Wesleyan University

[Historiography and Postmodernism: Reconsiderations]: Reply to Professor Zagorin

Author(s): F. R. Ankersmit
Source: History and Theory, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Oct., 1990), pp. 275-296
Published by: Wiley for Wesleyan University
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 REPLY TO PROFESSORZAGORIN

F. R. ANKERSMIT

As with everydiscipline,philosophyof historyhas a historyof its own. If we

wish,we can tracethat historyas far backas that of the writingof historyitself.
Classicalauthorsfrom Hesiod onwardspronouncedon the natureand the uses
of the writingof history.1If, then, we considerthis long historyof philosophy
of history,one featureof thathistoryimmediatelycatchesthe eye.I havein mind
philosophyof history'slack of autonomy.That is, the developmentand, espe-
cially,the most conspicuousmetamorphosesthat philosophyof historyunder-
wentduringits long life havealwaysdependedon whathappenedoutsidephilos-
ophy of historyitself. Philosophyof historyneverhad muchmomentumof its
own and ordinarilylimiteditself to the applicationto the domainof historical
thought of insightsthat had alreadybeen gained elsewhere.
Thus,for mostof its life philosophyof historyhasbeenan appendageof Chris-
tian theology.At a later stage,when the theologicalinterpretationof the past
was secularized,philosophyof historypresenteditself in the form of theories
of historicalprogress.And onceagainthesephilosophiesof historywerefounded
not upon historyor historicalthought, but upon doctrinesabout (dialectical)
reason(Hegel),scientificreason(Condorcet,Comte),or aboutthe rationalna-
tureof man (Kant).Next, if we take a look at our own time,we findthat philos-
ophyof sciencedeterminedphilosophyof historyforthe firstdecadesafterWorld
WarII. It is ironicthat the so-called"criticalphilosophyof history"that was
bornfromthis orientationhada shorterlife thananyof its predecessors,in spite
of its belief in havingfinallyprovidedphilosophyof historywiththe rightkind
of questionsafterso manycenturiesof uselessspeculation.For,less thanthirty
yearsafterits genesis,this criticalphilosophyof historyhadto abandonthe field
to a philosophyof historythat usesthe tools of literarytheoryand literarycriti-
cism. Wefind the only exceptionto the generalrule that philosophyof history
possessesno momentumor autonomyof its own in Germanhistorismas devel-
opedby Ranke,Humboldt,Droysen,or Meinecke.It is quitecharacteristic, then,
of philosophyof history'sdisinclinationto standon its ownfeetthatphilosophers
of historyhaveordinarilyturnedup their noses at historism.And it is no less
characteristicthat historismwas dealt its death-blowby ethics (in "thecrisisof

1. For a catalogue of theoretical statements by classical authors, see F. Wagner, Geschichtswissen-

schaft (Munich, 1966), 8-41.

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276 F. R. ANKERSMIT

historism")and by philosophyof science(in post-WorldWarII criticalphilos-

ophyof history),hencebytwo philosophicalsubdisciplinesthathavealwaysbeen
notoriouslyhostile to historicalthought.2
One can thus discerna numberof phasesin the historyof philosophyof his-
tory,whereeach of these phasesis governedby the alliancebetweenphilosophy
of historyand some other discipline.For convenience'ssake I shall speak here
of the "paradigms" of philosophyof history.But it must immediatelybe added
that the term"paradigm" is misleading.Forin the historyof science,paradigm
changesfind their origin and explanationin the autonomousdevelopmentof
a science,whereassuchchangesin philosophyof historyareeffectedbythe ideali-
zation of a new and different"master-discipline" by the most influentialphilos-
ophersof history.And one startscompletelyafreshin such cases. If, then, the
debatebetweenthe adherentsof differentscientificparadigmsis alreadyhan-
dicappedby the absenceof a commonground,it is not difficultto imaginethe
obstaclesthat mustthwarta meaningfuldebateacrossthe frontiersbetweentwo
differentparadigmsin philosophyof history.In such situationsimpotentaccu-
sationsof intellectualconservatismand radicalismare all too easilybandiedto
and fro; similarly,we may expectthat the adherentsof differentparadigmswill
considerone another'sintellectualpreoccupations shallowandfutile.Thespecula-
tive philosopherof historyin searchof the meaningof historywill feel nothing
but contemptfor the criticalphilosopherof historywrestlingwiththe technical-
ities of the "covering-law model"or of the "logicalconnectionargument."And
it is thereforeonly naturalthat ProfessorZagorinshouldconsiderpostmodern-
ism "superficial," "lackingin substance,"and indifferentto the realproblemsof
the writingof history.
Indeed,this is the state of affairsthat obtains in the disagreementbetween
Zagorinandme.Zagorin'sinterest'in problemsof historicaltruth,evidence,and
causality;his repeatedinsistenceon the essentiallyunproblematicborderlinebe-
tween historicalfact and fiction;the style of his reasoning;all make clearthat
he argueswithinthe "modernist" paradigm,morespecificallywithinthat of crit-
ical philosophyof history.Moreover,Zagorinhas obliginglydescribedhis posi-
tion as "modernist." How then to conductthis discussion,I askedmyself,after
havingreadZagorin'seloquent,perspicacious,andpersuasiveattackon mypost-
modernistviews?I could havepointedout to him that the modernistparadigm
has becomewornout and that in such a situationwe arewell advisedto change
the discussion(as Rortywould haveput it) becauseintellectualactivityin the
old paradigm,fruitfulin its own time, has finallyfallenvictimto the law of di-
minishingreturns.I couldhaveenumeratedfor Zagorina seriesof postmodern-
ist insightsinto the natureof the text and I could then haveshownhim howthe-
oristslike HaydenWhite,DominickLaCapra,and Hans Kellner3did use these

2. For a development of this theme, see F. R. Ankersmit, De navel van degeschiedenis (Groningen,
1990), introduction.
3. H. White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe (Baltimore,
1973), Tropics of Discourse (Baltimore, 1978), and The Content of the Form (Baltimore, 19.78);D.

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 REPLY TO PROFESSOR ZAGORIN 277

insightsin orderto makeus awareof hithertounsuspectedaspectsof the writing

of history.But I am afraidthat such a strategywould havebeen of no availin
my debatewith Zagorin.He would, not unreasonably,ripostethat such an an-
swerbegs the question. Besides,by implicatingthe authorsjust mentionedin
Zagorin'sattack on me I would make them sufferby guilt of association:not
a polite way of repayingthem for the servicesthey would haverenderedme. I
shall thereforeadopt anotherstrategy.I shall start from "modernist"assump-
tions- assumptionsthatareat leastnot necessarilyincompatiblewiththe modern-
ist outlook- and I shallproceedfromtherewith the help of a "modernist"way
of reasoningto postmodernistconclusions. I derive some confidencein this
strategyfrom the fact that in adoptingit I retracethe same routethat has led
me in recentyearsfrommodernist(thatis, historist4)convictionsto a postmodern-
ist position.5

At the start of our line of marchfrom modernismto postmodernismwe find

the (historical)text. We can say about the text the followingtwo things. First,
the historicaltextconsistsof (many)individualstatements.Thesestatementsmay
havemanydifferentfunctionsto performin the historicaltext, but it seemsun-
objectionableto saythatmostof thesestatementsclaimto givean accuratedescrip-
tion of some state of affairsin the past. Historiansformulatethese statements
on the basis of the evidencethey discoverin the archivesor elsewhereand it is
this evidence,availableeither now or in the future,that will decide about the
truthor falsityof the statementsin question.Second,withthe exceptionof fields
like archaeologyor ancienthistory,the evidenceavailableto historianswould
have permittedthem to write many more true statementsabout the past than
we actuallyfind in their texts. Nor are the way the statementsare formulated
and the emphasisthey get in the text mattersof chanceor arbitrariness.Out of
all the statementshistorianscould possiblyhavemade about the relevantpart
of the past, they carefullyselect qua descriptivecontent and qua formulation
the statementstheywill ultimatelydecideto mentionin theirbooks or articles-
one mightsaythat the writingof the historicaltext requiresof historiansa poli-
tics with regardto the statement,and the text is the resultof this politics. The
reasonfor historians'carefulnessin this selection-procedure is that these state-
ments,whenconsideredtogether,determine"thepicture"of partof the pastthey
wishto presentto theirreadersand for historiansthis "picture"is no less impor-
tant than the statementsthat make it up.

LaCapra,Historyand Criticism(Ithacaand London,1985);H. Kellner,Languageand Historical

Representation (Madison,1989);in thelastbook chapters1, 3, 7, 8, and9 arespecificallyrepresenta-
tive of the kind of insightsI havein mind here.
4. Thesurprising thesisthathistorismwasnot an attackon, but,on thecontrary,a newculminating
pointin the historyof the Enlightened"modernistic" programwasdefendedby Gadamer;see H. G.
Gadamer,Wahrheitund Methode(Tubingen,1973), 185-205.
5. If historismis transformedfroma theoryabouthistoricalthingslikenations,peoples,or indi-
vidualsinto a theoryabout the linguisticthingswe use for speakingabout these historicalthings,
postmodernismis the result.Postmodernismis the nominalistversionof historism.

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278 F. R. ANKERSMIT

Onemaythus saythe followingtwo thingsaboutthe text'sstatements:1)they

referto anddescribepartof the past andcan be eithertrueor false;2) theydefine
(I shalluse in this connectionthe technicalterm"toindividuate,"not to be con-
fused with the term "to identify")the "pictureof the past"historianswish to
conveyto theirreaders.Differentstatements,different"picturesof the past."TWo
commentsmust be added.First,it is in practicehardto tell what actuallyis the
set of statementsto individuatethe identityof a "pictureof the past."Historians
(includingthe authorof the text) maydisagreeabout how the set is constituted,
and if thereis consensusin one age this may changein the course of time, as
the historyof historicalwritingdemonstrates.I shall discusslaterthis problem
of the identification(as opposedto individuation)of what "pictureof the past"
has been proposedand what is the set of statementsinvolvedin this processof
identification.Butwhateverdifficultieswemayhavein identifyingthe setin ques-
tion, therecan be no doubt that thereis some set that individuatesthe "picture
of the past"in question.Second,all thatis essentialandinterestingin the writing
of history (both in theory and practice)is not to be found at the level of the
individualstatements,but at that of the politicsadoptedby historianswhenthey
selectthe statementsthat individuatetheir "pictureof the past."Therewe find
what most stimulateshistoricaldebateand what most determinesour sense of
the past. Sayingtruethings about the past is easy- anybodycan do that- but
sayingthe rightthings about the past is difficult.That truly requireshistorical
insight and originality.So if we want to say somethingworthwhileabout the
writingof historywe must focus our theoreticalreflectionon these "picturesof
the past"and not on individual(subsetsof) statementsand on what they say
about the past.
The lattercommentbringsme to the most crucialphase in my whole argu-
ment. Forreasonsunnecessaryto repeathereI haveelsewherecalledthese "pic-
turesof the past""narrative substances."6Thequestioneverythingturnson, then,
is whetheror not we arepreparedto recognizethese narrativesubstancesas log-
ical entitiesnext to the logical entitieslike subject,predicate,theoreticalcon-
cept, statement,and so on, we alreadyknowfromphilosophicallogic. If we are,
as I will show later, all the postmodernistextravagancesthat have provoked
Zagorin'sirefollow as a matterof course.If we arenot, we will remainenclosed
withinthe compassof modernistconceptionsand withinthe modernistmatrix
of argument.If we take seriouslythe text and its narrativesubstanceswe will
becomepostmodernists;if we see only the statementwe will remainmodernist.
Or,to put it in a slogan,the statementis modernist,the (historical)text is post-
modernist.7

6. F. R. Ankersmit, NarrativeLogic: A SemanticAnalysis of the Historian'sLanguage (The Hague,

1983), 96-104.
7. I therefore condemn a "postmodernist" approach to the statement as can sometimes be found
in postmodernist writings. I completely agree with Louch when he criticizes Barthes for the sup-
posed ambiguities that the latter wishes to discover in the greetings: "Monday. Returning tomorrow.
Jean Louis." See A. Louch, "Does Deconstruction Make Any Difference?,"Philosophy and Litera-
ture 10 (1986), 330, 331.

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 REPLYTO PROFESSORZAGORIN 279
I recognizethat it is not at all easyto demonstratethe necessityof postulating
this newlogicalentityandthat muchmoreoughtto be saidaboutit than I could
possiblydo here.8I restrictmyselfto answeringwhat is intuitivelythe most ob-
vious objectionagainstthe introductionof the notion. It will be arguedthat the
narrativesubstanceis a superfluousentity since everythingone might wish to
say about texts in termsof narrativesubstancescan also be expressedin terms
of statements.My initial replywould be that what statementsdo tell us about
textsand the waythey differfrom one anothercan be seen as merelythe marks
of anotherdifference,namelya differencein narrativesubstances.Of coursethe
disagreementends herein a stalemateas long as no additionalargumentis ad-
ducedin favorof the latterview that a differencelying moredeeplyis involved
as well.This additionalargumentis foundin the considerationthat withoutthe
notion of the narrativesubstance,it is impossibleto statewhatis at stakein de-
bates betweenhistoriansabout historicalinterpretationsand why the effortof
the historiangoes beyondmerelywritingdown true statements- as is the case
in the writingof history.
Once again, a few commentsarein order.First,it shouldbe noted that since
any (subsetof) statement(s)we might use to individuatea narrativesubstance
can be partof anothernarrativesubstance,the conclusionmust follow that the
thingI havecalleda narrativesubstancecan only be individuatedby an enumer-
ation of all its properties(this is why the metaphysicalconstitutionof the uni-
verseof narrativesubstancesdiffersfromthat of our own9).(I repeatthat I shall
explainbelowhowto findout aboutthe statementsconcerned.)Second,it follows
that statementsaboutnarrativesubstancesarealwaysanalyticallyandnevercon-
tingentlytrue.Everystatementof the form "N1is p" (whereN1 is the name of
a narrativesubstancereferringto that specificnarrativesubstanceandp is a state-
ment containedby that narrativesubstance)is analyticallytrue since the state-
mentcould not be trueif it werefalse of N1- whereasthe statementsaboutthe
objectsin our universeare only contingentlytrue if they aretrue.This implies
that Leibniz'sso-called"predicatein notion principle,"accordingto which all
predicatescan be derivedfrom the subject-termsin propositions,is correctfor
statementslike "N1 is p" that express the narrativemeaning of the text's
statements.10
Toindividuatethe narrativesubstanceproposedin an historicaltext, we must
read the relevant statements of the text each as "N1is Pi . . . n"(where N1 names
the narrative substance in question and Pi . . . pn is the relevant set of state-
ments).Statementslike "N1is p" expresswhat I wouldlike to call the narrative
meaningof the text'sindividualstatementsas contrastedwith theirdescriptive
meaning(that is, their capacityto describethe past). The necessityto readPi
. p.P. as "N1 is P," . . . "N1 is pa"if we want to grasp the narrative meaning

8. Ankersmit, Narrative Logic, 104-140.

9. Ibid., 116-118.
10. Foran expositionof Leibniz'slogic as the heartof narrativelogic, see Ankersmit,Narrative
Logic, 140-155.

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280 F. R. ANKERSMIT

of the textexplainsthe self-referentialcharacterof the historicaltextthatZagorin

objectsto as "highlyinappropriate andan obtrusivebreachof historicalwriting."
However,without this self-referenceof the text (as a set of statements)to the
text (as proposinga narrativesubstance),we would haveno interpretationsof
the past. Withoutthis self-referentialitythe text wouldimmediatelydisintegrate
into meaninglessincoherence:self-referencetruly is the "transcendental condi-
tion"for the possibilityof historicalinsight.1IWealso find herethe explanation
of the opacityof the historicaltext:fromthe pointof viewof its narrativemeaning
the text is not transparentwith regardto the past but it drawsthe reader'satten-
tion to itself and in doing so obscuresfromviewthe past itself- a tendencythat
is reinforcedby the historicaltext's "disciplinarygoal" of effectivelyreplacing
the past by the text (for an elaborationof this claim, see my accountbelow of
historicalrepresentation).And this may dispel Zagorin'sworriesabout the in-
tensionalcharacterof the historicaltext. The intensionalityof the text must be
relatedto the object the text refersto when we considerits dimensionof self-
referentiality.And this objectis far from accidental:changingit would change
the natureof the accountof the past givenby the historian.Thus,withoutinten-
sionalityno picturesor interpretationsof the past are possible at all.
Let us take a closerlook at these narrativesubstances.Wemay ask what the
relationis betweenthe narrativesubstanceand the part of the past represented
by it. It maybe illuminatingto givethe questiona context.Narrativesubstances
do not often get a name of their own, but sometimesthey are accordedone in
the historyof historicalwriting.Herewe can thinkof termsor notionslike "the
IndustrialRevolution"or "theCold War."Obviously,with suchnotionswe have
to do with interpretationsor representationsof the past, that is, with narrative
substances.What,then,is the relationbetweensuchnotionsandthe actualpast?
The modernistwill undoubtedlylook herefor some kindof correspondencebe-
tweenthe notionin questionand somepartof the past, or creditthe notionwith
a capacityto describethat part of the past. This is, I suppose,how Walshor
Mink(to whomwe owemanyvaluablecontributionsto the analysisof the kind
of notionsdiscussedhere12)wouldlook at the matter.Withinmy view,however,
thesenotionsshouldbe seenas the namesof narrativesubstancesand, therefore,
as far as referenceor correspondenceis concerned,these namesmust be denied
the capacityto referto anythingoutsidethe text:theyreferto narrativesubstances
(thatis, a set of statementscontainedby and withinthe text). But this certainly

11. The waythe narrativesubstanceorganizesknowledgeof the past as expressedin individual

statementsaboutthe past is reminiscentof Cassirer'snotion of the symbol.Cassirerattributedto
the symbolthe transcendentalcapacityto organizethe manifoldof experienceinto the unityof per-
ceptionthatKanthad alwaysattributedto the transcendental self. See S. W.Itzkoff,ErnstCassirer:
Philosopherof Culture(Boston, 1977),chapter4.
12. W. H. Walsh,"ColligatoryConceptsin History,"in Studiesin the Natureand Teachingof
History,ed. W.H. BurstonandD. Thompson(London,1967);L. 0. Mink,HistoricalUnderstanding,
ed. BrianFay,Eugene0. Golob, and RichardT. Vann(Ithacaand London, 1987),see especially
chapters2, 3, 6, and 9.

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 REPLY TO PROFESSOR ZAGORIN 281

does not mean that these notions are completely unrelated to the past itself: in
the set of statements the name of the narrative substance refers to, reference is
made to the past. Let us investigate, next, the reference of narrative substances
themselves, that is, not of their names. The narrativesubstance must be identified
with the set of statements expressing the narrative meaning (as contrasted with
the descriptive meaning) of the relevant statements in the historical text, hence
with the set "N1 is Pi" . "N1 is pa." It follows from this that the referent of
the narrativesubstance must be the narrativesubstance itself since it is the referent
of the name N1 -a conclusion that will not astonish us after what was said a
moment ago about the self-referentiality of narrative language. So the narrative
substance is a linguistic object we can refer to, either in statements using its name,
in case it happens to have one, or in statements expressing the narrativemeaning
of the historical text, but that never refers to anything other than or outside it-
self. Narrative substances are truly semantic "black holes" in the universe of the
language we use.

We can approach the problem from another perspective. Suppose we have two
or more historical texts on roughly the same historical topic and we wish to de-
cide between them. As constructivists like Oakeshott, Goldstein, or Stanford13
have successfully shown, there is no past that is given to us and to which we could
compare these two or more texts in order to find out which of them does cor-
respond to the past and which does not. One may conclude from their construc-
tivist argumentation that the past as the complex referent of the historical text
as a whole has no role to play in historical debate. From the point of view of
historicalpracticethis referentialpast is epistemicallya useless notion- something
like Wittgenstein's wheel in the machine that is turned but does not drive any-
thing else. Texts are all we have and we can only compare texts with texts. If we
are looking for the best account of the past, we ought to ask ourselves in which
of these texts the available historical evidence has been most successfully used.
But we can never test our conclusions by comparing the elected text with "the
past" itself. So narrativesubstances do not refer to the past, nor is such reference
required from the point of view of historical debate.
One might put it as follows. When we speak about reality in simple constative
statements like "the cat lies on the mat" there are a number of semantic conven-
tions that decide about the meaning, the truth, and the reference of such state-
ments. How these conventions - meaning, truth, and reference- hang together
is an immensely complicated problem that has inspired a major part of twentieth-
centuryphilosophy. But such semantic conventions are conspicuously absent when
we use the kind of historical notions we are now investigating;hence, at this stage
we cannot properly speak of truth, falsity, reference,or of a failure to refer.What

13. M. OakeshottExperience and Its Modes (Cambridge, Eng., 1978), chap. 3; L. Goldstein, His-
torical Knowing (Austin and London, 1976); and The Constitution of the Historical Past, History
and Theory, Beiheft 16 (1977); M. Stanford, The Nature of Historical Knowledge (New York, 1987),
114-115.

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282 F. R. ANKERSMIT

we can say, however, is that these historical notions or narrative substances are
very complex linguistic signs that have been carefully constructed by historians
to stipulate such a semantic convention for a very specific purpose (that is, for
relating words to things in the case of this specific part of the past). And, indeed,
if a narrativesubstance with exactly the meaning an historian has given to it were
to become universally accepted by all historians and even by non-historians we
could say that a new convention has been introduced in language for relating
words to things. But as long as such a universal agreement has not been reached
(and a word has not yet made its transition from historical to ordinary discourse),
we can only say that a semantic convention was proposed by the historian. This
may, therefore, induce us to see narrative substances as essentially proposals for
connecting things with words.14 The implication is -and I answer herewith an-
other of Zagorin's objections -that at the level of the historical text and of his-
torical interpretation, we cannot appropriately use the words truth and falsity.
For we can say a lot of things about proposals, for example, that they are fruitful,
well-considered, intelligent, to the point (or not), and so on, but not that they
are true or false. As my examples of how we can characterizeproposals may show,
the fact that proposals cannot be either true or false does not imply that no good
reasons can be given for or against a certain proposal. The mere fact that we
cannot label narrative interpretations or narrative substances as either true or
false does not in the least leave us empty-handed in historical debate.15It is a
fallacy as silly as it is dangerous to believe that we can or ought to restrict histor-
ical interpretation and historical argument to what can truthfully be said about
the past on the basis of available evidence.
On severaloccasions I referredto the problem of the identification- once again,
not to be confused with the individuation -of narrative substances. It will be
my thesis here that the identification of narrative substances requires the pres-
ence of other narrativesubstances and that, indeed, the properties of a narrative
substance are (partly) determined by those others. I shall begin by citing some
empirical support for this contention. History teachers are often struck (as I was
at the time) by the apparent incapacity of otherwise intelligent undergraduate
students with as yet little historical education to discern or identify what view
of the past is proposed in an historical study. Undergraduates often consider
what is only marginal to be of central importance and vice versa; and they often
find it impossible to indicate where mere description ends and interpretation
begins. The interpretations of the past offered in historical studies have few if
any contours for them and they are unable to conceive of competing views simply

14. F. R. Ankersmit,"TheUse of Languagein the Writingof History,"in WorkingwithLan-

guage, ed. H. Coleman(Berlin,1989),57-83.
15. Speakinggenerally,one couldsaythatweshouldusethe wordstrueandfalseonlywithregard
to the narrative'sstatements.Fromthis generalruleshouldbe excluded,however,statementscon-
tainingthe namesof narrativesubstances.On the otherhand, it wouldbe pedanticto forbidthe
use of thewordstrueandfalsein the caseof verysimplenarratives.SeeAnkersmit,NarrativeLogic,
178, 179.

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 REPLY TO PROFESSOR ZAGORIN 283
becausetheyhaveno ideawhatsuchviewsshouldbe competingwith.Especially
in the moreabstractdepartmentsof the writingof history,like intellectualhis-
tory, these phenomenacan be observed.However,when in the undergraduate
courseotherviewsof the topic in questionarediscussed,the student'scapacity
to identifythe viewsput forwardby historiansin theirbooks or articlesquickly
increases.
Thisdidacticexperienceis susceptibleof the followingexplanation.Narrative
substancesare,as we sawa momentago, proposalsfor how we shouldsee (part
of) the past. If, then, we haveonly one wayof seeingthe past we will be unable
to recognizeit as suchsincewe can only speakof waysof seeingor doing things
by virtueof our knowledgeof differentways of seeingor doing things. Hence
the student'sdifficultieswith discerningbetweendescriptionand interpretation
and betweendifferentinterpretationsof the past. Let us suppose,next, that we
do havea numberof historicaltexts on the same historicaltopic and that we
recognizethem as such. What, then, these texts do havein commoncould sui
generisnot be partof the specificwayof seeingthe pastthat is proposedby each
of the individualnarrativesubstancesproposedin thesetexts.Theiroverlapde-
termineswhathistoricalrealityactuallyis like for this set of textsin accordance
with the textuallaw that what is not interpretationbecomesdescription-here
we encounterthe transitionfrom historicalto ordinarydiscourseI alreadyindi-
catedin the previousparagraph(and I wholeheartedlyembracethe implication
that historicaldiscourseis logicallypriorto ordinarydiscourse").Consequently,
the identityof the narrativesubstancesinvolvedin historicaldebateof sometopic
shouldnot be identifiedwith theiroverlapbut exclusivelywith theirdifferences.
If therewereonly one narrativesubstance,we would have no differencesand,
therefore,in the end no narrativesubstance- once again, everythingbecomes
description.But if thereareseveralnarrativesubstancesthese owetheiridentity
to theirdifferences.In sum, it is only the presenceof othernarrativesubstances
and the systemof their differencesthat enable us to identify the identityof a
narrativesubstance.
Sincethe identityof narrativesubstancesis determinedby othernarrativesub-
stancesthat havebeen proposedby historiansin the courseof time, it follows
thatthe identityof narrativesubstancesis somethingwe canneverhaveveryclear
and definiteideasabout.Theiridentitywill dependon the availableset of narra-
tivesubstancesconsideredof centralimportanceby historians,andopinionsmay
differhere;moreover,whenat a latertimenewnarrativesubstancesareproposed,
the identityof the existingset will changeaccordingly.But alwaysthe identity
of narrativesubstanceswill remaincaught betweentwo "extremesof descrip-
tion":the extremewhen only one narrativesubstanceis present,and the other
extremeof an infinityof narrativesubstanceswhose overlapis complete,with
the exceptionof at least one statementfor each narrativesubstance(andin such
an extremecase the narrativesubstancewould be reducedto that statement).

16. Ibid., 117, 167-169.

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284 F. R. ANKERSMIT

I note in passingthe similarityof this argumentto that of Saussureabout the

meaningof signs being determinedby its differencesfrom that of other signs.
"Alanguageis a system,"writesSaussure,"inwhichall the elementsfit together,
and in whichthe valueof any one elementdependson the simultaneouscoexis-
tenceof all the others."17Frenchpostmodernism-whether as linguistictheory,
as literarycriticism,or as sociologicaltheory(Bourdieu)- is essentiallyan end-
less variationon this Saussurianmelody.I shall not pronounceupon the fruit-
fulness,let alone the validity,of these Saussurianclaimsin these fields,but re-
strictmyselfto repeatingthe assertionthat the identityof narrativesubstances
is determinedby the systemof differencesthat obtainin the set of narrativesub-
stancesof which a narrativesubstanceis part. And this enablesme to answer
Zagorin'scomplaintthat I did not make clear how and why the liar'sparadox
is applicableto the writingof history.The answergoes as follows.First,we must
note that in the contextof historicaldebate,narrativesubstancesare polarized
in a positionof mutualexclusion:if we acceptthis narrativesubstancewe must
eo ipso rejectthe other(s).Second,theseothernarrativesubstancesarerequired
for the identificationof the narrativesubstancewe accept.Viewsof the past we
rejectare,therefore,an integralpart of the identityof the view of the past, of
the narrativesubstancewe accept. Thus one can justifiablysay that a view of
the past, or narrativesubstance,is what it is not. The parallelismwith the liar's
paradoxis obvious.
Now I come to Zagorin'sdiscussionof causality.He criticizedme for having
substitutedheuristics(whatmakesus look for causes?)for the actualcourseof
eventsin realitywherethe causealwaysprecedesthe effect.And with an example
that hasthe ringof beingdecisivehe wishesto demonstratethateffectscan never
precedetheircauses(as I hadsuggested).Yetevenat thelevelof relativelystraight-
forwardexamples,like the one proposedby Zagorin,the issue is not so simple
as he believes.In theories of causalityit is customaryto distinguishbetween
sufficientand necessaryconditions.A is a sufficientcondition for B if each A
is accompaniedby a B;A is a necessaryconditionfor B if eachB is accompanied
by an A. Hencethereis a relationof symmetrybetweensufficientand necessary
causes and this meansthat if A is a sufficientcondition for B, then B must be
a necessarycondition for A and vice versa.So if thereexists a causalrelation
betweentwo eventsA andB and if A is a necessaryconditionfor B, we can agree
withDantowhenhe concludesthat "asufficientconditionfor an eventmaythus
occur later in time than the event.'18
Anotherconsiderationwhich leads to similarresultsis that we can describe
events in such a way that, thanks to the redescription,the arrowof causality
is turnedin a directionopposite to the one Zagorinthinks it alwaysought to
point to. Danto givesthe followingexample.One can say that Copernicus'sdis-

17. F. de Saussure,Coursein GeneralLinguistics,translated

andannotatedby RoyHarris(London,
1983), 113.
18. A. C. Danto,AnalyticalPhilosophyof History(Cambridge, Eng.,1968),155;F. R. Ankersmit,
Denken over geschiedenis (Groningen, 1986), 160-163.

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 REPLY TO PROFESSOR ZAGORIN 285
coveryof heliocentrismin 1543was the cause of the eventwe can correctlyde-
scribewiththe statement"in270 BC AristarchosanticipatedCopernicusby dis-
coveringheliocentrism."19 Withoutthe discovery,at a latertime,of heliocentrism
Aristarchoscould not haveanticipatedthat discovery.Once again, the cause is
later than the effect.
Remarkslikethese,thatcan routinelybe madeevenwithinthe modernistpar-
adigm,arealreadya decisivereplyto Zagorin'squeries.But I will not leavethe
matterthere and will look a bit more closely at his argumentthat I confuse
heuristicswith the actualcourseof events.Supposewe ask for the causeof, for
example,"the IndustrialRevolution"or of "the Cold War."We now ought to
rememberthat these termsdo not referto an historicalrealityoutside the text
but to narrativesubstances.This meanssuch questionsarenot questionsabout
the cause of a complexstate of affairsat the end of the eighteenthcenturyor
afterWorldWarII, but a questionaboutthe causeof a notion or narrativesub-
stance.I supposewe could not interpretsuch an admittedlyodd questiondiffer-
ently from the questionwhy some historiandecidedto proposethis particular
narrative substance.And, obviously,thatis preciselytheheuristicquestionZagorin
I
says should not ask.
Undoubtedlyit will now be objectedthat somethingmust havegone wrong
here:no sensiblepersonwouldinterpretthe questionof what is the causeof the
IndustrialRevolutionas a questionabout why an historiancame to defend a
specificinterpretationof the past. I quite agree.But if somethingwent wrong
it is becausecausalisticlanguagewas used hereoutside the rangeof its proper
application.Causallanguagemust be restrictedto the level of the statement:
only at thatlevelcan causalrelationsbe establishedbetweenthe statesof affairs
individualstatementsdescribe.20Causalisticlanguagecan only lead to confu-
sion and unsubstantiatedclaimsif introducedat the level of the text and of the
narrativesubstance.Someonewho asks for the causesof the IndustrialRevolu-
tion asks,in fact,fora convincingnarrativeinterpretation
coveringboththeperiod
of the beginningof that revolutionand the periodimmediatelyprecedingit and
not for the isolation of two (complex)historicaleventsthat can be relatedby
some causalmechanism.21The latterstrategycan, at most, resultin suggesting
a conceptualrelationbetweentwo differentnarrativesubstances(one for the
former,and anotherfor the other period) and such conceptualrelationsonly
provideus with truthsde dicto and not de re (whereasit is only the latterwe
are interestedin in the case of causal explanation22).And, indeed, if one care-
fully readsbooks likethose writtenby ImmanuelWallersteinor ThedaSkocpol,

19. Danto, Analytical Philosophy, 156.

20. A brilliantsynthesisof the latestdevelopmentsin theoreticalthoughtaboutcausalexplana-
tion withthe latestdevelopmentsin socioeconomichistoryis C. L. Lorenz,De constructievan het
verleden(Amsterdam,1987).
21. Ankersmit, Narrative Logic, 154-155. See also M. Mandelbaum, The Anatomy of Historical
Knowledge(London,1977),49-53 for a similarargument.
22. Ankersmit, Narrative Logic, 144.

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286 F. R. ANKERSMIT

one will see that what is presentedthere as causalrelationsis alreadyimplicit

in the principalnotions used by those authors.

I now arriveat a numberof issuesthat can be dispatchedmoreeasily.Zagorin

wondershow "stylecan engendercontent."Think of a paintingby Van Eyck
as differentfrom a paintingby Fragonard.It will be observedthat whereasVan
Eyck alwayslikes to depict a greatnumberof tiny detailswith the utmost ac-
curacy,Fragonardneverstrivesfor such"realityeffects,"to borrowBarthes'ster-
minology.Of coursethis is an importantdifferencein style betweenthe two ar-
tists,but, equallyobviously,it is also a matterof content.23The painteradopting
VanEyck'sstyle will paintdifferentthings(content)fromFragonard.Thusstyle
engenderscontent. It requireslittle effortto translatethis insightto the writing
of history.A momentago I discussedthe difficultyof identifyingthe narrative
substancesproposedin historicalwritingbecauseof theirintrinsicvaguenessand
dependenceon the presenceof othernarrativesubstances.I am convincedthat
style is a helpful instrumentif we wish to overcomethese difficulties.Stylistic
categoriesarelike a web that enablesus to catchthe interpretationsand narra-
tive substancesproposedby historians- HaydenWhite'sessayon Foucaultand
Hans Kellner'son Braudelare the best illustrationsof what I have in mind.24
Zagorinattacksmyviewson the intensionalcharacterof historicalwritingwith
the argumentthat it is possible"to paraphraseor summarizea workof history
withoutalteringits substanceor meaning"- a possibilitymy thesisaboutinten-
sionalityeffectivelyrules out. Now I find it hardto believethat Zagorinreally
holdsthat for exampleGay'sor Gossman's"summary" of Gibbon'sDeclineand
Fall has exactlythe samemeaningas the originalworkby Gibbon.If so, wecould
spareourselvesvaluabletimeby readingonly "summaries" insteadof the original
works. So I suppose Zagorinwill allow for some differences.But if therewill
alwaysbe differencesbetweenthe meaningof the originalwork and its "sum-
maries,"which differencesin meaning exceed our criteriafor the identity of
meaningand which do not (so that we are sufficientlyjustifiedto speak of an
identityof meaning)?Obviously,this problemis preciselywhat the writingof
history(or,in thiscase,the writingof the historyof historicalwriting)is all about.
For example,whenZagorinwritesabout Hobbes,he givesus a "paraphrase" or
to
"summary"of Hobbes'swork he thinks haveroughly the same meaningas
the original.Otherstudentsof Hobbes provideus with different"paraphrases"
also pretendingto reproduce"themeaning"of that greatman'swork. Identity
of meaningis not a givenhere,but a problem.So I am afraidthat whenZagorin

23. N. Goodman,Waysof Worldmaking (Hassocks,1978),26. Needlessto say,it doesnot follow

that all differencesin style are differencesin contentand vice versa:"onlysome featuresof what
in whatis saidconstitutedifferences
differences
is saidcountas aspectsof style;onlycertaincharacteristic
in style."See Goodman, Worldmaking, 26, 27.
24. H. White,"MichelFoucault," andSince,ed. J. Sturrock(Oxford,1979),81-116;
in Structuralism
H. Kellner,"DisorderlyConduct:Braudel'sMediterranean Satire,"Historyand Theory18 (1979),
197-222,reprintedin Languageand HistoricalRepresentation(Madison,1989),153-189.

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 REPLY TO PROFESSOR ZAGORIN 287
colloquiallyspeaks about "paraphrases" that summarize"a work of history
withoutalteringits substanceor meaning"he begs the questionpreciselyat the
pointwherevaguespeculationendsandhistory(orthehistoryof historicalwriting)
takes off.
I object, moreover,to this idea of the identityof "themeaning"of Gibbon's
DeclineandFall andthatof, for example,Gossman'sbrilliantstudyof thatwork.
All we have are stringsof wordsand sentencesin books like Gibbon'son the
one handand interpretationsof these stringsof wordsand sentences(including
the one of the author himself)on the other. If we speak about "themeaning"
of Gibbon'sDeclineandFall we do, in fact, referto one of these interpretations
(in most cases proudlyannouncedto be identicalwith the one of Gibbonhim-
self), but not to some hidden essence in Gibbon'swork. This hiddenessence,
whichone often has in mindwhenspeakingof "themeaningof Gibbon'swork,"
is epistemologicallyjust as uselessa notion as the notion of "the"past we dis-
cusseda momentago- it is anotherWittgensteinianwheelin the machinethat
drivesnothingitself. I am not beingundulyrelativisticor cynicalaboutthe his-
toricalprofessionhere;I merelystatehowthingsareandthatmeaningfuldebate
in the historicalprofessioncan both be conductedand analyzedphilosophically
without havingrecourseto this kind of epistemologicalsop.
ElsewhereZagorinstressesthat "the need for integrationand synthesis [is]
greaterand more importantthan everbefore."I entirelyagree:I am as ardent
an advocateof historicalsynthesisand integrationas is Zagorin.But it is not
our dreamsfor a happyfuturethat arethe issue here.The issue is whethercon-
temporaryhistoriographymovesin the directionof fragmentationratherthan
synthesis.I see that Zagorin'sdiagnosisaccordswith mine when I said that at
presentfragmentationprevailsoversynthesis.SinceZagorinis silent about my
explanationfor this tendencyin contemporaryhistoriography(althoughit hap-
penedto be the mainthesisof my essay),I supposewe haveno argumenthere.25
At the end of his polemic againstmy essay Zagorincontrastsmy views un-
favorablywiththose of Huizingawhenthe latterurgesthe historianto conform
to all the relevantstandardsof scientificity.But neitherin this essay nor in the
one criticizedby ZagorinhaveI recommendedthat the historian"abandonvig-
orous cognitivestandards,exigentcriticalmethods,"and so forth. It was, and
still is, my point, however,that when we reachthe level of historicalinterpreta-
tion, suchstandardswillbe of littlehelpto us. Herewemove"beyond,"although
not "against"such standardsof scientificity- a fact I have characterizedby
speakingof the a-scientificityratherthan anti-scientificityof historicalwriting.
How debateis conductedat this "a-scientific" level I shall discussbelow when
dealingwithhistoricalrepresentation. Moreover,apartfromthe factthatHuizinga
was also a Dutchmanand taught at the same universityas I do, I am slightly
astonishedthat Zagorinshouldappealto Huizingain orderto lectureme about

25. Foranotherapproachto this fragmentationof the historicaldiscipline,see F. R. Ankersmit,

The Reality Effect in the Writing of History (Amsterdam, 1989).

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288 F. R. ANKERSMIT

my disrespectfor scientificrigor. For it is well known that the author of The

Waningof the MiddleAges was heavilyindebtedboth for style and contentto
the literaryand the artisticclimatein the Netherlandsat the beginningof this
century(mainlythe so-called"Tachtigers"). The fact wasalreadyobviousat the
time of the publicationof the book andcausedmedievalists,notablyHuizinga's
collegaproximusin Utrecht,0. A. Oppermann,to dismissthe book as "lacking
in scientificrigor."So the HuizingaZagorinholdsup as an exampleto me prob-
ably could neverhavewrittenhis greatestwork. Zagorin'schoice of Huizinga
as his crown-witnessfor the "scientificity"of historycertainlyis not a fortunate
one.26
Against Zagorin'swell-contrivedinsinuationthat I regardhistorywith con-
temptI ventureto saythat my argumentthat to ask aboutthe use of historyis to
commita category-mistake testifiesto morerespectfor historythan one can at-
tributeto the person,like Zagorin,who believesthe questionof the utility of
historyto be a meaningfulone.Debatesaboututilityalwaysrequirea morecom-
prehensivebackgroundagainstwhich such debatescan be settled. But for me
historyis part of that backgroundand thereforea measuring-staffin questions
of utility ratherthan what is measured.27
At the beginningof his argumentZagorinenumeratedthreecharacteristics
of postmodernism.I wonderwhethermost postmodernistswill recognizethem-
selves in Zagorin'sportrait.They will perhapshave their reservationsabout
Zagorin'sassociationof postmodernismwith historicismand the belief in his-
toricalinevitability.But sincethe termis vague- a good exampleof a narrative
substance,I would say-and everybodycan thereforebe his or her own post-
modernist,I shall not disputeZagorin'sportraitof postmodernism.However,
if I am permitteda similarlibertyI would say that for me postmodernismis
above all a theory of writing.That is, not so much a theory of interpretation
likehermeneutics but a theoryof the (unintended)effectsof interpretative
writing
as we findtheseeffectsin literarytheoryand, of course,in the writingof history.
Zagorinrejectsmy claimthatin historiography interpretative writinggenerates
evermorewritingwiththe unintendedresultthat all this writingincreasesrather
than diminishesour distancefrom what the writingis about (a claim I formu-
latedwiththe statementthat historicalwritingtendsto takethe placeof the past
or the text itself). Zagorinalso recognizesthe phenomenonof historicalover-
production,but he prefersto take a moresanguineview of it. He comparesthe

26. J. Kamerbeek,Jr., "Huizingaen de bewegingvan Tachtig,"Tijdschriftvoorgeschiedenis67

(1954),145-164;F. Jansonius,"DestijIvan Huizinga,"Bijdragenen mededelingenbetreffendede
geschiedenisderNederlanden88 (1973),195-213.Withregardto Zagorin'squotesfrom Huizinga
it shouldnot be forgottenthat theymustbe placedin the contextof Huizinga'spolemicwithP. N.
van Eyckand his nephewM. ter Braak.For anotherHuizinga,a Huizingamoretrue to himself,
see his inaugurallecture"Hetaesthetischebestanddeelvangeschiedkundige voorstellingen,"in Ver-
zameldewerken7 (Haarlem,1950), 13-29.
27. Foran interestingattemptto linktheproblemof theuse of historyto thatof the roleof values
in the writingof history,see C. Lorenz,"Hetgewichtvande geschiedenis:Overhet waardeprobleem
in de geschiedwetenschap," Kennisen method 14 (1990),129-163.

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 REPLY TO PROFESSOR ZAGORIN 289

recentexplosionin historicalwritingto the sciences,wherethe same has hap-

penedin the last fewdecadeswithoutcausingthe kindof unintendedside-effects
I hadobservedin the writingof history.However,Zagorin'sownaccountdemon-
stratesthat his comparisonto the sciencesis unwarranted.
My pointof departurehereis Zagorin'sconfidentassertionthathistoryknows
historicalinterpretations whichhave"cometo be widelyaccepted"andthatfinally
are universallyrecognizedby historiansas "an establishedpart of our under-
standingof the past."And, innocently,Zagorinaddswhenreferringto thishappy
consensus:"of course,this may not last."The additionmust be an understate-
ment, I suppose,for when Zagorinoffersan expositionof the recenthistoryof
the debateon Hobbes'spoliticalphilosophyhe presentsus with a picturethat
contradictshisoptimisticconfidencein theparallelism betweenhistoryandscience.
I wouldlike to ask Zagorinto point out to me the sciencewhere-as in the de-
bate about Hobbesas depictedby him- for severaldecades,two, three,or even
moremutuallyincompatibletheoriescoexistmoreor less peacefully(thatis, no
scientisthas the impressionthat somethingunusualor dramaticis takingplace),
finallyall disappearingfrom the scene in orderto make way for a pluralityof
newertheories,but perhapsonly to reappearat some futuretimewhenan intelli-
gent revisionistdecidesto take one of them up again.Apart from a numberof
resemblancesI haveno wishto deny,thereexistsa numberof conspicuousdiffer-
ences betweenthe sciencesand historythat we cannot affordto disregardif we
strivefora realisticandunbiasedappraisalof thelatter.Andthe factthatZagorin's
scenarioof the debateabout Hobbes wouldbe utterlyinconceivablein one of
the sciencesis one of those differences.
The differencebetweenhistoryand the sciencesthat is most relevantin the
context of this discussioncan be identifiedif we make use of Bruno Latour's
convenientconceptof the "blackbox."28In sciencea black box is a theorythat
is so universallyacceptedthatno scientistbothers"toopenup"the box anymore
in orderto test what the box contains(only on the rareoccasionwhen science
gets caughtin a completeimpasseis one preparedto reconsiderthe blackboxes).
Scienceprogressesby the productionof blackboxes.History,on the otherhand,
in contrastto what I supposewould be Zagorin'sview,knowsno black boxes.
As his ownaccountof the debateaboutHobbes'spoliticalphilosophysufficiently
shows, discussiondid not resulttherein the productionof a black box. That
is the explanationof my claim, attackedby Zagorin,that the writingof history
generatesevernewinterpretations withoutcomingto a conclusion(a blackbox).
of
But this notion the black box can be of furtheruse for us. Zagorinsays
that historicaldebate(likethe one about Hobbes)alwaysdevelopsin close rela-
tion with the originaltext andthat historicaldebatealwayssendsus backto the
text(of Hobbes)itself.Thisis undoubtedlycorrect:in caseof disagreement about
interpretations the text itself will be the of
point departureboth for the purpose
of the debateitself and for the developmentof newinterpretations.But this fact

28. B. Latour,Sciencein Action (StonyStratford,1987),especiallythe introduction.

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290 F. R. ANKERSMIT

underminesratherthanjustifiesZagorin'sassertionthat historianscan test "the

validity"(his term)of their interpretationsas this is done in the sciences.For
scientistssettle their disputesby translatingthem in terms of the black boxes
that are acceptedby them all; it is to these black boxes that they retracetheir
disagreementin orderto findout who is rightand who is wrong(of course,fur-
ther disagreementmay arise about what should be consideredthe relevantset
of blackboxes).Physicalrealityis certainlyno such black box; blackboxes are
theoriesandit is theythatareinstrumentalfor scientificprogress.In many,though
not all, cases an appealto physicalrealitywill simplybeg the question.Conse-
quently,whenZagorin(correctly)pointsout that historicaldebatesendsus back
to the text-the historian'scounterpartof the physicalrealityof the scientist-
andnot to some historicalblackbox, he couldnot havestatedmoreclearlywhere
to look for the essentialdifferencebetweenhistoryand the sciences.
If, then, thereis this differencebetweenthe conductof debatein historyand
the sciences,we may ask how historianssettle their disputes.What is rational
argumentlikein historiography? OnceagainI appealto the notion of the narra-
tive substance-and naturallyso, since the narrativesubstanceis the embodi-
ment of the kind of insight (I deliberatelyavoid the word knowledge,because
of thewriting
of its affinitywithnotionsliketruth,falsity,andso on) characteristic
of history.Wecansay,then,that in the textthe historianaimsat the constitution
of a linguisticobject, the narrativesubstance,in terms of which he wishes us
to understandthe past. Here we find the explanationof the metaphorical(or
tropological)characterof historicalinsight and of the historicaltext. For it is
the natureof metaphoricalutteranceslike "A is B" that we should understand
A (the"tenor")in termsof B (the"vehicle"in Richards'sterminology29) Themet-
aphor"theearthis a spaceship"proposes(as narrativesubstancespropose)to
usethe languagefor speakingaboutspaceshipsto speakaboutthe earth.In met-
aphorand in historicalinterpretationwe use the languagesuitablefor one topic
to speak about another.
The analogybetweenmetaphorandhistoricalinterpretation canbe elaborated
as follows."Theearth,"the tenorin the metaphormentionedabove,corresponds
to the descriptivemeaningof historicalnarrativeand in both cases referenceis
madeto a realityoutsidelanguage."Thespaceship,"the vehicleof the metaphor,
correspondsto the narrativemeaningof historicalnarrativeand in both cases
no referenceis made to realityoutside language.The analogyjustifiesthe con-
clusionthat in historicalinterpretationthe narrativesubstancetendsto takethe
place of the past as topic of discussion(as the spaceshipand all we associate
withit tendsto takethe placeof the earth).Put differently,in historicalinterpre-
tationnarrativesubstancestendto act as a "substitute" or "replacement"for (part
of) the pastitself.Narrativesubstancescanbe likenedto the waxfiguresof Mme.
Tussaudthat are also constructedwith the utmostcarein such a waythat what
can be said about them could also be said about the original.It follows from

29. I. A. Richards,ThePhilosophyof Rhetoric(Oxford,1971),89-115.

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 REPLY TO PROFESSOR ZAGORIN 291
this that if the historianwants to maximizethe interpretativepower of his
narrative- and it will be self-evidentthat this is the naturalgoal of all historical
interpretation -he will emphasizenarrativemeaningat the cost of descriptive
meaningandthat it must,therefore,be the disciplinarygoal of historicalwriting
to producenarrativesubstancesthat can, in the literalsense of the word,func-
tion as the substitutesfor the past they attemptto replace.The distinctionbe-
tweena substituteon the one handand a good likeness(withthe latter'sassocia-
tions with correspondence,truth, correctdescription,the presenceof both the
originalandits description,andso on), on the other,neatlyepitomizesthe differ-
ence betweenmy position and more customaryones.
As art can neverfully producethe effectof the perfect"trompel'oeil"that
replaceswhat it represents,as metaphorcan neverentirelyobliterateits tenor,
so historicalnarrativewill neveractuallybe ableto achievethis disciplinarygoal
of the writingof history.Morespecifically,historicalnarrativewill alwayscon-
tain argument-extensive discussionswith rivalhistorians;it will in most cases
havethe characterof a speakingabout the past insteadof lettingthe past speak
for itself, with the resultthat we will never,even when both the past and its
representationhavethe form of texts, be actuallytemptedto mistakehistorical
narrativefor the pastit attemptsto replace.30 Onecouldcomparetheseargumen-
tativecharacteristicsof the historicaltextto the projectiverulesappliedbypainters
for "condensing"the realitydepictedby them into the paintingstheypresentas
its substitutes-in both cases we haveto do with the visible or invisible"scaf-
folding"of the substitutethat is presentedto us. But whetherwe think of those
statements(thenarrativesubstance)as formulatingthe conclusionsof argument,
of discussion,and of the historian'sspeakingabout the past, or, as in art, with
the pictureresultingfromthe applicationof the projectionrules,in both histori-
ographyandarttheidealis to presenta "picture" thatcanfunctionas a substitute."
Tothe degreethat the idealhas been realizedin the writingof history,we can
say that the absenceof the past, that provokesall writingof history,has been
compensatedfor by the presenceof narrativesubstances.I do not doubt for a
momentthat Zagorin,with his modernistideal of the transparenceof (histor-
ical) language,will indignantlycondemnthis as the most abjectand objection-

30. Indeed, the claim that the writing of history aims at the production of substitutes may be
criticized with the argument that much of this writing, especially in contemporary historiography,
presents us with arguments rather than with representations. A strong case for this position is made
in B. Verschaffel,"Geschiedschrijving-een waar verhaal, of de waarheidover verhalen?,"in Op verhaal
komen, ed. F. R. Ankersmit, M. C. Doeser, and A. Kibedi Varga(Kampen, 1990). Although I recog-
nize the force of the objection, I do not believe it to be fatal to the substitution thesis, for all argu-
ments have conclusions. One can say, next, about conclusions that 1) they are the raison d'dtre of
the argument and 2) they are part of representations of the past. In other words, ordinarily "l'histoire
probleme" is a propaedeutics to "l'histoire recit." The argumentative character of much of contem-
porary historical discourse thus need not be a decisive objection against the way the disciplinary
goal of the writing of history has been defined here.
31. This definition of the disciplinary goal of the writing of history can explain and justify the
requirementthat the historian should maximize the "scope" of his interpretation of the past as much
as possible and is thereforeto be preferredto the latteras a definition of the historian'sdisciplinarygoal.

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292 F. R. ANKERSMIT

able definition of the disciplinary goal of historical writing he has ever come
across. Yet, curiously enough, his own argument sometimes points in a similar
direction. For if summaries and paraphrases can, and ideally, ought to have the
same meaning as what they summarize as required by Zagorin, what other pur-
pose could they have than to be a substitute for the original? In fact, I believe
that intellectual history, the historical subdiscipline that inspired the major part
of Zagorin's considerations, is the best illustration of the claims that I have put
forward here. For is it not the pretension of intellectual historians writing about
Hobbes, Locke, or Marx that the reader of their texts will no longer have good
reasons for consulting those of Locke, Hobbes, or Marx themselves? And, in-
deed, is not the necessity still to refer to the original text despite the availability
of the historian's text the token of the latter's imperfection, that is, of its inca-
pacity effectively to function as a substitute?
My argument in the preceding paragraphsmay justify my interest, both in the
essay criticized by Zagorin and in a previous essay published in this journal,32
in Gombrich's and Danto's theories of the work of art and may justify why I
wholeheartedly embrace the postmodernist's attempt to aestheticize the work
of history. This is also why I would prefer to speak of historical representation
rather than of historical interpretation. For the former term is more suggestive
of the ambition of the historical text to function as a substitute and of the similar-
ities between the work of art and historical writing than the latter. I shall now
use these similarities to make a few tentative remarks about the possibilities and
the limitations of historical debate and about what we can and cannot expect
from it.
It is not my pretension to say anything deep or original about this topic; I
merely want to suggest how the aestheticist approach might help us to answer
questions as to how rational debate is conducted in the writing of history. Our
most important datum here in my opinion is, needless to say, the fact that the
work of history, like the work of art, is a substitute (or at least strives to be one).
Historical debate is, therefore, essentially a debate about substitutes and about
the narrative substances acting as those substitutes. Here we find a first indica-
tion of the many problems facing fruitful historical debate. For narrative sub-
stances are sui generis not very hospitable to rational debate. As we have seen,
it is difficult, to a certain extent even impossible, to have any very precise idea
about their identity; because of their dependence on each other for their identity
they have a tendency to get entangled with each other, which compromises their
identity. Moreover,we encounter the obstacle that an historical text rarely,if ever,
is a representation of exactly the same subject matter as the one studied in an-
other text -which contributes further to the difficulty of identifying them. But,
most of all, we can only pronounce on the representativemerits of narrativesub-
stances if we take them into account in their totality; breaking them up into more
manageable chunks would only give us a set of different narrative substances

32. F. R. Ankersmit,"HistoricalRepresentation,"
Historyand Theory27 (1988),206-229.

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 REPLY TO PROFESSOR ZAGORIN 293
and we may doubt whether their sum could still be identified with the original
one. A final problem is that there is no neutral intermediate space between narra-
tive substances within which debate over them can be conducted. Whatever at-
tempt one makes to break away from the field of gravity of the narrative sub-
stances involved, argumentwill alwaysbetraythe acceptance,open or unconscious,
of one of the rival narrative substances. In sum, fighting a debate over narrative
substances is in many ways similar to fighting a seventeenth-century naval battle
after the wind has completely died down: clumsy, ineffective, and most often in-
conclusive. All in all, I suppose Hayden White is right when he says that the only
really successful argument against a narrativeinterpretationis to produce a better
one.33
Yet, the history of art shows that we are not completely helpless. I take an
example from Dutch seventeenth-century landscape painting that is clearly in-
spired by what we would call "realist"ideals. If, then, we have a wooded land-
scape by Hobbema and one by Jan van Kessel (sometimes called "the poor man's
Hobbema"), any person with good eyesight can be made to see that Hobbema
painted better "substitutes" for wooded scenery than did Van Kessel. Similarly,
if we turn to history, Schorske's narrative substance on "fin de siecle" Vienna
is evidently superior to the one proposed by Janik and Toulmin. There surely
is a level where aesthetic debate about artistic and historical representation can
overcome all the handicaps I enumerated just now and where rational argument
about what may and what may not count as a "realist"interpretation has a fair
chance of being successful. But suppose we compare the wooded landscapes of
Hobbema to those of Jacob van Ruisdael or even to those of a relatively un-
known painter like Roelof Jansz van Vries (whose paintings were, in fact, some-
times attributed to Ruisdael). Here rational argument appealing to criteria for
realist representationwill in most cases remain indecisive;the argumentthat Ruis-
dael's "portraits of a tree" (think for example of his masterpiece "Oaks beside
a Pool" in the Gemildegalerie in Berlin-Dahlem) are, from a realist or descrip-
tivist point of view, better "substitutes" than those painted by Hobbema or by
Van Vries will convince some, but fail to convince others. Here, already, the in-
strument of realist or descriptivist accuracy has become blunted.
What happens in the history of art and connoisseurship under such circum-
stances, that is, in cases where we have to assess the quality of works of art that
can no longer be rated by an appeal to criteria of realism, is of much importance
to the theoretician of historical debate. For because of the unprecedented high
quality and the great number of rival representations of the past that are devel-
oped by contemporary historians (I completely agree with Zagorin's high esteem
for contemporary historical scholarship), historical discussion necessitates us to
choose between the Ruisdaels, Hobbemas, and Van Vries (and still many others)
of historical representation. Under such circumstances, then, in the history of
art and connoisseurship, attention will shift from the application of criteria of

33. H. White,"TheHistoricalTextas LiteraryArtifact,"in Topics of Discourse,89.

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294 F. R. ANKERSMIT

realist or descriptivist accuracyto questions of style and pictorial genius. We con-

sider Ruisdael to be a greater painter than Hobbema- and are quite justified
in doing so - since the former's paintings are, as substitutes, stylistically superior
to those of Hobbema or of Van Vries. And after this step has been taken, debate
can once again become fairly precise and efficient, as is demonstrated by the
writings of art historians. After criteria of photographic realism have become
impotent,34the educated eye of the connoisseur is still able to see why the substi-
tutes for reality that are presented by one painter are superior to those of an-
other. Moreover, even though such debates about style will certainly not always
be conclusive, they do guarantee the possibility of continuing rational debate
by clearly defining what is at stake in the debate. The concept of style opens
up a new domain for fruitful discussion.
So it is with the writing of history. To be sure, there is some space for a rational
debate about the "realist" accuracy of the substitutes for the past offered by
historians and for the question whether they do actually "correspond"to the past.
But for two reasons the space for this kind of debate is quite restricted, so that
we cannot expect much result from it. First, criteria for realist or naturalist ac-
curacy are relative to time-bound schemes as was shown by Goodman, and this
is probably even truer for history than for art. We can at least see a wooded land-
scape which seems to give us access to a reality independent of those time-bound
schemes, but even such comfort is not given to us in the case of the writing of
history. Historiography truly is the postmodernist disciplinepar excellence, since
in historiography (historical) reality yields to the depictions of itself so that we
are left with mere appearances, that is, with representations mirroring an ever
absent past reality. Second, the demand for realist accuracy is at odds with the
characteristic of the historical text as a substitute. As Gombrich has said, the
crucial question to be asked about substitutes is not whether they give a good
likeness but whether they can "function" as the original they replace.35Obviously,
the appeal to "function" will most often prove to be destructive of the common
ground that is conditional for rational debate about realist accuracy.
Much more is, therefore, to be expected if we are preparedto accept the lessons
taught us by the art historian and concentrate on the aesthetic features of histor-
ical writing. Moreover, the discipline that is ideally suited for dealing with these
aesthetic problems suggested by the history of art already exists. Needless to say,
I am thinking of historiography, the history of historical writing. However, the
kind of historiography we need is not the historiography of Fueter, Srbik, or
Lefebvre(although I am convinced of the indispensability of their work and that
of their modern successors and believe that we should also have more of that).
The kind of historiography we need most, however, is a connoisseurship of his-
torical writing, a historiography that is not satisfied merely to register the con-

34. It has, of course, nowadays become a cliche to question the realism of the photograph. See,
for example, R. Barthes, La chambre claire (Paris, 1980), 54, 55.
35. E. H. Gombrich, "Meditations on a Hobby Horse," in Aesthetics Today, ed. M. Philipson
and P. J. Gudel (New York, 1980), 175.

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 REPLY TO PROFESSOR ZAGORIN 295
tent, the rough outlines, and the political presuppositions of the historian's work,
but a historiography that explores the historical text in its most hidden corners,
that is sensitive to aspects of the text that may even have escaped its author, and
that knows how to find the secret key to the text not in its alleged correspondence
to the actual past but in its textual organization. It is this kind of historiography
that can show us what perfectly good reasons we may have for preferring the
Gibbons, the Rankes, the Meineckes, or the Braudels to their less gifted contem-
poraries. It is this historiography that can show us where to look for and how
to recognize historiographical progress, such that now a rational justification can
be given for our preference for one historical text (or perhaps even an historical
school) over another.
I could not be so confident about this form of historiography and what we
might expect from it if it had not already proven itself. However, the best work
that is done in the field of philosophy of history since Hayden White's Metahis-
tory, the book that initiated this form of historiography, gives ample proof of
the success we may expect from this aestheticist reading of historical texts. We
discover in this historiography a philosophy of history that is no longer inspired
by the quest for some "grand theory" attempting to formulate the universally
applicable philosophical standards for accuracyand for correspondence between
the past and historical description or explanation that each historian has to live
up to. The work done by authors such as White, Kellner, LaCapra, Orr, or Bann
is a far more modest philosophy of history in that it is a reflection about history
inspired by the actual practice and writing of history. Nevertheless, in an impor-
tant respect these historiographical studies still pursue the trusty ideals of good
old critical philosophy of history because these studies, no less than those of
the previous paradigm, hope to offer us a rational and reasonable explanation
of why certain historians of past and present can lay claim to our respect and
admiration. But such explanations of historiographical excellence are sought in
historical writing itself and not in the adoption of "scientistic pep-talk" that can
only alienate the reflection on history from its subject matter and codify historio-
graphical philistinism.
I expect that most readers of Zagorin's always fair and pertinent critique of
my essay will have concluded that I had maneuvered myself into a pretty hope-
less position and that there would be left to me little more than an idle attempt
to rescue some debris from the wreckage. I hope that this reply will have con-
vinced those readers that my case is not quite so hopeless as they initially had
thought. To the extent that I have been successful in this, it is proof of the neces-
sity to postulate the logical entity I have called the narrativesubstance. That nar-
rative language has the ontological status of being an object; that it is opaque;
that it is self-referential; that it is intensional and, hence, intrinsically aestheti-
cist; that the narrativemeaning of an (historical) text is undecidable in an impor-
tant sense of that word and even bears the marks of self-contradiction; that
narrativemeaning can only be identified in the presence of other meaning (inter-
textuality); that as far as narrative meaning is concerned the text refers but not
to a reality outside itself; that criteria of truth and falsity do not apply to histor-

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296 F. R. ANKERSMIT

ical representations of the past; that we can only properly speak of causes and
effectsat the level of the statement;that narrativelanguage is metaphorical (tropo-
logical) and as such embodies a proposal for how we should see the past; that
the historical text is a substitute for the absent past; that narrative representa-
tions of the past have a tendency to disintegrate (especially when many rival
representations of the past are present)36;all these postmodernist claims so
amazing and even repulsiveto the modernist can be given a formal or even "mod-
ernist" justification if we are prepared to develop a philosophical logic suitable
for dealing with the narrative substance. And "justification" does not have here
the connotation of recommendation; it is not my wish to applaud or condemn
anything. Narrative logic serves no other purpose than merely to understand.
If however, the modernist and Zagorin object to the argumentative style of
many postmodernists, I shall not disagree with them. It is true that one often
finds in postmodernist writings poor and unconvincing argument, superfluous
technicalities, and obscure jargon. Moreover, the argumentative nucleus and the
length of postmodernist writings are often inversely proportional to each other.
In a metaphorical way, the story that in each fat man there is a thin man who
wants to get out, is almost paradigmatically true of postmodernism. But I am
convinced that underneath the postmodernist fat the thin man really is there and
that we ought to listen to him since he can tell us a lot about the (historical)
text that we do not yet know and that the modernist never bothered to tell us.

Universityof Groningen

to disintegrate,see F. R.
36. For an explanationof this tendencyof narrativerepresentations
Ankersmit,"Hetverhaalin de filosofie,"in Op verhaalkomen.

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