Donoghue v Stevenson

Case established duty of care to third person (whos not party to contract)
Can reasonable foreseeability exist between a manufacturer and the ultimate consumer
giving rise to liability?
Can there be a legal duty of care without a pre-existing legal contract or agreement?
Case contains precedents showing conflicting positions on
Central theme in case- whether it be based on fraud or negligence?
Doesnt fall under fraud because of lack of knowledge of presence of snail in beer bottle.
In case of dangerous good, duty of care extends to all users/consumers- direct or indirect.
Note- How do judges use precedent?
Imp cases- Langridge v Levy, George v Skivvington, Heaven v Pender, Longmeid v Holiday,
Francis v Cockrell, La Liecre v Gould,
Note- how judges have interpreted the precedent differently.
All cases discuss the liability of a manufacturer to a person to whom he/she hasnt sold the
article(s).
Is there duty of care only where theres fraudulent misstatement or a dangerous good or
both? Can there exist a duty of care outside a contract?

BUCKMASTER
Cases going against appellant

Langridge v Levy- (p.2)- facts based on fraudulence- Narrower view- duty of care exists
when theres fraud. Buckmaster says that this case isnt relevant as there, fraudulent
statement and dangerous goods existed. Thats unlike the case at hand. Langridge v Levy
doesnt support the wider view that manufacturer has liability to 3rd party.
Winterbottom v Wright- (p.2)- no fraud- similar to case at hand- held that there was no
cause of action- liability would exist only when theres a contract- no limitless duty of
care. Doesnt apply. As theres no fraud, damaged good or contract.
Longmeid v Holliday- cause of action against vendor, not the manufacturer- says that
when article is of non-dangerous object, its unreasonable to expect too much duty of
care.

Cases in favour of appellant

George v Skivington- theres no fraud, theres no direct relationship between seller and
user, defendant had knowledge that article was for the use of plaintiff. Judges in George
v Skivington said that fraud can simply be substituted for negligence and the analogy
would be complete. They took Langridge v Levy as authority.
Buckmaster disagreed with the judges in George and said that fraud cant be substituted
for negligence because an action of fraud in tort cannot be supported by proof of
negligence. The duty of care/liability cannot be the same in both. He says that the
judgement in George is faulty, the judges way of approaching the case is flawed.
Therefore, George v Skivington is not the correct precedent to follow. Correct precedent
to follow is Winterbottom v Wright.
Francis v Cockrell- injury is not by the direct action of Defendant;
Baron Cleasby- if the seller knew whom the article was being bought for, the knowledge
 would make him hold a duty of care to the person for whom the article is being bought
for.
Buckmaster- Merely because seller knew who it was being bought for doesnt mean
showing fraud is not important. Requirement of having to show fraud cant be
substituted by the fact of knowledge.
Heaven v Pender- read proposition on p.5
Buckmaster- statement made by Lord Esher about supply of goods merely means sale of
goods. But there was
In Heaven n Pender, Esher tries to lay out wide principle. This has been negative. .
First attack on Esher- facts are different, Second-, Third-

ATKINS

Cases not in favour of plaintiff.

Langridge v Levy- Atkins says that in this case, it was argued that the user of the gun can take
benefit of the breach of contractual duty owed to the buyer (party to contract). There were
2 possible arguments- a) whether manufacturer owes direct duty of care to buyer; or b)
whether manufacturer owes duty of care to 3rd person/user. He says that in Donoghue, the
plaintiffs argument was on the basis of whether the manufacturer owed a duty of care to
the buyer. Atkins says that the decision in Langridge v Levy answered the question of
whether a 3rd party can take advantage of a breach of duty in contract. It was also a case
based on fraud. Atkins says that in Donoghue, the question that was being answered was
whether the manufacturer owed duty of care to buyer. Therefore the 2 cases are different
on the basis of facts and thus cannot be compared.
Winterbottom v Wright- Atkins argues that in the said case, the plaintiff sought to rely on
the contract for seeking damages. No duty of care other than the one arising out of contract.
Therefore, only party to contract can sue. No party can take benefit of the contract. Now, in
Donoghue, the question is whether the manufacturer owed direct duty of care to consumer.
Theres a difference in the claims of the plaintiffs in the two cases.
Longmeid v Holiday- is an irrelevant case.
The para cited by Baron Parke (and Buckmaster) is confined to machines and to lent or
given (they create contractual obligations- claiming for damages on the basis of a contract).
In Donoghue however, neither are we talking about a machine nor is it lent or given. Atkins
goes on to say that while saying that (p.15, para), Baron didnt have other circumstances in
mind such as food being mixed with poison affecting purchasers family, etc. Atkins says that
Longmeid v Holiday covers only situations where theres a contractual liability. Theres no
claim of a direct duty of care as such.
Earl v Lubbock- It was said in the case that its being decided on the basis of Winterbottom v
Wright. The grounds in Winterbottom were breach of contractual duty, so same grounds
were put forward in Earl v Lubbock.
Blacker v Lake and Elliot-

Cases that support the plaintiff.

George v Skivington- Atkins says that in this case, it is being said that fraud can be
substituted for negligence. The nature of relationship between seller/manufacturer and
 consumer is the same for both when theres fraud and negligence.
If theres fraud, manufacturer has a specific duty of care.
Heaven v Pender & Gould- Atkins says that Eshers statement in Heaven v Pender is too
broad. In Gould, Esher introduces the concept of proximity. Here, the duty to take care is
limited by proximity.
Atkins says that he doesnt find the need for a distinction between goods dangerous by
themselves and goods that have become dangerous by virtue of negligence. He doesnt see
that as a sufficient ground for demarcating legal rights and duties. He says that the degree of
duty of care could vary depending on nature of goods, but its absurd to say that an object
which isnt dangerous attracts no duty of care whatsoever. Kind/nature of goods has a
bearing on the proximity on who owes a duty of care. Atkins disagrees with the position that
holds that in case of non-dangerous goods, theres no duty of care. Eg- for certain goods, the
remoteness of damage is greater than for certain other goods. For guns, gas stoves, the duty
of care would be much greater and to who all the duty would extend would be greater than
for lets say- toys.
According to Atkins, a manufacturer is liable to the consumer when- a) theres no reasonable
possibility of intermediate examination, b) the manufacture has knowledge that if
reasonable care is not exercised, then injury is likely to happen, c) the product has reached
the ultimate consumer in the same form it was intended to reach the ultimate consumer
(Separate: Loophole in the abovementioned conditions laid out by Atkins: No consideration
of proximity.)
Dangerous goods cant be read into the ratio of the case as the material facts talk only about
non-dangerous goods. (As Atkins clarifies- liability changes in case of dangerous goods)