1
AQUILINO T. LARIN, petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF
FINANCE, COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND THE
COMMITTEE CREATED TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AGAINST
AQUILINO T. LARIN, COMPOSED OF FRUMENCIO A. LAGUSTAN, JOSE B.
ALEJANDRINO AND JAIME M. MAZA, respondents.
Public Officers; Civil Service; A presidential appointee who belongs to the career
service of the Civil Service comes under the direct disciplining authority of the
President.At the outset, it is worthy to
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Larin vs. Executive Secretary
note that the position of Assistant Commissioner of the BIR is part of the Career
Executive Service. Under the law, Career Executive Service officers, namely,
Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director,
Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other
officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service
Board, are all appointed by the President. Concededly, petitioner was appointed as
Assistant Commissioner in January, 1987 by then President Aquino. Thus, petitioner
is a presidential appointee who belongs to career service of the Civil Service. Being a
presidential appointee, he comes under the direct disciplining authority of the
President. This is in line with the well settled principle that the power to remove is
inherent in the power to appoint conferred to the President by Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution. Thus, it is ineluctably clear that Memorandum Order No. 164,
which created a committee to investigate the administrative charge against
petitioner, was issued pursuant to the power of removal of the President.
Same; Same; Security of Tenure; The fact that an officer is a presidential appointee
does not give the appointing authority the license to remove him at will or at his
pleasure.This power of removal, however, is not an absolute one which accepts no
reservation. It must be pointed out that petitioner is a career service officer. Under
the Administrative Code of 1987, career service is characterized by the existence of
security of tenure, as contra-distinguished from non-career service whose tenure is
co-terminus with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or
limited to a period specified by law or to the duration of a particular project for
which purpose the employment was made. As a career service officer, petitioner
enjoys the right to security of tenure. No less than the 1987 Constitution guarantees
the right of security of tenure of the employees of the civil service. Specifically,
Section 36 of P.D. No. 807, as amended, otherwise known as Civil Service Decree of
the Philippines, is emphatic that career service officers and employees who enjoy
security of tenure may be removed only for any of the causes enumerated in said
law. In other words, the fact that petitioner is a presidential appointee does not give
the appointing authority the license to remove him at will or at his pleasure for it is
an admitted fact that he is likewise a career service officer who under the law is the
recipient of tenurial protection, thus, may only be removed for a cause and in
accordance with procedural due process.
Same; Same; Same; Where the very basis of the administrative case against a public
officer is his conviction in a criminal action which was later on set aside by the
Supreme Court upon a categorical and clear finding that the acts for which he was
administratively held liable are not unlawful and irregular, his acquittal in the
criminal case necessarily entails the dismissal of the administrative action against
him, because in such a case, there is no more basis nor justifiable reason to maintain
the administrative suit.We are not unaware of the rule that since administrative
cases are independent from criminal actions for the same act or omission, the
dismissal or acquittal of the criminal charge does not foreclose the institution of
administrative action nor carry with it the relief from administrative liability.
However, the circumstantial setting of the instant case sets it miles apart from the
foregoing rule and placed it well within the exception. Corollarily, where the very
basis of the administrative case against petitioner is his conviction in the criminal
action which was later on set aside by this Court upon a categorical and clear finding
that the acts for which he was administratively held liable are not unlawful and
irregular, the acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal case necessarily entails the
dismissal of the administrative action against him, because in such a case, there is no
more basis nor justifiable reason to maintain the administrative suit.
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; The rule is well settled that the essence of due
process in administrative proceedings is that a party be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence he may have in support of his
defense.On the aspect of procedural due process, suffice it to say that petitioner
was given every chance to present his side. The rule is well settled that the essence
of due process in administrative proceedings is that a party be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence he may have in support of his
defense. The records clearly show that on October 1, 1993 petitioner submitted his
letter-response dated September 30, 1993 to the administrative charge filed against
him. Aside from his letter, he also submitted various documents attached as annexes
to his letter, all of which are evidences supporting his defense. Prior to this, he
received a letter dated September 17, 1993 from the Investigation Committee

requiring him to explain his side concerning the charge. It can not therefore be
argued that petitioner was denied of due process.
Same; Same; Same; Reorganizations; Republic Act 7645 authorizes the President to
effect organizational changes including
Larin vs. Executive Secretary
the creation of offices in the department or agency concerned.Initially, it is argued
that there is no law yet which empowers the President to issue E.O. No. 132 or to
reorganize the BIR. We do not agree. Under its preamble, E.O. No. 132 lays down the
legal bases of its issuance, namely: a) Sections 48 and 62 of R.A. No. 7645, b) Section
63 of E.O. No. 127, and c) Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292. Section 48 of R.A. 7645
provides that: Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities of Agencies Within
the Executive Branch.The heads of departments, bureaus and offices and agencies
are hereby directed to identify their respective activities which are no longer
essential in the delivery of public services and which may be scaled down, phased
out or abolished, subject to civil service rules and regulations. x x x. Actual scaling
down, phasing out or abolition of the activities shall be effected pursuant to Circulars
or Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the President. (italics ours) Said
provision clearly mentions the acts of scaling down, phasing out and abolition of
offices only and does not cover the creation of offices or transfer of functions.
Nevertheless, the act of creating and decentralizing is included in the subsequent
provision of Section 62, which provides that: Sec. 62. Unauthorized organizational
charges.Unless otherwise created by law or directed by the President of the
Philippines, no organizational unit or changes in key positions in any department or
agency shall be authorized in their respective organization structures and be funded
from appropriations by this Act. (italics ours) The foregoing provision evidently
shows that the President is authorized to effect organizational changes including the
creation of offices in the department or agency concerned.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Unless and until a specific
provision of the law is declared invalid and unconstitutional, the same is valid and
binding for all intents and purposes.The contention of petitioner that the two
provisions are riders deserves scant consideration. Well settled is the rule that every
law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Unless and until a specific
provision of the law is declared invalid and unconstitutional, the same is valid and
binding for all intents and purposes.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Presidential Decree No. 1416, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1772, expressly grants the President the continuing authority to
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reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate
bureaus and agencies,to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify
functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials.Another
legal basis of E.O. No. 132 is Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292 which states: Sec.
20. Residual Powers.Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall
exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided
for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above or which are not
delegated by the President in accordance with law. (italics ours) This provision
speaks of such other powers vested in the President under the law. What law then
gives him the power to reorganize? It is Presidential Decree No. 1772 which
amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President
of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national government,
which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish
offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities
and to standardize salaries and materials. The validity of these two decrees are
unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that all laws, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances
not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended,
repealed or revoked. So far, there is yet no law amending or repealing said decrees.
Significantly, the Constitution itself recognizes future reorganizations in the
government as what is revealed in Section 16 of Article XVIII, thus: Sec. 16. Career
civil service employees separated from service not for cause but as a result of the x x
x reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution shall be entitled to
appropriate separation pay x x x.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued
in good faith.While the Presidents power to reorganize can not be denied, this
does not mean however that the reorganization itself is properly made in accordance
with law. Well-settled is the rule that reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is
pursued in good faith. Thus, in Dario vs. Mison, this Court has had the occasion to
clarify that: As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for
the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event no
dismissal or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And
in that case the security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if
the abolition which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political
reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no
valid abolition takes place and whatever abolition is done is void ab initio. There is an
invalid abolition as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions or
where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds.

PETITION for review of a decision of the Executive Secretary.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Cruz, Cruz & Navarro III for petitioner.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Challenged in this petition is the validity of petitioners removal from service as
Assistant Commissioner of the Excise Tax Service of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
Incidentally, he questions Memorandum Order No. 164 issued by the Office of the
President, which provides for the creation of A Committee to Investigate the
Administrative Complaint Against Aquilino T. Larin, Assistant Commissioner, Bureau
of Internal Revenue as well as the investigation made in pursuance thereto, and
Administrative Order No. 101 dated December 2, 1993 which found him guilty of
grave misconduct in the administrative charge and imposed upon him the penalty of
dismissal from office.
Likewise, petitioner seeks to assail the legality of Executive Order No. 132, issued by
President Ramos on October 26, 1993, which provides for the Streamlining of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, and of its implementing rules issued by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, namely: a) Administrative Order No. 4-93, which provides for the
Organizational Structure and Statement of General Functions of Offices in the
National Office and b) Administrative Order No. 5-93, which provides for
Redefining the Areas of Jurisdiction and Renumbering of Regional And District
Offices.
The antecedent facts of the instant case as succinctly related by the Solicitor General
are as follows:
On September 18, 1992,1 a decision was rendered by the Sandiganbayan convicting
herein petitioner Aquilino T. Larin, Revenue Specific Tax Officer, then Assistant
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and his co-accused (except Justino
E. Galban, Jr.) of the crimes of violation of Section 268 (4) of the National Internal
Revenue Code and Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 in Criminal Case Nos. 14208-14209,
entitled People of the Philippines, Plaintiff vs. Aquilino T. Larin, Teodoro T. Pareno,
Justino E. Galban, Jr. and Potenciana N. Evangelista, Accused, the dispositive portion
of the judgment reads:
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WHEREFORE, judgment is now rendered in Criminal Cases Nos. 14208 and 14209
convicting accused Assistant Commissioner for Specific Tax AQUILINO T. LARIN, Chief
of the Alcohol Tax Division TEODORO P. PARENO, and Chief of the Revenue
Accounting Division POTENCIANA M. EVANGELISTA:
SO ORDERED.
The fact of petitioners conviction was reported to the President of the Philippines by
the then Acting Finance Secretary Leong through a memorandum dated June 4,
1993. The memorandum states, inter alia:
This is a report in the case of Assistant Commissioner AQUILINO T. LARIN of the
Excise Tax Service, Bureau of Internal Revenue, a presidential appointee, one of
those convicted in Criminal Case Nos. 14208-14209, entitled People of the
Philippines vs. Aquilino T. Larin, et al., referred to the Department of Finance by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
The cases against Pareno and Evangelista are being acted upon by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue as they are non-presidential appointees.
It is clear from the foregoing that Mr. Larin has been found beyond reasonable doubt
to have committed acts constituting grave
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1 The Office of the Solicitor General inadvertently dated it as December 1, 1992.
Larin vs. Executive Secretary
misconduct. Under the Civil Service Laws and Rules which require only
preponderance of evidence, grave misconduct is punishable by dismissal.
Acting by authority of the President, Sr. Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo A.
Quisumbing issued Memorandum Order No. 164 dated August 25, 1993 which
provides for the creation of an Executive Committee to investigate the
administrative charge against herein petitioner Aquilino T. Larin. It states thus:
A Committee is hereby created to investigate the administrative complaint filed
against Aquilino T. Larin, Assistant Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue, to be
composed of:
Atty. Frumencio A. LagustanChairman
Assistant Executive Secretary for Legislation

Mr. Jose B. AlejandroMember
Presidential Assistant
Atty. Jaime M. MazaMember
Assistant Commissioner for Inspector Services
Bureau of Internal Revenue
The Committee shall have all the powers and prerogatives of (an) investigating
committee under the Administrative Code of 1987 including the power to summon
witnesses, administer oath or take testimony or evidence relevant to the
investigation by subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum.
The Committee shall convene immediately, conduct the investigation in the most
expeditious manner, and terminate the same as soon as practicable from its first
scheduled date of hearing.
Consequently, the Committee directed the petitioner to respond to the
administrative charge leveled against him through a letter dated September 17,
1993, thus:
Presidential Memorandum Order No. 164 dated August 25, 1993, a xerox copy of
which is hereto attached for your ready reference, created an Investigation
Committee to look into the charges against you which are also the subject of the
Criminal Case Nos.
14208 and 14209 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Aquilino T. Larin, et al.
The Committee has in its possession a certified true copy of the Decision of the
Sandiganbayan in the above-mentioned cases.
Pursuant to Presidential Memorandum Order No. 164, you are hereby directed to
file your position paper on the aforementioned charges within seven (7) days from
receipt hereof x x x.
Failure to file the required position paper shall be considered as a waiver on your
part to submit such paper or to be heard, in which case, the Committee shall deem
the case submitted on the basis of the documents and records at hand.
In compliance, petitioner submitted a letter dated September 30, 1993 which was
addressed to Atty. Frumencio A. Lagustan, the Chairman of the Investigating
Committee. In said letter, he asserts that,
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The case being sub-judice, I may not, therefore, comment on the merits of the
issues involved for fear of being cited in contempt of Court. This position paper is
thus limited to furnishing the Committee pertinent documents submitted with the
Supreme Court and other tribunal which took cognizance of the case in the past, as
follows:
xxx
The foregoing documents readily show that I am not administratively liable or
criminally culpable of the charges leveled against me, and that the aforesaid cases
are mere persecutions caused to be filed and are being orchestrated by taxpayers
who were prejudiced by multi-million peso assessments I caused to be issued against
them in my official capacity as Assistant Commissioner, Excise Tax Office of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue.
In the same letter, petitioner claims that the administrative complaint against him is
already barred: a) on jurisdictional ground as the Office of the Ombudsman had
already taken cognizance of the case and had caused the filing only of the criminal
charges against him, b) by res judicata, c) by double jeopardy, and d) because to
proceed with the case would be redundant, oppressive and a plain persecution
against him.
Larin vs. Executive Secretary
Meanwhile, the President issued the challenged Executive Order No. 132 dated
October 26, 1993 which mandates for the streamlining of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. Under said order, some positions and functions are either abolished,
renamed, decentralized or transferred to other offices, while other offices are also
created. The Excise Tax Service or the Specific Tax Service, of which petitioner was
the Assistant Commissioner, was one of those offices that was abolished by said
executive order.
The corresponding implementing rules of Executive Order No. 132, namely, Revenue
Administrative Orders Nos. 4-93 and 5-93, were subsequently issued by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue.
On October 27, 1993, or one day after the promulgation of Executive Order No. 132,
the President appointed the following as BIR Assistant Commissioners:
1. Bernardo A. Frianeza
2. Dominador L. Galura

3. Jaime D. Gonzales
4. Lilia C. Guillermo
5. Rizalina S. Magalona
6. Victorino C. Mamalateo
7. Jaime M. Maza
8. Antonio N. Pangilinan
9. Melchor S. Ramos
10. Joel L. Tan-Torres
Consequently, the President, in the assailed Administrative Order No. 101 dated
December 2, 1993, found petitioner guilty of grave misconduct in the administrative
charge and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of his leave
credits and retirement benefits including disqualification for reappointment in the
government service.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed directly with this Court the instant petition on December
13, 1993 to question basically his alleged unlawful removal from office.
On April 17, 1996 and while the instant petition is pending, this Court set aside the
conviction of petitioner in Criminal Case Nos. 14208 and 14209.
In his petition, petitioner challenged the authority of the President to dismiss him
from office. He argued that in so far as presidential appointees who are Career
Executive Service Officers are concerned, the President exercises only the power of
control not the power to remove. He also averred that the administrative
investigation conducted under Memorandum Order No. 164 is void as it violated his
right to due process. According to him, the letter of the Committee dated September
17, 1993 and his position paper dated September 30, 1993 are not sufficient for
purposes of complying with the requirements of due process. He alleged that he was
not informed of the administrative charges leveled against him nor was he given
official notice of his dismissal.
Petitioner likewise claimed that he was removed as a result of the reorganization
made by the Executive Department in the BIR pursuant to Executive Order No. 132.
Thus, he assailed said Executive Order No. 132 and its implementing rules, namely,
Revenue Administrative Orders 4-93 and 5-93 for being ultra vires. He claimed that
5
there is yet no law enacted by Congress which authorizes the reorganization by the
Executive Department of executive agencies, particularly the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. He said that the reorganization sought to be effected by the Executive
Department on the basis of E.O. No. 132 is tainted with bad faith in apparent
violation of Section 2 of R.A. 6656, otherwise known as the Act Protecting the
Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees in the Implementation of
Government Reorganization.
On the other hand, respondents contended that since petitioner is a presidential
appointee, he falls under the disciplining authority of the President. They also
contended that E.O. No. 132 and its implementing rules were validly issued pursuant
to Sections 48 and 62 of Republic Act No. 7645. Apart from this, the other legal bases
of E.O. No. 132 as stated in its preamble are Section 63 of E.O. No. 127 (Reorganizing
the Ministry of Finance), and Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as
the Administrative Code of 1987. In addition, it is clear that in Section 11 of R.A.
No.6656 future reorganization is expressly contemplated and nothing in said law
prohibits subsequent reorganization through an executive order. Significantly,
respondents clarified that petitioner was not dismissed by virtue of EO 132.
Respondents claimed that he was removed from office because he was found guilty
of grave misconduct in the administrative cases filed against him.
The ultimate issue to be resolved in the instant case falls on the determination of the
validity of petitioners dismissal from office. Incidentally, in order to resolve this
matter, it is imperative that We consider these questions: a) Who has the power to
discipline the petitioner?, b) Were the proceedings taken pursuant to Memorandum
Order No. 164 in accord with due process?, c) What is the effect of petitioners
acquittal in the criminal case to his administrative charge?, d) Does the President
have the power to reorganize the BIR or to issue the questioned E.O. No. 132?, and
e) Is the reorganization of BIR pursuant to E.O. No. 132 tainted with bad faith?
At the outset, it is worthy to note that the position of Assistant Commissioner of the
BIR is part of the Career Executive Service.2 Under the law,3 Career Executive Service
officers, namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant
Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department
Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career
Executive Service Board, are all appointed by the President. Concededly, petitioner
was appointed as Assistant Commissioner in January, 1987 by then President Aquino.
Thus, petitioner is a presidential appointee who belongs to career service of the Civil
Service. Being a presidential appointee, he comes under the direct disciplining

authority of the President. This is in line with the well settled principle that the
power
_______________
2 See Floreza vs. Ongpin, G.R. Nos. 81356 and 86156, February 26, 1990, 182 SCRA
692, 707.
3 P.D. No. 807, as amended, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines; E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987.
Larin vs. Executive Secretary
to remove is inherent in the power to appoint conferred to the President by Section
16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, it is ineluctably clear that Memorandum
Order No. 164, which created a committee to investigate the administrative charge
against petitioner, was issued pursuant to the power of removal of the President.
This power of removal, however, is not an absolute one which accepts no
reservation. It must be pointed out that petitioner is a career service officer. Under
the Administrative Code of 1987, career service is characterized by the existence of
security of tenure, as contra-distinguished from non-career service whose tenure is
coterminus with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or limited
to a period specified by law or to the duration of a particular project for which
purpose the employment was made. As a career service officer, petitioner enjoys the
right to security of tenure. No less than the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of
security of tenure of the employees of the civil service. Specifically, Section 36 of P.D.
No. 807, as amended, otherwise known as Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, is
emphatic that career service officers and employees who enjoy security of tenure
may be removed only for any of the causes enumerated in said law. In other words,
the fact that petitioner is a presidential appointee does not give the appointing
authority the license to remove him at will or at his pleasure for it is an admitted fact
that he is likewise a career service officer who under the law is the recipient of
tenurial protection, thus, may only be removed for a cause and in accordance with
procedural due process.
Was petitioner then removed from office for a legal cause under a valid proceeding?
Although the proceedings taken complied with the requirements of procedural due
process, this Court, however, considers that petitioner was not dismissed for a valid
cause.
6
It should be noted that what precipitated the creation of the investigative committee
to look into the administrative charge against petitioner is his conviction by the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 14208 and 14209. As admitted by the
respondents, the administrative case against petitioner is based on the
Sandiganbayan Decision of September 18, 1992. Thus, in the Administrative Order
No. 101 issued by Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Quisumbing which found
petitioner guilty of grave misconduct, it clearly states that:
This pertains to the administrative charge against Assistant Commissioner Aquilino
T. Larin of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, for grave misconduct by virtue of a
Memorandum signed by Acting Secretary Leong of the Department of Finance, on
the basis of a decision handed down by the Hon. Sandiganbayan convicting Larin, et
al. in Criminal Case Nos. 14208 and 14209.4
In a nutshell, the criminal cases against petitioner refer to his alleged violation of
Section 268 (4) of the National Internal Revenue Code and of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No.
3019 as a consequence of his act of favorably recommending the grant of tax credit
to Tanduay Distillery, Inc. The pertinent portion of the judgment of the
Sandiganbayan reads:
As above pointed out, the accused had conspired in knowingly preparing false
memoranda and certification in order to effect a fraud upon taxes due to the
government. By their separate acts which had resulted in an appropriate tax credit of
P180,701,682.00 in favor of Tanduay. The government had been defrauded of a tax
revenuefor the full amount, if one is to look at the availments or utilization thereof
(Exhibits AA to AA-31-a), or for a substantial portion thereof (P73,000,000.00) if
we are to rely on the letter of Deputy Commissioner Eufracio D. Santos (Exhibits 21
for all the accused).
As pointed out above, the confluence of acts and omissions committed by accused
Larin, Pareno and Evangelista adequately prove conspiracy among them for no other
purpose than to bring about a tax credit which Tanduay did not deserve. These
misrepresentations as to how much Tanduay had paid in ad valorem taxes obviously
constituted a fraud of tax revenue of the government x x x.5
However, it must be stressed at this juncture that the conviction of petitioner by the
Sandiganbayan was set aside by this Court in our decision promulgated on April 17,
1996 in G.R. Nos. 108037-38 and 107119-20. We specifically ruled in no uncertain
terms that: a) petitioner can not be held negligent in relying on the certification of a
co-equal unit in the BIR, b) it is not incumbent upon Larin to go beyond the
certification made by the Revenue Accounting Division that Tanduay Distillery, Inc.

had paid the ad valorem taxes, c) there is nothing irregular or anything false in Larins
marginal note on the memorandum addressed to Pareno, the Chief of Alcohol Tax
Division who was also one of the accused, but eventually acquitted, in the said
criminal cases, and d) there is no proof of actual agreement between the accused,
including petitioner, to commit the illegal acts charged. We are emphatic in our
resolution in said cases that there is nothing illegal with the acts committed by the
petitioner(s). We also declare that there is no showing that petitioner(s) had acted
irregularly, or performed acts outside of his (their) official functions. Significantly,
these acts which We categorically declare to be not unlawful and improper in G.R.
Nos. 108037-38 and G.R. Nos. 107119-20 are the very same acts for which petitioner
is held to be administratively responsible. Any charge of malfeasance or misfeasance
on the part of the petitioner is clearly belied by our conclusion in said cases. In the
light of this decisive pronouncement, We see no reason for the administrative charge
to continueit must, thus, be dismissed.
We are not unaware of the rule that since administrative cases are independent
from criminal actions for the same act or omission, the dismissal or acquittal of the
criminal charge does not foreclose the institution of administrative action nor carry
with it the relief from administrative liability.6 However, the circumstantial setting of
the instant case sets it miles apart from the foregoing rule and placed it well within
the exception. Corollarily, where the very basis of the administrative case against
petitioner is his conviction in the criminal action which was later on set aside by this
Court upon a categorical and clear finding that the acts for which he was
administratively held liable are not unlawful and irregular, the acquittal of the
petitioner in the criminal case necessarily entails the dismissal of the administrative
action against him, because in such a case, there is no more basis nor justifiable
reason to maintain the administrative suit.
On the aspect of procedural due process, suffice it to say that petitioner was given
every chance to present his side. The rule is well settled that the essence of due
process in administrative proceedings is that a party be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence he may have in support of his
defense.7 The records clearly show that on October 1, 1993 petitioner submitted his
letter-response dated September 30, 1993 to the administrative charge filed against
him. Aside from his letter, he also submitted various documents attached as annexes
to his letter, all of which are evidences supporting his defense. Prior to this, he
received a letter dated September 17, 1993 from the Investigation Committee
requiring him to explain his side concerning the charge. It can not therefore be
argued that petitioner was denied of due process.
7
Let us now examine Executive Order No. 132.
As stated earlier, with the issuance of Executive Order No. 132, some of the positions
and offices, including the office of Excise Tax Services of which petitioner was the
Assistant Commissioner, were abolished or otherwise decentralized. Consequently,
the President released the list of appointed Assistant Commissioners of the BIR.
Apparently, petitioner was not included.
Initially, it is argued that there is no law yet which empowers the President to issue
E.O. No. 132 or to reorganize the BIR.
We do not agree.
Under its preamble, E.O. No. 132 lays down the legal bases of its issuance, namely: a)
Sections 48 and 62 of R.A. No. 7645, b) Section 63 of E.O. No. 127, and c) Section 20,
Book III of E.O. No. 292.
Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that:
Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities of Agencies Within the Executive
Branch.The heads of departments, bureaus and offices and agencies are hereby
directed to identify their respective activities which are no longer essential in the
delivery of public services and which may be scaled down, phased out or abolished,
subject to civil service rules and regulations. x x x. Actual scaling down, phasing out
or abolition of the activities shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued
for the purpose by the Office of the President. (italics ours)
Said provision clearly mentions the acts of scaling down, phasing out and abolition
of offices only and does not cover the creation of offices or transfer of functions.
Nevertheless, the act of creating and decentralizing is included in the subsequent
provision of Section 62, which provides that:
Sec. 62. Unauthorized organizational charges.Unless otherwise created by law or
directed by the President of the Philippines, no organizational unit or changes in key
positions in any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective
organization structures and be funded from appropriations by this Act. (italics ours)
The foregoing provision evidently shows that the President is authorized to effect
organizational changes including the creation of offices in the department or agency
concerned.

The contention of petitioner that the two provisions are riders deserves scant
consideration. Well settled is the rule that every law has in its favor the presumption
of constitutionality.8 Unless and until a specific provision of the law is declared
invalid and unconstitutional, the same is valid and binding for all intents and
purposes.
Another legal basis of E.O. No. 132 is Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292 which
states:
Sec. 20. Residual Powers.Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall
exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided
for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above or which are not
delegated by the President in accordance with law. (italics ours)
This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under the law.
What law then gives him the power to reorganize? It is Presidential Decree No.
17729 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant
the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national
government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies,
to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and
activities and to standardize salaries and materials. The validity of these two decrees
are unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that all laws, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances
not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended,
repealed or revoked.10 So far, there is yet no law amending or repealing said
decrees. Significantly, the Constitution itself recognizes future reorganizations in the
government as what is revealed in Section 16 of Article XVIII, thus:
Sec. 16. Career civil service employees separated from service not for cause but as a
result of the x x x reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution shall be
entitled to appropriate separation pay x x x.
However, We can not consider E.O. No. 127 signed on January 30, 1987 as a legal
basis for the reorganization of the BIR. E.O. No. 127 should be related to the second
paragraph of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6656.
Section 11 provides inter alia:
In the case of the 1987 reorganization of the executive branch, all departments and
agencies which are authorized by executive orders promulgated by the President to
reorganize shall have ninety days from the approval of this act within which to
8
implement their respective reorganization plans in accordance with the provisions of
this Act. (italics ours)
Executive Order No. 127 was part of the 1987 reorganization contemplated under
said provision. Obviously, it had become stale by virtue of the expiration of the
ninety day deadline period. It can not thus be used as a proper basis for the
reorganization of the BIR. Nevertheless, as shown earlier, there are other legal bases
to sustain the authority of the President to issue the questioned E.O. No. 132.
While the Presidents power to reorganize can not be denied, this does not mean
however that the reorganization itself is properly made in accordance with law. Well-
settled is the rule that reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in
good faith. Thus, in Dario vs. Mison, this Court has had the occasion to clarify that:
As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose
of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event no dismissal or
separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case
the security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the abolition
which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or
purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid
abolition takes place and whatever abolition is done is void . There is an invalid
abolition as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions or where
claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds.11
In this regard, it is worth mentioning that Section 2 of R.A. No. 6656 lists down the
circumstances evidencing bad faith in the removal of employees as a result of the
reorganization, thus:
Sec. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a
valid cause and after due notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exists when,
pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered
redundant or there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to
meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by the Civil Service
Law. The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be considered
as evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of the reorganization,
giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party:
a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing
pattern of the department or agency concerned;
 9

b) Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same
functions is created;
c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of
appointment, performance and merit;
d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned
and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original
offices;
e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof.
A reading of some of the provisions of the questioned E.O. No. 132 clearly leads us to
an inescapable conclusion that there are circumstances considered as evidences of
bad faith in the reorganization of the BIR.
Section 1.1.2 of said executive order provides that:
1.1.2 The Intelligence and Investigation Office and the Inspection Service are
abolished. An Intelligence and Investigation Service is hereby created to absorb the
same functions of the abolished office and service. x x x (italics ours)
Antonio Pangilinan who was one of those appointed as Assistant Commissioner, is
an outsider of sorts to the Bureau, not having been an incumbent officer of the
Bureau at the time of the reorganization. We should not lose sight of the second
paragraph of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6656 which explicitly states that no new
employees shall be taken in until all permanent officers shall have been appointed
for permanent position.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted, and petitioner is hereby
reinstated to his position as Assistant
Commissioner without loss of seniority rights and shall be entitled to full backwages
from the time of his separation from service until actual reinstatement unless, in the
meanwhile, he would have reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five years
in which case, he shall be deemed to have retired at such age and entitled thereafter
to the corresponding retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr. and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

This provision is a clear illustration of the circumstance mentioned in Section 2 (b) of Regalado, J., On leave.
R.A. No. 6656 that an office is abolished and another one performing substantially
Petition granted, petitioner reinstated.
the same function is created.
Note.If the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms his
Another circumstance is the creation of services and divisions in the BIR resulting to
innocence and makes him a new man and as innocent as if he had not been found
a significant increase in the number of positions in the said bureau as contemplated
guilty of the offense charged. When a person is given pardon because he did not
in paragraph (a) of Section 2 of R.A. No. 6656. Under Section 1.3 of E.O. No. 132, the
truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves the party from all punitive
Information Systems Group has two newly created Systems Services. Aside from this,
consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good
six new divisions are also created. Under Section 1.2.1, three more divisions of the
reputation and unstained character prior to the finding of guilt. (Garcia vs. Chairman,
Assessment Service are formed. With these newly created offices, there is no doubt
Commission on Audit, 226 SCRA 356 [1993] Larin vs. Executive Secretary, 280 SCRA
that a significant increase of positions will correspondingly follow.
713, G.R. No. 112745 October 16, 1997
Furthermore, it is perceivable that the non-reappointment of the petitioner as
Assistant Commissioner violates Section 4 of R.A. No. 6656. Under said provision,
officers holding permanent appointments are given preference for appointment to
the new positions in the approved staffing pattern comparable to their former
positions or in case there are not enough comparable positions to positions next
lower in rank. It is undeniable that petitioner is a career executive officer who is
holding a permanent position. Hence, he should have been given preference for
appointment in the position of Assistant Commissioner. As claimed by petitioner,

PURITA BERSABAL, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE JUDGE SERAFIN SALVADOR, as Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Caloocan City, Branch XIV, TAN THAT and ONG PIN
TEE, respondents.
Appeal; Action; In an appeal from a decision of a city or municipal court to the CFI
under RA. 6031, the submission of memorandum is optional and failure of appellant
to submit the same is not a ground for the dismissal of the appeal for failure to
prosecute.The foregoing provision is clear and leaves no room for doubt. It cannot
be interpreted otherwise than that the submission of memoranda is optional on the
part of the parties. Being optional on the part of the parties, the latter may so
choose to waive submission of the memoranda. And as a logical concomitant of the
choice given to the parties, the Court cannot dismiss the appeal of the party waiving
the submission of said memorandum. If the appellant so chooses not to submit the
memorandum, the Court of First Instance is left with no alternative but to decide the
case on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal
courts. In other words, the Court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on
the mere failure of an appellant to submit his memorandum, but rather it is the
Courts mandatory duty to decide the case on the basis of the available evidence and
records transmitted to it.
Same; Same; Statutory construction; Use of word may in the statute generally
connotes a permissible thing.As a general rule, the word may when used in a
statute is permissive only and operates to confer discretion; while the word shall is
imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced (dizon vs.
Encarnacion, L-18615, Dec. 24, 1963, 9 SCRA 714, 716-717). The implication is that
the Court is left with no choice but to decide the appealed case either on the basis of
the evidence and records transmitted to it, or on the basis of the latter plus
memoranda and/or brief with oral argument duly submitted and/or made on
request.
Same; Same; Courts should proceed with caution so as not deprive a party of the
right to appeal.In the case of Republic vs. Rodriguez (L-26056, May 29, 1969, 28
SCRA 378) this Court underscored the need of proceeding with caution so that a
party may not be deprived of its right to appeal except for weighty reasons.
MAKASIAR, J.:
On March 23, 1972, petitioner Purita Bersabal seeks to annul the orders of
respondent Judge of August 4, 1971, October 30, 1971 and March 15, 1972 and to
compel said respondent Judge to dicide petitioners perfected appeal on the basis of
10
the evidence and records of the case submitted by the City Court of Caloocan City
plus the memorandum already submitted by the petitioner and respondents.
Since only questions of law were raised therein, the Court of Appeals, on October 13,
1972, issued a resolution certifying said case to this Court pursuant to Section 17,
paragraph (4) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.
As found by the Court of Appeals, the facts of this case are as follows:
It appears that private respondents Tan That and Ong Pin Tee filed an ejectment
suit, docketed as Civil Case No. 6926 in the City Court of Caloocan City, against the
petitioner. A decision was rendered by said Court on November 25, 1970, which
decision was appealed by the petitioner to the respondent Court and docketed
therein as Civil Case No. C-2038.
During the pendency of the appeal, the respondent court issued on March 23, 1971
an order which reads:
Pursuant to the provisions of Rep. Act No. 6031, the Clerk of Court of Caloocan City,
is hereby directed to transmit to this Court within fifteen (16) days from receipt
hereof the transcripts of stenographic notes taken down during the hearing of this
case before the City Court of Caloocan City, and likewise, counsels for both parties
are given thirty (30) days from receipt of this order within which to file their
respective memoranda, and thereafter, this case shall be deemed submitted for
decision by this Court.
which order was apparently received by petitioner on April 17, 1971.
The transcript of stenographic notes not having yet been forwarded to the
respondent court, petitioner filed on May 5, 1971 a MOTION EX-PARTE TO SUBMIT
MEMORANDUM WITHIN 30 DAYS PROM RECEIPT OF NOTICE OP SUBMISSION OF
THE TRANSCRIPT OP STENOGRAPHIC NOTES TAKEN DUR. ING THE HEARING OF THE
CASE BEFORE THE CITY COURT OP CALOOCAN CITY which was granted by
respondent court on May 7, 1971. However, before the petitioner could receive any
such notice from the respondent court, the respondent Judge issued an order on
August 4, 1971 which says:
For failure of the defendant-appellant to prosecute her appeal, the same is hereby
ordered DISMISSED with costs against her.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order on September 28, 1971,
citing as a ground the granting of his ex-parte motion to submit memorandum within
 11

30 days form notice of the subsmission of the stenographic notes taken before the impose a duty which may be enforced (Dizon vs. Encarnacion, L-18615, Dec. 24,
City Court. Private respondents filed their opposition to the motion on September 1963, 9 SCRA 714, 716-717). The implication is that the Court is left with no choice
30, 1971. In the meantime, on October 30, 1971 filed her memorandum dated but to decide the appealed case either on the basis of the evidence and records
October 18, 1971, on October 30, 1971 the respondents Court denied the motion for transmitted to it, or on the basis of the latter plus memoranda and/or brief with oral
reconsideration. Then on January 25, 1972, petitioner filed a motion for leave to file argument duly submitted and/or made on request.
second motion for reconsideration which was likewise denied by the respondent
Moreover, memoranda, briefs and oral arguments are not essential requirements.
court on March 15, 1972. Hence this petition.
They may be submitted and/or made only if so requested
The sole inquiry in the case at bar can be stated thus: Whether, in the light of the
Finally, a contrary interpretation would be unjust and dangerous as it may defeat the
provisions of the second paragraph of Section 46 of Republic Act No. 296, as
litigants right to appeal granted to him by law. In the case of Republic vs. Rodriguez
amended by R.A. No. 6031, the mere failure of an appellant to submit on time the
(L-26056, May 29, 1969, 28 SCRA 378) this Court underscored the need of
memorandum mentioned in the same paragraph would empower the Court of First
proceeding with caution so that a party may not be deprived of its right to appeal
Instance, to dismiss, the appeal on the ground of failure to prosecute; or, whether it
except for weighty reasons. Courts should heed the rule in Municipality of Tiwi,
is mandatory upon said Court to proceed to decide the appealed case on the basis of
Albay vs. Cirujales (L-37520, Dec 26, 1973, 54 SCRA 390, 395), thus:
the evidence and records transmitted to it, the failure of the appellant to submit a
memorandum on time notwithstanding. The appellate courts summary dismissal of the appeal even before receipt of the
records of the appealed case as ordered by it in a prior mandamus case must be set
The second paragraph of Section 45 of R. A. No. 296, otherwise known as the
aside as having been issued precipitously and without an opportunity to consider
Philippine Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by R.A. No. 6031 provides, in part, as
and appreciate unavoidable circumstances of record not attributable to petitioners
follows:
that caused the delay in the elevation of the records of the case on appeal.
Courts of First Instance shall decide such appealed cases on the basis of the
In the instant case, no notice was received by petitioner about the submission of the
evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal courts: Provided, That
transcript of the stenographic notes, so that his 30-day period to submit his
the parties may submit memoranda and/or brief with oral argument if so requested.
memorandum would commence to run. Only after the expiration of such period can
x x x. (Italics Ours).
the respondent Judge act on the case by deciding it on the merits, not by dismissing
The foregoing provision is clear and leaves no room for doubt. It cannot be the appeal of petitioner.
interpreted otherwise than that the submission of memoranda is optional on the
WHEREFORE, THE CHALLENGED ORDERS OF RESPONDENT JUDGE DATED AUGUST 4,
part of the parties. Being optional on the part of the parties, the latter may so
1971, OCTOBER 30, 1971 AND MARCH 15, 1971 ARE HEREBY SET ASIDE AS NULL AND
choose to waive submission of the memoranda. And as a logical concomitant of the
VOID AND THE RESPONDENT COURT IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO DECIDE
choice given to the parties, the Court cannot dismiss the appeal of the party waiving
the submission of said memorandum. If the appellant so chooses not to submit the CIVIL CASE NO. C-2036 ON THE MERITS. NO COSTS.
memorandum, the Court of First Instance is left with no alternative but to decide the
case on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal Muoz Palma, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
courts. In other words, the Court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on
Teehankee, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
the mere failure of an appellant to submit his memorandum, but rather it is the
Courts mandatory duty to decide the case on the basis of the available evidence and TEEHANKEE, J., Concurring:
records transmitted to it.
I concur with the setting aside of the questioned dismissal of petitioners appeal on
As a general rule, the word may when used in a statute is permissive only and the ground that the record shows quite clearly that there was no failure on part of
operates to confer discretion; while theword shall is imperative, operating to
 12

petitioner-appellant to prosecute her appeal in respondent judges court. Petitioner
had been grafted in respondent judges Order of May 7, 1971, 30 days from notice of
submission of the transcripts within which to file her memorandum on appeal, yet
her appeal was dismissed per his Order of August 4, 1971 for alleged failure to
prosecute (by failure to file the memorandum) even before she had received any
such notice. Upon receipt of the dismissal order, petitioner had promptly moved for
reconsideration and filed her memorandum on appeal.
I am not prepared at this stage to concur with the ratio decidendi of the decision
penned by Mr. Justice Makasiar that the Court is not empowered by law to dismiss
the appeal on the mere failure of an appellant to submit his memorandum, but
rather it is the Courts mandatory duty to decide the case on the basis of the
available evidence and records transmitted to it. I entertain serious doubts about
such pronouncement, since when the court of first instance requests the party-
appellant to submit a memorandum or brief on appeal under the provisions of
Republic Act No. 6031 amending section 45 of Republic Act No. 296, such request
is tantamount to a requirement for the proper prosecution of the appeal; thus, when
the appellant willfuly fails to file such memorandum or brief, the judge should be
empowered to dismiss the appeal, applying suppletorily the analogous provisions of
Rule 50, section 1 for dismissal of appeal by the higher appellate courts and taking
into account that Rule 40, section 9 of the Rules of Court now expressly authorizes
the court of first instance to dismiss an appeal before it for failure to prosecute.
Notes.Where an order granting a new trial is reversed by the Court of Appeals, the
period of appeal from the decision of the trial court is 30 days counted from the
entry of final judgment of the decision of the Court of Appeals rather than from the
date of receipt of the decision of the trial court. (Pineda vs. Court of Appeals, 65
SCRA 258).
The order of the trial court approving the record on appeal and stating that the
appeal is made on time dispenses with the requirement that the record should show
timeliness of the appeal (Pimentel vs. Court of Appeals, 64 SCRA 475).
Where the verification to the notice of appeal contains the date when the decision
appealed from was received, the same complies with the requirements on appeal.
(Lacificar vs. Court of Appeals, 64 SCRA 361).
Section 45 of the Judiciary Act as amended by R.A. 6031 does not allow ah appeal by
record on appeal from the decision of the CFI in an appealed case falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the municipal or city court. (Gutierrez vs. Magat, 67
SCRA 262).
An appellee may be allowed to file her brief beyond the reglementary period where
no substantial prejudice may be caused to the appellant (Espiritu vs. Valerio, 3 SCRA
103.)
An extension of time for the filing of brief may be allowed for good and sufficient
cause, if the motion for extension is filed before the expiration of the time sought to
be extended. (Allan vs. Acosta, 10 SCRA 230.)
The right to appeal to a higher court being merely statutory may only be taken when
the law so provides and hence the parties cannot confer such right by mutual
agreement. (Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 3 SCRA 465.)
Right to appeal not a natural right nor part of due process but it is merely a statutory
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of the law. (Bello vs. Fernando, 4 SCRA 135; Ker & Company, Ltd. vs. Court
of Tax Appeals, 4 SCRA 160.)
Caluza vs. Workmens Compensation Commission
Supreme Court can review matters not assigned as errors in the appeal (Ortigas, Jr.
vs. Lufthansa German Airlines, 64 SCRA 610.) Supreme Court will entertain new
matters not raised in the Court of Appeals where the respondents did not pose any
answer to said new matters and in order to do justice to the case. (Vda. de Catingdig,
74 SCRA 83.) The liberal doctrine has been followed by the Supreme Court whenever
the material data rule is invoked to dismiss an appeal (Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 77
SCRA 148.) An appeal may be reinstated, even after the remand of the record to the
trial court, where it appears that dismissal of the appeal was made under the
erroneous impression that the appellants had abandoned their appeal (Balajadia vs.
Pineda, 81 SCRA 464.) Bersabal vs. Salvador, 84 SCRA 176, No. L-35910 July 21, 1978

On an appeal to the CFI from the municipal court, no new trial is required. (Bernabe
vs. Geraldez, 65 SCRA 96).

EDUARDO B. OLAGUER AND CONRADO S. REYES in their official capacity as FISCAL
AGENTS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, petitioners,
vs. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 48,
MANILA, PRESIDED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE DEMETRIO M. BATARIO, JR., M.B.
OLIVARES, AUGUSTO VILLANUEVA, ARACELLI LINSANGAN, LUISA LINSANGAN,
ALEJANDRO MARAMAG, MANUEL SALAK, TURNITA SORIANO, LINO SISON, DOMINGO
FLORES, MILAGROS HIZON and CARIDAD ORPIADA, respondents.
Administrative Law; Powers of the PCGG; The PCGG is a co-equal body of regional
trial courts in the exercise of its functions, and co-equal bodies have no power to
control each other.In the exercise of its functions, the PCGG is a co-equal body
with the regional trial courts and co-equal bodies have no power to control the
other. The regional trial courts and the Court of Appeals have no jurisdiction over the
PCGG in the exercise of its powers under the applicable Executive Orders and Section
26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution and, therefore, may not interfere with and
restrain or set aside the orders and actions of the PCGG. By the same token, the
regional trial courts have no jurisdiction over the acts of fiscal agents of the PCGG
acting for and in behalf of said commission.
Same; Same; Fiscal Agents; As fiscal agents of the PCGG, petitioners cannot be sued
in such capacity before ordinary courts, the tribunal for such purpose is the
Sandiganbayan.Civil Case No. 87-43156 pending before the respondent judge is
denominated as one for injunction with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order and damages. Particularly, under paragraph
17(d) of the complaint, private respondents admitted that the PJI is listed as one of
the involved corporations in Civil Case No. 0035 pending before the Sandiganbayan
which now exercises jurisdiction over the said corporation. Petitioners Olaguer and
Reyes appear to be fiscal agents of the PCGG. There can be no doubt, therefore, that
the subject matter of the action (the PJI, its properties and assets) falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners, as fiscal agents of the PCGG,
cannot be sued in such capacity before the ordinary courts. The tribunal for such
purpose is the Sandiganbayan. It necessarily follows that the issues raised by the
private respondents before the respondent judge to the effect that petitioners are
usurpers and have no right to sit in the board of directors or act as corporate officers
of the PJI are issues which should be addressed to the Sandiganbayan.
PETITION to review the order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 48. Batario, Jr.
J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
13
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
Delia L. Hermoso for private respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The parameters of the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts in relation to the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Sandiganbayan are put into issue in this
petition.
On December 17, 1987, private respondents filed a complaint for injunction and
damages, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila against
petitioners and Winston Marbella, Gaston Ortigas, Robeto Federis, Manuel C. Villa-
Real, Emanuel Soriano, Jack Arroyo and Benjamin Tulio.
The complaint alleges, among others, that private respondents are the only
stockholders with the right to vote of the Philippine Journalists, Inc. (PJI), Publisher of
several daily periodicals such as Manila Journal, Peoples Journal, etc. Sometime in
1977, PJI, obtained from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) certain
financing accommodations and as security thereof executed a first mortgage in favor
of DBP on its assets enumerated in a list attached to the mortgage. The PJI
stockholders assigned to DBP the voting rights over 67% of the total subscribed and
outstanding voting shares of stock of the company held by them. The DBP appointed
said PJI stockholders as proxies to exercise its right to vote. Due to some financial
difficulty on its part, PJI requested for a restructuring of its loan obligation with
certain conditions. The request was granted by the DBP in a letter dated August 4,
1986. Due to the default on the part of the PJI, the DBP cancelled the proxies in favor
of the assigning stockholders on September 30, 1986 and designated as its proxies
petitioner Eduardo Olaguer, Jose Mari Velez and Manuel de Leon. DBP scheduled a
special stockholders meeting for the purpose of electing a new set of directors.
It is also alleged in the complaint that before the special meeting, petitioner Olaguer
asked private respondent Rosario M. Barreto Olivares to assign qualifying shares not
only to the three proxies of DBP but also to two others to be chosen by him so as to
enable the five of them to sit in the PJI board of directors, and that, accordingly, they
may be able to coordinate more effectively with DBP as regards the early evaluation
and approval of the request for another restructuring of the PJI loan. Thus
respondent Olivares assigned her shareholdings covered by Stock Certificate. No. 34
(which were at that time assigned to DBP) to petitioner Olaguer, Marbella, Ortigas,
Mari Velez and De Leon, at one share each. The deeds of assignment provided that

the said assignment are valid only as long as the nominee is the person designated
by the DBP as its representative to sit in the board of directors.
The complaint also alleges that although Olaguer was elected chairman of the board
and chief executive officer of PJI, he failed to comply with his commitment and that
this gave private respondents a reason to cancel the assignment. Olaguer also
committed certain illegal acts which gave rise to the filing of several complaints
against him. However, before these cases could be resolved, Olaguers appointment
as member of the board of directors of DBP was terminated by President Corazon C.
Aquino effective September 9, 1987. He was informed about his termination through
two letters dated August 27 and October 12, 1987.
It is likewise alleged that, the termination notwithstanding, Olaguer continued to
exercise and retain full management and control of PJI. The DBP chief legal counsel
wrote to petitioner Reyes informing him of Olaguers removal from office and
enjoining him from implementing or complying with any instructions from Olaguer
and from disposing of the properties of PJI and disbursing any funds without prior
approval of the board of directors of PJI which will soon be elected, except such
amounts needed in the ordinary course of business. Accordingly, the DBP, acting
through its Chairman, Jesus Estanislao and its Director-in-Charge, Jose Mari Velez,
entered into an Interim Agreement with private respondents. The said agreement
called for a special stockholders meeting for the purpose of electing a new board of
directors which shall hold office until the next regular stockholders meeting to be
held on February 2, 1988.
The complaint further alleges that in a letter dated December 14, 1987, the DBP
chief legal counsel informed the private respondents that the said Interim
Agreement cannot be implemented because Olaguer claims that he has just been
designated the fiscal and team leader of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) assigned to the PJI and that all his actions are sanctioned and
reported to PCGG Chairman Ramon A. Diaz, and that it is the PCGG which exercises
the voting rights of all PJI common stocks sequestered since 1986, including those
assigned to DBP and that the PJI qualifying share now held by PJI Directors came
from shares sequestered by the PCGG. These observations are contained in a letter
dated October 31, 1987 written by petitioner Reyes in his capacity as chief legal
counsel and corporate secretary of PJI. It is stated therein that Olaguer, together
with Marbella, Ortigas, Soriano, Federis, Arroyo and Villa-Real have been acting as
corporate officers and/or members of the board without their having been elected
by the majority vote of stockholders and without their owning in their own right
even a single qualifying share.
14
In addition, it is alleged that petitioner Reyes had been sending out notices to private
respondents about an alleged stockholders meeting to be held on December 21,
1987 at the PJI building, and that in the letter written by the DBP chief legal
counsel,1 it is stated that petitioner Olaguer and his associates who claim to be
members of the board and corporate officers of
PJI do not represent DBP and that they are not authorized to act in its behalf.
The complaint emphasizes that the claim of petitioner Reyes that Olaguer can sit as
chairman of the board of directos of PJI even if he is no longer a director of DBP but
as long as he is the fiscal agent and team leader of the PCGG assigned is baseless
because: (a) the writs of sequestration on the shares of respondents Hizon, Orpiada,
Maramag, Flores and Sison, served on them on or about February 19, 1987, and on
respondents Linsangan, Salak, Soriano and Villanueva, served on them on or about
April 28, 1987, had been automatically lifted last August 19, 1987 and October 28,
1987, respectively, pursuant to Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution; and
only the sequestration on the shares of respondent Olivares has not been lifted since
a complaint was filed against her before the expiration of the constitutional deadline
for filing cases; (b) the sequestered shares of respondent Olivares could not be voted
upon by petitioners herein and their companions under their claim of being PCGG
fiscal agents under the recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in several cases
clearly stating that sequestration does not involve the right of ownership; (c) no
other meeting has been validly called for the election of a new set of directors after
the members of the board elected last October 2, 1986 had ceased to be such
directors, either by virtue of the cancellation of their qualifying shares or their
resignation; (d) with the filing of Civil Case No. 35 before the Sandiganbayan where
the PJI was listed as one of the involved corporations, all actions affecting said
corporation, including those which will affect rights of ownership and disposition of
assets, must have the prior approval of the Sandiganbayan which excercises
jurisdiction over these corporations as one of the properties in litigation; and (e) by
order of President Aquino, petitioner Olaguers separation from the PJI was called
for; that the acts of all the petitioners and their companions of either continuing to
sit in the board of directors of PJI and/or representing and acting as its corporate
officers are illegal and are the acts of usurpers and intruders violative of the rights of
private respondents as stockholders and are causing great damage and prejudice to
them as well as to the rights of the
DBP under the Deed of Assignment, and that such acts of usurpation should be
enjoined by the trial court.

Under the second cause of action for damages, it is alleged that Olaguer acted
illegally and outside the authority granted him as nominee of DBP and, accordingly,
Olivares cancelled the Deed of Assignment of one qualifying share to him as well as
the Deed of Assignment in favor of Marbella and Ortigas. The notice of cancellation
was served upon them on December 5, 1986. As a consequence of such cancellation,
the three failed to qualify to sit as members of the board of PJI.
Private respondents also alleged that despite such notice, petitioner and his
associates continued to sit in the board and that Olaguer took over the complete
management of the corporation and even caused the appointment of other
members of the board and/or corporate officers even if such appointees do not own
PJI shares of stock in their own right. It is likewise alleged that the petitioner and his
associates should be enjoined from committing further acts of usurpation and that
they should be held liable for all unlawful disbursements they have made. It is
further alleged that some of the private respondents had been unlawfully dismissed
and/or retired one after another thereby depriving them of all benefits they are
entitled to and subjecting them to great mental anguish, sleepless nights, deep
humiliation and great anxiety for which they must be paid damages in an amount left
to the sound discretion of the court. Private respondents also asked for exemplary
damages as well as the sum of P200,000.00 for attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation.
Private respondents prayed that pending a hearing on the merits of the case, a writ
of preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order be issued against
petitioner Reyes enjoining him from holding the special stockholders meeting
scheduled at 8:00 A.M. on December 21, 1987, and enjoining Olaguer and his
associates from sitting and acting as members of the board of directors of PJI or as
corporate officers. Private respondents also prayed that such temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction be made permanent after due hearing
and that Petitioner Olaguer and his associates be made to pay, jointly and severally,
actual damages as may be proved after audit, including moral and exemplary
damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses in the amount of P200,000.00, and
the costs of the suit.2
On December 18, 1987, an order was issued by the trial court setting the petition for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction for hearing on January 4, 1988 at 1:30
in the afternoon. A temporary restraining order was issued enjoining petitioner
Reyes from holding the special stockholders meeting scheduled for December 21,
1987 and enjoining all the other petitioners including Olaguer from sitting and acting
15
as members of the board and/or corporate officers of PJI until further orders of the
court.
On January 4, 1988, a motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners on the ground
that the court has no jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners; that they were not
served summons and that the subject matter of the action involves controversies
arising out of intra-corporate relations between and among stockholders which are
covered by the provisions of Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A so that the
matter is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC); that the venue for a petition seeking injunctive relief should be
the Sandiganbayan where aforesaid PCGG Case No. 0035 against Benjamin
Romualdez, Rosario Olivares, et al. is pending, pursuant to Executive Order No. 14
defining the jurisdiction over cases involving the alleged ill-gotten wealth of Former
President Marcos, et al.; that it is the SEC which should exercise jurisdiction over the
case pursuant to Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A; and that the complaint
states no cause of action inasmuch as the petitoners and the other defendants hold
shares emanating from the PCGG, and not from the DBP; that the shares issued to
DBP for Olivares, et al. on the basis of an erroneous DBP legal opinion have been
declared void ab initio and cancelled by the PCGG on November 4, 1987 so that the
DBP is not a stockholder of record; that the call for the stockholders meeting by
petitioner Reyes was with the approval of the PCGG Chairman; that PJI is a
sequestered corporation listed as item
No. 49 under Shares of Stock in Assets and Other Property of Benjamin
Romualdez marked Annex A, in Case No. 0035 for Reconveyance, Reversion,
Accounting, Restitution and Damages, entitled Republic of the Philippines, plaintiff
versus Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez, et al.,; that the PJI, pursuant to its Board
Resolution No. 43, dated November 14, 1987, has authorized the filing of criminal
complaints against Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez, Rosario Olivares, Tuynita Soriano,
Jose T. Abundo, Evelyn Nicasio, Alejandro Maramag, Caridad Orpiada and other
former and present PJI officers and employees who defrauded the company by
conspiring in and/or authorizing the illegal disbursements of PJI funds amounting to
P10.6 million, all for the account and upon instructions of said Romualdez who was
neither an officer, director, stockholder of record of PJI nor a creditor or supplier
thereof; that regarding the sequestration of PJI pursuant to orders of the PCGG
dated April 22, 1986 and February 19, 1987, the actual sequestration proceedings
have not been terminated upon the filing of PCGG Case No. 0035 before the
Sandiganbayan on July 31, 1987.

Petitioners maintain that under the pertinent provisions of the 1987 Constitution,
the commencement of a judicial action does not ipso facto lift the sequestration
order. It is the non-filing of a judicial action within six months from the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution if the sequestration order is issued before the ratification, or
within six months from the time sequestration order was issued if the same was
issued after such ratification, which will automatically lift the sequestration order.
Petitioners also stated that while the PJI suffered huge loses under the
administration of private respondents, the corporation realized profits under the
management of petitioner Olaguer. All the common and preferred stocks of private
respondents have been sequestered pursuant to the orders of the PCGG dated April
22, 1986 and February 19, 1987 and it is the PCGG which exercises the voting rights
pertaining to said sequestered shares pursuant to the Memorandum of President
Aquino to the PCGG dated June 26, 1986.
A Memorandum in support of the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and opposition to the motion to dismiss was filed by counsel for private
respondents.
On January 14, 1988, an order was issued by the trial court denying the motion to
dismiss and issuing a writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for upon a bond in the
amount of P50,000.00 to be filed by private respondents.
Hence, the herein petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/ or a writ of preliminary injunction
wherein the main issue is whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action.
On January 26, 1988, a resolution was issued by this Court requiring the respondents
to comment therein within ten (10) days from notice. A temporary restraining order
was issued enjoining the respondent judge to cease and desist from enforcing the
order of the trial court dated January 14, 1988 in Civil Case No. 87-43156 as well as
the writ of preliminary injunction issued against petitioners.
Acting on the manifestation and motion filed by counsel for private respondents on
February 4, 1988, this Court issued a resolution enjoining petitioner Reyes and/or
the corporate officers of PJI from holding another special stockholders meeting on
February 5, 1988 or at any date thereafter pending resolution of this case, and
directing the parties to maintain the status quo until further orders from the Court.
The private respondents filed their comment on the petition. Thereafter, the
petitioners filed their reply. On April 5, 1988, the court resolved to give due course to
16
the petition and considered the case submitted for decision. Nevertheless, the
private respondents filed a rejoinder.
The petition is impressed with merit. There is no dispute that the PJI is now under
sequestration by the PCGG and that Civil Case No. 0035 was filed in the
Sandiganbayan wherein the PJI is listed as among the corporations involved in the
unexplained wealth case against former President Marcos, Romualdez and many
others. The records likewise show that petitioner Olaguer, among others, is a fiscal
agent of the PCGG and that as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the PJI, he was
acting for and in behalf of the PCGG. Under Section 2 of Executive Order No. 14, the
Sandiganbayan has exclusive and original jurisdiction over all cases regarding the
funds, moneys, assets and properties illegally acquired by Former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives,
subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees,3 civil or criminal,
including incidents arising from such cases. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan is
subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court.4
In the exercise of its functions, the PCGG is a co-equal body with the regional trial
courts and co-equal bodies have no power to control the other.5 The regional trial
courts and the Court of Appeals have no jurisdiction over the PCGG in the exercise of
its powers under the applicable Executive Orders and Section 26, Article XVIII of the
1987 Constitution and, therefore, may not interfere with and restrain or set aside
the orders and actions of the PCGG.6 By the same token, the regional trial courts
have no jurisdiction over the acts of fiscal agents of the PCGG acting for and in behalf
of said commission.
The Commission should not be embroiled in and swamped by legal suits before
inferior courts all over the land. Otherwise, the Commission will be forced to spend
valuable time defending all its actuations in such courts. This will defeat the very
purpose behind the creation of the Commission. Accordingly, Section 4(a) of
Executive Order No. 1 expressly accorded the Commission and its members
immunity from suit for damages in that: No civil action shall lie against the
Commission or any member thereof for anything done or omitted in the discharge of
the task contemplated by this order.
Civil Case No. 87-43156 pending before the respondent judge is denominated as one
for injunction with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order and damages. Particularly, under paragraph 17(d) of the
complaint, private respondents admitted that the PJI is listed as one of the involved
corporations in Civil Case No. 0035 pending before the Sandiganbayan which now
 17

exercises jurisdiction over the said corporation. Petitioners Olaguer and Reyes
appear to be fiscal agents of the PCGG. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the
subject matter of the action (the PJI, its properties and assets) falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioners, as fiscal agents of the PCGG, cannot be sued in such capacity before the
ordinary courts. The tribunal for such purpose is the Sandiganbayan.

It necessarily follows that the issues raised by the private respondents before the
respondent judge to the effect that petitioners are usurpers and have no right to sit
in the board of directors or act as corporate officers of the PJI are issues which
should be addressed to the Sandiganbayan.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The respondent judge is permanently

enjoined from enforcing the order of the trial court dated January 14, 1988. The
restraining order issued by this Court dated February 4, 1988 enjoining petitioner
Reyes and/or the corporate officers of the PJI from holding the special stockholders
meeting on February 5, 1988 or at any date thereafter, and to preserve and maintain
the status quo, is hereby lifted. The order of the trial court dated January 14, 1988 is
hereby SET ASIDE and another order is hereby issued dismissing the complaint,
without pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,

Corts, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., I reiterate my dissent in PCGG vs. Pea, G.R. No. 77663, April 12,
1988.

Feliciano, J., I concur in the result, for the reasons and with the qualifications set
out in my separate opinion in PCGG vs. Pea, G.R. No. 77553, 12 April 1988.

Note.Exercise of administrative discretion when not abused is not subject to

contrary judgment or control of the court. (Meralco Securities Corporation vs.
Savellano, 117 SCRA 804.) Olaguer vs. Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Br. 48, 170 SCRA
478, G.R. No. 81385 February 21, 1989

HIJO PLANTATION, INC., DAVAO FRUITS CORPORATION, TWIN RIVERS PLANTATION,
INC. and MARSMAN & CO., INC., for themselves and in behalf of other persons and
entities similarly situated, petitioners, vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; Regulations found to be in consonance
and in harmony with the general purposes and objects of the law have uniformly
been held to have the force of law.Such regulations have uniformly been held to
have the force of law, whenever they are found to be in consonance and in harmony
with the general purposes and objects of the law. Such regulations once established
and found to be in conformity with the general purposes of the law, are just as
binding upon all the parties, as if the regulation had been written in the original law
itself (29 Phil. 119, ibid). Upon the other hand, should the regulation conflict with the
law, the validity of the regulation cannot be sustained.
Same; Same; Taxation; Argument that the stabilization tax on banana should be
imposed only on July 1, 1972 finds support in the very language of the law.In
petitioners reply (Rollo, p. 154) they argue that since the Banana Exports reached
the aggregate annual F.O.B. value of US $5 million in August 1971, the stabilization
tax on banana should be imposed only on July 1, 1972, the fiscal year following the
calendar year during which the industry attained the $5 million mark. Their
argument finds support in the very language of the law and upon congressional
record where a clarification on the applicability of the law was categorically made by
the then Senator Aytona, who stated that the tax shall be applicable only after the $5
million aggregate value is reached, making such tax prospective in application and for
a period of one yearreferring to the fiscal year (Annex 8, Comment of Respondent;
Rollo, p. 60). Clearly such clarification was indicative of the legislative intent.
Same; Same; Same; Board acted beyond its authority under the law and the
Constitution.It will be observed that while Monetary Board Resolution No. 1995
cannot be said to be the product of grave abuse of discretion but rather the result of
respondents overzealous desire to carry into effect the provisions of RA 6125, it is
evident that the Board acted beyond its authority under the law and the
Constitution. Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition in the case at bar, is
proper.
Same; Same; In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation
issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails.Moreover, there is no dispute
that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to
18
implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go
beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law (People v. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091).
Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned (University of Sto. Tomas v.
Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376; Del Mar v. Phil. Veterans Administration, 51 SCRA
340). Except for constitutional officials who can trace their competence to act to the
fundamental law itself, a public official must locate in the statute relied upon a grant
of power before he can exercise it. Department zeal may not be permitted to outrun
the authority conferred by statute (Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v.
Santiago, L-29236, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 493; cited in Tayug Rural Bank v.
Central Bank, L-46158, November 28, 1986, 146 SCRA 120, 130).
PETITION for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the Central Bank.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition which seeks: (1) to declare Monetary
Board Resolution No. 1995, series of 1971, as null and void; (2) to prohibit the
Central Bank from collecting the stabilization tax on banana exports shipped during
the period January 1, 1972 to June 30, 1982; and (3) a refund of the amount
collected as stabilization tax from the Central Bank.
The facts of this case as culled from the records are as follows:
Hijo Plantation, Inc., Davao Fruits Corporation, Twin Rivers Plantation, Inc., and
Marsman Plantation (Manifestation, Rollo, p. 18), collectively referred to herein as
petitioners, are domestic corporations duly organized and existing under the laws of
the Philippines, all of which are engaged in the production andexportation of
bananas in and from Mindanao.
Owing to the difficulty of determining the exchange rate of the peso to the dollar
because of the floating rate and the promulgation of Central Bank Circular No. 289
which imposes an 80% retention scheme on all dollar earners, Congress passed
Republic Act No. 6125 entitled an act imposing STABILIZATION TAX ON
CONSIGNMENTS ABROAD TO ACCELERATE THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, approved and made effective on May 1,
1970 (Comment on Petition, Rollo, p. 32), to eliminate the necessity for said circular
and to stabilize the peso. Among others, it provides as follows:
SECTION 1. There shall be imposed, assessed and collected a stabilization tax on the
gross F.O.B. peso proceeds, based on the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of

receipt of such proceeds, whether partial or total, of any exportation of the following
products in accordance with the following schedule:
a. In the case of logs, copra, centrifugal sugar, and copper ore and concentrates:
Ten per centum of the F.O.B. peso proceeds of exports received on or after the date
of effectivity of this Act to June thirty, nineteen hundred seventy one;
Eight per centum of the F.O.B. peso proceeds of exports received from July first,
nineteen hundred seventy-one to June thirty, nineteen hundred seventy-two;
Six per centum of the F.O.B. peso proceeds of exports received from July first,
nineteen hundred seventy-two to June thirty, nineteen hundred seventy -three; and
Four per centum of the F.O.B. peso proceeds of exports received from July first,
nineteen hundred seventy-three to June thirty, nineteen hundred seventy-four.
b. In the case of molasses, coconut oil, dessicated coconut, iron ore and
concentrates, Chromite ore and concentrates, copra meal or cake, unmanufactured
abaca, unmanufactured tobacco, veneer core and sheets, plywood (including
plywood panels faced with plastics), lumber, canned pineapples, and bunker fuel oil;
Eight per centum of the F.O.B. peso proceeds of exports shipped on or after the
date of effectivity of this Act to June thirty, nineteen hundred seventy-one;
Six per centum of the F.O.B, peso proceeds of exports shipped from July first,
nineteen hundred seventy-one to June thirty nineteen hundred seventy -two; Four
per centum of the F.O.B. peso proceeds of exports shipped from July first, nineteen
hundred seventy-two to June thirty nineteen hundred seventy-three; and
Two per centum of the F.O.B. peso proceeds of exports shipped from July first,
nineteen hundred seventy-three to June thirty nineteen hundred seventy-four.
Any export product the aggregate annual F.O.B. value of which shall exceed five
million United States dollars in any one calendar year during the effectivity of this Act
shall likewise be subject to the rates of tax in force during the fiscal years following
its reaching the said aggregate value. (Italics supplied).
During the first nine (9) months of calendar year 1971, the total banana export
amounted to an annual aggregate FOB value of P8,949,000.00 (Answer, Rollo, p. 73)
thus exceeding the aggregate FOB value of five million United States Dollar, bringing
it within the ambit of Republic Act No. 6125. Consequently, the banana industry was
in a dilemma as to when the stabilization tax was to become due and collectible from
19
it and under what schedule of Section 1 (b) of Republic Act 6125 should said tax be
collected. Accordingly, petitioners through their counsel, by letter dated November
5, 1971, sought the authoritative pronouncement of the Central Bank (herein
referred to as respondent), therein advancing the opinion that the stabilization tax
does not become due and collectible from the petitioners until July 1, 1972 at the
rate of 4% of the FOB peso proceeds of the exports shipped from July 1, 1972 to
June 30, 1973. Replying by letter dated December 17, 1971 (Rollo, p. 11), the Central
Bank called attention to Monetary Board Resolution No. 1995 dated December 3,
1971 which clarified that:
1) For exports of bananas shipped during the period from January 1, 1972 to June
30, 1972; the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 6%;
2) For exports of bananas shipped during the period from July 1, 1972 to June 30,
1973, the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 4%; and
3) For exports of bananas shipped during the period from July 1, 1973, to June 30,
1974, the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 2%.
Contending that said Board Resolution No. 1995 was manifestly contrary to the
legislative intent, petitioners sought a reconsideration of said Board Resolution by
letter dated December 27, 1971 (Rollo, p. 12) which request for reconsideration was
denied by the respondent, also by letter dated January 20, 1972 (Rollo, p. 24). With
the denial of petitioners request for reconsideration, respondent thru its agent
Bank, Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation has been collecting from the petitioners
who have been forced to pay under protest, such stabilization tax.
Petitioners view respondents act as a clear violation of the provision of Republic Act
No. 6125, and as an act in excess of its jurisdiction, hence, this petition.
The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued Monetary Board
Resolution No. 1995, series of 1971 which in effect reaffirmed Central Bank Circular
No. 309, enacted pursuant to Monetary Board Resolution No. 1179.
There is here no dispute that the banana industry is liable to pay the stabilization tax
prescribed under Republic Act No. 1995, it being the admission of both parties, that
the Industry has indeed reached and for the first time in the calendar year 1971, a
total banana export exceeding the aggregate annual FOB value of five million United
States dollars. The crux of the controversy, however, is the manner of
implementation of Republic Act No. 6125.

Section 1 of R.A. 6125 clearly provides as follows:
An export product the aggregate annual FOB value of which shall exceed five million
US dollars in any one calendar year during the effectivity of the act shall likewise be
subject to the rates of tax in force during the fiscal year following its reaching the
said aggregate value.
Petitioners contend that the stabilization tax to be collected from the banana
industry does not become due and collectible until July 1, 1972 at the rate of 4% of
the F.O.B. peso proceeds
of the export shipped from July 1, 1972 to June 30, 1973. They further contend that
respondent gave retroactive effect to the law (RA 6125) by ruling in Monetary Board
Resolution No. 1995 dated December 3, 1971, that the export stabilization tax on
banana industry would start to accrue on January 1, 1972 at the rate of 6% of the
F.O.B. peso proceeds of export shipped from July 1, 1971 to June 30, 1972 (Rollo, pp.
3-4).
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the aforecited provision of RA 6125
merely prescribes the rates that may be imposed but does not provide when the tax
shall be collected and makes no reference to any definite fixed period when the tax
shall begin to be collected (Rollo, pp. 77-78).
There is merit in this petition.
In the very nature of things, in many cases it becomes impracticable for the
legislative department of the Government to provide general regulations for the
various and varying details for the management of a particular department of the
Government. It therefore becomes convenient for the legislative department of the
government, by law, in a most general way, to provide for the conduct, control, and
management of the work of the particular department of the government; to
authorize certain persons, in charge of the management and control of such
department (United States v. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119 [1914]).
Such is the case in RA 6125, which provided in its Section 6, as follows:
All rules and regulations for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the act
shall be promulgated by the Central Bank of the Philippines and shall take effect
fifteen days after publication in three newspapers of general circulation throughout
the Philippines, one of which shall be in the national language.
20
Such regulations have uniformly been held to have the force of law, whenever they
are found to be in consonance and in harmony with the general purposes and
objects of the law. Such regulations once established and found to be in conformity
with the general purposes of the law, are just as binding upon all the parties, as if the
regulation had been written in the original law itself (29 Phil. 119, ibid). Upon the
other hand should the regulation conflict with the law, the validity of the regulation
cannot be sustained (Director of Forestry vs. Muroz, 23 SCRA 1183).
Pursuant to the aforecited provision, the Monetary Board issued Resolution No.
1179 which contained the rules and regulations for the implementation of said
provision which Board resolution was subsequently embodied in Central Bank
Circular No. 309, dated August 10, 1970 (duly published in the Official Gazette, Vol.
66, No. 34, August 24, 1970, p. 7855 and in three newspapers of general circulation
throughout the Philippines namely, the Manila Times, Manila Chronicle and Manila
Daily Bulletin). Section 3 of Central Bank Circular No. 309, provides that the
stabilization tax shall begin to apply on January first following the calendar year
during which such export products shall have reached the aggregate annual F.O.B.
value of more than $5 million and the applicable tax rates shall be the rates
prescribed in schedule (b) of Section 1 of RA No. 6125 for the fiscal year following
the reaching of the said aggregate value. Central Bank Circular No. 309 was
subsequently reaffirmed in Monetary Board Resolution No. 1995 herein assailed by
petitioners for being null and void (Rollo, pp. 97-98).
In its comment (Rollo, p. 40), respondent argues that the request for authoritative
pronouncement of petitioners was made because there was no express provision in
Section 1 of RA 6125 which categorically states, when the stabilization tax shall begin
to accrue on those aggregate annual FOB values exceeding five (5) million United
States dollars in any one calendar year during the effectivity of said act. For which
reason, the law itself authorized it under Section 7 to promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out the provisions of said law.
In petitioners reply (Rollo, p. 154) they argue that since the Banana Exports reached
the aggregate annual F.O.B. value of US $5 million in August 1971, the stabilization
tax on banana should be imposed only on July 1, 1972, the fiscal year following the
calendar year during which the industry attained the $5 million mark. Their
argument finds support in the very language of the law and upon congressional
record where a clarification on the applicability of the law was categorically made by
the then Senator Aytona, who stated that the tax
 21

shall be applicable only after the $5 million aggregate value is reached, making such Petition granted.
tax prospective in application and for a period of one yearreferring to the fiscal
Note.It is a cardinal principle that a statute must be so construed as to harmonize
year (Annex 8, Comment of Respondent; Rollo, p. 60). Clearly such clarification was
all apparent conflicts, and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible. (People
indicative of the legislative intent. Further, they argue that respondent bank through
vs. Antillos, 114 SCRA 665.)
the Monetary Board clearly overstepped RA 6125 which empowered it to
promulgate rules and regulations for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of o0o Hijo Plantation, Inc. vs. Central Bank, 164 SCRA 192, No. L-34526
said act, because while Section 1 of the law authorizes it to levy a stabilization tax on August 9, 1988
petitioners only in the fiscal year following their reaching the aggregate annual F.O.B.
value of US $5 million, that is, the fiscal year July 1, 1972 to June 30, 1973, at a tax
rate of 4% of the FOB peso proceeds, respondent in gross violation of the law,
instead issued Resolution No. 1995 which impose a 6% stabilization tax for the
calendar year January 1, 1972 to June 30, 1972, which obviously is in excess of its
jurisdiction. It was further argued that in directing its agent bank to collect the
stabilization tax in accordance with Monetary Board Resolution No. 1995, it acted
whimsically and capriciously (Rollo, p. 155).

It will be observed that while Monetary Board Resolution No. 1995 cannot be said to
be the product of grave abuse of discretion but rather the result of respondents
overzealous desire to carry into effect the provisions of RA 6125, it is evident that
the Board acted beyond its authority under the law and the Constitution. Hence, the
petition for certiorari and prohibition in the case at bar, is proper.

Moreover, there is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and
a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said
rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law
(People vs. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091). Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned
(University of Sto. Tomas v. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376; Del Mar v. Phil.
Veterans Administration, 51 SCRA 340). Except for constitutional officials who can
trace their competence to act to the fundamental law itself, a public official must
locate to the statute relied upon a grant of power before he can exercise it.
Department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute
(Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. Santiago, L-29236, August 21, 1974,
58 SCRA 493; cited in Tayug Rural Bank v. Central Bank, L-46158, November 28,
1986, 146 SCRA 120, 130).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is hereby GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.


GLOBE WIRELESS LTD., petitioner, vs. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION and ANTONIO B.
ARNAIZ, respondents.
Mercantile Law; Public Service Commission; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction of the Public
Service Commission limited only to the rate which petitioner may charge the public,
but not in the imputed negligence of petitioner in failing to deliver a telegraphic
message.Verily, Section 13 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, otherwise
known as the Public Service Act, vested in the Public Service Commission jurisdiction,
supervision and control over all public services and their franchises, equipment and
other properties. However, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 4630, the legislative
franchise under which petitioner was operating, limited respondent Commissions
jurisdiction over petitioner only to the rate which petitioner may charge the public. x
x x The act complained of consisted in petitioner having allegedly failed to deliver the
telegraphic message of private respondent to the addressee in Madrid, Spain.
Obviously, such imputed negligence had nothing whatsoever to do with the subject
matter of the very limited jurisdiction of the Commission over petitioner.
Same; Same; Same; Commission empowered to impose an administrative fine in
cases of violation of or failure by a public service to comply with the terms and
conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions or regulations of the
Commission; Absence of violation by petitioner of said terms or orders or decisions
in case at bar.Moreover, under Section 21 of C.A. No. 146, as amended, the
Commission was empowered to impose an administrative fine in cases of violation of
or failure by a public service to comply with the terms and conditions of any
certificate or any orders, decisions or regulations of the Commission. Petitioner
operated under a legislative franchise, so there were no terms nor conditions of any
certificate issued by the Commission to violate. Neither was there any order,
decision or regulation from the Commission applicable to petitioner that the latter
had allegedly violated, disobeyed, defied or disregarded.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies limited to
those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation
creating such body.Too basic in administrative law to need citation of
jurisprudence is the rule that the jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies,
like respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily
implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body; and any order
without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective. The order under
consideration belonged to this category.
PETITION for certiorari to review the order of the Public Service Commission.
22
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
RESOLUTION
G.R. No. 27520 [Globe Wireless Ltd., vs. Public Service Commission and Antonio B.
Arnaiz].Challenged in this petition for certiorari is the jurisdiction of the defunct
Public Service Commission [PSC] under Section 21 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as
amended, to discipline and impose a fine upon petitioner, Globe Wireless, Ltd., a
duly-organized Philippine corporation engaged in international telecommunication
business under a franchise granted by Public Acts Nos. 3495, 3692 and 4150, as
amended by Republic Act No. 4630.
A message addressed to Maria Diaz, Monte Esquina 30, Madrid, Spain, filed by
private respondent Antonio B. Arnaiz with the telegraph office of the Bureau of
Telecommunications in Dumaguete City was transmitted to the Bureau of
Telecommunications in Manila. It was forwarded to petitioner Globe Wireless Ltd.
for transmission to Madrid. Petitioner sent the message to the American Cable and
Radio Corporation in New York, which, in turn, transmitted the same to the Empresa
Nacional de Telecommunicaciones in Madrid. The latter, however, mislaid said
message, resulting in its non-delivery to the addressee.
After being informed of said fact, private respondent Arnaiz sent to then Public
Service Commissioner Enrique Medina an unverified letter-complaint relating the
incident. The complaint was docketed as PSC Case No. 6539-OC and petitioner was
required to answer the same. Petitioner, in its answer, questioned PSCs jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the letter-complaint, even as it denied liability for the
non-delivery of the message to the addressee.
Hearing ensued, after which the PSC issued an order finding petitioner responsible
for the inadequate and unsatisfactory service complained of, in violation of the
Public Service Act and ordering it to pay a fine of TWO HUNDRED [P200.00] PESOS
under Sec. 21 of Com. Act 146, as amended. Petitioner was likewise required to
refund the sum of P19.14 to the remitter of the undelivered message. [Annex C",
Petition, p. 23, Rollo].
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner instituted the instant
petition.
We find for petitioner.
Verily, Section 13 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, otherwise known as
the Public Service Act, vested in the Public Service Commission jurisdiction,

supervision and control over all public services and their franchises, equipment and
other properties. However, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 4630, the legislative
franchise under which petitioner was operating, limited respondent Commissions
jurisdiction over petitioner only to the rate which petitioner may charge the public.
Thus,
Sec. 5. The Public Service Commission is hereby given jurisdiction over the grantee
only with respect to the rates which the grantee may charge the public subject to
international commitments made or adhered to by the Republic of the Philippines.
(Italics supplied.)
The act complained of consisted in petitioner having allegedly failed to deliver the
telegraphic message of private respondent to the addressee in Madrid, Spain.
Obviously, such imputed negligence had nothing whatsoever to do with the subject
matter of the very limited jurisdiction of the Commission over petitioner.
Moreover, under Section 21 of C.A. No. 146, as amended, the Commission was
empowered to impose an administrative fine in cases of violation of or failure by a
public service to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any
orders, decisions or regulations of the Commission. Petitioner operated under a
legislative franchise, so there were no terms nor conditions of any certificate issued
by the Commission to violate. Neither was there any order, decision or regulation
from the Commission applicable to petitioner that the latter had allegedly violated,
disobeyed, defied or disregarded.
Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that the
jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies, like respondent Commission, are
limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the
legislation creating such body; and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is
void and ineffective. The order under consideration belonged to this category.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is hereby granted and the order of respondent
Public Service Commission in PSC Case No. 6539-OC is set aside for being null and
void.
Petition granted. Order set aside.
Notes.Section 13(b) of the Public Service Act, as amended, defines Public Service
as includes every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage or
control in the Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or limited clientele,
whether permanent, occasional or accidental, and done for general business
23
purposes, any common carrier, railroad, xxx, wire or wireless communications
system, wire or wireless broadcasting stations and other similar public services x x x.
(Bureau of Telecommunications vs. Public Service Commission, 29 SCRA 751.)
The jurisdiction to act on a motion for reconsideration of a decision of the Public
Service Commission is vested in the Commission en banc, and no commissioner can
act alone thereon unless such power has been delegated to him. (Manila Electric Co.
vs. Medina, 14 SCRA 510; Tacloban Electric & Ice Plants Co., Inc. vs. Medina, 22 SCRA
775; Beltran vs. Medina, 32 SCRA 458.) Globe Wireless Ltd. vs. Public Service
Commission, 147 SCRA 269, No. L-27520 January 21, 1987
HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. and NESTORIO F. APOLINARIO, in his
personal capacity and as President of Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc.,
petitioners, vs. SECRETARY MICHAEL DEFENSOR, in his capacity as Chairman of the
Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), ATTY. EDGARDO
PAMINTUAN, in his capacity as General Manager of the National Housing Authority
(NHA), MR. PERCIVAL CHAVEZ, in his capacity as Chairman of the Presidential
Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP), MAYOR FELICIANO BELMONTE, in his
capacity as Mayor of Quezon City, SECRETARY ELISEA GOZUN, in her capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and
SECRETARY FLORENTE SORIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH) as ex-officio members of the NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT CENTER ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE, respondents.
National Government Center (NGC); Judicial Review; Locus Standi; An association has
the legal standing to institute the petition, whether or not it is the duly recognized
association of homeowners in the National Government Center (NGC) where it is
shown that the individual members of the association are residents of the NGC.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of
standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions. Petitioner association has the legal standing to institute the instant
petition, whether or not it is the duly recognized association of homeowners in the
NGC. There is no dispute that the individual members of petitioner association are
residents of the NGC. As such they are covered and stand to be either benefited or
injured by the enforcement of the IRR, particularly as regards the selection process
of beneficiaries and lot allocation to qualified beneficiaries. Thus, petitioner

association may assail those provisions in the IRR which it believes to be unfavorable
to the rights of its members. Contrary to the OSGs allegation that the failure of
petitioner association and its members to qualify as beneficiaries effectively bars
them from questioning the provisions of the IRR, such circumstance precisely
operates to confer on them the legal personality to assail the IRR.
Administrative Law; Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making
powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers.Administrative
agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or
administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the
power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is
within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and
separability of powers.
Same; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; The principle of exhaustion of
administrative agencies applies only where the act of the administrative agency
concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the
assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.In questioning
the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative
agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This
principle, however, applies only where the act of the administrative agency
concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the
assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.
Same; Jurisdictions; Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule
or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-
legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.The
assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee
expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that
the assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not
germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks to implement. Where
what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the
administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular
courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.
National Government Center (NGC); Hierarchy of Courts; Since the regular courts
have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) issued by the National Government Center Administration
Committee (Committee) in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial
course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courtsa direct
24
invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction should be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition.Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass
upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its
quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to assail its validity must follow the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and
the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such
concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court
forum. True, this Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the
petition filed directly with it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of
the issues raised, so warrant. A direct invocation of the Courts original jurisdiction to
issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. In Heirs of Bertuldo
Hinog v. Melicor, 455 SCRA 460 (2005), the Court said that it will not entertain direct
resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts,
and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and
of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of
certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.
Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; The Supreme Courts power to evaluate the validity of
an implementing rule or regulation is generally appellate in nature.A perusal,
however, of the petition for prohibition shows no compelling, special or important
reasons to warrant the Courts taking cognizance of the petition in the first
instance. Petitioner also failed to state any reason that precludes the lower courts
from passing upon the validity of the questioned IRR. Moreover, as provided in
Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, the Courts power to evaluate the validity
of an implementing rule or regulation is generally appellate in nature. Thus, following
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, the instant petition should have been initially
filed with the Regional Trial Court.
Prohibition; Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against
legislative or quasi-legislative functions; Where the principal relief sought is to
invalidate the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), petitioners remedy is an
ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.A petition for prohibition is also not the
proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function.
Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board,

officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions,
ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said
proceedings are without or in excess of said entitys or persons jurisdiction, or are
accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies
against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative
functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court
within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in
orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation
of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in
handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the
bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available
in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained. Where the
principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners remedy is an ordinary
action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners allegation that respondents are
performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their
jurisdiction may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of
injunction or a temporary restraining order.
Courts; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; The Supreme Court will not shirk from
its duty to rule on the merits of this petition to facilitate the speedy resolution of this
casein proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest
of substantial justice, and the power of the Court to except a particular case from its
rules whenever the purposes of justice require it cannot be questioned.In a
number of petitions, the Court adequately resolved them on other grounds without
adjudicating on the constitutionality issue when there were no compelling reasons to
pass upon the same. In like manner, the instant petition may be dismissed based on
the foregoing procedural grounds. Yet, the Court will not shirk from its duty to rule
on the merits of this petition to facilitate the speedy resolution of this case. In proper
cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial
justice. And the power of the Court to except a particular case from its rules
whenever the purposes of justice require it cannot be questioned.
Republic Act No. 9207; The governments policy to set aside public property aims to
benefit not only the urban poor but also the local government and various
government institutions devoted to socioeconomic, charitable, educational and
religious purposes.Petitioners interpretation is also not supported by the policy of
R.A. No. 9207 and the prior proclamations establishing the NGC. The governments
25
policy to set aside public property aims to benefit not only the urban poor but also
the local government and various government institutions devoted to
socioeconomic, charitable, educational and religious purposes. Thus, although
Proclamation No. 137 authorized the sale of lots to bona fide residents in the NGC,
only a third of the entire area of the NGC was declared open for disposition subject
to the condition that those portions being used or earmarked for public or quasi-
public purposes would be excluded from the housing program for NGC residents.
The same policy of rational and optimal land use can be read in Proclamation No.
248 issued by then President Ramos. Although the proclamation recognized the
rapid increase in the population density in the NGC, it did not allocate additional
property within the NGC for urban poor housing but instead authorized the vertical
development of the same 150 hectares identified previously by Proclamation No.
137 since the distribution of individual lots would not adequately provide for the
housing needs of all the bona fide residents in the NGC.
Same; Where a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly stated or contained in
the statute being implemented, that provision does not necessarily contradict the
statuteall that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects
and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in
conformity with the standards prescribed by the law; Implicit in the authority of the
Committee and the statutes objective of urban poor housing is the power of the
Committee to formulate the manner by which the reserved property may be
allocated to the beneficiaries.Where a rule or regulation has a provision not
expressly stated or contained in the statute being implemented, that provision does
not necessarily contradict the statute. A legislative rule is in the nature of
subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the
details thereof. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in
conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. In Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207,
the Committee is granted the power to administer, formulate guidelines and policies,
and implement the disposition of the areas covered by the law. Implicit in this
authority and the statutes objective of urban poor housing is the power of the
Committee to formulate the manner by which the reserved property may be
allocated to the beneficiaries. Under this broad power, the Committee is mandated
to fill in the details such as the qualifications of beneficiaries, the selling price of the
lots, the terms and conditions governing the sale and other key particulars necessary
to implement the objective of the law. These details are purposely omitted from the
statute and their determination is left to the discretion of the Committee because
the latter possesses special knowledge and technical expertise over these matters.

Same; The Committees authority to fix the selling price of the lots may be likened to
the rate-fixing power of administrative agencies, and in case of a delegation of rate-
fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the
guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just.
The Committees authority to fix the selling price of the lots may be likened to the
rate-fixing power of administrative agencies. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing
power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the
guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just.
However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to
reasonableness, this standard may be implied. In this regard, petitioners do not even
claim that the selling price of the lots is unreasonable.
Same; There is nothing objectionable about prescribing a period within which the
parties must execute the contract to sell. This condition can ordinarily be found in a
contract to sell and is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy.The provision on the price escalation clause as a penalty imposed to a
beneficiary who fails to execute a contract to sell within the prescribed period is also
within the Committees authority to formulate guidelines and policies to implement
R.A. No. 9207. The Committee has the power to lay down the terms and conditions
governing the disposition of said lots, provided that these are reasonable and just.
There is nothing objectionable about prescribing a period within which the parties
must execute the contract to sell. This condition can ordinarily be found in a contract
to sell and is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy.
Same; In subordinate legislation, as long as the passage of the rule or regulation had
the benefit of a hearing, the procedural due process requirement is deemed
complied with.Petitioners also suggest that the adoption of the assailed IRR suffers
from a procedural flaw. According to them the IRR was adopted and concurred in by
several representatives of peoples organizations contrary to the express mandate of
R.A. No. 9207 that only two representatives from duly recognized peoples
organizations must compose the NGCAC which promulgated the assailed IRR. It is
worth noting that petitioner association is not a duly recognized peoples
organization. In subordinate legislation, as long as the passage of the rule or
regulation had the benefit of a hearing, the procedural due process requirement is
deemed complied with. That there is observance of more than the minimum
requirements of due process in the adoption of the questioned IRR is not a ground to
invalidate the same.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition.
26
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Elpidio S. Salgado and Joel F. Pradia for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
The City Attorney for respondent City Government.
TINGA, J.:
The instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction, seeks to prevent respondents from enforcing the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207, otherwise known
as the National Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act of
2003.
Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners
association from the West Side of the NGC. It is represented by its president,
Nestorio F. Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-petitioner in his own personal capacity and on
behalf of the association.
Named respondents are the ex officio members of the National Government Center
Administration Committee (Committee). At the filing of the instant petition, the
Committee was composed of Secretary Michael Defensor, Chairman of the Housing
and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), Atty. Edgardo Pamintuan,
General Manager of the National Housing Authority (NHA), Mr. Percival Chavez,
Chairman of the Presidential Commission for Urban Poor (PCUP), Mayor Feliciano
Belmonte of Quezon City, Secretary Elisea Gozun of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), and Secretary Florante Soriquez of the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH).
Prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, a number of presidential issuances authorized
the creation and development of what is now known as the National Government
Center (NGC).
On March 5, 1972, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No.
1826, reserving a parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covering a little
over 440
hectares as a national government site to be known as the NGC.1

On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 137,
excluding 150 of the 440 hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of
Proclamation No. 1826 and authorizing instead the disposition of the excluded
portion by direct sale to the bona fide residents therein.2
In view of the rapid increase in population density in the portion excluded by
Proclamation No. 137 from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former President
Fidel Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248 on September 7, 1993, authorizing the
vertical development of the excluded portion to maximize the number of families
who can effectively become beneficiaries of the governments socialized housing
program.3
On May 14, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207.
Among the salient provisions of the law are the following:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy.It is hereby declared the policy of the State to
secure the land tenure of the urban poor. Toward this end, lands located in the NGC,
Quezon City shall be utilized for housing, socioeconomic, civic, educational, religious
and other purposes.
Sec. 3. Disposition of Certain Portions of the National Government Center Site to
Bona Fide Residents.Proclamation No. 1826, Series of 1979, is hereby amended by
excluding from the coverage thereof, 184 hectares on the west side and 238
hectares on the east side of Commonwealth Avenue, and declaring the same open
for disposition to bona fide residents therein: Provided, That the determination of
the bona fide residents on the west side shall be based on the census survey
conducted in 1994 and the determination of the bona fide residents on the east side
shall be based on the census survey conducted in 1994 and occupancy verification
survey conducted in 2000: Provided, further, That all existing legal agreements,
programs and plans signed, drawn up or implemented and actions taken, consistent
with the provisions of this Act are hereby adopted.
Sec. 4. Disposition of Certain Portions of the National Government Center Site for
Local Government or Community Facilities, Socioeconomic, Charitable, Educational
and Religious Purposes.Certain portions of land within the aforesaid area for local
government or community facilities, socioeconomic, charitable, educational and
religious institutions are hereby reserved for disposition for such purposes: Provided,
That only those institutions already operating and with existing facilities or
structures, or those occupying the land may avail of the disposition program
established under the provisions this Act; Provided, further, That in ascertaining the
specific areas that may be disposed of in favor of these institutions, the existing site
27
allocation shall be used as basis therefore: Provided, finally. That in determining the
reasonable lot allocation of such institutions without specific lot allocations, the land
area that may be allocated to them shall be based on the area actually used by said
institutions at the time of effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis supplied.)
In accordance with Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207,4 the Committee formulated the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9207 on June 29, 2004.
Petitioners subsequently filed the instant petition, raising the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3.1 (A.4), 3.1 (B.2), 3.2 (A.1) AND 3.2 (C.1) OF THE RULES
AND REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9207, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT CENTER (NGC) HOUSING AND LAND UTILIZATION ACT OF 2003
SHOULD BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID FOR BEING INCONSISTENT WITH THE LAW IT
SEEKS TO IMPLEMENT.
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3.1 (A.4), 3.1 (B.2), 3.2 (A.1) AND 3.2 (C.1) OF THE RULES
AND REGULATIONS OF REPUB
4 Sec. 5. National Government Center Administration Committee.There is
hereby created a National Government Center Administration Committee to
administer, formulate guidelines and policies, and implement the land disposition of
the areas covered by this Act. x x x
LIC ACT NO. 9207, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS NATIONAL GOVERNMENT CENTER (NGC)
HOUSING AND LAND UTILIZATION ACT OF 2003 SHOULD BE DECLARED NULL AND
VOID FOR BEING ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND WHIMSICAL.5
First, the procedural matters.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that petitioner Association cannot
question the implementation of Section 3.1 (b.2) and Section 3.2 (c.1) since it does
not claim any right over the NGC East Side. Section 3.1 (b.2) provides for the
maximum lot area that may be awarded to a resident-beneficiary of the NGC East
Side, while Section 3.2 (c.1) imposes a lot price escalation penalty to a qualified
beneficiary who fails to execute a contract to sell within the prescribed period.6 Also,
the OSG contends that since petitioner association is not the duly recognized
peoples organization in the NGC and since petitioners not qualify as beneficiaries,
they cannot question the manner of disposition of lots in the NGC.7

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of
standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.8
Petitioner association has the legal standing to institute the instant petition, whether
or not it is the duly recognized association of homeowners in the NGC. There is no
dispute
that the individual members of petitioner association are residents of the NGC. As
such they are covered and stand to be either benefited or injured by the
enforcement of the IRR, particularly as regards the selection process of beneficiaries
and lot allocation to qualified beneficiaries. Thus, petitioner association may assail
those provisions in the IRR which it believes to be unfavorable to the rights of its
members. Contrary to the OSGs allegation that the failure of petitioner association
and its members to qualify as beneficiaries effectively bars them from questioning
the provisions of the IRR, such circumstance precisely operates to confer on them
the legal personality to assail the IRR. Certainly, petitioner and its members have
sustained direct injury arising from the enforcement of the IRR in that they have
been disqualified and eliminated from the selection process. While it is true that
petitioners claim rights over the NGC West Side only and thus cannot be affected by
the implementation of Section 3.1 (b.2), which refers to the NGC East Side, the rest
of the assailed provisions of the IRR, namely, Sections 3.1 (a.4), 3.2 (a.1) and 3.2
(c.1), govern the disposition of lots in the West Side itself or all the lots in the NGC.
We cannot, therefore, agree with the OSG on the issue of locus standi. The petition
does not merit dismissal on that ground.
There are, however, other procedural impediments to the granting of the instant
petition. The OSG claims that the instant petition for prohibition is an improper
remedy because the writ of prohibition does not lie against the exercise of a quasi-
legislative function.9 Since in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the
Committee was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function, which is
the scope of a petition for prohibition under Section 2, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, the instant prohibition should be dismissed outright, the OSG
contends. For their
28
part, respondent Mayor of Quezon City10 and respondent NHA11 contend that
petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in filing the instant petition
with this Court and not with the Court of Appeals, which has concurrent jurisdiction
over a petition for prohibition.
The cited breaches are mortal. The petition deserves to be spurned as a
consequence.
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-
judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making
power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated
legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-
delegability and separability of powers.12
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an
administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before
going to court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of the
administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial
function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-
legislative power.13
The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee
expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that
the assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not
germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks to implement. Where
what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the
administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular
courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.14
Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR
issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial
course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although
the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum.15
True, this Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition
filed directly with it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues
raised, so warrant.16 A direct invocation of the Courts original jurisdiction to issue

these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.17
In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor,18 the Court said that it will not entertain direct
resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts,
and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and
of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of
certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.19 A perusal, however, of
the petition for prohibition shows no compelling, special or important reasons to
warrant the Courts taking cognizance of the petition in the first instance. Petitioner
also failed to state any reason that precludes the lower courts from passing upon the
validity of the questioned IRR. Moreover, as provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution,20 the Courts power to evaluate the validity of an implementing rule or
regulation is generally appellate in nature. Thus, following the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts, the instant petition should have been initially filed with the Regional Trial
Court.
A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the
exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed
against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist
from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said
entitys or persons jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion,
and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.21 Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but
not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ
of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to
maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels.22 Prohibition
20 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 5 states: The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
xxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or
the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decrees, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question. x x x
29
21 Rules of Court, Rule 65, Sec. 2.
22 David v. Rivera, G.R. Nos. 139913 & 140159, January 16, 2004, 420 SCRA 90, 100.
is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an
inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly
within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by
the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of
law by which such relief can be obtained.23 Where the principal relief sought is to
invalidate an IRR, petitioners remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an
action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any
case, petitioners allegation that respondents are performing or threatening to
perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction may appropriately be
enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining
order.
In a number of petitions,24 the Court adequately resolved them on other grounds
without adjudicating on the constitutionality issue when there were no compelling
reasons to pass upon the same. In like manner, the instant petition may be dismissed
based on the foregoing procedural grounds. Yet, the Court will not shirk from its duty
to rule on the merits of this petition to facilitate the speedy resolution of this case. In
proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of
substantial justice. And the power of the Court to except a particular case from its
rules whenever the purposes of justice require it cannot be questioned.25
Now, we turn to the substantive aspects of the petition. The outcome, however, is
just as dismal for petitioners.
Petitioners assail the following provisions of the IRR:
Section 3. Disposition of Certain portions of the NGC Site to the bona fide
residents
3.1. Period for Qualification of Beneficiaries
xxxx
(a.4) Processing and evaluation of qualifications shall be based on the Code of
Policies and subject to the condition that a beneficiary is qualified to acquire only
one (1) lot with a minimum of 36 sq. m. and maximum of 54 sq. m. and subject
further to the availability of lots.

xxxx
(b.2) Applications for qualification as beneficiary shall be processed and evaluated
based on the Code of Policies including the minimum and maximum lot allocation of
35 sq. m. and 60 sq. m.
xxxx
3.2. Execution of the Contract to Sell
(a) Westside
(a.1) All qualified beneficiaries shall execute Contract to Sell (CTS) within sixty (60)
days from the effectivity of the IRR in order to avail of the lot at P700.00 per sq. m.
xxxx
(c) for both eastside and westside
(c.1) Qualified beneficiaries who failed to execute CTS on the deadline set in item
a.1 above in case of westside and in case of eastside six (6) months after approval of
the subdivision plan shall be subjected to lot price escalation.
The rate shall be based on the formula to be set by the National Housing Authority
factoring therein the affordability criteria. The new rate shall be approved by the
NGC-Administration Committee (NGC-AC).
Petitioners contend that the aforequoted provisions of the IRR are constitutionally
infirm as they are not germane to and/or are in conflict with the object and purpose
of the law sought to be implemented.
First. According to petitioners, the limitation on the areas to be awarded to qualified
beneficiaries under Sec. 3.1 (a.4)and (b.2) of the IRR is not in harmony with the
provisions of R.A. No. 9207, which mandates that the lot allocation to qualified
beneficiaries shall be based on the area actually used or occupied by bona fide
residents without limitation to area. The argument is utterly baseless.
The beneficiaries of lot allocations in the NGC may be classified into two groups,
namely, the urban poor or the bona fide residents within the NGC site and certain
government institutions including the local government. Section 3, R.A. No. 9207
mandates the allocation of additional property within the NGC for disposition to its
bona fide residents and the manner by which this area may be distributed to
qualified beneficiaries. Section 4, R.A. No. 9207, on the other hand, governs the lot
30
disposition to government institutions. While it is true that Section 4 of R.A. No. 9207
has a proviso mandating that the lot allocation shall be based on the land area
actually used or occupied at the time of the laws effectivity, this proviso applies only
to institutional beneficiaries consisting of the local government, socioeconomic,
charitable, educational and religious institutions which do not have specific lot
allocations, and not to the bona fide residents of NGC. There is no proviso which
even hints that a bona fide resident of the NGC is likewise entitled to the lot area
actually occupied by him.
Petitioners interpretation is also not supported by the policy of R.A. No. 9207 and
the prior proclamations establishing the NGC. The governments policy to set aside
public property aims to benefit not only the urban poor but also the local
government and various government institutions devoted to socioeconomic,
charitable, educational and religious purposes.26 Thus, although Proclamation No.
137 authorized the
26 Republic Act No. 9207 (2003), Sec. 2, provides: Declaration of Policy.It is hereby
declared the policy of the State to secure the land tenure of the urban poor. Toward
this end, lands located in the NGC, Quezon City shall be utilized for housing,
socioeconomic, civic, educational, religious and other purposes. sale of lots to bona
fide residents in the NGC, only a third of the entire area of the NGC was declared
open for disposition subject to the condition that those portions being used or
earmarked for public or quasi-public purposes would be excluded from the housing
program for NGC residents. The same policy of rational and optimal land use can be
read in Proclamation No. 248 issued by then President Ramos. Although the
proclamation recognized the rapid increase in the population density in the NGC, it
did not allocate additional property within the NGC for urban poor housing but
instead authorized the vertical development of the same 150 hectares identified
previously by Proclamation No. 137 since the distribution of individual lots would not
adequately provide for the housing needs of all the bona fide residents in the NGC.
In addition, as provided in Section 4 of R.A. No. 9207, the institutional beneficiaries
shall be allocated the areas actually occupied by them; hence, the portions intended
for the institutional beneficiaries is fixed and cannot be allocated for other non-
institutional beneficiaries. Thus, the areas not intended for institutional beneficiaries
would have to be equitably distributed among the bona fide residents of the NGC. In
order to accommodate all qualified residents, a limitation on the area to be awarded
to each beneficiary must be fixed as a necessary consequence.
 31

Second. Petitioners note that while Sec. 3.2 (a.1) of the IRR fixes the selling rate of a this standard may be implied.29 In this regard, petitioners do not even claim that the
lot at P700.00 per sq. m., R.A. No. 9207 does not provide for the price. They add Sec. selling price of the lots is unreasonable.
3.2 (c.1) penalizes a beneficiary who fails to execute a contract to sell within six (6)
The provision on the price escalation clause as a penalty imposed to a beneficiary
months from the approval of the subdivision plan by imposing a price escalation,
who fails to execute a contract to sell within the prescribed period is also within the
while there is no such penalty imposed by R.A. No. 9207. Thus, they conclude that
Committees authority to formulate guidelines and policies to implement R.A. No.
the assailed provisions conflict with R.A. No. 9207 and should be nullified. The
9207. The Committee has the power to lay down the terms and conditions governing
argument deserves scant consideration.
the disposition of said lots, provided that these are reasonable and just. There is
Where a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly stated or contained in the nothing objectionable about prescribing a period within which the parties must
statute being implemented, that provision does not necessarily contradict the execute the contract to sell. This condition can ordinarily be found in a contract to
statute. A legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to sell and is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof.27 All that is
Third. Petitioners also suggest that the adoption of the assailed IRR suffers from a
required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the
procedural flaw. According to them the IRR was adopted and concurred in by several
law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the
representatives of peoples organizations contrary to the express mandate of R.A.
standards prescribed by the law.28
No. 9207 that only two representatives from duly recognized peoples organizations
In Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee is granted the power to administer, must compose the NGCAC which promulgated the assailed IRR. It is worth noting
formulate guidelines and policies, and implement the disposition of the areas that petitioner association is not a duly recognized peoples organization.
covered by the law. Implicit in this authority and the statutes objective of urban
In subordinate legislation, as long as the passage of the rule or regulation had the
poor housing is the power of the Committee to formulate the manner by which the
benefit of a hearing, the procedural due process requirement is deemed complied
reserved property may be allocated to the beneficiaries. Under this broad power, the
with. That there is observance of more than the minimum requirements of due
Committee is mandated to fill in the details such as the qualifications of
process in the adoption of the questioned IRR is not a ground to invalidate the same.
beneficiaries, the selling price of the lots, the terms and conditions governing the
sale and other key particulars necessary to implement the objective of the law. In sum, the petition lacks merit and suffers from procedural deficiencies.
These details are purposely omitted from the statute and their determination is left
to the discretion of the Committee because the latter possesses special knowledge WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED. Costs against
and technical expertise over these matters. petitioners. Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. Defensor, 497 SCRA 581,
G.R. No. 163980 August 3, 2006
The Committees authority to fix the selling price of the lots may be likened to the
rate-fixing power of administrative agencies. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing
power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the
guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just.
However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to
reasonableness,

27 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 987, 1006-1007;

261 SCRA 236 (1996), citing Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v.
Department of Finance Secretary, 238 SCRA 63.

28 Sigre v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 711, 719; 387 SCRA 15, 23 (2002).

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION,
INC., respondents.
LAUREL, J.:
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the
above-entitled case has filed a motion for reconsideration and moves that, for the
reasons stated in his motion, we reconsider the following legal conclusions of the
majority opinion of this Court:
1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin termino fijo
de duracion o que no sea para una determinada, termina o bien por
voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que ilega el plazo fijado para
el pago de los salarios segun costumbre en la localidad o cunado se termine
la obra;
2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato, ya
individual ya colectivamente, con ell, sin tiempo fijo, y que se han visto
obligados a cesar en sus tarbajos por haberse declarando paro forzoso en la
fabrica en la cual tarbajan, dejan de ser empleados u obreros de la misma;
3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de
trabajo con sus osbreros sin tiempo fijo de duracion y sin ser para una obra
determiminada y que se niega a readmitir a dichos obreros que cesaron
como consecuencia de un paro forzoso, no es culpable de practica injusta in
incurre en la sancion penal del articulo 5 de la Ley No. 213 del
Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir se deba a que dichos
obreros pertenecen a un determinado organismo obrero, puesto que tales
ya han dejado deser empleados suyos por terminacion del contrato en
virtud del paro.
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation
of the judgement rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the
case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was
shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to
temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely
32
false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the
Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.
2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro
was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond
despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29,
1938, (re supposed delay of leather soles from the States) was but a scheme
to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of
his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or
employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions
of which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed memorandum, p.
25.)
5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining,
majority rule and elective representation are highly essential and
indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the)
principal source of dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and
should not be made applicable in interpreting and applying the salutary
provisions of a modern labor legislation of American origin where the
industrial peace has always been the rule.
7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for
discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring
the National Workers' Brotherhood.
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents
that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to
have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial
Relations.
9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching
importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the
modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein.

The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for
reconsideration of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with reference
to the motion for a new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of
the opinion that it is not necessary to pass upon the motion for reconsideration of
the Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to dispose of the motion for new trial of the
respondent labor union. Before doing this, however, we deem it necessary, in the
interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, in interest of orderly procedure
in cases of this nature, to make several observations regarding the nature of the
powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and emphasize certain guiding principles
which should be observed in the trial of cases brought before it. We have re-
examined the entire record of the proceedings had before the Court of Industrial
Relations in this case, and we have found no substantial evidence that the exclusion
of the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity. The whole
transcript taken contains what transpired during the hearing and is more of a record
of contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic
conclusion drawn to suit their own views. It is evident that these statements and
expressions of views of counsel have no evidentiary value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically
stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an
administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not
intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice
which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding
only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of
Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active,
affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in
the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions in
the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions
are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter
controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees
or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance
with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take
cognizance or purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any
industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising
from differences as regards wages, shares or compensation, hours of labor or
conditions of tenancy or employment, between landlords and tenants or farm-
laborers, provided that the number of employees, laborers or tenants of farm-
laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute is
33
submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to
the controversy and certified by the Secretary of labor as existing and proper to be
by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be dealth with by the Court for
the sake of public interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in
the course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to
settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When
directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and study all
industries established in a designated locality, with a view to determinating the
necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or locality a minimum
wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to be paid by
the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may
appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ
mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of
official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific
controversies between labor and capital industry and in agriculture. There is in
reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from
the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673,
promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to joint out that the Court of
Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had
occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly
constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according
to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal
forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform
its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20,
Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed
or demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may
include in the award, order or decision any matter or determination which may be
deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of
preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the
light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by
the rules recently promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to
carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the
Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it,
entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due
process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary
rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right
of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v.
U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty and
property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements
of fair play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and
to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in
Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed. 1288.) In the
language of this court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to
adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board
to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or
persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without
notice or consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide
right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of
having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached."
(Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the more
fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is
both a grant and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 45844, promulgated
November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence must be
"substantial." (Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v. national
labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed.
965.) It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as
adequate to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v. National
Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations
Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater
Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . .
The statute provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law
and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar
provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical
rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed
incompetent inn judicial proceedings would not invalidate the
administrative order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S.
25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce
34
Commission v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185,
187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct.
220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in
administrative procedure does not go far as to justify orders without a basis
in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay
or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co.
v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op.,
p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88,
33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal
to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their
right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however,
detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that
purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and
informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of
inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining
the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory.
(Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations
may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under its
consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a
justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate to such board
or public official such powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial
Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the
exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section 10, ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act
on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at
a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally
Relations personally to decide all controversies coming before them. In the
United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory
authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final
decision, with the right to appeal to board or commission, but in our case
there is no such statutory authority.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can
 35

know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.

In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here

that, except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National
Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the
thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of
law.

This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for
the by respondent National Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of
material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically
discharged all the members of the National Labor Union Inc., from work" and this
avernment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the "records of the Bureau
of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the
National Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union
dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal."
Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to
prove his substantial avernments" are so inaccessible to the respondents that even
within the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained
them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the
documents attached to the petition "are of such far reaching importance and effect
that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the
judgment rendered herein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its
arguments against the petition. By and large, after considerable discussions, we have
come to the conclusion that the interest of justice would be better served if the
movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in
his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved.
The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it
acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely
attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion
for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of
this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that
it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise
proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered.

LORLENE A. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
FIFTH DIVISION, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, and ATENEO DE DAVAO
UNIVERSITY, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
By way of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court petitioner seeks the
nullification of the Decision of public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission, Fifth Division, which reversed and set aside that of Executive Labor
Arbiter Conchita J. Martinez.
Lorlene Gonzales, petitioner, has been a schoolteacher in the Elementary
Department of private respondent Ateneo de Davao University (hereafter ATENEO)
since 1974 assigned to teach Reading, Mathematics, Language and Pilipino in the
Grade VI class, while ATENEO is an educational institution, a corporation duly
organized under the laws of the Philippines, with principal address at Jacinto St., Davao
City.
Sometime in 1991 Fr. Oscar Millar, S.J., Ateneo Grade School Headmaster, sent
a letter dated 11 April 1991 informing petitioner Lorlene A. Gonzales of the complaints
of two (2) parents for alleged use of corporal punishment on her students. Petitioner
claimed that she was not informed of the identity of the parents who allegedly
complained of the corporal punishment she purportedly inflicted in school-year 1990-
1991. She likewise claimed that she was not confronted about it by private respondent
ATENEO in 1991 and that it was only two (2) years after the complaints were made
that she discovered, through her students and their parents, that ATENEO was
soliciting complainants to lodge written complaints against her.
On 31 March 1993 she wrote a letter to Fr. Oscar Millar, S.J., demanding that she
be formally informed of the complaint and be duly investigated.
On 9 June 1993 petitioner was informed of the composition of an investigative
committee organized by Fr. Oscar Millar, S.J., to look into the alleged use of corporal
punishment by petitioner in disciplining her students. It can be gleaned from the
records that she was duly furnished with the rules of procedure, informed of the
schedule of the hearings, and given copies of the affidavits executed by the students
who testified against her.
Petitioner refused to take part in the investigation unless the rules of procedure
laid down by the Committee be revised, contending that the same were violative of
her right to due process. Petitioner specifically objected to the provision which
36
stated: x x x 3) Counsel for Ms. Lorlene Gonzales shall not directly participate in the
investigation but will merely advise Ms. Gonzales x x x (par. 3).[1]
But the Committee was steadfast in its resolve to adopt the aforementioned
rules. In its letter dated 9 August 1993, private respondent informed petitioner that
the rules of procedure to be applied were substantially the same rules that were used
in the investigation of a former Ateneo employee and therefore we are under legal
advice not to change these rules."[2] Over the objection of petitioner the Committee
commenced with its investigation without petitioners participation. Out of the twenty
-two (22) invitations sent out by ATENEO to petitioners students and their parents to
shed light on the matter of corporal punishment allegedly administered by her, eleven
(11) appeared and testified before the committee. The eleven (11) witnesses also
executed written statements denominated as affidavits.
On 10 November 1993 private respondent served a Notice of Termination on
petitioner pursuant to the findings and recommendation of the
Committee. Thereafter, petitioner received a letter from the president of ATENEO
demanding her voluntary resignation a week from receipt of the letter, otherwise, she
would be considered resigned from the service.
On 29 November 1993 petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for
illegal dismissal. After trial, Executive Labor Arbiter Conchita J. Martinez found her
dismissal illegal for lack of factual basis and ordered ATENEO to award petitioner
separation pay, back wages and 13th month pay. In her decision, the Executive Labor
Arbiter opined that although petitioner was afforded procedural due process
respondent institution failed to establish substantial evidence as to the guilt of the
complainant of the offense charged"[3] thus -
x x x the complainant was afforded procedural due process. There is convincing and
sufficient evidence x x x showing respondent complied with the notice and hearing
requirement x x x x.[4]
After considering the evidence, arguments and counter-arguments of the parties,
this office finds that the respondent failed to establish substantial evidence as to the
guilt of complainant of the offense charged x x x x.[5]
Complainant has sufficiently established that she is a very good teacher. She is
equipped with the appropriate educational qualifications, trainings, seminars and
work experiences. Such fact was affirmed by her present and former students, their
parents, colleagues and the former headmaster of the grade school x x x x [6]
 37

As a matter of fact, six (6) out of the nine (9) students and their parents/guardians evidence of private respondent did not measure up to this standard. It relied solely on
have retracted and withdrawn their statements x x x x[7] the witnesses affidavits with questionable veracity. Moreover, the affidavit of
recantation executed by some students and their parents all the more weakened the
Both parties appealed to the NLRC which on 25 March 1996 reversed the case of private respondent. Failure in this regard negates the very existence of the
decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter by declaring petitioners dismissal valid and ground for dismissal.
legal but added that since ATENEO offered petitioner her retirement benefits it was
On the other hand, petitioner adequately proved, by means of affidavits, letters
but proper that she be extended said benefits. Petitioner now seeks the reversal of
of petition and manifesto made by her students and co-teachers, that she was a
the decision; hence, this petition.
competent and dedicated teacher having spent seventeen (17) years of her life in the
The crux of the controversy is whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of service of the very institution which is now seeking her dismissal.
discretion in sustaining as valid and legal the dismissal of petitioner by private
In view of the foregoing, the conclusion of the NLRC is
respondent ATENEO.
unwarranted. Employment is not merely a contractual relationship; it has assumed the
The NLRC, in our view, appears to have skirted several important issues raised by nature of property right. It may spell the difference whether or not a family will have
petitioner foremost of which is the absence of due process. Upon being notified of her food on their table, roof over their heads and education for their children. It is for this
termination, she has the right to demand compliance with the basic requirements of reason that the State has taken up measures to protect employees from unjustified
due process. Compliance entails the twin requirements of procedural and substantial dismissals. It is also because of this that the right to security of tenure is not only a
due process. Ample opportunity must be afforded the employee to defend herself statutory right but, more so, a constitutional right.
either personally and/or with assistance of a representative; to know the nature of her
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of public respondent National Labor Relations
offense; and, to cross examine and confront face to face the witnesses against
Commission dated 25 March 1996 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision of
her. Likewise, due process requires that the decision must be based on established
Executive Labor Arbiter Conchita J. Martinez declaring the dismissal of complainant
facts and on a sound legal foundation.
Lorlene A. Gonzales illegal for lack of factual basis and ordering respondent Ateneo de
It is precisely to demand compliance with these requirements that petitioner at Davao University to pay complainant separation pay, back wages and 13th month pay
the very onset of the investigation demanded the revision of the rules laid down by in the total amount of TWO HUNDRED SIXTEEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY-
the Investigative Committee. The adamant refusal of the Committee to accede to this EIGHT and 70/100 PESOS (P216,938.70) x x x [f]urther, ordering respondent to pay
demand resulted in her failure to confront and cross-examine her accusers. This is not 10% of the total monetary award as attorney's fees to counsel for complainant x x x
harping at technicalities as wrongfully pointed out by the NLRC but a serious violation [d]ismissing all other claims for lack of merit, is REINSTATED, AFFIRMED and ADOPTED
of petitioner's statutory and constitutional right to due process that ultimately vitiated herein as the decision in the instant case.
the investigation.
SO ORDERED.
Moreover, the failure of ATENEO to refute the contention of petitioner that the
joint affidavits executed by the students and parents were "pre-prepared" raises
serious doubts as to the probative value of this evidence. As correctly pointed out by
the Executive Labor Arbiter, there is more reason to disregard it especially where the
same was challenged and has remained unexplained. Hearsay evidence, in the strict
sense, has no probative value whether objected to or not.
In the instant case, ATENEO failed to prove by substantial evidence that
petitioner had inflicted corporal punishment on her students. In Ang Tibay v. CIR, the
Court set the measure of evidence to be presented in an administrative investigation
when it said, substantial evidence is more than mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The

UTE PATEROK, petitioner-appellant, vs. BUREAU OF CUSTOMS and HON. SALVADOR
N. MISON, respondents-appellees.
Administrative Law; Due Process; Notice and Hearing; The elementary rules of due
process require notice and opportunity to be heard before any person can be
lawfully deprived of his rights.As regards the first assignment of error, we agree
with the petitioner that a notice of hearing posted on the bulletin board of the public
respondent in a forfeiture proceeding where the owner of the alleged prohibited
article is known does not constitute sufficient compliance with proper service of
notice and procedural due process. Time and again, the Court has emphasized the
imperative necessity for administrative agencies to observe the elementary rules of
due process. And no rule is better established under the due process clause of the
Constitution than that which requires notice and opportunity to be heard before any
person can be lawfully deprived of his rights.
Tariff and Customs Code; Prohibited Importations; Batas Pambansa Blg. 73; A
passenger motor car with an engine displacement of over 2,800 cubic centimeters
like petitioners Mercedes Benz 450 SLC is a prohibited importation under BP 73,
whether the importation be direct or indirect.Batas Pambansa Blg. 73, a law
intended to promote energy conservation, provides that: SEC. 3. Towards the same
end and to develop a more dynamic and effective program for the rational use of
energy, the following acts are hereby prohibited: (a) The importation, manufacture
or assembling of gasoline-powered passenger motor cars with engine displacement
of over 2,800 cubic centimeters or Kerbweight exceeding 1,500 kilograms, including
accessories. The petitioner does not dispute the fact that the motor car in question,
a Mercedes Benz 450 SLC, has an engine displacement of over 2,800 cubic
centimeters which clearly falls within the prohibited importation specified in the law
aforequoted and as such, is liable for seizure and forfeiture by the public
respondents. On the other hand, the petitioner claims that the said prohibition
involves only direct and not indirect importation as when both the shipper and
the consignee are one and the same person which is the case at bar. Be that as it
may, the law is clear and when it does not make any distinction on the term
importation, we likewise must not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemus.
PADILLA, J.: Dissenting
Tariff and Customs Code; Prohibited Importations; BP 73; The Mercedes Benz in the
case at bar was not manufactured nor assembled in the Philippines, hence, it is not
subject to confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the government.It would thus
38
appear that, under the fore-quoted provisions of Sec. 11 of BP 73, only passenger
motor vehicles manufactured or assembled in violation of Section 3(a) thereof shall
be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government. The Mercedes Benz in the
case at bar, having been admittedly imported, but not manufactured or assembled in
violation of Sec. 3(a) of BP 73, is not, therefore, subject to confiscation and forfeiture
in favor of the government.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari to review the decision of the Bureau of Customs.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Untalan, Trinidad, Razon, Santos & Associate Law Offices for petitioner-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
Before us is a special civil action for certiorari filed by Ute Paterok, the petitioner
herein, seeking the annulment of the decision1 rendered by the public respondent,
the Bureau of Customs, through its Commissioner, the Hon. Salvador N. Mison,
approving the order2 of forfeiture issued by the District Collector of Customs against
the shipment of one (1) unit of Mercedes Benz of the petitioner in favor of the
government.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In March 1986, the petitioner shipped from Germany to the Philippines two (2)
containers, one with used household goods and the other with two (2) used
automobiles (one Bourgetti and one Mercedes Benz 450 SLC). The first container
was released by the Bureau of Customs and later on, the Bourgetti car, too. The
Mercedes Benz, however, remained under the custody of the said Bureau.
In December 1987, after earnest efforts to secure the release of the said Mercedes
Benz, the petitioner received a notice3 of hearing from the legal officer of the Manila
International Container Port, Bureau of Customs informing the former that seizure
proceedings were being initiated against the said Mercedes Benz for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 73 in relation to Section 2530(F) of the Tariff and Customs Code
of the Philippines (TCCP), as amended, and Central Bank Circular (CBC) 1069.
While the said case was pending, the petitioner received only on April, 1988, a
letter4 informing her that a decision ordering the forfeiture of her Mercedes Benz
had been rendered on December 16, 1986 by the District Collector of Customs. The
petitioner had not been informed that a separate seizure case was filed on the same

Mercedes Benz in question before the said District Collector, an office likewise under
the Bureau of Customs.
The petitioner later found out that on November 13, 1986, a Notice of Hearing set
on December 2, 1986, concerning the said Mercedes Benz, was posted on the
bulletin board of the Bureau of Customs at Port Area, Manila.
The petitioner, thereafter, filed a motion for new trial5 before the Collector of
Customs, Port of Manila, but the latter, in an order6 dated May 30, 1988, denied the
same, invoking the failure of the former to appear in the said hearing despite the
posting of the notice on the bulletin board.
Moreover, the Collector of Customs contended that a reopening of the case was an
exercise in futility considering that the forfeited property, a Mercedes Benz 450 SLC,
had an engine displacement of more than 2800 cubic centimeters and therefore was
under the category of prohibited importation pursuant to B.P. Blg. 73.
Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for review7 with the Department of
Finance, which petition the latter referred to the public respondent. The petitioner
likewise addressed a letter8 to the Hon. Cancio Garcia, the Assistant Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs, Office of the President, Malacaang, requesting the
latters assistance for a speedy resolution of the said petition.
Finally, the public respondent rendered a decision on September 22, 1989 affirming
the previous order of the Collector of Customs for the Forfeiture of the Mercedes
Benz in question in favor of the government.
Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging that:
III-1. THE RESPONDENT-APPELLEE (Bureau of Customs) ERRED IN THE RULING THAT
A NOTICE OF HEARING POSTED IN [sic] THE BULLETIN BOARD IS SUFFICIENT NOTICE
AND FAILURE OF PETITIONER-APPELLANT TO APPEAR CAUSED HER DECLARATION IN
DEFAULT;
III-2. ERRED IN RULING THAT THEIR OFFICE WAS LEFT WITH NO ALTERNATIVE BUT
TO FORFEIT THE SHIPMENT AS MANDATED BY BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 73;
III-3. ERRED IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENT OFFICE FINDS THE RE-OPENING OF
THE CASE AN EXERCISE IN FUTILITY AND THAT THERE IS NO POINT IN DISTURBING
THE DECISION DECREEING THE FORFEITURE OF THE SHIPMENT.9
39
As regards the first assignment of error, we agree with the petitioner that a notice of
hearing posted on the bulletin board of the public respondent in a forfeiture
proceeding where the owner of the alleged prohibited article is known does not
constitute sufficient compliance with proper service of notice and procedural due
process.
Time and again, the Court has emphasized the imperative necessity for
administrative agencies to observe the elementary rules of due process.10 And no
rule is better established under the due process clause of the Constitution than that
which requires notice and opportunity to be heard before any person can be lawfully
deprived of his rights.11
In the present case, although there was a notice of hearing posted on the bulletin
board, the said procedure is premised on the ground that the party or owner of the
property in question is unknown. This is clear from the provisions of the TCCP relied
upon by the public respondent, namely, Sections 2304 and 2306, captioned
Notification of Unknown Owner and Proceedings in Case of Property Belonging to
Unknown Parties, respectively, wherein the posting of the notice of hearing on the
bulletin board is specifically allowed.
But in the case at bar, the facts evidently show that the petitioner could not have
been unknown. The petitioner had previous transactions with the Bureau of Customs
and in fact, the latter had earlier released the first container consisting of household
goods and the Bourgetti car to the former at her address (as stated in the Bill of
Lading). Moreover, there was a similar seizure case12 that had been instituted by the
Manila International Container Port, docketed as S.I. No. 86-224, covering the same
Mercedes Benz in question and involving the same owner, the petitioner herein.
If only the public respondents had exercised some reasonable diligence to ascertain
from their own records the identity and address of the petitioner as the owner and
the consignee of the property in question, the necessary information could have
been easily obtained which would have assured the sending of the notice of hearing
properly and legally. Then, the petitioner would have been afforded the opportunity
to be heard and to present her defense which is the essence of procedural due
process. But the public respondent regrettably failed to perform such basic duty.
Notwithstanding the procedural infirmity aforementioned, for which the Court
expresses its rebuke, the petition nonetheless can not be granted.
This brings us to the second and third assignments of error raised by the petitioner.
 40

Batas Pambansa Blg. 73, a law intended to promote energy conservation, provides presupposes a prior custody pursuant to forfeiture and seizure proceedings as in the
that: case at bar.

SEC. 3. Towards the same end and to develop a more dynamic and effective program As thus worded:
for the rational use of energy, the following acts are hereby prohibited:
SEC. 2609. Disposition of Contra band.Article of prohibited importation or
(a) The importation, manufacture or assembling of gasoline-powered passenger exportation, known as contraband, shall, in the absence of special provision, be dealt
motor cars with engine displacement of over 2,800 cubic centimeters or Kerbweight with as follows:
exceeding 1,500 kilograms, including accessories.13
...
The petitioner does not dispute the fact that the motor car in question, a Mercedes
(c) Other contraband of commercial value and capable of legitimate use may be sold
Benz 450 SLC, has an engine displacement of over 2,800 cubic centimeters which
under such restrictions as will insure its use for legitimate purposes only . . .
clearly falls within the prohibited importation specified in the law aforequoted and as
such, is liable for seizure and forfeiture by the public respondents. There is nothing in the Code that authorizes the Collector to release the contraband
in favor of an importer. The Code, on the other hand, is clear that the thing may be
On the other hand, the petitioner claims that the said prohibition involves only
disposed of by sale alone under such restrictions as will insure its use for legitimate
direct and not indirect importation as when both the shipper and the consignee
purposes. To be sure, the restrictions to be prescribed by the Collector must
are one and the same person which is the case at bar. Be that as it may, the law is
coincide with the purpose underlying Batas Blg. 73, that is, to conserve energy.
clear and when it does not make any distinction on the term importation, we
Hence, he cannot allow its use (after sale), in this case a Mercedes Benz with an
likewise must not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
engine displacement of more than 2,800 cubic centimeters, that would set at naught
Finally, the petitioner invokes Sec. 2307 of the TCCP, as amended by Executive Order that purpose. He must make sure that the engine is changed before it is allowed to
No. 38, dated August 6, 1986, which provides an alternative in lieu of the forfeiture ply Philippine soil.
of the property in question, that is, the payment of fine or redemption of the
In all cases, forfeiture is a must.
forfeited property. But the last paragraph of the said section, as amended,
categorically states that: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. No costs.
Redemption of forfeited property shall not be allowed in any case where the SO ORDERED.
importation is absolutely prohibited or where the surrender of the property to the
person offering to redeem the same would be contrary to law. (Emphasis ours)14

Inasmuch as it would be contrary to law, i.e., B.P. Blg. 73, to allow the petitioner to
redeem the Mercedes Benz in question, there is therefore no alternative, as
correctly claimed by the public respondents, but to forfeit the same.

We can not agree with the proposition that the Collector of Customs is authorized to
release the motor vehicle in question to the petitioner which, in effect, would
absolve the latter from any liability.

In the matter of disposing of contrabands, Section 2609(c) of the Tariff and Customs
Code specifically provides that the prerogative of the Collector of Customs is not the
release of the contraband like the Mercedes Benz in question but its sale, which
 41

Paterok vs. Bureau of Customs In short, the petitioner may be criminally prosecuted for the act of importing the
subject motor vehicle but, at the same time, the vehicle may be released to her
not less than one thousand pesos but not more than five thousand pesos, or by
subject to such restrictions and conditions as may be imposed by the Collector of
imprisonment of not less than one month nor more than one year, or both, in the
Customs, one of which should be the changing of the engine of the vehicle with an
discretion of the court: Provided, That if the violation is committed by a juridical
engine with a displacement of not more than 2,800 cubic centimeters or that the
person, the penalty herein provided shall be imposed on the official and/or
vehicle may be ordered re-exported to Germany at the expense of petitioner-
employee thereof responsible for the violation: Provided, further, That if the
importer.
violation is committed by a government official or employee including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations, he shall, in addition to the penalty Petition dismissed.
provided above, be subject to disciplinary administrative proceedings and penalties:
Note.Due process is also required in administrative proceedings. (Doruelo vs.
Provided, finally, That any passenger motor vehicle manufactured or assembled in
Commission on Elections, 133 SCRA 376.)
violation of Section 3(a) hereof shall, after proper proceedings, be confiscated and
forfeited in favor of the Government. (Italics supplied.) Paterok vs. Bureau of Customs, 193 SCRA 132, G.R. Nos. 90660-61 January 21, 1991
It would thus appear that, under the forequoted provisions of Sec. 11 of BP 73, only
passenger motor vehicles manufactured or assembled in violation of Section 3(a)
thereof shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government.

The Mercedes Benz in the case at bar, having been admittedly imported, but not
manufactured or assembled in violation of Sec. 3(a) of BP 73, is not, therefore,
subject to confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the Government.

On the other hand, Sec. 2609 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides:

SEC. 2609. Disposition of Contraband.Article of prohibited importation or

exportation, known as contraband, shall, in the absence of special provision, be dealt
with as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

c. Other contraband of commercial value and capable of legitimate use may be sold
under such restrictions as will insure its use for legitimate purposes only; but if the
thing is unfit for use or the Collector is of the opinion that, if sold, it would be used
for unlawful purposes, it shall be destroyed in such manner as the Collector shall
direct. (Italics supplied.)

The questioned Mercedes Benz is decidedly of commercial value and capable of

legitimate use, which may be sold under such restrictions as will insure its use for a
legitimate purpose, by changing its engine with an engine with a displacement of not
more than 2,800 cubic centimeters or the vehicle may be ordered re-exported to
Germany.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Extradition; Due Process; The only duty of the Secretary of
Justice is to file the extradition petition after the request and all the supporting
papers are forwarded to him by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.A strict
observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the only duty of the Secretary of
Justice is to file the extradition petition after the request and all the supporting
papers are forwarded to him by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is the latter official
who is authorized to evaluate the extradition papers, to assure their sufficiency, and
under Paragraph [3], Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine whether or not the request
is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not
punishable under non-military penal legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly provided in
Paragraph [1], Section 5 of the Extradition Law,
the Secretary of Justice has the ministerial duty of filing the extradition papers.
Same; Same; Same; The evaluation process may be characterized as an investigative
or inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding conducted in the exercise of an
administrative bodys quasijudicial power.The evaluation process, just like the
extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself. It is sui generis. It is not a
criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of
ministerial functions. At such stage, the executive authority has the power: (a) to
make a technical assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition
papers; (b) to outrightly deny the request if on its face and on the face of the
supporting documents the crimes indicated are not extraditable; and (c) to make a
determination whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense
is a military one which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation (tsn,
August 31, 1999, pp. 28-29; Article 2 and Paragraph [3], Article 3, RP-US Extradition
Treaty). Hence, said process may be characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial
process in contrast to a proceeding conducted in the exercise of an administrative
bodys quasi-judicial power.
Same; Same; Same; What a quasi-judicial proceeding involve.In administrative law,
a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of evidence; (b)
determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or
decision supported by the facts proved (De Leon, Administrative Law: Text and
Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial
power, which is also known as examining or investigatory power, is one of the
determinative powers of an administrative body which better enables it to exercise
42
its quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This
power allows the administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and
investigate the activities, of persons or entities coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p.
27), or to require disclosure of information by means of accounts, records, reports,
testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p.
64).
Same; Same; Same; Same; An investigatory body does not exercise judicial functions
and its power is limited to investigating the facts and making findings in respect
thereto; Its only power is to determine whether the papers comply with the
requirements of the law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an
extradition petition.In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the
Court had occasion to rule on the functions of an investigatory body with the sole
power of investigation. It does not exercise judicial functions and its power is limited
to investigating the facts and making findings in respect thereto. The Court laid down
the test of determining whether an administrative body is exercising judicial
functions or merely investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies the exercise of
power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties
before it. Hence, if the only purpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence
submitted before it based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the
agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then
there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment. The above description in
Ruperto applies to an administrative body authorized to evaluate extradition
documents. The body has no power to adjudicate in regard to the rights and
obligations of both the Requesting State and the prospective extraditee. Its only
power is to determine whether the papers comply with the requirements of the law
and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an extradition petition.
Such finding is thus merely initial and not final. The body has no power to determine
whether or not the extradition should be effected. That is the role of the court. The
bodys power is limited to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition petition
can be filed in court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency
conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially
criminal; In essence the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal
investigation.Logically, although the Extradition Law is silent on this respect, the
provisions only mean that once a request is forwarded to the Requested State, the
prospective extraditee may be continuously detained, or if not, subsequently
rearrested (Paragraph [5], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), for he will only be

discharged if no request is submitted. Practically, the purpose of this detention is to
prevent his possible flight from the Requested State. Second, the temporary arrest of
the prospective extraditee during the pendency of the extradition petition in court
(Section 6, Presidential Decree No. 1069). Clearly, there is an impending threat to a
prospective extraditees liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. It is not only
an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one. Because of these possible
consequences, we conclude that the evaluation process is akin to an administrative
agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are
essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the
procedure for, and ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extraditee.
As described by petitioner himself, this is a tool for criminal law enforcement (p.
78, Rollo). In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a
criminal investigation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Test to determine whether a proceeding is civil or
criminal.There is also the earlier case of Almeda, Sr. vs. Perez (5 SCRA 970 [1962]),
where the Court, citing American jurisprudence, laid down the test to determine
whether a proceeding is civil or criminal: If the proceeding is under a statute such
that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture can be included in the criminal case,
such proceeding is criminal in nature, although it may be civil in form; and where it
must be gathered from the statute that the action is meant to be criminal in its
nature, it cannot be considered as civil. If, however, the proceeding does not involve
the conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged, the proceeding is civil in
nature.
Same; Same; Same; Due process is comprised of substantive and procedural due
process; The basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil
proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well.Due process is comprised of
two componentssubstantive due process which requires the intrinsic validity of the
law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or property, and
procedural due process which consists of the two basic rights of notice and hearing,
as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal
(Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102-106). True to the mandate of the due
process clause, the basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not only in criminal
and civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well. Non-observance of
these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of
any pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice, they may claim the right
to appear therein and present their side and to refute the position of the opposing
parties.
43
Same; Same; Same; Same; The notice and hearing requirements of administrative
due process cannot be dispensed with and shelved aside.Worthy of inquiry is the
issue of whether or not there is tentativeness of administrative action. Is private
respondent precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time
without prejudice to him? Here lies the peculiarity and deviant characteristic of the
evaluation procedure. On one hand, there is yet no extraditee, but ironically on the
other, it results in an administrative determination which, if adverse to the person
involved, may cause his immediate incarceration. The grant of the request shall lead
to the filing of the extradition petition in court. The accused (as Section 2[c] of
Presidential Decree No. 1069 calls him), faces the threat of arrest, not only after the
extradition petition is filed in court, but even during the evaluation proceeding itself
by virtue of the provisional arrest allowed under the treaty and the implementing
law. The prejudice to the accused is thus blatant and manifest. Plainly, the notice
and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be dispensed with
and shelved aside.
MELO, J.:
The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis--vis the vast and
overwhelming powers of government. His only guarantee against oppression and
tyranny are his fundamental liberties under the Bill of Rights which shield him in
times of need. The Court is now called to decide whether to uphold a citizens basic
due process rights, or the governments ironclad duties under a treaty. The bugle
sounds and this Court must once again act as the faithful guardian of the
fundamental writ.
The petition at our doorstep is cast against the following factual backdrop:
On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree
No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have
Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of
incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression of
crime both in the state where it was committed and the state where the criminal
may have escaped; the extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the
intention of the Philippines to enter into similar treaties with other interested
countries; and the need for rules to guide the executive department and the courts
in the proper implementation of said treaties.
On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition

Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
Government of the United States of America" (hereinafter referred to as the RP-US
Extradition Treaty). The Senate, by way of Resolution No. 11, expressed its
concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the
Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility
of the documents accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the
principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in the
Requesting State). Kycalr
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of
Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition
of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note
Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S.
District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said
extradition. Based on the papers submitted, private respondent appears to be
charged in the United States with violation of the following provisions of the United
States Code (USC):
A)......18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the
United States; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each
count);
B)......26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax; four [4] counts;
Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);
C)......18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; two [2]
counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);
D)......18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six [6] counts;
Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);
E)......2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; thirty-
three [33] counts; Maximum Penalty less than one year).
(p. 14, Rollo.)
On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating and
authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case pursuant to
Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1069. Accordingly, the panel began with the
"technical evaluation and assessment" of the extradition request and the documents
44
in support thereof. The panel found that the "official English translation of some
documents in Spanish were not attached to the request and that there are some
other matters that needed to be addressed" (p. 15, Rollo). Calrky
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent,
through counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999 addressed to petitioner requesting
copies of the official extradition request from the U. S. Government, as well as all
documents and papers submitted therewith; and that he be given ample time to
comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers.
Private respondent also requested that the proceedings on the matter be held in
abeyance in the meantime.
Later, private respondent requested that preliminarily, he be given at least a copy of,
or access to, the request of the United States Government, and after receiving a
copy of the Diplomatic Note, a period of time to amplify on his request.
In response to private respondents July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in a reply-letter
dated July 13, 1999 (but received by private respondent only on August 4, 1999),
denied the foregoing requests for the following reasons:
1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies of the
extradition request and supporting documents from the United
States Government, pending evaluation by this Department of the
sufficiency of the extradition documents submitted in accordance
with the provisions of the extradition treaty and our extradition
law. Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and
the United States enumerates the documentary requirements and
establishes the procedures under which the documents submitted
shall be received and admitted as evidence. Evidentiary
requirements under our domestic law are also set forth in Section
4 of P.D. No. 1069.
Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned documents
is not a preliminary investigation nor akin to preliminary
investigation of criminal cases. We merely determine whether the
procedures and requirements under the relevant law and treaty
have been complied with by the Requesting Government. The
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in all criminal
prosecutions are therefore not available.

It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the
person sought to be extradited will be furnished by the court with
copies of the petition, request and extradition documents and this
Department will not pose any objection to a request for ample
time to evaluate said documents. Mesm
2. The formal request for extradition of the United States contains
grand jury information and documents obtained through grand
jury process covered by strict secrecy rules under United States
law. The United States had to secure orders from the concerned
District Courts authorizing the United States to disclose certain
grand jury information to Philippine government and law
enforcement personnel for the purpose of extradition of Mr.
Jimenez. Any further disclosure of the said information is not
authorized by the United States District Courts. In this particular
extradition request the United States Government requested the
Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the
subject information. This Departments denial of your request is
consistent with Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which
provides that the Philippine Government must represent the
interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a
request for extradition. The Department of Justice under P.D. No.
1069 is the counsel of the foreign governments in all extradition
requests.
3. This Department is not in a position to hold in abeyance
proceedings in connection with an extradition request. Article 26
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which we are a
party provides that "[E]very treaty in force is binding upon the
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith".
Extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement and to be
effective, requests for extradition or surrender of accused or
convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.
(pp. 77-78, Rollo.)
Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999, private respondent filed with
the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region a petition against the
Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish
private respondent the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to
45
afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and
thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to
set aside herein petitioners letter dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain
petitioner from considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition
petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of
the NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of private respondent to
the United States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and a writ of preliminary injunction (pp. 104-105, Rollo). Scslx
The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94684 and
thereafter raffled to Branch 25 of said regional trial court stationed in Manila which
is presided over by the Honorable Ralph C. Lantion.
After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on August 9, 1999. Petitioner,
who appeared in his own behalf, moved that he be given ample time to file a
memorandum, but the same was denied.
On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an order dated the previous day,
disposing:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the respondents, namely:
the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the
Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, their agents
and/or representatives to maintain the status quo by refraining
from committing the acts complained of; from conducting further
proceedings in connection with the request of the United States
Government for the extradition of the petitioner; from filing the
corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial court; and from
performing any act directed to the extradition of the petitioner to
the United States, for a period of twenty (20) days from service on
respondents of this Order, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of the
1997 Rules of Court.
The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall issue the
preliminary injunction, as agreed upon by the counsels for the
parties herein, is set on August 17, 1999 at 9:00 oclock in the
morning. The respondents are, likewise, ordered to file their
written comment and/or opposition to the issuance of a
Preliminary Injunction on or before said date.
SO ORDERED.

(pp. 110-111, Rollo.)
Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant proceedings, arguing that:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING
THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER BECAUSE: Slxs c
I.
BY ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO REFRAIN FROM
COMMITTING THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF, I. E., TO DESIST FROM
REFUSING PRIVATE RESPONDENT ACCESS TO THE OFFICIAL
EXTRADITION REQUEST AND DOCUMENTS AND FROM DENYING
PRIVATE RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO FILE A COMMENT ON,
OR OPPOSITION TO, THE REQUEST, THE MAIN PRAYER FOR A WRIT
OF MANDAMUS IN THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS, CERTIORARI
AND PROHIBITION WAS, IN EFFECT, GRANTED SO AS TO
CONSTITUTE AN ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS OF THE
MANDAMUS ISSUES;
II.
PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY PREVENTED FROM
PERFORMING LEGAL DUTIES UNDER THE EXTRADITION TREATY
AND THE PHILIPPINE EXTRADITION LAW;
III.
THE PETITION FOR (MANDAMUS), CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION
IS, ON ITS FACE, FORMALLY AND SUBSTANTIALLY DEFICIENT; AND
IV.
PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT IN ESSE THAT NEEDS
PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT, AND WILL NOT SUFFER ANY
IRREPARABLE INJURY.
(pp. 19-20, Rollo.)
46
On August 17, 1999, the Court required private respondent to file his comment. Also
issued, as prayed for, was a temporary restraining order (TRO) providing: slx mis
NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until
further orders from this Court, You, Respondent Judge Ralph C.
Lantion, your agents, representatives or any person or persons
acting in your place or stead are hereby ORDERED to CEASE and
DESIST from enforcing the assailed order dated August 9, 1999
issued by public respondent in Civil Case No. 99-94684.
GIVEN by the Honorable HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., Chief Justice,
Supreme Court of the Philippines, this 17th day of August 1999.
(pp. 120-121, Rollo.)
The case was heard on oral argument on August 31, 1999, after which the parties, as
directed, filed their respective memoranda.
From the pleadings of the opposing parties, both procedural and substantive issues
are patent. However, a review of these issues as well as the extensive arguments of
both parties, compel us to delineate the focal point raised by the pleadings: During
the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is private respondent entitled to
the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing? An affirmative answer would
necessarily render the proceedings at the trial court, moot and academic (the issues
of which are substantially the same as those before us now), while a negative
resolution would call for the immediate lifting of the TRO issued by this Court dated
August 24, 1999, thus allowing petitioner to fast-track the process leading to the
filing of the extradition petition with the proper regional trial court. Corollarily, in the
event that private respondent is adjudged entitled to basic due process rights at the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, would this entitlement constitute a
breach of the legal commitments and obligations of the Philippine Government
under the RP-US Extradition Treaty? And assuming that the result would indeed be a
breach, is there any conflict between private respondents basic due process rights
and the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty?
The issues having transcendental importance, the Court has elected to go directly
into the substantive merits of the case, brushing aside peripheral procedural matters
which concern the proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684, particularly the propriety
of the filing of the petition therein, and of the issuance of the TRO of August 17,
1999 by the trial court. Missdaa
 47

To be sure, the issues call for a review of the extradition procedure. The RP-US
Extradition Treaty which was executed only on November 13, 1994, ushered into
force the implementing provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069, also called as the
Philippine Extradition Law. Section 2(a) thereof defines extradition as "the removal of
an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of
foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in
connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a
penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or
government." The portions of the Decree relevant to the instant case which involves
a charged and not convicted individual, are abstracted as follows:
The Extradition Request
immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to
take charge of the case.
The above provision shows only too clearly that the executive authority given the
task of evaluating the sufficiency of the request and the supporting documents is the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs. What then is the coverage of this task?
In accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the
executive authority must ascertain whether or not the request is supported by:
1. Documents, statements, or other types of information which describe the identity
and probable location of the person sought;

The request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the Requesting State, addressed to 2. A statement of the facts of the offense and the procedural history of the case;
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and shall be accompanied by:
3. A statement of the provisions of the law describing the essential elements of the
1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal charge and the warrant of arrest offense for which extradition is requested;
issued by the authority of the Requesting State having jurisdiction over the matter,
or some other instruments having equivalent legal force;
4. A statement of the provisions of law describing the punishment for the
offense; Rtc spped
2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is requested, with the fullest particulars
as to the name and identity of the accused, his whereabouts in the Philippines, if
5. A statement of the provisions of the law describing any time limit on the
known, the acts or omissions complained of, and the time and place of the
prosecution or the execution of punishment for the offense;
commission of these acts; Sda adsc
6. Documents, statements, or other types of information specified in paragraph 3 or
3. The text of the applicable law or a statement of the contents of said law, and the
paragraph 4 of said Article, as applicable.
designation or description of the offense by the law, sufficient for evaluation of the
request; and
(Paragraph 2, Article 7, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
4. Such other documents or information in support of the request.
7. Such evidence as, according to the law of the Requested State, would provide
probable cause for his arrest and committal for trial if the offense had been
(Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
committed there;

Section 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth the duty of the Secretary of
8. A copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a judge or other competent
Foreign Affairs, pertinently provides:
authority; and

. . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the

9. A copy of the charging document.
request fails to meet the requirements of this law and the relevant
treaty or convention, he shall forward the request together with
(Paragraph 3, ibid.)
the related documents to the Secretary of Justice, who shall

The executive authority (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) must also see to it that the
accompanying documents received in support of the request had been certified by
the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the Requested State resident in the
Requesting State (Embassy Note No. 052 from U. S. Embassy; Embassy Note No.
951309 from the Department of Foreign Affairs).
In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty provides that "[e]xtradition shall not
be granted if the executive authority of the Requested State determines that the
request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not
punishable under non-military penal legislation."
The Extradition Petition
Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the extradition request
and its supporting documents are sufficient and complete in form and substance, he
shall deliver the same to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate
and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case (Paragraph [1],
Section 5, P. D. No. 1069). The lawyer designated shall then file a written petition
with the proper regional trial court of the province or city, with a prayer that the
court take the extradition request under consideration (Paragraph [2], ibid.). Korte
The presiding judge of the regional trial court, upon receipt of the petition for
extradition, shall, as soon as practicable, issue an order summoning the prospective
extraditee to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the
order. The judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it appears that the immediate arrest
and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice
(Paragraph [1], Section 6, ibid.), particularly to prevent the flight of the prospective
extraditee.
The Extradition Hearing
The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the extradition proceeding
is criminal, civil, or a special proceeding. Nevertheless, Paragraph [1], Section 9
thereof provides that in the hearing of the extradition petition, the provisions of the
Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the summary nature
of the proceedings, shall apply. During the hearing, Section 8 of the Decree provides
that the attorney having charge of the case may, upon application by the Requesting
State, represent the latter throughout the proceedings.
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a decision granting the
extradition and giving the reasons therefor upon a showing of the existence of
48
a prima facie case, or dismiss the petition (Section 10, ibid.). Said decision is
appealable to the Court of Appeals, whose decision shall be final and immediately
executory (Section 12, ibid.). The provisions of the Rules of Court governing appeal in
criminal cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply in the aforementioned appeal,
except for the required 15-day period to file brief (Section 13, ibid.).
The trial court determines whether or not the offense mentioned in the petition is
extraditable based on the application of the dual criminality rule and other
conditions mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty. The trial court also
determines whether or not the offense for which extradition is requested is a
political one (Paragraph [1], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty).
With the foregoing abstract of the extradition proceedings as backdrop, the
following query presents itself: What is the nature of the role of the Department of
Justice at the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings?Sclaw
A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the only duty of the
Secretary of Justice is to file the extradition petition after the request and all the
supporting papers are forwarded to him by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is the
latter official who is authorized to evaluate the extradition papers, to assure their
sufficiency, and under Paragraph [3], Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine whether or
not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which
is not punishable under non-military penal legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly
provided in Paragraph [1], Section 5 of the Extradition Law, the Secretary of Justice
has the ministerial duty of filing the extradition papers.
However, looking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it would appear that
there was failure to abide by the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069. For
while it is true that the extradition request was delivered to the Department of
Foreign Affairs on June 17, 1999, the following day or less than 24 hours later, the
Department of Justice received the request, apparently without the Department of
Foreign Affairs discharging its duty of thoroughly evaluating the same and its
accompanying documents. The statement of an assistant secretary at the
Department of Foreign Affairs that his Department, in this regard, is merely acting as
a post office, for which reason he simply forwarded the request to the Department
of Justice, indicates the magnitude of the error of the Department of Foreign Affairs
in taking lightly its responsibilities. Thereafter, the Department of Justice took it upon
itself to determine the completeness of the documents and to evaluate the same to
find out whether they comply with the requirements laid down in the Extradition
Law and the RP-US Extradition Treaty. Petitioner ratiocinates in this connection that
although the Department of Justice had no obligation to evaluate the extradition

documents, the Department also had to go over them so as to be able to prepare an
extradition petition (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 24-25). Notably, it was also at this
stage where private respondent insisted on the following: (1) the right to be
furnished the request and the supporting papers; (2) the right to be heard which
consists in having a reasonable period of time to oppose the request, and to present
evidence in support of the opposition; and (3) that the evaluation proceedings be
held in abeyance pending the filing of private respondent's opposition to the
request. Kyle
The two Departments seem to have misread the scope of their duties and authority,
one abdicating its powers and the other enlarging its commission. The Department
of Foreign Affairs, moreover, has, through the Solicitor General, filed a manifestation
that it is adopting the instant petition as its own, indirectly conveying the message
that if it were to evaluate the extradition request, it would not allow private
respondent to participate in the process of evaluation.
Plainly then, the record cannot support the presumption of regularity that the
Department of Foreign Affairs thoroughly reviewed the extradition request and
supporting documents and that it arrived at a well-founded judgment that the
request and its annexed documents satisfy the requirements of law. The Secretary of
Justice, eminent as he is in the field of law, could not privately review the papers all
by himself. He had to officially constitute a panel of attorneys. How then could the
DFA Secretary or his undersecretary, in less than one day, make the more
authoritative determination?
The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a
class by itself. It is sui generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous
to say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage, the
executive authority has the power: (a) to make a technical assessment of the
completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the
request if on its face and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes
indicated are not extraditable; and (c) to make a determination whether or not the
request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military one which is not
punishable under non-military penal legislation (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 28-29;
Article 2 & and Paragraph [3], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty). Hence, said
process may be characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast
to a proceeding conducted in the exercise of an administrative bodys quasi-judicial
power. Ex sm
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation
of evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c)
49
rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved (De
Leon,Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs. United
States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power, which is also known as examining or
investigatory power, is one of the determinative powers of an administrative body
which better enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil.
Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This power allows the administrative body to
inspect the records and premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or
entities coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure of
information by means of accounts, records, reports, testimony of witnesses,
production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p. 64).
The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing evidence,
which is a useful aid or tool in an administrative agencys performance of its rule-
making or quasi-judicial functions. Notably, investigation is indispensable to
prosecution.
In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court had occasion to
rule on the functions of an investigatory body with the sole power of investigation. It
does not exercise judicial functions and its power is limited to investigating the facts
and making findings in respect thereto. The Court laid down the test of determining
whether an administrative body is exercising judicial functions or merely
investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to
adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if the only
purpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the
facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make
a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial
discretion and judgment. Mse sm
The above description in Ruperto applies to an administrative body authorized to
evaluate extradition documents. The body has no power to adjudicate in regard to
the rights and obligations of both the Requesting State and the prospective
extraditee. Its only power is to determine whether the papers comply with the
requirements of the law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an
extradition petition. Such finding is thus merely initial and not final. The body has no
power to determine whether or not the extradition should be effected. That is the
role of the court. The bodys power is limited to an initial finding of whether or not
the extradition petition can be filed in court.
It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary investigations, the evaluation
procedure is characterized by certain peculiarities. Primarily, it sets into motion the
wheels of the extradition process. Ultimately, it may result in the deprivation of

liberty of the prospective extraditee. This deprivation can be effected at two
stages: First, the provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the
submission of the request. This is so because the Treaty provides that in case of
urgency, a contracting party may request the provisional arrest of the person sought
pending presentation of the request (Paragraph [1], Article 9, RP-US Extradition
Treaty), but he shall be automatically discharged after 60 days if no request is
submitted (Paragraph 4). Presidential Decree No. 1069 provides for a shorter period
of 20 days after which the arrested person could be discharged (Section 20[d]).
Logically, although the Extradition Law is silent on this respect, the provisions only
mean that once a request is forwarded to the Requested State, the prospective
extraditee may be continuously detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested
(Paragraph [5], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), for he will only be discharged if
no request is submitted. Practically, the purpose of this detention is to prevent his
possible flight from the Requested State. Second, the temporary arrest of the
prospective extraditee during the pendency of the extradition petition in court
(Section 6, Presidential Decree No. 1069).
Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditees liberty as early as
during the evaluation stage. It is not only an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very
imminent one. Sc lex
Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that the evaluation process is
akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the
consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets
off or commences the procedure for, and ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a
prospective extraditee. As described by petitioner himself, this is a "tool" for criminal
law enforcement (p. 78, Rollo). In essence, therefore, the evaluation process
partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. In a number of cases, we had
occasion to make available to a respondent in an administrative case or investigation
certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal
prosecutions. Further, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Mendoza during the oral
arguments, there are rights formerly available only at the trial stage that had been
advanced to an earlier stage in the proceedings, such as the right to counsel and the
right against self-incrimination (tsn, August 31, 1999, p. 135; Escobedo vs. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478; Gideon vs. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436).
In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344 [1969]), we held that the
right against self-incrimination under Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
which is ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions, extends to administrative
proceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect, such as an administrative
50
investigation of a licensed physician who is charged with immorality, which could
result in his loss of the privilege to practice medicine if found guilty. The Court, citing
the earlier case of Cabal vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059 [1962]), pointed out that the
revocation of ones license as a medical practitioner, is an even greater deprivation
than forfeiture of property.
Cabal vs. Kapunan (supra) involved an administrative charge of unexplained wealth
against a respondent which was filed under Republic Act No. 1379, or the Anti-Graft
Law. Again, we therein ruled that since the investigation may result in forfeiture of
property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, and such
forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. There is also the earlier case of Almeda,
Sr. vs. Perez (5 SCRA 970 [1962]), where the Court, citing American jurisprudence,
laid down the test to determine whether a proceeding is civil or criminal: If the
proceeding is under a statute such that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture
can be included in the criminal case, such proceeding is criminal in nature, although
it may be civil in form; and where it must be gathered from the statute that the
action is meant to be criminal in its nature, it cannot be considered as civil. If,
however, the proceeding does not involve the conviction of the wrongdoer for the
offense charged, the proceeding is civil in nature. x law
The cases mentioned above refer to an impending threat of deprivation of ones
property or property right. No less is this true, but even more so in the case before
us, involving as it does the possible deprivation of liberty, which, based on the
hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, is placed second only to life itself and
enjoys precedence over property, for while forfeited property can be returned or
replaced, the time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense.
By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to
eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus saliently exhibiting the criminal or
penal aspect of the process. In this sense, the evaluation procedure is akin to a
preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same result the arrest
and imprisonment of the respondent or the person charged. Similar to the
evaluation stage of extradition proceedings, a preliminary investigation, which may
result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his
arrest, and to the deprivation of his liberty.
Petitioners reliance on Wright vs. Court of Appeals (235 SCRA 241 [1992]) (p. 8,
Petitioners Memorandum) that the extradition treaty is neither a piece of criminal
legislation nor a criminal procedural statute is not well-taken. Wrightis not authority
for petitioners conclusion that his preliminary processing is not akin to a preliminary
investigation. The characterization of a treaty in Wright was in reference to the

applicability of the prohibition against an ex post facto law. It had nothing to do with
the denial of the right to notice, information, and hearing.
As early as 1884, the United States Supreme Court ruled that "any legal proceeding
enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age or custom, or newly
devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the general public
good, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be
held to be due process of law" (Hurtado vs. California, 110 U.S. 516). Compliance
with due process requirements cannot be deemed non-compliance with treaty
commitments.
The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression
and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both
States accord common due process protection to their respective citizens. Sc
The due process clauses in the American and Philippine Constitutions are not only
worded in exactly identical language and terminology, but more importantly, they
are alike in what their respective Supreme Courts have expounded as the spirit with
which the provisions are informed and impressed, the elasticity in their
interpretation, their dynamic and resilient character which make them capable of
meeting every modern problem, and their having been designed from earliest time
to the present to meet the exigencies of an undefined and expanding future. The
requirements of due process are interpreted in both the United States and the
Philippines as not denying to the law the capacity for progress and improvement.
Toward this effect and in order to avoid the confines of a legal straitjacket, the courts
instead prefer to have the meaning of the due process clause "gradually ascertained
by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decisions of cases as
they arise" (Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78). Capsulized, it refers to "the
embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play" (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Owners Association vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 [1967]). It relates to
certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free
government (Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366).
Due process is comprised of two components substantive due process which
requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to
his life, liberty, or property, and procedural due process which consists of the two
basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an
impartial and competent tribunal (Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102-106).
True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and hearing
pervade not only in criminal and civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings
51
as well. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals
are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, and upon
notice, they may claim the right to appear therein and present their side and to
refute the position of the opposing parties (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed.,
p. 64).
In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory proceeding,
Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court guarantees the respondents basic due
process rights, granting him the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the
affidavits, and other supporting documents, and the right to submit counter-
affidavits and other supporting documents within ten days from receipt thereof.
Moreover, the respondent shall have the right to examine all other evidence
submitted by the complainant. Scmis
These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain instances, such
as:
1. In proceedings where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the
summary abatement of a nuisance per se (Article 704, Civil Code), the preventive
suspension of a public servant facing administrative charges (Section 63, Local
Government Code, B. P. Blg. 337), the padlocking of filthy restaurants or theaters
showing obscene movies or like establishments which are immediate threats to
public health and decency, and the cancellation of a passport of a person sought for
criminal prosecution;
2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the
respondent is not precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later
time without prejudice to the person affected, such as the summary distraint and
levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, and the replacement of a temporary
appointee; and
3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise them
had not been claimed.
Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the query may be asked: Does the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings fall under any of the described
situations mentioned above?
Let us take a brief look at the nature of American extradition proceedings which are
quite noteworthy considering that the subject treaty involves the U.S.
Government. Mis sc

American jurisprudence distinguishes between interstate rendition or extradition
which is based on the Extradition Clause in the U.S. Constitution (Art. IV, 2 cl 2), and
international extradition proceedings. In interstate rendition or extradition, the
governor of the asylum state has the duty to deliver the fugitive to the demanding
state. The Extradition Clause and the implementing statute are given a liberal
construction to carry out their manifest purpose, which is to effect the return as
swiftly as possible of persons for trial to the state in which they have been charged
with crime (31A Am Jur 2d 754-755). In order to achieve extradition of an alleged
fugitive, the requisition papers or the demand must be in proper form, and all the
elements or jurisdictional facts essential to the extradition must appear on the face
of the papers, such as the allegation that the person demanded was in the
demanding state at the time the offense charged was committed, and that the
person demanded is charged with the commission of the crime or that prosecution
has been begun in the demanding state before some court or magistrate
(35 C.J.S. 406-407). The extradition documents are then filed with the governor of
the asylum state, and must contain such papers and documents prescribed by
statute, which essentially include a copy of the instrument charging the person
demanded with a crime, such as an indictment or an affidavit made before a
magistrate. Statutory requirements with respect to said charging instrument or
papers are mandatory since said papers are necessary in order to confer jurisdiction
on the governor of the asylum state to effect the extradition (35 C.J.S. 408-410). A
statutory provision requiring duplicate copies of the indictment, information, affidavit,
or judgment of conviction or sentence and other instruments accompanying the
demand or requisitions be furnished and delivered to the fugitive or his attorney is
directory. However, the right being such a basic one has been held to be a right
mandatory on demand (Ibid., p. 410, citing Ex parte Moore, 256 S.W. 2d 103, 158 Tex.
Cr. 407 and Ex parte Tucker, Cr., 324, S.W.2d 853). Mis spped
In international proceedings, extradition treaties generally provide for the
presentation to the executive authority of the Requested State of a requisition or
demand for the return of the alleged offender, and the designation of the particular
officer having authority to act in behalf of the demanding nation (31A Am Jur 2d
815).
In petitioners memorandum filed on September 15, 1999, he attached thereto a
letter dated September 13, 1999 from the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department
of Justice, summarizing the U.S. extradition procedures and principles, which are
basically governed by a combination of treaties (with special reference to the RP-US
Extradition Treaty), federal statutes, and judicial decisions, to wit:
52
1. All requests for extradition are transmitted through the diplomatic channel. In
urgent cases, requests for the provisional arrest of an individual may be made
directly by the Philippine Department of Justice to the U.S. Department of Justice,
and vice-versa. In the event of a provisional arrest, a formal request for extradition is
transmitted subsequently through the diplomatic channel.
2. The Department of State forwards the incoming Philippine extradition request to
the Department of Justice. Before doing so, the Department of State prepares a
declaration confirming that a formal request has been made, that the treaty is in full
force and effect, that under Article 17 thereof the parties provide reciprocal legal
representation in extradition proceedings, that the offenses are covered as
extraditable offenses under Article 2 thereof, and that the documents have been
authenticated in accordance with the federal statute that ensures admissibility at
any subsequent extradition hearing.
3. A judge or magistrate judge is authorized to issue a warrant for the arrest of the
prospective extraditee (18 U.S.C. 3184). Said judge or magistrate is authorized to
hold a hearing to consider the evidence offered in support of the extradition request
(Ibid.)
4. At the hearing, the court must determine whether the person arrested is
extraditable to the foreign country. The court must also determine that (a) it has
jurisdiction over the defendant and jurisdiction to conduct the hearing; (b) the
defendant is being sought for offenses for which the applicable treaty permits
extradition; and (c) there is probable cause to believe that the defendant is the
person sought and that he committed the offenses charged (Ibid.)Spped
5. The judge or magistrate judge is vested with jurisdiction to certify extraditability
after having received a "complaint made under oath, charging any person found
within his jurisdiction" with having committed any of the crimes provided for by the
governing treaty in the country requesting extradition (Ibid.) [In this regard, it is
noted that a long line of American decisions pronounce that international extradition
proceedings partake of the character of a preliminary examination before a
committing magistrate, rather than a trial of the guilt or innocence of the alleged
fugitive (31A Am Jur 2d 826).]
6. If the court decides that the elements necessary for extradition are present, it
incorporates its determinations in factual findings and conclusions of law and
certifies the persons extraditability. The court then forwards this certification of
extraditability to the Department of State for disposition by the Secretary of State.

The ultimate decision whether to surrender an individual rests with the Secretary of
State (18 U.S.C. 3186).
7. The subject of an extradition request may not litigate questions concerning the
motives of the requesting government in seeking his extradition. However, a person
facing extradition may present whatever information he deems relevant to the
Secretary of State, who makes the final determination whether to surrender an
individual to the foreign government concerned.
From the foregoing, it may be observed that in the United States, extradition begins
and ends with one entity the Department of State which has the power to evaluate
the request and the extradition documents in the beginning, and, in the person of
the Secretary of State, the power to act or not to act on the courts determination of
extraditability. In the Philippine setting, it is the Department of Foreign Affairs which
should make the initial evaluation of the request, and having satisfied itself on the
points earlier mentioned (see pp. 10-12), then forwards the request to the
Department of Justice for the preparation and filing of the petition for extradition.
Sadly, however, the Department of Foreign Affairs, in the instant case, perfunctorily
turned over the request to the Department of Justice which has taken over the task
of evaluating the request as well as thereafter, if so warranted, preparing, filing, and
prosecuting the petition for extradition. Jo spped
Private respondent asks what prejudice will be caused to the U.S. Government
should the person sought to be extradited be given due process rights by the
Philippines in the evaluation stage. He emphasizes that petitioners primary concern
is the possible delay in the evaluation process.
We agree with private respondents citation of an American Supreme Court ruling:
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve
legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy of
cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution
recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one
might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process
Clause, in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile
values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for
efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy
government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre
ones.
(Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656)
53
The United States, no doubt, shares the same interest as the
Philippine Government that no right that of liberty secured not
only by the Bills of Rights of the Philippines Constitution but of the
United States as well, is sacrificed at the altar of expediency.
(pp. 40-41, Private Respondents Memorandum.) Spped jo
In the Philippine context, this Courts ruling is invoked:
One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where
the rights of the individual are concerned, the end does not justify
the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also
necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with
the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional
shortcuts. There is no question that not even the strongest moral
conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few
notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individuals
rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right
guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one
even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that
right (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 375-376 [1989]).
There can be no dispute over petitioners argument that extradition is a tool of
criminal law enforcement. To be effective, requests for extradition or the surrender
of accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously. Nevertheless,
accelerated or fast-tracked proceedings and adherence to fair procedures are,
however, not always incompatible. They do not always clash in discord. Summary
does not mean precipitous haste. It does not carry a disregard of the basic principles
inherent in "ordered liberty." Miso
Is there really an urgent need for immediate action at the evaluation stage? At that
point, there is no extraditee yet in the strict sense of the word. Extradition may or
may not occur. In interstate extradition, the governor of the asylum state may not, in
the absence of mandatory statute, be compelled to act favorably (37 C.J.S. 387) since
after a close evaluation of the extradition papers, he may hold that federal and
statutory requirements, which are significantly jurisdictional, have not been met (31
Am Jur 2d 819). Similarly, under an extradition treaty, the executive authority of the
requested state has the power to deny the behest from the requesting state.
Accordingly, if after a careful examination of the extradition documents the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs finds that the request fails to meet the requirements of

the law and the treaty, he shall not forward the request to the Department of Justice
for the filing of the extradition petition since non-compliance with the aforesaid
requirements will not vest our government with jurisdiction to effect the extradition.
In this light, it should be observed that the Department of Justice exerted notable
efforts in assuring compliance with the requirements of the law and the treaty since
it even informed the U.S. Government of certain problems in the extradition papers
(such as those that are in Spanish and without the official English translation, and
those that are not properly authenticated). In fact, petitioner even admits that
consultation meetings are still supposed to take place between the lawyers in his
Department and those from the U.S. Justice Department. With the meticulous
nature of the evaluation, which cannot just be completed in an abbreviated period of
time due to its intricacies, how then can we say that it is a proceeding that urgently
necessitates immediate and prompt action where notice and hearing can be
dispensed with?
Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there is tentativeness of
administrative action. Is private respondent precluded from enjoying the right to
notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to him? Here lies the peculiarity
and deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure. On one hand, there is yet no
extraditee, but ironically on the other, it results in an administrative determination
which, if adverse to the person involved, may cause his immediate incarceration. The
grant of the request shall lead to the filing of the extradition petition in court. The
"accused" (as Section 2[c] of Presidential Decree No. 1069 calls him), faces the threat
of arrest, not only after the extradition petition is filed in court, but even during the
evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional arrest allowed under the
treaty and the implementing law. The prejudice to the "accused" is thus blatant and
manifest.
Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be
dispensed with and shelved aside.
Apart from the due process clause of the Constitution, private respondent likewise
invokes Section 7 of Article III which reads: Nex old
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
54
The above provision guarantees political rights which are available to citizens of the
Philippines, namely: (1) the right to information on matters of public concern, and (2)
the corollary right of access to official records and documents. The general right
guaranteed by said provision is the right to information on matters of public concern.
In its implementation, the right of access to official records is likewise conferred.
These cognate or related rights are "subject to limitations as may be provided by
law" (Bernas, The 1987 Phil. Constitution A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 104) and
rely on the premise that ultimately it is an informed and critical public opinion which
alone can protect the values of democratic government (Ibid.).
Petitioner argues that the matters covered by private respondents letter-request
dated July 1, 1999 do not fall under the guarantee of the foregoing provision since
the matters contained in the documents requested are not of public concern. On the
other hand, private respondent argues that the distinction between matters vested
with public interest and matters which are of purely private interest only becomes
material when a third person, who is not directly affected by the matters requested,
invokes the right to information. However, if the person invoking the right is the one
directly affected thereby, his right to information becomes absolute.
The concept of matters of public concern escapes exact definition. Strictly speaking,
every act of a public officer in the conduct of the governmental process is a matter of
public concern (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,
1996 ed., p. 336). This concept embraces a broad spectrum of subjects which the
public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives or simply
because such matters arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen (Legaspi v. Civil
Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 [1987]). Hence, the real party in interest is the
people and any citizen has "standing".Mani kx
When the individual himself is involved in official government action because said
action has a direct bearing on his life, and may either cause him some kind of
deprivation or injury, he actually invokes the basic right to be notified under Section
1 of the Bill of Rights and not exactly the right to information on matters of public
concern. As to an accused in a criminal proceeding, he invokes Section 14,
particularly the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
The right to information is implemented by the right of access to information within
the control of the government (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 337). Such information may be contained in official records,
and in documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions.

In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent pertain to official
government action from the U. S. Government. No official action from our country
has yet been taken. Moreover, the papers have some relation to matters of foreign
relations with the U. S. Government. Consequently, if a third party invokes this
constitutional provision, stating that the extradition papers are matters of public
concern since they may result in the extradition of a Filipino, we are afraid that the
balance must be tilted, at such particular time, in favor of the interests necessary for
the proper functioning of the government. During the evaluation procedure, no
official governmental action of our own government has as yet been done; hence the
invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in contrast, records of the extradition
hearing would already fall under matters of public concern, because our government
by then shall have already made an official decision to grant the extradition request.
The extradition of a fellow Filipino would be forthcoming.
We now pass upon the final issue pertinent to the subject matter of the instant
controversy: Would private respondents entitlement to notice and hearing during
the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the
Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty? Assuming the answer is in
the affirmative, is there really a conflict between the treaty and the due process
clause in the Constitution?
First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass
upon the constitutionality of the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the
Extradition Law implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of the
grant of the basic rights of notice and hearing to private respondent on foreign
relations. Maniks
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of
international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in
good faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also
compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he
Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to
the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all
nations." Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of
the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules
applicable in the domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public International Law, 1992 ed.,
p. 12).
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local
courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict
55
between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute
of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give
effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper
regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the
Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine
Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the conflict is
irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and
municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs.
Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that
such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all
circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that international law has
been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of
international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The
doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of
international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national
legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes
effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states
where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the
Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with
the constitution (Ibid.). Manikan
In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law and municipal
or national law? En contrario, these two components of the law of the land are not
pitted against each other. There is no occasion to choose which of the two should be
upheld. Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as
implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due process
rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings.
From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition
and during the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of
notice and hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior
thereto, the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition
procedures also manifests this silence.
Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights. Consequently, he
describes the evaluation procedure as an "ex parte technical assessment" of the
sufficiency of the extradition request and the supporting documents.
We disagree.

In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An
application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go
against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition
Law precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly, American
jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in
interstate extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee
may even request for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the
asylum state, and if he does, his right to be supplied the same becomes a
demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410).
Petitioner contends that the United States requested the Philippine Government to
prevent unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. Hence, the secrecy
surrounding the action of the Department of Justice Panel of Attorneys. The
confidentiality argument is, however, overturned by petitioners revelation that
everything it refuses to make available at this stage would be obtainable during trial.
The Department of Justice states that the U.S. District Court concerned has
authorized the disclosure of certain grand jury information. If the information is truly
confidential, the veil of secrecy cannot be lifted at any stage of the extradition
proceedings. Not even during trial. Oldmiso
A libertarian approach is thus called for under the premises.
One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Extradition Law, as well as
American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition, for any prohibition against
the conferment of the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings. We have to consider similar
situations in jurisprudence for an application by analogy.
Earlier, we stated that there are similarities between the evaluation process and a
preliminary investigation since both procedures may result in the arrest of the
respondent or the prospective extraditee. In the evaluation process, a provisional
arrest is even allowed by the Treaty and the Extradition Law (Article 9, RP-US
Extradition Treaty; Sec. 20, Presidential Decree No. 1069). Following petitioners
theory, because there is no provision of its availability, does this imply that for a
period of time, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, despite
Section 15, Article III of the Constitution which states that "[t]he privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion
when the public safety requires it"? Petitioners theory would also infer that bail is
not available during the arrest of the prospective extraditee when the extradition
petition has already been filed in court since Presidential Decree No. 1069 does not
provide therefor, notwithstanding Section 13, Article III of the Constitution which
56
provides that "[a]ll persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended " Can petitioner validly argue that since these
contraventions are by virtue of a treaty and hence affecting foreign relations, the
aforestated guarantees in the Bill of Rights could thus be subservient thereto?Ncm
The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the essence of due
process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain ones side or an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of (Mirano
vs. NLRC, 270 SCRA 96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 457 [1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC,
276 SCRA 1 [1997]; Helpmate, Inc. vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 315 [1997]; Aquinas School vs.
Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602 [1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632 [1997]). In essence,
procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced
(Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31 [1997]). This
Court will not tolerate the least disregard of constitutional guarantees in the
enforcement of a law or treaty. Petitioners fears that the Requesting State may have
valid objections to the Requested States non-performance of its commitments under
the Extradition Treaty are insubstantial and should not be given paramount
consideration.
How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do we limit ourselves to
the four corners of Presidential Decree No. 1069?
Of analogous application are the rulings in Government Service Insurance System vs.
Court of Appeals (201 SCRA 661 [1991]) and Go vs. National Police Commission (271
SCRA 447 [1997]) where we ruled that in summary proceedings under Presidential
Decree No. 807 (Providing for the Organization of the Civil Service Commission in
Accordance with Provisions of the Constitution, Prescribing its Powers and Functions
and for Other Purposes), and Presidential Decree No. 971 (Providing Legal Assistance
for Members of the Integrated National Police who may be charged for Service-
Connected Offenses and Improving the Disciplinary System in the Integrated
National Police, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for other purposes), as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1707, although summary dismissals may be effected
without the necessity of a formal investigation, the minimum requirements of due
process still operate. As held in GSIS vs. Court of Appeals:
... [I]t is clear to us that what the opening sentence of Section 40 is
saying is that an employee may be removed or dismissed even
without formal investigation, in certain instances. It is equally clear
 57

to us that an employee must be informed of the charges preferred reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. The
against him, and that the normal way by which the employee is so incidents in Civil Case No. 99-94684 having been rendered moot and academic by
informed is by furnishing him with a copy of the charges against this decision, the same is hereby ordered dismissed.SO ORDERED.
him. This is a basic procedural requirement that a statute cannot
dispense with and still remain consistent with the constitutional
provision on due process. The second minimum requirement is
that the employee charged with some misfeasance or malfeasance
must have a reasonable opportunity to present his side of the
matter, that is to say, his defenses against the charges levelled
against him and to present evidence in support of his
defenses. Ncmmis

(at p. 671)

Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in nature, yet we upheld
the due process rights of the respondent.

In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger
of loss of property or employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to
his forcible banishment to a foreign land. The convergence of petitioners favorable
action on the extradition request and the deprivation of private respondents liberty
is easily comprehensible.

We have ruled time and again that this Courts equity jurisdiction, which is aptly
described as "justice outside legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and
never against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA
677 [1997]). The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice
outside legality," since private respondents due process rights, although not
guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We
would not be true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over
guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the
principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised.

Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing currents of

liberty and government authority, he must ever hold the oar of freedom in the
stronger arm, lest an errant and wayward course be laid.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent
copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a

BENJAMIN MASANGCAY, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondent.
Elections; Commission on Elections; Lack of power to punish for contempt in the
exercise of ministerial functions.The Commission on Elections, in the exercise of its
ministerial functions, such as the distribution of ballots and other election
paraphernalia among the different municipalities, has no power to punish for
contempt, because such power is inherently judicial in nature.
APPEAL from a decision of the Commission on Elections.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Godofredo A. Ramos and Ruby Salazar-Alberto for petitioner.
Solicitor General and Dominador D. Dayot for respond dent.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Benjamin Masangcay, with several others, was on October 14, 1957 charged before
the Commission on Elections with contempt for having opened three boxes bearing
serial numbers 1-8071, 1-8072 and 1-8073 containing official and sample ballots for
the municipalities of the province of Aklan, in violation of the instructions of said
Commission embodied in its resolution promulgated on September 2, 1957, and its
unnumbered resolution dated March 5, 1957, inasmuch as he opened said boxes not
in the presence of the division superintendent of schools of Aklan, the provincial
auditor, and the authorized representatives of the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal
Party and the Citizens Party, as required in the aforesaid resolutions, which are
punishable under Section 5 of the Revised Election Code and Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court Masangcay was then the provincial designated by the Commission in its
resolution in Case CE-No. 270, part II 2(b) thereof, to take charge of the receipt and
custody of the official ballots, election forms and supplies, as well as of their
distribution, among the different municipalities of the province.
In compliance with the summons issued to Masangcay and his co-respondents to
appear and show cause why they should not be punished for contempt on the basis
of the aforementioned charge, they all appeared before the Commission on October
21, 1957 and entered a plea of not guilty. Thereupon, evidence was presented by
58
both the prosecution and the defense, and on December 16, 1957 the Commission
rendered its decision finding Masangcay and his co-respondent Molo guilty as
charged and sentencing each of them to suffer three months imprisonment and pay
a fine of P500, with subsidiary imprisonment of two months in case of insolvency, to
be served in the provincial jail of Aklan. The other respondents were exonerated for
lack of evidence.
Masangcay brought the present petition for review raising as main issue the
constitutionality of Section 5 of the Revised Election Code which grants the
Commission on Elections as well as its members the power to punish acts of
contempt against said body under the same procedure and with the same penalties
provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court in that the portion of said section which
grants to the Commission and members the power to punish for contempt is
unconstitutional for it infringes the principle underlying the separation of powers
that exists among the three departments of our constitutional form of government.
In other words, it is contended that, even if petitioner can be held guilty of the act of
contempt charged, the decision is null and void for lack of valid power on the part of
the Commission to impose such disciplinary penalty under the principle of separation
of powers.
There is merit in the contention that the Commission on Elections lacks power to
impose the disciplinary penalty meted out to petitioner in the decision subject of
review. We had occasion to stress in the case of Guevara v. The Commission on
Elections1 that under the law and the constitution, the Commission on Elections has
not only the duty to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of
elections, but also the power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be
submitted to it in connection with the elections. In this sense, we said, the
Commission, although it cannot be classified as a court of justice within the meaning
of the Constitution (Section 30, Article VIII), for it is merely an administrative body,
may however exercise quasi-judicial functions insofar as controversies that by
express provision of law come under its jurisdiction. The difficulty lies in drawing the
demarcation line between the duty which inherently is administrative in character
and a function which calls for the exercise of the quasi-judicial function of the
Commission. In the same case, we also expressed the view that when the
Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot exercise the power to punish
for contempt because such power is inherently judicial in nature, as can be clearly
gleaned from the following doctrine we laid down therein:
xxx In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not
exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to

punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in
nature. As this Court has aptly said: The power to punish for contempt is inherent in
all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts,
and, consequently, in the administration of justice (Slade Perkins v. Director of
Prisons, 58 Phil., 271; U.S. v. Lee Hoc, 36 Phil., 867; In Re Sotto, 46 O.G., 2570; In Re
Kelly, 35 Phil., 944). The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a
necessary incident and attribute of courts (Slade Perkins v. Director of Prisons, Ibid.).
Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited to making effective
the power to elicit testimony (People v. Swena, 296 P., 271). And the exercise of that
power by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has
been held invalid (Langenberg v. Lecker, 31 N.E., 190; In Re Sims, 37 P., 135; Roberts
v. Hacney, 58 SW., 810).
In the instant case, the resolutions which the Commission tried to enforce and for
whose violation the charge for contempt was filed against petitioner Masangcay
merely call for the exercise of an administrative or ministerial function for they
merely concern the procedure to be followed in the distribution of ballots and other
election paraphernalia among the different municipalities. In fact, Masangcay, who
as provincial treasurer of Aklan was the one designated to take charge of the receipt,
custody and distribution of election supplies in that province, was charged with
having opened three boxes containing official ballots for distribution among several
municipalities in violation of the instructions of the Commission which enjoin that
the same cannot be opened except in the presence of the division superintendent of
schools, the provincial auditor, and the authorized representatives of the
Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party, and the Citizens Party, for he ordered their
opening and distribution not in accordance with the manner and procedure laid
down in said resolutions. And because of such violation he was dealt as for contempt
of the Commission and was sentenced accordingly. In this sense, the Commission has
exceeded its jurisdiction in punishing him for contempt, and so its decision is null and
void.
Having reached the foregoing conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to pass on the
question of constitutionality raised by petitioner with regard to the portion of
Section 5 of the Revised Election Code which confers upon the Commission on
Elections the power to punish for contempt for acts provided for in Rule 64 of our
Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from insofar as petitioner Benjamin Masangcay
is concerned, as well as the resolution denying petitioners motion for
59
reconsideration, insofar as it concerns him, are hereby reversed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredez, Dizon, Regala and
Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., took no part.
Decision and resolution reversed.
Note.Rule 71 of the Rules of Court on contempt applies only to inferior and
superior courts and does not Masangcay vs. Commission on Elections, 6 SCRA 27, No.
L-13827 September 28, 1962
HON. ISIDRO CARIO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education,
Culture 6, Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent of City
Schools of Manila, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO
BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ
DEL CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Jurisdiction; Commission on Human Rights; Court declares the
Commission on Human Rights to have no jurisdiction on adjudicatory powers over
certain specific type of cases like alleged human rights violations involving civil or
political rights.The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on
Human Rights has the power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a
court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory
powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific
type of cases, like alleged human rights violations in volving civil or political rights.
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and
that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasijudicial
agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the
way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make
findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political
rights.The most that may be conceded to the Commission. in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings
of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights.
But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a
court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial

function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence
and making factual conclusion in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function,
to repeat, the Commission does not have.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to
the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations
invoking civil and political rights.As should at once be observed, only the first of
the enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or
adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the
power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person.
It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and,
in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of
Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it
may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine
the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or
agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in
extending such remedy as may be required by its findings.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It cannot try and decide cases (or hear and
determine causes) as courts of justice or even quasi-judicial bodies do.But it
cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or
even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether
in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite
distinct meanings.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Commission on Human Rights having
merely the power to investigate cannot and should not try and resolve on the merits
the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90775.Hence it is that the
Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power to investigate, cannot and
should not try and resolve on the merits (adjudicate) the matters involved in
Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90775, as it has announced it means to do; and it
cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary
proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS,
their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed.
60
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The matters are undoubtedly and
clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education and also within
the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.These are matters
undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education,
being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil
Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION of certiorari and prohibition to review the order of the
Commission on Human Rights.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
NARVASA, J.:
The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar,
instituted by the Solicitor General, may be formulated as follows: where the relief
sought from the Commission on Human Rights by a party in a case consists of the
review and reversal or modification of a decision or order issued by a court of justice
or government agency or official exercising quasi-judicial functions, may the
Commission take cognizance of the case and grant that relief? Stated otherwise,
where a particular subject-matter is placed by law within the jurisdiction of a court
or other government agency or official for purposes of trial and adjudgment, may the
Commission on Human Rights take cognizance of the same subject-matter for the
same purposes of hearing and adjudication?
The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the respondents and are hence
taken as substantially correct for purposes of ruling on the legal questions posed in
the present action. These facts,1 together with others involved in related cases
recently resolved by this Court,2 or otherwise undisputed on the record, are
hereunder set forth.
1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school
teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association
(MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described
as mass concerted actions to dramatize and highlight their plight resulting from
the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and
again been brought to the latters attention. According to them they had decided to
undertake said mass concerted actions after the protest rally staged at the DECS
premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for the
government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the

Secretary of Education. The mass actions consisted in staying away from their
classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies,
etc. Through their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions
were served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24
hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned
to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their
replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the
week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed.
Among those who took part in the concerted mass actions were the eight (8)
private respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila,
who had agreed to support the non-political demands of the MPSTA.4
2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private
respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principals report and
given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for
ninety (90) days pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807' and temporarily replaced
(unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H). An investigation committee was
consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance with P.D. 807."5
3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90082 in which CHR
complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber
were, among others, named respondents,6 the latter filed separate answers, opted
for a formal investigation, and also moved for suspension of the administrative
proceedings pending resolution by xx (the Supreme) Court of their application for
issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining order. But when their motion
for suspension was denied by Order dated November 8, 1990 of the Investigating
Committee, which later also denied their motion for reconsideration orally made at
the hearing of November 14,1990, the respondents led by their counsel staged a
walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings."7 The case
eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cario dated December 17, 1990,
rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well as the answers, affidavits and
documents submitted by the respondents, decreeing dismissal from the service of
Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del
Castillo.8
4. In the meantime, the MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila against petitioner (Cario), which was dismissed (unmarked
CHR Exhibit, Annex I). Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court (on certiorari, in
an attempt to nullify said dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of the striking
61
teachers right to due process and peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445,
supra. The ACT also filed a similar petition before the Supreme Court xx docketed as
G.R. No. 95590."9 Both petitions in this Court were filed in behalf of the teacher
associations, a few named individuals, and other teacher-members so numerous
similarly situated or other similarly situated public school teachers too numerous
to be impleaded.
5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements dated
September 27, 1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that while
they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their
replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons
completely unknown to them.10
6. Their complaintsand those of other teachers also ordered suspended by the xx
(DECS)," all numbering forty-two (42)were docketed as Striking Teachers CHR
Case No. 90775." In connection therewith the Commission scheduled a dialogue
on October 11,1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cario requiring his
attendance therein.11
On the day of the dialogue, although it said that it was not certain whether he
(Sec. Cario) received the subpoena which was served at his office, xx (the)
Commission, with the Chairman presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin
and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded to hear the case; it heard the complainants
counsel (a) explain that his clients had been denied due process and suspended
without formal notice, and unjustly, since they did not join the mass leave, and (b)
expatiate on the grievances which were the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA
teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize."12 The
Commission thereafter issued an Order13 reciting these facts and making the
following disposition:
To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be accordingly guided in its
investigation and resolution of the matter, considering that these forty two teachers
are now suspended and deprived of their wages, which they need very badly,
Secretary Isidro Cario, of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Dr.
Erlinda Lolarga, school superintendent of Manila and the Principal of Ramon
Magsaysay High School, Manila, are hereby enjoined to appear and enlighten the
Commission en banc on October 19,1990 at 11:00 A.M. and to bring with them any
and all documents relevant to the allegations aforestated herein to assist the
Commission in this matter. Otherwise, the Commission will resolve the complaint on
the basis of complainants evidence.

x x x.
7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cario sought and was
granted leave to file a motion to dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was
submitted on November 14, 1990 alleging as grounds therefor, that the complaint
states no cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case."14
8. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments
affecting the striking teachers were promulgated in two (2) cases, as aforestated,
viz.:
________________
a) The Decision dated December 17, 1990 of Education Secretary Cario in Case No.
DECS 90082, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the
suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo;15 and
b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and
95590 dismissing the petitions without prejudice to any appeals, if still timely, that
the individual petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission on the matters
complained of,"16 and inter alia ruling that it was prima facie lawful for petitioner
Cario to issue return-to-work orders, file administrative charges against
recalcitrants, preventively suspend them, and issue decision on those charges."17
9. In an Order dated December 28,1990, respondent Commission denied Sec.
Carios motion to dismiss and required him and Superintendent Lolarga to submit
their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days x x (after which) the Commission shall
proceed to hear and resolve the case on the merits with or without respondents
counter affidavit."18 It held that the striking teachers were denied due process of
law; x x they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the
administrative charges; there had been a violation of their civil and political rights
which the Commission was empowered to investigate; and while expressing its
utmost respect to the Supreme Court xx the facts before xx (it) are different from
those in the case decided by the Supreme Court (the reference being ummistakably
to this Courts joint Resolution of August 6,1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590,
supra).
It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor
General, in behalf of petitioner Cario, has commenced the present action of
certiorari and prohibition.
62
The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not feel
bound by this Courts joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra. It has
also made plain its intention to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers
HRC Case No. 90775) on the merits. It intends, in other words, to try and decide or
hear and determine, i.e., exercise jurisdiction over the following general issues:
1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just cause
exists for the imposition of administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by their
superiors; and
2) whether or not the grievances which were the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA
teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize, justify their
mass action or strike.
The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with
character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon
and decided by the Secretary of Education, Culture 6, Sports, subject to appeal to the
Civil Service Commission, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that
the teachers affected may take appeals to the Civil Service Commission on said
matters, if still timely.
The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the
power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice,19 or
even a quasi-judicial agency,20 it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the
power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific
________________
19 Including Regional Trial Courts designated and acting as Special Agrarian Courts,
and the Court of Tax Appeals. SEE Supreme Court Circular No. 191 eff. April 1,1991.
20 Vested with judicial authority or quasi-judicial powers are such agencies, boards
or officers like the Securities 6, Exchange Commission, Land Registration Authority,
Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks
and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory
Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform,
Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission,
Philippine Atomic Energy Commission. SEE Circular No. 1 -91, supra. Also possessed
of quasi-judicial authorities are department heads and heads of office under the Civil

Service Law, and the Ombudsman. type of cases, like alleged human rights violations
involving civil or political rights.
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and
that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial
agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power
is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards
claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is
not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice,
or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making
factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of
applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be
decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.21 This function, to repeat,
the Commission does not
________________
21 The nature of a judicial function was inter alia described in Republic of the
Philippines (PCGG) v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 90478 as follows: The
resolution of controversies is, as everyone knows, the raison detre of courts. This
esential function is accomplished by first, the ascertainment of all the material and
relevant facts from the pleadings and from the evidence adduced by the parties, and
second after that determination of the facts has been completed, by the application
of the law thereto to the end that the controversy may be settled authoritatively,
definitively and finally.
x x It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine
what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in
controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes
to determine those questions, he acts judicially. x x. Mun. Council of Lemery v.
Prov. Board of Batangas, 56 Phil. 260, 270, citing State ex rel. Boards of Commrs. v.
Dunn, 86 Minn. 301, 304.
63
It has been held that a special civil action of certiorari would not lie to challenge
action of the lntegrity Board set up by Executive
The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the powers
of the Commission on Human Rights. The Commission was created by the 1987
Constitution as an independent office.23 Upon its constitution, it succeeded and
superseded the Presidential Committee on Human Rights existing at the time of the
effectivity of the Constitution,24 Its powers and functions are the following:25
"(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for
violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
________________
Order No. 318 of May 25, 1950, because that board, like the later Presidential
Complaints and Action Commission, was not invested with judicial functions but only
with power to investigate charges of graft and corruption in office and to submit the
record, together with findings and recommendations, to the President. Ruperto v.
Torres, G.R. No. L-8785, Feb. 25, 1957 (Unrep., 100 Phil 1098) (Rep. of the Phil.
Digest, Vol. 1, Certiorari, Sec. 22, p. 430).
Ballentines Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed., treating of jurisdiction in relation to a criminal
case, states it to be the power of a court to inquire into the fact, to apply the law,
and to declare the punishment, in a regular course of judicial proceeding x x. In
Blacks Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., adjudge is defined as: To pass on judicially, to
decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x Implies a judicial
determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment (italics supplied)."
22 A distinguished Member of the Constitutional Commission that drew up the 1987
Constitution, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., citing the Commissions official records, states
that the principal function of the Commission (on Human Rights) is investigatory. In
fact, in terms of law enforcement, this pretty much is the limit of its function. Beyond
investigation, it will have to rely on the Justice Department which has full control
over prosecutions. Thus, under Section 18 (9) it can only request assistance from
executive offices. (Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, a
Commentary, 1988 ed., Vol. I p. p. 503/).

23 ART. XIII, Sec. 17. (1)
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all
persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human
rights have been violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to
enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to
provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Governments compliance with international treaty
obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine
the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the
performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and
functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution
clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms
of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that
power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power
pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said
rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any
investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from
prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or
other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also
request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the
performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such
remedy as may be required by its findings.26
64
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of
justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or
adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well
understood and quite distinct meanings.
Investigate commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or
probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of investigate is to
observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: to search or inquire into: xx to
subject to an official probe x x: to conduct an official inquiry."27 The purpose of
investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information.
Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a
controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of investigate is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by
step by patient inquiry or observation, To trace or track; to search into; to examine
and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition;
examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;"28 to inquire; to make an
investigation, investigation being in turn described as "(a)n administrative
function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L
Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of
26 E.g.: the prosecution of persons guilty of crimes, or institution of civil or
administrative proceedings; exercise of visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or
detention facilities; the submission of recommendations to the Congress of
measures to promote human rights and provide for compensation to victims of
violations thereof, etc.
27 Websters Third New International Dictionary. The Oxford English Dictionary (2d
ed,, 1961) definition is: To search or inquire into; to examine (a matter)
systematically or in detail; to make an inquiry or examination into. The American
College Encyclopedic Dictionary (1959 ed.) defines (a) investigate as to search or
examine into the particulars of; examine in detail; and (b) investigation, an act or
process of investigating; a searching inquiry in order to ascertain facts; a detailed or
careful examination.
facts concerning a certain matter or matters."29

Adjudicate, commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate,
judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as
to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of
issues raised: xx to pass judgment on: settle judicially: xx act as judge."30 And
adjudge means to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial
powers: xx to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy xx."31
In the legal sense, adjudicate means: To settle in the exercise of judicial authority.
To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense; and adjudge
means: To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn.
xx Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."32
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power to
investigate, cannot and should not try and resolve on the merits (adjudicate) the
matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90775, as it has announced it
means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative
disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by
the DECS, their
________________
29 Ballentines Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed.
30 Websters Third New International Dictionary. The Oxford English Dictionary (2d
ed., 1961) definition is To adjudge; to award; to give something controverted to
one of the litigants, by a sentence or decision. xx To try and determine judicially; to
pronounce by sentence of court. xx To sit in judgment and pronounce sentence; to
act as a judge, or court of judgment.
31 Id., the Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed., 1961) definition is To settle, determine,
or decide judicially; to adjudicate upon; xx To pronounce or decree by judicial
sentence xx xx To award judicially; to grant, bestow, or impose by judicial sentence
xx.
32 Blacks Law Dictionary, 5th ed.; in Ballentines Law Dictionary, adjudicate is
defined as: To give judgment; to render or award judgment, and adjudge as: To
give judgment; to decide, to sentence. In Bouviers Law Dictionary Third Revision
(8th Ed.), adjudication is defined as A judgment; giving or pronouncing judgment
in a case. Determination in the exercise of judicial power. human rights, or civil or
political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no
65
power to resolve on the merits the question of (a) whether or not the mass
concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute a strike and are prohibited
or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking
part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions and
return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education,
constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative
disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and
(c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what
sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions,
These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the
Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to
him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil
Service Commission.
Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken cognizance
of the issues and resolved them,33 and it appears that appeals have been seasonably
taken by the aggrieved parties to the Civil Service Commission; and even this Court
itself has had occasion to pass upon said issues.34
Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the
Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on
substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or
defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not
the Secretary of Education had in truth committed human rights violations involving
civil and political rights, are matters which may be passed upon and determined
through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary of Education
himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service
Commission and eventually by the Supreme Court.
________________
The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has
no business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education Secretary
or the Civil Service Commission. It has no business going over the same ground
traversed by the latter and making its own judgment on the questions involved. This
would accord success to what may well have been the complaining teachers
strategy to abort, frustrate or negate the judgment of the Education Secretary in the
administrative cases against them which they anticipated would be adverse to them.
 66

This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done.

In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would serve no
useful purpose. If its investigation should result in conclusions contrary to those
reached by Secretary Cario, it would have no power anyway to reverse the
Secretarys conclusions. Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil Service
Commission and lastly by this Court. The only thing the Commission can do, if it
concludes that Secretary Cario was in error, is to refer the matter to the
appropriate Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil
Service Commission.35 It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the
Civil Service Commission.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29,1990 is ANNULLED

and SET ASIDE, and the respondent Commission on Human Rights and the Chairman
and Members thereof are prohibited to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking
Teachers HRC Case No. 90775) on the merits.

SO ORDERED.