusive rights in the clove trade.107 Hiemao, on the northern shores

of Saparua, remained the single Muslim centre free from Portuguese
raids.10*
After Central Maluku temporarily submitted, the general
Furtado de Mendona was petitioned by Sultan Mole Madjimoe of
Tidore and the local Portuguese settlers to defend the island against
the Dutch and retrieve the old Portuguese fortress in Ternate. Sultan
Mole had become king in 1599 with the help of the governor Rui
Gonalves de Sequeira. After the arrival of the Dutch, who were
friendly with Ternate, Tidore approached the Portuguese and the
Spanish.109 In spite of the Ambon settlers being more interested in a
campaign against Banda where the Dutch had a major influence,
Mendona decided to attack their positions in northern Maluku.110 In
1603, his forces, together with an expedition from the Philippines,
were not enough to defeat Ternate. The Portuguese attributed this
failure to the lack of reinforcements from Melaka. The Spanish
sources emphasised the incompetence of the Portuguese general and
his officers, the lack of military discipline and experience of their sol-
diers, and the leakage of information through the casados of Tidore to
the Sultan of Ternate. In 1603, Mendona's decision to leave for
Melaka was followed by the usual syndrome of military expeditions
in Maluku. As Ternatian strength was reinvigorated, Sultan Said
Berkat became lord of Maluku and all Portuguese and missionary
dreams were brought back to earth.111
hi 1605, both Ambon and Tidore forts fell into the hands of the
Dutch. The Sultan of Tidore was forced to accept a Dutch factory in his
capital and to sign a Treaty of Protection with them, as a result of
which they came to dominate the trade in cloves. Next year, the
Spaniards, under the command of the governor of Philippines, Pedro de
Acuna, came back and regained all their lost positions, as well as the
fortress and island of Ternate. Sultan Said and his presumptive heir
fled. Persecuted by the Sultan of Tidore, Said presented himself before
the governor Pedro de Acuna who took him to the Philippines.112 As a
result of these events, the Iberian presence at Maluku came entirely
into the military and administrative sphere of the Philippines. A
Spanish governor was appointed at Malukuthe first one being [uan de
Esquiveiunder the command of the governor of the Philippines.
During the next decade, the Spanish resisted the Dutch military
supremacy with the aid of many of the local rulers and inhabitants.113
 THE MOLUCCAN ARCHIPELAGO 57

Conclusion
It is not easy to follow the twists and turns in the political tra-
jectories of the Sultanates of Ternate and Tidore on the basis of
European sources alone. The changes in the states of the region that
appear from a first reading of these sources reflect the particular
vision that Europeans in the epoch had of these courts and rulers. For
their part, the foundation myths of the inhabitants of the archipelago,
which speak of their discovery and the establishment of the primor-
dial hero in these islands, appear to have influenced the manner in
which the Moluccans viewed the arrival of these foreigners. They
were for the most part hardly seen as intruders. On the contrary, rela-
tions between the rulers of Maluku and the Portuguese and Castilians
soon came to acquire a supernatural dimension: the very strength of
the European presence was seen as a catalyst, pre-destined to favour
the expansionist tendencies of the people of the archipelago. This for-
mulation helps us understand the conduct of the Ternatians and
Tidorians in the epoch, since they sought to profit from the Iberian
presence in order to extract from it the greatest possible commercial
and political gains for themselves.
Even if the Portuguese were convinced that they were the princi-
pal obstacle to Ternatian expansionism, in fact the Portuguese pres-
ence, rather than damping the emerging power of the Sultanate,
forced Temate to seek links with other Islamic states to the west, to
build a solid military basis for its power, and to view in a rather differ-
ent manner its relations with its neighbours, since Ternate took upon
itself the role of the principal defender of an Islam threatened by
Christianity in the region. By successfully resisting the Portuguese
and Spaniards, Ternate attracted to its orbit a large number of princi-
palities which were spread far beyond the rather limited ambit of the
Moluccan archipelago.
The most significant feature, as elsewhere in the whole of the
Indonesian archipelago, is that the areas dominated by Ternate and
Tidore were discontinuous and hardly well-defined in geographical
terms; rather, they appear to be interpenetrating networks of posses-
sions, creating a strategic web which on the one hand generated con-
stant conflicts and military instability, but on the other created a geo-
strategic context that was far more stable than might be supposed.
During the period of Portuguese hegemony in the Moluccas, both
Temate and Tidore expanded their insular possessions, but the former
kingdom did so in greater measure than the latter, and in part man-
aged to do so by expanding into regions over which Tidore had earlier
established its ascendancy.
58 MANUEL LOBATO

The Castilian presence in the region after 1580 in fact permitted,

under the cloak of & radicalisation in the terms of the conflict
between Temate and the Portuguese, the fine-tuning of the centralis-
ing machinery oi the Sultanate, which came to impose its stamp little
by little over the whole eastern archipelago. During the latter half of
the sixteenth century, the Sultan of Temate came to be less and less
dependent on the traditional links of kinship, and managed to acquire
sufficient personal power and authority to be able to define and imple-
ment fairly independent and personalised policies. The turning point
here appears to have been the assassination in 1570 of Hairun, Under
his son and successor, Baab Ullah, these tendencies culminated in a
form of strong personal dominance asserted by the Sultan.
As for the Portuguese, it may be inferred from the entire discus-
sion above, that save for the clove trade that was conducted on the
route that ran from the Moluccas to Melaka, and thence to Goa, they
were unable to exploit regional conflicts to their own advantage, even
if this was the stated policy as defined by the Portuguese Crown.114

NOTES
I.I am grateful to Professor Sanjay Subrahmanyam for helping in the revision of this text for
publication.
2. V. M. Godinho, Os Descobrimentos e a Economia Mundial, 4 Vols. Editorial Presena, 21
ed., Lisboa, 1982, m, pp. 142-44.
3. M. Augusta Lima Cruz, "O assassnio do rei de Maluco, lcabcrtura de um processo",
Artur Teodoio de Matos and Lus Filipe P. Reis Thomaz (cds.|, As relaes entre a ndia
Portuguesa, a sia do Sueste e o Extremo Oriente. AiXas dt> V! Seminrio Internacional de
Histria Indo-Portuguesa (Macau, 22 a 26 de Outubro de!991), Mauau-Lisboa, 1993, p. S18
4. Id., ib., pp. 515, 518 and p. 521.
5. John Villiers, "Ls Yslas de Esperar en Dios: The Jesuit Mission in Moro 1546-1571",
Modera Asiun Studies, 22,3 (1988), p. 500.
6. Francisco de Sousa, Oriente Conquistado a esus Crista, M. Lopes de Almeida |ed.), Lello
& irmo, Porto, 197i,p, 1101.
7. Cf. M. A. Lima Cruz, "O assassnio do rei de Maluco", pp. S14-16.
8. Sousa, Oriente Conquistado, p. 1050.
9. Hubert Jacobs, S.J., "The Portuguese town of Ambon, 1567-1605", // Seminrio
Internacional de Historia Fndn-pnrtagassa, HCT, Lisboa, 1985, p. 604.
10. Leonardo Y. Andaya, "Los primeros contactos de los espanoles con el mundo de Ias
Molucas en Ias Isls de Ias Espcies", Revista Espnnola dei Pacifico. H, 2 [1992), p. 82.
11. Sousa, Orients Canqaixtadu, pp. 1043,1059,1115 e 420-21.
12. M. A. Lima Cruz, "O assassnio do rei de Maluco", pp. 526-27.
13. John Villiers, "The Cash-crop Economy and State Formation in the Spice Islands in the
Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries", J. Kathmthamhy-Wells S. John Villiers |eds.), The
Southeast Asian Port and Polity. Rise and Demise, Singapore University Press, Singapore,
1930, p. 96.
 THE MOLUCCAN ARCHIPELAGO 59

14. Francisco de Sousa casts suspicion on Henrique de S, who may have been bribed by
Sultan Hairun [Oriente Conquistado, pp. 1045-571.
15. Manamaque's departure from Goa is dated by Francisco de Sousa to 1567 contradicting
1566 as staled by Diogo do Couto (id., ibid., p. 1058).
16. It was not known in India that, meanwhile, the Portuguese had withdrawn from Ambon
(Artur Basflio de S, (ed], Documentao para a Histria das Misses do Padioado
Pnrtugues do Oriente - Insulinilia, E, Lisboa, 1955. p. 435-44, henceforth DHMPPO|.
17. Sousa, Oriente Conquistado, p. 1066; DHMPPO-lnsuIindia, IV, p. 174, Caspar dc San
Agustn, O.S.A., Conquistas de, las Isias Filipinas (1565-1615), Manuel Merino, O.S.A. (ed.|,
C.S.I.C., Madrid. 1975, Liv. I, Cap. XXI, pp. 156-57; DHMPPO-Insuiindia, IV, pp. 457 e 472.
On Gonalo Pereira Marrarnaque, see M. A. Lima Cruz, "A viagem de Gonalo Pereira
Marraraaque do Minho s Molucss ou ns itinerrios da fidalguia portuguesa no Oriente",
Slvdia, 49 (1989), pp. 333-36.
18. Hubert Jacobs, S.f., Documenta Malucencia, II, Roma, 1980, p. 79, henceforth DM.
19. DHMPPO-lnsulindia, W, p. igs.
20. Id., pp. 548-19; San Agustu, Liv. Ill, Cap. IV, p. 596. The Lima family was tKe most
influential Portuguese family in Maluku. Their members were half-caste people married to
women of royal blood. This did not inhibit the crown from recognising their aristocratic
rank and appointing them to command fortresses and ships. Probably, they were the finly
Portuguese married into the nobility and permanently resident in those islands. Paulo de

[Bartolom Leonardo de Aigensola, Conquista de las Mas Malucas, Madrid, 1609,

pp. 167-69).
21. M. A. Lima Cruz, "O assassnio do rei de Maluco", pp. 515, 518 and 522.
11. Sousa, Oriente Conquistado, pp. 1072 and ss.; L. Y. Andaya,'Los primeroa contactos de
Ids espanoles", p. 82; J. Villiera, "Las Yslas dc Esperar cn Dios", pp. 594-604.
23. M. A. Lima Cruz, "A viagem de Conalo Pereira Marramaque", p. 335; idem, "O assas-
snio do rei de Maluco", p. 517. The author emphasizes the Portuguese inability to deal with
this problem. See Sousa, Oriente Conquistado, p. 1065.
24. Sousa, Oriente Conquistado, pp. 1075-79, Argcnsola, Conquistei, p. 73.
25. H. Jacobs, SJ., "The Portuguese town of Ambon", p. 604.
26. Paramita R. Abdurachman, "Atakiwan, Casados and Tupassi, Portuguese Settlements
arid Christian Communities in Solor and Flores (15.6-16.10)", Masyarakat Indonesia, X, 1
11983], p. 98.
27. Conquista, pp. 78-80.
28. Hairun was charged with involvement in Muslim activities at Amboa against local
Christian communities, in close co-ordination with Japara. He was also charged with pro-
moting clove smuggling from that island to Japara. See M. A. Lima Cruz, "O assassnio do
rei de Maluco", pp. 525-26.
29. Argensoa, Conquista, p. 2.
30. L. Andaya, "Cultural State Formation in Eastern Indonesia", Paper submitted to the
Internationa! Conference on Southeast Asia in lSth-18th Centuries, Lisbon, 4-7 Dec.1989,
pp. 10-16.
31. San Agustn, Liv. II, Cap. XXV, pp. 527-28, Sousa, Oriente Conquistado, p. 1114.
32. San Agustn, Liv. in. Cap. IV, pp. 598-99; DORO do Couto, Da sia, Lisboa, 1788, Dec.
X, Pte. 2>, Liv. VIU, Cap. IV, pp. 289-^1, Liv. IX, Cap. X1U, pp. 511-15.
33. Argensola, Conquista, pp. 78-80.
60 MANUlL LOBATO

34. P. R. Abdurachman, "Niichile Pokaraga. A Sad Story of a Moluccan Queea", Modern

Asian Studies, 22, 3 (1988), pp. 5S6-H7.
35. The King of Tidonr was afraid of a PoitUguese reaction against his alliance with the
Sultan of Ternate. For this reason he sent small vessels to the shores of Borneo looking for
Portuguese ships coming from India (Aigensola, Conquista, p. 89].
36. Sousa, Oriente Conquistado, pp. 1091-92.
37. DHMPPO-InsuIfndia, IV, pp. 215 e 252; P.P. Mendes da Luz (ed.), Livio das Cidades e,

gos, que nelas ha, e da importncia delles, ed. facsimilada do Ms. da Biblioteca Nacional de
Madrid (cod. 3Z17), published in Stvdia, 6 \\96Q], fl.67.
38. DHMPPO-Insulndia, IV, pp. 313 e 382.
39. M. A. Lima Cruz, "A viagem de Conalo Pereira Marramaque", p. 335.
40. Ajgensola, Couquisa, p. S3.
41. DHMPPQ-Insullnia, IV, p. 473. Such limited reinforcements led Spanish sources lo say
that the Temate fortress did not receive any help from India during the six year siege (DM,
II, p. 223).
42. In 1586, five galleons were used in military and trade operations in the Maluku area |J.H.
Cunha Rivaia \e&.\, Aiehivo Poitaguez-Oriental, I1 ei., Nova-Goa, W&l-lWH,fl\,pt. \ pp.
156-57, henceforth APO).
43. DM, E, pp. 32-33.
44. Letter from Father Duarte de Sande, Goa, 1579-11-07, ANTY, Armrio Jesutico, n 28,
fl.119.
45. DHMPPO-Insulndia, IV, p. 254.
46. V. M. Godinho, Os Descobrimentos e a Eeanomia Mundial, 01, p, 146.
47. DM, n, p. 40; DUMPPO-Insuh'ndia, IV, pp. 255-56.
48. Aigensola, Conquista, p. 9; DHMPPO-insulnia, IV, p. 160; A. da Silva Rego |ed.|,
Documentao Ultramarina Portuguesa, I, Lisboa, 1960, p. 15.
49. According to H. Jacobs, Temate was mainly visited by Javanese from fapara, Tuban,
Sidayu and Cresik, for trade and military support (DM, II, p. 36, n,10|. The tole of Aceh in
commerce with the westwards Islamic netwof k, K well as the role of Johor eastwards, have
been emphasized by Kenneth R. Hall, "The Opening of the Malay World to European Trade
in the Sixteenth Century", Journal of the Malay*'an Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society,
LVCI, 2 [Dec. 1985], p. S9.
50. Sousa, Oriente Conquistado, p, 1101.
51. DM, H, p. 438; DHMPPO-Insalindia, [V, p. 236, Couto, Dec. X, Pte. 2a, Liv. VI, Cap. VTI,
pp. 55-56.
52. Concerning Hitu, in the context of the power structures in Eastern Indonesia, see H.
Jacobs, "The Portuguese town of Ambon", p. 604, and also John VUliers, "The Cash-crop
Economy and State Formation in the Spice Islands in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth
Centuries", J. Kathirithamhy-Wells & John Villiers |eds.|, The Southeast Asian Foil and
Polity. Rise and Demise, Singapore University Press, Singapore, 1390, p. 92.
53. Paramita R. Abdurachman, "Niachile Pokaraga. A Sad Story of a Moluccan Queen",
Modern Asian Studies, 22,3 11988], p. 575.
54. M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian trade and European influence in the Indonesian
Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630, The Hague, 1962, p. 160, H. Jacobs, "The
Portuguese town of Ambon", p. 612, Lus Filipe Thomaz, "Maluco c Malaca", A. Teiieira da
Mota (ed.), A viagern de Fetaao tie MagaMes e a Questo das Molucas. Actas do II
Colquio Luso-espanhol de Histria Ultramarina, Lisbon, 1975, p. 38, M. A. Lima Cruz, "o
 THE MOLUCCAN ARCHIPELAGO 61

assassnio do rei de Maluco", p. 525; id., "A viagem de Gonalo Pereira", p. 333.
55. DHMPPO-Insulindia, p. 140. See M. A. Lima Cruz, "O assassnio do rei de Maluco", pp.
526-27.
56. P. R. Abdurachmart, "Atakiwan, Casados aad Tupassi", p. 98. Information from an
Hituan, Malay language chronicle, tile Hikayat Tanah Hitu. The Portuguese sources say
nothing about the role of Cresik in their departure from Ambon in 1565.
57. M. A. Lima Cruz, "A viagem de Gonalo Pereira", p. ,114; H. Jacobs, "The Portuguese
town of Ambon", p. 604.
58. DHMPPO-Insulindia, IV, pp. 192-99, 229, 262, 368 and 458.
59. Id., ibid., pp. 196; R Jacobs, "The Portuguese town of Ambon", p. 604.
60. The two groups may be distinguished on account of the alimentary taboo on pork that
the Ulilima strictly observed {DHMPPO-Insulittdia, p. 195).
61. H. Jacobs, "The Portuguese town of Ambon", p. 604; P. R. Abdurachman, "Atakiwan,
Casados and Tupassi", p. 107.
62. DHMPPO-Insulindia, pp. 200-03.
63. Id., ibid., p. 247; DM, II, pp. 39^0. In 1582, a secret agent sent by the governor of the
Philippines "found at Ternate many crypto Christian people and many other nations that,
when the time will come, would not refuse to fight side by side with the Castilians" [San
Agustin, Liv, II, Cap. XXXVUT, p. 548).
64. H. Jacobs, "The Portuguese town of Ambon", p. 611.
65. DHMPPO-Insulindia, IV p. 327.
66. H. Jacobs, "The Portuguese town of Ambon", p. 604.
67. DM, n, pp. 1-5.
68 Conquista, p. 72.
69. San Agustfn, Liv. D, Cap. XXXVIH, p. 548; DA, H, pp. 39-40, 55-56 and p. 79, Mendes da
Luz, Livro, fl.70, DM, n, p.l 14.
70. P. R., "Atakiwan, Casados and Tupassi", p.108; Manuel Lobato, "Os Portugueses em
Timor", Coral, \ (Dec.1991], pp. 8-14.
71. Mendes da Luz, Livro, fl.73v.
72. DHMPPO-lnsulindia, V, p. 103.
73. Wars involving different ethnic groups, rival lineages, such as Christian and Muslim
people, were the main source for slavery in Maluku and, generally, in Southeast Asia
|A.Rcid, "The Structure of Cities in Southeast Asia, Fifteenth to Seventeenth Centuries",
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, XI, 2 [Sept.1980], Sing. Univ. Press, p. 248].
74. DM, H, p. 102.
75. Femo Guerreiro, Relao anua! das coisas que fizeram os Padies da Companhia de
/e.us nas suas misses [...j nos anos de 1600 a 1609, l, Coimbra, Imprensa da Universidade,
1930, pp. 273-74.
76. San Agustin, Liv. n, Cap. XXXIH, pp. 505-10 and pp. 520-21, DM, II, pp. 32-A1).
77. DM, II, p. 223. Obviously it was mainly due to the lack of institutional collaboration
between the Iberian kingdoms which, even after their unification, continued to be the case.
78. DM, II, p. 363j Guerreiro, Relao anual, I, p. 269.
79. DHMPPO-Insulindia, V, p. 116, DM, D, pp. 32-33 and p 169- San Agustn Liv U Cap
XXXm, pp. 509-11, Cap. XXXIV, pp. 520-21 and Cap. XXXV, pp. 527-2S.
SO. San Agustn presents an incorrect chronology. \id., ibid., pp. 527-28]. On chc Ternatian
62 MANUEL LOBATO

81. Couto, Dec. X, Pee. l, Liv. m, Cap. VI, pp. 307 e 312; San Agusto, Liv. D, Cap. XXXV, p.
528; DHMPPQ-!ns\slinda. IV, p.! 13.
82. Argensola, Conquista, pp. 84-86.
S3. DM, H, p. 93.
84. San Agustin, Liv. D, Cap. XXXIII, p. 508. Similar in Argensola, Conquista, p. 107.
85. See Roderich Ptak, "The Northern Trade Route to the Spice Islands: South China
Sea-Sulu Zone-North Moluccas, (14th to early 16th century)", Aichipel, 43 (1992), pp.
27-55, passim.
Hfi. "The Bishop of Melaka to the king", Melaka, 1588-12-31, A. G. Simancas, Sec. Ptov.,
cod.1551, fl.275v, quoted hy Artur Teodoro de Matos, O Extado da ndia nos anos de
1581-1588. Estrutura administrativa e econmica. Alguns elementos pata o seu estudo,
Universidade dos Aeores, Ponta Delgada, 1982, p. 39.
87. DHMPPO-Insalndia, V, p. 10R.
88. DM, D, pp. 123, 165, n. 32 and p. i 79. The Spanish expedition led by Juan de Morn or
Morones arrived at Tidore around March 1585, It was the third expedition sent from the
Philippines to Maluku in four years: the first one in 1581 was commanded hy Juan de
Ronquillo, a second one by Pedro Sarmiento in 15S4. See San Agustin, Liv. II Cap. XXXVTO,
Liv. Ill, Cap. II and Cap. IV; Couto, Dec. X, Fee. 2a, Liv. VI, Cap. VI and Cap. VII, p. 49 and
Caps.VIII and IX. For the 1580s Boxer refers to only two Spanish expeditions, both with a
Portuguese contribution ("Portuguese and Spanish projects for the Conquest of Southeast
Asia", /oufflfll of Asian History, III (1969), p. 126].
89. Argenaola, Conquista, p. 10.
90. Couto, Dec. X, Ptc. 2, Liv. VI, Cap. VII, pp. 46-49, Liv. VIII, Cap. IV, pp. 285-86.
91. DM, n, pp. 170 and 393; APO, in, 1 pt., pp. 156-57.
92. DM, D, pp. 134, 207 and 393; APO, HI, I a pt., pp. 34, 80 and p. 278; DHMPPQ-lasulindia,
V, p. 27; San Agustin, Liv. Ill, Cap. IV, p. 597.
93. DM, II, pp. 190-91 and 222-24. A conspiracy by the people of Brunei and Luzon to take
Manila hy force was discovered in 15S7 (San Agustin, Liv. HI, Cap. IV, p. 601).
94. Id., ibid,-, Jacques de Coiitre, Aadanzas Asiticos, Eddy Stols, B.Teensman and
J.We/berckmoesieds.), Madrid, 1991, p. 146.
95. DM, E, p. 306.
96. DM, D, pp. 331, 359 and p. 369.
97. C" rgia a Peio Lopes de Sousa, Lisboa, 1590-03-06, AHU, Cons. Via., cod.281, 1.H6.
98. According to Proi. Roxer, the figure of a thousand Spanish soldiers, under the governor's
command, is not reliable ("Portuguese and Spanish projects", p. 1,14].
99. Regimento do vice-rei Conde da Vidigiieim, Lisboa, 1596-01-05, AHU, Cons, lllti.,
cod.lBl,fU66.
100. DM, II, pp. 389, 445^6 and 456,- Coutre, Andanzas Asiticas, p, 149; APO, in, 1" pt., p.
481, 2' pt., p. 580; Antonio de Morga, Sucesos de las Mas Filipinas, J. S. Cummins (ed.|,
liakluyt Society, Cambridge University Press, 1971, pp. 9.V94.
101. DM, n, pp. 470, 490 and p. 505.
102 William Foster, "Introduction", Tlie Voyage of Sir Heaiy Middleton to the Moluccas.
16M-1606, Hakluyt Society, 1943, Klaus Reprint, Millwood, New York, 1990, p. XXIV;
DM, II, pp. 470 and p. 474.
103. Id., ibid., p. XXIV; DM, II, pp. 495-96. See also H.Jacobs, "The Portuguese town of

104. DM, D, pp. 520-21.

105. Francisco Pyrard de Laval, Viagem [1601-11], transi, and annot. by Cunha Uivara, II,
 THE MOLUCCAN ARCHIPELAGO 63

Liv. Civilizao, Potto, 1944, p.158; Carta de Toma de Sousa Couuniio do vce-rei, Goa,
1000-04-07, ANTT, MMCCiaa, Cx.6, t.n E, p. 349; C" de Luis da Goma. Secretrio do
Eftado. ao vice-rci, Goa, 1600-04-07, ANTT, MMCGzaa, Cx. 6,1.11 E, p. 273, Couto, Dc.
Xn, Pte. ltima. Liv. V, Cap. Vffl, p. 512.
106. Hoamoal is another name for this peninsula. See Htihert Jacobs, 5.T., "Un rglement de
comptes entre Portugais et Javanais dans les mers de Indonsie en 1580", Archipel, 18
[1979), p. 170.
107. The Voyage of Sir Henry Middleton..., p. 20.
11)8. C. R. Boxer & Frazo de Vasconcelos, Andr Furtado de Mendona, Lisboa, 1955
(reimp. 1989), pp. 40-45.
1(19. Argensola, Conijiiistii, pp. 155-5S. Argensola seems to use iuformatiun about Maluku
ni)t available in the Portuguese and missionary reports,
1 ID. Roxer, Andr Furtado, p. 47.
111. H. Jacobs, "The Portuguese town of Ambon", p. 611. Magalhes Godinho clearly notes
the failure of Andr Furtado at Ambon and Ceram. See Os Descobrimentos e a Econumiu
Mundial III, p. 162. The Spanish sources alsn suggest it. The Portuguese sources, without
aii evident reason, repeatedly glorify the achievement of Fuitado de Mendona. Boxer,
Afldr Fartado, pp. 46-54, Argensola, Conquista, pp. 288-307.
112. Morsa, SiieiMiM, p. 233; Ferno Gueneiio, Relao armai, U, pp. 131-32 e 306-1L
113. V,M. Godinho, Os Descobrimentos e a Economia Mundial, m, p. 163; Antnio de
Morga, Sucesos, p. 239; "A discourse of the present state of the Moluccos, anexed to the for-
mer Journall Voyage of George Spitsbergen, extracted out of Apollonius Schot of
Middleboiough' [1617], Pinchas Mis Pilgrimes, II, p. 227.
114. After completing this essay, 1 had an opportunity to read the work of Leonard Y.
Andaya, The World of Maluku. Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modem Period, University of
Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1993, which may be consulted for another approach to the history
of this period.