Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
MARSMAN
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the Honorable Conrado,
M. Vasquez, presiding, sentencing defendants-appellants to pay the amounts of
P44,134.35, P6,603.20 and P456.12, plus legal interest from August 26, 1959, on the first
item, and, from September 5, 1958, on the later two, representing sales taxes and forest
charges, together with surcharges and penalties.
As found by His Honor, the factual setting of the decision is as follows:
Defendant corporation was a timber licensee holding Timber Licensee Agreement No.
37-A, with concessions in the Municipality of Basud and Mondazo, Camarines Norte.
Sometime before October 15, 1953 an investigation was conducted on the business
operation and activities of the corporation leading to the discovery that certain taxes were
due (from) it on logs produced from its concession. On October 15, 1953, the Deputy
Collector of Internal Revenue demanded the payment of P13,136.00 representing forest
charges due from May 18, 1950 to September 30, 1953, and a surcharge of 25% (Exh.
M). On September 13, 1954, after further investigation another assessment was sent to
the defendant corporation by the Bureau of Internal Revenue demanding from it the total
sum of P45,541.66 representing deficiency sales tax, forest charges, surcharges and
penalties (Exh. A). On November 8, 1954 another assessment was addressed to the
defendant corporation for the payment of P456.12 as 25% surcharge for discharging
lumber without permit (Exh. P). The three assessments totalling P59,133.78 are the
subject matter of the instant case for collection.
xxx xxx xxx
The-contention of the defendant that the assessment in question have not yet become
final and executory is not borne out by the record. The Bureau of Internal Revenue made
its first demand for the payment of P13,136.00 as forest charges and surcharges in the
letter dated October 15, 1953 (Exh. M). After further investigation, a second assessment
in the total amount of P45,541.66 was demanded from the defendant corporation
representing sales tax and surcharges, and is contained in the letter dated September
13, 1954 (Exh. A). The third assessment for the payment of P456.12 representing 25%
surcharge for discharging lumber without permit was made on November 8, 1954 (Exh.
B).
The first acknowledgment by the defendant corporation of its receipt of assessment
contained in the letter of September 13, 1954, Exh. A, was the letter of the defendant
corporation under the signature of its counsel, Atty. Pedro L. Moya dated December 28,
1954, wherein it is requested that said defendant be furnished with an itemized statement
of the said taxes and wherein notice is served of its intention to question the validity and
the legality of the assessments and to appear before the Conference Staff of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue in connection with the said tax (Exhibit B). In reply to the letter, Exhibit
B, the Bureau of Internal Revenue wrote Atty. Moya a letter dated February 11, 1955
informing him that before the case may be acted upon by the Conference Staff, it was
necessary that the defendant corporation comply within 10 days from date of said letter,
with the provisions of Dept. Order No. 213 dated November 2, 1954 which required,
among others, that requests for reinvestigation or reexamination of tax assessments shall
be made in writing under oath of the taxpayer concerned, specifying the ground or
grounds relied upon for the revision of the assessment and accompanied by such
documents and other documents relied upon in support of the request; and that, as a
general rule, the revision will be granted only upon payment of one-half of the total
assessments and upon filing of a bond to guarantee the payment of the balance of the
tax (Exhibit C). Acknowledgment of Exhibit C was made by Atty. Moya in the latter's letter
of February 23, 1955 wherein, for the reasons therein stated, he requested exemption
from the requirements contained in the letter Exhibit C (Exhibit D). In Reply to Exhibit D,
the Collector of Internal Revenue wrote Atty. Moya on May 3, 1955 informing him that his
request to exempt his client from the requirements contained in the letter dated February
11, 1955, cannot be favorably considered and that in order that the Conference Staff may
be directed to hear the case on the merits, the said requirements must be complied with
within five days from receipt of said letter; otherwise, the "assessment will be considered
final" (Exhibit E). A follow-up letter dated June 4, 1955, was addressed to Atty. Moya after
discovering that the requirements mentioned in the letters dated February 11, 1955 and
March 3, 1955 have not been complied with inspite of the considerable length of time that
had already elapsed (Exhibit F). In the last paragraph of the said letter, Exhibit F, the
defendant corporation was warned that unless the aforementioned requirements are
complied with within five (5) days from receipt, the "case will be considered abandoned
and appropriate action will be taken in accordance with law". Again on November 14,
1955, after discovering that the letters dated February 11, 1955, March 3, 1955 and June
4, 1955 have remained unheeded by the defendant corporation, the latter was given
another chance of complying with the requirements mentioned within five days from
receipt of said letter otherwise, the Bureau of Internal Revenue "will be constrained to
enforce the immediate collection of the deficiency percentage tax and forest charges due"
(Exhibit G).
On April 27, 1956, the Bureau of Internal Revenue issued "final tax notices" to the
defendant corporation. Although the letters containing the "final tax notices" were not
presented in evidence, the defendants admit having received the same, as shown by the
contents of defendant corporation's letters dated May 10, 1956, Exhibit H, and August 7,
1956, Exhibit J. In said Exhibit H defendant corporation again protested the assessment
of P45,541.66 and reiterated its request for specification of the items disputing the
assessment in question. It further requests for a period of 30 days from the receipt of the
specifications within which to consider its tax liability, further reserving its right to contest
the legality or validity of the assessment or any particular items thereof within the said
period of 30 days. Defendant corporation also protested the sending of final notices and
requested that they be countermanded or withheld. Finding no merit in the protests of the
defendant corporation, a warrant of distraint and levy was issued against it by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue on July 3, 1956 (Exhibit O).
On August 3, 1956, defendant corporation again wrote the Collector of Internal Revenue
acknowledging the receipt of the warrant of distraint and levy served upon it and
reiterating its request for a specification of the different items of the assessment, subject
to the right to contest the legality and validity of the same within 30 days after receipt of
said specifications (Exh. J). The record does not show what action was taken on the
request contained in said letter on August 3, 1956. The next communication appearing in
the record is that of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue dated July 30, 1959,
addressed to the defendant corporation demanding on the letter the payment of the
assessment of P45,541.66 which has remained unpaid, and informing the said
corporation that if they do not settle said tax obligation within five days from receipt
thereof, the Bureau of Internal Revenue will be constrained to file an action in Court for
the collection thereof without further notice (Exhibit I). Defendant corporation replied to
Exhibit I in a letter dated August 17, 1959 stating that it needed more time to go over the
records and vouchers, and requesting for an extension of 10 days (Exhibit E). In another
letter of same date, the defendant corporation reiterated its exception to the validity and
legality of the assessment against it in the sum of P45,541.66 and its request for a detailed
statement of the transactions involved (Exhibit L). [Record on Appeal pp. 188-189, 190-
195.]
According to the Record on Appeal, and as additionally stated also by the trial court, the
original complaint filed on September 5, 1958 prayed for the payment of only P13,695.96,
and it was only in an amended complaint filed on August 26, 1959 and admitted on
September 23, 1959 that, for the first time, the amount of P59,133.78 was judicially
demanded to be paid.
Upon these facts, appellants now complain that
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE NOTICES OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE DATED APRIL 27, 1956 WERE THE
"ASSESSMENTS" THAT BECAME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S RIGHT TO
ASSESS AND COLLECT THE TAXES FOR THE YEARS 1947 TO SEPTEMBER 23,
1949 HAS NOT PRESCRIBED.
III
THE LOWER COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S
RIGHT TO COLLECT THE SUM OF P45,541.66 HAS NOT PRESCRIBED.
IV
THE LOWER COURT FURTHER ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT SUIT AGAINST
F.H. BURGESS IN HIS CAPACITY AS LIQUIDATOR OF MARSMAN DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY HAS PRESCRIBED AND IN ORDERING HIM TO PAY THE SUMS
CONTAINED IN ITS DECISION.
The Court does not agree.
Anent the first assignment of error, it may be stated that regardless of what might have
been alleged in appellee's pleadings and memoranda, the facts proven by evidence,
which are not alleged to have been objected to as varying supposed judicial admissions,
unmistakably show that when Atty. Pedro L. Moya acknowledged receipt on December
28, 1954, on behalf of appellant corporation, of the Bureau of Internal Revenue's
assessments of September 13, 1954 and November 8, 1954, requesting at the same time
for a reinvestigation before the Conference Staff, he was informed that his request for
investigation would not be given due course unless his client priorly complied within ten
(10) days from Februaxy 11, 1955, the date of the letter of the Bureau, with the provisions
of Department Order No. 213, dated November 2, 1954, which required inter alia, that
requests for reinvestigation or reexamination of tax assessments should be made in
writing and under oath of the taxpayer concerned, specifying the ground or grounds relied
upon for the requested revision and accompanied by the documents relied upon, in
support of the request, as well as by the payment of one-half of the total assessments,
plus a bond to guarantee payment of the balance, but appellants failed to comply with
said conditions: that in reply to Atty. Moya's request for exemption from the Department
order, on March 3, 1955 (not May), the attorney was advised that his request was denied
and that if the corporation failed to comply therewith within five (5) days from receipt of
the letter, "the assessment (would) be considered final"; that on June 4, 1955, said Atty.
Moya was reminded in writing that the previous demands had not been properly attended
to, with the warning that should appellants further fail to comply with the requirements in
the letter of February 11, 1955, within five (5) days from receipt thereof, the "case (would)
be considered abandoned and appropriate action (would) be taken in accordance with
law"; that even as late as November 14, 1955, the corporation was again advised to
comply with the earlier communications of February 11, 1955, March 3, 1955 and June
4, 1955, within five days, otherwise, the Bureau of Internal Revenue would "be
constrained to enforce immediate collection of the deficiency percentage tax and forest
charges due"; that as nothing was done by it to comply with this last letter, the Bureau of
Internal Revenue issued, on April 27, 1956, "final tax notices" to it, and all that the latter
did after receipt thereof was to reiterate, by its letters of May 19, 1956 and August 7,
1956, its request for specification of the items involved in the assessment and for another
period of 30 days within which to consider its tax liabilities, reserving once more its right
to contest the legality or validity of the assessment and to protest the issuance of the "final
tax notices"; that evidently tired of awaiting compliance by the said appellant, the Bureau
of Internal Revenue issued on July 3, 1956 a warrant of distraint and levy against it, which
it acknowledged on August 3, 1956, only to reiterate again its position previously stated
of asking for specification and reserving its right to contest the validity of the assessment;
that, finally, on July 30, 1959, after three years, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
made extrajudicial demand for payment of the amounts in question within five (5) days,
and since no payment came, and instead, defendants asked for more time to go over the
records and, under separate cover, questioned for the nth time, the validity of the
assessment, the present action was filed.
Under these circumstances, it is plain that His Honor committed no error in holding that
the period to question the tax assessments herein involved had already expired when the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue initiated this suit against defendants. Defendant
corporation aknowledged receipt of the said assessments way back on December 28,
1954, and, in fact, it requested for a reinvestigation before the Conference Staff, but when
the Bureau demanded compliance with the prerequisites aforementioned of such
reinvestigation, the corporation failed to comply. The corporation did ask for exemption,
but when this request was denied, again there was no compliance. In view of such non-
compliance, in its letter of March 3, 1955, the Bureau unequivocally warned the
corporation that should it fail further to comply, within five days from receipt thereof, the
"assessments (would) be considered final". still no compliance came. Subsequent follow-
up letters brought no better results.
As it appears, therefore, appellant corporation, by its own omission, made it impossible
for the Bureau of Internal Revenue to act on its motion for reconsideration. Not that it
would have otherwise mattered, for it has been held that the mere filing of such a motion
does not suspend the running of the period for the collection of the tax, 1 which implies
that any assessment made by the Bureau is supposed to be final and executory, insofar
as the taxpayer is concerned, unless revised by the Bureau in accordance with law and
regulations, but it is to be emphasized that a taxpayer cannot delay the collection of taxes
by the simple expedient of barely asking for clarification or reconsideration, very often
unnecessary and unwarranted, without doing anything to comply with the statutory and
reglementary requirements for the reconsideration of the assessment made against him.
In any event, since appellant corporation did nothing from December, 1954 when it
acknowledged receipt of the assessment now impugned to appeal the same, if such an
appeal was possible, to the Court of Tax Appeals, even after it was warned by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue that its failure to comply with the requirements for reconsideration
within five (5) days would result in its being "considered" final, We find no merit in
appellants' posture that the assessments here in question has not yet become final and
executory. Consequently, overruling of appellants' first assignment of error is clearly in
order.
In their second assignment of error, appellants raise the issue of prescription. They point
out that the Collector of Internal Revenue had only five years within which to assess the
percentage and forest charges herein involved. Since it does not appear, however, that
appellant corporation had filed any return in relation to the taxes herein involved, and it
was incumbent upon appellants to show that such a return had been submitted,2 We find
the following holding of His Honor to be fully in accordance with law:
Defendants' contention that the right to assess the percentage and forest charges for the
period from 1947 to September 23, 1949 had already prescribed is based on the provision
of Section 231 of the Revenue Code which requires the Collector of Internal Revenue to
assess the tax within the period of five years. The Court agrees with the plaintiff that said
Section 231 is not applicable in this case inasmuch as defendant corporation did not file
returns for the taxes in question. The pertinent provision applicable herein is Section 332
(a) which provides that "in case of a false or fraudulent return or of a failure to file a return,
the tax may be assessed ... at anytime within ten years after the discovery of the falsity,
fraud or omission." The assessments made on October 15, 1953, September 13, 1954,
and November 3, 1954 were all within the aforecited 10-year period for the assessment
of the tax.
Even if the Court were to consider, as appellants suggest, the fact brought out in their
brief but not found by the trial court that what are being sought to be collected are
deficiency taxes, thereby implying a return must have been filed, nothing can he gained
by appellants, for in order that the filing of a return may serve as the starting point of the
period for the making of an assessment, the return must be as substantive complete as
to include the needed details on which the full assessment may be made, and appellants
have not shown that such was the nature of the return they would infer had been filed by
the corporation.3
Appellants' third assignment of error does not require any extended discussion. The
argument thereunder that the judicial action for the recovery of the bigger amount of
P45,541.66 was not filed within five (5) years from September 13, 1954, the date of the
earliest assessment, has neither factual nor legal basis. As aptly explained by his Honor,
such argument proceeds from the erroneous premises that because the amended
complaint in which the said amount was first alleged and demanded was formally
admitted by the court only on September 23, 1959 and that the filing of said amended
complaint on August 26, 1959 is immaterial. While in the procedural sense, especially in
relation to the possible necessity of and time for the filing of responsive and other
corresponding pleadings, an amended complaint is deemed filed only as of the date of its
admission, nothing in Breslin v. Luzon, 84 Phil. 625, relied upon by appellant, was
intended to modify the self-evident proposition that for practical reasons and to avoid the
complications that may rise from undue delays in the admission thereof, such an
amended complaint must be considered as filed, for the purposes of such a substantive
matter as prescription, on the date it is actually filed with the court, regardless of when it
is ultimately formally admitted by the court. After all, the only purpose of requiring leave
of and formal admission by the court of an amended pleading after issues have already
been joined as to the original ones is to prevent the injection of other issues which might
either to be considered as barred already or made the subject of another proceeding, if
they are not anyway indispensable for the resolution of the original ones and no
unnecessary multiplicity of suits would result; so, when the court ultimately admits the
amendment, the legal effect, for substantive purposes, of such admission retroacts as a
rule to the date of its actual filing.
Appellants' last assignment of error was disposed of by the trial court this wise:
The defendants further contend that the present action is already barred under section
77 of the Corporation Law, Act No. 1459, as amended, which allows the corporate
existence of a corporation to continue only for three years after its dissolution, for the
purpose of presenting or defending suits by or against it, and to settle and close its affairs.
They point out that inasmuch as the Marsman Development Co. was extra-judicially
dissolved on April 23, 1954, a fact admitted in the amended complaint, the filing of both
the original complaint on September 8, 1958 and the amended complaint on August 26,
1956 was beyond the aforesaid three-year period.
The record shows that the filing of the amended complaint was intended, among others,
to include as a party defendant, in an alternative capacity, Mr. F.H. Burgess, who is the
liquidator of the Marsman Development Co. Although it is an admitted fact that the
defendant corporation was extrajudicially dissolved on April 23, 1954, there is no claim
that the affairs of said corporation had already been finally liquidated or settled. Evidently,
Mr. F.H. Burgess is still continuing in his aforesaid capacity as liquidator of the Marsman
Development Co. While section 77 of the Corporation Law provides for a three-year
period for the continuation of the corporate existence of the corporation for purposes of
liquidation, there is nothing in said provision which bars an action for the recovery of the
debts of the corporation against the liquidator thereof, after the lapse of the said three-
year period.
We agree with His Honor. The stress given by appellants to the extinction of the corporate
and juridical personality as such of appellant corporation by virtue of its extra-judicial
dissolution which admittedly took place on April 23, 1954 is misdirected. While Section
77 of the Corporation Law does provide that:
Every corporation whose charter expires by its own limitation or is annulled by forfeiture
or otherwise, or whose corporate existence for other purposes is terminated in any other
manner, shall nevertheless be continued as a body corporate for three years after the
time when it would have been so dissolved, for the purpose of prosecuting and defending
suits by or against it and of enabling it gradually to settle and close its affairs, to dispose
of and convey its property and to divide its capital stock, but not for the purpose of
continuing the business for which it was established.
the next provision, Section 78, adds for clarification:
At any time during said three years said corporation is authorized and empowered to
convey all of its property to trustees for the benefit of members, stock-holders, creditors,
and others interested. From and after any such conveyance by the corporation of its
property in trust for the benefit of its members, stockholders, creditors, and others in
interest, all interest which the corporation had in the property terminates, the legal interest
vests in the trustee, and the beneficial interest in the members, stockholders, creditors,
or other persons in interest.
It is to be recalled that the assessments against appellant corporation for deficiency taxes
due for its operations since 1947 were made by the Bureau of Internal Revenue on
October 15, 1953, September 13, 1954 and November 8, 1954, such that the first was
before its dissolution and the last two not later than six months after such dissolution.
Thus, in whatever way the matter may be viewed, the Government became the creditor
of the corporation before the completion of its dissolution by the liquidation of its assets.
Appellant F.H. Burgess, whom it chose as liquidator, became in law the trustee of all its
assets for the benefit of all persons enumerated in Section 78, including its creditors,
among whom is the Government, for the taxes herein involved. To assume otherwise
would render the extra-judicial dissolution illegal and void, since, according to Section 62
of the Corporation Law, such kind of dissolution is permitted only when it "does not affect
the rights of any creditor having a claim against the corporation." It is immaterial that the
present action was filed after the expiration of three years after April 23, 1954, for at the
very least, and assuming that judicial enforcement of taxes may not be initiated after said
three years despite the fact that the actual liquidation has not been terminated and the
one in charge thereof is still holding the assets of the corporation, obviously for the benefit
of all the creditors thereof, the assessment aforementioned, made within the three years,
definitely established the Government as a creditor of the corporation for whom the
liquidator is supposed to hold assets of the corporation. And since the suit at bar is only
for the collection of taxes finally assessed against the corporation within the three years
invoked by appellants, their fourth assignment of error cannot be sustained. As to the
allegation that appellant Burgess has not in fact received any property or asset of the
corporation, that is a matter that can well be taken care of in the execution of the judgment
which may be rendered herein, albeit it seems some kind of fraud would be perceptible,
if the corporation had been dissolved without leaving any assets whatsoever with the
liquidator.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed with costs against the
appellants.
CIR v. PHOENIX ASSURANCE
From a judgment of the Court of Tax Appeals in C.T.A. Cases Nos. 305 and 543,
consolidated and jointly heard therein, these two appeals were taken. Since they involve
the same facts and interrelated issues, the appeals are herein decided together.
Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd., a foreign insurance corporation organized under the laws
of Great Britain, is licensed to do business in the Philippines with head office in London.
Through its head office, it entered in London into worldwide reinsurance treaties with
various foreign insurance companies. It agree to cede a portion of premiums received
on original insurances underwritten by its head office, subsidiaries, and branch offices
throughout the world, in consideration for assumption by the foreign insurance
companies of an equivalent portion of the liability from such original
insurances.1wph1.t
Pursuant to such reinsurance treaties, Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd., ceded portions of
the premiums it earned from its underwriting business in the Philippines, as follows:
Ye
Amount Ceded
ar
195
P316,526.75
2
195
P246,082.04
3
195
P203,384.69
4
upon which the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, by letter of May 6, 1958, assessed
the following withholding tax:
Ye
Withholding Tax
ar
195
P 75,966.42
2
195
59,059.68
3
195
48,812.32
4
Tot
P183,838.42
al
=============
On April 1, 1951, Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd. filed its Philippine income tax return for
1950, claiming therein, among others, a deduction of P37,147.04 as net addition to
marine insurance reserve equivalent to 40% of the gross marine insurance premiums
received during the year. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed
P11,772.57 of such claim for deduction and subsequently assessed against Phoenix
Assurance Co., Ltd. the sum of P1,884.00 as deficiency income tax. The disallowance
resulted from the fixing by the Commissioner of the net addition to the marine insurance
reserve at 100% of the marine insurance premiums received during the last three
months of the year. The Commissioner assumed that "ninety and third, days are
approximately the length of time required before shipments reach their destination or
before claims are received by the insurance companies."
On April 1, 1953, Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd. filed its Philippine income tax return for
1952, declaring therein a deduction from gross income of P35,912.25 as part of the
head office expenses incurred for its Philippine business, computed at 5% on its gross
Philippine income.
On August 30, 1955 it amended its income tax return for 1952 by excluding from its
gross income the amount of P316,526.75 representing reinsurance premiums ceded to
foreign reinsurers and further eliminating deductions corresponding to the coded
premiums. The amended return showed an income tax due in the amount of P2,502.00.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed P15,826.35 of the claimed deduction
for head office expenses and assessed a deficiency tax of P5,667.00 on July 24, 1958.
On April 30, 1954, Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd. filed its Philippine income tax return for
1953 and claimed therein a deduction from gross income of P33,070.88 as head office
expenses allocable to its Philippine business, equivalent to 5%, of its gross Philippine
income. On August 30, 1955 it amended its 1953 income tax return to exclude from its
gross income the amount of P246,082.04 representing reinsurance premiums ceded to
foreign reinsurers. At the same time, it requested the refund of P23,409.00 as overpaid
income tax for 1953. To avoid the prescriptive period provided for in Section 306 of the
Tax Code, it filed a petition for review on April 11, 1956 in the Court of Tax Appeals
praying for such refund. After verification of the amended income tax return the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed P12,304.10 of the deduction representing
head office expenses allocable to Philippine business thereby reducing the refundable
amount to P20,180.00.
On April 29, 1955, Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd. filed its Philippine income tax return for
1954 claiming therein, among others, a deduction from gross income of P99,624.75 as
head office expenses allocable to its Philippine business, computed at 5% of its gross
Philippine income. It also excluded from its gross income the amount of P203,384.69
representing reinsurance premiums ceded to foreign reinsurers not doing business in
the Philippines.
On August 1, 1958 the Bureau of Internal Revenue released the following assessment
for deficiency income tax for the years 1952 and 1954 against Phoenix Assurance Co.,
Ltd.:
1952
Net income per audited return P 12,511.61
Unallowable deduction & additional income:
Overclaimed Head Office expenses:
Amount claimed . . . . . . . . . . . . P 35,912.25
Amount allowed . . . . . . . . . . . . 20,085.90 P 15,826.35
Appeal from the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals dated June 20, 1968, in its CTA
Case No. 1346, cancelling and declaring of no force and effect the assessment made
by the petitioner, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, against the accumulated surplus
of the respondent, Ayala Securities Corporation.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On November 29, 1955, respondent Ayala Securities Corporation, a domestic
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, filed its income tax
returns with the office of the petitioner for its fiscal year which ended on September 30,
1955. Attached to its income tax return was the audited financial statements of the
respondent corporation as of September 30, 1955, showing a surplus of P2,758,442.37.
The income tax due on the return of the respondent corporation was duly paid for within
the time prescribed by law.
In a letter dated February 21, 1961, petitioner advised the respondent corporation of the
assessment of P758.687.04 on its accumulated surplus reflected on its income tax
return for the fiscal year which ended September 30, 1955 (Exit. D). The respondent
corporation, on the other hand, in a letter dated April 19, 1961, protested against the
assessment on its retained and accumulated surplus pertaining to the taxable year 1955
and sought reconsideration thereof for the reasons (1) that the accumulation of the
surplus was for a bona fide business purpose and not to avoid the imposition of income
tax on the individual shareholders, and (2) that the said assessment was issued beyond
the five-year prescriptive period (Exh. E).
On May 30, 1961, petitioner wrote respondent corporation's auditing and accounting
firm with the "advise that your request for reconsideration will be the subject matter of
further reinvestigation and a thorough analysis of the issues involved conditioned,
however, upon the execution of your client of the enclosed form for waiver of the
defense of prescription". (Exh. F) However, respondent corporation did not execute the
requested waiver of the statute of limitations, considering its claim that the assessment
in question had already prescribed.
On February 21, 1963, respondent corporation received a letter dated February 18,
1963, from the Chief, Manila Examiners, of the Office of the herein petitioner, calling the
attention of the respondent corporation to its outstanding and unpaid tax in the amount
of P708,687.04 and thereby requesting for the payment of the said amount within five
(5) days from receipt of the said letter (Exh. G). Believing the aforesaid letter to be a
denial of its protest, the herein respondent corporation filed with the Court of Tax
Appeals a Petition for Review of the assessment, docketed as CTA Case No. 1346.
Respondent corporation in its Petition for Review alleges that the assessment made by
petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue is illegal and invalid considering that (1)
the assessment in question, having been issued only on February 21, 1961, and
received by the respondent corporation on March 22, 1961, the same was issued
beyond the five-year period from the date of the filing of respondent corporations
income tax return November 29, 1955, and, therefore, petitioner's right to make the
assessment has already prescribed, pursuant to the provision of Section 331 of the
National Internal Revenue Code; and (2) the respondent corporation's accumulation of
surplus for the taxable year 1955 was not improper, considering that the retention of
such surplus was intended for legitimate business purposes and was not availed of by
the corporation to prevent the imposition of the income tax upon its shareholders.
Petitioner in his answer alleged that the assessment made by his office on the
accumulated surplus of the corporation as reflected on its income tax return for the
taxable year 1955 has not as yet prescribed and, further, that the respondent
corporation's accumulation of surplus for the taxable year 1955 was improper as the
retention of such surplus was availed of by the corporation to prevent the imposition of
the income tax upon the individual shareholders or members of the said corporation.
After trial the Court of Tax Appeals rendered its decision of June 20, 1968, the
dispositive portion of which is as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue
assessing petitioner the amount of P758,687.04 as 25 surtax and interest is reversed.
Accordingly, said assessment of respondent for 1955 is hereby cancelled and declared
of no force and effect. Without pronouncement as to costs.
From this decision, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue interposed this appeal.
Petitioner maintains that respondent Court of Tax Appeals erred in holding that the letter
dated February 18, 1963, (Exh. G) is a denial of the private respondent corporation's
protest against the assessment, and as such, is a decision contemplated under the
provisions of Sections 7 and 11 of Republic Act No. 1125. Petitioner contends that the
letter dated February 18, 1963, is merely an ordinary office letter designed to remind
delinquent taxpayers of their obligations to pay their taxes to the Government and,
certainly, not a decision on a disputed or protested assessment contemplated under
Section 7(1) of R.A. 1125.
Petitioner likewise maintains that the respondent Court of Tax Appeals erred in holding
that the assessment of P758,687.04 as surtax on private respondent corporation's
unreasonably accumulated profits or surplus had already prescribed. Petitioner further
contends that the applicable provision of law to this case is Section 332 (a) of the
National Internal Revenue Code which provides for a ten (10) year prescriptive period of
assessment, and not Section 331 thereof as held by the Tax Court which provides a
period of limitation of assessment for five (5) years only after the filing of the return.
Petitioner's theory, therefore, is to the effect that since the Corporate income tax return
in question was filed on, November 29, 1955, and the assessment thereto was issued
on February 21, 1961, said assessment is not barred by prescription as the same was
made very well within the ten (10) year period allowed by law.
Petitioner also maintains that the respondent Court of Tax Appeals erred in not deciding
the issue as to whether or not the accumulated profits or surplus is indispensable to the
business operations of the private respondent corporation. It is the contention of the
petitioner that the accumulation of profits or surplus was resorted to by the respondent
corporation in order to avoid the payment of taxes by its stockholders or members, and
was not availed of in order to meet the reasonable needs of its business operations.
The legal issues for resolution by this Court in this case are: (1) Whether or not the
instant case falls within the jurisdiction of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals; (2)
Whether or not the applicable provision of law to this case is Section 331 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, which provides for a five-year period of prescription of
assessment from the filing of the return, or Section 332(a) of the same Code which
provides for a ten-year period of limitation for the same purpose; and (3) Whether or not
the respondent Court of Tax Appeals committed a reversible error in not making any
ruling on the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the accumulated profits or surplus
in question of the private respondent corporation.
I
It is to be noted that the respondent Court of Tax Appeals is a court of special appellate
jurisdiction created under R. A. No. 1125. Thus under Section 7 (1), R. A. 1125, the
Court of Tax Appeals exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal
"decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed
assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties
imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue
Code or other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue".
The letter of February 18, 1963 (Exh. G), in the view of the Court, is tantamount to a
denial of the reconsideration or protest of the respondent corporation on the
assessment made by the petitioner, considering that the said letter is in itself a
reiteration of the demand by the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the settlement of the
assessment already made, and for the immediate payment of the sum of P758, 687.04
in spite of the vehement protest of the respondent corporation on April 21, 1961. This
certainly is a clear indication of the firm stand of petitioner against the reconsideration of
the disputed assessment in view of the continued refusal of the respondent corporation
to execute the waiver of the period of limitation upon the assessment in question.
This being so, the said letter amounts to a decision on a disputed or protested
assessment and, therefore, the court a quo did not err in taking cognizance of this case.
II
On the issue of whether Sec. 331 or See. 332(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code
should apply to this case, there is no iota of evidence presented by the petitioner as to
any fraud or falsity on the return with intent to evade payment of tax, not even in the
income tax assessment (Exh. 5) nor in the letter-decision of February 18, 1963 (Exh.
G), nor in his answer to the petition for review. Petitioner merely relies on the provisions
of Sec 25 of the National Internal Revenue Code, violation of which, according to
Petitioner, presupposes the existence of fraud. But this is begging the question and We
do not subscribe to the view of the petitioner.
Fraud is a question of fact and the circumstances constituting fraud must be alleged and
proved in the court below. The finding of the trial court as to its existence and non-
existence is final and cannot be reviewed here unless clearly shown to be erroneous
(Republic of the Philippines vs. Ker & Company, Ltd., L-21609, Sept. 29, 1966, 18
SCRA 207; Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Lilia Yusay Gonzales and the Court
of Tax Appeals,
L-19495, Nov. 24, 1966, 18 SCRA 757). Fraud is never lightly to be presumed because
it is serious charge (Yutivo Sons Hardware Company vs. Court of Tax Appeals and
Collector of Internal Revenue, L-13203, January 28,1961, 1 SCRA 160).
The applicable provision of law in this case is Section 331 of the National Internal
Revenue Code, to wit:
SEC. 331. Period of limitation upon assessment and collection. Except as provided in
the succeeding section, internal revenue taxes shall be assessed within five years after
the return was filed, and no proceeding in court without assessment for the collection of
such taxes shall be begun after the expiration of such period. For the purposes of this
section, a return filed before the last day prescribed by law for the filing thereof shall be
considered as filed on such last day: Provided, That this limitation shall not apply to
cases already investigated prior to the approval of this Code.
Under Section 46(d) of the National Internal Revenue Code, the Ayala Securities
Corporation designated September 30, 1955, as the last day of the closing of its fiscal
year, and under Section 46(b) the income tax returns for the said corporation shall be
filed on or before the fifteenth (15th) day of the fourth (4th) month following the close of
its fiscal year. The Ayala Securities Corporation could, therefore, file its income tax
returns on or before January 15, 1956. The assessment by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue shall be made within five (5) years from January 15, 1956, or not later
than January 15, 1961, in accordance with Section 331 of the National Internal Revenue
Code herein above-quoted. As the assessment issued on February 21, 1961, which
was received by the Ayala Securities Corporation on March 22, 1961, was made
beyond the five-year period prescribed under Section 331 of said Code, the same was
made after the prescriptive period had expired and, therefore, was no longer binding on
the Ayala Securities Corporation.
This Court is of the opinion that the respondent court committed no reversible error in
not making any ruling on the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the accumulated
profits or surplus of the respondent corporation. For this reason, We are of the view that
after reaching the conclusion that the right of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to
assess the 25% surtax had already prescribed under Section 331 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, to delve further into the reasonableness or unreasonableness
of the accumulated profits or surplus of the respondent corporation for the fiscal year
ending September 30, 1955, will only be an exercise in futility.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto.
Without special pronouncement as to costs.
However, as to whether or not the Waiver of the Statute of Limitations is valid and
binding on the petitioner is another question. Since the subject assessments were
issued beyond the three-year prescriptive period, it becomes imperative on our part to
rule first on the validity of the waiver allegedly executed on September 22, 1997, for if
this court finds the same to be ineffective, then the assessments must necessarily fail.
After carefully examining the questioned Waiver of the Statute of Limitations, this Court
considers the same to be without any binding effect on the petitioner for the following
reasons:
The waiver is an unlimited waiver. It does not contain a definite expiration date. Under
RMO No. 20-90, the phrase indicating the expiry date of the period agreed upon to
assess/collect the tax after the regular three-year period of prescription should be filled
up
Secondly, the waiver failed to state the date of acceptance by the Bureau which under
the aforequoted RMO should likewise be indicated
Finally, petitioner was not furnished a copy of the waiver. It is to be noted that under
RMO No. 20-90, the waiver must be executed in three (3) copies, the second copy of
which is for the taxpayer. It is likewise required that the fact of receipt by the taxpayer of
his/her file copy be indicated in the original copy. Again, respondent failed to comply.
It bears stressing that RMO No. 20-90 is directed to all concerned internal revenue
officers. The said RMO even provides that the procedures found therein should be
strictly followed, under pain of being administratively dealt with should non-compliance
result to prescription of the right to assess/collect
Thus, finding the waiver executed by the petitioner on September 22, 1997 to be
suffering from legal infirmities, rendering the same invalid and ineffective, the Court
finds Assessment/Demand No. 33-1-000757-94 issued on December 5, 1998 to be
time-barred. Consequently, the Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy issued pursuant thereto
is considered null and void.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant Petition for Review is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the deficiency income, value-added and expanded withholding
tax assessments issued by the respondent against the petitioner on December 9, 1998,
in the total amount of P111,291,214.46 for the year 1994 are hereby declared
CANCELLED, WITHDRAWN and WITH NO FORCE AND EFFECT. Likewise, Warrant
of Distraint and/or Levy No. 33-06-046 is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.14
After the motion for reconsideration of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue was denied
by the CTA in a Resolution dated August 2, 2002, an appeal was filed with the Court of
Appeals on August 12, 2002.
In its decision dated August 5, 2003, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the ruling of the
CTA, to wit:
The petition for review filed on 26 April 2000 with CTA was neither timely filed nor the
proper remedy. Only decisions of the BIR, denying the request for reconsideration or
reinvestigation may be appealed to the CTA. Mere assessment notices which have
become final after the lapse of the thirty (30)-day reglementary period are not appealable.
Thus, the CTA should not have entertained the petition at all.
[T]he CTA found the waiver executed by Phil. Journalists to be invalid for the following
reasons: (1) it does not indicate a definite expiration date; (2) it does not state the date of
acceptance by the BIR; and (3) Phil. Journalist, the taxpayer, was not furnished a copy of
the waiver. These grounds are merely formal in nature. The date of acceptance by the
BIR does not categorically appear in the document but it states at the bottom page that
the BIR "accepted and agreed to:", followed by the signature of the BIRs authorized
representative. Although the date of acceptance was not stated, the document was dated
22 September 1997. This date could reasonably be understood as the same date of
acceptance by the BIR since a different date was not otherwise indicated. As to the
allegation that Phil. Journalists was not furnished a copy of the waiver, this requirement
appears ridiculous. Phil. Journalists, through its comptroller, Lorenza Tolentino, signed
the waiver. Why would it need a copy of the document it knowingly executed when the
reason why copies are furnished to a party is to notify it of the existence of a document,
event or proceeding?
As regards the need for a definite expiration date, this is the biggest flaw of the decision.
The period of prescription for the assessment of taxes may be extended provided that the
extension be made in writing and that it be made prior to the expiration of the period of
prescription. These are the requirements for a valid extension of the prescriptive period.
To these requirements provided by law, the memorandum order adds that the length of
the extension be specified by indicating its expiration date. This requirement could be
reasonably construed from the rule on extension of the prescriptive period. But this
requirement does not apply in the instant case because what we have here is not an
extension of the prescriptive period but a waiver thereof. These are two (2) very different
things. What Phil. Journalists executed was a renunciation of its right to invoke the
defense of prescription. This is a valid waiver. When one waives the prescriptive period,
it is no longer necessary to indicate the length of the extension of the prescriptive period
since the person waiving may no longer use this defense.
WHEREFORE, the 02 August 2002 resolution and 14 May 2002 decision of the CTA are
hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent Phil. Journalists is ordered [to] pay its assessed tax
liability of P111,291,214.46.
SO ORDERED.15
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated March 31, 2004.
Hence, this appeal on the following assignment of errors:
I.
The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave error in ruling that it is outside the
jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals to entertain the Petition for Review filed by the
herein Petitioner at the CTA despite the fact that such case inevitably rests upon the
validity of the issuance by the BIR of warrants of distraint and levy contrary to the
provisions of Section 7(1) of Republic Act No. 1125.
II.
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred when it ruled that failure to comply with
the provisions of Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 20-90 is merely a formal
defect that does not invalidate the waiver of the statute of limitations without stating the
legal justification for such conclusion. Such ruling totally disregarded the mandatory
requirements of Section 222(b) of the Tax Code and its implementing regulation, RMO
No. 20-90 which are substantive in nature. The RMO provides that violation thereof
subjects the erring officer to administrative sanction. This directive shows that the RMO
is not merely cover forms.
III.
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred when it ruled that the assessment
notices became final and unappealable. The assessment issued is void and legally non-
existent because the BIR has no power to issue an assessment beyond the three-year
prescriptive period where there is no valid and binding waiver of the statute of limitation.
IV.
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred when it held that the assessment in
question has became final and executory due to the failure of the Petitioner to protest
the same. Respondent had no power to issue an assessment beyond the three year
period under the mandatory provisions of Section 203 of the NIRC. Such assessment
should be held void and non-existent, otherwise, Section 203, an expression of a public
policy, would be rendered useless and nugatory. Besides, such right to assess cannot
be validly granted after three years since it would arise from a violation of the mandatory
provisions of Section 203 and would go against the vested right of the Petitioner to
claim prescription of assessment.
V.
The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave error when it HELD valid a defective
waiver by considering the latter a waiver of the right to invoke the defense of
prescription rather than an extension of the three year period of prescription (to make an
assessment) as provided under Section 222 in relation to Section 203 of the Tax Code,
an interpretation that is contrary to law, existing jurisprudence and outside of the
purpose and intent for which they were enacted.16
We find merit in the appeal.
The first assigned error relates to the jurisdiction of the CTA over the issues in this case.
The Court of Appeals ruled that only decisions of the BIR denying a request for
reconsideration or reinvestigation may be appealed to the CTA. Since the petitioner did
not file a request for reinvestigation or reconsideration within thirty (30) days, the
assessment notices became final and unappealable. The petitioner now argue that the
case was brought to the CTA because the warrant of distraint or levy was illegally
issued and that no assessment was issued because it was based on an invalid waiver
of the statutes of limitations.
We agree with petitioner. Section 7(1) of Republic Act No. 1125, the Act Creating the
Court of Tax Appeals, provides for the jurisdiction of that special court:
SEC. 7. Jurisdiction. The Court of Tax Appeals shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided
(1) Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed
assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties
imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal
Revenue Code or other laws or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue; (Emphasis supplied).
The appellate jurisdiction of the CTA is not limited to cases which involve decisions of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on matters relating to assessments or refunds.
The second part of the provision covers other cases that arise out of the NIRC or
related laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The wording of the
provision is clear and simple. It gives the CTA the jurisdiction to determine if the warrant
of distraint and levy issued by the BIR is valid and to rule if the Waiver of Statute of
Limitations was validly effected.
This is not the first case where the CTA validly ruled on issues that did not relate directly
to a disputed assessment or a claim for refund. In Pantoja v. David,17 we upheld the
jurisdiction of the CTA to act on a petition to invalidate and annul the distraint orders of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Also, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Court of Appeals,18 the decision of the CTA declaring several waivers executed by the
taxpayer as null and void, thus invalidating the assessments issued by the BIR, was
upheld by this Court.
The second and fifth assigned errors both focus on Revenue Memorandum Circular No.
20-90 (RMO No. 20-90) on the requisites of a valid waiver of the statute of limitations.
The Court of Appeals held that the requirements and procedures laid down in the RMO
are only formal in nature and did not invalidate the waiver that was signed even if the
requirements were not strictly observed.
The NIRC, under Sections 203 and 222,19 provides for a statute of limitations on the
assessment and collection of internal revenue taxes in order to safeguard the interest of
the taxpayer against unreasonable investigation.20 Unreasonable investigation
contemplates cases where the period for assessment extends indefinitely because this
deprives the taxpayer of the assurance that it will no longer be subjected to further
investigation for taxes after the expiration of a reasonable period of time. As was held in
Republic of the Phils. v. Ablaza:21
The law prescribing a limitation of actions for the collection of the income tax is
beneficial both to the Government and to its citizens; to the Government because tax
officers would be obliged to act promptly in the making of assessment, and to citizens
because after the lapse of the period of prescription citizens would have a feeling of
security against unscrupulous tax agents who will always find an excuse to inspect the
books of taxpayers, not to determine the latters real liability, but to take advantage of
every opportunity to molest peaceful, law-abiding citizens. Without such a legal defense
taxpayers would furthermore be under obligation to always keep their books and keep
them open for inspection subject to harassment by unscrupulous tax agents. The law
on prescription being a remedial measure should be interpreted in a way
conducive to bringing about the beneficent purpose of affording protection to the
taxpayer within the contemplation of the Commission which recommend the
approval of the law. (Emphasis supplied)
RMO No. 20-90 implements these provisions of the NIRC relating to the period of
prescription for the assessment and collection of taxes. A cursory reading of the Order
supports petitioners argument that the RMO must be strictly followed, thus:
In the execution of said waiver, the following procedures should be followed:
1. The waiver must be in the form identified hereof. This form may be reproduced by
the Office concerned but there should be no deviation from such form. The phrase
"but not after __________ 19___" should be filled up
2.
Soon after the waiver is signed by the taxpayer, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue or the revenue official authorized by him, as hereinafter provided, shall
sign the waiver indicating that the Bureau has accepted and agreed to the waiver.
The date of such acceptance by the Bureau should be indicated
3. The following revenue officials are authorized to sign the waiver.
A. In the National Office
3. Commissioner For tax cases involving
more than P1M
B. In the Regional Offices
1. The Revenue District Officer with respect to tax cases still pending investigation and
the period to assess is about to prescribe regardless of amount.
5. The foregoing procedures shall be strictly followed. Any revenue official found
not to have complied with this Order resulting in prescription of the right to
assess/collect shall be administratively dealt with. (Emphasis supplied)22
A waiver of the statute of limitations under the NIRC, to a certain extent, is a derogation
of the taxpayers right to security against prolonged and unscrupulous investigations
and must therefore be carefully and strictly construed.23 The waiver of the statute of
limitations is not a waiver of the right to invoke the defense of prescription as
erroneously held by the Court of Appeals. It is an agreement between the taxpayer and
the BIR that the period to issue an assessment and collect the taxes due is extended to
a date certain. The waiver does not mean that the taxpayer relinquishes the right to
invoke prescription unequivocally particularly where the language of the document is
equivocal. For the purpose of safeguarding taxpayers from any unreasonable
examination, investigation or assessment, our tax law provides a statute of limitations in
the collection of taxes. Thus, the law on prescription, being a remedial measure, should
be liberally construed in order to afford such protection. As a corollary, the exceptions to
the law on prescription should perforce be strictly construed.24 RMO No. 20-90 explains
the rationale of a waiver:
... The phrase "but not after _________ 19___" should be filled up. This indicates the
expiry date of the period agreed upon to assess/collect the tax after the regular three-
year period of prescription. The period agreed upon shall constitute the time within
which to effect the assessment/collection of the tax in addition to the ordinary
prescriptive period. (Emphasis supplied)
As found by the CTA, the Waiver of Statute of Limitations, signed by petitioners
comptroller on September 22, 1997 is not valid and binding because it does not conform
with the provisions of RMO No. 20-90. It did not specify a definite agreed date between
the BIR and petitioner, within which the former may assess and collect revenue taxes.
Thus, petitioners waiver became unlimited in time, violating Section 222(b) of the NIRC.
The waiver is also defective from the government side because it was signed only by a
revenue district officer, not the Commissioner, as mandated by the NIRC and RMO No.
20-90. The waiver is not a unilateral act by the taxpayer or the BIR, but is a bilateral
agreement between two parties to extend the period to a date certain. The conformity of
the BIR must be made by either the Commissioner or the Revenue District Officer. This
case involves taxes amounting to more than One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) and
executed almost seven months before the expiration of the three-year prescription
period. For this, RMO No. 20-90 requires the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to sign
for the BIR.
The case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals,25 dealt with waivers
that were not signed by the Commissioner but were argued to have been given implied
consent by the BIR. We invalidated the subject waivers and ruled:
Petitioners submission is inaccurate
The Court of Appeals itself also passed upon the validity of the waivers executed by
Carnation, observing thus:
We cannot go along with the petitioners theory. Section 319 of the Tax Code earlier
quoted is clear and explicit that the waiver of the five-year26 prescriptive period must be
in writing and signed by both the BIR Commissioner and the taxpayer.
Here, the three waivers signed by Carnation do not bear the written consent of the BIR
Commissioner as required by law.
We agree with the CTA in holding "these waivers to be invalid and without any binding
effect on petitioner (Carnation) for the reason that there was no consent by the
respondent (Commissioner of Internal Revenue)."
For sure, no such written agreement concerning the said three waivers exists between
the petitioner and private respondent Carnation.
What is more, the waivers in question reveal that they are in no wise unequivocal, and
therefore necessitates for its binding effect the concurrence of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue. On this basis neither implied consent can be presumed nor
can it be contended that the waiver required under Sec. 319 of the Tax Code is
one which is unilateral nor can it be said that concurrence to such an agreement
is a mere formality because it is the very signatures of both the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue and the taxpayer which give birth to such a valid agreement. 27
(Emphasis supplied)
The other defect noted in this case is the date of acceptance which makes it difficult to
fix with certainty if the waiver was actually agreed before the expiration of the three-year
prescriptive period. The Court of Appeals held that the date of the execution of the
waiver on September 22, 1997 could reasonably be understood as the same date of
acceptance by the BIR. Petitioner points out however that Revenue District Officer
Sarmiento could not have accepted the waiver yet because she was not the Revenue
District Officer of RDO No. 33 on such date. Ms. Sarmientos transfer and assignment to
RDO No. 33 was only signed by the BIR Commissioner on January 16, 1998 as shown
by the Revenue Travel Assignment Order No. 14-98.28 The Court of Tax Appeals noted
in its decision that it is unlikely as well that Ms. Sarmiento made the acceptance on
January 16, 1998 because "Revenue Officials normally have to conduct first an
inventory of their pending papers and property responsibilities." 29
Finally, the records show that petitioner was not furnished a copy of the waiver. Under
RMO No. 20-90, the waiver must be executed in three copies with the second copy for
the taxpayer. The Court of Appeals did not think this was important because the
petitioner need not have a copy of the document it knowingly executed. It stated that the
reason copies are furnished is for a party to be notified of the existence of a document,
event or proceeding.
The flaw in the appellate courts reasoning stems from its assumption that the waiver is
a unilateral act of the taxpayer when it is in fact and in law an agreement between the
taxpayer and the BIR. When the petitioners comptroller signed the waiver on
September 22, 1997, it was not yet complete and final because the BIR had not
assented. There is compliance with the provision of RMO No. 20-90 only after the
taxpayer received a copy of the waiver accepted by the BIR. The requirement to furnish
the taxpayer with a copy of the waiver is not only to give notice of the existence of the
document but of the acceptance by the BIR and the perfection of the agreement.
The waiver document is incomplete and defective and thus the three-year prescriptive
period was not tolled or extended and continued to run until April 17, 1998.
Consequently, the Assessment/Demand No. 33-1-000757-94 issued on December 9,
1998 was invalid because it was issued beyond the three (3) year period. In the same
manner, Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy No. 33-06-046 which petitioner received on
March 28, 2000 is also null and void for having been issued pursuant to an invalid
assessment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 5, 2003 and its Resolution dated March
31, 2004 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals in
CTA Case No. 6108 dated May 14, 2002, declaring Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy No.
33-06-046 null and void, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
CIR v. KUDOS METAL
The prescriptive period on when to assess taxes benefits both the government and the
taxpayer.1 Exceptions extending the period to assess must, therefore, be strictly
construed.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to set aside the Decision2 dated March 30,
2007 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) affirming the cancellation of the assessment
notices for having been issued beyond the prescriptive period and the Resolution 3 dated
May 18, 2007 denying the motion for reconsideration.
Factual Antecedents
On April 15, 1999, respondent Kudos Metal Corporation filed its Annual Income Tax
Return (ITR) for the taxable year 1998.
Pursuant to a Letter of Authority dated September 7, 1999, the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) served upon respondent three Notices of Presentation of Records.
Respondent failed to comply with these notices, hence, the BIR issued a Subpeona
Duces Tecum dated September 21, 2006, receipt of which was acknowledged by
respondents President, Mr. Chan Ching Bio, in a letter dated October 20, 2000.
A review and audit of respondents records then ensued.
On December 10, 2001, Nelia Pasco (Pasco), respondents accountant, executed a
Waiver of the Defense of Prescription,4 which was notarized on January 22, 2002,
received by the BIR Enforcement Service on January 31, 2002 and by the BIR Tax
Fraud Division on February 4, 2002, and accepted by the Assistant Commissioner of
the Enforcement Service, Percival T. Salazar (Salazar).
This was followed by a second Waiver of Defense of Prescription 5 executed by Pasco
on February 18, 2003, notarized on February 19, 2003, received by the BIR Tax Fraud
Division on February 28, 2003 and accepted by Assistant Commissioner Salazar.
On August 25, 2003, the BIR issued a Preliminary Assessment Notice for the taxable
year 1998 against the respondent. This was followed by a Formal Letter of Demand with
Assessment Notices for taxable year 1998, dated September 26, 2003 which was
received by respondent on November 12, 2003.
Respondent challenged the assessments by filing its "Protest on Various Tax
Assessments" on December 3, 2003 and its "Legal Arguments and Documents in
Support of Protests against Various Assessments" on February 2, 2004.
On June 22, 2004, the BIR rendered a final Decision6 on the matter, requesting the
immediate payment of the following tax liabilities:
Kind of Tax Amount
Income Tax 9,693,897.85
VAT 13,962,460.90
EWT 1,712,336.76
Withholding Tax-Compensation 247,353.24
Penalties 8,000.00
Total 25,624,048.76