DUCO v.
COMELEC motion for reconsideration for the resolution of the commission en banc
[G.R. No. 183366; August 19, 2009]
Facts:
On Oct. 2007, simultaneous barangay and SK elections were held all
over the country.
In Brgy Ibabao, Loay, Bohol, Duco was proclaimed as elected
Punong Barangay.
Avelino, his opponent, initiated an election protest in the MCTC
seeking a recount of the ballots in four precincts.
o He alleged that the election results were spurious, fraudulent
and did not indicate the true will of the electorate.
MCTC ruled in favor of Avelino.
Duco filed a notice of appeal and subsequently a motion for
reconsideration.
o COMELEC dismissed for failure to pay necessary motion
fees and for failure to specify that evidence is insufficient to
justify assailed COMELEC Order.
Issue:
WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in dismissing Ducos appeal and in denying his Motion
for Reconsideration
Held:
Yes and no. The court noted that the assailed resolution by COMELEC
denying the Motion for Reconsideration was issued by the 1st Division when
instead it should have been made by the COMELEC en banc due to the
matter thereby resolved being the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The action of the 1st Division was contrary to Sec. 3, Art. IX-C of the
Constitution which provides that provided that motions for
reconsiderations of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
Moreover, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that upon the filing
of a motion for reconsideration of a Division, the Clerk of Court concerned
shall notify the Presiding Commissioner, who shall thereafter certify the case
to the Commission en banc. The Clerk of Court shall then calendar the
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
within 10 days from the certification thereof. There is no showing that the
clerk of court of the 1st Division notified the Presiding Commissioner; or that
the Presiding Commissioner certified the case to the COMELEC en banc; or
that the Clerk of Court of COMELEC en banc calendared the motion within
10 days from its certification.
Overlooking the said constitutional violation, the court provides that there is
no need to remand the motion for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc
for its proper resolution. Considering the urgent need for resolution of
election cases, the court has decided that the petition for certiorari lacks
merit.
Firstly, Duco filed his appeal on time but paid the deficiency of his appeal
fees beyond the 5-day reglementary period. This payment did not cure the
defect because the date of payment of appeal fee is deemed the actual date of
the filing of notice of appeal. This means the decision of the MCTC was
already final and immutable, since his appeal is considered filed beyond the
reglementary period. The court will not bar any claim of good faith,
excusable negligence or mistake in any failure to pay the full amount of
filing fees in election cases. Thus, the plea for a liberal application of
technical rules of procedure is undeserving of any sympathy. Such payment
is not a mere technicality of law or procedure, but an essential requirement.
An appeal is not a right but a mere statutory privilege that must be exercised
strictly in accordance with the provisions set by law.
Lastly, petitioners claim that MCTC was not furnished a copy of said
Resolution lacks substance. The resolution was not unknown to the MCTC
and to his counsel, because it has already been issued in 2002. Thus, the
COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. The petitioner was not able to discharge the burden
of proving that there was not merely a reversible error but grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
COMELEC for his issuance of such order.
1
 RE: QUERY OF MR. ROGER C. PRIORESCHI RE
EXEMPTION FROM LEGAL AND FILING FEES OF THE
GOOD SHEPHERD FOUNDATION, INC.
A. M. No. 09-6-9-SC, August 19, 2009

Facts:
Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is a foundation working for indigent
and underprivileged people.
Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi, administrator of the Good Shepherd
Foundation, Inc., wrote a letter addressed to the Chief Justice.
o He asks the Court to apply to it the exemption from paying
legal fees granted to indigent applicants.

Issue:
WON a foundation working for the indigent and underprivileged people can
be granted the same exemption from payment of legal fees granted to
indigent litigants. NO

Held:

The basis of the exemption from legal and filing fees is the free access clause
embodied in Art. 3, Sec. 11 of the Constitution which is implemented under
Rule 3, Sec. 21 and Rule 141, Sec. 19 of the Rules of Court. The clear intent
and precise language of said provisions of the Rules of Court indicate that
only a natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. Good
Shepherd Foundation has a separate juridical personality from its members. It
being a juridical person, it is not covered by the scope of the free access
clause and the provisions of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, poverty is a
condition that can only be experienced by a natural person. Other reasons for
denying the expansion of the language of the law is that such allowance
could be prone to abuse by corporations and that scrutiny of the necessary
documents if a corporation were to comply would be time consuming for the
courts.

Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017 2

GUZMAN v. COMELEC
[GR No. 182380, August 28, 2009]
Facts
On March 31, 2004, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tugegarao City
authorized City Mayor Ting to acquire two parcels of land for use as
a public cemetery
As payment, City Treasurer Garcia issued and released a Treasury
Warrant
Guzman then filed a complaint in the Office of the Provincial
Election Supervisor of Cagayan Province against both Ting and
Garcia for violations of the Omnibus Election Code, for having
undertaken construction of a public cemetery and disbursement of
public funds withing 45 days prior to the May 9, 2004 elections due
to the election ban having commenced on March 26, 2004, ending on
May 9, 2004
The Acting Provincial Election Supervisor of Cagayan recommended
dismissal of the complaint, which the COMELEC en banc adopted
It argued that acquisition of the two parcels of land was not
considered within the term public works, hence this present
case
This is a petition under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 assailing the
resolution of the COMELEC of the dismissing the criminal
complaints against Mayor Randolph Ting and City Treasurer
Salvacion Garcia, both of Tugegarao City
The two were charged with allegedly violating prohibitions against:
1) disbursing public funds and undertaking public works; and 2)
issuing treasury warrant in payment
Guzman alleges that the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
exonerating Ting and Garcia, based on its finding that the
acquisition of the land for use as a public cemetery and the
issuance of treasury warrants
Issues
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
1. WON the acquisition of lots during the election ban was covered by
the term public works as to be in violation of Section 261 (v) of the
Omnibus Election Code
2. WON the issuance of Treasury Warrants during the period of the
election ban was in violation of Section 261 (w) of the Omnibus
Election Code
Held
1. NO. To be liable for violation of Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus
Election Code, four essential elements must concur: 1) A public
official releases, disburses or expends any public funds; 2) The
release, disbursement or expenditure of such funds must be within
forty-five days before regular elections; 3) The release, disbursement
or expenditure of funds is for any and all kinds of public works, and;
4) The release, disbursement or expenditure of the public funds
should not cover any exceptions of Section 261 (v) of the OEC. The
Local Government Code of 1991 defines public works to be the fixed
infrastructures and facilities owned and operated by the government
for public use and enjoyment. Likewise the Administrative Code in
defining the Declaration of Poliy of the DPWH states that the said
department has the responsibility in: The planning design,
construction and maintenance of infrastructure facilities, especially
national highways, flood control and water resources development
systems and other public works in accordance with national
development objectives Thus only fixed infrastructures for the
use of the public are regarded as public works. This construction
conforms to the rule of ejusdem generis. The Omnibus Election Code
construes public works as any building or structure on land or to
structures (such as roads or dams) built by the Government for public
use and paid for by public funds. Public works are clearly works,
whether of construction or adaptation undertaken and carried out by
the national, state, or municipal authorities, designed to subserve
some purpose or public necessity, use or convenience, such as public
buildings, roads, aqueducts, parks, etc:; or, in other words, all fixed
works construed for public use
3
 2. THERE IS PROBABLE CAUSE TO CHARGE TING AND
GARCIA. The OSG posits that there are two methods of violation of
Section 261 (w) of the OEC: a). By any person who, within 45 days
preceding a regular election and 30 days before a special election,
undertakes the construction of any public works except those
exempted by law or b) by any person who issues, uses or avails of
treasury warrants or any device undertaking future delivery of
money, goods or other things of value chargeable against public
funds within 45 days preceding a regular election and 30 days before
a special election. The court concurred with the OSGs position.
There was a probable cause to believe that Section 261 (w),
subparagraph (b) of the OEC was violated by Ting and garcia when
they issued a treasury warrant during the election ban period. The
COMELEC en banc gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the
election case for lack of merit.
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
SUHURI v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 181869; October 2, 2009]
Facts:
Ismunlatip Suhuri ran for the position of Municipal Mayor of
Patikul, Sulu during the 2007 national and local elections. He was
opposed by Kabir Hayudini and a third candidate, Datu Jun Tarsum.
During the canvassing, Suhuri orally objected to the inclusion of the
election returns from 25 precincts.
o He asserted that the 25 election returns were (1) obviously
fabricated (2) tampered with or falsified (3) prepared under
duress and (4) characterized by statistical improbability.
The Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) ruled against Suhuri by
rejecting his objections to the 25 election returns.
Suhuri filed his notice of appeal.
MBC proclaimed Hayudini as the duly elected Mayor.
Suhuri filed a petition-appeal with the COMELEC. This was
assigned to the Second Division.
Suhuri filed an election protest ad cautelam in the RTC in Patikul,
Sulu to contest the results of the elections.
RTC held the election protest in abeyance given the pending pre-
proclamation controversy.
Suhuri brought a petition to declare a failure of election with urgent
motion to suspend and/or annul the canvass the election returns.
COMELEC en banc denied the petition to declare a failure of
election for insufficiency of evidence.
COMELEC Second Division gave due course to Suhuris petition-
appeal.
COMELEC Second Division excluded the 25 questioned electoral
returns and voided the proclamation of Hayudini as the duly elected
Mayor.
Hayudini moved for the reconsideration of the COMELEC Second
Division resolution.
4
 Due to the fact that the required majority vote necessary to reverse
the COMELEC Second Division resolution was not reached,
COMELEC en banc conducted a re-hearing.
COMELEC en banc granted the motion for reconsideration. Thus the
proclamation of Hayudini was declared valid.
Issue:
WON there were proper grounds for a pre-proclamation controversy?
Held:
NO. Not every question bearing on or arising from the elections may
constitute a ground for a pre-proclamation controversy. Sec. 243 of the
Omnibus Election Code enumerates the scope of a pre-proclamation
controversy; the enumeration is restrictive and exclusive. As a result, the
petition for a pre-proclamation controversy must fail in the absence of any
clear showing or proof that the election returns canvassed are incomplete or
contain material defects; or appear to have been tampered with, falsified or
prepared under duress; or contain discrepancies in the votes credited to any
candidate, the difference of which affects the result of the election. To be
noted too is that in a pre-proclamation controversy, the COMELEC is
restricted to an examination of the election returns and is without jurisdiction
to go beyond or behind the election returns and to investigate election
irregularities. In a special civil action for certiorari, the petitioner carries the
burden of proving not merely reversible error but grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction non the part of the public
respondent for its issuance of the impugned order. In this case, Suhuri did not
discharge his burden as petitioner. The COMELEC cannot look behind or
beyond the 25 contested election returns in a pre-proclamation controversy.
Thus Court affirmed COMELEC en banc resolution, and confirmed the
proclamation of Hayudini as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of
Patikul, Sulu in the 2007 local elections.
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
Mayor Tolentino vs. COMELEC
[G.R. Nos. 187958, 187961, and 187962; April 7, 2010]
Facts:
In the May 14, 2007 elections, Tolentino and De Castro were
proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor and Vice-Mayor, respectively.
Ricardo et.al contested the election results in 116 ballot boxes by
filing 3 separate election protests against the proclaimed winning
candidates for Mayor, VM and Members of the Sanggunian
Panlungsod.
After finding the protests sufficient in form and substance, the
COMELEC Division required the City Treasurer of Tagaytay to
inventory the protested ballot boxes and turn them over to the
Election Officer for delivery and submission to the COMELECs
Electoral Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) in Manila.
The delivery and submission took place only in Dec. 17, 2008 due to
the actions of Tolentino and Castro in suspending the transmittal.
Further delay occurred because 44 of the 116 contested ballot boxes
became involved in the election protest of Koko Pimentel against
Sen. Migz Zubiri pending in the SET. These were set aside due to
apparent sealing defects or irregularities.
On Jan. 6, 2009, upon receipt of the 72 ballot boxes, the Division
ordered the constitution of the 4 Revision Committees.
Tolentino and De Castro moved for the reconsideration of the order.
-GRANTED
The Division suspended the revision proceedings until all the
contested ballots were already in the custody of the COMELEC. But
lifted the suspension when the SET agreed to conduct the revision
proceedings in the SET premises.
De Castro filed a verified omnibus motion requesting the Division to
formulate the mechanics, guidelines and procedure for the
simultaneous revision of the ballots for the 3 distinct positions
protested, and to defer the revision proceedings until after all
pending incidents had been resolved. DENIED
De Castro assailed the denial.
5
 Meanwhile, Tolentino filed a supplement to his petition asserting that
the revision proceedings conducted within the SET premises
involved only 28 ballot boxes because the Revision Committee
suspended the revision of the set-aside 16 ballot boxes.
Issue:
WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering
the revision, thereby depriving Tolentino and De Castro of due process?
NO.
Held:
NO. The SC held that the order of revision and the revision of
ballots synchronized with that of the SET were proper.
In the case of Air Manila, Inc. v. Balatbat, the procedural due
process was simplified into four basic rights, as follows:
1. The right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the
institution of the proceedings that may affect a persons
legal right;
2. The right to a reasonable opportunity to appear and
defend his rights and to introduce witnesses and relevant
evidence in his favor;
3. The right to a tribunal so constituted as to give him
reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and
one of competent jurisdiction; and
4. The right to a finding or decision of that tribunal
supported by substantial evidence presented at the
hearing or at least ascertained in the records or disclosed
to the parties.
Gauged upon the foregoing guidelines, Tolentinos complaint was
unwarranted.
o He was not denied procedural due process.
o The Division had required him to provide the names of his
revisors whose tasks included the raising of objections, the
claiming votes for him, or the contesting of the votes in favor
of his opponent. He has neither alleged being deprived of
this opportunity, nor indicated any situation in which his
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
revisors were denied access to the revision proceedings. He
could not also insist that the COMELEC did not consider his
legal and factual arguments; besides, he could still raise them
in his memorandum should he chose to. During the revision
stage, he should raise all objections, present his evidence and
witnesses, and file his memorandum before the case would
be submitted for resolution.
Thus, the Division did not commit any abuse of discretion, least of
all grave, in its issuance of the assailed orders. Its actuations relative
to the conduct of the revision proceedings in the three election
protests were far from capricious or whimsical.
o The Division issued ground rules with sufficient notice to the
parties, who were thereby adequately shielded from partiality
or unfairness during the process of revision. The Division
should instead be commended for carrying out its mandate to
expedite the disposition of the present election controversies.
In an election protest, the electoral tribunal has an imperative duty to
promptly ascertain by all means within its command the candidates
the electorate have chosen. It bears stressing that in the exercise of
the plenitude of its powers to protect the integrity of the elections,
the COMELEC should not and must not be straitjacketed by
procedural rules in resolving election disputes.
The nature of election protests cases often makes the COMELEC
face varied situations calling for the exercise of its general authority
to adopt means necessary to effect its powers and jurisdiction. The
COMELEC, in its performance of its duties, must be given a
considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that would
insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was
created to promote free, orderly, and honest elections. The choice of
the means by the COMELEC should not be interfered with, unless
the means were clearly illegal or the choice constituted grave abuse
of discretion.
Thus, a liberal construction of its rules should be conceded to the
COMELEC
6
CIBAC v. COMELEC
GR No. 179431-32, June 22, 2010
Facts:
Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) is a duly-organized
party-list.
CIBAC submitted a list of 5 nominees from which its representatives
will be chosen.
o The nominees are Villanueva (CIBACs president), Lokin,
Jr., Cruz-Gonzales, Tugna, and Galang.
o This list was also published in newspapers of general
circulation.
Prior to the election, CIBAC, through Villanueva, filed a certificate
of nomination, substitution, and amendment of the list of nominees.
o The new list consist of Villanueva, Cruz-Gonzales, and
Borje.
Following the close of polls, Villanueva sent a letter to COMELEC
Chairman Abalos transmitting a signed petition of CIBAC members
confirming the withdrawal of Lokin, Tugna, and Galang.
CIBAC filed with COMELEC en banc a motion seeking the
proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee as it is entitled to a
second seat based on preliminary computations.
o This motion was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales.
COMELEC, as National Board of Canvassers, issued a resolution
proclaiming CIBAC as one of the winning party-list.
o Another resolution was issued by COMELEC proclaiming
CIBAC to an additional seat.
Ricardo de los Santos, the secretary of CIBAC, requested the
secretary general of the House of Representatives to have Lokin be
sworn in by Speaker Jose de Venecia.
o De los Santos replied that he could not do so because he was
notified by the COMELEC regarding the issue in CIBACs
list of nominees.
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
COMELEC en banc issued a resolution declaring that CIBACs list
of nominees is composed of Villanueva, Cruz-Gonzales, and Borje
and the withdrawal of Lokin, Tugno, and Galang.
o COMELEC ruled that such change was done by Villanueva
within his power as CIBACs president.
o As a result, Cruz-Gonzales became the official second
nominee of CIBAC.
Hence, Lokin seeks through certiorari and mandamus to compel
COMELEC to declare him as the official second nominee of CIBAC.
o He assails Resolution No. 7804 (promulgating the IRR for
RA 7941) and COMELECs resolution allowing the
amended list of nominees as unconstitutional because it
expands the scope of RA 7941 (Party-list System Act).
o COMELEC counters that the proper remedy should be an
election protest with the HRET and not a petition with the
Court.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction. YES
(2) Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 or the IRR is
unconstitutional and violates the Party-List System Act. YES
Held:
(1) YES. The court has jurisdiction over the issue of Lokin because it is
neither an election protest or a proper subject for quo warranto. Hence, a
petition for certiorari and mandamus is the proper remedy. Lokins case is
not an issue wherein one nominee of a party-list seeks to unseat a nominee of
another party-list nor is it an issue imputing ineligibility or disloyalty of
Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of the Philippines. Lokins case is one in
which he seeks to be seated as the proper second nominee of CIBAC.
An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from
office. It is strictly a contest between the defeated and the
winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and
irregularities, to determine who between them has actually
obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to
7
 hold the office. It can only be filed by a candidate who has duly o It must be within the scope of the authority given by
filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for in the the Legislature;
preceding elections. o It must be promulgated in accordance with the
A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of prescribed procedure; and
disloyalty to the State, or of ineligibility of the winning o It must be reasonable.
candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible
person from the office, but not to install the petitioner in his
place. Any voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly
speaking, not a contest where the parties strive for supremacy
because the petitioner will not be seated even if the respondent
may be unseated.
The proper remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 of
the Rules of Court which seeks to review the judgments or
resolutions of COMELEC.

(2) YES. RA 7941 provides that no change of names or alteration of the

order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been
submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the (1) nominee
dies, (2) withdraws in writing his nomination, or (3) becomes
incapacitated. On the other hand, the IRR includes as a fourth
exception the instance when the nominee withdraws his acceptance
to the nomination.
The Court noted that adding the fourth ground is against the
object of RA 7941. It will promote arbitrariness on the part of
the party-list and will not give the electorate a chance of making
an intelligent and informed choice.
Since such provision or additional exception in the IRR is void,
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in allowing the
amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC after it has
submitted an original list to COMELEC. Hence, the
proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales was annulled and set-aside and
the Court ordered COMELEC to have Lokin be proclaimed as
one of the representatives for CIBAC.
For an IRR to be valid, the following requisites must be present:
o Its promulgation must be authorized by the
Legislature;
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017 8
GOMEZ-CASTILLO v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 187231; June 22, 2010]
Facts:
Minerva Gomez-Castillo and Strike Revilla ran for Municipal Mayor
of Bacoor, Cavite during the May 14, 2007 local elections.
After the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Revilla as the
elected Municipal Mayor, Castillo filed an Election Protest Ad
Cautelam in the RTC in Bacoor, Cavite.
o The election protest was raffled to Branch 19.
Revilla sought the dismissal of the election protest, alleging that it
was filed in the wrong Branch of the RTC.
o Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 54-2007
designated Branch 22 of the RTC in Imus, Cavite and
Branch 88 of the RTC in Cavite City to hear, try and decide
election contests involving municipal officials in Cavite.
Branch 19 dismissed Castillos election protest for being violative of
SCAO No. 54-2007.
Castillo presented a notice of appeal.
RTC ordered that the complete records of the protest be forwarded to
the Election Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) of the
COMELEC.
COMELEC First Division dismissed the appeal for being brought
beyond the five-day reglementary period prescribed in Sec. 3 of Rule
22 of COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
o Although Castillo received the November 21, 2008 order of
RTC on December 15, 2008, she filed the notice of appeal
on December 23, 2008, a day too late to appeal.
Castillo moved for reconsideration of dismissal of appeal.
COMELEC denied the motion because Castillo did not pay the
motion fees required under Sec. 7 (f), Rule 40 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure.
Castillo brought the present recourse, contending that the
COMELECs orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
Issues:
1) Does Sec. 13 of Rule 2 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC designate the RTC
Branch that has jurisdiction over an election contest, or does it
merely designate the proper venue for filing?
2) WON Castillos tardy appeal should be dismissed?
Held:
1) It merely designates the proper venue for filing. Jurisdiction over
election contests involving municipal offices has been vested in the
RTC by Section 251, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election
Code). On the other hand, A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, by specifying the
proper venue where such cases may be filed and heard, only spelled
out the manner by which an RTC with jurisdiction exercises such
jurisdiction. Like other rules on venue, A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC was
designated to ensure a just and orderly administration of justice and
is permissive. Castillos filing her protest in the RTC in Bacoor,
Cavite amounted only to a wrong choice of venue. The dismissal of
the protest by Branch 19 constituted plain error, considering that her
wrong choice did not affect the jurisdiction of the RTC. What Branch
19 should have done under the circumstances was to transfer the
protest to Branch 22 of the RTC in Imus, Cavite, which was the
proper venue.
2) YES. Although Castillo had received the November 21, 2008 order
of the RTC on December 15, 2008, she filed her notice of appeal
only on December 23, 2008 or eight days after her receipt of the
decision. Her appeal was properly dismissed for being too late under
the aforequoted rule of COMELEC. The period of appeal and the
perfection of appeal are not mere technicalities to be so lightly
regarded, for they are essential to the finality of judgments, a notion
underlying the stability of our judicial system.
9
DE CASTRO v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO
[GR No. 191002, March 17, 2010]
Facts
The controversy in the case arose from the then-forthcoming
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or
seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in
relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof from a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy.
The JBC passed a resolution stating that it will open applications or
recommendations and deliberate on the list of candidates for Chief
Justice, however, as to the time to submit the list, the JBC said that it
welcomes and will consider all views on the matter taking into
consideration the seemingly incongruent provisions banning
midnight appointments in Article VII and the imperative duty of the
president to fill out a vacancy in the Supreme Court within ninety
days from the occurrence thereof
The OSG submitted its comment stating that the incumbent President
can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement
by May 17, 2010
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint
the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section
15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to
appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any
vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days
from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of
the Constitution
It argues that the framers of the Constitution neither
mentioned nor referred to the ban against midnight
appointments or its effects on such period, vice versa
Had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to the
Supreme Court, they could have expressly stated so in the
Constitution
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
The Valenzuela case involved the appointment of RTC
judges, the situation now refers to the appointment of the
next Chief Justice to which the prohibition does not apply
At any rate, Valenzuela even recognized that there might be
the imperative need for an appointment during the period of
the ban
Issue
WON the ban on midnight appointments in Section 15, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution applies to appointments in the Supreme Court as well?
Held
NO. The deliberations of the Constitutional COmmission reveal that the
framers evoted time to meticulously drafting, styling and arranging the
Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and
arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or
whimsically done by the framers. It was the intention of the framers that the
awesome powers of the government were allocated among the three great
departments. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in
Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of members of the Supreme Court in
Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4(1). Moreover, the usage of in
Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall an imperative, operating to
impose a duty may be enforced should not be disregarded. Thereby Section
4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of
a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the
vacancy. The failure of the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to
the Constitution.
10
SPS. YUSAY v. COURT OF APPEALS Held:
[G.R. No. 156664; April 6, 2011] No. Certiorari does not lie to assail the issuance of a resolution by the
Sanggunian Panglungsod which was not part of the Judiciary settling an
Facts: actual controversy involving legally demandable and enforceable rights when
Sps. Yusay owned a parcel of land with an area of 1,044 sq. meters it adopted the Resolution but a legislative and policy making body declaring
between 2 streets in Mandaluyong City. its sentiment or opinion. Moreover, the LGC required the City to pass an
o Half of their land was used as their residence, while the rest ordinance and not adopt a resolution. Such resolution that merely expresses
was rented out to nine other families. the sentiment of the Sangguniang Panglungsod is not sufficient for the
o Allegedly, the land was their only property and only source purpose of initiating an expropriation proceeding.
of income.
On Oct. 1997, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City Prohibition also does not lie against expropriation considering that only a
adopted a Resolution authorizing the Mayor to take necessary steps resolution expressing the desire of the Sangguniang Panglungsod to
for the expropriation of the land of Sps. Yusay expropriate the property was issued. As of then, it was premature for Sps.
o This was said to be for the purpose of developing it for low Yusay to mount any judicial challenge. Before the City, as the expropriating
cost housing for the less privileged but deserving city authority, files a verified complaint, no expropriation proceeding could be
inhabitants. said to exist. Until then, Sps. Yusay, as the owners, could not also be
Despite such resolution being only the initial step, Sps. Yusay dperived of heir property under the power of eminent dominion.
became alarmed and filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in
the RTC
o They prayed for the annulment of the Resolution for being
unconstitutional, confiscatory, improper, and without force
and effect.
RTC ruled in favor of the City saying that certiorari did not lie
against a legislative act of the City Government.
On Motion for Reconsideration, RTC set aside its decision and
declared the resolution null and void.
o The passage of said Resolution would already pave the way
for the City to deprive Sps. Yusay and their heirs of their
only property without due process
CA reversed RTCs second decision claiming presumption of
regularity and validity of laws.

Issue:
WON the validity of a resolution may be assailed even before its
implementation?

Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017 11

NAPOCOR v. Heirs of Sangkay
[G.R. No. 165828; August 24, 2011]
Facts:
Pursuant to its legal mandate under RA 6395, NPC undertook the
Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant Project in the 1970s to
generate electricity for Mindanao.
o The project included the construction of several underground
tunnels to be used in diverting the water flow from the Agus
River to the hydroelectric plants.
The Heirs of Sangkay sued NPC in the RTC for recovery damages
and property, with the alternative prayer for payment of just
compensation.
o They alleged that (1) the underground tunnel had been
constructed without their knowledge and consent (2) the
presence of the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural,
commercial, industrial and residential value of their land,
and (3) their land had become an unsafe place for habitation.
NPC countered that the Heirs of Sangkay had no right of
compensation, and assuming that they were entitled to compensation,
their cause of action already prescribed.
o NPC argued that the Heirs of Sangkay had no right to
compensation under Sec. 3 (f) of RA 6395, under which a
mere legal easement of their land was established. And
should they be entitled to compensation, their cause of action
already prescribed due to the tunnel having been constructed
in 1979. By reason of the tunnel being an apparent and
continuous easement, any action arising from such easement
prescribed in five years.
RTC ruled in favor of the Heirs of Sangkay. NPC had concealed the
construction of the tunnel in 1979 and had since continuously denied
its existence.
o Prayer for removal or dismantling of tunnel was denied.
However RTC ordered payment just compensation.
o RTC fixed the just compensation at P500/square meter based
on the testimony of Dionisio Banawan, OIC-City Assessor
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
of Iligan City. RTC based its fixing of just compensation on
the prevailing market value at the time of the filing of the
complaint, instead of reckoning from the time of taking.
NPC appealed to the CA.
CA affirmed the decision of RTC.
Issue:
WON the Heirs of Sangkay are entitled to just compensation?
Held:
YES. Firstly, the five-year prescriptive period under Sec. 3 (i) of RA 6395 is
applicable only to an action for damages, and does not extend to an action to
recover just compensation. An action to recover just compensation, also
known as inverse condemnation, has the objective to recover the value of the
property taken by the governmental defendant. Just compensation is the full
and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.
On the other hand, action for damages seeks to vindicate a legal wrong
through damages, which may be actual, moral, nominal, temperate,
liquidated or exemplary. Secondly, NPC is liable to pay not merely an
easement fee but rather the full compensation for the land. It is settled that
the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be
an actual physical taking or appropriation. Compensable taking includes
destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership
or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a
lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value. NPC then should pay just
compensation for the entire land. Lastly, the valuation of P500/square meter
is binding given that NPC did not assail the valuation in the lower courts. As
for the reckoning value, Court held that value should be determined at the
time of the filing of the complaint in order to prevent NCC from unjustly
profiting from its deliberate acts of denying due process of law to the Heirs
of Sangkay.
12
EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY v. PULIDO
[GR No. 188995, August 24, 2011]
Facts
This case involved expropriation of three parcels of land in Rosario
Cavite, by the petitioner, Export Processing Zone Authority, of land
belonging to Salud Jimenez (who would later be represented by the
Estate of Salud Jimenez).
Export Processing Zone Authority filed expropriation cases in May
15, 1981
Originally, three parcels of land were subject of expropriation, Lots
1408, 1409-B-2 and 1406.
o Lot 1406 was later subdivided into Lots 1406 A and B
during the pendency of the case For this case, Lot 1406 B is
of importance
The RTC sustained the right of EPZA to expropriate the land except
Lot 1406-A 1991, which led EPZA to file an appeal to the Court of
Appeals.
EPZA and the Estate of Salud Jimenez later entered into a
compromise agreement where the parties agreed that:
o EPZA would withdraw its appeal over the release of 1406 A
from expropriation while the Estate would waive its claim
for damages because of the possession by EPZA over the
parcel of land since 1981
o The Estate would transfer Lot 1406-B in exchange for Lot
434, as just compensation
The CA remanded the case to the RTC and the RTC approved the
compromise agreement in August of 1993
The EPZA was not able to transfer the title of Lot 434 to the Estate
because the registered owner was Progressive Realty Inc., not EPZA
The Estate filed a motion to partially annul the compromise
agreement which was granted. The EPZA appealed from this
decision by the RTC and the RTC which the CA granted.
o The CA remanded the case to the RTC to determine just
compensation for Lot 1406 B
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
o The RTC determined that the just compensation should be
the value of Lot 1406 B in 1993 when the compromise
agreement was entered into, not 1981, when the actual taking
occurred
o EPZA appealed from this decision, hence this present case
Issues
1. WON just compensation should be determined from the value or
assessment rate prevailing in 1981 (date of taking) or 1993 (date of
the compromise agreement) or 1997 (the date when the compromise
agreement was set aside)
2. WON the Estate is entitled to legal interest
Held
1. Just compensation should be determined from the value or
assessment rate prevailing in 1993. When the parties signed the
compromise agreement and the same was approved, they had in fact
settled between themselves the question of what is just compensation
and that had intended that the Estate would be compensated on the
basis of the prevailing values at the time of the agreement. What the
compromise agreement only set out to do is to determine the mode of
compensation which is by land swap. Since such is not possible the
value of the Lot 1406 B or Lot 434 in 1993 should be the basis for
the determination of just compensation
2. YES. The EPZA should have known the inefficacy of land swapping
as a mode of just compensation. In view of the long delay in the
payment of just compensation to the Estate, an interest rate of 12% is
imposed from the approval of the compromise agreement until full
payment.
13
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SUNTAY NO. Such insinuation runs afoul of the well settled doctrine of immutability
[GR. No. 188376; December 14, 2011] of judgments. Although Article VIII, Section 4 (1) of the Constitution gives
the Supreme Court the discretion to sit either en banc or in divisions of three,
Facts: five, or seven Members, the divisions are not considered separate and distinct
Federico Suntay owned land situated in Sta. Lucia, Sablayan, courts. Nor is a hierarchy of courts thereby established within the Supreme
Occidental Mindoro. Court, which remains a unit notwithstanding that it also works in divisions.
In 1972, the Department of Agrarian Reform expropriated 948.1911 The actions taken and the decisions rendered by any of the divisions are
hectares of Suntays land pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27. those of the Court itself, considering that the divisions are not considered
o Land Bank and DAR fixed the value of the expropriated separate and distinct courts but as divisions of one and the same court.
portion at P4,497.50/hectare, for a total valuation of Lastly, the only thing that the Constitution allows the banc to do in this
P4,251,141. regard is to reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court en
Rejecting the valuation, however, Suntay filed a petition for banc or in division.
determination of just compensation in the Office of the Regional
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Region IV, DARAB.
On January 24, 2001, after summary administrative proceeding,
RARAD Mias rendered a decision fixing the total just compensation
for the expropriated portion at P157,541,951.30.
On October 11, 2007, the Supreme Court promulgated its decision in
Land Bank v. Suntay (G.R. No. 157903) holding that it is the
Regional Trial Courts sitting as Special Agrarian Courts which has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the determination of just
compensation.
o Adjudicators are merely empowered to make a preliminary
determination of the compensation, subject to the ultimate
power of the courts.
Suntay alleged that the RARAD Decision had already attained
finality in DARAB v. Lubrica because the Land Bank failed to file
the petition within the reglementary period, notwithstanding its
recourse to the special agrarian court.

Issue:
WON a final and executory decision may be reversed, modified, or set aside
by the Supreme Court en banc

Held:

Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017 14

LEAGUE OF CITIES v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 176951; February 15, 2011]
Facts:
Congress filed 57 bills for the conversion of 57 municipalities into
component cities.
o Only 33 were enacted into law. 24 remained as pending bills,
with 16 municipalities already converted into component
cities through the Cityhood Laws
A Senate Bill was introduced to amend LGC
o The amendment sought to increase the income requirement
to qualify for conversion into a city from P20M average
annual income to P100M locally generated income
The said amendment was signed into law as RA 9009
After he effectivity of RA 9009, the Congress soght to exempt from
the income requirement in the law the 24 municipalities
o However, Senate did not approve the Resolution exempting
them
During a Senate session, Sen. Pimentel asserted passing the
Resolution, suggesting that the House of Representatives file
individual bills.
o Heeding the advice, 16 municipalities filed individual
cityhood bills, which all had a provision exempting the
municipality from the P100M requirement
Both Houses of Congress approved the individual cityhood bills.
Petitions were then filed seeking to declare the cityhood laws
unconstitutional for violation of Art. X of the Constitution, as well as
violation of the equal protection clause.
o The conversion of the municipalities into cities will reduce
the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue
Allotment.
On Nov. 2008, the court held that the exemption clauses in the
pending bills were unconstitutional because they were not written in
the LGC.
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
Issue:
WON the Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional and violative of the equal
protection clause
Held:
No.
The phrase in the Constitution in accordance with the criteria established in
the LGC was put to lay stress that it is Congress alone and no other which
can impose the criteria. Since the GC is a creation of Congress, Congress
also has the power to alter or modify as it did when it enacted RA 9009. This
power of amendment of laws was again exercised when Congress enacted the
Cityhood Laws. The exemption clauses found in the individual Cityhood
Laws are the express articulation of that intent to exempt respondent
municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009, which amended the LGC.
Therefore, since the Cityhood Laws explicitly amended the 16 municipalities
from RA 9009, such Cityhood Laws are also amendments to the LGC itself.
As to the equal protection clause, the favorable treatment accorded to the 16
municipalities rests on substantial distinction. It must be noted that the 16
municipalities were going through the process of becoming a city when RA
9009 was passed. It would be unfair if they were suddenly restricted by the
sudden increase in the revenue requirement. The classification was also
germane to the purpose of law because it was meant to reduce inequality
brought by the amendment, which was non-retroactive since it was a mere
declaration of prior qualification with the non-retroactive effect of RA 9009.
The constitutional protection extends to all persons within the territorial
jurisdiction. Artificial persons, however, are entitled to protection only
insofar as their property is concerned. League of cities cannot invoke equal
protection clause because no deprivation of property results by virtue of the
enactment of the Cityhood Laws. It is also presumptuous on the part of the
League of Cities member-cities to stake a claim on the IRA as the IRA is yet
to be allocated. For final consideration, the existence of cities consequent to
the approval of the creating, but challenged cityhood laws in the plebiscites
held in the affected LGUs is now an operative fact. Thus, the Cityhood Laws
are constitutional.
15
AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. SPOUSES DAVID AND compensation and without the proper expropriation proceeding being first
ELISEA RAMOS resorted to.
[GR No. 159402, February 23, 2011]
Lastly, RA 9497 or the Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2008 which
Facts: abolished ATO and to be replaced by CAAP. Section 23 of said Act provides
Spouses Ramos discovered that a portion of their lot was being used that one of the powers of CAAP is to sue and be sued. Hence, the obligations
as a runway of the Loakan Airport being operated by Air of ATO it incurred through the deed of sale can now be enforced against
Transportation Office (ATO). CAAP which can be sued.
Spouses Ramos agreed to convey the affected portion by deed of sale
to ATO in consideration of P 778,150.
ATO failed to pay despite demands. Thus, the Spouses filed a
collection case against ATO.
ATOs invoked the following defenses:
o Proclamation No. 1358 by Pres. Marcos reserving certain
parcels of land, including the Spouses, for use by Loakan
Airport
o Since the deed of sale was entered by ATO in the
performance of its governmental function, it cannot be sued
without the consent of the State.
RTC ruled in favor of the Spouses which was affirmed by the CA.

Issue:
WON ATO can be sued without the States consent (or can it claim State
immunity).

Held:

YES. ATO is an agency of the government NOT performing a purely

governmental or sovereign function, but was involved in the management
and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive
prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no
claim to the States immunity from suit.

Furthermore, the doctrine of State immunity cannot be used as a shield to

defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from the taking without just

Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017 16

CAGAS v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 194139; January 29, 2012]
Facts:
Douglas Cagas and Claude Bautista contested the position of
Governor of Province of Davao del Sur in the May 10, 2010
automated national and local elections.
o Cagas was proclaimed the winner with 163,440 votes, with
Bautista garnering 159,527 votes.
Bautista filed an electoral protest alleging fraud, anomalies,
irregularities, vote buying and violation of election laws, rules and
resolutions.
o The protest was raffled to COMELEC First Division.
Cagas averred that Bautista did not make the requisite cash deposit
on time, and that Bautista did not render a detailed specification of
the acts or omissions complained of.
COMELEC First Division issued the first assailed order denying the
special affirmative defenses of Cagas.
Cagas moved to reconsider on the ground that the order did not
discuss whether the protest specified the alleged irregularities in the
conduct of the elections.
o COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 requires all decisions to
clearly and distinctly express the facts and the law on which
they were based, and further requires a detailed specified of
the acts or omissions complained of.
o Cagas prayed that the matter be certified to the COMELEC
en banc.
Bautista countered that the assailed orders, being merely
interlocutory, could not be elevated to the COMELEC en banc.
COMELEC First Division issued its second assailed order, denying
Cagas motion for reconsideration for failing to show that the first
order was contrary to law.
o The allegations in Bautistas petition have substantially
complied with the requirements of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8804 that will warrant the opening of the ballot boxes in
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
order to resolve not only the issues raised in the protest but
also those set forth in Cagas answer.
o The prayer to elevate the motion for reconsideration to the
COMELEC en banc is denied considering that the
COMELEC First Division order is merely interlocutory and
it does not dispose of the instant case with finality.
Cagas commenced this special civil action for certiorari directly in
this Court.
Issue:
WON Court can take cognizance of the petition for certiorari?
Held:
NO. Sec. 7, Art. IX of the 1987 Constitution, although it confers on the Court
the power to review any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, limits
such power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc. It
does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a COMELEC Division.
Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an
interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a COMELEC
Division. A decision, order or resolution of a COMELEC Division must be
reviewed by the COMELEC en banc via a motion for reconsideration before
the final en banc decision may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.
The pre-requisite filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory.
17
PEOPLE v. BAKUNAWA
[GR No. 180418, August 28, 2013]
Facts
The Republic appeals from the decision of the Sandiganbayan
dismissing the action for reconveyance brought against Luz Reyes-
Bakunawa, Manuela Bakunawa, Jr. Manuel Bakunawa III, President
Marcos and First Lady Imelda R. Marcos for allegedly having
acquired and accumulated ill-gotten wealth consisting of funds and
other property in unlawful concert with one another and in
flagrant breach of trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public
officers
The complaint alleged that respondent Luz Reyes-Bakunawa had
served as Imelda Marcos Social Secretary during the Marcos
administration; that it was during that period of her incumbency in
that position that Luz Bakunawa and her husband Manuel Bakunawa
had acquired assets, funds and other property grossly and manifestly
disproportionate to her salaries and their other lawful income and
that Luz Bakunawa by herself and/or in unlawful concert with
Defendants Ferdinand E. marcos and Imelda R. marcos, taking undue
advantage of her position, influence and connection with the latter
Defendant spouses, for their benefit and unjust enrichment and in
order to prevent disclosure and recovery of assets illegally obtained,
engaged in devices, schemes and startagems
In their defense, the Bakunawas alleged that Luz Bakunawa was
never Social Secretary of Imelda Marcos, but only an employee in
the office of the Social Secretary; that the properties acquired while
Luz Bakunawa was employed in the government were purchased
with honestly earned money and their acquisition was well within
their legitimate income
Issue
WON the defendant Luz Bakunawa, considering her position in Malacanang
during the incumbency of President Marcos occupied a confidential position
and was able to obtain contracts, run businesses and acquire real properties
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
using her officer and the influence of either or both of the spouses Ferdinand
and Imelda Marcos so as to give propriety to the filing of cases by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government under EOs 1, 2, 14 and 14-a
Held
NO. In Republic v. Migrino, the Court held that it does not suffice that the
respondent is or was a government official or employee during the
administration of Former President Marcos.. There must be prima facie
showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his
close association or relation with former President Marcos and/or his wife.
The Republic particularly insists that Luz Bakunawa served as the Social
Secretary or the Assistant Social Secretary of the First Lady Marcos; and
mentions several other circumstances that indicated her close relationship
with the Marcoses, such as her assumption of office in the early part of the
Marcos administration, the accommodations extended to her during her
various travels, and the fact that her close relationship was common
knowledge among the Masbatenos, and the negotiated contracts with
Bakunawas entered into during the Marcos administration. The Court holds
that the Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the evidence of Republic was
able to establish, at best, that Luz Bakunawa had been an employee in
Malacanang Palace during the marcos admnistration, and did not establish
her having a close relationship with the Marcoses
18
FUNA v. AGRA
[GR. No. 191644; February 19, 2013]
Facts:
On January 12, 2010, Alberto C. Agra was the Government
Corporate Counsel when President Arroyo designated him as the
Acting Solicitor General in place of Solicitor General Devanadera.
On March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated him also as the
Acting Secretary of Justice vice Secretary Devanadera who had
tendered her resignation in order to run for Congress.
Agra alleged that he then relinquished his position as the
Government Corporate Counsel, and that pending the appointment of
his successor, Agra continued to perform his duties as the
Acting Solicitor General.
On April 7, 2010, Funa, in his capacity as a taxpayer, a concerned
citizen and a lawyer, commenced this suit to challenge the
constitutionality of Agras concurrent appointments or designations,
claiming it to be prohibited under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
During the pendency of the suit, President Benigno S. Aquino III
appointed Atty. Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz as the Solicitor General.
Issue/s:
1. WON the designation of Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice,
concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General,
violates the constitutional prohibition against dual or multiple
offices for the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and
assistants
2. WON the Agra was designated as Secretary of Justice in an ex
officio capacity.
3. Assuming that his designation as Secretary of Justice is void,
WON his actions are without effect.
Held:
1. YES. The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently
with his position of Acting Solicitor General was unconstitutional and void
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
because the Constitution has not otherwise so provided. It was of no moment
that Agras designation was in an acting or temporary capacity. The
prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be
construed as to apply to all appointments or designations, whether permanent
or temporary, for it is without question that the avowed objective of Section
13 of Article VII is to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive
Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants.
According to Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, the only two exceptions
against the holding of multiple offices are: (1) those provided for under the
Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice-President to
become a member of the Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied by Executive
officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional compensation
in ex officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of the officials offices. In Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive
Secretary, the Supreme Court held that the phrase the Members of the
Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants found in Section 13 referred only to the heads of the
various executive departments, their undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries, and did not extend to other public officials given the rank of
Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary.
2. NO. Agras designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice was not in an ex
officio capacity, by which he would have been validly authorized to
concurrently hold the two positions due to the holding of one office being the
consequence of holding the other. An ex officio means from office; by
virtue of office. It refers to an authority derived from official character
merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather
annexed to the official position.
Indeed, the powers and functions of the OSG are neither required by the
primary functions nor included by the powers of the DOJ, and vice versa.
The OSG, while attached to the DOJ, is not a constituent unit of the latter, as,
in fact, the Administrative Code of 1987 decrees that the OSG is independent
and autonomous. With the enactment of Republic Act No. 9417, the Solicitor
19
General is now vested with a cabinet rank, and has the same qualifications
for appointment, rank, prerogatives, salaries, allowances, benefits and
privileges as those of the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals.
Considering that the nature and duties of the two offices are such as to render
it improper, from considerations of public policy, for one person to retain
both, an incompatibility between the offices exists, further warranting the
declaration of Agras designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice,
concurrently with his designation as the Acting Solicitor General, to be void
for being in violation of the express provisions of the Constitution.
3. NO. All official actions of Agra as a de facto Acting Secretary of Justice
were presumed valid, binding and effective as if he was the officer legally
appointed and qualified for the office. A de facto officer is one who derives
his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the office
is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face.
Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes
as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are
interested therein are concerned.
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
Nazareth vs. COA
[GR. No. 188635; January 29, 2013]
Facts:
Congress enacted R.A. No. 8439 to provide a program for human
resources development in science and technology in maintaining the
necessary reservoir of talent and manpower that would sustain the
drive for total science and technology mastery.
Sec. 7 grants additional allowances and benefits (Magna Carta
benefits) such as honorarium, share in royalties, hazard allowance,
subsistence allowance, laundry allowance, housing and quarter
allowance, longevity pay and medical examination.
The funds of the Magna Carta benefits are to be appropriated by the
GAA of the year following the enactment of the law.
The DOST Regional Offices released the Magna Carta benefits to
the covered officials and employees commencing in CY 1998 despite
the absence of specific appropriation for the purpose in GAA.
Subsequently, COA State Auditor Vargas issued several Notice of
Disallowances (ND) disapproving the payment of the benefits
following a post-audit.
This prompted DOST Sec. Uriarte Jr. to request the OP for the
authority to utilize the DOSTs savings to pay the benefits. -
GRANTED
Exec. Sec. Zamora, acting by authority of the Pres, approved the
request through a Memorandum.
Nazareth as the DOST RD in Region IX, lodged an appeal with COA
RD Sescon, urging the lifting of the disallowance of the benefits for
the period covering CY 1998 to CY 2001 amounting to
P4,363,997.47, citing the Memorandum issued by Exec. Sec. Zamora
and Sec. 58 of GAA in 1998. She argued that the Memorandum
ratified the payment of the benefits out of the savings for CY 1998
and CY 1999 and allowed the use of the savings for CY 2000, but
also operated as a continuing endorsement of the use of savings to
cover the benefits in succeeding calendar years. DENIED.
20
 Director Inok of COA Legal and Adjudication Office denied the
appeal but set-aside the NDs covering the Magna Carta benefits for
CY 2000 in view of the authorization under the Memorandum.
Nazareth filed a petition for review with COA Head Office, insisting
that the payments had been allowed under RA 8349.
COA rendered a decision lifting the NDs covering the Magna Carta
benefits for CY 1998 and CY 1999 for the same reason for lifting
NDs for CY 2000. However, it maintained the disallowance of the
benefits for CY 2001 because they were not covered by the
authorization granted by the Memorandum.
Issue:
WON the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
disallowance of the Magna Carta benefits for CY 2001 despite the provision
of RA 8439 and in ruling that the Memorandum did not cover the payment of
the Magna Carta benefits for CY2001?
Held:
No. The Memorandum is not a blanket authority from the OP to pay
the benefits out of the DOSTs savings. Although it was silent as to
the period, it was clear that it only encompassed CY 1998, 1999, and
CY 2000.
o The limitation of its applicability to those calendar years was
based on the tenor of the request of Secretary Uriarte, Jr. to
the effect that the DOST had previously used its savings to
pay the Magna Carta benefits in CY 1998 and CY 1999; that
the 2000 GAA did not provide for the use of savings; and
that the DOST personnel were looking forward to the
Presidents favorable consideration. The Memorandum could
only be read as an authority covering the limited period until
and inclusive of CY 2000. The text of the Memorandum was
also bereft of any indication that the authorization was to be
indefinitely extended to any calendar year beyond CY 2000.
The COA correctly ruled on the matter. Art. VI Sec. 29 (1) provides
that, No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law. This requires that the
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
GAA be purposeful, deliberate and precise in its provisions and
stipulations. In line with this, the requirement in RA 8439 that the
amounts needed to fund the Magna Carta benefits were to be
appropriated by the GAA only meant that such funding must be
purposefully, deliberately and precisely included in the GAA.
The funding for the Magna Carta benefits would not materialize if
not initially proposed by the officials of the DOST for submission
and consideration by the Congress. RA 8439 alone could not fund
the payment of the benefits because the GAA did not mirror every
provision of law that referred to it as the source of funding. DOST
itself acknowledged the need for appropriation.
In the funding of current activities, projects, and programs, the
general rule should still be that the budgetary amount contained in
the appropriations bill is the extent Congress will determine as
sufficient for the budgetary allocation for the proponent agency.
o The only exception is found in Section 25 (5), Article VI of
the Constitution, by which the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions are authorized to transfer
appropriations to augment any item in the GAA for their
respective offices from the savings in other items of their
respective appropriations. The plain language of the
constitutional restriction leaves no room for the Nazareths
posture.
Lastly, Nazareth ignored the provisions in the 2000 GAA on the use
of savings
o Augmentation implies the existence in this Act of an item,
project, activity or purpose with an appropriation which
upon implementation or subsequent evaluation of needed
resources is determined to be deficient. In no case, therefore,
shall a non-existent item, project, activity, purpose or object
of expenditure be funded by augmentation from savings or
by the use of appropriations authorized otherwise in this
Act.
21
 Clearly and indubitably, the prohibition against the transfer of
appropriations is the general rule. Consequently, the payment of the
Magna Carta benefits for CY 2001 without a specific item or
provision in the GAA and without due authority from the President
to utilize the DOSTs savings in other items for the purpose was
repugnant to R.A. No. 8439, the Constitution, and the re-enacted
GAA for 2001.
The COA is generally accorded complete discretion in the exercise
of its constitutional duty and responsibility to examine and audit
expenditures of public funds, particularly those which are perceptibly
beyond what is sanctioned by law.
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
LAND BANK OF THE PHILS v. SPS. RIGOR-SORIANO
[G.R. No. 178312; January 30, 2013]
Facts:
Sps Rigor-Soriano and other respondents are children of the owners
of two parcels of land in Nueva Ecija covered by a Transfer
Certificate of Title.
The properties became subject to Operation Land Transfer (OLT)
and were valued at P10,000/hectare by Land Bank and DAR.
Sps. Rigor-Soriano filed an action for just compensation contending
that the valuation was too low compared to other existing valuations
of agricultural lands.
o They claim that the properties were irrigated lands
o They asked that a final valuation of the properties be pegged
at P1,800,000.
Land Bank claimed that under PD27 and EP228 the Government,
through the DAR had taken the properties in 1972 and had since then
redistributed the properties to farmer-beneficiaries.
o Thus, in all cases under PD27 and EO 228, its participation
was only to pay the landowners accepting the valuations
fixed by the DAR.
Issue:
WON the respondents may ask for a revaluation for just compensation?
Held:
No. It appears that the parties entered into a Joint Manifestation and Motion
stating the approval by Land Bank of the revaluation of the properties which
was communicated to Sps. Rigor Soriano for their unconditional acceptance.
There is no question that the agreement was a compromise that the parties
freely and voluntarily entered into for the purpose of finally settling their
dispute in this case. A compromise is either judicial, if the objective is to put
an end to a pending litigation; or extrajudicial, if the objective is to avoid a
litigation. It is perfected by mutual consent. However, a judicial compromise,
while immediately binding between the parties upon its execution, is not
executory until it is being approved by the court and reduced to a judgment.
22

A review of the terms of the Agreement indicates that it is a judicial
compromise because the parties intended it to terminate their pending
litigation by fully settling their dispute. With the respondents thereby
expressly signifying their unconditional or absolute acceptance and full
receipt of the foregoing amounts as just compensation, the ultimate
objective of the action to determine just compensation for the landowners
was achieved. Therefore, the court approves the agreement being in
compliance with the requirements of the law.
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
MANALANG-DEMIGILLO v TIDCORP
[G.R. No. 168613 ; March 5, 2013]
Facts:
Petitioner Rosario Manalang-Demigillo (Demigillo) was appointed
as Senior Vice President (PG 15) with permanent status, and was
assigned to the Legal and Corporate Services Department (LCSD) of
TIDCORP.
In 2002, TIDCORP President Joel C. Valdes sought an opinion from
the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) relative to
TIDCORPs authority to undertake a reorganization under the law.
o Assailing that Sec 7 and Sec 8 provides that it must be the
Board of directors who should reorganize.
Government Corporate Counsel released an Opinion which sided
with TIDCORP
TIDCORP then passed a resolution (Resolution 1365) to approve the
following
o a so-called Organizational Refinement/Restructuring Plan to
implement a new organizational structure and staffing
pattern,
o a position classification system,
o a new set of qualification standards.
During the implementation of the Organizational
Refinement/Restructuring Plan, the LCSD was abolished.
o Petitioner Demigillo, albeit retaining her position as a Senior
Vice President, was assigned to head the Remedial and
Credit Management Support Sector (RCMSS). On the same
date, President Valdes issued her appointment as head of
RCMSS, such appointment being in nature a reappointment
under the reorganization plan.
o This was later approved by the president
Demigillo challenged before the Board of Directors the validity of
Resolution No. 1365 and of her assignment to the RCMSS.
o She averred that she had been thereby illegally removed
from her position of Senior Vice President in the LCSD to
23
 which she had been previously assigned during the 1st
reorganization.
o She insisted that the Board of Directors had not been
authorized to undertake the reorganization and corporate
restructuring.
Pending determination of her challenge by the Board of Directors,
Demigillo appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), raising
the same issues.
The TIDCORP board dismissed Demigillos appeal for its lack of
merit, thereby rendering the question about the propriety of
Demigillos appeal moot and academic
In the meanwhile, by letter, President Valdes informed Demigillo of
her poor performance rating for the period from January 1, 2002 to
December 31, 2002,
Demigillo formally communicated to Atty. Florencio P. Gabriel Jr.,
Executive Vice President of the Operations Group, appealing the
"poor rating" given her by President Valdes.
o Atty. Gabriel informed Demigillo that he could not act on
her appeal because of her "failure to state facts and
arguments constituting the grounds for the appeal and submit
any evidence to support the same."
Demigillo received a memorandum from President Valdes stating
that her performance rating for the period from January 1, 2003 to
June 2003 "needs improvement," attaching the pertinent Performance
Evaluation Report Form that she was instructed to return "within 24
hours from receipt."
The Board of Directors rendered Decision No. 03-003 which
unanimously dropped Demigillo from the rolls.
CSC decision held the following:
o that the 2002 Organizational Refinements or Restructuring
Plan of TIDCORP had been valid for being authorized by
Republic Act. No. 6656
o that Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8498 granted a
continuing power to TIDCORPs Board of Directors to
prescribe the agencys organizational structure, staffing
pattern and compensation packages
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
o that such grant continued until declared invalid by a court of
competent jurisdiction or revoked by Congress.
o However, TIDCORPs implementation of its reorganization
did not comply with Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6656
that although there was no diminution in Demigillos
rank, salary and status, there was nonetheless a
demotion in her functions and authority
the functions of Demigillos office were in fact
transferred to the Operations Group.
o that the dropping from the rolls of Demigillo did not comply
with the mandatory requirement
Issue:
WON the Board of Directors of TIDCORP was an alter ego of the
President who had the continuing authority to reorganize TIDCORP
NO
HELD:
The doctrine of qualified political agency essentially postulates that
the heads of the various executive departments are the alter egos of
the President, and, thus, the actions taken by such heads in the
performance of their official duties are deemed the acts of the
President unless the President himself should disapprove such acts.
o This doctrine is in recognition of the fact that in our
presidential form of government, all executive organizations
are adjuncts of a single Chief Executive;
that the heads of the Executive Departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and
that the multiple executive functions of the
President as the Chief Executive are performed
through the Executive Departments.
The doctrine has been adopted here out of practical necessity,
considering that the President cannot be expected to personally
perform the multifarious functions of the executive office.
But the doctrine of qualified political agency could not be
extended to the acts of the Board of Directors of TIDCORP
24
 despite some of its members being themselves the appointees of the
President to the Cabinet.
o Under the circumstances, when the members of the Board of
Directors effected the assailed 2002 reorganization, they
were acting as the responsible members of the Board of
Directors of TIDCORP constituted pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 1080, as amended by Republic Act No. 8494,
not as the alter egos of the President.
Nonetheless, the court upholds the 2002 reorganization and declare it
valid for being done in accordance with the exclusive and final
authority expressly granted under Republic Act No. 8494
The court also reiterate that the ruling of the CSC that deals with
specific cases coming within its area of technical knowledge and
expertise
that the reorganization was not arbitrary and whimsical. It had been
formulated following lengthy consultations and close coordination
with the affected offices within TIDCORP in order for them to come
up with various functional statements relating to the new
organizational setup
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
ARAULLO V. AQUINO III
[G.R. No. 209287; February 3, 2015]
Facts:
In a privilege speech, Sen. Jinggoy Estrada revealed that he and his
fellow senators received 50 million-peso incentive because of their
vote to impeach Chief Justice Corona.
Sec. Abad responded to the speech saying that it is part of the
Spending Acceleration Program.
1. The Spending Acceleration Program is also known as the
Disbursement Acceleration Program [DAP].
2. Sec. Abad also said that the money was given in response to
several funding requests from the senators.
The money used for the DAP are taken from:
1. Unreleased appropriations under personnel services;
2. Unprogrammed [sic] funds;
3. Carry-over appropriations unreleased from the previous year;
and
4. Budget for slow-moving items or projects that had been
realigned to support faster-disbursing projects.
The Department of Budget and Management [DBM] released a claim
on its website saying that the money used for the DAP are savings
from:
1. Pooling of unreleased appropriations, and
2. Withdrawal of unobligated allotments.
The legal bases of DBM in implementing DAP vis--vis the use of
savings are as follows:
1. Article VI, Sec. 25 (5) of the Constitution, which granted the
President the power to augment an item for his office in the
general appropriations law,
2. Administrative Code of 1987s Book VI, Chapter 5, Sections
38 (suspension of expenditure appropriations) and 49
(Authority to use savings for certain purpose),
3. 2011-2013 General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) which
provides for (a) use of savings, (b) meanings of savings and
augmentation, and (c) priority in the use of savings.
25
 With regard to unprogrammed [sic] funds, the legal bases of DBM
are the 2011-2013 GAAs.
Araullo, et al., filed a petition to the Supreme Court assailing the
Constitutionality of National Budget Circular [NBC] No. 541, which
was issued to implement the DAP.
Issues:
1. WON the certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper remedies
to assail the Constitutionality and validity of the DAP, NBC no. 541,
and other issuances implementing the DAP?
a. WON controversy is ripe for judicial determination; and
b. WON the petitioners have locus standi?
2. WON the DAP violates Article VI, Sec. 29 of the Constitution,
which provides, [n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except
in pursuance of an appropriation made by law?
3. WON the DAP, NBC Bo. 541, and all other executive issuances
allegedly implementing the DAP violate Article VI, Sec. 25 (5) of
the Constitution insofar as:
a. They treat the unreleased appropriations and unobligated
allotments withdrawn from government agencies as
savings as the term used in Sec. 25 (5), in relation to 2011-
2013 GAAs,
b. They authorize the disbursement of funds for projects or
programs not provided in the GAAs for the Executive
Departments, and
c. They augment discretionary lump sum appropriations in the
GAAs?
4. WON the DAP violates (1) the equal protection clause [EPC], (2) the
system of checks and balances, and (3)the principle of public
accountability enshrined in the Constitution that it authorizes the
release of funds upon the request of legislators?
5. WON factual and legal justification exists to issue a TRO to restrain
the implementation of DAP and other executive issuances
implementing DAP?
Held/Ratio:
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
1. Yes, certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper remedies to
assail the Constitutionality of DAP. Since certiorari and prohibition
are large in scope and the issues involved the limitations of the
Executives spending power, the said remedies are proper.
a. The case is not moot and academic even if the President has
terminated the DAP. The fact that huge public funds have
been allocated, disbursed, or utilized by reason or on account
of the challenged executive acts gave rise to an actual
controversy that is ripe for adjudication. Even if assuming
that the DAP has mooted the case, this case still falls under
the exception to the requirement of ripeness:
i. There is a grave violation of the Constitution,
ii. The case involved a situation of exceptional
character and was of paramount public interest,
iii. When the constitutional issue raised required the
formulation of controlling principles to guide the
Bench, the Bar, and the public, and
iv. When the case was capable of repetition yet evading
review.
b. The petitioners have legal standing to assail the
Constitutionality of the DAP. Considering that the issue
involves the expenditure of public funds and the present case
is of transcendental importance, the petitioners do have a
legal standing to raise the issues before the Court.
2. No, there is no violation of the provision since DAP is not an
appropriation measure but a program of prioritizing spending.
Congresss duty vis--vis treasury is to allocate funds in the treasury
in a particular fund.
3. Yes. The term savings does not include unreleased appropriations
and withdrawn unobligated allotments under the DAP because
savings refers to portions or balances of any programmed
appropriation in the GAA free from any obligation or encumbrance,
which are:
a. Still available after the completion or final discontinuance or
abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the
appropriation is authorize,
26
 b. From appropriations balances arising from unpaid
compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant positions
and leaves of absences without pay, and
c. From appropriations balances realized form the
implementation of measures resulting in improved systems
and efficiencies and thus enabled agencies to meet and
deliver the required or planned targets, programs, and
services approved in the GAAs at a lesser cost.
Mere declaration of the DBM will not ripen the status of the funds
under the DAP to the categories considered as savings. It is
necessary that these funds must be released first and not merely
withheld.
On the other hand, the term augment means to enlarge or increase
the allotment for an item in the GAA wherein the current
appropriation for the said item is deficient.
The Constitution also limits the augmentation within the office of the
President; hence, savings of the Executive branch must be
augmented only to an item under the executive. In the present case,
the savings of the Executive were augmented to the members of
Congress. Therefore, the Constitutional provision was violated.
4. The Court did not pass upon a judgment over the alleged violation of
the EPC because the contentions of Luna and COURAGE are
speculative. As regards to the violation of separation of powers and
the public accountability, the Court has already addressed the issue
in the discussion of other issues.
5. No, the doctrine of operative fact applies. A legislative or executive
act is presumed to be constitutional such that when it is declared void
for being unconstitutional does not give rise to any right or
obligation. The Court recognized that the result of the DAP and its
related issuances could not be ignored and be undone. The Court also
declared that the doctrine of operative fact is not confined to statutes
and rules and regulations. The doctrine can be invoked only in
situations where the nullification of the effects of what used to be a
valid law would result in inequity and injustice.
Other concepts discussed:
Budget cycle:
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
o Budget preparation- it is commenced by the issuance of
DBM of budget calls, i.e., one for government offices
including SUCs and another for GOCCs and GFIs. The
government agencies will then submit their respective
budget proposals to the DBM. DBM will consolidate these
proposals to the National Expenditure Program [NEP] and a
Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing [BESF].
o Budget legislation or budget authorization- the Congress
will receive the Presidents budget, which includes the NEP
and BESF. With this, Congress will come up with a General
Appropriations Bill [GAB]. The President will then approve
of the GAB and make it into GAA [See PHIL. CONST. art. VI,
27 (2)].
o Budget execution- the Budget Execution Phase is primarily
the function of the DBM, which is tasked to perform the
following procedures, namely: (1) to issue the programs and
guidelines for the release of funds; (2) to prepare an
Allotment and Cash Release Program; (3) to release
allotments; and (4) to issue disbursement authorities.
o Accountability- it ensures that the government funds have
been effectively and efficiently utilized to achieve the States
socio-economic goals. It also allows the DBM to assess the
performance of agencies during the fiscal year for the
purpose of implementing reforms and establishing new
policies. An agencys accountability may be examined and
evaluated through (1) performance targets and outcomes; (2)
budget accountability reports; (3) review of agency
performance; and (4) audit conducted by the Commission on
Audit (COA).
Public Expenditures:
o Categories:
Capital Expenditures are the expenses whose
usefulness lasts for more than one year, and which
add to the assets of the Government, including
investments in the capital of government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
27
 Current Operating Expenditures are the purchases
of goods and services in current consumption the
benefit of which does not extend beyond the fiscal
year.
o Functions:
Economic development expenditures
Social services or social development expenditures
General government or general public services
expenditures
National defense expenditures
Public debt
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by NATIONAL
POWER CORPORATION (NAPOCOR) v. HEIRS OF
SATURNINO BORBON
[GR No. 165354, January 12, 2015]
Facts:
In 1993, NAPOCOR entered into the property owned by the Heirs of
Borbon in order to construct and maintain transmission lines.
In 1995, NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation in the RTC
seeking the acquisition of easement of right of way over a portion of
the same property.
o It allege that it had negotiated with the Heirs but failed to
reach any agreement and that it is willing to deposit an
amount of P 9,790 representing the assessed value of the
property.
The Heirs answered that there was no prior negotiation. NAPOCOR
entered their property without consent and in the process destroyed
some fruit trees without payment.
o They also allege that the presence of the high tension wires
rendered the remaining unaffected portion inutile for any
future use and capabilities.
o They tendered no objection to the expropriation by
NAPOCOR as long as it is for the entire property and not
only for the affected portion.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Heirs and ordered NAPOCOR to pay
the Heirs just compensation for the whole property. The CA affirmed
the RTC ruling.
Hence, NAPOCOR appealed to the SC.
o During the pendency of the appeal, NAPOCOR filed a
manifestation stating that there is no longer any public
purpose since the transmission lines will be retired already.
o NAPOCOR wants the expropriation proceedings to be
discontinued.
Issue:
28
 Furthermore, the compensation should be based on what the
(1) Whether or not the expropriation proceedings should be Heirs actually lost as a result of dispossession of their
discontinued. YES property and its use including the value of the fruit trees and
(2) Whether or not just compensation should be paid by NAPOCOR. crops destroyed.
NO Considering that the dismissal of the expropriation
proceeding occurred during the appeal, the action is now
Held: treated as an action for damages. Hence, the case will be
remanded back to the RTC to give both parties the
(1) YES. Since public use is the fundamental basis for the action of opportunity to re-establish the factual and legal issues.
expropriation, NAPOCORs motion to discontinue the proceedings is
warranted.
The very moment that it appears at any stage of the
proceedings that the expropriation is not for a public use, the
action must necessarily fail and should be dismissed, for the
reason that the action cannot be maintained at all except
when the expropriation is for some public use. That must be
true even during the pendency of the appeal or at any other
stage of the proceedings.
Although there is no Board Resolution showing that
NAPOCOR decided as a corporate body to retire the
transmission lines, the Court considered the Memorandum
and the Certificate of Inspection/Accomplishment attached
to NAPOCORs motion attesting to the retirement of the
transmission lines as sufficient to establish that the public
purpose has ceased to exist.
(2) NO. In view of the discontinuance of the expropriation proceedings,
there is no need to pay just compensation since the property will be
returned to the Heirs. However, NAPOCOR is liable to compensate
the Heirs for the disturbance they caused given that NAPOCOR
entered the property without the Heirs consent, destroying fruit
trees, and the effect of the transmission lines or hogh tension wires
with respect to the whole property.
The Court ordered that the payment will be reckoned when
the property was taken (1993) and not when the
expropriation complaint was filed (1995).

Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017 29

LIMKAICHONG v. LBP NO. Such insinuation runs afoul of the well settled doctrine of immutability
[GR. No. 158464; August 2, 2016] of judgments. Although Article VIII, Section 4 (1) of the Constitution gives
the Supreme Court the discretion to sit either en banc or in divisions of three,
Facts: five, or seven Members, the divisions are not considered separate and distinct
Federico Suntay owned land situated in Sta. Lucia, Sablayan, courts. Nor is a hierarchy of courts thereby established within the Supreme
Occidental Mindoro. Court, which remains a unit notwithstanding that it also works in divisions.
In 1972, the Department of Agrarian Reform expropriated 948.1911 The actions taken and the decisions rendered by any of the divisions are
hectares of Suntays land pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27. those of the Court itself, considering that the divisions are not considered
o Land Bank and DAR fixed the value of the expropriated separate and distinct courts but as divisions of one and the same court.
portion at P4,497.50/hectare, for a total valuation of Lastly, the only thing that the Constitution allows the banc to do in this
P4,251,141. regard is to reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court en
Rejecting the valuation, however, Suntay filed a petition for banc or in division.
determination of just compensation in the Office of the Regional
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Region IV, DARAB.
On January 24, 2001, after summary administrative proceeding,
RARAD Mias rendered a decision fixing the total just compensation
for the expropriated portion at P157,541,951.30.
On October 11, 2007, the Supreme Court promulgated its decision in
Land Bank v. Suntay (G.R. No. 157903) holding that it is the
Regional Trial Courts sitting as Special Agrarian Courts which has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the determination of just
compensation.
o Adjudicators are merely empowered to make a preliminary
determination of the compensation, subject to the ultimate
power of the courts.
Suntay alleged that the RARAD Decision had already attained
finality in DARAB v. Lubrica because the Land Bank failed to file
the petition within the reglementary period, notwithstanding its
recourse to the special agrarian court.

Issue:
WON a final and executory decision may be reversed, modified, or set aside
by the Supreme Court en banc

Held:

Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017 30

Macapagal-Arroyo v. People of the Philippines
[G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016]
FACTS:
The Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan with plunder as
defined by, and penalized under Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 the following: (1) GMA, (2)
Aguas, (3) former PCSO General Manager and Vice Chairman
Rosario C. Uriarte, (4) former PCSO Chairman of the Board of
Directors Sergio O. Valencia, (5) former members of the PCSO
Board of Directors, and (6) two former officials of the Commission
on Audit (COA).
The Sandiganbayan eventually acquired jurisdiction over most of the
accused, including petitioners. All filed petitions for bail, which the
Sandiganbayan granted except those of the petitioners. Their motions
for reconsideration were denied. GMA assailed the denial of her
petition for bail before the Supreme Court. However, this remains
unresolved.
After the Prosecution rested its case, the accused separately filed
their demurrers to evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not
establish a case for plunder against them.
The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers and dismissed the case
against the accused within its jurisdiction, except for petitioners and
Valencia. It held that there was sufficient evidence showing that they
had conspired to commit plunder.
Petitioners filed this case before the Supreme Court
on certiorari before the Supreme Court to assail the denial of their
demurrers to evidence, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Issue:
WON the special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail the denial of
the demurrers to evidence NO.
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
Held:
The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an
interlocutory order issued by the trial court because of the availability of
another remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule
119 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the order denying the
motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself
shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment. It is not
an insuperable obstacle to this action, however, that the denial of the
demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an interlocutory order that did
not terminate the proceedings, and the proper recourse of the demurring
accused was to go to trial, and that in case of their conviction they may then
appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as among the errors to be
reviewed. Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in which the writ of
certiorari may issue should not be limited, because to do so x x x would be
to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the discretion of
the court that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more
discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus. In the exercise of our
superintending control over other courts, we are to be guided by all the
circumstances of each particular case as the ends of justice may require. So
it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial
wrong or to do substantial justice.
The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to the contrary
or for the sake of the convenience of one side. This is because the Court has
the bounden constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion
whenever and wherever it is committed. Thus, notwithstanding the
interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the demurrers to evidence,
the petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of the remedy of
certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
31