G.R. No.

143363 February 6, 2002

ST. MARY'S ACADEMY, petitioner,
vs.
WILLIAM CARPITANOS and LUCIA S. CARPITANOS, GUADA DANIEL, JAMES DANIEL
II, JAMES DANIEL, SR., and VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision1 of the Court of Appeals as well as the resolution
denying reconsideration, holding petitioner liable for damages arising from an accident that resulted in
the death of a student who had joined a campaign to visit the public schools in Dipolog City to solicit
enrollment.
The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
"Claiming damages for the death of their only son, Sherwin Carpitanos, spouses William Carpitanos
and Lucia Carpitanos filed on June 9, 1995 a case against James Daniel II and his parents, James
Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys Academy before
the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City.
"On 20 February 1997, Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City rendered its decision the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in the following manner:
1. Defendant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City, is hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs William
Carpitanos and Luisa Carpitanos, the following sums of money:
a. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) indemnity for the loss of life of Sherwin S. Carpitanos;
b. FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00) actual damages incurred by plaintiffs for burial and
related expenses;
c. TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) for attorneys fees;
d. FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) for moral damages; and to pay costs.
2. Their liability being only subsidiary, defendants James Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel are hereby
ordered to pay herein plaintiffs the amount of damages above-stated in the event of insolvency of
principal obligor St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City;
3. Defendant James Daniel II, being a minor at the time of the commission of the tort and who was
under special parental authority of defendant St. Marys Academy, is ABSOLVED from paying the
above-stated damages, same being adjudged against defendants St. Marys Academy, and subsidiarily,
against his parents;
4. Defendant Vivencio Villanueva is hereby ABSOLVED of any liability. His counterclaim not being in
order as earlier discussed in this decision, is hereby DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED." (Decision, pp. 32-33; Records, pp. 205-206)."
"From the records it appears that from 13 to 20 February 1995, defendant-appellant St. Marys
Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the
enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. As
a student of St. Marys Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly,
on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep
owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, Larayan,
Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same
school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle.
"Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident."2
In due time, petitioner St. Marys academy appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.3
On February 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision reducing the actual damages to
P25,000.00 but otherwise affirming the decision a quo, in toto.4
On February 29, 2000, petitioner St. Marys Academy filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision. However, on May 22, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.5
Hence, this appeal.6
The Issues
1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the petitioner liable for damages for the death
of Sherwin Carpitanos.
2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award of moral damages against the
petitioner.
The Courts Ruling
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Marys Academy liable for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos
under Articles 2187 and 2198 of the Family Code, pointing out that petitioner was negligent in allowing
a minor to drive and in not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep.
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor
child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and
teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This special parental authority
and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the
school, entity or institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and
other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school
or its teachers.9
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special
parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of
the unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.10
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as
negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal
connection to the accident.11
"In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the injury for
which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection
between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by
intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury.
For, negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate
cause of the injury complained of. And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred."12
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause of
the death of the victim.
Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not
the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep.
In their comment to the petition, respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted the documentary
exhibits establishing that the cause of the accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide of
the jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the
mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva. Respondents, including the spouses Carpitanos,
parents of the deceased Sherwin Carpitanos, did not dispute the report and testimony of the traffic
investigator who stated that the cause of the accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide
that caused the jeep to turn turtle.
Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the
accident was the negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II. Hence,
the respondents reliance on Article 219 of the Family Code that "those given the authority and
responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused
by acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor" was unfounded.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the
jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio
Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed
James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minors parents primarily.
The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. Between the
remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minors parents or the detachment of
the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
"The proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred."13
Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of
the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St. Marys Academy had
no control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the
death resulting from such accident.
Consequently, we find that petitioner likewise cannot be held liable for moral damages in the amount of
P500,000.00 awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission.14 In this case, the proximate cause of the
accident was not attributable to petitioner.
For the reason that petitioner was not directly liable for the accident, the decision of the Court of
Appeals ordering petitioner to pay death indemnity to respondent Carpitanos must be deleted.
Moreover, the grant of attorneys fees as part of damages is the exception rather than the rule. 15 The
power of the court to award attorneys fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal
and equitable justification.16 Thus, the grant of attorneys fees against the petitioner is likewise deleted.
Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the vehicle was respondent Villanueva.
He never denied and in fact admitted this fact.1wphi1 We have held that the registered owner of any
vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third
persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets." 17
Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that
the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the
school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death
of Sherwin Carpitanos.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals 18 and
that of the trial court.19 The Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liability of
defendants, excluding petitioner St. Marys Academy, Dipolog City.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 125018. April 6, 2000]
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
CRISPIN E. LAT, respondents. francis
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. (REMMAN), and CRISPIN E. LAT are adjoining landowners
in Barangay Bugtong Na Pulo, Lipa City. The land of Lat containing an area of 1.8 hectares is
agricultural and planted mostly with fruit trees while REMMAN occupies a land area of fifteen
(15) hectares six (6) hectares of which are devoted to its piggery business. REMMAN's land is
one and a half (1) meters higher in elevation than that of respondent Lat.
Sometime in July 1984 Lat noticed that REMMAN's waste disposal lagoon was already
overflowing and inundating one-fourth (1/4) of Lat's plantation. He made several
representations with REMMAN but they fell on deaf ears. On 14 March 1985, after almost one
(1) hectare of Lat's plantation was already inundated with water containing pig manure, as a
result of which the trees growing on the flooded portion started to wither and die, Lat filed a
complaint for damages with preliminary mandatory injunction against REMMAN. Lat alleged
that the acidity of the soil in his plantation increased because of the overflow of the water
heavy with pig manure from REMMAN's piggery farm.
REMMAN denied all the allegations of Lat and raised as an affirmative defense that measures
such as the construction of additional lagoons were already adopted to contain the waste
water coming from its piggery to prevent any damage to the adjoining estates.
After conducting an ocular inspection and evaluating the evidence of both parties the
Regional Trial Court found that indeed REMMANs waste disposal lagoon overflowed with the
contaminated water flooding one (1) hectare of Lat's plantation. The waste water was ankle-
deep and caused death and destruction to one (1) jackfruit tree, fifteen (15) coconut trees,
one hundred twenty-two (122) coffee trees, and an unspecified number of mango trees,
bananas and vegetables. As a consequence, the trial court ordered REMMAN to indemnify
Lat P186,975.00 for lost profits for three (3) crop years and P30,000.00 as attorney's fees.[1]
marie

The decision of the court a quo was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.[2]
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari REMMAN prays that we pass upon the findings of the
trial court as well as of the appellate court. REMMAN insists that factual findings of lower
courts may be passed upon, reviewed and reversed: (a) when the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d)
when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion; (f) when the conclusions of the Court of
Appeals are not supported by the evidence on record; (g) when facts of substance were
overlooked which, if correctly considered, might have changed the outcome of the case; and,
(h) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are not in accord with what reasonable men
would readily accept are the correct inferences from the evidence extant in the records. [3]
Indeed, in the abovementioned instances, the factual milieu of a particular case may be
passed upon, reversed or modified by this Court. But examination of the record reveals that
all the above instances are unavailing. From this point of view alone the instant petition is
dismissible. Nevertheless, we shall discuss them hereunder to dispose finally of the
contentions of REMMAN.
First, REMMAN argues that its liability for the damages suffered by Lat was not clearly
established.
We disagree. During the ocular inspection conducted by the lower court where
representatives of both parties were present, it was established that the waste water
containing pig manure was continuously flowing from REMMAN's piggery farm to Lat's
plantation. The water was ankle-deep and flooded one (1) hectare of Lat's plantation. The
overflow of the "acidic, malodorous and polluted water" continued from June 1984 to March
1985 thus destroying one (1) jackfruit tree, fifteen (15) coconut trees, one hundred an twenty-
two (122) coffee trees, and an unspecified number of mango trees, bananas and vegetables.
[4]

In addition, the appellate court found that there was indeed negligence on the part of
REMMAN which directly caused the damage to the plantation of Lat. Thus - novero
x x x Negligence was clearly established. It is uncontroverted that the land of
appellee was flooded on account of the overflow of acidic, malodorous and
polluted water coming from the adjacent piggery farm of appellant sometime in
May 1984. This resulted in the impairment of the productivity of appellee's land
as well as the eventual destruction and death of several fruit trees, such as
coconuts, coffee, jackfruits, bananas and other plants x x x x Appellant cannot
avoid liability because their negligence was the proximate cause of the damage.
Appellee's property was practically made a catch-basin of polluted water and
other noxious substances emptying from appellant's piggery which could have
been prevented had it not been for the negligence of appellant arising from its:
(a) failure to monitor the increases in the level of water in the lagoons before,
during and after the heavy downpours which occurred during the rainy months
of 1984; (b) failure to augment the existing lagoons prior to the incident,
notwithstanding the fact that at the time of the flooding, the piggery had grown to
a capacity of 11,000 heads, and considering that it was reasonably forseeable
that the existing waste disposal facilities were no longer adequate to
accomodate the increasing volume of waste matters in such a big farm; and
more importantly, (c) the repeated failure to comply with their promise to
appellee.[5]
Second, REMMAN argues that the trial court as well as the Court of Appeals should not have
rejected its request for the production of Lat's income tax returns. According to REMMAN had
Lat's income tax returns been produced, the issue of the alleged damages suffered by Lat
would have been settled.
This argument is moot, if not trite. For this matter has been laid to rest when we affirmed the
Court of Appeals' decision in an earlier case involving the same parties. [6] In sustaining the
trial court's quashal of the subpoena duces tecum previously issued compelling Lat to
produce his income tax returns for the years 1982-1986, the appellate court explained that the
production of the income tax returns would not necessarily serve to prove the special and
affirmative defenses set up by REMMAN nor rebut Lat's testimony regarding the losses he
sustained due to the piggery. The tax returns per se could not reflect the total amount of
damages suffered by Lat, as income losses from a portion of the plantation could be offset by
any profit derived from the rest of the plantation or from other sources of income. Conversely,
losses incurred from other sources of income would be totally unrelated to the income from
the particular portion of the plantation flooded with waste matter coming from REMMAN's
piggery.[7]
Third, REMMAN contends that the damages allegedly sustained by Lat have not been
satisfactorily established. nigel
We a not convinced. The factual findings of the court a quo rightly support its conclusions on
this respect -
Coming now to the issue of damages, We find appellant's allegations not well-
taken. Appellant contends that actual and compensatory damages require
evidentiary proof, and there being no evidence presented as to the necessity of
the award for damages, it was erroneous for the lower court to have made such
award. It must be remembered that after the ocular inspection, the court a quo
rendered an inventory of dead and rotten trees and plants found in appellee's
property. Appellee also testified on the approximate annual harvest and fair
market value thereof. Significantly, no opposition or controverting evidence was
presented by appellant on the matter. Hence, appellant is bound thereby and
cannot now be heard to complain. As correctly held by the court a quo:
An ocular inspection has been conducted by the trial court. The inventory of the trees
damaged and the itemized valuation placed therein by private respondent after the ocular
inspection which is not rebutted by the petitioner, is the more accurate indicator of the said
amount prayed for as damages. If the valuation is indeed unreasonable, petitioner should
present controverting evidence of the fair market value of the crops involved. The trial court
held that the private respondent himself had been subjected to extensive cross and re-cross
examination by the counsel for the petitioner on the amount of damages. [8]
Finally, REMMAN complains that the damages, if any, were due to a fortuitous event.
Again cannot agree with petitioner. We defer instead to the findings opinions expressed by
the lower courts -
Even assuming that the heavy rains constituted an act of God, by reason of their
negligence, the fortuitous event became humanized, rendering appellants liable
for the ensuing damages. In National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
233 SCRA 649 (1993), the Supreme Court held: ella
Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force majeure to escape
liability for the loss or damage sustained by private respondents since they, the petitioners,
were guilty of negligence. This event then was not occasioned exclusively by an act of God or
force majeure; a human factor - negligence or imprudence - had intervened. The effect then of
the force majeure in question may be deemed to have, even if only partly, resulted from the
participation of man. Thus, the whole occurrence was thereby humanized, as it were, and
removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.
As regards the alleged natural easement imposed upon the property of
appellee, resort to pertinent provisions of applicable law is imperative. Under the
Civil Code, it is provided:
Art. 637. Lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which naturally and without the
intervention of man descend from the higher estates, as well as the stones or earth which
they carry with them.
The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede this easement;
neither can the owner of the higher estate make works which will increase the burden.
A similar provision is found in the Water Code of the Philippines (P.D. No.1067),
which provides:
Art. 50. Lower estates are obliged to receive the water which naturally and without the
intervention of man flow from the higher estates, as well as the stone or earth which they
carry with them.
The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede this natural flow,
unless he provides an alternative method of drainage; neither can the owner of the higher
estate make works which will increase this natural flow. marinella
As worded, the two (2) aforecited provisions impose a natural easement upon
the lower estate to receive the waters which naturally and without the
intervention of man descend from higher states. However, where the waters
which flow from a higher state are those which are artificially collected in man-
made lagoons, any damage occasioned thereby entitles the owner of the lower
or servient estate to compensation.[9]
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, it is crystal clear that REMMAN is directly
accountable to Lat for the damages sustained by him. The negligence of REMMAN in
maintaining the level of waste water in its lagoons has been satisfactorily established. The
extent of damages suffered by Lat remains unrebutted; in fact, has been proved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 19 October 1995 Decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court-Br. 16, Lipa City, holding petitioner Remman
Enterprises, Inc. (REMMAN) liable to private respondent Crispin E. Lat for damages and to
indemnify the latter P186,975.00 for lost profits for three (3) crop years and P30,000.00 as
attorneys fees, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143360. September 5, 2002]
EQUITABLE LEASING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. LUCITA SUYOM, MARISSA ENANO,
MYRNA TAMAYO and FELIX OLEDAN, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In an action based on quasi delict, the registered owner of a motor vehicle is solidarily liable for the
injuries and damages caused by the negligence of the driver, in spite of the fact that the vehicle may
have already been the subject of an unregistered Deed of Sale in favor of another person. Unless
registered with the Land Transportation Office, the sale -- while valid and binding between the parties
-- does not affect third parties, especially the victims of accidents involving the said transport
equipment. Thus, in the present case, petitioner, which is the registered owner, is liable for the acts of
the driver employed by its former lessee who has become the owner of that vehicle by virtue of an
unregistered Deed of Sale.
Statement of the Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the May 12, 2000
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55474. The decretal portion of the
Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
assailed decision, dated May 5, 1997, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 14, in Civil Case
No. 95-73522, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award of attorneys fees is
DELETED.[3]
On the other hand, in Civil Case No. 95-73522, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 14)
had earlier disposed in this wise:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant
Equitable Leasing Corporation ordering said defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the following:
A. TO MYRNA TAMAYO
1. the sum of P50,000.00 for the death of Reniel Tamayo;
2. P50,000.00 as moral damages; and
3. P56,000.00 for the damage to the store and its contents, and funeral expenses.
B. TO FELIX OLEDAN
1. the sum of P50,000.00 for the death of Felmarie Oledan;
2. P50,000.00 as moral damages; and
3. P30,000.00 for medical expenses, and funeral expenses.
C. TO MARISSA ENANO
1. P7,000.00 as actual damages
D. TO LUCITA SUYOM
1. The sum of P5,000.00 for the medical treatment of her two sons.
The sum of P120,000.00 as and for attorneys fees.[4]
The Facts
On July 17, 1994, a Fuso Road Tractor driven by Raul Tutor rammed into the house cum store of
Myrna Tamayo located at Pier 18, Vitas, Tondo, Manila. A portion of the house was destroyed. Pinned
to death under the engine of the tractor were Respondent Myrna Tamayos son, Reniel Tamayo, and
Respondent Felix Oledans daughter, Felmarie Oledan. Injured were Respondent Oledan himself,
Respondent Marissa Enano, and two sons of Respondent Lucita Suyom.
Tutor was charged with and later convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and
multiple physical injuries in Criminal Case No. 296094-SA, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 12.[5]
Upon verification with the Land Transportation Office, respondents were furnished a copy of Official
Receipt No. 62204139[6] and Certificate of Registration No. 08262797,[7] showing that the registered
owner of the tractor was Equitable Leasing Corporation/leased to Edwin Lim. On April 15, 1995,
respondents filed against Raul Tutor, Ecatine Corporation (Ecatine) and Equitable Leasing Corporation
(Equitable) a Complaint[8] for damages docketed as Civil Case No. 95-73522 in the RTC of Manila,
Branch 14.
The trial court, upon motion of plaintiffs counsel, issued an Order dropping Raul Tutor, Ecatine and
Edwin Lim from the Complaint, because they could not be located and served with summonses.[9] On
the other hand, in its Answer with Counterclaim,[10] petitioner alleged that the vehicle had already been
sold to Ecatine and that the former was no longer in possession and control thereof at the time of the
incident. It also claimed that Tutor was an employee, not of Equitable, but of Ecatine.
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision ordering petitioner to pay actual and moral
damages and attorneys fees to respondents. It held that since the Deed of Sale between petitioner and
Ecatine had not been registered with the Land Transportation Office (LTO), the legal owner was still
Equitable.[11] Thus, petitioner was liable to respondents.[12]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Sustaining the RTC, the CA held that petitioner was still to be legally deemed the owner/operator of the
tractor, even if that vehicle had been the subject of a Deed of Sale in favor of Ecatine on December 9,
1992. The reason cited by the CA was that the Certificate of Registration on file with the LTO still
remained in petitioners name.[13] In order that a transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle can bind third
persons, it must be duly recorded in the LTO.[14]
The CA likewise upheld respondents claim for moral damages against petitioner because the appellate
court considered Tutor, the driver of the tractor, to be an agent of the registered owner/operator.[15]
Hence, this Petition.[16]
Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the Courts consideration:
I
Whether or not the Court of Appeals and the trial court gravely erred when they decided and held that
petitioner [was] liable for damages suffered by private respondents in an action based on quasi delict
for the negligent acts of a driver who [was] not the employee of the petitioner.
II
Whether or not the Court of Appeals and the trial court gravely erred when they awarded moral
damages to private respondents despite their failure to prove that the injuries they suffered were
brought by petitioners wrongful act.[17]
This Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Liability for Wrongful Acts
Petitioner contends that it should not be held liable for the damages sustained by respondents and that
arose from the negligence of the driver of the Fuso Road Tractor, which it had already sold to Ecatine
at the time of the accident. Not having employed Raul Tutor, the driver of the vehicle, it could not have
controlled or supervised him.[18]
We are not persuaded. In negligence cases, the aggrieved party may sue the negligent party under (1)
Article 100[19] of the Revised Penal Code, for civil liability ex delicto; or (2) under Article 2176[20] of
the Civil Code, for civil liability ex quasi delicto.[21]
Furthermore, under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers may be held subsidiarily liable
for felonies committed by their employees in the discharge of the latters duties.[22] This liability
attaches when the employees who are convicted of crimes committed in the performance of their work
are found to be insolvent and are thus unable to satisfy the civil liability adjudged.[23]
On the other hand, under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180[24] of the Civil Code, an action
predicated on quasi delict may be instituted against the employer for an employees act or omission. The
liability for the negligent conduct of the subordinate is direct and primary, but is subject to the defense
of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.[25] The enforcement of the judgment
against the employer for an action based on Article 2176 does not require the employee to be insolvent,
since the liability of the former is solidary -- the latter being statutorily considered a joint tortfeasor.[26]
To sustain a claim based on quasi delict, the following requisites must be proven: (a) damage suffered
by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, and (c) connection of cause and effect between
the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.[27]
These two causes of action (ex delicto or ex quasi delicto) may be availed of, subject to the caveat[28]
that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both
causes.[29] Since these two civil liabilities are distinct and independent of each other, the failure to
recover in one will not necessarily preclude recovery in the other.[30]
In the instant case, respondents -- having failed to recover anything in the criminal case -- elected to
file a separate civil action for damages, based on quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.[31]
The evidence is clear that the deaths and the injuries suffered by respondents and their kins were due to
the fault of the driver of the Fuso tractor.
Dated June 4, 1991, the Lease Agreement[32] between petitioner and Edwin Lim stipulated that it is the
intention of the parties to enter into a FINANCE LEASE AGREEMENT.[33] Under such scheme,
ownership of the subject tractor was to be registered in the name of petitioner, until the value of the
vehicle has been fully paid by Edwin Lim.[34] Further, in the Lease Schedule,[35] the monthly rental for
the tractor was stipulated, and the term of the Lease was scheduled to expire on December 4, 1992.
After a few months, Lim completed the payments to cover the full price of the tractor.[36] Thus, on
December 9, 1992, a Deed of Sale[37] over the tractor was executed by petitioner in favor of Ecatine
represented by Edwin Lim. However, the Deed was not registered with the LTO.
We hold petitioner liable for the deaths and the injuries complained of, because it was the registered
owner of the tractor at the time of the accident on July 17, 1994.[38] The Court has consistently ruled
that, regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered owner is the lawful operator insofar as
the public and third persons are concerned; consequently, it is directly and primarily responsible for the
consequences of its operation.[39] In contemplation of law, the owner/operator of record is the employer
of the driver, the actual operator and employer being considered as merely its agent.[40] The same
principle applies even if the registered owner of any vehicle does not use it for public service.[41]
Since Equitable remained the registered owner of the tractor, it could not escape primary liability for
the deaths and the injuries arising from the negligence of the driver.[42]
The finance-lease agreement between Equitable on the one hand and Lim or Ecatine on the other has
already been superseded by the sale. In any event, it does not bind third persons. The rationale for this
rule has been aptly explained in Erezo v. Jepte,[43] which we quote hereunder:
x x x. The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident
happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility
therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner. Instances are numerous where
vehicles running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles
without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of identification. It is
to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle
registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the determination of persons responsible for
damages or injuries caused on public highways.[44]
Further, petitioners insistence on FGU Insurance Corp. v. Court of Appeals is misplaced.[45] First, in
FGU Insurance, the registered vehicle owner, which was engaged in a rent-a-car business, rented out
the car. In this case, the registered owner of the truck, which is engaged in the business of financing
motor vehicle acquisitions, has actually sold the truck to Ecatine, which in turn employed Tutor.
Second, in FGU Insurance, the registered owner of the vehicle was not held responsible for the
negligent acts of the person who rented one of its cars, because Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not
applicable. We held that no vinculum juris as employer and employee existed between the owner and
the driver.[46] In this case, the registered owner of the tractor is considered under the law to be the
employer of the driver, while the actual operator is deemed to be its agent.[47] Thus, Equitable, the
registered owner of the tractor, is -- for purposes of the law on quasi delict -- the employer of Raul
Tutor, the driver of the tractor. Ecatine, Tutors actual employer, is deemed as merely an agent of
Equitable.[48]
True, the LTO Certificate of Registration, dated 5/31/91, qualifies the name of the registered owner as
EQUITABLE LEASING CORPORATION/Leased to Edwin Lim. But the lease agreement between
Equitable and Lim has been overtaken by the Deed of Sale on December 9, 1992, between petitioner
and Ecatine. While this Deed does not affect respondents in this quasi delict suit, it definitely binds
petitioner because, unlike them, it is a party to it.
We must stress that the failure of Equitable and/or Ecatine to register the sale with the LTO should not
prejudice respondents, who have the legal right to rely on the legal principle that the registered vehicle
owner is liable for the damages caused by the negligence of the driver. Petitioner cannot hide behind its
allegation that Tutor was the employee of Ecatine. This will effectively prevent respondents from
recovering their losses on the basis of the inaction or fault of petitioner in failing to register the sale.
The non-registration is the fault of petitioner, which should thus face the legal consequences thereof.
Second Issue:
Moral Damages
Petitioner further claims that it is not liable for moral damages, because respondents failed to establish
or show the causal connection or relation between the factual basis of their claim and their wrongful act
or omission, if any. [49]
Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to compensate[50] and alleviate in some way
the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused a person.[51] Although
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages must nevertheless be somehow proportional to and
in approximation of the suffering inflicted.[52] This is so because moral damages are in the category of
an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered, not to impose a penalty on the
wrongdoer.[53]
Viewed as an action for quasi delict, the present case falls squarely within the purview of Article 2219
(2),[54] which provides for the payment of moral damages in cases of quasi delict.[55] Having established
the liability of petitioner as the registered owner of the vehicle,[56] respondents have satisfactorily
shown the existence of the factual basis for the award[57] and its causal connection to the acts of Raul
Tutor, who is deemed as petitioners employee.[58] Indeed, the damages and injuries suffered by
respondents were the proximate result of petitioners tortious act or omission.[59]
Further, no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the
amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court.[60] The evidence gives no ground for
doubt that such discretion was properly and judiciously exercised by the trial court.[61] The award is in
fact consistent with the rule that moral damages are not intended to enrich the injured party, but to
alleviate the moral suffering undergone by that party by reason of the defendants culpable action.[62]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157906 November 2, 2006
JOAQUINITA P. CAPILI, Petitioner,
vs.
SPS. DOMINADOR CARDAA and ROSALITA CARDAA, Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review assailing the Decision 1 dated October 18, 2002 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 54412, declaring petitioner liable for negligence that resulted in the death
of Jasmin Cardaa, a school child aged 12, enrolled in Grade 6, of San Roque Elementary School,
where petitioner is the principal. Likewise assailed is the Resolution 2 dated March 20, 2003 denying
reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On February 1, 1993, Jasmin Cardaa was walking along the perimeter fence of the San Roque
Elementary School when a branch of a caimito tree located within the school premises fell on her,
causing her instantaneous death. Thus, her parents - Dominador and Rosalita Cardaa - filed a case for
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte against petitioner.
The Cardaas alleged in their complaint that even as early as December 15, 1992, a resident of the
barangay, Eufronio Lerios, reported on the possible danger the tree posed to passersby. Lerios even
pointed to the petitioner the tree that stood near the principals office. The Cardaas averred that
petitioners gross negligence and lack of foresight caused the death of their daughter.
Petitioner denied the accusation and said that at that time Lerios had only offered to buy the tree. She
also denied knowing that the tree was dead and rotting. To prove her point, she presented witnesses
who attested that she had brought up the offer of Lerios to the other teachers during a meeting on
December 15, 1992 and assigned Remedios Palaa to negotiate the sale.
In a Decision3 dated February 5, 1996, the trial court dismissed the complaint for failure of the
respondents to establish negligence on the part of the petitioner.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision. The appellate court found the
appellee (herein petitioner) liable for Jasmins death, as follows:
Foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Appellee Joaquinita Capili is hereby
declared liable for negligence resulting to the death of Jasmin D. Cardaa. She is hereby ordered to
indemnify appellants, parents of Jasmin, the following amounts:
1. For the life of Jasmin D. Cardaa P50,000.00;
2. For burial expenses 15,010.00;
3. For moral damages 50,000.00;
4. For attorneys fees and litigation 10,000.00.
expenses
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Petitioner now comes before us submitting the
following issues for our resolution:
 I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIS--VIS THE SET OF FACTS STATED
IN THE CHALLENGED DECISION, ERRED IN FINDING THE PETITIONER
NEGLIGENT AND THEREFORE LIABLE FOR DAMAGES UNDER ARTICLE 2206 OF
THE CIVIL CODE AND IN ORDERING THE PETITIONER TO PAY DAMAGES TO THE
RESPONDENTS; AND
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.5
On the other hand, respondents posit the following issue:
Whether or not the Decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals, Twelfth Division, in CA G.R. CV. No.
54412 promulgated on October 18, 2002 should be affirmed and respected, thus remain
undisturbed.6
Primarily, the issue is whether petitioner is negligent and liable for the death of Jasmin Cardaa.
Petitioner asserts that she was not negligent about the disposal of the tree since she had assigned her
next-in-rank, Palaa, to see to its disposal; that despite her physical inspection of the school grounds,
she did not observe any indication that the tree was already rotten nor did any of her 15 teachers inform
her that the tree was already rotten; 7 and that moral damages should not be granted against her since
there was no fraud nor bad faith on her part.
On the other hand, respondents insist that petitioner knew that the tree was dead and rotting, yet, she
did not exercise reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have done in the
same situation.
To begin, we have to point out that whether petitioner was negligent or not is a question of fact which
is generally not proper in a petition for review, and when this determination is supported by substantial
evidence, it becomes conclusive and binding on this Court. 8 However, there is an exception, that is,
when the findings of the Court of Appeals are incongruent with the findings of the lower court. 9 In our
view, the exception finds application in the present case.
The trial court gave credence to the claim of petitioner that she had no knowledge that the tree was
already dead and rotting and that Lerios merely informed her that he was going to buy the tree for
firewood. It ruled that petitioner exercised the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances
require and that there was an absence of evidence that would require her to use a higher standard of
care more than that required by the attendant circumstances.10 The Court of Appeals, on the other hand,
ruled that petitioner should have known of the condition of the tree by its mere sighting and that no
matter how hectic her schedule was, she should have had the tree removed and not merely delegated
the task to Palaa. The appellate court ruled that the dead caimito tree was a nuisance that should have
been removed soon after petitioner had chanced upon it.11
A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely carelessly done from a lack of ordinary prudence
and may be one which creates a situation involving an unreasonable risk to another because of the
expectable action of the other, a third person, an animal, or a force of nature. A negligent act is one
from which an ordinary prudent person in the actors position, in the same or similar circumstances,
would foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to do the act or to do it in
a more careful manner.12
The probability that the branches of a dead and rotting tree could fall and harm someone is clearly a
danger that is foreseeable. As the school principal, petitioner was tasked to see to the maintenance of
the school grounds and safety of the children within the school and its premises. That she was unaware
of the rotten state of a tree whose falling branch had caused the death of a child speaks ill of her
discharge of the responsibility of her position.
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance
of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or
some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between
the fault or negligence and the damages incurred.13
The fact, however, that respondents daughter, Jasmin, died as a result of the dead and rotting tree
within the schools premises shows that the tree was indeed an obvious danger to anyone passing by
and calls for application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an
inference that it would not have happened except for the defendants negligence; (2) the accident must
have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the
person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.14
The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere
falling of the branch of the dead and rotting tree which caused the death of respondents daughter was a
result of petitioners negligence, being in charge of the school.
In the case of D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,15 this Court held:
As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which
recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a
substitute for specific proof of negligence.
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an accident
or injury will not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on
defendants part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or transaction
speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or
circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a presumption, or at least permit an
inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged with
negligence.
x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of was
under the control or management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the injury was
such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its control or management
used proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the
absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused by the defendants
want of care.
The procedural effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is that petitioners negligence is presumed
once respondents established the requisites for the doctrine to apply. Once respondents made out a
prima facie case of all requisites, the burden shifts to petitioner to explain. The presumption or
inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances a
disputable presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference.16
Was petitioners explanation as to why she failed to have the tree removed immediately sufficient to
exculpate her?
As the school principal, petitioner was tasked to see to the maintenance of the school grounds and
safety of the children within the school and its premises. That she was unaware of the rotten state of the
tree calls for an explanation on her part as to why she failed to be vigilant.
Petitioner contends she was unaware of the state of the dead and rotting tree because Lerios merely
offered to buy the tree and did not inform her of its condition. Neither did any of her teachers inform
her that the tree was an imminent danger to anyone. She argues that she could not see the immediate
danger posed by the tree by its mere sighting even as she and the other teachers conducted ground
inspections. She further argues that, even if she should have been aware of the danger, she exercised
her duty by assigning the disposition of the tree to another teacher.
We find petitioners explanation wanting. As school principal, petitioner is expected to oversee the
safety of the schools premises.1wphi1 The fact that she failed to see the immediate danger posed by
the dead and rotting tree shows she failed to exercise the responsibility demanded by her position.
Moreover, even if petitioner had assigned disposal of the tree to another teacher, she exercises
supervision over her assignee.17 The record shows that more than a month had lapsed from the time
petitioner gave instruction to her assistant Palaa on December 15, 1992, to the time the incident
occurred on February 1, 1993. Clearly, she failed to check seasonably if the danger posed by the rotting
tree had been removed. Thus, we cannot accept her defense of lack of negligence.
Lastly, petitioner questions the award of moral damages. Moral damages are awarded if the following
elements exist in the case: (1) an injury clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) a culpable act or omission
factually established; (3) a wrongful act or omission by the defendant as the proximate cause of the
injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages predicated on any of the cases stated in
Article 2219 of the Civil Code.18 However, the person claiming moral damages must prove the
existence of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence for the law always presumes good faith. It is
not enough that one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish, and serious anxiety as the result
of the actuations of the other party. Invariably, such action must be shown to have been willfully done
in bad faith or with ill motive.19 Under the circumstances, we have to concede that petitioner was not
motivated by bad faith or ill motive vis--vis respondents daughters death. The award of moral
damages is therefore not proper.
In line with applicable jurisprudence, we sustain the award by the Court of Appeals of P50,000 as
indemnity for the death of Jasmin,20 and P15,010 as reimbursement of her burial expenses.21
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 18, 2002 and the Resolution
dated March 20, 2003, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 54412 are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION such that the award of moral damages is hereby deleted.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118664 August 7, 1998
JAPAN AIRLINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, ENRIQUE AGANA., MARIA ANGELA NINA AGANA, ADALIA B. FRANCISCO and JOSE MIRANDA, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

1 which
Before us is an appeal by certiorari filed by petitioner Japan Airlines, Inc. (JAL) seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals,
affirmed with modification the award of damages made by the trial court in favor of herein private respondents
Enrique Agana, Maria Angela Nina Agana, Adelia Francisco and Jose Miranda.
On June 13, 1991, private respondent Jose Miranda boarded JAL flight No. JL 001 in San Francisco, California
bound for Manila. Likewise, on the same day private respondents Enrique Agana, Maria Angela Nina Agana and
Adelia Francisco left Los Angeles, California for Manila via JAL flight No. JL 061. As an incentive for travelling on
the said airline, both flights were to make an overnight stopover at Narita, Japan, at the airlines' expense,
thereafter proceeding to Manila the following day.
Upon arrival at Narita, Japan on June 14, 1991, private respondents were billeted at Hotel Nikko Narita for the
night. The next day, private respondents, on the final leg of their journey, went to the airport to take their flight to
Manila. However, due to the Mt. Pinatubo eruption, unrelenting ashfall blanketed Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA), rendering it inaccessible to airline traffic. Hence, private respondents' trip to Manila was cancelled
indefinitely.
To accommodate the needs of its stranded passengers, JAL rebooked all the Manila-bound passengers on flight
No. 741 due to depart on June 16, 1991 and also paid for the hotel expenses for their unexpected overnight stay.
On June 16, 1991, much to the dismay of the private respondents, their long anticipated flight to Manila was
again cancelled due to NAIA's indefinite closure. At this point, JAL informed the private respondents that it would
no longer defray their hotel and accommodation expense during their stay in Narita.
Since NAIA was only reopened to airline traffic on June 22, 1991, private respondents were forced to pay for
their accommodations and meal expenses from their personal funds from June 16 to June 21, 1991. Their
unexpected stay in Narita ended on June 22, 1991 when they arrived in Manila on board JL flight No. 741.
Obviously, still reeling from the experience, private respondents, on July 25, 1991, commenced an action for
damages against JAL before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104. 2 To support their claim,
private respondents asserted that JAL failed to live up to its duty to provide care and comfort to its stranded
passengers when it refused to pay for their hotel and accommodation expenses from June 16 to 21, 1991 at
Narita, Japan. In other words, they insisted that JAL was obligated to shoulder their expenses as long as they
were still stranded in Narita. On the other hand, JAL denied this allegation and averred that airline passengers
have no vested right to these amenities in case a flight is cancelled due to "force majeure."
On June 18, 1992, the trial court rendered its judgment in favor of private respondents holding JAL liable for
damages, viz.:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiffs ordering the defendant Japan Airlines to pay the plaintiffs Enrique Agana, Adalia
B. Francisco and Maria Angela Nina Agana the sum of One million Two Hundred forty-six Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Six Pesos
(P1,246,936.00) and Jose Miranda the sum of Three Hundred Twenty Thousand Six Hundred sixteen and 31/100 (P320,616.31) as actual,
moral and exemplary damages and pay attorney's fees in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00), and to pay the
costs of suit.

Undaunted, JAL appealed the decision before the Court of Appeals, which, however, with the exception of lowering the damages awarded affirmed the trial
court's finding,
3 thus:

Thus, the award of moral damages should be as it is hereby reduced to P200,000.00 for each of the plaintiffs, the exemplary damages to
P300,000.00 and the attorney's fees to P100,000.00 plus the costs.

WHEREFORE, with the foregoing Modification, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.

JAL filed a motion for reconsideration which proved futile and

unavailing.
4

Failing in its bid to reconsider the decision, JAL has now filed this instant petition.
The issue to be resolved is whether JAL, as a common carrier has the obligation to shoulder the hotel and meal
expenses of its stranded passengers until they have reached their final destination, even if the delay were
caused by "force majeure."
To begin with, there is no dispute that the Mt. Pinatubo eruption prevented JAL from proceeding to Manila on
schedule. Likewise, private respondents concede that such event can be considered as "force majeure" since
their delayed arrival in Manila was not imputable to JAL. 5
However, private respondents contend that while JAL cannot be held responsible for the delayed arrival in
Manila, it was nevertheless liable for their living expenses during their unexpected stay in Narita since airlines
have the obligation to ensure the comfort and convenience of its passengers. While we sympathize with the
private respondents' plight, we are unable to accept this contention.
We are not unmindful of the fact that in a plethora of cases we have consistently ruled that a contract to transport
passengers is quite different in kind, and degree from any other contractual relation. It is safe to conclude that it
is a relationship imbued with public interest. Failure on the part of the common carrier to live up to the exacting
standards of care and diligence renders it liable for any damages that may be sustained by its passengers.
However, this is not to say that common carriers are absolutely responsible for all injuries or damages even if the
same were caused by a fortuitous event. To rule otherwise would render the defense of "force majeure," as an
exception from any liability, illusory and ineffective.
Accordingly, there is no question that when a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of "force majeure,"
the general rule is that he cannot be held liable for damages for non-performance. 6 Corollarily, when JAL was
prevented from resuming its flight to Manila due to the effects of Mt. Pinatubo eruption, whatever losses or
damages in the form of hotel and meal expenses the stranded passengers incurred, cannot be charged to JAL.
Yet it is undeniable that JAL assumed the hotel expenses of respondents for their unexpected overnight stay on
June 15, 1991.
Admittedly, to be stranded for almost a week in a foreign land was an exasperating experience for the private
respondents. To be sure, they underwent distress and anxiety during their unanticipated stay in Narita, but their
predicament was not due to the fault or negligence of JAL but the closure of NAIA to international flights. Indeed,
to hold JAL, in the absence of bad faith or negligence, liable for the amenities of its stranded passengers by
reason of a fortuitous event is too much of a burden to assume.
Furthermore, it has been held that airline passengers must take such risks incident to the mode of travel. 7 In this
regard, adverse weather conditions or extreme climatic changes are some of the perils involved in air travel, the
consequences of which the passenger must assume or expect. After all, common carriers are not the insurer of
all risks. 8
Paradoxically, the Court of Appeals, despite the presence of "force majeure," still ruled against JAL relying in our
decision in PAL v. Court of Appeals, 9 thus:
The position taken by PAL in this case clearly illustrates its failure to grasp the exacting standard required by law. Undisputably, PAL's
diversion of its flight due to inclement weather was a fortuitous event. Nonetheless, such occurrence did not terminate PAL's contract with
its passengers. Being in the business of air carriage and the sole one to operate in the country, PAL is deemed equipped to deal with
situations as in the case at bar. What we said in one case once again must be stressed, i.e., the relation of carrier and passenger
continues until the latter has been landed at the port of destination and has left the carrier's premises. Hence, PAL necessarily would still
have to exercise extraordinary diligence in safeguarding the comfort, convenience and safety of its stranded passengers until they have
reached their final destination. On this score, PAL grossly failed considering the then ongoing battle between government forces and
Muslim rebels in Cotabato City and the fact that the private respondent was a stranger to the place.

The reliance is misplaced. The factual background of the PAL case is different from the instant petition. In that case there was indeed a fortuitous event resulting
in the diversion of the PAL flight. However, the unforeseen diversion was worsened when "private respondents (passenger) was left at the airport and could not
10 not
to mention the apparent apathy of the PAL station manager as
even hitch a ride in a Ford Fiera loaded with PAL personnel,"
to the predicament of the stranded passengers. 11 In light of these circumstances, we held that if the fortuitous
event was accompanied by neglect and malfeasance by the carrier's employees, an action for damages against
the carrier is permissible. Unfortunately, for private respondents, none of these conditions are present in the
instant petition.
We are not prepared, however, to completely absolve petitioner JAL from any liability. It must be noted that
private respondents bought tickets from the United States with Manila as their final destination. While JAL was
no longer required to defray private respondents' living expenses during their stay in Narita on account of the
fortuitous event, JAL had the duty to make the necessary arrangements to transport private respondents on the
first available connecting flight to Manila. Petitioner JAL reneged on its obligation to look after the comfort and
convenience of its passengers when it declassified private respondents from "transit passengers" to "new
passengers" as a result of which private respondents were obliged to make the necessary arrangements
themselves for the next flight to Manila. Private respondents were placed on the waiting list from June 20 to June
24. To assure themselves of a seat on an available flight, they were compelled to stay in the airport the whole
day of June 22, 1991 and it was only at 8:00 p.m. of the aforesaid date that they were advised that they could be
accommodated in said flight which flew at about 9:00 a.m. the next day.
We are not oblivious to the fact that the cancellation of JAL flights to Manila from June 15 to June 21, 1991
caused considerable disruption in passenger booking and reservation. In fact, it would be unreasonable to
expect, considering NAIA's closure, that JAL flight operations would be normal on the days affected.
Nevertheless, this does not excuse JAL from its obligation to make the necessary arrangements to transport
private respondents on its first available flight to Manila. After all, it had a contract to transport private
respondents from the United States to Manila as their final destination.
Consequently, the award of nominal damages is in order. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right
of a plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized and not for
the purpose of indemnifying any loss suffered by him. 12 The court may award nominal damages in every
obligation arising from any source enumerated in article 1157, or in every case where any property right has
been invaded. 13
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 22, 1993 is hereby
MODIFIED. The award of actual, moral and exemplary damages is hereby DELETED. Petitioner JAL is ordered
to pay each of the private respondents nominal damages in the sum of P100,000.00 each including attorney' s
fees of P50,000.00 plus costs.
SO ORDERED.
DY TEBAN TRADING, INC., G.R. No. 161803
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,*
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
JOSE CHING /OR LIBERTY
FOREST, INC. and CRESILITO Promulgated:
M. LIMBAGA,
Respondents. February 4, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
THE vehicular collision resulting in damages and injuries in this case could have been
avoided if the stalled prime mover with trailer were parked properly and equipped with
an early warning device. It is high time We sounded the call for strict enforcement of the
law and regulation on traffic and vehicle registration. Panahon na para mahigpit na
ipatupad ang batas at regulasyon sa trapiko at pagpapatala ng sasakyan.

Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of

Appeals (CA) modifying that[2] of the Regional Trial Court () in
finding private respondents Liberty Forest, Inc. and Cresilito Limbaga liable to
petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc. for damages.

Facts

On , at around , Rogelio Ortiz, with helper Romeo Catamora, was driving a Nissan van
owned by petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc. along the in Barangay Sumilihon, , going to
. They were delivering commercial ice to nearby barangays and municipalities. A Joana
Paula passenger bus was cruising on the opposite lane towards the van. In between the
two vehicles was a parked prime mover with a trailer, owned by private respondent
Liberty Forest, Inc.[3]

The night before, at around , the prime mover with trailer suffered a tire blowout. The
driver, private respondent Cresilito Limbaga, parked the prime mover askew occupying
a substantial portion of the national highway, on the lane of the passenger bus. He
parked the prime mover with trailer at the shoulder of the road with the left wheels still
on the cemented highway and the right wheels on the sand and gravel shoulder of the
highway.[4] The prime mover was not equipped with triangular, collapsible reflectorized
plates, the early warning device required under Letter of Instruction No. 229. As
substitute, Limbaga placed a banana trunk with leaves on the front and the rear portion
of the prime mover to warn incoming motorists. It is alleged that Limbaga likewise
placed kerosene lighted tin cans on the front and rear of the trailer.[5]

To avoid hitting the parked prime mover occupying its lane, the incoming passenger bus
swerved to the right, onto the lane of the approaching Nissan van. Ortiz saw two bright
and glaring headlights and the approaching passenger bus. He pumped his break slowly,
swerved to the left to avoid the oncoming bus but the van hit the front of the stationary
prime mover. The passenger bus hit the rear of the prime mover.[6]

Ortiz and Catamora only suffered minor injuries. The Nissan van, however, became
inoperable as a result of the incident. After the collision, 4 Teofilo Pame conducted an
investigation and submitted a police traffic incident investigation report.[7]
On , petitioner Nissan van owner filed a complaint for damages[8] against private
respondents prime mover owner and driver with the in . The Joana Paula passenger bus
was not impleaded as defendant in the complaint.

RTC Disposition

On , the rendered a decision in favor of petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc. with a fallo
reading:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered directing, ordaining and ordering:

a) That defendants Liberty Forest, Inc. and Cresilito M. Limbaga
pay, jointly and solidarily, plaintiff Dy Teban Trading, Inc. the
amounts of P279,832.00 as actual and compensatory damages,
P30,000.00 as attorneys fees and P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation;
b) That all money claims of plaintiff Rogelio C. Ortiz are dismissed;
c) That defendant Jose Ching is absolved from any civil liability or
the case against him dismissed;
d) That the counterclaim of all the defendants is dismissed; and
e) That defendants Liberty Forest, Inc. and Cresilito M. Limbaga to
pay, jointly and solidarily, the costs.
SO ORDERED.[9]
The held that the proximate cause of the three-way vehicular collision was improper
parking of the prime mover on the national highway and the absence of an early warning
device on the vehicle, thus:

The court finds that the proximate cause of the incidents is the negligence and carelessness attributable
to the defendants. When the trailer being pulled by the prime mover suffered two (2) flat tires at
Sumilihon, the prime mover and trailer were parked haphazardly, as the right tires of the prime mover
were the only ones on the sand and gravel shoulder of the highway while the left tires and all the tires
of the trailer were on the cemented pavement of the highway, occupying almost the whole of the right
lane on the direction the prime mover and trailer were traveling. The statement of Limbaga that he
could not park the prime mover and trailer deeper into the sand and gravel shoulder of the highway to
his right because there were banana plants is contradicted by the picture marked Exhibit F. The picture
shows that there was ample space on the shoulder. If defendant Limbaga was careful and prudent
enough, he should have the prime mover and trailer traveled more distance forward so that the bodies
of the prime mover and trailer would be far more on the shoulder rather than on the cemented highway
when they were parked. x x x The court has some doubts on the statement of witness-driver Limbaga
that there were banana trunks with leaves and lighted tin cans with crude oil placed 3 strides in front of
the prime mover and behind the trailer because the testimonies of witnesses Rogelio C. Ortiz, driver of
the ice van, Romeo D. Catamora, helper of the ice van, and Police Traffic Investigator 3 Teofilo M.
Pame show that there were no banana trunks with leaves and lighted tin cans at the scene of the
incident. But even assuming that there were banana trunks with leaves but they were placed close to the
prime mover and trailer as they were placed 3 strides away which to the mind of the court is equivalent
approximately to 3 meters and with this distance, approaching vehicles would have no sufficient time
and space to make a complete stop, especially if the vehicles are heavy and loaded. If there were
lighted tin cans, it was not explained by the defendants why the driver, especially driver witness Ortiz,
did not see them.
xxxx
Defendant Liberty Forest, Inc. did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in managing
and running its business. The evidence on record shows that it failed to provide its prime mover and
trailer with the required early warning devices with reflectors and it did not keep proper maintenance
and condition of the prime mover and the trailer. The circumstances show that the trailer were provided
with wornout tires and with only one (1) piece of spare tire. The pictures marked Exhibit 3 and 4 show
that two (2) flat tires suffered by the trailer and these two (2) tires were attached to one of the two (2) I-
beams or axles attached to the rear of the trailer which axle is very near but behind the other axle and
with the location of the 2 I-beams, it would have the other I-beam that would have suffered the flat tires
as it has to bear the brunt of weight of the D-8 bulldozer. The bulldozer was not loaded directly above
the two (2) I-beams as 2 I-beams, as a pair, were attached at the far rear end of the trailer.
xxxx
However, defendant Jose Ching should be absolved of any liability as there is no showing that he is the
manager or CEO of defendant Liberty Forest, Inc. Although in the answer, it is admitted that he is an
officer of the defendant corporation, but it is not clarified what kind of position he is holding, as he
could be an officer as one of the members of the Board of Directors or a cashier and treasurer of the
corporation. Witness Limbaga in his testimony mentioned a certain Boy Ching as the Manager but it
was never clarified whether or not Boy Ching and defendant Jose Ching is one and the same person.
[10]
Private respondents appealed to the CA.

CA Disposition

On , the CA reversed the decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, in
Civil Case No. 4360 is hereby PARTLY MODIFIED by absolving the defendants-appellants/appellees
of any liability to plaintiffs-appellants/appellees by reason of the incident on .
The dismissal of the case against Jose Ching, the counterclaim of defendants-appellants/appellees and
the money claim of Rogelio Ortiz STANDS.
SO ORDERED.[11]
In partly reversing or partly modifying the decision, the CA held that the proximate
cause of the vehicular collision was the failure of the Nissan van to give way or yield to
the right of way of the passenger bus, thus:
It was stated that the Joana Paula bus in trying to avoid a head-on collision with the truck, sideswept
the parked trailer loaded with bulldozer.
Evidently, the driver of the Joana Paula bus was aware of the presence on its lane of the parked trailer
with bulldozer. For this reason, it proceeded to occupy what was left of its lane and part of the opposite
lane. The truck occupying the opposite lane failed to give way or yield the right of way to the
oncoming bus by proceeding with the same speed. The two vehicles were, in effect, trying to beat each
other in occupying a single lane. The bus was the first to occupy the said lane but upon realizing that
the truck refused to give way or yield the right of way, the bus, as a precaution, geared to its right
where the trailer was parked. Unfortunately, the bus miscalculated its distance from the parked trailer
and its rear right side hit the protruding blade of the bulldozer then on the top of the parked trailer. The
impact of the collision on its right rear side with the blade of the bulldozer threw the bus further to the
opposite lane, landing its rear portion on the shoulder of the opposite lane.
xxxx
Facts of the case reveal that when Ortiz, the driver of the truck, failed to give the Joana Paula bus the
space on the road it needed, the latter vehicle scraped its rear right side on the protruded bulldozer
blade and the impact threw the bus directly on the path of the oncoming truck. This made plaintiffs-
appellants/appellees conclude that the Joana Paula bus occupied its lane which forced Ortiz, the driver
of the truck, to swerve to its left and ram the front of the parked trailer.
xxxx
The trailer was parked because its two (2) rear-left tires were blown out. With a bulldozer on top of the
trailer and two (2) busted tires, it would be dangerous and quite impossible for the trailer to further park
on the graveled shoulder of the road. To do so will cause the flat car to tilt and may cause the bulldozer
to fall from where it was mounted. In fact, it appeared that the driver of the trailer tried its best to park
on the graveled shoulder since the right-front tires were on the graveled shoulder of the road.
The lower court erred in stating that the Joana Paula bus swerved to the left of the truck because it did
not see the parked trailer due to lack of warning sign of danger of any kind that can be seen from a
distance. The damage suffered by the Joana Paula bus belied this assessment. As stated before, the
Joana Paula bus, with the intention of passing first which it did, first approached the space beside the
parked trailer, veered too close to the parked trailer thereby hitting its rear right side on the protruding
bulldozer blade. Since the damage was on the rear right most of the bus, it was clearly on the space
which was wide enough for a single passing vehicle but not sufficient for two (2) passing vehicles. The
bus was thrown right to the path of the truck by the impact of the collision of its rear right side with the
bulldozer blade.[12]
The CA disagreed with the that the prime mover did not have an early warning device.
The appellate court accepted the claim of private respondent that Limbaga placed
kerosene lighted tin cans on the front and rear of the trailer which, in Baliwag Transit,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[13] may act as substitute early warning device. The CA stated:

Likewise, it was incorrect for the lower court to state that there was no warning sign of danger of any
kind, most probably referring to the absence of the triangular reflectorized plates. The police sketch
clearly indicated the stack of banana leaves placed at the rear of the parked trailer. The trailers driver
testified that they placed kerosene lighted tin can at the back of the parked trailer.
A pair of triangular reflectorized plates is not the only early warning device allowed by law. The
Supreme Court (in Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals) held that:
x x x Col. Dela Cruz and Romano testified that they did not see any early
warning device at the scene of the accident. They were referring to the
triangular reflectorized plates in red and yellow issued by the Land
Transportation Office. However, the evidence shows that Recontique and
Ecala placed a kerosene lamp or torch at the edge of the road, near the
rear portion of the truck to serve as an early warning device. This
substantially complies with Section 34(g) of the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code x x x
Baliwags argument that the kerosene lamp or torch does not substantially
comply with the law is untenable. The aforequoted law clearly allows the
use not only of an early warning device of the triangular reflectorized
plates variety but also parking lights or flares visible one hundred meters
away. x x x.
This Court holds that the defendants-appellants/appellees were not negligent in parking the trailer on
the scene of the accident. It would have been different if there was only one flat tire and defendant-
appellant/appellee Limbaga failed to change the same and left immediately.
As such, defendants-appellants/appellees are not liable for the damages suffered by plaintiffs-
appellants/appellees. Whatever damage plaintiffs-appellants/appellees suffered, they alone must bear
them.[14]
Issues

Petitioner raises two issues[15] for Our consideration, to wit:

I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITHOUT ANY AVAILABLE CONCRETE
EVIDENCE, ERRONEOUSLY DETERMINED THAT THERE WERE EARLY WARNING
DEVICES PLACED IN FRONT OF THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS/APPELLEES TRUCK
FLAT TO WARN PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT/APPELLEE ROGELIO ORTIZ OF THEIR
PRESENCE.
II.
WITH DUE RESPECT, IT IS HIGH TIME TO ENFORCE THE LAW ON EARLY WARNING
DEVICES IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST.
Our Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

The meat of the petition is whether or not the prime mover is liable for the damages
suffered by the Nissan van. The ruled in the affirmative holding that the proximate cause
of the vehicular collision was the negligence of Limbaga in parking the prime mover on
the national highway without an early warning device on the vehicle. The CA reversed
the decision, holding that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of
Ortiz in not yielding to the right of way of the passenger bus.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict. To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following requisites
must concur: (a) damage suffered by plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of defendant; and
(c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of defendant and the
damage incurred by plaintiff.[16]

There is no dispute that the Nissan van suffered damage. That is borne by the records
and conceded by the parties. The outstanding issues are negligence and proximate cause.
Tersely put, the twin issues are: (a) whether or not prime mover driver Limbaga was
negligent in parking the vehicle; and (b) whether or not his negligence was the
proximate cause of the damage to the Nissan van.

Limbaga was negligent in parking the prime

mover on the national highway; he failed to
prevent or minimize the risk to oncoming
motorists.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of
another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.[17] The Supreme Court stated
the test of negligence in the landmark case Picart v. Smith[18] as follows:

The test by which to determine the existence or negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinary person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined
by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what
would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that. (Underscoring supplied)
The test of negligence is objective. We measure the act or omission of the tortfeasor with
that of an ordinary reasonable person in the same situation. The test, as applied to this
case, is whether Limbaga, in parking the prime mover, used that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinary reasonable person would have used in the same situation.

We find that Limbaga was utterly negligent in parking the prime mover askew on the
right side of the national highway. The vehicle occupied a substantial portion of the
national road on the lane of the passenger bus. It was parked at the shoulder of the road
with its left wheels still on the cemented highway and the right wheels on the sand and
gravel shoulder of the highway. It is common sense that the skewed parking of the prime
mover on the national road posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. It was incumbent
upon Limbaga to take some measures to prevent that risk, or at least minimize it.

We are unable to agree with the CA conclusion it would have been dangerous and quite
impossible to further park the prime mover on the graveled shoulder of the road because
the prime mover may tilt and the bulldozer may fall off. The photographs taken after the
incident show that it could have been possible for Limbaga to park the prime mover
completely on the shoulder of the national road without risk to oncoming motorists. We
agree with the observation on this point, thus:

x x x The statement of Limbaga that he could not park the prime mover and trailer deeper into the sand
and gravel shoulder of the highway to his right because there were banana plants is contradicted by the
picture marked Exhibit F. The picture shows that there was ample space on the shoulder. If defendant
Limbaga was careful and prudent enough, he should have the prime mover and trailer traveled more
distance forward so that the bodies of the prime mover and trailer would be far more on the shoulder
rather than on the cemented highway when they were parked. Although at the time of the incident, it
was about in the morning and it was drizzling but there is showing that it was pitch dark that whoever
travels along the highway must be extra careful. If the Joana Paula bus swerved to the lane on which
the Nissan ice van was properly traveling, as prescribed by Traffic Rules and Regulations, it is because
the driver of the bus did not see at a distance the parked prime mover and trailer on the bus proper lane
because there was no warning signs of danger of any kind that can be seen from a distance.[19]
Limbaga also failed to take proper steps to minimize the risk posed by the improperly
parked prime mover. He did not immediately inform his employer, private respondent
Liberty Forest, Inc., that the prime mover suffered two tire blowouts and that he could
not have them fixed because he had only one spare tire. Instead of calling for help,
Limbaga took it upon himself to simply place banana leaves on the front and rear of the
prime mover to serve as warning to oncoming motorists. Worse, Limbaga slept on the
prime mover instead of standing guard beside the vehicle. By his own account, Limbaga
was sleeping on the prime mover at the time of the collision and that he was only
awakened by the impact of the Nissan van and the passenger bus on the prime mover.
[20]

Limbaga also admitted on cross-examination that it was his first time to drive the prime
mover with trailer loaded with a D-8 caterpillar bulldozer.[21] We find that private
respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. was utterly negligent in allowing a novice driver, like
Limbaga, to operate a vehicle, such as a truck loaded with a bulldozer, which required
highly specialized driving skills. Respondent employer clearly failed to properly
supervise Limbaga in driving the prime mover.

The noted that private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. also failed to keep the prime
mover in proper condition at the time of the collision. The prime mover had worn out
tires. It was only equipped with one spare tire. It was for this reason that Limbaga was
unable to change the two blown out tires because he had only one spare. The bulldozer
was not even loaded properly on the prime mover, which caused the tire blowouts.

All told, We agree with the that private respondent Limbaga was negligent in parking the
prime mover on the national highway. Private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. was also
negligent in failing to supervise Limbaga and in ensuring that the prime mover was in
proper condition.

The case of Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of

Appeals is inapplicable; Limbaga did not put
lighted kerosene tin cans on the front and rear
of the prime mover.
Anent the absence of an early warning device on the prime mover, the CA erred in
accepting the bare testimony of Limbaga that he placed kerosene lighted tin cans on the
front and rear of the prime mover. The evidence on records belies such claim. The CA
reliance on Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[22] as authority for the proposition
that kerosene lighted tin cans may act as substitute early warning device is misplaced.
First, the traffic incident report did not mention any lighted tin cans on the prime mover
or within the immediate vicinity of the accident. Only banana leaves were placed on the
prime mover. The report reads:

VIII RESULT OF INVESTIGATION: A Joana Paula Bus, with Body No. 7788, with Plate No. LVA-
137, driven by one Temestocles Relova v. Antero, of legal age, married and a resident of San Roque,
Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte, while traveling along the National Highway, coming from the east going
to the west direction, as it moves along the way and upon reaching Brgy. Sumilihon, to evade bumping
to the approaching Nissan Ice Van with Plate No. PNT-247, driven by one Rogelio Cortez y Ceneza. As
the result, the Joana Paula Bus accidentally busideswept (sic) to the parked Prime Mover with Trailer
loaded with Bulldozer without early warning device, instead placing only dry banana leaves three (3)
meters at the rear portion of the Trailer, while failure to place at the front portion, and the said vehicle
occupied the whole lane. As the result, the Joana Paula Bus hit to the left edge blade of the Bulldozer.
Thus, causing the said bus swept to the narrow shouldering, removing the rear four (4) wheels
including the differential and injuring the above-stated twelve (12) passengers and damaged to the right
side fender above the rear wheel. Thus, causing damage on it. While the Nissan Ice Van in evading,
accidentally swerved to the left lane and accidentally bumped to the front bumper of the parked Prime
Mover with Trailer loaded with Bulldozer. Thus, causing heavy damage to said Nissan Ice Van
including the cargoes of the said van.[23]
Second, 4 Pame, who investigated the collision, testified[24] that only banana leaves
were placed on the front and rear of the prime mover. He did not see any lighted tin cans
in the immediate vicinity of the collision.

Third, the claim of Limbaga that he placed lighted tin cans on the front and rear of the
prime mover belatedly surfaced only during his direct examination. No allegation to this
effect was made by private respondents in their Answer to the complaint for damages.
Petitioners counsel promptly objected to the testimony of Limbaga, thus:

. ROSALES:
Q. Now you mentioned about placing some word signs in front and at the rear of the prime mover with
trailer, will you please describe to us what this word signs are?
A. We placed a piece of cloth on tin cans and filled them with crude oil. And these tin cans were
lighted and they are like torches. These two lights or torches were placed in front and at the rear side of
the prime mover with trailer. After each torch, we placed banana trunk. The banana trunk is placed
between the two (2) torches and the prime mover, both on the rear and on the front portion of the prime
mover.
Q. How far was the lighted tin cans with wick placed in front of the prime mover.
.:
At this point, we will be objecting to questions particularly referring to the alleged tin cans as some of
the warning-sign devices, considering that there is no allegation to that effect in the answer of the
defendants. The answer was just limited to the numbers 4 & 5 of the answer. And, therefore, if we
follow the rule of the binding effect of an allegation in the complaint, then the party will not be allowed
to introduce evidence to attack jointly or rather the same, paragraph 5 states, warning device consisting
of 3 banana trunks, banana items and leaves were filed. He can be cross-examined in the point, Your
Honor.
COURT:
Q. Put that on record that as far as this tin cans are concerned, the plaintiffs are interposing continuing
objections. But the Court will allow the question.[25]
We thus agree with the that Limbaga did not place lighted tin cans on the front and rear
of the prime mover. We give more credence to the traffic incident report and the
testimony of 4 Pame that only banana leaves were placed on the vehicle. Baliwag
Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[26] thus finds no application to the case at bar.

The skewed parking of the prime mover was the

proximate cause of the collision.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred. More comprehensively, proximate cause is that cause
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as
an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom.[27]

There is no exact mathematical formula to determine proximate cause. It is based upon

mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.[28] Plaintiff must,
however, establish a sufficient link between the act or omission and the damage or
injury. That link must not be remote or far-fetched; otherwise, no liability will attach.
The damage or injury must be a natural and probable result of the act or omission. In the
precedent-setting Vda. de Bataclan v. Medina,[29] this Court discussed the necessary
link that must be established between the act or omission and the damage or injury, viz.:

It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely causing
him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on
fire, say, by lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger
is burned to death, one might still contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and not the
overturning of the vehicle. But in the present case and under the circumstances obtaining in the same,
we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the
bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the
leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with
a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably,
by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was very dark (about 2:30 in the
morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them; and coming as they did from a rural area where
lanterns and flashlights were not available, they had to use a torch, the most handy and available; and
what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the overturned vehicle to
extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with
the torch was to be expected and was natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of
some of its passengers bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help.
The ruling in Bataclan has been repeatedly cited in subsequent cases as authority for the
proposition that the damage or injury must be a natural or probable result of the act or
omission. Here, We agree with the that the damage caused to the Nissan van was a
natural and probable result of the improper parking of the prime mover with trailer. As
discussed, the skewed parking of the prime mover posed a serious risk to oncoming
motorists. Limbaga failed to prevent or minimize that risk. The skewed parking of the
prime mover triggered the series of events that led to the collision, particularly the
swerving of the passenger bus and the Nissan van.

Private respondents Liberty Forest, Inc. and Limbaga are liable for all damages that
resulted from the skewed parking of the prime mover. Their liability includes those
damages resulting from precautionary measures taken by other motorist in trying to
avoid collision with the parked prime mover. As We see it, the passenger bus swerved to
the right, onto the lane
of the Nissan van, to avoid colliding with the improperly parked prime mover. The
driver of the Nissan van, Ortiz, reacted swiftly by swerving to the left, onto the lane of
the passenger bus, hitting the parked prime mover. Ortiz obviously would not have
swerved if not for the passenger bus abruptly occupying his vans lane. The passenger
bus, in turn, would not have swerved to the lane of the Nissan van if not for the prime
mover improperly parked on its lane. The skewed parking is the proximate cause of the
damage to the Nissan van.

In Phoenix Construction, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[30] this Court held that a
similar vehicular collision was caused by the skewed parking of a dump truck on the
national road, thus:

The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that private respondent
Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving faster
than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General
Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and
sticking out onto the road lane.
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the
legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisios injuries was the wrongful or negligent
manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That
there was a reasonable relationship between petitioner Carbonels negligence on the one hand and the
accident and respondents injuries on the other hand, is quite clear. Put in a slightly different manner, the
collision of Dionisios car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck
drivers negligence.
xxxx
We believe, secondly, that the truck drivers negligence far from being a passive and static condition
was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between the dump truck and the private
respondents car would in all probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew
without any warning lights or reflector devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created an
unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down and for having so created this risk, the truck driver
must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisios negligence, although later in point of time than the
truck drivers negligence and, therefore, closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or
independent cause. What the Petitioner describes as an intervening cause was no more than a
foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the negligent manner in which the truck driver had
parked the dump truck. In other words, the petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private respondent
Dionisio and others similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had
created. Dionisios negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were,
the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, nor to
sever the juris vinculum of liability. x x x (Underscoring supplied)
We cannot rule on the proportionate or
contributory liability of the passenger bus, if
any, because it was not a party to the case; joint
tortfeasors are solidarily liable.
The CA also faults the passenger bus for the vehicular collision. The appellate court
noted that the passenger bus was aware of the presence of the prime mover on its lane,
but it still proceeded to occupy the lane of the Nissan van. The passenger bus also
miscalculated its distance from the prime mover when it hit the vehicle.

We cannot definitively rule on the proportionate or contributory liability of the Joana

Paula passenger bus vis--vis the prime mover because it was not a party to the complaint
for damages. Due process dictates that the passenger bus must be given an opportunity
to present its own version of events before it can be held liable. Any contributory or
proportionate liability of the passenger bus must be litigated in a separate action, barring
any defense of prescription or laches. Insofar as petitioner is concerned, the proximate
cause of the collision was the improper parking of the prime mover. It was the improper
parking of the prime mover which set in motion the series of events that led to the
vehicular collision.

Even granting that the passenger bus was at fault, its fault will not necessarily absolve
private respondents from liability. If at fault, the passenger bus will be a joint tortfeasor
along with private respondents. The liability of joint tortfeasors is joint and solidary.
This means that petitioner may hold either of them liable for damages from the collision.
In Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[31] this Court
held:

According to the great weight of authority, where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or
omission of two or more persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in combination, the
direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person and it is impossible to determine in what
proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act
alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from the acts of
the other tort-feasor x x x.
In Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals, the Court declared that the
liability of joint tortfeasors is joint and solidary, to wit:
It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole
cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes other
than plaintiffs, is the proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to
produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them,
it being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without
which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to
the person injured. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have
resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent
tortfeasors. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause
without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the
causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the
circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by
them to the injured person was not the same. No actors negligence ceases to be a proximate cause
merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the
entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are
liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or
more persons, although acting independently, are in combination with the direct and proximate cause of
a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the
injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence
resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for
the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code. (Underscoring supplied)
All told, all the elements of quasi delict have been proven by clear and convincing
evidence. The CA erred in absolving private respondents from liability for the vehicular
collision.

Final Note
It is lamentable that the vehicular collision in this case could have been easily avoided
by following basic traffic rules and regulations and road safety standards. In hindsight,
private respondent Limbaga could have prevented the three-way vehicular collision if he
had properly parked the prime mover on the shoulder of the national road. The improper
parking of vehicles, most especially along the national highways, poses a serious and
unnecessary risk to the lives and limbs of other motorists and passengers. Drivers owe a
duty of care to follow basic traffic rules and regulations and to observe road safety
standards. They owe that duty not only for their own safety, but also for that of other
motorists. We can prevent most vehicular accidents by simply following basic traffic
rules and regulations.
We also note a failure of implementation of basic safety standards, particularly the law
on early warning devices. This applies even more to trucks and big vehicles, which are
prone to mechanical breakdown on the national highway. The law, as crafted, requires
vehicles to be equipped with triangular reflectorized plates.[32] Vehicles without the
required early warning devices are ineligible for registration.[33] Vehicle owners may
also be arrested and fined for non-compliance with the law.[34]
The Land Transportation Office (LTO) owes a duty to the public to ensure that all
vehicles on the road meet basic and minimum safety features, including that of early
warning devices. It is most unfortunate that We still see dilapidated and rundown
vehicles on the road with substandard safety features. These vehicles not only pose a
hazard to the safety of their occupants but that of other motorists. The prime mover truck
in this case should not have been granted registration because it failed to comply with
the minimum safety features required for vehicles on the road.

It is, indeed, time for traffic enforcement agencies and the LTO to strictly enforce all
pertinent laws and regulations within their mandate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals decision dated

August 28, 2003 is hereby SET ASIDE. The decision dated is REINSTATED IN .

SO ORDERED.
DY TEBAN TRADING, INC., G.R. No. 161803
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,*
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
JOSE CHING /OR LIBERTY
FOREST, INC. and CRESILITO Promulgated:
M. LIMBAGA,
Respondents. February 4, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
THE vehicular collision resulting in damages and injuries in this case could have been
avoided if the stalled prime mover with trailer were parked properly and equipped with
an early warning device. It is high time We sounded the call for strict enforcement of the
law and regulation on traffic and vehicle registration. Panahon na para mahigpit na
ipatupad ang batas at regulasyon sa trapiko at pagpapatala ng sasakyan.

Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of

Appeals (CA) modifying that[2] of the Regional Trial Court () in
finding private respondents Liberty Forest, Inc. and Cresilito Limbaga liable to
petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc. for damages.

Facts

On , at around , Rogelio Ortiz, with helper Romeo Catamora, was driving a Nissan van
owned by petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc. along the in Barangay Sumilihon, , going to
. They were delivering commercial ice to nearby barangays and municipalities. A Joana
Paula passenger bus was cruising on the opposite lane towards the van. In between the
two vehicles was a parked prime mover with a trailer, owned by private respondent
Liberty Forest, Inc.[3]

The night before, at around , the prime mover with trailer suffered a tire blowout. The
driver, private respondent Cresilito Limbaga, parked the prime mover askew occupying
a substantial portion of the national highway, on the lane of the passenger bus. He
parked the prime mover with trailer at the shoulder of the road with the left wheels still
on the cemented highway and the right wheels on the sand and gravel shoulder of the
highway.[4] The prime mover was not equipped with triangular, collapsible reflectorized
plates, the early warning device required under Letter of Instruction No. 229. As
substitute, Limbaga placed a banana trunk with leaves on the front and the rear portion
of the prime mover to warn incoming motorists. It is alleged that Limbaga likewise
placed kerosene lighted tin cans on the front and rear of the trailer.[5]

To avoid hitting the parked prime mover occupying its lane, the incoming passenger bus
swerved to the right, onto the lane of the approaching Nissan van. Ortiz saw two bright
and glaring headlights and the approaching passenger bus. He pumped his break slowly,
swerved to the left to avoid the oncoming bus but the van hit the front of the stationary
prime mover. The passenger bus hit the rear of the prime mover.[6]

Ortiz and Catamora only suffered minor injuries. The Nissan van, however, became
inoperable as a result of the incident. After the collision, 4 Teofilo Pame conducted an
investigation and submitted a police traffic incident investigation report.[7]
On , petitioner Nissan van owner filed a complaint for damages[8] against private
respondents prime mover owner and driver with the in . The Joana Paula passenger bus
was not impleaded as defendant in the complaint.

RTC Disposition

On , the rendered a decision in favor of petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc. with a fallo
reading:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered directing, ordaining and ordering:

a) That defendants Liberty Forest, Inc. and Cresilito M. Limbaga
pay, jointly and solidarily, plaintiff Dy Teban Trading, Inc. the
amounts of P279,832.00 as actual and compensatory damages,
P30,000.00 as attorneys fees and P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation;
b) That all money claims of plaintiff Rogelio C. Ortiz are dismissed;
c) That defendant Jose Ching is absolved from any civil liability or
the case against him dismissed;
d) That the counterclaim of all the defendants is dismissed; and
e) That defendants Liberty Forest, Inc. and Cresilito M. Limbaga to
pay, jointly and solidarily, the costs.
SO ORDERED.[9]
The held that the proximate cause of the three-way vehicular collision was improper
parking of the prime mover on the national highway and the absence of an early warning
device on the vehicle, thus:

The court finds that the proximate cause of the incidents is the negligence and carelessness attributable
to the defendants. When the trailer being pulled by the prime mover suffered two (2) flat tires at
Sumilihon, the prime mover and trailer were parked haphazardly, as the right tires of the prime mover
were the only ones on the sand and gravel shoulder of the highway while the left tires and all the tires
of the trailer were on the cemented pavement of the highway, occupying almost the whole of the right
lane on the direction the prime mover and trailer were traveling. The statement of Limbaga that he
could not park the prime mover and trailer deeper into the sand and gravel shoulder of the highway to
his right because there were banana plants is contradicted by the picture marked Exhibit F. The picture
shows that there was ample space on the shoulder. If defendant Limbaga was careful and prudent
enough, he should have the prime mover and trailer traveled more distance forward so that the bodies
of the prime mover and trailer would be far more on the shoulder rather than on the cemented highway
when they were parked. x x x The court has some doubts on the statement of witness-driver Limbaga
that there were banana trunks with leaves and lighted tin cans with crude oil placed 3 strides in front of
the prime mover and behind the trailer because the testimonies of witnesses Rogelio C. Ortiz, driver of
the ice van, Romeo D. Catamora, helper of the ice van, and Police Traffic Investigator 3 Teofilo M.
Pame show that there were no banana trunks with leaves and lighted tin cans at the scene of the
incident. But even assuming that there were banana trunks with leaves but they were placed close to the
prime mover and trailer as they were placed 3 strides away which to the mind of the court is equivalent
approximately to 3 meters and with this distance, approaching vehicles would have no sufficient time
and space to make a complete stop, especially if the vehicles are heavy and loaded. If there were
lighted tin cans, it was not explained by the defendants why the driver, especially driver witness Ortiz,
did not see them.
xxxx
Defendant Liberty Forest, Inc. did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in managing
and running its business. The evidence on record shows that it failed to provide its prime mover and
trailer with the required early warning devices with reflectors and it did not keep proper maintenance
and condition of the prime mover and the trailer. The circumstances show that the trailer were provided
with wornout tires and with only one (1) piece of spare tire. The pictures marked Exhibit 3 and 4 show
that two (2) flat tires suffered by the trailer and these two (2) tires were attached to one of the two (2) I-
beams or axles attached to the rear of the trailer which axle is very near but behind the other axle and
with the location of the 2 I-beams, it would have the other I-beam that would have suffered the flat tires
as it has to bear the brunt of weight of the D-8 bulldozer. The bulldozer was not loaded directly above
the two (2) I-beams as 2 I-beams, as a pair, were attached at the far rear end of the trailer.
xxxx
However, defendant Jose Ching should be absolved of any liability as there is no showing that he is the
manager or CEO of defendant Liberty Forest, Inc. Although in the answer, it is admitted that he is an
officer of the defendant corporation, but it is not clarified what kind of position he is holding, as he
could be an officer as one of the members of the Board of Directors or a cashier and treasurer of the
corporation. Witness Limbaga in his testimony mentioned a certain Boy Ching as the Manager but it
was never clarified whether or not Boy Ching and defendant Jose Ching is one and the same person.
[10]
Private respondents appealed to the CA.

CA Disposition

On , the CA reversed the decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, in
Civil Case No. 4360 is hereby PARTLY MODIFIED by absolving the defendants-appellants/appellees
of any liability to plaintiffs-appellants/appellees by reason of the incident on .
The dismissal of the case against Jose Ching, the counterclaim of defendants-appellants/appellees and
the money claim of Rogelio Ortiz STANDS.
SO ORDERED.[11]
In partly reversing or partly modifying the decision, the CA held that the proximate
cause of the vehicular collision was the failure of the Nissan van to give way or yield to
the right of way of the passenger bus, thus:
It was stated that the Joana Paula bus in trying to avoid a head-on collision with the truck, sideswept
the parked trailer loaded with bulldozer.
Evidently, the driver of the Joana Paula bus was aware of the presence on its lane of the parked trailer
with bulldozer. For this reason, it proceeded to occupy what was left of its lane and part of the opposite
lane. The truck occupying the opposite lane failed to give way or yield the right of way to the
oncoming bus by proceeding with the same speed. The two vehicles were, in effect, trying to beat each
other in occupying a single lane. The bus was the first to occupy the said lane but upon realizing that
the truck refused to give way or yield the right of way, the bus, as a precaution, geared to its right
where the trailer was parked. Unfortunately, the bus miscalculated its distance from the parked trailer
and its rear right side hit the protruding blade of the bulldozer then on the top of the parked trailer. The
impact of the collision on its right rear side with the blade of the bulldozer threw the bus further to the
opposite lane, landing its rear portion on the shoulder of the opposite lane.
xxxx
Facts of the case reveal that when Ortiz, the driver of the truck, failed to give the Joana Paula bus the
space on the road it needed, the latter vehicle scraped its rear right side on the protruded bulldozer
blade and the impact threw the bus directly on the path of the oncoming truck. This made plaintiffs-
appellants/appellees conclude that the Joana Paula bus occupied its lane which forced Ortiz, the driver
of the truck, to swerve to its left and ram the front of the parked trailer.
xxxx
The trailer was parked because its two (2) rear-left tires were blown out. With a bulldozer on top of the
trailer and two (2) busted tires, it would be dangerous and quite impossible for the trailer to further park
on the graveled shoulder of the road. To do so will cause the flat car to tilt and may cause the bulldozer
to fall from where it was mounted. In fact, it appeared that the driver of the trailer tried its best to park
on the graveled shoulder since the right-front tires were on the graveled shoulder of the road.
The lower court erred in stating that the Joana Paula bus swerved to the left of the truck because it did
not see the parked trailer due to lack of warning sign of danger of any kind that can be seen from a
distance. The damage suffered by the Joana Paula bus belied this assessment. As stated before, the
Joana Paula bus, with the intention of passing first which it did, first approached the space beside the
parked trailer, veered too close to the parked trailer thereby hitting its rear right side on the protruding
bulldozer blade. Since the damage was on the rear right most of the bus, it was clearly on the space
which was wide enough for a single passing vehicle but not sufficient for two (2) passing vehicles. The
bus was thrown right to the path of the truck by the impact of the collision of its rear right side with the
bulldozer blade.[12]
The CA disagreed with the that the prime mover did not have an early warning device.
The appellate court accepted the claim of private respondent that Limbaga placed
kerosene lighted tin cans on the front and rear of the trailer which, in Baliwag Transit,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[13] may act as substitute early warning device. The CA stated:

Likewise, it was incorrect for the lower court to state that there was no warning sign of danger of any
kind, most probably referring to the absence of the triangular reflectorized plates. The police sketch
clearly indicated the stack of banana leaves placed at the rear of the parked trailer. The trailers driver
testified that they placed kerosene lighted tin can at the back of the parked trailer.
A pair of triangular reflectorized plates is not the only early warning device allowed by law. The
Supreme Court (in Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals) held that:
x x x Col. Dela Cruz and Romano testified that they did not see any early
warning device at the scene of the accident. They were referring to the
triangular reflectorized plates in red and yellow issued by the Land
Transportation Office. However, the evidence shows that Recontique and
Ecala placed a kerosene lamp or torch at the edge of the road, near the
rear portion of the truck to serve as an early warning device. This
substantially complies with Section 34(g) of the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code x x x
Baliwags argument that the kerosene lamp or torch does not substantially
comply with the law is untenable. The aforequoted law clearly allows the
use not only of an early warning device of the triangular reflectorized
plates variety but also parking lights or flares visible one hundred meters
away. x x x.
This Court holds that the defendants-appellants/appellees were not negligent in parking the trailer on
the scene of the accident. It would have been different if there was only one flat tire and defendant-
appellant/appellee Limbaga failed to change the same and left immediately.
As such, defendants-appellants/appellees are not liable for the damages suffered by plaintiffs-
appellants/appellees. Whatever damage plaintiffs-appellants/appellees suffered, they alone must bear
them.[14]
Issues

Petitioner raises two issues[15] for Our consideration, to wit:

I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITHOUT ANY AVAILABLE CONCRETE
EVIDENCE, ERRONEOUSLY DETERMINED THAT THERE WERE EARLY WARNING
DEVICES PLACED IN FRONT OF THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS/APPELLEES TRUCK
FLAT TO WARN PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT/APPELLEE ROGELIO ORTIZ OF THEIR
PRESENCE.
II.
WITH DUE RESPECT, IT IS HIGH TIME TO ENFORCE THE LAW ON EARLY WARNING
DEVICES IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST.
Our Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

The meat of the petition is whether or not the prime mover is liable for the damages
suffered by the Nissan van. The ruled in the affirmative holding that the proximate cause
of the vehicular collision was the negligence of Limbaga in parking the prime mover on
the national highway without an early warning device on the vehicle. The CA reversed
the decision, holding that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of
Ortiz in not yielding to the right of way of the passenger bus.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict. To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following requisites
must concur: (a) damage suffered by plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of defendant; and
(c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of defendant and the
damage incurred by plaintiff.[16]

There is no dispute that the Nissan van suffered damage. That is borne by the records
and conceded by the parties. The outstanding issues are negligence and proximate cause.
Tersely put, the twin issues are: (a) whether or not prime mover driver Limbaga was
negligent in parking the vehicle; and (b) whether or not his negligence was the
proximate cause of the damage to the Nissan van.

Limbaga was negligent in parking the prime

mover on the national highway; he failed to
prevent or minimize the risk to oncoming
motorists.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of
another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.[17] The Supreme Court stated
the test of negligence in the landmark case Picart v. Smith[18] as follows:

The test by which to determine the existence or negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinary person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined
by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what
would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that. (Underscoring supplied)
The test of negligence is objective. We measure the act or omission of the tortfeasor with
that of an ordinary reasonable person in the same situation. The test, as applied to this
case, is whether Limbaga, in parking the prime mover, used that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinary reasonable person would have used in the same situation.

We find that Limbaga was utterly negligent in parking the prime mover askew on the
right side of the national highway. The vehicle occupied a substantial portion of the
national road on the lane of the passenger bus. It was parked at the shoulder of the road
with its left wheels still on the cemented highway and the right wheels on the sand and
gravel shoulder of the highway. It is common sense that the skewed parking of the prime
mover on the national road posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. It was incumbent
upon Limbaga to take some measures to prevent that risk, or at least minimize it.

We are unable to agree with the CA conclusion it would have been dangerous and quite
impossible to further park the prime mover on the graveled shoulder of the road because
the prime mover may tilt and the bulldozer may fall off. The photographs taken after the
incident show that it could have been possible for Limbaga to park the prime mover
completely on the shoulder of the national road without risk to oncoming motorists. We
agree with the observation on this point, thus:

x x x The statement of Limbaga that he could not park the prime mover and trailer deeper into the sand
and gravel shoulder of the highway to his right because there were banana plants is contradicted by the
picture marked Exhibit F. The picture shows that there was ample space on the shoulder. If defendant
Limbaga was careful and prudent enough, he should have the prime mover and trailer traveled more
distance forward so that the bodies of the prime mover and trailer would be far more on the shoulder
rather than on the cemented highway when they were parked. Although at the time of the incident, it
was about in the morning and it was drizzling but there is showing that it was pitch dark that whoever
travels along the highway must be extra careful. If the Joana Paula bus swerved to the lane on which
the Nissan ice van was properly traveling, as prescribed by Traffic Rules and Regulations, it is because
the driver of the bus did not see at a distance the parked prime mover and trailer on the bus proper lane
because there was no warning signs of danger of any kind that can be seen from a distance.[19]
Limbaga also failed to take proper steps to minimize the risk posed by the improperly
parked prime mover. He did not immediately inform his employer, private respondent
Liberty Forest, Inc., that the prime mover suffered two tire blowouts and that he could
not have them fixed because he had only one spare tire. Instead of calling for help,
Limbaga took it upon himself to simply place banana leaves on the front and rear of the
prime mover to serve as warning to oncoming motorists. Worse, Limbaga slept on the
prime mover instead of standing guard beside the vehicle. By his own account, Limbaga
was sleeping on the prime mover at the time of the collision and that he was only
awakened by the impact of the Nissan van and the passenger bus on the prime mover.
[20]

Limbaga also admitted on cross-examination that it was his first time to drive the prime
mover with trailer loaded with a D-8 caterpillar bulldozer.[21] We find that private
respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. was utterly negligent in allowing a novice driver, like
Limbaga, to operate a vehicle, such as a truck loaded with a bulldozer, which required
highly specialized driving skills. Respondent employer clearly failed to properly
supervise Limbaga in driving the prime mover.

The noted that private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. also failed to keep the prime
mover in proper condition at the time of the collision. The prime mover had worn out
tires. It was only equipped with one spare tire. It was for this reason that Limbaga was
unable to change the two blown out tires because he had only one spare. The bulldozer
was not even loaded properly on the prime mover, which caused the tire blowouts.

All told, We agree with the that private respondent Limbaga was negligent in parking the
prime mover on the national highway. Private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. was also
negligent in failing to supervise Limbaga and in ensuring that the prime mover was in
proper condition.

The case of Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of

Appeals is inapplicable; Limbaga did not put
lighted kerosene tin cans on the front and rear
of the prime mover.
Anent the absence of an early warning device on the prime mover, the CA erred in
accepting the bare testimony of Limbaga that he placed kerosene lighted tin cans on the
front and rear of the prime mover. The evidence on records belies such claim. The CA
reliance on Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[22] as authority for the proposition
that kerosene lighted tin cans may act as substitute early warning device is misplaced.
First, the traffic incident report did not mention any lighted tin cans on the prime mover
or within the immediate vicinity of the accident. Only banana leaves were placed on the
prime mover. The report reads:

VIII RESULT OF INVESTIGATION: A Joana Paula Bus, with Body No. 7788, with Plate No. LVA-
137, driven by one Temestocles Relova v. Antero, of legal age, married and a resident of San Roque,
Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte, while traveling along the National Highway, coming from the east going
to the west direction, as it moves along the way and upon reaching Brgy. Sumilihon, to evade bumping
to the approaching Nissan Ice Van with Plate No. PNT-247, driven by one Rogelio Cortez y Ceneza. As
the result, the Joana Paula Bus accidentally busideswept (sic) to the parked Prime Mover with Trailer
loaded with Bulldozer without early warning device, instead placing only dry banana leaves three (3)
meters at the rear portion of the Trailer, while failure to place at the front portion, and the said vehicle
occupied the whole lane. As the result, the Joana Paula Bus hit to the left edge blade of the Bulldozer.
Thus, causing the said bus swept to the narrow shouldering, removing the rear four (4) wheels
including the differential and injuring the above-stated twelve (12) passengers and damaged to the right
side fender above the rear wheel. Thus, causing damage on it. While the Nissan Ice Van in evading,
accidentally swerved to the left lane and accidentally bumped to the front bumper of the parked Prime
Mover with Trailer loaded with Bulldozer. Thus, causing heavy damage to said Nissan Ice Van
including the cargoes of the said van.[23]
Second, 4 Pame, who investigated the collision, testified[24] that only banana leaves
were placed on the front and rear of the prime mover. He did not see any lighted tin cans
in the immediate vicinity of the collision.

Third, the claim of Limbaga that he placed lighted tin cans on the front and rear of the
prime mover belatedly surfaced only during his direct examination. No allegation to this
effect was made by private respondents in their Answer to the complaint for damages.
Petitioners counsel promptly objected to the testimony of Limbaga, thus:

. ROSALES:
Q. Now you mentioned about placing some word signs in front and at the rear of the prime mover with
trailer, will you please describe to us what this word signs are?
A. We placed a piece of cloth on tin cans and filled them with crude oil. And these tin cans were
lighted and they are like torches. These two lights or torches were placed in front and at the rear side of
the prime mover with trailer. After each torch, we placed banana trunk. The banana trunk is placed
between the two (2) torches and the prime mover, both on the rear and on the front portion of the prime
mover.
Q. How far was the lighted tin cans with wick placed in front of the prime mover.
.:
At this point, we will be objecting to questions particularly referring to the alleged tin cans as some of
the warning-sign devices, considering that there is no allegation to that effect in the answer of the
defendants. The answer was just limited to the numbers 4 & 5 of the answer. And, therefore, if we
follow the rule of the binding effect of an allegation in the complaint, then the party will not be allowed
to introduce evidence to attack jointly or rather the same, paragraph 5 states, warning device consisting
of 3 banana trunks, banana items and leaves were filed. He can be cross-examined in the point, Your
Honor.
COURT:
Q. Put that on record that as far as this tin cans are concerned, the plaintiffs are interposing continuing
objections. But the Court will allow the question.[25]
We thus agree with the that Limbaga did not place lighted tin cans on the front and rear
of the prime mover. We give more credence to the traffic incident report and the
testimony of 4 Pame that only banana leaves were placed on the vehicle. Baliwag
Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[26] thus finds no application to the case at bar.

The skewed parking of the prime mover was the

proximate cause of the collision.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred. More comprehensively, proximate cause is that cause
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as
an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom.[27]

There is no exact mathematical formula to determine proximate cause. It is based upon

mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.[28] Plaintiff must,
however, establish a sufficient link between the act or omission and the damage or
injury. That link must not be remote or far-fetched; otherwise, no liability will attach.
The damage or injury must be a natural and probable result of the act or omission. In the
precedent-setting Vda. de Bataclan v. Medina,[29] this Court discussed the necessary
link that must be established between the act or omission and the damage or injury, viz.:

It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely causing
him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on
fire, say, by lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger
is burned to death, one might still contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and not the
overturning of the vehicle. But in the present case and under the circumstances obtaining in the same,
we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the
bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the
leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with
a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably,
by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was very dark (about 2:30 in the
morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them; and coming as they did from a rural area where
lanterns and flashlights were not available, they had to use a torch, the most handy and available; and
what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the overturned vehicle to
extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with
the torch was to be expected and was natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of
some of its passengers bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help.
The ruling in Bataclan has been repeatedly cited in subsequent cases as authority for the
proposition that the damage or injury must be a natural or probable result of the act or
omission. Here, We agree with the that the damage caused to the Nissan van was a
natural and probable result of the improper parking of the prime mover with trailer. As
discussed, the skewed parking of the prime mover posed a serious risk to oncoming
motorists. Limbaga failed to prevent or minimize that risk. The skewed parking of the
prime mover triggered the series of events that led to the collision, particularly the
swerving of the passenger bus and the Nissan van.

Private respondents Liberty Forest, Inc. and Limbaga are liable for all damages that
resulted from the skewed parking of the prime mover. Their liability includes those
damages resulting from precautionary measures taken by other motorist in trying to
avoid collision with the parked prime mover. As We see it, the passenger bus swerved to
the right, onto the lane
of the Nissan van, to avoid colliding with the improperly parked prime mover. The
driver of the Nissan van, Ortiz, reacted swiftly by swerving to the left, onto the lane of
the passenger bus, hitting the parked prime mover. Ortiz obviously would not have
swerved if not for the passenger bus abruptly occupying his vans lane. The passenger
bus, in turn, would not have swerved to the lane of the Nissan van if not for the prime
mover improperly parked on its lane. The skewed parking is the proximate cause of the
damage to the Nissan van.

In Phoenix Construction, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[30] this Court held that a
similar vehicular collision was caused by the skewed parking of a dump truck on the
national road, thus:

The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that private respondent
Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving faster
than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General
Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and
sticking out onto the road lane.
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the
legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisios injuries was the wrongful or negligent
manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That
there was a reasonable relationship between petitioner Carbonels negligence on the one hand and the
accident and respondents injuries on the other hand, is quite clear. Put in a slightly different manner, the
collision of Dionisios car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck
drivers negligence.
xxxx
We believe, secondly, that the truck drivers negligence far from being a passive and static condition
was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between the dump truck and the private
respondents car would in all probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew
without any warning lights or reflector devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created an
unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down and for having so created this risk, the truck driver
must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisios negligence, although later in point of time than the
truck drivers negligence and, therefore, closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or
independent cause. What the Petitioner describes as an intervening cause was no more than a
foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the negligent manner in which the truck driver had
parked the dump truck. In other words, the petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private respondent
Dionisio and others similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had
created. Dionisios negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were,
the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, nor to
sever the juris vinculum of liability. x x x (Underscoring supplied)
We cannot rule on the proportionate or
contributory liability of the passenger bus, if
any, because it was not a party to the case; joint
tortfeasors are solidarily liable.
The CA also faults the passenger bus for the vehicular collision. The appellate court
noted that the passenger bus was aware of the presence of the prime mover on its lane,
but it still proceeded to occupy the lane of the Nissan van. The passenger bus also
miscalculated its distance from the prime mover when it hit the vehicle.

We cannot definitively rule on the proportionate or contributory liability of the Joana

Paula passenger bus vis--vis the prime mover because it was not a party to the complaint
for damages. Due process dictates that the passenger bus must be given an opportunity
to present its own version of events before it can be held liable. Any contributory or
proportionate liability of the passenger bus must be litigated in a separate action, barring
any defense of prescription or laches. Insofar as petitioner is concerned, the proximate
cause of the collision was the improper parking of the prime mover. It was the improper
parking of the prime mover which set in motion the series of events that led to the
vehicular collision.

Even granting that the passenger bus was at fault, its fault will not necessarily absolve
private respondents from liability. If at fault, the passenger bus will be a joint tortfeasor
along with private respondents. The liability of joint tortfeasors is joint and solidary.
This means that petitioner may hold either of them liable for damages from the collision.
In Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[31] this Court
held:

According to the great weight of authority, where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or
omission of two or more persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in combination, the
direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person and it is impossible to determine in what
proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act
alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from the acts of
the other tort-feasor x x x.
In Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals, the Court declared that the
liability of joint tortfeasors is joint and solidary, to wit:
It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole
cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes other
than plaintiffs, is the proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to
produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them,
it being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without
which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to
the person injured. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have
resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent
tortfeasors. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause
without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the
causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the
circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by
them to the injured person was not the same. No actors negligence ceases to be a proximate cause
merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the
entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are
liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or
more persons, although acting independently, are in combination with the direct and proximate cause of
a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the
injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence
resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for
the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code. (Underscoring supplied)
All told, all the elements of quasi delict have been proven by clear and convincing
evidence. The CA erred in absolving private respondents from liability for the vehicular
collision.

Final Note
It is lamentable that the vehicular collision in this case could have been easily avoided
by following basic traffic rules and regulations and road safety standards. In hindsight,
private respondent Limbaga could have prevented the three-way vehicular collision if he
had properly parked the prime mover on the shoulder of the national road. The improper
parking of vehicles, most especially along the national highways, poses a serious and
unnecessary risk to the lives and limbs of other motorists and passengers. Drivers owe a
duty of care to follow basic traffic rules and regulations and to observe road safety
standards. They owe that duty not only for their own safety, but also for that of other
motorists. We can prevent most vehicular accidents by simply following basic traffic
rules and regulations.
We also note a failure of implementation of basic safety standards, particularly the law
on early warning devices. This applies even more to trucks and big vehicles, which are
prone to mechanical breakdown on the national highway. The law, as crafted, requires
vehicles to be equipped with triangular reflectorized plates.[32] Vehicles without the
required early warning devices are ineligible for registration.[33] Vehicle owners may
also be arrested and fined for non-compliance with the law.[34]
The Land Transportation Office (LTO) owes a duty to the public to ensure that all
vehicles on the road meet basic and minimum safety features, including that of early
warning devices. It is most unfortunate that We still see dilapidated and rundown
vehicles on the road with substandard safety features. These vehicles not only pose a
hazard to the safety of their occupants but that of other motorists. The prime mover truck
in this case should not have been granted registration because it failed to comply with
the minimum safety features required for vehicles on the road.

It is, indeed, time for traffic enforcement agencies and the LTO to strictly enforce all
pertinent laws and regulations within their mandate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals decision dated

August 28, 2003 is hereby SET ASIDE. The decision dated is REINSTATED IN .

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118492 August 15, 2001
GREGORIO H. REYES and CONSUELO PUYAT-REYES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,
respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the Decision 1 dated July 22, 1994 and Resolution2 dated December
29, 1994 of the Court of Appeals 3 affirming with modification the Decision 4 dated November 12, 1992
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 64, which dismissed the complaint for
damages of petitioners spouses Gregorio H. Reyes and Consuelo Puyat-Reyes against respondent Far
East Bank and Trust Company.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
In view of the 20th Asian Racing Conference then scheduled to be held in September, 1988 in Sydney,
Australia, the Philippine Racing Club, Inc. (PRCI, for brevity) sent four (4) delegates to the said
conference. Petitioner Gregorio H. Reyes, as vice-president for finance, racing manager, treasurer, and
director of PRCI, sent Godofredo Reyes, the club's chief cashier, to the respondent bank to apply for a
foreign exchange demand draft in Australian dollars.
Godofredo went to respondent bank's Buendia Branch in Makati City to apply for a demand draft in the
amount One Thousand Six Hundred Ten Australian Dollars (AU$1,610.00) payable to the order of the
20th Asian Racing Conference Secretariat of Sydney, Australia. He was attended to by respondent
bank's assistant cashier, Mr. Yasis, who at first denied the application for the reason that respondent
bank did not have an Australian dollar account in any bank in Sydney. Godofredo asked if there could
be a way for respondent bank to accommodate PRCI's urgent need to remit Australian dollars to
Sydney. Yasis of respondent bank then informed Godofredo of a roundabout way of effecting the
requested remittance to Sydney thus: the respondent bank would draw a demand draft against Westpac
Bank in Sydney, Australia (Westpac-Sydney for brevity) and have the latter reimburse itself from the
U.S. dollar account of the respondent in Westpac Bank in New York, U.S.A. (Westpac-New York for
brevity). This arrangement has been customarily resorted to since the 1960's and the procedure has
proven to be problem-free. PRCI and the petitioner Gregorio H. Reyes, acting through Godofredo,
agreed to this arrangement or approach in order to effect the urgent transfer of Australian dollars
payable to the Secretariat of the 20th Asian Racing Conference.
On July 28, 1988, the respondent bank approved the said application of PRCI and issued Foreign
Exchange Demand Draft (FXDD) No. 209968 in the sum applied for, that is, One Thousand Six
Hundred Ten Australian Dollars (AU$ 1,610.00), payable to the order of the 20 th Asian Racing
Conference Secretariat of Sydney, Australia, and addressed to Westpac-Sydney as the drawee
bank.1wphi1.nt
On August 10, 1988, upon due presentment of the foreign exchange demand draft, denominated as
FXDD No. 209968, the same was dishonored, with the notice of dishonor stating the following: "xxx
No account held with Westpac." Meanwhile, on August 16, 1988, Wespac-New York sent a cable to
respondent bank informing the latter that its dollar account in the sum of One Thousand Six Hundred
Ten Australian Dollars (AU$ 1,610.00) was debited. On August 19, 1988, in response to PRCI's
complaint about the dishonor of the said foreign exchange demand draft, respondent bank informed
Westpac-Sydney of the issuance of the said demand draft FXDD No. 209968, drawn against the
Wespac-Sydney and informing the latter to be reimbursed from the respondent bank's dollar account in
Westpac-New York. The respondent bank on the same day likewise informed Wespac-New York
requesting the latter to honor the reimbursement claim of Wespac-Sydney. On September 14, 1988,
upon its second presentment for payment, FXDD No. 209968 was again dishonored by Westpac-
Sydney for the same reason, that is, that the respondent bank has no deposit dollar account with the
drawee Wespac-Sydney.
On September 17, 1988 and September 18, 1988, respectively, petitioners spouses Gregorio H. Reyes
and Consuelo Puyat-Reyes left for Australia to attend the said racing conference. When petitioner
Gregorio H. Reyes arrived in Sydney in the morning of September 18, 1988, he went directly to the
lobby of Hotel Regent Sydney to register as a conference delegate. At the registration desk, in the
presence of other delegates from various member of the conference secretariat that he could not register
because the foreign exchange demand draft for his registration fee had been dishonored for the second
time. A discussion ensued in the presence and within the hearing of many delegates who were also
registering. Feeling terribly embarrassed and humiliated, petitioner Gregorio H. Reyes asked the lady
member of the conference secretariat that he be shown the subject foreign exchange demand draft that
had been dishonored as well as the covering letter after which he promised that he would pay the
registration fees in cash. In the meantime he demanded that he be given his name plate and conference
kit. The lady member of the conference secretariat relented and gave him his name plate and
conference kit. It was only two (2) days later, or on September 20, 1988, that he was given the
dishonored demand draft and a covering letter. It was then that he actually paid in cash the registration
fees as he had earlier promised.
Meanwhile, on September 19, 1988, petitioner Consuelo Puyat-Reyes arrived in Sydney. She too was
embarassed and humiliated at the registration desk of the conference secretariat when she was told in
the presence and within the hearing of other delegates that she could not be registered due to the
dishonor of the subject foreign exchange demand draft. She felt herself trembling and unable to look at
the people around her. Fortunately, she saw her husband, coming toward her. He saved the situation for
her by telling the secretariat member that he had already arranged for the payment of the registration
fee in cash once he was shown the dishonored demand draft. Only then was petitioner Puyat-Reyes
given her name plate and conference kit.
At the time the incident took place, petitioner Consuelo Puyat-Reyes was a member of the House of
Representatives representing the lone Congressional District of Makati, Metro Manila. She has been an
officer of the Manila Banking Corporation and was cited by Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin as the top
lady banker of the year in connection with her conferment of the Pro-Ecclesia et Pontifice Award. She
has also been awarded a plaque of appreciation from the Philippine Tuberculosis Society for her
extraordinary service as the Society's campaign chairman for the ninth (9th) consecutive year.
On November 23, 1988, the petitioners filed in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, a
complaint for damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 88-2468, against the respondent bank due to the
dishonor of the said foreign exchange demand draft issued by the respondent bank. The petitioners
claim that as a result of the dishonor of the said demand draft, they were exposed to unnecessary shock,
social humiliation, and deep mental anguish in a foreign country, and in the presence of an international
audience.
On November 12, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the defendant (respondent bank)
and against the plaintiffs (herein petitioners), the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant, dismissing plaintiff's
complaint, and ordering plaintiffs to pay to defendant, on its counterclaim, the amount of
P50,000.00, as reasonable attorney's fees. Costs against the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.5
The petitioners appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals. On July 22, 1994, the
appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court but in effect deleted the award of attorney's fees
to the defendant (herein respondent bank) and the pronouncement as to the costs. The decretal portion
of the decision of the appellate court states:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from, insofar as it dismissed plaintiff's complaint, is
hereby AFFIRMED, but is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE in all other respect. No special
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.6
According to the appellate court, there is no basis to hold the respondent bank liable for damages for
the reason that it exerted every effort for the subject foreign exchange demand draft to be honored. The
appellate court found and declared that:
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, the Bank had every reason to believe that the transaction finally went through smoothly,
considering that its New York account had been debited and that there was no
miscommunication between it and Westpac-New York. SWIFT is a world wide association used
by almost all banks and is known to be the most reliable mode of communication in the
international banking business. Besides, the above procedure, with the Bank as drawer and
Westpac-Sydney as drawee, and with Westpac-New York as the reimbursement Bank had been
in place since 1960s and there was no reason for the Bank to suspect that this particular demand
draft would not be honored by Westpac-Sydney.
From the evidence, it appears that the root cause of the miscommunications of the Bank's
SWIFT message is the erroneous decoding on the part of Westpac-Sydney of the Bank's SWIFT
message as an MT799 format. However, a closer look at the Bank's Exhs. "6" and "7" would
show that despite what appears to be an asterick written over the figure before "99", the figure
can still be distinctly seen as a number "1" and not number "7", to the effect that Westpac-
Sydney was responsible for the dishonor and not the Bank.
Moreover, it is not said asterisk that caused the misleading on the part of the Westpac-Sydney of
the numbers "1" to "7", since Exhs. "6" and "7" are just documentary copies of the cable
message sent to Wespac-Sydney. Hence, if there was mistake committed by Westpac-Sydney in
decoding the cable message which caused the Bank's message to be sent to the wrong
department, the mistake was Westpac's, not the Bank's. The Bank had done what an ordinary
prudent person is required to do in the particular situation, although appellants expect the Bank
to have done more. The Bank having done everything necessary or usual in the ordinary course
of banking transaction, it cannot be held liable for any embarrassment and corresponding
damage that appellants may have incurred.7
xxx xxx xxx
Hence, this petition, anchored on the following assignment of errors:
 I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING PRIVATE RESPONDENT
NOT NEGLIGENT BY ERRONEOUSLY APPLYING THE STANDARD OF DILIGENCE OF
AN "ORDINARY PRUDENT PERSON" WHEN IN TRUTH A HIGHER DEGREE OF
DILIGENCE IS IMPOSED BY LAW UPON THE BANKS.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ABSOLVING PRIVATE
RESPONDENT FROM LIABILITY BY OVERLOOKING THE FACT THAT THE
DISHONOR OF THE DEMAND DRAFT WAS A BREACH OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S
WARRANTY AS THE DRAWER THEREOF.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT AS SHOWN
OVERWHELMINGLY BY THE EVIDENCE, THE DISHONOR OF THE DEMAND DRAFT
AS DUE TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S NEGLIGENCE AND NOT THE DRAWEE BANK. 8
The petitioners contend that due to the fiduciary nature of the relationship between the respondent bank
and its clients, the respondent should have exercised a higher degree of diligence than that expected of
an ordinary prudent person in the handling of its affairs as in the case at bar. The appellate court,
according to petitioners, erred in applying the standard of diligence of an ordinary prudent person only.
Petitioners also claim that the respondent bank violate Section 61 of the Negotiable Instruments Law 9
which provides the warranty of a drawer that "xxx on due presentment, the instrument will be accepted
or paid, or both, according to its tenor xxx." Thus, the petitioners argue that respondent bank should be
held liable for damages for violation of this warranty. The petitioners pray this Court to re-examine the
facts to cite certain instances of negligence.
It is our view and we hold that there is no reversible error in the decision of the appellate court.
Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that "(T)he petition (for review) shall raise
only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth." Thus, we have ruled that factual findings of
the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court and they carry
even more weight when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings of the trial court.10
The courts a quo found that respondent bank did not misrepresent that it was maintaining a deposit
account with Westpac-Sydney. Respondent bank's assistant cashier explained to Godofredo Reyes,
representing PRCI and petitioner Gregorio H. Reyes, how the transfer of Australian dollars would be
effected through Westpac-New York where the respondent bank has a dollar account to Westpac-
Sydney where the subject foreign exchange demand draft (FXDD No. 209968) could be encashed by
the payee, the 20th Asian Racing Conference Secretariat. PRCI and its Vice-President for finance,
petitioner Gregorio H. Reyes, through their said representative, agreed to that arrangement or
procedure. In other words, the petitioners are estopped from denying the said arrangement or
procedure. Similar arrangements have been a long standing practice in banking to facilitate
international commercial transactions. In fact, the SWIFT cable message sent by respondent bank to the
drawee bank, Westpac-Sydney, stated that it may claim reimbursement from its New York branch,
Westpac-New York, where respondent bank has a deposit dollar account. The facts as found by the
courts a quo show that respondent bank did not cause an erroneous transmittal of its SWIFT cable
message to Westpac-Sydney. It was the erroneous decoding of the cable message on the part of
Westpac-Sydney that caused the dishonor of the subject foreign exchange demand draft. An employee
of Westpac-Sydney in Sydney, Australia mistakenly read the printed figures in the SWIFT cable
message of respondent bank as "MT799" instead of as "MT199". As a result, Westpac-Sydney
construed the said cable message as a format for a letter of credit, and not for a demand draft. The
appellate court correct found that "the figure before '99' can still be distinctly seen as a number '1' and
not number '7'." Indeed, the line of a "7" is in a slanting position while the line of a "1" is in a
horizontal position. Thus, the number "1" in "MT199" cannot be construed as "7".11
The evidence also shows that the respondent bank exercised that degree of diligence expected of an
ordinary prudent person under the circumstances obtaining. Prior to the first dishonor of the subject
foreign exchange demand draft, the respondent bank advised Westpac-New York to honor the
reimbursement claim of Westpac-Sydney and to debit the dollar account12 of respondent bank with the
former. As soon as the demand draft was dishonored, the respondent bank, thinking that the problem
was with the reimbursement and without any idea that it was due to miscommunication, re-confirmed
the authority of Westpac-New York to debit its dollar account for the purpose of reimbursing Westpac-
Sydney.13 Respondent bank also sent two (2) more cable messages to Westpac-New York inquiring
why the demand draft was not honored.14
With these established facts, we now determine the degree of diligence that banks are required to exert
in their commercial dealings. In Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals15 upholding a long
standing doctrine, we ruled that the degree of diligence required of banks, is more than that of a good
father of a family where the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors is concerned. In
other words banks are duty bound to treat the deposit accounts of their depositors with the highest
degree of care. But the said ruling applies only to cases where banks act under their fiduciary capacity,
that is, as depositary of the deposits of their depositors. But the same higher degree of diligence is not
expected to be exerted by banks in commercial transactions that do not involve their fiduciary
relationship with their depositors.
Considering the foregoing, the respondent bank was not required to exert more than the diligence of a
good father of a family in regard to the sale and issuance of the subject foreign exchange demand draft.
The case at bar does not involve the handling of petitioners' deposit, if any, with the respondent bank.
Instead, the relationship involved was that of a buyer and seller, that is, between the respondent bank as
the seller of the subject foreign exchange demand draft, and PRCI as the buyer of the same, with the
20th Asian Racing conference Secretariat in Sydney, Australia as the payee thereof. As earlier
mentioned, the said foreign exchange demand draft was intended for the payment of the registration
fees of the petitioners as delegates of the PRCI to the 20th Asian Racing Conference in Sydney.
The evidence shows that the respondent bank did everything within its power to prevent the dishonor of
the subject foreign exchange demand draft. The erroneous reading of its cable message to Westpac-
Sydney by an employee of the latter could not have been foreseen by the respondent bank. Being
unaware that its employee erroneously read the said cable message, Westpac-Sydney merely stated that
the respondent bank has no deposit account with it to cover for the amount of One Thousand Six
Hundred Ten Australian Dollar (AU $1610.00) indicated in the foreign exchange demand draft. Thus,
the respondent bank had the impression that Westpac-New York had not yet made available the amount
for reimbursement to Westpac-Sydney despite the fact that respondent bank has a sufficient deposit
dollar account with Westpac-New York. That was the reason why the respondent bank had to re-
confirm and repeatedly notify Westpac-New York to debit its (respondent bank's) deposit dollar account
with it and to transfer or credit the corresponding amount to Westpac-Sydney to cover the amount of
the said demand draft.
In view of all the foregoing, and considering that the dishonor of the subject foreign exchange demand
draft is not attributable to any fault of the respondent bank, whereas the petitioners appeared to be
under estoppel as earlier mentioned, it is no longer necessary to discuss the alleged application of
Section 61 of the Negotiable Instruments Law to the case at bar. In any event, it was established that
the respondent bank acted in good faith and that it did not cause the embarrassment of the petitioners in
Sydney, Australia. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversable error in its challenged
decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt

G.R. No. 141910 August 6, 2002

FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
G.P. SARMIENTO TRUCKING CORPORATION and LAMBERT M. EROLES, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver on 18 June 1994 thirty (30) units of
Condura S.D. white refrigerators aboard one of its Isuzu truck, driven by Lambert Eroles, from the
plant site of Concepcion Industries, Inc., along South Superhighway in Alabang, Metro Manila, to the
Central Luzon Appliances in Dagupan City. While the truck was traversing the north diversion road
along McArthur highway in Barangay Anupol, Bamban, Tarlac, it collided with an unidentified truck,
causing it to fall into a deep canal, resulting in damage to the cargoes.
FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), an insurer of the shipment, paid to Concepcion Industries, Inc., the
value of the covered cargoes in the sum of P204,450.00. FGU, in turn, being the subrogee of the rights
and interests of Concepcion Industries, Inc., sought reimbursement of the amount it had paid to the
latter from GPS. Since the trucking company failed to heed the claim, FGU filed a complaint for
damages and breach of contract of carriage against GPS and its driver Lambert Eroles with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, of Makati City. In its answer, respondents asserted that GPS was the
exclusive hauler only of Concepcion Industries, Inc., since 1988, and it was not so engaged in business
as a common carrier. Respondents further claimed that the cause of damage was purely
accidental.1wphi1.nt
The issues having thus been joined, FGU presented its evidence, establishing the extent of damage to
the cargoes and the amount it had paid to the assured. GPS, instead of submitting its evidence, filed
with leave of court a motion to dismiss the complaint by way of demurrer to evidence on the ground
that petitioner had failed to prove that it was a common carrier.
The trial court, in its order of 30 April 1996,1 granted the motion to dismiss, explaining thusly:
"Under Section 1 of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is provided that Each party must prove
his own affirmative allegation, xxx.
"In the instant case, plaintiff did not present any single evidence that would prove that defendant
is a common carrier.
"x x x xxx xxx
"Accordingly, the application of the law on common carriers is not warranted and the
 presumption of fault or negligence on the part of a common carrier in case of loss, damage or
deterioration of goods during transport under 1735 of the Civil Code is not availing.
"Thus, the laws governing the contract between the owner of the cargo to whom the plaintiff
was subrogated and the owner of the vehicle which transports the cargo are the laws on
obligation and contract of the Civil Code as well as the law on quasi delicts.
"Under the law on obligation and contract, negligence or fault is not presumed. The law on
quasi delict provides for some presumption of negligence but only upon the attendance of some
circumstances. Thus, Article 2185 provides:
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a
motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any
traffic regulation.
"Evidence for the plaintiff shows no proof that defendant was violating any traffic regulation.
Hence, the presumption of negligence is not obtaining.
"Considering that plaintiff failed to adduce evidence that defendant is a common carrier and
defendants driver was the one negligent, defendant cannot be made liable for the damages of
the subject cargoes."2
The subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied, 3 plaintiff interposed an appeal to the
Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court had erred (a) in holding that the appellee corporation
was not a common carrier defined under the law and existing jurisprudence; and (b) in dismissing the
complaint on a demurrer to evidence.
The Court of Appeals rejected the appeal of petitioner and ruled in favor of GPS. The appellate court,
in its decision of 10 June 1999,4 discoursed, among other things, that -
"x x x in order for the presumption of negligence provided for under the law governing common
carrier (Article 1735, Civil Code) to arise, the appellant must first prove that the appellee is a
common carrier. Should the appellant fail to prove that the appellee is a common carrier, the
presumption would not arise; consequently, the appellant would have to prove that the carrier
was negligent.
"x x x xxx xxx
"Because it is the appellant who insists that the appellees can still be considered as a common
carrier, despite its `limited clientele, (assuming it was really a common carrier), it follows that
it (appellant) has the burden of proving the same. It (plaintiff-appellant) `must establish his case
by a preponderance of evidence, which means that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side
is superior to that of the other. (Summa Insurance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA
175). This, unfortunately, the appellant failed to do -- hence, the dismissal of the plaintiffs
complaint by the trial court is justified.
"x x x xxx xxx
"Based on the foregoing disquisitions and considering the circumstances that the appellee
trucking corporation has been `its exclusive contractor, hauler since 1970, defendant has no
choice but to comply with the directive of its principal, the inevitable conclusion is that the
appellee is a private carrier.
"x x x xxx xxx
"x x x the lower court correctly ruled that 'the application of the law on common carriers is not
 warranted and the presumption of fault or negligence on the part of a common carrier in case of
loss, damage or deterioration of good[s] during transport under [article] 1735 of the Civil Code
is not availing.' x x x.
"Finally, We advert to the long established rule that conclusions and findings of fact of a trial
court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and
valid reasons."5
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied; 6 hence, the instant petition,7 raising the
following issues:
I
WHETHER RESPONDENT GPS MAY BE CONSIDERED AS A COMMON CARRIER AS
DEFINED UNDER THE LAW AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE.
II
WHETHER RESPONDENT GPS, EITHER AS A COMMON CARRIER OR A PRIVATE
CARRIER, MAY BE PRESUMED TO HAVE BEEN NEGLIGENT WHEN THE GOODS IT
UNDERTOOK TO TRANSPORT SAFELY WERE SUBSEQUENTLY DAMAGED WHILE
IN ITS PROTECTIVE CUSTODY AND POSSESSION.
III
WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR IS APPLICABLE IN THE
INSTANT CASE.
On the first issue, the Court finds the conclusion of the trial court and the Court of Appeals to be amply
justified. GPS, being an exclusive contractor and hauler of Concepcion Industries, Inc., rendering or
offering its services to no other individual or entity, cannot be considered a common carrier. Common
carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or
transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for hire or compensation, offering their
services to the public,8 whether to the public in general or to a limited clientele in particular, but never
on an exclusive basis.9 The true test of a common carrier is the carriage of passengers or goods,
providing space for those who opt to avail themselves of its transportation service for a fee. 10 Given
accepted standards, GPS scarcely falls within the term "common carrier."
The above conclusion nothwithstanding, GPS cannot escape from liability.
In culpa contractual, upon which the action of petitioner rests as being the subrogee of Concepcion
Industries, Inc., the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify,
prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. 11 The law, recognizing the obligatory force of contracts, 12
will not permit a party to be set free from liability for any kind of misperformance of the contractual
undertaking or a contravention of the tenor thereof.13 A breach upon the contract confers upon the
injured party a valid cause for recovering that which may have been lost or suffered. The remedy serves
to preserve the interests of the promisee that may include his "expectation interest," which is his
interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been in
had the contract been performed, or his "reliance interest," which is his interest in being reimbursed for
loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had
the contract not been made; or his "restitution interest," which is his interest in having restored to him
any benefit that he has conferred on the other party. 14 Indeed, agreements can accomplish little, either
for their makers or for society, unless they are made the basis for action. 15 The effect of every
infraction is to create a new duty, that is, to make recompense to the one who has been injured by the
failure of another to observe his contractual obligation16 unless he can show extenuating
circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due diligence (normally that of the diligence of a good
father of a family or, exceptionally by stipulation or by law such as in the case of common carriers, that
of extraordinary diligence) or of the attendance of fortuitous event, to excuse him from his ensuing
liability.
Respondent trucking corporation recognizes the existence of a contract of carriage between it and
petitioners assured, and admits that the cargoes it has assumed to deliver have been lost or damaged
while in its custody. In such a situation, a default on, or failure of compliance with, the obligation in
this case, the delivery of the goods in its custody to the place of destination - gives rise to a
presumption of lack of care and corresponding liability on the part of the contractual obligor the burden
being on him to establish otherwise. GPS has failed to do so.
Respondent driver, on the other hand, without concrete proof of his negligence or fault, may not
himself be ordered to pay petitioner. The driver, not being a party to the contract of carriage between
petitioners principal and defendant, may not be held liable under the agreement. A contract can only
bind the parties who have entered into it or their successors who have assumed their personality or their
juridical position.17 Consonantly with the axiom res inter alios acta aliis neque nocet prodest, such
contract can neither favor nor prejudice a third person. Petitioners civil action against the driver can
only be based on culpa aquiliana, which, unlike culpa contractual, would require the claimant for
damages to prove negligence or fault on the part of the defendant.18
A word in passing. Res ipsa loquitur, a doctrine being invoked by petitioner, holds a defendant liable
where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the latters management
and the accident is such that, in the ordinary course of things, cannot be expected to happen if those
who have its management or control use proper care. It affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. 19 It is not a rule of substantive
law and, as such, it does not create an independent ground of liability. Instead, it is regarded as a mode
of proof, or a mere procedural convenience since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves the plaintiff
of, the burden of producing specific proof of negligence. The maxim simply places on the defendant
the burden of going forward with the proof.20 Resort to the doctrine, however, may be allowed only
when (a) the event is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence; (b) other
responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated
by the evidence; and (c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendant's duty to the
plaintiff.21 Thus, it is not applicable when an unexplained accident may be attributable to one of several
causes, for some of which the defendant could not be responsible.22
Res ipsa loquitur generally finds relevance whether or not a contractual relationship exists between the
plaintiff and the defendant, for the inference of negligence arises from the circumstances and nature of
the occurrence and not from the nature of the relation of the parties. 23 Nevertheless, the requirement
that responsible causes other than those due to defendants conduct must first be eliminated, for the
doctrine to apply, should be understood as being confined only to cases of pure (non-contractual) tort
since obviously the presumption of negligence in culpa contractual, as previously so pointed out,
immediately attaches by a failure of the covenant or its tenor. In the case of the truck driver, whose
liability in a civil action is predicated on culpa acquiliana, while he admittedly can be said to have
been in control and management of the vehicle which figured in the accident, it is not equally shown,
however, that the accident could have been exclusively due to his negligence, a matter that can allow,
forthwith, res ipsa loquitur to work against him.
If a demurrer to evidence is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed, the movant shall
be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. 24 Thus, respondent corporation may no longer
offer proof to establish that it has exercised due care in transporting the cargoes of the assured so as to
still warrant a remand of the case to the trial court.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the order, dated 30 April 1996, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, of Makati
City, and the decision, dated 10 June 1999, of the Court of Appeals, are AFFIRMED only insofar as
respondent Lambert M. Eroles is concerned, but said assailed order of the trial court and decision of the
appellate court are REVERSED as regards G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation which, instead, is
hereby ordered to pay FGU Insurance Corporation the value of the damaged and lost cargoes in the
amount of P204,450.00. No costs.
SO ORDERED.