THIRD DIVISION

ARLYN* PINEDA, G.R. No. 170172

Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

JULIE C. ARCALAS,
Respondent. Promulgated:

November 23, 2007

x-------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

The subject property consists of three parcels of land, Lots D, E and F, the total area of
which consists of 50,000 square meters. These three lots are portions of Lot No. 3762,
registered in the name of Spouses Mauro Lateo and EncarnacionEvangelista
(spouses Lateo) with a total area of 74,708 square meters, located at
Barrios Duhat and Labuin, Santa Cruz, Laguna.

A certain Victoria Tolentino bought the said property from the Spouses Lateo.

Civil Case No. Q-96-27884, for Sum of Money, was instituted by Arcalas against
Victoria Tolentino. This case stemmed from an indebtedness evidenced by a promissory
note and four post-dated checks later dishonored, which
Victoria Tolentino owed Arcalas.[3]

On 9 September 1997, Branch 93 of the Quezon City RTC, rendered judgment in favor
of Arcalas and against Victoria Tolentino.[4]

In December 1997, Pineda bought the subject property from Victoria L. Tolentino.[5]
 - Pineda alleged that upon payment of the purchase price, she took possession of the
subject property by allowing a tenant, Rodrigo Bautista to cultivate the
same. However, Pineda failed to register the subject property under her name.[6]

To execute the judgment, the Quezon City RTC levied upon the subject property and the
Notice of Levy on Alias Writ of Execution dated 12 January 1999 was annotated as
Entry No. 315074, in relation to Entry No. 319362, at the back of TCT No. T-52319.[7]

Asserting ownership of the subject property, Pineda filed with the Deputy Sheriff of
the Quezon City RTC an Affidavit of Title and Third Party Claim.

Arcalas filed a motion to set aside Pinedas Affidavit of Title and Third Party Claim,
which the Quezon City RTC granted.

Pineda filed with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna another Affidavit of
Third Party Claim and caused the inscription of a notice of adverse claim at the back of
TCT No. T-52319 under Entry No. 324094. [10]

Arcalas and Leonardo Byron P. Perez, Jr. purchased Lot No. 3762 at an auction sale
conducted by the Deputy Sheriff of Quezon City. The sale was evidenced by a Sheriffs
Certificate of Sale issued on the same day and registered as Entry No. 324225 at the back of
TCT No. T-52319.[11]

Arcalas then filed an action for the cancellation of the entry of Pinedas adverse claim
before the Laguna RTC. The Laguna RTC ordered the cancellation of the Notice of
Adverse Claim on the ground of res judicata:

Pineda appealed the Order, the appellate court dismissed the appeal and considered it
abandoned when Pineda failed to file her appellants brief.

Two motions for reconsideration by Pineda were filed and dismissed.

The primary issues

I.

WHETHER THE LEVY ON ALIAS WRIT OF EXECUTION ISSUED BY THE

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY MAY EXEMPT THE
PORTION BOUGHT BY [PINEDA] FROM VICTORIA TOLENTINO; [and] NO

II.

WHETHER THE POSSESSION OF [PINEDA] OF THE 5 HECTARES PORTION

OF LOT 3762 IS ALREADY EQUIVALENT TO A TITLE DESPITE THE
ABSENCE OF REGISTRATION. NO

This petition must be dismissed.

 The Court of Appeals properly dismissed the case for Pinedas failure to file an
appellants brief. This is in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 44 of the Rules of Court,
which imposes upon the appellant the duty to file an appellants brief in ordinary appealed
cases before the Court of Appeals, thus:

Section 7. Appellants brief.It shall be the duty of the appellant to file with the court,
within forty-five (45) days from receipt of the notice of the clerk that all the evidence,
oral and documentary, are attached to the record, seven (7) copies of his legibly
typewritten, mimeographed or printed brief, with proof of service of two (2) copies
thereof upon the appellee.

In special cases appealed to the Court of Appeals, such as certiorari,

prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus cases, a memorandum of appeal must be
filed in place of an appellants brief as provided in Section 10 of Rule 44 of the Rules of Court

Section 10. Time of filing memoranda in special cases.In certiorari, prohibition,

mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus cases, the parties shall file, in lieu of briefs,
their respective memoranda within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from
receipt of the notice issued by the clerk that all the evidence, oral and documentary,
is already attached to the record.

The failure of the appellant to file his memorandum within the period therefor may
be a ground for dismissal of the appeal.

Non-filing of an appellants brief or a memorandum of appeal is one of the explicitly recognized

grounds of dismissal of the appeal in Section 1 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court:

Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. - An appeal may be dismissed by the Court
of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:

xxxx

(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his
brief or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules;

Thus, in Casim v. Flordeliza,[18] this Court affirmed the dismissal of an appeal, even when the filing of an
appellants brief was merely attended by delay and fell short of some of the requirements of the Rules of
Court. The Court, in Gonzales v. Gonzales,[19] reiterated that it is obligatory on the part of the appellant to
submit or file a memorandum of appeal, and that failing such duty, the Rules of Court unmistakably
command the dismissal of the appeal.

In this case, Pineda did not even provide a proper justification for her failure to file her
appellants brief. It was merely alleged in her Motion for Reconsideration that her counsel overlooked the
period within which to file the appellants brief. Although Pineda filed no less than two motions for
reconsideration, Pineda had not, at any time, made any attempt to file her appellants brief. Nor did
she supply any convincing argument to establish her right to the subject property for which she
seeks vindication.
 Thus, this Court cannot reverse or fault the appellate court for duly acting in faithful
compliance with the rules of procedure and established jurisprudence that it has been mandated to
observe, nor turn a blind eye and tolerate the transgressions of these rules and doctrines.[20] An
appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court since the right to
appeal is a purely statutory right.[21]

- The Court eyes with disfavor the unjustified delay in the termination of cases; once
a judgment has become final, the winning party must not be deprived of the fruits of
the verdict, through a mere subterfuge. The time spent by the judiciary, more so of
this Court, in taking cognizance and resolving cases is not limitless and cannot be
wasted on cases devoid of any right calling for vindication and are merely
reprehensible efforts to evade the operation of a decision that is final and executory.[23]

In the present case, there is a clear intent on the part of Pineda to delay the termination of
the case, thereby depriving Arcalas of the fruits of a just verdict. The Quezon City RTC already
quashed Pinedas third party claim over the subject property, yet she filed another adverse claim before the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna based on the same allegations and arguments previously settled
by the Quezon City RTC.Arcalas, thus, had to file another case to cause the cancellation of Pinedas notice
of adverse claim on TCT No. T-52319 before the Laguna RTC. After the Laguna RTC gave due course
to Arcalass petition, Pineda filed a dilatory appeal before the Court of Appeals, where she merely let the
period for the filing of the appellants brief lapse without exerting any effort to file one. The two motions
for reconsideration and even the petition before this Court fail to present new issues. They raised
the very same issues which had been consistently resolved by both the Quezon City RTC and the
Laguna RTC in favor of Arcalas, upholding the superiority of her lien over that of Pinedas
unregistered sale.

- The only exception to this rule is when the counsels negligence is so gross that a
party is deprived of due process and, thus, loses life, honor or property on mere
technicalities.[25] The exception cannot apply to the present case, where Pineda is merely
repeating arguments that were already heard and decided upon by courts of proper
jurisdiction, and the absolute lack of merit of the petition is at once obvious.

Pineda avers that she is not a party to Civil Case No. Q-96-27884, heard before
the Quezon City RTC, and that the levy on the alias writ of execution issued in Civil Case
No. Q-96-27884 cannot affect her purchase of subject property. Such position runs contrary
to law and jurisprudence.

Sections 51 and 52 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, provide that:

Section 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner.An owner of registered
land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance
with existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary
instruments as are sufficient in law.But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary
instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take
effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between
the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make
registration.
 The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar
as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall
be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or the city where the land
lies. (Emphasis provided.)

Section 52. Constructive notice upon registration.Every conveyance, mortgage, lease,

lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if
registered, filed or entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city
where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the
time of such registering, filing or entering. (Emphasis provided.)

It is clear from these provisions that before a purchaser of land causes the registration of
the transfer of the subject property in her favor, third persons, such as Arcalas, cannot be bound
thereby. Insofar as third persons are concerned, what validly transfers or conveys a persons interest in
real property is the registration of the deed. As the deed of sale was unrecorded, it operates merely as a
contract between the parties, namely Victoria Tolentino as seller and Pineda as buyer, which may
be enforceable against Victoria Tolentino through a separate and independent action. On the other
hand, Arcalass lien was registered and annotated at the back of the title of the subject property and
accordingly amounted to a constructive notice thereof to all persons, whether or not party to the
original case filed before the Quezon City RTC.

The doctrine is well settled that a levy on execution duly registered takes preference over a
prior unregistered sale.[26] A registered lien is entitled to preferential
consideration. In Valdevieso v. Damalerio,[28] the Court held that a registered writ of attachment was a
[27]

superior lien over that on an unregistered deed of sale.

Pineda also contends that her possession of the subject property cures the defect caused by her
failure to register the subject property in her name. This contention is inaccurate as well as
inapplicable.

True, that notwithstanding the preference given to a registered lien, this Court has made an
exception in a case where a party has actual knowledge of the claimants actual, open, and notorious
possession of the disputed property at the time the levy or attachment was registered. In such situations,
the actual notice and knowledge of a prior unregistered interest, not the mere possession of the
disputed property, was held to be equivalent to registration.[29]

Lamentably, in this case, Pineda did not even allege, much less prove, that Arcalas had actual
knowledge of her claim of ownership and possession of the property at the time the levy was
registered.
 [G.R. No. 133303. February 17, 2005]

BERNARDO VALDEVIESO, petitioner, vs. CANDELARIO DAMALERIO AND AUREA C.

DAMALERIO, respondents.

Facts:
Bernardo Valdevieso (petitioner) bought from spouses Lorenzo and Elenita Uy a parcel
of land consisting of 10,000 square meters, more or less, located at Bo. Tambler, General
Santos City.
- The deed of sale was not registered, nor was the title of the land transferred to
petitioner.[3]

Said property was immediately declared by petitioner for taxation purposes with the City
Assessors Office.[4] Tax declaration

Spouses Candelario and Aurea Damalerio (respondents) filed with the (RTC) of
General Santos City, a complaint for a sum of money against spouses Lorenzo and
Elenita Uy with application for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment.[5]

- RTC issued a Writ of Preliminary Attachment by virtue of which the property, then still
in the name of Lorenzo Uy but which had already been sold to petitioner, was levied. The
levy was duly recorded in the Register of Deeds of General Santos City and annotated
at the back of the title.

Title in the name of Lorenzo Uy was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, another certificate of
title was issued in the name of petitioner.[7] This new TCT carried with it the attachment in
favor of respondents.

***NIPALIT SI PETITIONER FROM SPOUSES UY, WALA NA REGISTER. NAAY KASO

ANG SPOUSES UY BY THE RESPONDENTS FOR COLLECTION OF SUM OF MONEY. SO
NIAPPLY ANG RESPONDENTS FOR WRIT OF ATTACHMENT OVER THE PROPERTY
NGA GIPALIT NI PETITIONER PERO REGISTERED PA SA NAME NI UY. NA LEVY GYUD
ANG YUTA AND THE LEVY WAS RECORDED IN THE REGISTER OF DEEDS. ANG TITLE
NI UY KAY GICANCEL AND THEN GITRANSFER SA NGAN SA PETITIONER, BUT IT
CARRIED WITH IT THE ATTACHMENT IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENTS.
Petitioner filed a third-party claim to discharge or annul the attachment levied on the
property on the ground that the said property belongs to him and no longer to Lorenzo
and Elenita Uy.[8]
- RTC ruled in favour of the petitioner.[9] Citing Manliguez v. Court of
Appeals[10] and Santos v. Bayhon,[11] it held that the levy of the property by virtue of
attachment is lawful only when the levied property indubitably belongs to the defendant.
Applying the rulings in the cited cases, it opined that although defendant Lorenzo Uy
remained the registered owner of the property attached, yet the fact was that he was no
longer the owner thereof as it was already sold earlier to petitioner, hence, the writ of
attachment was unlawful.
 Respondents sought reconsideration thereof which was denied by the trial court.

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the
resolution
- It declared that an attachment or levy of execution, though posterior to the sale, but if
registered before the sale is registered, takes precedence over the sale.[13] The writ of
attachment in favor of the respondents, being recorded ahead of the sale to petitioner, will
therefore take precedence.

Motion for reconsideration by the petitioner was dismissed.

***SA THIRD PARTY CLAIM BY THE PETITIONER TO ANNUL THE ATTACHMENT
LEVIED ON THE PROPERTY, NIFAVOR ANG RTC EXPLAINING THAT SINCE ANG
PROPERTY DILI NA OWNERSHIP NI UY, ENOUGH NANA PARA MUINGON NA LAWFUL
ANG WRIT, BISAN PA UG REGISTERED GIHAPON SIYA UNDER SA NAME NI UY. PERO
NIINGON ANG COURT OF APPEALS NA SAYOP NA. SINCE ANG WRIT OF ATTACHMENT
SA RESPONDENTS KAY NA RECORD UG UNA KAYSA SALE, ANG ATTACHMENT JUD
ANG MUBIND, DILI ANG PRIOR SALE.
GI UPHOLD NI SA SUPREME COURT! MAO NI ANG CONTENTION PUD SA
RESPONDENTS.
The primary issue
Whether or not a registered writ of attachment on the land is a superior lien over that of an
earlier unregistered deed of sale.

Ruling
PETITIONER: Petitioner maintains that he has a superior right over the questioned property
because when the same was attached, this property was no longer owned by spouses Uy against whom
attachment was issued as it was already sold to petitioner. The ownership thereof was already
transferred to petitioner pursuant to Article 1477[15] in relation to Article 1498[16] of the Civil Code.
- Dismissing the allegation that he slept on his rights by not immediately registering
at least an adverse claim based on his deed of sale, petitioner avers that he promptly
worked out for the transfer of registration in his name. The slight delay in the
registration, he claims was not due to his fault but attributable to the process
involved in the registration of property such as the issuance of the Department of
Agrarian Reform clearance which was effected only after compliance with several
requirements.
- Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining in this case, petitioner submits
it would be in accord with justice and equity to declare him as having a superior right to
the disputed property than the respondents.
RESPONDENTS: Respondents maintain the contrary view. They aver that registration of a
deed of sale is the operative act which binds the land and creates a lien thereon. Before the
registration of the deed, the property is not bound insofar as third persons are concerned. Since the writ
of attachment in favor of respondents was registered earlier than the deed of sale to petitioner,
respondents were of the belief that their registered writ of attachment on the subject property
enjoys preference and priority over petitioners earlier unregistered deed of sale over the same property.
They also contend that Articles 1477 and 1498 of the Civil Code as cited by petitioner are not
applicable to the case because said provisions apply only as between the parties to the deed of sale.
These provisions do not apply to, nor bind, third parties, like respondents, because what affects or
binds third parties is the registration of the instrument in the Register of Deeds.
- Furthermore, respondents argue that petitioner cannot invoke equity in his favor unless
the following conditions are met: (a) the absence of specific provision of a law on the
matter; and (b) if the person who invokes it is not guilty of delay. Both conditions
have not been met, however, since there is a law on the subject matter, i.e., Section
51 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, and that petitioner allegedly slept on his rights
by not immediately registering an adverse claim based on his deed of sale.
We agree with the respondents.
The law applicable to the facts of this case is Section 51 of P.D. No. 1529. Said Section provides:

Sec. 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. - An owner of registered land may convey,
mortgage, lease, charge, or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may use
such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no
deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect
registered land, shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract
between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration.

The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third
persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of
the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies.

It is to be noted that though the subject land was deeded to petitioner as early as 05 December 1995,
it was not until 06 June 1996 that the conveyance was registered, and, during that interregnum, the land
was subjected to a levy on attachment. It should also be observed that, at the time of the attachment
of the property on 23 April 1996, the spouses Uy were still the registered owners of said property.
Under the cited law, the execution of the deed of sale in favor of petitioner was not enough as a
succeeding step had to be taken, which was the registration of the sale from the spouses Uy to him.
Insofar as third persons are concerned, what validly transfers or conveys a persons interest in real
property is the registration of the deed. Thus, when petitioner bought the property on 05 December
1995, it was, at that point, no more than a private transaction between him and the spouses Uy. It
needed to be registered before it could bind third parties, including respondents. When the
registration finally took place on 06 June 1996, it was already too late because, by then, the levy in
favor of respondents, pursuant to the preliminary attachment ordered by the General Santos City RTC,
had already been annotated on the title.
The settled rule is that levy on attachment, duly registered, takes preference over a prior unregistered
sale.[17] This result is a necessary consequence of the fact that the property involved was duly covered by
the Torrens system which works under the fundamental principle that registration is the operative act
which gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land.[18]
The preference created by the levy on attachment is not diminished even by the subsequent
registration of the prior sale. This is so because an attachment is a proceeding in rem.[19] It is against the
particular property, enforceable against the whole world. The attaching creditor acquires a specific lien on
the attached property which nothing can subsequently destroy except the very dissolution of the
attachment or levy itself.[20] Such a proceeding, in effect, means that the property attached is an indebted
thing and a virtual condemnation of it to pay the owners debt.[21] The lien continues until the debt is paid,
or sale is had under execution issued on the judgment, or until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment
discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law.
 Thus, in the registry, the attachment in favor of respondents appeared in the nature of a real
lien when petitioner had his purchase recorded. The effect of the notation of said lien was to subject
and subordinate the right of petitioner, as purchaser, to the lien. Petitioner acquired ownership of
the land only from the date of the recording of his title in the register, and the right of ownership
which he inscribed was not absolute but a limited right, subject to a prior registered lien of respondents, a
right which is preferred and superior to that of petitioner.[22]

[G.R. No. 127941. January 28, 1999]

BIBLIA TOLEDO-BANAGA and JOVITA TAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
CANDELARIO DAMALERIOrespondents.

Facts:
In an action for redemption filed by petitioner Banaga, the trial court declared that she
had lost her right to redeem her property earlier foreclosed and which was subsequently
sold at public auction to private respondents. ***
- Certificates of Title covering the said property were issued to private respondent
over which petitioner Banaga annotated a notice of lis pendens.[3]
- CA reversed and allowed the Banaga to redeem the property within a certain
period.[4]
- Private respondents petition to this Court was dismissed[5] and the decision became
final.***

Banaga tried to redeem the property by depositing with the trial court the amount of
redemption which was financed by her co-petitioner Tan.

Private respondent opposed the redemption arguing that it was made beyond the time
given to her by the court in the earlier case. ***

However, the lower court issued an order upholding the redemption and ordered the
Register of Deeds to cancel private respondents Certificates of Title and issue new titles
in the name of petitioner Banaga.[6]

When his motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court, respondent filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA.

Private respondent caused the annotation of said petition as another notice of lis
pendens on the Certificates of Title. Three days later, the CA issued a temporary
restraining order to enjoin the execution of the August 7, 1992 and January 4, 1993 orders.
***

Petitioner Banaga sold the subject property to petitioner Tan with the deed of absolute
sale mentioning private respondents certificate of title which was not yet cancelled. ***
 - Notwithstanding the notice of lis pendens, petitioner Tan subdivided the property in
question under a subdivision plan, which she made not in her name but in the name
of private respondent.
- There being no preliminary injunction issued and with the expiration of the TRO,
petitioner Tan asked the Register of Deeds to issue new titles in her name.
- Such titles were issued in petitioner Tans name but it still carried the annotations of the
two notices of lis pendens.

Upon learning of the new title of petitioner Tan, private respondent impleaded the
former in his petition.

CA set aside the August 7, 1992 and January 4, 1993 orders of the trial court and declared
private respondent absolute owner of the subject property.

- That decision became final and executory after petitioner Banagas petition for
review was dismissed by this Court for lack of merit.[8]
- Upon motion of private respondent, the trial court issued a writ of execution on
December 27, 1994 ordering the Register of Deeds to reinstate the Certificates of
Title in the name of the movant herein private respondent.

Register of Deeds refused to comply with the writ of execution alleging that the
Certificates of Title issued to petitioner Tan must first be surrendered.
- Accordingly, private respondent moved to cite the Register of Deeds in contempt of
court which was denied,
- Trial court ruled that the respondents remedy is by consulta to the Commissioner of
Land Registration.[10]

Trial court likewise denied private respondents motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession ruling that the latters remedy is a separate action to declare petitioner Tans
Certificates of Title void.
- private respondent again elevated the case to the CA via a petition
for certiorari and mandamus[11] assailing the above-mentioned two orders of the court a
quo naming as respondents the trial court judge, the Register of Deeds and the petitioners.
- CA rendered a decision granting the petition and, among others, set aside the
assailed orders of the trial court.

Upon denial by the CA of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed the instant
petition for certiorari and mandamus. The Court, however, is puzzled why petitioners, in
their petition, would seek to set aside the two orders (January 4, 1995 and March 29, 1996) of
respondent judge who was not named in their petition.[13]

The primary issue

Assuming this to be a mere lapsus since they also confusingly refer to Banaga and Tan as private
respondent and to Damalerio as petitioner,[14] the petition is still utterly without merit. It is
petitioners stand (1) that petitioner Tan is a buyer in good faith and (2) that the remedy of private
respondent to secure the titles in his name is by consulta to the Land Registration Commissioner
and not through contempt.
The Court is not convinced of the arguments proffered by petitioners.
By arguing that petitioner Tan was a buyer in good faith, petitioners in effect raise once more
the issue of ownership of the subject property. But such issue had already been clearly and
categorically ruled upon by the CA and affirmed by this Court, wherein private respondent was
adjudged the rightful and absolute owner thereof. The decision in that case bars a further repeated
consideration of the very same issue that has already been settled with finality. To once again re-
open that issue through a different avenue would defeat the existence of our courts as final arbiters
of legal controversies. Having attained finality, the decision is beyond review or modification even by
this Court.[15]
Under the principle of res judicata, the Court and the parties, are bound by such final decision,
otherwise, there will be no end to litigation. It is to the interest of the public that there should be an end
to litigation by the parties over a subject fully and fairly adjudicated, and an individual should not be
vexed twice for the same cause.[16] All the elements of res judicata are present in this case, which are:
(a) the former judgment must be final;
(b) the court which rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter;
(c) it must be a judgment on the merits;
(d) and there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, subject matter, and
cause of action.[17]
The judgment in the redemption suit had long become final and executory; there is no question
that the court had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter; it involves an adjudication
on the merits of the case as the court discussed and passed upon petitioner Banagas right of
redemption which she did not timely exercise and as a consequence, lost her claim of ownership of
the lot. Both petitioners and private respondent are parties to the earlier cases, disputing the same parcel
of land with both opposing parties claiming ownership thereof. Certainly, res judicata had set in. Besides,
once a judgment had become final and executory, it can no longer be disturbed no matter how erroneous
it may be. In any case, no such error was attributed to in this case.

Contrary to petitioners argument, private respondents remedy is not a direct or independent

civil action for cancellation of petitioner Tans titles. The facts, circumstances, evidence and
arguments invoked in this derailed final and executory decision are the very same matters that will
be established assuming such independent suit is legally warranted. It does not matter whether the
former case was a redemption suit and the new one will be for cancellation of title because the test
of identity of causes of action is not in its form but whether the same evidence would support and
establish the former and present causes of action.[18]

Petitioners other contention that the execution of the final and executory decision - which is to
issue titles in the name of private respondent - cannot be compelled by mandamus because of the
formality that the registered owner first surrenders her duplicate Certificates of Title for
cancellation per Section 80 of Presidential Decree 1529[19] cited by the Register of Deeds,[20] bears no
merit. In effect, they argue that the winning party must wait execution until the losing party has complied
with the formality of surrender of the duplicate title. Such preposterous contention borders on the
absurd and has no place in our legal system. Precisely, the Supreme Court had already affirmed the
CAs judgment that Certificates of Title be issued in private respondents name. To file another
action just to compel the registered owner, herein petitioner Tan, to surrender her titles constitute
violation of, if not disrespect to, the orders of the highest tribunal. Otherwise, if execution cannot be
had just because the losing party will not surrender her titles, the entire proceeding in the courts, not to
say the efforts, expenses and time of the parties, would be rendered nugatory. It is revolting to conscience
to allow petitioners to further avert the satisfaction of their obligation because of sheer literal adherence to
technicality,[21] or formality of surrender of the duplicate titles. The surrender of the duplicate is
implied from the executory decision since petitioners themselves were parties thereto. Besides, as
part of the execution process, it is a ministerial function of the Register of Deeds to comply with the
decision of the court to issue a title and register a property in the name of a certain person,
especially when the decision had attained finality, as in this case.
In addition, the enforcement of a final and executory judgment is likewise a ministerial
function of the courts[22] and does not call for the exercise of discretion.Being a ministerial duty, a
writ of mandamus lies to compel its performance.[23] Moreover, it is axiomatic that where a decision on
the merits is rendered and the same has become final and executory, as in this case, the action on
procedural matters or issues becomes moot and academic.[24] Thus, the so-called consulta to the
Commissioner of Land Registration, which is not applicable herein, was only a naive and belated
effort resorted to by petitioners in order to delay execution. If petitioners desire to stop the
enforcement of a final and executory decision, they should have secured the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction,[25] but which they did not avail knowing that there exists no legal or even
equitable justifications to support it.
At any rate, at the time petitioner Banaga sold the property to petitioner Tan, the latter was
well aware of the interest of private respondent over the lot. Petitioner Tan furnished the amount used
by petitioner Banaga for the attempted redemption. One who redeems in vain a property of another
acquires notice that there could be a controversy. It is for the same reason that petitioner Tan was
included as party to the case filed in court. Worse, at the time of the sale, petitioner Tan was buying a
property not registered in the sellers name. This clear from the deed of absolute sale which even
mentioned that the Certificates of Title is still in the name of private respondent. It is settled that a party
dealing with a registered land need not go beyond the Certificate of Title to determine the true owner
thereof so as to guard or protect her interest. She has only to look and rely on the entries in the Certificate
of Title. By looking at the title, however, petitioner Tan cannot feigned ignorance that the property
is registered in private respondents name and not in the name of the person selling to her. Such fact
alone should have at least prompted, if not impelled her to investigate deeper into the title of her
seller - petitioner Banaga, more so when such effort would not have entailed additional hardship,
and would have been quite easy, as the titles still carried the two notices of lis pendens.
By virtue of such notices, petitioner Tan is bound by the outcome of the litigation subject of
the lis pendens. As a transferee pendente lite, she stands exactly in the shoes of the transferor and must
respect any judgment or decree which may be rendered for or against the transferor. Her interest is subject
to the incidents or results of the pending suit, and her Certificates of Title will, in that respect, afford her
no special protection.[26]
To repeat, at the time of the sale, the person from whom petitioner Tan bought the property is
neither the registered owner nor was the former authorized by the latter to sell the same. She knew
she was not dealing with the registered owner or a representative of the latter. One who buys property
with full knowledge of the flaws and defects in the title of his vendor is enough proof of his bad
faith[27] and cannot claim that he acquired title in good faith as against the owner or of an interest
therein.[28] When she nonetheless proceeded to buy the lot, petitioner Tan gambled on the result of
litigation.[29] She is bound by the outcome of her indifference with no one to blame except herself if she
looses her claim as against one who has a superior right or interest over the property. These are the
undeniable and uncontroverted facts found by the CA, which petitioners even quote and cite in their
petition. As aptly concluded by the CA that petitioner Tan is indeed a buyer in bad faith on which the
Court agrees:

Notwithstanding her constructive and actual knowledge that Damalerio was claiming the land, that
the land was in his name, and it was involved in pending litigation, Jovita Tan bought it from
Banaga on January 7, 1993. The deed of sale recites that the parcels of land sold were covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title No. __ (formerly [T-12488] T-530) and TCT No. __ (formerly [T-12488] T-
530) (sic) and TCT No. __ (formerly P-1294). (Annex F, Petition). Apart from the fact that Banaga was
without any TCT, as above stated, TCT No. T-12488 was petitioners title (Annex C, Petition). Herein
private respondent Tan was buying a land not registered in her sellers (Banagas) name, but in that of
petitioner Damalerio who had been claiming it as his own. She admitted this fact when she had the land
subdivided on February 2, 1993 not in her name but in the name of Candelario Damalerio (Annex Q,
Reply). Evidently, she was a purchaser in bad faith because she had full knowledge of the flaws and
defects of title of her seller, Banaga. X x x.

The notice of lis pendens registered on March 3, 1993 involving the land in question and private
respondent Tans actual knowledge of the then pending Civil Case No. 2556, where the question as
to whether the redemption of the land which she financed was raised, rendered her a purchaser in
bad faith and made the decision therein binding upon her.[30]

Being a buyer in bad faith, petitioner Tan cannot acquire a better rights than her predecessor in
interest,[31] for she merely stepped into the shoes of the latter. Such finding of bad faith is final and may
not be re-opened for the law cannot allow the parties to trifle with the courts.[32]
With respect to the issue of possession, such right is a necessary incident of ownership. [33] The
adjudication of ownership to private respondent includes the delivery of possession since the
defeated parties in this case has not shown by what right to retain possession of the land
independently of their claim of ownership which was rejected.[34] Otherwise, it would be unjust if
petitioners who has no valid right over the property will retain the same. [35] Thus, the CA correctly
disagreed with the trial courts order denying private respondents motion for writ of possession for the
following reasons cited in its decision:
1. The order violates the doctrine laid down in Javier vs. Court of Appeals, 224 SCRA 704,
which ruled that the issuance of title in favor of a purchaser in bad faith does not exempt the
latter from complying with the decision adverse to his predecessor in interest, nor preclude him
from being reached by writ of execution;
2. Private respondent Tan was a party respondent in CA-G.R. SP No. 29869, she having been
impleaded in a supplemental petition, which this Court gave due course and required the
respondents to file their answer. The fact that she did not file any pleading, nor intervene
therein did not excuse her from being bound by the decision, otherwise all that a party
respondent was to fold his arm to prevent him from being bound by a decision in a case. Her
securing titles over the land during the pendency of said case did not protect her from the
effects of said decision. The validity of tile of a purchaser of registered land depends on
whether he had knowledge, actual or constructive, of defects in the title of his vendor. If he has
such knowledge, he is a purchaser in bad faith and acquires the land subject to such defects (X x
x indicates that citations of authorities omitted) The title secured by a purchaser in bad faith is a
nullity and gave the latter no right whatsoever, as against the owner (x x x).
3. Private respondent Tans titles and those of her predecessor, Banaga, arose from the void
orders of August 7, 1992 and January 4, 1993. Since a void order could not give rise to valid
rights, said titles were also necessarily null and void (x x x).
 4. Private respondents and respondent Judge executed the questioned orders of August 7, 1993
and January 4, 1993, pending review of said orders in CA-G.R. SP No. 29869. The nullification
of said orders by this out imposed upon the private respondents the obligation to return the
property to Damalerio and upon respondent Judge, upon motion for execution, to order the
cancellation of private respondents titles and the issuance of new titles to him.
5. This Court in its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 29869 declared petitioner Damalerio absolute
owner of the property in question. Private respondents were parties litigants in said case, who
did not claim possession of the land separately from their claim of ownership thereof. Such
being the case, the delivery of possession is considered included in this Courts decision
declaring Damalerio absolute owner of the property (x x x), which can be enforced by writ of
possession (x x x). In denying petitioners motion for writ of possession, the trial court violated
said doctrines, and
6. Lastly, the effect of respondent Judges order of March 29, 1996 is to re-open the decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 29689 for re-litigation and alteration in a separate action. For while this Court
already declared that Banagas redemption of the land financed by private respondent Tan was
invalid, and as a consequence declared Damalerio absolute owner of the property, which was
binding against private respondent Tan, as she was a respondent therein and a
purchaser pendente lite and in bad faith, the order of the respondent Court holding that another
civil action be filed to annul private respondent Tans titles would be to re-litigate such issues
and modify or alter this Courts final decision.
The respondent Court has no authority to do so.[36]

THIRD DIVISION

SPOUSES LETICIA & JOSE ERVIN G.R. No. 189239

ABAD, SPS. ROSARIO AND ERWIN
COLLANTES, SPS. RICARDO AND FELITA Present:
ANN, SPS. ELSIE AND ROGER LAS PIAS,
LINDA LAYDA, RESTITUTO MARIANO, CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson, J.,
SPS. ARNOLD AND MIRIAM MERCINES, BRION,
SPS. LUCITA AND WENCESLAO A. BERSAMIN
RAPACON, SPS. ROMEO AND EMILYN VILLARAMA, JR., and
HULLEZA, LUZ MIPANTAO, SPS. HELEN SERENO, JJ.
AND ANTHONY TEVES, MARLENE
TUAZON, SPS. ZALDO AND MIA SALES,
SPS. JOSEFINA AND JOEL YBERA, SPS.
LINDA AND JESSIE CABATUAN, SPS.
WILMA AND MARIO ANDRADA, SPS.
RAYMUNDO AND ARSENIA LELIS, FREDY
AND SUSANA PILONEO,
Petitioners,

- versus -
FIL-HOMES REALTY and DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION and MAGDIWANG Promulgated:
REALTY CORPORATION,
Respondents.
November 24, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

Facts:

Respondents (Filhomes) alleged that petitioners (Abad), through tolerance, had

occupied the subject lots since 1980 but ignored their repeated demands to vacate them.

Petitioners countered that there is no possession by tolerance for they have been in
adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the lots for more than 30 years;
and that respondents predecessor-in-interest, Pilipinas Development Corporation, had no
title to the lots. In any event, they contend that the question of ownership must first be
settled before the issue of possession may be resolved. WRONG!

During the pendency of the case, the City of Paraaque filed expropriation proceedings
covering the lots before the RTC of Paranaque with the intention of establishing a
socialized housing project therein for distribution to the occupants including petitioners.

- A writ of possession was consequently issued and a Certificate of Turn-over given to

the City.

Branch 77 of the MeTC rendered judgment in the unlawful detainer case against
petitioners (Abad).

- held that as no payment had been made to respondents for the lots, respondents still
maintain ownership thereon;
- that petitioners cannot claim a better right by virtue of the issuance of a Writ of
Possession for the project beneficiaries have yet to be named. ***

On appeal, the (RTC) reversed the MeTC decision and dismissed respondents complaint
- The RTC went on to rule that the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the City
bars the continuation of the unlawful detainer proceedings, and since the judgment
had already been rendered in the expropriation proceedings which effectively
turned over the lots to the City, the MeTC has no jurisdiction to disregard the . . .
 final judgment and writ of possession due to non-payment of just compensation.
WRONG!

Before the Court of Appeals where respondents filed a petition for review, respondents
maintained that respondents act of allowing several years to pass without requiring
[them] to vacate nor filing an ejectment case against them amounts to acquiescence or
tolerance of their possession.[5]
- CA noting that petitioners did not present evidence to rebut respondents allegation of
possession by tolerance, and considering petitioners admission that they commenced
occupation of the property without the permission of the previous owner Pilipinas
Development Corporation as indicium of tolerance by respondents predecessor-in-
interest, ruled in favor of respondents.

- Respecting the issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation proceedings, the

appellate court, citing Republic v. Gingoyon,[8] held the same does not signify the
completion of the expropriation proceedings. Petitioners motion for reconsideration
was denied by Resolution dated August 26, 2009, hence, the filing of the present petition
for review.***

The petition fails. Abads are wrong!

In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the State expropriates private property for
public use upon payment of just compensation. A socialized housing project falls within the ambit
of public use as it is in furtherance of the constitutional provisions on social justice.[9]

As a general rule, ejectment proceedings, due to its summary nature, are not suspended or their resolution
held in abeyance despite the pendency of a civil action regarding ownership.

EXCEPTION: Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 538[10] enlightens, however:

Section 1. When the Government seeks to acquire, through purchase or

expropriation proceedings, lands belonging to any estate or chaplaincy (cappellania), any
action for ejectment against the tenants occupying said lands shall be automatically
suspended, for such time as may be required by the expropriation proceedings or the
necessary negotiations for the purchase of the lands, in which latter case, the period of
suspension shall not exceed one year.
 To avail himself of the benefits of the suspension, the tenants shall pay to the
landowner the current rents as they become due or deposit the same with the
court where the action for ejectment has been instituted. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Petitioners did not comply with any of the acts mentioned in the law to avail of the benefits of the
suspension. They nevertheless posit that since the lots are the subject of expropriation proceedings,
respondents can no longer assert a better right of possession; and that the City Ordinance authorizing the
initiation of expropriation proceedings designated them as beneficiaries of the lots, hence, they are
entitled to continue staying there. WRONG!

Petitioners position does not lie.

The exercise of expropriation by a local government unit is covered by Section 19 of the
Local Government Code (LGC):

SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief
executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for
public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon
payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and
pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be
exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and
such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may
immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation
proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent
(15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the
property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the
expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market
value of the property.
Lintag v. National Power Corporation[11] clearly outlines the stages of expropriation, viz:

Expropriation of lands consists of two stages:

The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise
the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts
involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to
be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the
payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint x x x.

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by
the court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by
the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners x x x .
 It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have
been completed. The process is not complete until payment of just compensation.
Accordingly, the issuance of the writ of possession in this case does not write finis to
the expropriation proceedings. To effectuate the transfer of ownership, it is
necessary for the NPC to pay the property owners the final just
compensation.[12] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In the present case, the mere issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation proceedings did
not transfer ownership of the lots in favor of the City. Such issuance was only the first stage in
expropriation. There is even no evidence that judicial deposit had been made in favor of respondents
prior to the Citys possession of the lots, contrary to Section 19 of the LGC.

- Respecting petitioners claim that they have been named beneficiaries of the lots, the
city ordinance authorizing the initiation of expropriation proceedings does not state
so.[13] Petitioners cannot thus claim any right over the lots on the basis of the
ordinance.

- Even if the lots are eventually transferred to the City, it is non sequitur for
petitioners to claim that they are automatically entitled to be beneficiaries
thereof. For certain requirements must be met and complied with before they can be
considered to be beneficiaries.

In another vein, petitioners posit that respondents failed to prove that their possession is by
mere tolerance. This too fails. Apropos is the ruling in Calubayan v. Pascual:[14]

In allowing several years to pass without requiring the occupant to vacate the
premises nor filing an action to eject him, plaintiffs have acquiesced to
defendants possession and use of the premises. It has been held that a person
who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied
promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against them. The status of the defendant is
analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose
occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the
demand to vacate. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)