CONFIRMATION OF CERTAIN APPOINTMENTS

SARMIENTO VS MISON

Mison MAY be appointed by the President without the consent/confirmation of the COA

- The proceedings of the 1986 ConCom support this. In the original text, the phrase "AND BUREAUS"
came after "heads of executive

The petitioners (Sarmiento and Arcilla) want to stop Mison from performing his functions in the Office of
the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (BOC) on the ground that Mison's appointment as
COMMISSIONER of the BOC is UNCONSTITUTIONAL because it was not confirmed by the Commission on
Apppointments (COA).

- Mison says that his appointment by the President is Constitutional, EVEN WITHOUT the confirmation
of the COA.

Under Article 7, Sec. 16 of the 1987 Consti, there are 4 groups of officers whom the President shall
appoint:

GROUP 1: Heads of executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of
the AFP from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in
him in this Constitutio

- clearly appointed with the consent of the COA, and if the President approves the nomination, he
appoints them

GROUP 2: All other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law

GROUP 3: Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint

GROUP 4: Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone

GROUPS 2, 3 and 4: contentious in the case

RATIO/DOCTRINE: Mison MAY be appointed by the President without the consent/confirmation of the
COA

- The proceedings of the 1986 ConCom support this. In the original text, the phrase "AND BUREAUS"
came after "heads of executive

-According to the ConCom records, Commissioner Regalado asked for the deletion of the phrase "and
bureaus"

- However, this STILL MEANS that the President is the one who will appoint them, but their appointment
shall no longer be subject to The Committee
 - amendment because it MAKES IT CLEAR THAT THOSE OTHER OFFICERS MENTIONED IN GROUPS 2, 3
and 4 DO NOT HAVE TO BE CONFIRMED BY THE COA.

POWER OF IMPEACHMENT

Art. XI, Sec. 2

RPC 114
RPC 210
R.A. 3019
Art. XI, Sec. 3

Romulo vs. Yniguez (Feb 4, 1986)

Court will not mandamus speaker of Batasan to retrieve shelved impeachment case against Marcos

If acquitted:

o One cannot file a criminal for the same acts on which he was acquitted from on the impeachment
proceedings

o Official remains in office

Facts:
1. Petitioners, representing more than one-fifth of all members of the Batasan in 1985, filed with the Batasan
Resolution No. 644 and complaint calling for the impeachment of President Marcos. Said resolution and
complaint were referred by the Speaker to the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Government. The Committee found the complaint not sufficient in form and substance to warrant its
further consideration and disapproved and dismissed all the charges contained in the complaint attached.
It then submitted its report which was duly noted by the Batasan and sent to the archives.

2. On August 14, 1985, MP Ramon V. Mitra filed with the Batasan a motion praying for the recall from the
archives of Resolution No. 644 and the verified complaint attached thereto. Said motion was disapproved
by the Batasan.

3. Hence, this petition for prohibition to restrain respondents from enforcing Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the
Batasan Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings and mandamus to compel the Batasan
Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to recall from the archives and report out
the resolution together with the verified complaint for the impeachment of the President of the
Philippines. Petitioner contend that said provisions are unconstitutional because they amend Sec. 3 of
Article XI I of the 1973 Constitution, without complying with the mandatory amendatory process provided
 for under Article XVI of the Constitution, by empowering a smaller body to supplant and overrule the
complaint to impeach endorsed by the requisite 1/5 of all the members of the Batasan Pambansa and
that said questioned provisions derail the impeachment proceedings at various stages by vesting the
Committee on Justice, etc. the power to impeach or not to impeach, when such prerogative belongs solely
to Batasan Pambansa as a collegiate body.

4. Petitioners further contend that Section 8 of the Rules is unconstitutional because it imposes an
unconstitutional and illegal condition precedent in order that the complaint for impeachment can proceed
to trial before the Batasan. By requiring a majority vote of all the members of the Batasan for the approval
of the resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment, the Rules impose a condition not required by
the Constitution for all that Section 3, Article XIII requires is the endorsement of at least one-fifth of all
The members of the Batasan for the initiation of impeachment proceedings or for the impeachment trial
to proceed.

5. Respondents Speaker and the Members of the Committee on Justice of the Batasan Pambansa contend
that that the petition should be dismissed because (1) it is a suit against the Batasan itself over which this
Court has no jurisdiction; (2) it raises questions which are political in nature; (3) the Impeachment Rules
are strictly in consonance with the Constitution and even supposing without admitting that the Rules are
invalid, their invalidity would not nullify the dismissal of the complaint for impeachment for the Batasan
as a body sovereign within its own sphere has the power to dismiss the impeachment complaint even
without the benefit of said Rules; and (4) the Court cannot by mandamus compel the Batasan to give due
course to the impeachment complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court can interfere with the Batasans power of
impeachment

NO.

1. The dismissal by the majority of the members of the Batasan of the impeachment proceedings is an act
of the Batasan as a body in the exercise of powers that have been vested upon it by the Constitution
beyond the power of this Court to review. This Court cannot compel the Batasan to conduct the
impeachment trial prayed for by petitioners. A dismissal by the Batasan itself as a body of the resolution
and complaint for impeachment makes irrelevant under what authority the Committee on Justice, Human
Rights and Good Government had acted.

2. Aside from the fact that said Committee cannot recall from the Archives said resolution and complaint for
impeachment without revoking or rescinding the action of the Batasan denying MP Mitra's motion for
recall (which of course it had no authority to do and, therefore, said Committee is in no position to comply
 with any order from the Court for said recall) such an order addressed to the Committee would actually
be a direct order to the Batasan itself.

3. The Court held that if it has no authority to control the Philippine Senate, then it does not have the
authority to control the actions of subordinate employees acting under the direction of the Senate. The
secretary, sergeant-at-arms, and disbursing officer of the Senate are mere agents of the Senate who
cannot act independently of the will of that body. Should the Court do as requested, there will be the
spectacle presented of the court ordering the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and the disbursing officer
of the Philippine Senate to do one thing, and the Philippine Senate ordering them to do another thing.

4. The writ of mandamus should not be granted unless it clearly appears that the person to whom it is
directed has the absolute power to execute it.

Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan (Mar 22, 1984)

If position is impeachable, that official must FIRST BE IMPEACHED before criminal case is filed against
him

Petitioner was the Mayor of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque. He was charged with grave coercionhe allegedly
took over a gas station. (Later, this information was amendedLecaroz allegedly ordered policemen to
sell the gas in the station and padlocked the station without any legal authority. (Note: if not mayor,
police would not have followed orders.) The information for grave coercion was filed with the
Sandiganbayan. Lecaroz filed a motion to quash the information principally on the ground that the
Sandiganbayan lacks jurisdiction to entertain the case that it should have instead been filed with the
ordinary courts in Marinduque where the alleged crime was committed. When the Sandiganbayan
denied the motion, Lecaroz filed a petition for certiorari with the SC.

The SC decided against Lecaroz

1. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case. Said court exercised jurisdiction over public
officials even for cases not related to Graft and CorruptionPD 1486 had expanded the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction to include offenses committed in relation to a public officials
office. The amended complaint clearly alleges this. While PD 1861 subsequently limited
jurisdiction to offenses punishable by imprisonment greater than prision correccional, the same
Decree had a proviso indicating that pending cases shall remain with the Sandiganbayan
2. Impeachment cases are the exception to the rule of Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. Those public
officials who are subject to impeachment, in order to be held liable in subsequent criminal
proceedings, must first be removed from office through impeachment.
 Corona vs. Senate (July 17, 2012)

Impeachment proceedings are political in nature, but the role of the judiciary in these cases is a matter
of utmost importance to ensure the effective functioning of the separate branches while preserving the
structure of checks and balances in our government.

An impeachment complaint was filed against CJ Corona alleging culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of public trust, and graft and corruption [refer to the eight Articles of Impeachment]. Petitioner
argued against these proceedings in that there was grave abuse of discretion and that the petition
against him was legally infirm and the allegations, baseless. Respondents argue that subjecting the
impeachments proceedings defeats the purpose of impeachment, but the court ruled that it has
certiorari jurisdiction over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings, particularly those tainted by
GAD. However, the issue was rendered moot, given that the impeachment trial concluded and Corona
accepted the verdict.

The Court held that the power of judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in
impeachment proceedings. Impeachment proceedings are political in nature, but the role of the
judiciary in these cases is a matter of utmost importance to ensure the effective functioning of the
separate branches while preserving the structure of checks and balances in our government. Acts of any
branch or instrumentality of the government are subject to judicial review if tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.

HOWEVER, the impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of petitioner by more than
the required majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict and
without any protest vacated his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar Council is already in the process of
screening applicants and nominees, and the President of the Philippines is expected to appoint a new
Chief Justice within the prescribed 90- day period from among those candidates shortlisted by the JBC.
Unarguably, the constitutional issue raised by petitioner had been mooted by supervening events and
his own acts.

Philippine Savings Bank vs Senate Impeachment Court

A clear right to maintain the confidentiality of the foreign currency deposits of the Chief Justice is
provided under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit
Act of the Philippines (RA 6426). This law establishes the absolute confidentiality of foreign currency
deposits:

I. THE FACTS

Philippine Savings Bank (PS Bank) and its President, Pascual M. Garcia III, filed before the
Supreme Court an original civil action for certiorari and prohibition with application for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The TRO was sought to stop the Senate, sitting
as impeachment court, from further implementing the Subpoena Ad Testificandum et Duces Tecum,
dated February 6, 2012, that it issued against the Branch Manager of PS Bank, Katipunan Branch.
The subpoena assailed by petitioners covers the foreign currency denominated accounts allegedly
owned by the impeached Chief Justice Renato Corona of the Philippine Supreme Court.

II. THE ISSUE

Should a TRO be issued against the impeachment court to enjoin it from further implementing
the subpoena with respect to the alleged foreign currency denominated accounts of CJ Corona?

III. THE RULING

[The Court en banc ISSUED A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER enjoining the

respondents from implementing the subpoena. It also REQUIRED the respondents to COMMENT on
the [merits of the] petition.]

YES, a TRO should be issued against the impeachment court to enjoin it from further
implementing the subpoena with respect to the alleged foreign currency denominated
accounts of CJ Corona.

There are two requisite conditions for the issuance of a preliminary injunction:

(1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and

(2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the
violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injustice.

A clear right to maintain the confidentiality of the foreign currency deposits of the Chief Justice is
provided under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit
Act of the Philippines (RA 6426). This law establishes the absolute confidentiality of foreign currency
deposits:

xxx xxx xxx

Under R.A. No. 6426 there is only a single exception to the secrecy of foreign currency
deposits, that is, disclosure is allowed only upon the written permission of the depositor. In Intengan
v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that where the accounts in question are U.S. dollar deposits, the
applicable law is not Republic Act No. 1405 but RA 6426. Similarly, in the recent case of Government
Service Insurance System v. 15thDivision of the Court of Appeals, the Court also held that RA 6426 is
the applicable law for foreign currency deposits and not Republic Act No. 1405. xxx.

xxx xxx xxx

The written consent under RA 6426 constitutes a waiver of the depositors right to privacy in relation to
such deposit. In the present case, neither the prosecution nor the Impeachment Court has presented
any such written waiver by the alleged depositor, Chief Justice Renato C. Corona. Also, while
impeachment may be an exception to the secrecy of bank deposits under RA 1405, it is not an
exemption to the absolute confidentiality of foreign currency deposits under RA 6426.

xJ del Castillos Cases (Plagiarism)

Justice del Castillo is not guilty of misconduct. The error here is in good faith. There was no malice, fraud
or corruption.

On April 28, 2010, the Supreme Court issued a decision which dismissed a petition issued by the Malaya
Lolas Organization in the case of Vinuya vs Romulo. Atty. Herminio Harry Roque Jr., counsel for Vinuya et
al, questioned the said decision. He raised, among others, that the ponente in said case, Justice Mariano
del Castillo, plagiarized three books when the honorable Justice twisted the true intents of the
following books to support the assailed decision:

a. A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, Yale Journal of
International Law (2009);
b. Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by Mark Ellis, Case Western Reserve
Journal of International Law (2006); and
c. Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J. Tams, Cambridge University Press (2005).

As such, Justice del Castillo is guilty of plagiarism, misconduct, and at least inexcusable negligence.

HELD:

The court ruled in favor of Justice Castillo and held that he was not guilty of plagiarism, misconduct and
inexcusable negligence.

This cannot be a case of plagiarism because as proved by evidence, in the original drafts of the assailed
decision, there was attribution to the three authors but due to errors made by Justice del Castillos
researcher, the attributions were inadvertently deleted. According to the Supreme Court, the passages
lifted from their works were merely used as background facts in establishing the state on international
law at various stages of its development. The Supreme Court went on to state that the foreign authors
works can support conflicting theories. The Supreme Court also stated that since the attributions to said
authors were accidentally deleted, it is impossible to conclude that Justice del Castillo twisted the
advocacies that the works espouse.

Justice del Castillo is not guilty of misconduct. The error here is in good faith. There was no malice, fraud
or corruption.

The error of Justice del Castillos researcher is not reflective of his gross negligence. The researcher is a
highly competent one. The researcher earned scholarly degrees here and abroad from reputable
educational institutions. The researcher finished third in her class and 4th in the bar examinations. Her
error was merely due to the fact that the software she used, Microsoft Word, lacked features to apprise
her that certain important portions of her drafts are being deleted inadvertently. Such error on her part
cannot be said to be constitutive of gross negligence nor can it be said that Justice del Castillo was
grossly negligent when he assigned the case to her.

Justice Serenos Dissent:

In her dissent, she presented the portions of Castillos work and those of the original authors work ---
something that the majority did not even look at or considered in the ruling of their decision. Evidently
from these factual data, Castillo should have been guilty of plagiarism. Further, it was said that there
exists a judicial plagiarism because courts are bound by precedents and stare decisis.

AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION ART 17 SEC 1-4

Gonzales vs. COMELEC (Nov 9, 1967)

when Congress makes amendments or proposes amendments, it is not actually doing so as Congress;
but rather, it is sitting as a constituent assembly. Such act is not a legislative act. Since it is not a
legislative act, it is reviewable by the Supreme Court.

In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for
the proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was provided in the said law that the plebiscite shall
be held on the same day that the general national elections shall be held (November 14, 1967). This was
questioned by Ramon Gonzales and other concerned groups as they argued that this was unlawful as
there would be no proper submission of the proposals to the people who would be more interested in
the issues involved in the general election rather than in the issues involving the plebiscite.

Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by Congress when they came up with
their proposals to amend the Constitution (RA 4913). In this regard, the COMELEC and other
respondents interposed the defense that said act of Congress cannot be reviewed by the courts because
it is a political question

ISSUE/HELD/RATIO:

1. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing amendments is a political question.

No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the power to amend as well as the power to
propose amendments to the Constitution is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to
Congress. Such powers are not constitutionally granted to Congress. On the contrary, such powers are
inherent to the people as repository of sovereignty in a republican state. That being, when Congress
makes amendments or proposes amendments, it is not actually doing so as Congress; but rather, it is
sitting as a constituent assembly. Such act is not a legislative act. Since it is not a legislative act, it is
reviewable by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has the final say whether or not such act of the
constituent assembly is within constitutional limitations.

2. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously with a general election.

Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must only be held on a special election. SC held
that there is nothing in this provision of the [1935] Constitution to indicate that the election therein
referred to is a special, not a general election. The circumstance that the previous amendment to the
Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that
Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its
authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.

Art. XV, Sec. 1, The 1935 Constitution

ARTICLE XV AMENDMENTS

Section 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this
Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are
submitted to the people for their ratification.

*Lambino v. COMELEC

Through peoples initiative, citizens may only propose amendments, not revisions, to the Constitution

The Lambino groups proposal constitutes not an amendment but a revision. It fails to pass both the
qualitative and quantitative tests used to determine if something partakes of an amendment or a
revision. The proposal to change from a Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral Parliamentary
one is a revision because:

(1) it would affect a lot of other provisions in the Constitution, and

(2) it changes the underlying policy embodied in the constitution. Amendments generally do not
affect other provisions apart from the one being amended.

Moreover, the proposal submitted to the people did not even contain the text of the actual
amendment. People should know what the effects of the amendment would be prior to giving their
imprimatur to it.
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

a. REQUIRMENT AS TO BILLS

ART 6 SEC 26

LIDASAN vs COMELEC

Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law
it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the
bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is to
the prejudice of his own province

FACTS:

Bara Lidasan was a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, Republic Act No. 4790, entitled An
Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur, was passed.
Lidasan however discovered that certain barrios located in Cotabato were included in
Dianaton, Lanao Del Sur pursuant to RA 4790. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of
Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish
precincts for voter registration in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed a case to
have RA 4790 be nullified for being unconstitutional. He averred that the law did not clearly
indicate in its title that in creating Dianaton, it would be including in its territory several barrios
from Cotabato.
ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another
province Cotabato to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that
No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill?
HELD: No. The said law is void. The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not
so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact
of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and
in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns
and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the
dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill that even a
Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is to the prejudice of
his own province. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality
of RA 4790.
 Cordero vs Cabatuando

The constitutional requirement is complied with as long as the law, as in the instant case,
has a single general subject which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the amendatory
provisions no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or
foreign to the general subject, will be regarded as valid.

Manuel Cordero was the trial lawyer of the Tenancy Counsel Unit (TCU) of the Agricultural
Tenancy Commission of the Department of Justice. He later appeared as the counsel of
indigent tenant Vicente Salazar who filed a case against landlord Leonardo Sta. Romana in
order to reinstate and reliquidate past harvests. Sta. Romana filed a motion to disqualify
Cordero as counsel for Salazar and he invoked Sec. 54 of Republic Act No. 1199 or The
Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines. The said section indicates that representation by
counsel of tenants who cannot afford to pay should be done by the public defenders of the
Department of Labor.
Judge Jose Cabatuando ruled in favor of Sta. Romana. Cordero appealed. During pendency
of the appeal Republic Act No. 2263, AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF
REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETY-NINE,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE AGRICULTURAL TENANCY ACT OF THE PHILIPPINES,
was passed. This law, particularly Sections 19 and 20 thereof, amended the previous law and
now allows trial lawyers from the TCU to represent indigent tenants and it is also the basis of
the creation of the Tenancy Mediation Division. Cordero filed a Manifestation averring that by
virtue of the amendment the issue has now become moot and academic. Cabatuando
countered that the provisions were not embraced in the title of the amending law nor in the
amended law hence void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of the TMD is embraced in the title of the bill and whether
or not to allow trial lawyers from TCU to appear as counsel for indigent tenants should be
allowed.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that that the constitutional requirement in question is
satisfied if all parts of the law are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed
in the title of the bill.The constitutional requirement is complied with as long as the law, as in
the instant case, has a single general subject which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the
amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, will be regarded as valid. To declare
sections 19 and 20 of RA 2263 null and void would in effect upset the transfer of the duty of
representing indigent tenants from the public defenders of the Department of Labor to the
trial attorneys in the Mediation Division of the Agricultural Tenancy Commission of the
Department of Justice. In other words, a declaration of nullity of these provisions of RA 2263
would do harm to, and would be nugatory of, the intention of Congress to consolidate the
function of enforcing our tenancy laws in the Department of Justice.
 De La Cruz vs. Paras (July 25, 1983)
Still good law but VV Mendoza says this is a wrong case; Title SHOULD NOT prevail over
body. The power of regulation includes the power of prohibition
Yu note: this case is unfortunate for holding that when there is a difference in the title and in the
text of the law, the title would control. (Contrary to prior jurisprudence.)

Petitioners had been granted licenses to operate businesses, between 1958 and 1972: well-lit
night clubs with no partitions, where tables are near one another; the hospitality girls are not
allowed to engage in immoral acts and are even subjected to periodic check ups. However, an
Ordinance prohibited the operation of nightclubs, cabarets, and dance halls. Pursuant to the
Ordinance, the petitioners business permits were revoked. Petitioners then assailed the validity
of the ordinance, but the CFI of Bocaue subsequently upheld its constitutionality and dismissed
the cases. The petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the SC.

The SC decided in favor of the petitioners.

1. The Ordinance was not a valid exercise of police power. It was overbroad: it sought not
merely regulation, but prohibitionit thus amounted to a clear invasion of personal and
property rights.
2. The amendment to RA 938, which the Municipality relied on for the Ordinance, did not
violate the One Bill-One Subject provisionbut only through statutory construction.
Initially, and as reflected in the title, City/Municipal Boards/Councils were only granted
the power to regulate certain places of amusement. The amendment included the power to
prohibit, but this change was not reflected in the title. The SC implied that the statute was
to be interpreted as just allowing Municipal corporations to regulateto save the statute
from Constitutional infirmity.

HENRY R. GIRON v. COMELEC

petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention were unable to present a compelling reason that would
surpass the strong presumption of validity and constitutionality in favor of the Fair Election Act
FACTS:
This case is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of
Sec. 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and Sec. 14 (Repealing Clause) of R.A. 9006, otherwise
known as the Fair Election Act. The Petition also seeks to prohibit the COMELEC from further
implementing the aforesaid sections of the Fair Election Act, on the ground that these provisions
would enable elective officials to gain campaign advantage and allow them to disburse public
funds from the time they file their certificates of candidacy until after the elections.
ISSUE:
WON the inclusion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates Section 26(1), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution, or the one subject-one title rule

HELD:
NO. It is a well-settled rule that Congress is deemed to have enacted a valid, sensible, and just
law. Because of this strong presumption, courts are to adopt a liberal interpretation in favor of
the constitutionality of legislation, as Co, the one who asserts the invalidity of a law has to prove
that there is a clear, unmistakable, and unequivocal breach of the Constitution; otherwise, the
petition must fail.
After a thorough review of the arguments raised, the Court found that petitioner and petitioners-
in-intervention were unable to present a compelling reason that would surpass the strong
presumption of validity and constitutionality in favor of the Fair Election Act. They have not put
forward any gripping justification to reverse the ruling in Farias, in which the SC have already
ruled that the title and the objectives of R.A. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include subjects
other than the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda

Alvarez vs. Guingona (Jan 31, 1996)

Although a bill of local application should originate exclusively in the HOR, the claim of
petitioners is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the HOR
first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate.

April 18, 1993 House Bill No. 8817, An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago
into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago was filed by Rep.
Antonio Abaya in the House of Representative.
It was referred to the House Committee on Local Government and the House Committee on
Appropriations. Then public hearings were conducted and got a favorable report. The bill got
through the second and third reading and later on was transmitted to the Senate on January
28, 1994
May 19, 1993 (right after the HOR had its 2st public hearing for HB No. 8817) A
counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill 1243, An Act Converting the Municipality of
Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago was filed
in the Senate by Sen. Vicente Sotto III.
February 23, 1994 Senate Committee on Local Government conducted public hearings on
SB No. 1243. After which a report of said bill without amendment was approved by Alvarez.
 It passed through the second and third readings and the HOR approved the amendments
proposed by the Senate
May 5, 1994 the enrolled bill was signed by the Chief Executive as RA. 7720. The
plebiscite resulted into the conversion of Santiago into a city
Petitioners assail the validity of RA 7720, on the ground that the bill creating the law did
not originate exclusively in the HOR as mandated by Article VI, Section 24 of the 1987
Constitution.

The Court held that RA 7720 is VALID. Although a bill of local application should originate
exclusively in the HOR, the claim of petitioners is untenable because it cannot be denied that
HB No. 8817 was filed in the HOR first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate. Also, it
is unquestionable that HB No. 8817 was already approved on the 3rd reading prior to its
hearing of its own SB No. 1243. The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of
its receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that
a bill of local application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the
Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.

APPROPRIATION LAWS ART 7 SEC 22, ART 6 SEC 24

PAL vs Edu

Yes. If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if revenue is, at least, one of the real and substantial
purposes, then the exaction is properly called a tax. Such is the case of motor vehicle registration fees.

FACTS:

The Philippine Airlines (PAL) is a corporation engaged in the air transportation business under a
legislative franchise, Act No. 42739. Under its franchise, PAL is exempt from the payment of taxes.

Sometime in 1971, however, Land Transportation Commissioner Romeo F. Elevate (Elevate) issued a
regulation pursuant to Section 8, Republic Act 4136, otherwise known as the Land and Transportation
and Traffic Code, requiring all tax exempt entities, among them PAL to pay motor vehicle registration
fees.

Despite PAL's protestations, Elevate refused to register PAL's motor vehicles unless the amounts
imposed under Republic Act 4136 were paid. PAL thus paid, under protest, registration fees of its motor
vehicles. After paying under protest, PAL through counsel, wrote a letter dated May 19,1971, to Land
Transportation Commissioner Romeo Edu (Edu) demanding a refund of the amounts paid. Edu denied
the request for refund. Hence, PAL filed a complaint against Edu and National Treasurer Ubaldo
Carbonell (Carbonell).

The trial court dismissed PAL's complaint. PAL appealed to the Court of Appeals which in turn certified
the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:

Whether or not motor vehicle registration fees are considered as taxes.

RULING:

Yes. If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if revenue is, at least, one of the real and substantial
purposes, then the exaction is properly called a tax. Such is the case of motor vehicle registration fees.
The motor vehicle registration fees are actually taxes intended for additional revenues of the
government even if one fifth or less of the amount collected is set aside for the operating expenses of
the agency administering the program

TESDA v. COA
G.R. No. 196418, February 10, 2015

Whatever latitude was afforded to a government agency extended only to the determination of
which services to include in the program, not to the choice of an alternative to such health
program or to authorizing the conversion of the benefits into cash.

Facts:
- The TESDA audit team discovered that for the calendar year 2003, TESDA paid for
healthcare maintenance ALLOWANCE of P5,000.00 to covered TESDA employees.
- This was pursuant to Administrative Order (AO) No. 430, series of 2003, authorizing the
payment of healthcare maintenance allowance of P5,000.00 to all officials and
employees of the DOLE, which was purportedly based on Civil Service Commission
(CSC) Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 33, series of 1997, and Section 34 of the
General Provisions of the 2003 General Appropriations Act.
- In the letter of CSC Director Imelda Laceras of Region VII to DOLE Region VII Auditor,
Ms. Damiana Pelino, the former, HOWEVER, informed the latter that there are no
existing guidelines authorizing the grant of Health Care Maintenance Allowance and
medical Allowance to all government officials and employees. Hence, DOLE
Administrative Order No. 430, series of 2003 is clearly without legal basis.
- Atty. Rebecca Mislang, Officer In-Charge of the COA LAO-National, subsequently
issued Notice of Disallowance (ND) No. 2006-015 dated May 26, 2006 of the P 5,000.00
allowance.
- MC No. 33 did not intend the health care program to be a single activity or endowment to
achieve a fleeting goal, for it rightfully concerned the institutionalization of a system of
healthcare for government employees. A careful perusal of MC No. 33 and its precursor
reveals the unequivocal intent to afford government employees a sustainable health care
program instead of an intermittent healthcare provision.

POLTICAL LAW

Issue: WON COA properly disallowed the payment of the healthcare allowance?
Held/Ratio: YES. COA is generally accorded complete discretion in the exercise of its
constitutional duty and responsibility to examine and audit expenditures of public funds,
particularly those which are perceptibly beyond what is sanctioned by law. Only in instances
when COA acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction shall the Court interfere.
- MC No. 33, series of 1997 provides that [a]ll government offices shall provide the
following a. Health Program for Government Employees which shall include 1.
Hospitalization services, 2. Annual mental, medical-physical examinations.
- The Court stated MC No. 33 did not intend the health care program to be a single
activity or endowment to achieve a fleeting goal, for it rightfully concerned the
institutionalization of a system of healthcare for government employees. A careful
perusal of MC No. 33 and its precursor reveals the unequivocal intent to afford
government employees a sustainable health care program instead of an intermittent
healthcare provision. It was not to give the allowances to the employees.
- Thus, it was right for COA to disallow payments of healthcare allowances.

Issue: WON TESDAs claim that of giving allowances as a better option tenable?

Held/Ratio: NO. MC No. 33 and its precursor were worded in a plain and straightforward
manner to the effect that the (h)ealth program for employees shall include any or all of the
following: 1) Hospitalization services, and 2) Annual mental, medical-physical examinations.
Whatever latitude was afforded to a government agency extended only to the determination of
which services to include in the program, not to the choice of an alternative to such health
program or to authorizing the conversion of the benefits into cash. The giving of health care
maintenance allowance of P5,000.00 to the TESDAs employees was not among any of the
hospitalization services or examinations listed in the circular.

Jacomille v. Abaya, G.R. No. 212381, 22 April 2015.

[MENDOZA, J.]
FACTS:

Recently, the LTO formulated the Motor Vehicle License Plate Standardization Program (MVPSP) to supply
the new license plates for both old and new vehicle registrants. The DOTC published in newspapers of
general circulation the Invitation To Bid for the supply and delivery of motor vehicle license plates for the
MVPSP and stated that the source of funding in the amount of P3,851,600,100.00 would be the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). However, a perusal of R.A. No. 10352 or the General Appropriations Act of 2013
(GAA 2013), would show that Congress appropriated only the amount of P187,293,000.00 under the
specific heading of Motor Vehicle Plate-Making Project. The DOTC proceeded with the bidding process,
but delayed in the implementation of the project. The Senate Committee on Public Services conducted an
inquiry in aid of legislation on the reported delays in the release of motor vehicle license plates, stickers
and tags by the LTO.

Petitioner, by counsel and assisted by Retired Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, instituted this
taxpayer suit, averring that he was a diligent citizen paying his correct taxes to the Philippine Government
regularly; that he was a registered vehicle owner, as evidenced by the Certificate of Registration of his
motor vehicle and a registered licensed driver; that he would be affected by the government issuance of
vehicle plates thru its MVPSP upon his renewal of the registration of his vehicle; that not being a participant
to the bidding process, he could not avail of the administrative remedies and procedure provided under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9184 or the Government Procurement Reform Act, and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR); that as far as he was concerned, there was no appeal or any plain or speedy remedy
available to him.
For the respondents, the OSG stated that the issues presented had been rendered moot and academic as
the gap in the budget of MVPSP was already bridged and covered by the full and specific funding by GAA
2014 in the amount of P4,843,753,000.00 for the item Motor Vehicle Registration and Drivers Licensing
Regulatory Services. With the signing of MVPSP on February 21, 2014, after the enactment of GAA 2014,
the OSG claimed that all objections that petitioner might have, whether right or wrong, had been rendered
naught.

On the other hand, JKG-Power Plates averred that petitioner had no locus standi. It pointed out that
petitioner had admitted that he was not one of the bidders in MVPSP and so he would not suffer any direct
injury. Likewise, the present case was not a proper subject of taxpayer suit because no taxes would be
spent for this project. The money to be paid for the plates would not come from taxes, but from payments
of vehicle owners, who would pay P450.00 for every pair of motor vehicle license plate, and P120.00 for
every motorcycle license plate. Out of the P450.00, the cost of the motor vehicle plate would only be
P380.00. In effect, the government would even earn P70.00 from every pair of plate.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the petition should be dismissed for being moot and academic, considering the assailed
deficiencies in appropriation have been substantially complied with.

2. Whether the petitioner has locus standi to bring his case in court.

3. Whether the petitioner established a taxpayers suit.

HELD:
1. NO.

In the case at bench, the issues presented must still be passed upon because paramount public interest is
involved and the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. MVPSP is a nationwide project which
affects new and old registrants of motor vehicles and it involves P3,851,600,100.00 of the taxpayers
money. Also, the act complained of is capable of repetition because the procurement process under R.A.
No. 9184 is regularly made by various government agencies. Hence, it is but prudent for the Court to rule
on the substantial merits of the case.

2. YES.

In the present case, petitioner justifies his locus standi by claiming that the petition raises issues of
transcendental importance and that he institutes the same as a taxpayers suit. It must be noted that the
Court has provided the following instructive guides to determine whether a matter is of transcendental
importance, namely: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence
of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest
in the questions being raised.

Petitioner sufficiently showed that his case presents a matter of transcendental importance based on the
above-cited determinants. He elucidated that, first, around P3.851 billion in public funds stood to be illegally
disbursed; second, the IRR of R.A. No. 9184 and R.A. No. 7718 were violated and the contract for MVPSP
was awarded to respondent JKG Power Plates despite the utter disregard of the said laws; third, there was
no other party with a more direct and specific interest who had raised the issues therein; and fourth, MVPSP
had a wide range of impact because all registered motor vehicles owners would be affected.

3. YES.

A person suing as a taxpayer must show that the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement
of public funds derived from taxation. Contrary to the assertion of JKG-Power Plates, MVPSP clearly
involves the expenditure of public funds. While the motor vehicle registrants will pay for the license plates,
the bid documents and contract for MVPSP indicate that the government shall bear the burden of paying
for the project. Every portion of the national treasury, when appropriated by Congress, must be properly
allocated and disbursed. Necessarily, an allegation that public funds in the amount of P3.851 billion shall
be used in a project that has undergone an improper procurement process cannot be easily brushed off by
the Court.

DPI VS COA
the factual findings of the Commission on Audit (COA) must be accorded great respect and finality.

They maintain that there is no credible evidence to show that the subject textbooks were delivered and
that without any proof of delivery, there is no basis for petitioner DPI to recover even under the principle
of quantum meruit.

FACTS:

On November 15, 2007, then Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Secretary Rolando G. Andaya, Jr.
requested the respondent COA to validate and evaluate the request of then Regional Governor of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Nur Misuari for the release of funds to cover the regions alleged unpaid
obligation to petitioner DPI for textbooks delivered in 1998. 8

In response to the request, the respondent COA issued Local Government Sector (LGS) Office Order No. 2007-058
dated December 7, 2007, creating a team of auditors to validate and evaluate the alleged unpaid obligation.

On April 29, 2008, Assistant Commissioner Gloria S. Cornejo of the LGS issued a Memorandum 10 expressing serious
doubts on the validity of the obligation as the actual receipt of the subject textbooks could not be ascertained.

On September 22, 2008, petitioner DPI filed with the respondent COA a money claim 12 for the payment of textbooks it
allegedly delivered on July 3, 1998 to the respondent Department of Education (DepEd)-ARMM, formerly the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)-ARMM.13

The Fraud Audit and Investigation Office (FAIO), Legal Services Sector(LSS) conducted further validation of
petitioner DPIs money claim, which yielded the same result.

COA denied the money claim because it found no convincing proof that the subject textbooks were delivered.
DPI ARGUMENTS: Petitioner DPI ascribes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent COA in denying
the money claim solely on sheer doubt.31 Petitioner DPI claims there were funds COA ARGUMENTS: available for
the procurement of the subject textbooks but were inadvertently reverted to the National Treasury because the said
amount was twice obligated under Personal Service.

The respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that the respondent COA committed no grave
abuse of discretion in denying the money claim as the denial is supported by the evidence on record. They maintain
that there is no credible evidence to show that the subject textbooks were delivered and that without any proof of
delivery, there is no basis for petitioner DPI to recover even under the principle of quantum meruit.

HELD: SC ruled in favor of COA

There are inconsistencies, discrepancies, and inaccuracies in the dates and figures stated in the documents.

Contrary to the claim of petitioner DPI, there is sufficient reason for the respondent COA to doubt and disregard the
documentary evidence presented by petitioner DPI as the FAIO found inconsistencies, discrepancies, and
inaccuracies in the dates and figures stated in the POs, DRs, Sis, and other documents. Pertinent portions of the
LSS-FAIO Report No. 2010-001 are quoted below:

2) Various inconsistencies/inaccuracies were noted in the verification of documents submitted/attached to the claim
showing different dates, amounts, and signatories, casting doubt on the authenticity of the documents and the
transaction.

a) Three (3) copies of POs were issued with the same number but with three different amounts, received undated by
[petitioner] DPI and White Orchids Printing, indicating the absence of safeguards against irregularities in the handling
or substitution of vital documents like PO.

b) There were two sets of [SI] Nos. 5806 and 5808 and two (2) sets of [DRs] Nos. 5206 and 5207, all dated July 3,
1998, bearing similar serial numbers but with different signatories on the received portion thereof, indicating possible
falsification of public documents.

c) Two Certifications purportedly issued by Sulpicio Lines differed in dates of delivery and receipt, casting doubt on
the authenticity of the delivery of textbooks.

d) Five contradicting reports on receipt and acceptance of deliveries and three sets of Inspection Reports by the
Regional Secretary of ARMM, indicate doubtful invoices and

We believe that these inconsistencies, discrepancies, and inaccuracies are enough reasons for the respondent COA
to deny the money claim.

ART 7 SEC 25

Demetria vs. Alba (Feb 27, 1987)

The assailed provision is unconstitutional for unduly extending the privilege granted by the Constitution,
since it empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department to any program
of any department without regard as to WoN the funds to be transferred are actually savings.
Petitionersconcerned citizens, taxpayers, and members of the National Assemblyassailed the
constitutionality of Sec. 44 of the Budget Reform Decree of 1977 (PD 1177): The President shall have
the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and
agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any
program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations
Act or approved after its enactment.

The SC declared the assailed section to be unconstitutional.

1. On whether the petition should be dismissed on the grounds of being moot and academicthe SC
held that it would take cognizance of the case, in particular because the 1987 Constitution carries
verbatim the provision of the 1973 Constitution relevant to the case at bar.

2. The assailed provision is unconstitutional for unduly extending the privilege granted by the
Constitution, since it empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department to
any program of any department without regard as to WoN the funds to be transferred are actually
savings.

Such authority may:

a) Result in uncontrolled executive expenditures;

b) Diffuse accountability for budgetary performance; and
c) Entrench the pork barrel system.

Guingona vs. Carague (Apr 22, 1991)

Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of:

a) automatic appropriations for debt servicing;

b) the fact that the appropriation for debt-servicing multiple times theappropriation for public
education;
c) undue delegation of legislative powers.

The SC upheld the validity of the 1990 appropriations, and the automatic debt servicing.

1. Congress is not hamstrung by Sec. 5, Art. XIV which mandates the State to assign the
highest budgetary priority to educationso as to deprive it of the power to respond to the imperatives
of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives. First, the amount set
aside for education is the highest budgetary allocation among the department budgets: this is a clear
compliance of the constitutional mandate to accord the highest priority to education. Second, Congress
is not without power to provide an appropriation that can service the countrys enormous debtnot
only a matter of honor, but concerns the survival of the economy.

2. The Decrees that authorized the automatic debt-servicing did not become functus oficio upon
the ouster of former President Marcos. The transitory provisions of the Constitution were adopted
precisely to preserve the social order.
 3. The procedural requirements for passing laws are not meant to be applied to laws already
existing. The general rule is that the law is applied prospectively, unless it is so clearly stated.

4. There was no undue delegation of legislative authority. The questioned laws are complete in
all their essential terms and conditions and sufficient standards are indicated therein. Purpose of the
laws: to enable the government to make prompt payments and/or advances for all loans to protect and
maintain the credit standing of the country. Although the Decrees do not state specific amounts to be
paid, these amounts are determinable based on legislative parameters provided in the decrees
themselvesthe President does not have unlimited discretion: the limit will be the exact amounts
shown by the books of the Treasury. Note the budgetary process as described by the SolGen:

a) Budget Preparation: Executiveestimate government revenues, determine budget priorities

and activities (constraint: available revenues; borrowing limits); starts with budget call by DBM;

b) Legislative Authorization: Legislativedeliberate on budget proposals of the President,

formulate an appropriations act;

c) Budget Execution: Executiveoperational aspects; and

d) Budget Accountability: evaluation of actual performance.

TAX LAWS

Art. VI, Sec. 28

Art. XIV, Sec. 4
Art. X, Sec. 5
Art. VI, Sec. 23

CIR vs Fortune Tobacco Corp

CIR may not disregard legal requirements in the exercise of its quasi-legislative powers which
publication, filing, and prior hearing.

Facts: Fortune Tobacco Corporation ("Fortune Tobacco"), engaged in the manufacture of different
brands of cigarettes, registered "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes. BIR classified them as
foreign brands since they were listed in the World Tobacco Directory as belonging to foreign companies.
However, Fortune changed the names of 'Hope' to 'Hope Luxury' and 'More' to 'Premium More,' thereby
removing the said brands from the foreign brand category.

A 45% Ad Valorem taxes were imposed on these brands. Then Republic Act ("RA") No. 7654 was enacted
55% for locally manufactured foreign brand while 45% for locally manufactured brands. 2
days before the effectivity of RA 7654, Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 ("RMC 37-93"), was
issued by the BIR saying since there is no showing who the real owner/s are of Champion, Hope and
More, it follows that the same shall be considered locally manufactured foreign brand for purposes of
determining the ad valorem tax - 55%. BIR sent via telefax a copy of RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco
addressed to no one in particular. Then Fortune Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox
copy of RMC 37-93. CIR assessed Fortune Tobacco for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to
P9,598,334.00.

Fortune Tobacco filed a petition for review with the CTA. CTA upheld the position of Fortune. CA
affirmed.

Issue: WON it was necessary for BIR to follow the legal requirements when it issued its RMC

Held. YES. CIR may not disregard legal requirements in the exercise of its quasi-legislative powers which
publication, filing, and prior hearing.

When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further
than its bare issuance for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already
prescribed. BUT when, upon the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for
the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but
substantially increases the burden of those governed, the agency must accord, at least to those directly
affected, a chance to be heard, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.

RMC 37-93 cannot be viewed simply as construing Section 142(c)(1) of the NIRC, as amended, but has, in
fact and most importantly, been made in order to place "Hope Luxury," "Premium More" and
"Champion" within the classification of locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brands and to
thereby have them covered by RA 7654 which subjects mentioned brands to 55% the BIR not simply
interpreted the law; verily, it legislated under its quasi-legislativeauthority. The due observance of the
requirements of notice, of hearing, and of publication should not have been then ignored.

Quezon City v. ABS-CBN (Oct. 6, 2008)

Cases should be resolved in favor of Congress taxing authority over local government. Rationale:
LGUs power is delegated from Congress, it cannot supersede that of Congress.

Yu notes:

Power of Congress to tax: inherent

Power of LGUs to tax: power not merely delegated, but conferred (Sec. 5, Art. X)

o Before: LGUs would have to wait for Congress to pass a law before they could exercise their taxing
power

o Now: power of Congress vis-a-vis LGUs To determine the exemptions To impose limitations on
the LGUs taxing powers

FACTS: A Quezon City Ordinance provided that any entity enjoying a franchise and doing business in
QCnotwithstanding any grant of tax exemptionshall be liable to the City for a franchise tax. ABS-CBN
had been granted a franchise through RA 7966. One of the provisions therein was that a franchise tax on
gross receipts would be paid in lieu of all taxes on this franchise or earnings thereof. Although in the
beginning ABSCBN had paid the QC franchise tax, it eventually developed the opinion that it was not
liable to pay the same. After the RTC decided in favor of ABS-CBN, the CA referred the appeal of QC to
the SC, as it involved purely legal questions.

The SC decided in favor of QC.

1. [I]n lieu of all taxes does not exempt ABSCBN from payment of the local franchise tax. Citing City
Government of QC, et al. v. Bayan Telecommunications: The power to tax is primarily vested in the
Congress; however, in our jurisdiction, it may be exercised by local legislative bodies, no longer merely
be virtue of a valid delegation as before, but pursuant to direct authority conferred by Section 5, Article
X of the Constitution. Nonetheless, this power may be limited by the power of Congress to grant
exemptions. Statutes granting tax exemptions are construed stricissimi juris against the taxpayer and
liberally in favor of the taxing authority: whether the in lieu of all taxes provision would include
exemption from local tax is not unequivocal. ABS-CBN failed to prove that it was in fact covered by the
exemption.

2. The in lieu of all taxes clause had become functus officio: ABS-CBN no longer subject to a franchise
taxnow liable for VAT. The passage of VAT laws subsequent to the law that granted the franchise to
ABS-CBN changed the nature of ABS-CBNs liability from the payment of franchise tax to the payment of
VAT. The in lieu of all taxes clause only pertained to the payment of the franchise tax, not to the
payment of VAT or any other tax.

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxPURISIMA vs LAZATINxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

ART 7 SEC 29

ART 10 SEC 6
Swedish Match v The Treasurer of the City of Manila
businesses such as respondents, already subject to a local business Tax under Section 14 of Tax Ordinance No.
7794 [which is based on Section 143(a) of the LGC], can no longer be made liable for local business tax under
Section 21 of the same Tax Ordinance

Parties:
petitioner: Swedish Match Philippines, Inc.
respondent: The Treasurer of the City of Manila

Facts:
This is a Petition for Refund of Taxes with the RTC of Manila in accordance with Section 196 of the Local
Government Code (LGC) of 1991. The petitioner says that it had been religiously paying its taxes based on Section
14 of Ordinance No. 7794 or the Manila Revenue Code (as amended by Ordinance Nos. 7988 and 8011). However, it
was still taxed based on Section 21 of the same code. RTC denied the petition because of the failure of the petitioner
to plead the latters capacity to sue and to state the authority of Ms. Beleno, who had executed the Verification and
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. It also denied it on the ground that Section 14 and 21 pertained to taxes of a
different nature and, thus the elements of double taxation were wanting in this case. CTA affirmed the decision.

Petitioner points out that Section 21 is not in itself invalid, but the enforcement of this provision would constitute
double taxation if business taxes have already been paid under Section 14 of the same revenue code. Petitioner
further argues that since Ordinance Nos. 7988 and 8011 have already been declared null and void in Coca-Cola
Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. City of Manila, all taxes collected and paid on the basis of these ordinances should be
refunded.

The respondent also argues that Sections 14 and 21 pertain to two different objects of tax; thus, they are not of the
same kind and character so as to constitute double taxation. Section 14 is a tax on manufacturers, assemblers and
other processors, while Section 21 applies to business subject to excise, value-added, or percentage tax.
Respondent posits that under Section 21, petitioner is merely a withholding tax agent of the City of Manila.

Issue:
WON the imposition of tax under Section 21 of the Manila Revenue Code constitutes double taxation in view of the
tax collected and paid under Section 14 of the same code-YES

Ratio:
The Court used the holding in The City of Manila v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. to justify that taxation under
Sections 14 and 21 would result to double taxation. Here, it was elaborated that Section 143(a) of the LGC: said
municipality or city may no longer subject the same manufacturers, etc, to a business tax under Section 143(h) of the
same Code. SECTION 143(h) may be imposed only on businesses that are subject to excise tax, VAT or percentage
tax under the NIRC, and that are not otherwise specified in preceding paragraphs. In the same way, businesses
such as respondents, already subject to a local business Tax under Section 14 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794 [which is
based on Section 143(a) of the LGC], can no longer be made liable for local business tax under Section 21 of the
same Tax Ordinance [which is based on Section 143(h) of the LGC.]

Thus, since petitioner has already been paying under Section 14, it should not be subjected to the payment of taxes
under Section 21. Further, the Court agreed with petitioner that Ordinance Nos. 7988 and 8011 cannot be the basis
for the collection of business taxes because Coca-Cola already ruled that these ordinances were null and void.

Hence, payments made under Section 21 must be refunded in favor of petitioner.

Petition is GRANTED.

Mactan Intl Airport vs. Lapu-lapu City

MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers
and performing essential public services pursuant to Section 2(10) of the Introductory
Provisions of the Administrative Code. As a government instrumentality, MIAA is
not subject to any kind of tax by local governments
FACTS:
Petitioner, Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was created by Congress under Republic
Act No. 6958. Upon its creation, petitioner enjoyed exemption from realty taxes imposed by the National
Government or any of its political subdivision. However, upon the effectivity of the LGC the Supreme
Court rendered a decision that the petitioner is no longer exempt from realty estate taxes.

Respondent City issued to petitioner a Statement of Real Estate Tax assessing the lots comprising
the Mactan International Airport which included the airfield, runway, taxi way and the lots on which these
are built. Petitioner contends that these lots, and the lots to which they are built, are utilized solely and
exclusively for public purposes and are exempt from real property tax. Petitioner based its claim for
exemption on DOJ Opinion No. 50.

Respondent issued notices of levy on 18 sets of real properties of petitioners. Petitioner filed a petition
for Prohibition, TRO, and a writ of preliminary injunction with RTC Lapulapu which sought to enjoin
respondent City from issuing the warrant of levy against petitioners properties from selling them at public
auction for delinquency in realty tax obligations.

Petitioner claimed before the RTC that it had discovered that respondent City did not pass any ordinance
authorizing the collection of real property tax, a tax for the special education fund (SEF), and a penalty
interest for its nonpayment. Petitioner argued that without the corresponding tax ordinances, respondent
City could not impose and collect real property tax, an additional tax for the SEF, and penalty interest from
petitioner.

RTC granted the writ of preliminary which was later on lifted upon motion by the respondents.

(fait accompli)

RULING OF THE CA: Court of Appeals held that petitioners airport terminal building, airfield, runway,
taxiway, and the lots on which they are situated are not exempt from real estate tax reasoning as
follows: Under the Local Government Code (LGC for brevity), enacted pursuant to the constitutional
mandate of local autonomy, all natural and juridical persons, including government-owned or controlled
corporations (GOCCs), instrumentalities and agencies, are no longer exempt from local taxes even if
previously granted an exemption. The only exemptions from local taxes are those specifically provided
under the Code itself, or those enacted through subsequent legislation.

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:

MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation under Section
2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code because it is not organized
as a stock or non-stock corporation. Neither is MIAA a government-owned or controlled
corporation under Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution because MIAA is not required to meet
the test of economic viability. MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with
corporate powers and performing essential public services pursuant to
Section 2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code. As a government
instrumentality, MIAA is not subject to any kind of tax by local
governments under Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code. The exception to the
exemption in Section 234(a) does not apply to MIAA because MIAA is not a taxable entity under the
Local Government Code. Such exception applies only if the beneficial use of real property owned by the
Republic is given to a taxable entity.

Finally, the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are properties devoted to public use and thus are
properties of public dominion. Properties of public dominion are owned by the State or the Republic.

As properties of public dominion owned by the Republic, there is no doubt

whatsoever that the Airport Lands and Buildings are expressly exempt from real
estate tax under Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code. This Court has
also repeatedly ruled that properties of public dominion are not subject to
execution or foreclosure sale.

1. Petitioners properties that are actually, solely and exclusively used for public purpose,
consisting of the airport terminal building, airfield, runway, taxiway and the lots on which they
are situated, EXEMPT from real property tax imposed by the City of Lapu-Lapu.

2. VOID all the real property tax assessments, including the additional tax for the special education
fund and the penalty interest, as well as the final notices of real property tax delinquencies,
issued by the City of Lapu-Lapu on petitioners properties, except the assessment covering the
portions that petitioner has leased to private parties.
 3. NULL and VOID the sale in public auction of 27 of petitioners properties and the eventual
forfeiture and purchase of the said properties by respondent City of Lapu-Lapu. We likewise
declare VOID the corresponding Certificates of Sale of Delinquent Property issued to respondent
City of Lapu-Lapu.

TAXATION OF RELIGIOUS AND CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS

Abra vs. Hernando (Aug 31, 1981)

declaratory relief is not available when there has been a violation of government regulation. The
Bishops primary recourse is to file a petition with the Local Board of Assessment Appeals

The provincial assessor of Abra assessed taxes on property owned by the Roman Catholic Bishop of
Bangued, Inc. The CFI, on a petition for declaratory relief, ruled that the property was exempt from
taxes.

HELD: Judge Hernando committed grave abuse of discretion when he decided the petition without
hearing it on the merits. The rule under the 1987 Constitution is different from what the 1935 charter
provides; it added the words actually and directly in determining whether land is exempt from taxes.

It is to be noted that tax exemptions are construed liberally in favor of the taxing power and strictly
against the taxpayer. Futhermore, declaratory relief is not available when there has been a violation of
government regulation. The Bishops primary recourse is to file a petition with the Local Board of
Assessment Appeals.

YMCA vs. Collector (Jan 19, 1916)

The Charter of the City of Manila does not require that the land be devoted exclusively to any one of the
purposes mentioned. YMCA is engaged in all three (religious, charitable, and educational).

YMCA claims exemption from taxation on the ground that its land is used for religious, charitable and
educational purposes. While its buildings can accommodate boarders and lodgers, it does not derive
profit from the same. HELD: YMCA is exempt from taxation. The Charter of the City of Manila does not
require that the land be devoted exclusively to any one of the purposes mentioned. YMCA is engaged in
all three (religious, charitable, and educational).

Bishop of Nueva Segovia vs. Provincial Board (Dec 31, 1972)

What did Justice Malcolm say? He dissented that the land used as vegetable garden should not be
covered by the grant on tax exemption.

1935 constitution: Land EXCLUSIVELY USED for religious purposes

 1973 & 1987 constitutions: Land ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY AND EXCLUSIVELY USED for religious purposes
If a same case were to be decided now, dissent of Malcolm will prevail. Rationale: Vegetable garden is
not utilized for a religious purpose.

The Provincial Board of Ilocos Norte assessed taxes on the land of petitioner then being utilized as a
convent and vegetable farm. The Bishop filed an action for recovery, claiming exemption from taxation.

HELD: the areas mentioned are exempt from taxation. The convent is where the priest actually lives and
the vegetable garden adjacent thereto is for his own benefit. The convent is likewise being used as a
lodging house for people who participate in religious activities.

*Apostolic Prefect vs. City Treasurer (Apr 18, 1941)

Can churches be asked to pay special assessments? YES.

Special assessment is not tax, hence, churches are not exempted.

Ordinance No. 137 was passed which sought to impose a special assessment on land located within
the city limits of Baguio. The Apostolic Prefect of Mountain Province paid the tax in protest. They
brought the matter to the CFI which affirmed the imposition of the tax.

HELD: a special assessment is not a tax for purposes of determining exemption therefrom. It is payment
for the cost of public improvements, levied with special benefits to the property assessed. Moreover,
the property owned by petitioner was then being used for non-religious purposes.

TAXATION OF EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES

*Hodges vs. Municipal Board of Iloilo City (Jan 31, 1963)

Respondents promulgated Ordinance No. 31 imposing a sales tax of of 1% of contract price for the
sale of real estate, to be shouldered by the vendor. Petitioner was then engaged in the business of
buying and selling real property. He filed a petition for declaratory relief. The CFI declared the Ordinance
null and void.

Is Ordinance No. 31 valid? YES. The Municipal Board is vested with plenary power to enact ordinances.
The only requirements are that they must be for public purposes and that the imposition of taxes must
be just and uniform. The Ordinance is valid except insofar as it poses a condition precedent the payment
of such tax before registration of title.

PROCEDURE FOR THE PASSING OF BILLS ART 6 SEC 26

Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance (Aug. 25, 1994 and Oct 30, 1995)
LANDMARK CASE! Bicameral conference committee can introduce entirely new proposals under same
subject of bills from Senate and House that are being reconciled.

Several bills were introduced in the HoR seeking to amend certain provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code, relative to the VAT. Eventually, the House Ways and Means Committeetaking into
consideration the different bills was able to recommend a substitute measure for approval. This
substitute measure was approved by the HoR on the third reading and it was then sent to the Senate.
The Senate, taking into consideration the bill sent by the HoR, approved its own bill on the 3rd reading.
The HoR and Senate Bills were referred to a Bicameral Conference Committee. Eventually, the
Conference Committee Bill was finalized, and was eventually passed in both Houses as RA 7716.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the SC on various grounds assailing the
Constitutionality of RA 7716.

The SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 7716.

1. RA 7716 did not violate the directive of the Constitution that all revenue bills originate exclusively in
the HoR. Petitioners are incorrect in stating that RA 7716 must retain the essence of the House Billthe
bill, not the law, is what is required to originate in the HoR. Once passed onto the Senate, the bill may
undergo amendments that will substantially change the bill from what the House had passed. Legislative
power is conferred to both the HoR and the Senateno preference is given to any single chamber.

2. There is nothing wrong if a substitute bill was passed in the Senate in anticipation of its receipt of the
bill from the House, as long as the former is not acted upon by the Senate while waiting for the receipt
of the House Bill.

3. The requirement of passing a bill after 3 readings on separate days may be done away if the President
certifies that a particular bill is urgent.

4. The Bicameral Conference Committee may reconcile bills from the HoR and the Senate. It is possible
for the Conference Committee to draft an entirely new bill: the only requirement is that the bill should
be germane to the subjects of the HoR and the Senate Bills. Besides, the final bill put together by the
Conference Committee would still have to be approved by both Houses

5. RA 7716 did not violate the One Bill-One Subject/Title provision. The title is not supposed to be an
index of the statutes contents. It is enough that the title provides the general purpose, and that all
provisions are germane to the general subject. The provision withdrawing the tax exemption previously
enjoyed by PAL is germane to the general subject: widening the scope of the VAT system

6. Other Substantive issues:

a. Does not violate freedom of speech, press (petitioners had assailed the withdrawal of the
exemption previously granted to the Press);

b. Does not violate freedom of religion;

c. Claims of regressivity an academic exercise, owing to the lack of empirical data; and
 d. The non-impairment clause has never been thought as a limitation on the exercise of the
States power of taxation.

Abakada Guro vs. Executive Secretary (Sept 1, 2005, Oct 18, 2005)

Congress did not abdicate its functions and did not delegate its power; it merely delegated the
implementation of the law. Clearly specified: what must be done, who has to do it and what is the scope
of authority.

RA 9337, also known as the E Vat law, is a consolidation of two HoR bills and one Senate bill. Due to
disagreements between the two bodies, a Bicameral Conference Committee was formed to polish the
contentious provisions. The Committee eventually accomplished a consolidated version that was signed
into law. On July 1 2005, the proposed date of implementation, the Court issued a TRO enjoining
respondents from enforcing the law. This was after the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the
statute on May 27 2005.

IMPORTANT CASE!

Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality because theres a section that allows Executive
Department to increase the VAT based on certain conditions:

That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1,
2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has
been satisfied:

o Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year
exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or

o National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half
percent (1 %).

Petitioners claim that there is undue delegation because the President is given the power to increase
VAT.

The Court ruled that it is valid. Those that could not be delegated are those that are inherently
legislative. In this case, Congress merely delegated ascertainment of facts (the conditions
abovementioned) to the Secretary of Finance. The increase in VAT is conditional based on these factual
matters. There is no discretion on the part of the President; it is only a ministerial duty because all the
conditions have been specified by Congress. The Secretary of Finance in recommending to the President
based on the ascertainment on whether the conditions have been met acts as an agent of legislative and
not as an alter-ego of the President. Congress did not abdicate its functions and did not delegate its
power; it merely delegated the implementation of the law. Clearly specified: what must be done, who
has to do it and what is the scope of authority.

PRESIDENTS VETO POWER

ART 1 SEC 7 OF US CONSTI

The Origination Clause, sometimes called the Revenue Clause, is part of the United States
Constitution. This clause says that all bills for raising revenue must start in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as in the case of other
bills.

ART 6 SEC 20 1935 CONSTI

Section 20.

(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he
approves the same, he shall sign it; but if not, he shall return it with his objections to the House where it
originated, which shall enter the objections at large on its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after
such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be
sent together, with the objections, to the House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if
approved by twothirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the
votes of each House shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the Members voting for
and against shall be entered on its Journal. If any bill shall not be returned by the President as herein
provided within twenty days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same
shall become a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by adjournment prevent its
return, in which case it shall become a law unless vetoed by the President within thirty days after
adjournment.

(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriation bill, but
the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object. When a provision of an
appropriation bill affects one or more items of the same, the President cannot veto the provision
without at the same time, vetoing the particular item or items to which it relates. The item or items
objected to shall not take effect except in the manner heretofore provided as to bills returned to the
Congress without the approval of the President. If the veto refers to a bill or any item of an
appropriation bill which appropriates a sum in excess of ten per centum of the total amount voted in the
appropriation bill for the general expenses of the Government for the preceding year, or if it should
refer to a bill authorizing an increase of the public debt, the same shall not become a law unless
approved by three-fourths of all the Members of each House

(3) The President shall have the power to veto any separate item or items in a revenue of tariff bill, and
the item or items shall not take effect except in the manner provided as to bills vetoed by the President.
 Bolinao Electronics Corp. vs. Valencia (June 30, 1964)

The power to veto does not include the power to strike out conditions or restrictions. Thus, the veto
produced no effect whatsoever

Petitionersowners and operators of radio and television stationsfiled a petition for prohibition and
mandatory injunction against the Secretary of Public Works and Communications and the Acting Chief of
the Radio Control Division. Petitioners had sought to renew their Stations licenses. The Secretary
through his Undersecretaryhad served notice to the petitioners that a hearing would be conducted to
look into the filing of the petitioners applications for renewal after the expiration of their licenses, in
violation of the requirement that such applications must be submitted 2 months before the expiration
date, to determine whether there is ground to disapprove the applications for renewal. As a defense,
petitioners submitted that the late filing was condoned or pardoned by the respondents by the issuance
of a circular that allowed late filing of applications to allow licensees to correct violations of radio laws
and regulations.

SC decided in favor of the petitioners

1. The Circular clearly condoned the late filing of applications for the renewal of licenses. First, the
Secretary is empowered by specific provision of law to reprimand and warn offenders of radio laws or
regulationswhich was what the Circular did. Second, the circular having been issued by the
respondents, the latter cannot now claim its illegality to evade the effect of its enforcement

2. CBN did not renounce its right to operate Channel 9. Although in the construction permit to transfer
its TV station from QC to Baguio City, Channel 10 assigned in lieu of Channel 9 appearsCBN
explained that the assignment of Channel 10 was to be effective upon the final transfer of the station.
When the plan to transfer DZXL-TV to Baguio had to be abandoned, it did not mean abandonment by
the station of its right to operate and broadcast on Channel 9 in Quezon City. The fact that CBN was
allowed to continue and did continue operating on Channel 9 even after the approval of its proposed
transfer, is proof that there was no renunciation or abandonment of that channel upon the approval of
its petition to transfer.

3. The Presidents veto of the condition attached to the appropriation for the Philippine Broadcasting
Servicethat no portion of the appropriation shall be used for the operation of TV stations in Luzon or
in any part of the Philippines where there were TV stationswas not legally permissible. The power to
veto does not include the power to strike out conditions or restrictions. Thus, the veto produced no
effect whatsoeverthe restriction imposed remained. PBS would not have been entitled to any
reimbursement, in any case, even if it were able to prove its right to operate Channel 9.

Gonzales vs. Macaraig (Nov 19, 1990)

The President is not allowed to veto just the restrictions or conditionsbut in an Appropriations Bill,
these restrictions or conditions must exhibit a connection with money items in a budgetary sense in the
schedule of expenditures.
The President had vetoed Sec. 55 of the 1989 General Appropriations Bill (GAB), which provided that
items of appropriation disapproved or reduced in the Act would not be restored or increased by
augmentation. He justified his veto by submitting that Sec. 55 was in violation of the privilege granted
by the Constitution to the President, Speaker of the House, Chief Justice of the SC, and Heads of the
Constitutional Commissions to augment any item in the GAA from savings. The President also vetoed
Sec. 16 of the 1990 GAB, which was worded similarly.

The SC upheld the validity of the veto

1. The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the President may not veto a
provision without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a
distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto but also
overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the general appropriations
bill shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein and that any such
provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
2. But even assuming arguendo that provisions are beyond the executive power to veto,
the vetoed sections are not provisions in the budgetary sense of the term. They are
inappropriate provisions and should be treated as items for the purpose of the
Presidents veto power. First, the vetoed provisions do not relate to any particular or
distinctive appropriation. Second, the disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be
found on the face of the Bill. Third, the vetoed Sections are more of an expression of
Congressional policy in respect of augmentation from savings rather than a budgetary
appropriation.
3. The President is not allowed to veto just the restrictions or conditionsbut in an
Appropriations Bill, these restrictions or conditions must exhibit a connection with
money items in a budgetary sense in the schedule of expenditures. The assailed
provisions do not meet this criteria. Considering that the vetoed provisions are not, in
the budgetary sense of the term, conditions or restrictions, the case of Bolinao
Electronics Corporation v. Valencia invoked by petitioners, becomes inapplicable.
4. The heads of the different branches of the Government and those of the Constitutional
Commissions are afforded considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and
resources. When the assailed provisions prohibit the restoration or increase by
augmentation of appropriations disapproved or reduced by Congress, they impair the
constitutional and statutory authority of the President and other key officials to
augment any item or any appropriation from savings in the interest of expediency and
efficiency
5. Remedy for unconstitutional veto: overriding the same by votes of at least ! of members
of Congress. However, Congress made no attempt to do so

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Tax Appeals, (May 14, 1990)

It is within the power of the President to veto particular items which means, not an entire section, but
subjects of the tax and the tax rate. (This held true even for the 1935 constitution).
Manila golf wants the interpretation of the veto that makes the entire sec 42 (of HB) considered vetoed,
so that sec 191-A would not be in effect, hence no tax on them. Commissioner of ITR says the veto (as
interpreted) only referred to certain words, thus, the rest of sec 42 that was not vetoed, hence sec 191-
A, would still be in effect, thus making Manila Golf taxable.

The Court held that the presidential veto referred only to certain words hotels, motels, resthouses

1. It is within the power of the President to veto particular items which means, not an entire
section, but subjects of the tax and the tax rate. (This held true even for the 1935 constitution).

2. To interpret the term item as meaning an entire section would be render the veto power
useless since it would tie his hands in choosing either to approve the whole section at the expense of
also approving a provision therein which he deems unacceptable or veto the entire section at the
expense of foregoing the collection of the kind of tax altogether

3. Also,To interpret the veto message otherwise would result in the exemption of entities
already subject of tax. This would be absurd. Where the Congress wanted to exempt, it was so provided
in the bill. While the President may veto any item or items in a revenue bill the constitution does not
give him the power to repeal an existing tax.

Henry vs. Edwards (Mar 24, 1977)

If the Governor wishes to disapprove of conditions or limitations legitimately included in an

appropriation bill, he must veto not only the conditions or limitations but also the money "item" to
which they are connected.

On July 16, 1976, the Louisiana Legislature passed a General Appropriation Bill (GAB) and delivered it
to the Governor for his consideration

On the next day, the Governor signed the bill but vetoed 12 provisions and returned it to the
legislature for further consideration.(Note: When signed by the Governor, the bill became law and is
designated as Act No. 17 of the Regular Session of the 1976 Louisiana Legislature. The act contains the
GA for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1976 and ending June 30, 1977)

The Governor's veto message indicated that he considered the disapproved provisions to be
substantive law improperly incorporated in the appropriation bill in contravention of La.Const. art. 3,
16(C)*, citing as authority for his vetoes La.Const. art. 4, 5(G)*.

Each of the Governor's vetoes was sustained by the Senate

Plaintiffs, believing the vetoes to be unconstitutional, instituted this action for a declaratory judgment.

Trial judge held that the Governor improperly exercised the "line item" veto power conferred by
La.Const. art. 4, 5(G)1 and that 11 of the 12 provisions vetoed were unconstitutional in that they
constituted matter not properly included in a GAB, hence this appeal
The Court ruled that If the Governor wishes to disapprove of conditions or limitations legitimately
included in an appropriation bill, he must veto not only the conditions or limitations but also the money
"item" to which they are connected.

Just as the Governor may not use his item-veto power to usurp constitutional powers conferred on the
legislature, neither can the legislature deprive the Governor of the constitutional powers conferred on
him as the chief executive officer of the state by including in a general appropriation bill matters more
properly enacted in separate legislationThe legislature cannot by location of a bill give it immunity
from executive veto. Nor can it circumvent the Governor's veto power over substantive legislation by
artfully drafting general law measures so that they appear to be true conditions or limitations on an
item of appropriationwhen the legislature inserts inappropriate provisions in a general appropriation
bill, such provisions must be treated as "items" for purposes of the Governor's item veto power over
general appropriation bills

Bengzon vs. Drilon (Apr 15, 1992)

What the President vetoed was not the itemthe General Fund Adjustment that appropriated P500M
but the methods or systems placed by Congress to insure the fulfilling of the obligations therein.

The President may not veto the provisions of a law enacted 35 years before his Term of office

In accordance with the holding of the SC in an Administrative Matterwhere the PD that removed the
automatic adjustment provision for the retirement pension of SC and CA Justices was declared as never
having taken effect due to non-publicationCongress provided for adjusted pensions of the Justices in
the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992. President Aquino however vetoed the parts of the GAB
that granted the adjustment.

The SC struck down the Veto.

1. The Constitution provides that only a particular item or items may be vetoed. The power to
disapprove any item or items in an appropriate bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item
and to approve the remaining portion of the same item. (An item is is an indivisible sum of money
dedicated to a stated purpose.) What the President vetoed was not the itemthe General Fund
Adjustment that appropriated P500M but the methods or systems placed by Congress to insure the
fulfilling of the obligations therein. Less than all of an item has been vetoed. Moreover, the vetoed
portions are not items, they are provisions. For example, the authorization to augment retirement
payments by transferring savings from other items is a provision, not an itemthere is no specific
appropriation of money involved.

2. The veto struck something else: (i) RA 1797; (ii) the Resolution of the SC in Administrative
Matter. The President may not veto the provisions of a law enacted 35 years before his Term of office

3. The assailed veto is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized
clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. (Fiscal autonomy contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to
allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require.) The Chief
Justice must be given a free hand on how to augment appropriations where augmentation is needed.

4. The retired Justices have vested rights to the retirement pension.

Bengzon vs Sec of Justice

The Governor-General shall have the power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriation bill,
but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

Juan Bengzon was appointed as Justice of the Peace in 1912 in Lingayen, Pangasinan. Upon
reaching 65 years of age in 1933 he would have to retire in accordance with the law. He later
sought to claim gratuity pursuant to Act 4051 An Act to provide for the payment of retirement
gratuities to officers and employees of the Insular Government retired from the service as a
result of the reorganization or reduction of personnel thereof, including the justices of the
peace who must relinquish office in accordance with the provisions of Act Numbered Thirty-
eight hundred and ninety-nine, and for other purposes.
Section 7 thereof specifically provides that gratuity may be availed of by justices like Bengzon
but that provision has been vetoed by the governor-general. Bengzon said the veto is beyond
the power of the governor-general hence he filed a petition for mandamus to compel the
Secretary of Justice to implement the gratuity provision of the said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bengzon is entitled to the gratuity provision of the Retirement Gratuity
Law.
HELD: No. The governor-general in vetoing the said item of the law has acted within his power; for this
is also in compliance with the Organic Act. Section 19 of the former Organic Act, the Act of Congress of
August 29, 1916, established the practice for the enactment of a law, including the sanctioning of the
veto power by the Governor-General. Specifically it provided:

The Governor-General shall have the power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriation bill,
but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

The SC then is constrained to rule against Bengzon and to hold that the veto by the Governor-
General of section 7 of Act No. 4051 was in conformity with the legislative purpose and the
provisions of the Organic Act.

NOTE: Quite interestingly, while I was doing some research on this, it appears that this case
was further appealed (via certiorari) to the U.S. Supreme Court (299 U.S. 410). That was
allowed then because the Philippines was under the Commonwealth regime. The U.S.
Supreme Court reversed the decision. You can read it here. It was ruled that the Governor-
General did not have the power to veto such item in the said law because in truth and in fact,
the said law was not an appropriations law. hence, no line item veto can be had.

*PHILCONSA vs. Enriquez (Aug 19, 1994)

Pork Barrel Constitutional: the Congressmen are in a better position to RECCOMEND as to where funds
should be allocated.

This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the president involving
the General Appropriations Bill of 1994 as well as the constitutionality of the pork barrel. The Philippine
Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide development fund. PHILCONSA said
that Congress can only allocate funds but they cannot specify the items as to which those funds would
be applied for since that is already the function of the executive. In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by
the president of some provisions of the GAB of 1994, neither house of congress took steps to override
the veto. Instead, Senators Wigberto Taada and Alberto Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of
prohibition and mandamus against Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona et al. Taada et al contest the
constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAB of 1994 for the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and
(2) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the
CAFGUs, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA).

ISSUE: Whether or not the Presidents veto is valid.

HELD: In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted within its power and that the CDF is
constitutional. In the Taada petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions and granted the others.

Veto on special provisions:

The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to the ruling in Gonzales vs Macaraig.
The president particularly vetoed the debt reduction scheme in the GAA of 1994 commenting that the
scheme is already taken cared of by other legislation and may be more properly addressed by revising
the debt policy. He, however did not delete the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation therefor. Taada et al
averred that the president cannot validly veto that provision w/o vetoing the amount allotted therefor.
The veto of the president herein is sustained for the vetoed provision is considered inappropriate; in
fact the Sc found that such provision if not vetoed would in effect repeal the Foreign Borrowing Act
making the legislation as a log-rolling legislation

Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs:

The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs), the President vetoed special provisions
which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds was
likewise vetoed. The reason for the veto is that there were already funds allotted for the same in the
National expenditure Program. Taada et al claimed this as unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the veto
is valid for it is in compliant to the One Fund Policy it avoided double funding and redundancy.

Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance

The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a breach of contractual obligations.
The funds if allotted may result to abandonment of some existing contracts. The SC ruled that this
Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is
not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said
item shall be expended 70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The 1987 Constitution allows the
addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be
vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so long as they are appropriate in the
budgetary sense. The veto herein is then not valid.

Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment

As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and prohibition violate the
Constitutional mandate of non-impairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed, shall effectively
alter the original intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment deemed
necessary to modernize the AFP. The SC affirmed the veto. Any provision blocking an administrative
action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in
a separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being inappropriate provisions.

Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds

According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits should be covered by direct
appropriations specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the
Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials enumerated
in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. The SC retained the veto per reasons provided by the
president.

Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGUs:

Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGUs including the payment of separation benefits. The
President declared in his Veto Message that the implementation of this Special Provision to the item on
the CAFGUs shall be subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758.
The SC ruled to retain the veto per reasons provided by the president. Further, if this provision is
allowed the it would only lead to the repeal of said existing laws.

Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc:

In his veto message: The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional injunction prescribed
under Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitutional which states that no elective or appointive public
officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation unless specifically
authorized by law. I am, therefore, confident that the heads of the said offices shall maintain fidelity to
the law and faithfully adhere to the well-established principle on compensation standardization. Taada
et al claim that the conditions imposed by the President violated the independence and fiscal autonomy
of the Supreme court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR. The SC sustained the veto: In the first
place, the conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not by the
President. The Veto Message merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect
compensation can only be given pursuant to law. In the second place, such statements are mere
reminders that the disbursements of appropriations must be made in accordance with law. Such
statements may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.
Pork Barrel Constitutional:

The pork barrel makes the unequal equal. The Congressmen, being representatives of their local districts
know more about the problems in their constituents areas than the national government or the
president for that matter. Hence, with that knowledge, the Congressmen are in a better position to
recommend as to where funds should be allocated.

LEGISLATIVE VETOS

Miller vs. Mardo (July 31, 1961)

the Legislature may not and cannot delegate its power to legislate or create courts of justice to any
other agency of the Government.

The Reorganization Plan put together by the Executive had purportedly vested jurisdiction to the
Regional Offices of the Department of Labor over money claims and violations of labor standards. Prior
to the Reorganization Plan, the Department only had authority to mediate and in case of refusal to
submit to arbitration, the remedy was to file a complaint in the proper court. Various petitions
concerning the jurisdiction of the Courts vs. the Department were consolidated by the SC

The SC invalidated the Reorganization Plan.

1. The Government Survey and Reorganization Commission was created to carry out the reorganization
of the Executive Branchplainly, this did not include the creation of Courts. Although the Legislature
may confer on Administrative Boards/Bodies quasijudicial powersin so doing the Legislature must
state its intention in express terms, leaving no doubt as to the limitations of the quasijudicial
prerogatives. As held in Corominas et al. v. Labor Standards Commission, the Legislature may not and
cannot delegate its power to legislate or create courts of justice to any other agency of the
Government.

2. Enactment of law by legislative inaction is not countenanced. Sec. 6 of RA 997 had provided that the
reorganization plans shall be deemed approved upon the adjournment of the 2nd Session, or after the
expiration of 70 session days following transmittal, in case the reorganization plans were submitted
after the adjournment of the 2nd Session. The contemplated procedure violates the constitutional
provisions requiring positive and separate action by each House of Congress; it also dispense with the
passage of any measure, as that word is commonly used and understood; and, it does away with the
requirement of presentation to the President.

EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS Art. 2, Civil Code

Tanada vs. Tuvera, (Apr 24, 1985 and Dec 29, 1986)
 Even when the law provides it own date of effectivity, the publication requirement is mandatory, in
order than a law may become effective.

Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern, Petitioners sought to compel
the respondent public officials to publish and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various
PDs, LOIs, General Orders, Proclamations, EOs, Letters of Implementation, and Administrative Orders.
Respondents asserted that publication is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws
where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.

SC decided in favor of the petitioners

1. Even when the law provides it own date of effectivity, the publication requirement is mandatory, in
order than a law may become effective. The object of the publication requirement is to give the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conductwithout
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim, ignorantia legis non excusat.
The publication requirement is a requirement of due process. CA 638 provides the legal documents that
must be published in the Official Gazette (There shall be published in the Official Gazette...):

a. Legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature

b. Executive and Administrative orders and proclamations except those that have no general
applicability

c. Decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals

d. Documents, classes of documents as may be required by law to be published

e. Documents, classes of documents as the President shall determine from time to time to have
general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize to be published

2. The Presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force
and effect. Nonetheless, the operative fact doctrine shall apply

People vs. Que Po Lay (Mar 29, 1954)

Circular No. 20 was issued for the implementation of a law, it has the force and effect of lawthus, the
publication requirement is mandatory for the Circulars effectivity.

Que Po Lay was convicted for violating Central Bank Circular No. 20, in Connection with Sec. 34 of RA
265. He was in possession of foreign exchange (USD, US Checks, and US money orders) amounting to
$7K, but failed to sell the same to the Central Bank within one day from receipt, as required by Circular
20. Que Po Lay appealed his conviction, claiming that since Circular No. 20 was not published in the OG
prior to the act/omission imputed to the appellantthe Circular has no force and effect.

The SC decided in favor of Que Po Lay.

 Circular No. 20 was issued for the implementation of a law, it has the force and effect of lawthus, the
publication requirement is mandatory for the Circulars effectivity. Before the public is bound by its
contentsespecially its penal provisionsa law, regulation, or circular must first be published. The
Circular was only published 3 months after Que Po Lays conviction.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200 June 18, 1987 -- PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS
EITHER IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR IN A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION IN
THE PHILIPPINES AS A REQUIREMENT FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY

Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. vs. Military Shrine Services

Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No.
2476 as published. Without publication, the note never had any legal force and
effect

IN 1957, President Carlos Garcia issued Proclamation No. 423, reserving parcels of land in
Pasig, Taguig, Paraaque, Rizal, and Pasay City as a military reservation, more commonly
known as Fort Bonifacio.

In 1967, President Ferdinand Marcos amended Proclamation No. 423 and reserved a portion of
Fort Bonifacio for a national shrine. Today, this area is known as Libingan ng mga Bayani. In
1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476, further amending Proclamation No. 423
by excluding certain barangays in Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from
forming part of the military reservation. At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President
Marcos made a handwritten addendum, which read: P.S.This includes Western Bicutan
(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos. That same year, Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the
Official Gazette without the addendum.

In 1999, members of Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI)

filed a petition with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP)
to convert the areas they were occupying in Western Bicutan from public land to
alienable land pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476. COSLAP granted the request,
ruling that despite the lack of publication of the addendum, the intention of
President Marcos could not be defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of
others.
The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision of COSLAP. On appeal, the
Supreme Court (SC) sustained the CA. It ruled that the Court cannot rely on a
handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published.
Without publication, the note never had any legal force and effect.

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION v. HON. REYNALDO M. LAIGO, GLICERIA AYAD, et.
al.
Gr. No. 188639, 2 September 2015, SECOND DIVISION, (Mendoza, J.)

Assets in the trust fund shall at all times remain for the sole benefit of the planholders. The trust
fund assets cannot be used to satisfy claims of other creditors of the pre-need company.

Legacy Consolidated Plans, Inc. (Legacy), being a pre-need provider, complied with the trust fund
requirement of the petitioner, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and entered into a trust
agreement with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP). The industry collapsed and Legacy was unable to
pay its obligation to the planholders.. Private respondents, as planholders, filed a petition for involuntary
insolvency against Legacy before the the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Accordingly, Legacy was declared
insolvent and was ordered to submit an inventory of its assets and liabilities pursuant to the Insolvency
Law. The RTC ordered the SEC to submit the documents pertaining to Legacy's assets and liabilities. The
SEC opposed the inclusion of the trust fund in the inventory of corporate assets on the ground that to do
so would contravene the New Rules on Registration and Sale of Pre-Need Plans which treated trust
funds as principally established for the exclusive purpose of guaranteeing the delivery of benefits due to
the planholders. It was added that the inclusion of the trust fund in the insolvent's estate and its being
opened to claims by non-planholders would contravene the purpose for its establishment. Despite the
opposition of the SEC, respondent Judge Reynaldo M. Laigo (Judge Laigo) ordered the insolvency
Assignee to take possession of the trust fund. Judge Laigo viewed the trust fund as Legacy's corporate
assets and included it in the insolvent's estate. The SEC contended that Judge Laigo gravely abused his
discretion in treating the trust fund as part of the insolvency estate of Legacy. It argued that the trust fund
should redound exclusively to the benefit of the planholders, who are the ultimate beneficial owners.

ISSUE:

Can the trust fund be used to satisfy the claims of other creditors of Legacy?

RULING:
 No. The contention of SEC finds support under Section 30 of the Pre-Need Code where in it clearly
provides that the proceeds of trust funds shall redound solely to the planholders. In no case shall the trust
fund assets be used to satisfy claims of other creditors of the pre-need company.

It must be stressed that a person is considered as a beneficiary of a trust if there is a manifest

intention to give such a person the beneficial interest over the trust properties. This categorical declaration
doubtless indicates that the intention of the trustor is to make the planholders the beneficiaries of the trust
properties, and not Legacy. It is clear that because the beneficial ownership is vested in the planholders
and the legal ownership in the trustee, LBP, Legacy, as trustor, is left without any iota of interest in the trust
fund.

Legacy is out of the picture and exists only as a representative of the trustee, LBP, with the limited role of
facilitating the delivery of the benefits of the trust fund to the beneficiaries -the planholders. The trust fund
should not revert to Legacy, which has no beneficial interest over it. Not being an asset of Legacy, the
trust fund is immune from its reach and cannot be included by the RTC in the insolvency estate.

Carpio-Morales v. CA

DOCTRINE

The condonation doctrine, which says that a re-elected official cannot be removed for misconduct
committed during a previous term, is inconsistent with the concepts of public trust and public
accountability to the people at all times of the 1987 Constitution, and must now be abandoned.

SUMMARY

The Ombudsman issued a preventive suspension order against Makati Mayor Binay Jr. for plunder
regarding the procurement and construction of the Makati Parking Building, which took place during
both his first and second terms. The Court of Appeals applied the condonation doctrine and issued a
TRO to the suspension order, which the Ombudsman contested. The Court, in looking at the history and
applications of the condonation doctrine in the Philippines, found it to be inconsistent with the 1987
Constitution, and thus abandoned it prospectively.

FACTS

July 22, 2014 - a complaint/affidavit was before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and
other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al), accusing them
of Plunder and violation of "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with the five (5)
phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking
Building).
 The OMB Complaint alleged that Binay Jr. was involved in anomalous activities attending the following
procurement and construction phases of the Makati Parking Building project, committed during his
previous and present terms as City Mayor of Makati:

First Term (2010 to 2013)

Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award for Phases III, IV, and V of the Makati Parking Building project to
Hilmarc's Construction Corporation (Hilmarc's), and executed the contracts without the required
publication and the lack of architectural design, and approved the release of funds for it.

Second Term (2013 to 2016)

Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the September 13, 2012 contract
with Hilmarc's for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project and approved the release of funds for
the remaining balance of the contract48 with MANA Architecture & Interior Design Co. (MANA) for the
design and architectural services covering the Makati Parking Building project.

March 10, 2015 - The Ombudsman placed Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not more
than six (6) months without pay, during the pendency of the OMB Cases upon finding that the evidence
of Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt was strong.

Binay, Jr. sought the nullification of and prevention of the implementation of the preventive
suspension order with the CA. Primarily, he argued that he could not be held administratively liable for
any anomalous activity regarding any of the five (5) phases of the Makati Parking Building project since:
(a)

Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V
transpired during his first term and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a second term
effectively condoned his administrative liability. In any event, Binay, Jr. claimed that the

Ombudsman's preventive suspension order failed to show that the evidence of guilt presented against
him is strong.

March 16, 2015 DILG Secretary Roxas implemented the preventive suspension order, and on the
same day the CA granted Binay Jr.s prayer for a TRO. The CA found that if it were established that the
acts subject of the administrative cases against Binay, Jr. were all committed during his prior term, then,
applying the condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s re-election meant that he can no longer be
administratively charged. Binay then filed for contempt against petitioners.

The Ombudsman filed the present petition before this Court, assailing the CA's March 16, 2015
Resolution, which granted Binay, Jr.'s prayer for TRO and the March 20, 2015 Resolution directing her to
file a comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt. The Ombudsman claims that:

(a) the CA had no jurisdiction to grant Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, citing Section 14 of "The Ombudsman
Act of 1989," which states that no injunctive writ could be issued to delay the Ombudsman's
investigation unless there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter thereof is outside the latter's
jurisdiction; and
 (b) the CA's directive for the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt is illegal and
improper, considering that the Ombudsman is an impeachable officer, and therefore, cannot be
subjected to contempt proceedings.

CA responded that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to relief in view of the condonation doctrine, citing
Aguinaldo v. Santos. Particularly, it found that the Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive
suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati condoned any
administrative liability arising from anomalous activities relative to the Makati Parking Building project
from 2007 to 2013.

In this regard, the CA added that, although there were acts which were apparently committed by
Binay, Jr. beyond his first term corresponding to the services of Hillmarc's and MANA - still, Binay, Jr.
cannot be held administratively liable therefor based on the cases of Salalima v. Guingona,Jr. and Mayor
Garcia v. Mojica wherein the condonation doctrine was still applied by the Court although the payments
were made after the official's re-election, reasoning that the payments were merely effected pursuant
to contracts executed before said re-election.

The Ombudsman argues that the condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the determination of whether
the evidence of guilt is strong for purposes of issuing preventive suspension orders. They maintained
that a reliance on the condonation doctrine is a matter of defense, which Binay, Jr. should have raised
during the administrative proceedings, and that, at any rate, there is no condonation because Binay, Jr.
committed acts subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-election in 2013.

ISSUE

Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and eventually, the WPI in
enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on the
condonation doctrine.

YES.

1. The cases cited by the CA which applied the condonation doctrine had as their basis a 1959 case
(Pascual, see notes) decided under the 1935 Constitution.
2. The 1987 Constitution, meanwhile, puts primacy on the integrity of the public service by
declaring it as a constitutional principle and a State policy. The 1987 Constitution strengthened
and solidified what has been first proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution by commanding public
officers to be accountable to the people at all times.
3. The concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to
the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with
the idea that an elective local official's administrative liability for a misconduct committed
during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office,
or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense,
and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion
that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising
from an offense done during a prior term.
 4. Some of the cases adopted in Pascual were decided by US jurisdictions; it was deemed that
condonation through re-election was a policy under their constitution - which adoption in this
jurisdiction runs counter to our present Constitution's requirements on public accountability.
5. Pascual's proposition that the electorate disregarded any of a local officials faults or misconduct
when they re-elected him is also false. They are presumed to have had knowledge of the
officials acts. No such presumption exists in any statute or procedural rule. Misconduct
committed by an elective official is easily covered up, and is almost always unknown to the
electorate when they cast their votes. At a conceptual level, condonation presupposes that the
condoner has actual knowledge of what is to be condoned. Thus, there could be no condonation
of an act that is unknown. It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the
condonation doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines.

PORK BARREL FUNDS

*PHILCONSA vs. Enriquez (Aug 19, 1994)

Pork Barrel Constitutional: the Congressmen are in a better position to RECCOMEND as to where funds
should be allocated.

This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the president involving
the General Appropriations Bill of 1994 as well as the constitutionality of the pork barrel. The Philippine
Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide development fund. PHILCONSA said
that Congress can only allocate funds but they cannot specify the items as to which those funds would
be applied for since that is already the function of the executive. In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by
the president of some provisions of the GAB of 1994, neither house of congress took steps to override
the veto. Instead, Senators Wigberto Taada and Alberto Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of
prohibition and mandamus against Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona et al. Taada et al contest the
constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAB of 1994 for the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and
(2) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the
CAFGUs, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA).

ISSUE: Whether or not the Presidents veto is valid.

HELD: In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted within its power and that the CDF is
constitutional. In the Taada petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions and granted the others.

Veto on special provisions:

 The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to the ruling in Gonzales vs Macaraig.
The president particularly vetoed the debt reduction scheme in the GAA of 1994 commenting that the
scheme is already taken cared of by other legislation and may be more properly addressed by revising
the debt policy. He, however did not delete the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation therefor. Taada et al
averred that the president cannot validly veto that provision w/o vetoing the amount allotted therefor.
The veto of the president herein is sustained for the vetoed provision is considered inappropriate; in
fact the Sc found that such provision if not vetoed would in effect repeal the Foreign Borrowing Act
making the legislation as a log-rolling legislation

Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs:

The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs), the President vetoed special provisions
which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds was
likewise vetoed. The reason for the veto is that there were already funds allotted for the same in the
National expenditure Program. Taada et al claimed this as unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the veto
is valid for it is in compliant to the One Fund Policy it avoided double funding and redundancy.

Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance

The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a breach of contractual obligations.
The funds if allotted may result to abandonment of some existing contracts. The SC ruled that this
Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is
not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said
item shall be expended 70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The 1987 Constitution allows the
addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be
vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so long as they are appropriate in the
budgetary sense. The veto herein is then not valid.

Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment

As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and prohibition violate the
Constitutional mandate of non-impairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed, shall effectively
alter the original intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment deemed
necessary to modernize the AFP. The SC affirmed the veto. Any provision blocking an administrative
action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in
a separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being inappropriate provisions.

Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds

According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits should be covered by direct
appropriations specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the
Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials enumerated
in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. The SC retained the veto per reasons provided by the
president.

Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGUs:

Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGUs including the payment of separation benefits. The
President declared in his Veto Message that the implementation of this Special Provision to the item on
the CAFGUs shall be subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758.
The SC ruled to retain the veto per reasons provided by the president. Further, if this provision is
allowed the it would only lead to the repeal of said existing laws.

Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc:

In his veto message: The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional injunction prescribed
under Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitutional which states that no elective or appointive public
officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation unless specifically
authorized by law. I am, therefore, confident that the heads of the said offices shall maintain fidelity to
the law and faithfully adhere to the well-established principle on compensation standardization. Taada
et al claim that the conditions imposed by the President violated the independence and fiscal autonomy
of the Supreme court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR. The SC sustained the veto: In the first
place, the conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not by the
President. The Veto Message merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect
compensation can only be given pursuant to law. In the second place, such statements are mere
reminders that the disbursements of appropriations must be made in accordance with law. Such
statements may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.

Pork Barrel Constitutional:

The pork barrel makes the unequal equal. The Congressmen, being representatives of their local districts
know more about the problems in their constituents areas than the national government or the
president for that matter. Hence, with that knowledge, the Congressmen are in a better position to
recommend as to where funds should be allocated.

*LAMP vs. Sec of Budget, GR No. 164987, Apr 24 2012

FACTS: For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the
constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004
(GAA of 2004). Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty(LAMP), a group of lawyers
who have banded together with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or
social monopoly in the country. According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore,
prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen
for the funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members of Congress to propose,
select and identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF.

For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in
receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in
effect intrude into an executive function. Further, the authority to propose and select projects
does not pertain to legislation. It is, in fact, a non-legislative function devoid of constitutional
sanction,8 and, therefore, impermissible and must be considered nothing less than malfeasance

RESPONDENTS POSITION: the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of PDAF must

not be based on mere speculations circulated in the news media preaching the evils of pork
barrel.
ISSUES: 1) whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met in
this case; and

2) whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is unconstitutional

and illegal.

HELD:

A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect
on the individual challenging it. In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an
alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. The petition complains of illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that there
indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court.

LOCUS STANDI: The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions. Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure
of money raised by taxation required in taxpayers suits is established. Thus, in the claim that
PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue

Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public
interest. The ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves
the consideration of the Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition.

The Court rules in the negative.

In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of the
presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. To justify the nullification of the
law or its implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the
Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the
Court must sustain legislation because to invalidate [a law] based on x x x baseless supposition
is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive
which approved it.

The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was presented showing
that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend
them according to their sole discretion. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal
misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous
Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioners request for rejection of a law
which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement.

PORK BARREL:
The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend projects and
programs which may be funded from the PDAF. The list submitted by the Members of Congress
is endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives to the DBM, which reviews and
determines whether such list of projects submitted are consistent with the guidelines and the
priorities set by the Executive.33 This demonstrates the power given to the President to execute
appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per se of the budget.

As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that individual Members
of Congress receive and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. So long as there is no showing of a
direct participation of legislators in the actual spending of the budget, the constitutional
boundaries between the Executive and the Legislative in the budgetary process remain intact.

*Belgica vs. Ochoa, GR No. 208566, Nov 19, 2013 (PDAF)

FACTS:

The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members may
request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for realignment is approved
or concurred by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork
barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project this has been
around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR this
has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle
blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had
been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds
into about 20 bogus NGOs (non-government organizations) which would make it appear that government funds
are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to ghost projects. An audit was then conducted by
the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the Supreme Court
questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.

HELD:

I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates the
following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
 As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The
executive, on the other hand, implements the laws this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only
the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, whats happening was that, after the GAA,
itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be
allocated to a clear act of implementing the law they enacted a violation of the principle of separation of
powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or
the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the legislators only recommend where their
pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the concurrence
of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the people
legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That being,
legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it
by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his PDAF
money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate
funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual
members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to the
individual member of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the GAA which
he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of the fact that once the
GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such
system, how can the president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the
approval of the GAA again, Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the
constitutionally-given power of the President useless.
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local Development
Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning their localities. But with the
PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of representatives, whats happening is that a
congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an
instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs of the
local government and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. Its
good if thats all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal
fund on the part of legislators.

II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.

The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional because it
violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:

No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR
and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869
(as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCORs charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:
 (i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-related ventures
shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource
development and for other purposes which the President may direct;

(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCORs earnings shall be allocated to a
General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects

These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation
contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the
case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

Araullo vs Aquino

When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish
growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan.
Budget Secretary Florencio Butch Abad then came up with a program called the
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP
enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead
of waiting for next years appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain
government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds
allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are
declared as savings by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority
projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in
fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme
Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations
Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming that he,
and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor
of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the
money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign
funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded;
to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the
MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for
certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan,
and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court
questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings
and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the
President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to
suspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).

Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the
executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.

HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a
program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for
prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited
in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from
the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds,
which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the
Presidents power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for
whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an
unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless,
theres no impoundment in the case at bar because whats involved in the DAP was the
transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President
(and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution
to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made
within their respective offices. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be
allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for
the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment of funds to an
existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the
Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds
were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate,
they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As
such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are savings
These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the Executive.
Under the definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances,
when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally
discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to savings as funds withdrawn
from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied
with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be
declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn
from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as savings by the
Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP
because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the
National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue
targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were
used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it
being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has
definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is
ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The
DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return
what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the
Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and
proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or
administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.

Nazareth v Villar

FACTS: On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8439 to address the policy of the
State to provide a program for human resources development in science and technology in order
to achieve and maintain the necessary reservoir of talent and manpower that would sustain the
drive for total science and technology mastery.3 Section 7 of R.A. No. 8439 grants the following
additional allowances and benefits (Magna Carta benefits) to the covered officials and employees
of the DOST.Funds shall be appropriated from GAA of the year.
DOST RDIX Brenda Nazareth released the Magna Carta for covered officials and employees
covering CY 1998 despite absence of specific appropriation in GAA. Subsequently COA issued
several notice of disallowance disapproving payment of Magna Carta benefits. Provision for use
of savings of GAA was vetoed by the President. DOST Sec Dr. Filemon Uriarte Jr requested from
the Office of the President for authority to utilize DOSTs savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits
which exec sec Ronaldo Zamora approved.
Nazareth thereafter lodged an appeal with COA urging the lifting of disallowances of the magna
Carta Benefits for CY 1998 to 2001.Her appeal was anchored by Memorandum from Exec Sec
Zamora.
ISSUE: W/N the act of Exec Sec Zamora Valid?
HELD: Art.VI Sec.25(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations;
however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law
for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

In the funding of current activities, projects, and programs, the general rule should still be that the
budgetary amount contained in the appropriations bill is the extent Congress will determine as
sufficient for the budgetary allocation for the proponent agency. The only exception is found in
Section 25 (5),14 Article VI of the Constitution, by which the President, the President of the Senate,
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the
heads of Constitutional Commissions are authorized to transfer appropriations to augment any
item in the GAA for their respective offices from the savings in other items of their respective
appropriations. The plain language of the constitutional restriction leaves no room for the
petitioners posture, which we should now dispose of as untenable.

It bears emphasizing that the exception in favor of the high officials named in Section 25(5), Article
VI of the Constitution limiting the authority to transfer savings only to augment another item in the
GAA is strictly but reasonably construed as exclusive