Each expression of a language surely means something there is some fact as to what it means; but the

nature of such facts is notoriously obscure and controversial. Consider the term dog. It possesses a
distinctive literal meaning in English, and this feature is closely associated with various others, for
example, that we use the word to help articulate certain thoughts; that it is appropriately translated into
the Italian cane and the German Hund; and that we should try to apply it to dogs and only to dogs. But
such characteristics range from the puzzling to the downright mysterious. Does thought itself take place
in language? How might little meanings (like that of dog) combine into bigger ones (like that of dogs
bark)? What is it about that word's meaning that enables it to reach out through space and time, and latch
on to a particular hairy animal in ancient China? And there is a ramified profusion of further questions, as
we shall see. So it isn't surprising that philosophy abounds with theories that aim to demystify these
matters, to say what it is for a word or a sentence to have a meaning. The present review aims to map the
terrain of alternative suggestions. To that end I will mention the central issues that must be confronted in
developing an adequate account of meaning, the various positions that might be taken with respect to
them, and some of the arguments