[G.R. No. L-5343. September 16, 1910.

CELESTINO RODRIGUEZ, administrator, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. LUISA RAVILAN, defendant-appellant.

On November 29, 1904, Jorgia Barte and Donato Mendoza, in representation of their son, Nicolas Mendoza, filed a written amended
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against Luisa Ravillan, the guardian of their daughters Maximina, Paulina, Pelagia, and
Maxima, all surnamed Barte. The complaint recites, among other things, that many years ago Javier Barte and Eulalia Seno died in the pueblo
of Mandaue, leaving property and, as heirs, Espiridion, Feliciana, Telesfora, Juana, Carmelo, Casimira, Jorgia, Matea, and Pedro, surnamed
Barte, and that, although five of them divided among themselves he said property, consisting of lands situated in the said pueblo and several
carabaos, the legal portions which pertained to four of them, Espiridion, Jorgia, Matea, and Pedro, remained undivided, and these latter
continued to possess, in associated in business separately from their other coheirs.
That the said brothers and sisters purchased, out of the profits obtained from these lands, other lands, to wit, a parcel of land in the
barrio of Libog and pueblo of Bogo, of an area usually sown with 14 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north, south, east, and west by
property of Hermenegildo Pelayo, Feliciano Cortes, Domingo Nunez, and Feliciano Cortes, respectively; another parcel in the same barrio, of
an area sufficient for 3 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north by the property of Benito Cabajug, on the south by the lands of Mariano
Cabajug, on the east by those of Amadeo Elore, and on the west by that of Mariano Mendoza; another parcel in the same barrio, of sufficient
area for 10 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north, south, east, and west by the lands of Ciriaco Dajuna, Crisanto Zurra, Feliciano Cortes,
and Mariano Fontanosa; another parcel in the same barrio, of an area ordinarily sown with 3 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north, south,
east, and west by the lands of Benito Cabajug, Monico Pajuga, Marianoa Cabajug, and Mariano Fontanosa, respectively; another parcel in the
said barrio, bounded on the north, south, east, and west by lands of Damiano Pelagio and Crisanto Zurra; another parcel of an area sown by 4
gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north, south, east, and west by lands of Mariano Cabajug, Anacleto Lambojon, Ciriaco Dajuna, and
Anacleto Lambojon, respectively; another parcel, situated in the barrio of Tabayho of the aforesaid pueblo, of an area sown by 14 gantas of
seed corn, bounded on the north, south, east and west by lands of Maximino Fernan, Domingo Fontanosa, Vicente Odian, and Meliton
Mendoza; another parcel in the barrio of Cadaohan of the pueblo of Tabugon, bounded on the north, south, east, and west by lands of Santiago
Ortelano, a creek, and lands of Jose Arfon and Santiago Ortelano, respectively; and another parcel in the barrio of Dughoy, Tabugon, of an
area sown with 25 gantas of seed, bounded on the north, south, east, and west by property of Feliciano Cortes, Felix Manalili, Santiago
Ortelano, and Donato Mendoza; eleven plow carabaos, three carabao cows with four calves, and four head of cattle, acquired by the
community; a mortgage credit of 130 pesos against Laureano Solianoa secured by a mortgage on his land in the barrio of Bagacay of the
pueblo of Bogo, and three carabaos.
That the business of the said four brothers and sisters was, by common accord, administered by one of them, Espiridion Barte, and,
when he died, the three survivors remained united in their interests and the undivided property was administered, until December, 1901, by
Pedro Barte, who at his death left four heirs, the said Maximina, Paulina, Pelagia, and Maxima, represented by their mother, Luisa Ravilan, the
wife and widow of Pedro Barte and the defendant in this suit; that the said property, as aforestated, was administered by Espiridon Barte, in
common accord with the others, and, he having died without leaving heirs, by force of law the pat that pertained to him passed to his brother
Pedro and his sisters Jorgia and Matea, as the heirs nearest of kin of the said Espiridion, and, by common agreement, the said brother and
sisters continued their partnership organization and appointed the brother Pedro as administrator; that during the latter's administration, Matea
Barte also died, leaving as her heir Nicolas Mendoza, represented by his father Donato, one of the plaintiffs; that at the death of Pedro Barte,
Jorgia Barte and Donato Mendoza, in the name of their son Nicolas, decided upon the distribution of the property mentioned and so stated, in
February, 1902, to Luisa Ravilan, the guardian of the heirs of Pedro Barte, but that Ravilan would not agree to the partition, on the pretext
that, as the administratrix of that property, she had to pay debts of the deceased.
That three years having elapsed, up to the time of the complaint, and the debts having been settled, as admitted by the defendant
herself, the latter was requested to present the accounts, which she absolutely refused to do, and that she continued in the possession and to
enjoy the usufruct of the said property, without the consent or intervention of the plaintiffs; that Jorgia Barte, Nicolas Mendoza, the heir of
Matea Barte, and the heirs of Pedro Barte, named Maximina, Paulina, Pelagia, and Maxima Barte, were then entitled to the property in
question, which should be divided among them in three equal parts, one to be allotted to Jorgia Barte, another to Nicolas Mendoza, and the
other to the heirs of Pedro Barte.
The demand further recites that the plaintiffs desire that a division be made and therefore pray that a partition of the property, both
real and personal, be decreed and also of the profits that may have accrued thereto during the time that it was in the possession of and usufruct
enjoyed by the defendant, in accordance with the respective rights of the parties, and that, in case that the distribution can not be made without
detriment to such rights, the property be ordered sold and the proceeds divided among the parties. The plaintiffs requested also that the costs
of the suit be assessed against the defendant.
A demurrer to the complaint was interposed, although the record does not show how it was decided. The defendants in their answer
denied all the allegations of the amended complaint.
The case came to trial and, the testimony having been adduced by both parties, the exhibits being attached to the record, the judge,
in view of the conclusions reached therefrom and on the date of November 4, 1907, rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, by ordering
the partition of the property mentioned, in the manner and portions expressed in the judgment, and decreeing that such partition must be made
in accordance with sections 185 to 195 of the Code of Civil Procedure, with respect to the real property, and that the five carabaos should be
distributed in three equal allotments in the manner determined for the real property. The costs were charged to the plaintiffs and assessed
against the divisible property.
Counsel for the defendant excepted to this judgment and prayed for its annulment and a new trial. The motion was overruled, to
which exception was taken, and the appellant duly presented his bill of exceptions, which was approved and forwarded to this court.
A demand is made in the complaint for the partition of the common property held undividedly by four brothers and sisters who
formed a partnership for the use and enjoyment of the same.

In relating the origin of a part of the property of the four brothers and sisters joined in partnership, the plaintiffs stated that their
deceased parents, Javier Barte and Eulalia Seno, left at their death nine children, above mentioned, and property consisting of carabaos, a
credit, and lands situated in the pueblo of Mandaue, and that, their property having been divided among their nine children, that portion
thereof which corresponded to the brothers and sisters Espiridion, Jorgia, Matea, and Pedro remained undivided and its owners, associated
together, continued undivided and its owners, associated together, continued to enjoy it and manage it in common, separately from their other
brothers and sisters.
Although it be decided that it was not necessary to prove that the said nine brothers and sisters were unquestionably the children of
the deceased Javier Barte and Eulalia, and are therefore their only heirs, it should at least have been shown that a lawful partition was made
among their nine children, of the property left by both spouses at their death, and that the three parcels of land situated in the pueblo of
Mandaue, and said to be possessed by the said four brothers and sisters associated together, were awarded to the same. Such a partition, were
 it made, should appear in an authentic document, which was not exhibited with the complaint, since article 1068 of the civil Code provides "A
division legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property which may have been awarded to him."
Even though titles of ownership of the said property were not exhibited, if it had been shown that the Mandaue lands had been
awarded by partition to the fourth brothers and sisters aforementioned, there would have been prima facie proof that they were and certainly
are the owners thereof.
Section 181 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads: "A person having or holding real estate with others, in any form of joint tenancy
or tenancy in common, may compel partition thereof in the manner hereinafter prescribed."
Section 183 of the same code also prescribes: "The complaint in an action for partition shall set forth the nature and extent of the
plaintiff's title and contain an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded, and name each tenant in common,
coparcener, or other person interested therein, as defendants."
So that he who demands or claims a partition of the property must have the status of a coproprietor or coowner of the property the
partition of which is asked for; and notwithstanding the fact that Jorgia Barte and the son of Matea Barte, through his representative, aver that
they are the coowners of the said Mandaue lands and of others situated in the municipalities of Bogo and Tabogon, they have not proved their
averment by titles which establish the common ownership alleged. A mere affirmation without proofs is insufficient, since the defendant party,
representing the four daughters of the deceased Pedro Barte, absolutely denied all the allegations of the complaint.
It is true that the defendant Luisa Ravilan stated in her sworn testimony that, as the guardian of her children, she had an interest in
the lands situated in Mandaue and that the parcels of land situated in Tabogon did not belong to her, nor to her deceased husband, Pedro Barte;
but she positively affirmed that the seven parcels of land situated in Bogo were acquired by her said husband during his lifetime and during his
marriage with her, and she exhibited five documents, one of them the original of a possessory information, as titles proving the ownership of
her said husband.
Against the averment of the plaintiffs appears that of the defendant in the name of her four daughters, the heirs if Pedro Barte, and
while the plaintiff party exhibited no title of ownership whatever, not even of the lands situated in the pueblo of Bogo and which the defendant
affirmed were acquired by her deceased husband, Pedro Barte, during his lifetime, it is an indisputable fact that the latter's widow, who in her
own behalf and in the name of her four daughters claims the exclusive ownership of the lands in Bogo, is at the present time in possession
thereof, and moreover showed documents which prove the acquisition of some of them. The testimony of the defendant to the effect that she
only had a share in the lands of Mandaue, but not in those situated in Tabogon, is worthy of serious consideration, although she positively
affirmed that those situated in Tabogon, is worthy of serious consideration, although she positively affirmed that those situated in Bogo
belonged to her husband and to herself. As she is in possession of these lands, and as the record of the trial shows no proof that they belonged
to the joint association or partnership existing between the said four brothers and sisters, there are no legal provisions that would support the
issuance of the issuance of an order for the partition of the said lands in Bogo, of which the widow of their alleged former owner is now in
possession.
In actions for the partition of property held in common it is assumed that the parties are all coowners or coproprietors of the
undivided property to be parrtitioned. The question of common ownership need not be gone into at the time of the trial, but only how, in what
manner, and in what proportion the said property of common ownership shall be distributed among the interested parties by order of court.
Moreover, for the purposes of the partition demanded, it must be remembered that the hereditary succession of the deceased
Espiridion Barte, who it is said left no legitimate descendants at his death, should be divided among his eight brothers and sisters who may
have survived him, and in case any of these have died, the children of his deceased brother or sister, that is, his nephews and nieces per
stripes, are entitled to share in his inheritance, according to the provisions of articles 946. 947, 948 of the Civil Code, the last cited of which
prescribes: "Should brothers survive with nephews, children of brothers of the whole blood, the former shall inherit per capita and the latter
per stripes," representing their respective fathers or mothers, brothers or sisters of the deceased.
The record does not show whether Jorgia Barte left any legitimate heir at her death, and if she did not, her collateral relatives
succeed her in the manner provided by law.
It is to be noted that the partnership contract entered into by the fourth brothers and sisters can not affect the hereditary rights which
belong to the relatives of the deceased predecessor in interest nor alter the order prescribed by law for testate or intestate successions. (Arts.
744, 763, 806, 808, 913, 946, Civil Code.)
For the foregoing reasons, it is proper, in our opinion, with a reversal of the judgment appealed from, to declare, and we do hereby
declare, that the partition prayed for be denied, and to absolve, as we do hereby absolve, the defendant Luisa Ravilan from the complaint,
without special finding as to costs.
GERTRUDES DE LOS SANTOS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MAXIMO DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant.

FACTS: On May 21, 1965, Gertrudes de los Santos filed a complaint for specific performance against Maximo de la Cruz, alleging, among others,
that on August 24, 1963, she and several co-heirs, including the defendant, executed an extrajudicial partition agreement (a copy of which was
attached to the complaint) over a certain portion of land with an area of around 20,000 sq. m.; that the parties thereto had agreed to adjudicate three
(3) lots to the defendant, in addition to his corresponding share, on condition that the latter would undertake the development and subdivision of the
estate which was the subject matter of the agreement, all expenses in connection therewith to be defrayed from the proceeds of the sale of the
aforementioned three (3) lots; that in spite of demands by the plaintiff, by the other co-heirs, and by the residents of the subdivision, the defendant
refused to perform his aforesaid obligation although he had already sold the aforesaid lots. The plaintiff prayed the court to order the defendant to
comply with his obligation under the extra-judicial partition agreement and to pay the sum of P1,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.

In his answer, the defendant admitted the due execution of the extrajudicial partition agreement, but set up the affirmative defenses that the plaintiff
had no cause of action against him because the said agreement was void with respect to her, for the reason that the plaintiff was not an heir of
Pelagia de la Cruz, deceased owner of the property, and was included in the extrajudicial partition agreement by mistake; and that although he had
disposed of the three lots adjudicated to him, nevertheless the proceeds of the sale were not sufficient to develop and improve properly the
subdivided estate. The answer contained a counterclaim wherein the defendant alleged that the plaintiff had likewise sold her share in the estate for
P10,000.00, and that the extrajudicial partition agreement being void insofar as the latter was concerned, he was entitled to one-fourth (1/4) of the
proceeds as his share by way of reversion. The defendant prayed that the complaint be dismissed; that the extrajudicial partition agreement be
declared void with respect to the plaintiff; and, on his counterclaim, that the plaintiff be ordered to pay him the sum of P2,500.00.

On motion of the defendant, the court below entered an order on July 19, 1965, declaring the plaintiff in default for not having answered the
counterclaim.

In its decision dated November 3, 1966, the court a quo held that the defendant, being a party to the extrajudicial partition agreement, was estopped
from raising in issue the right of the plaintiff to inherit from the decedent Pelagia de la Cruz; hence, he must abide by the terms of the agreement.
The court ordered the defendant "to perform his obligations to develop Lots 1, 2 and 3 of (LRC) Psd-29561 as described on page 2 of the
Extrajudicial Partition Agreement. No disposition was made of defendant's counterclaim. The defendant filed a "Motion for New Trial' but the
same was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not , in the premises, plaintiff-appellee is an heir of the decedent.

HELD: We are convinced that she is not. Plaintiff-appellee being a mere grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, she could not inherit from the latter by
right of representation.

"ART. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line, but never in the ascending.

"In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or half
blood."

Much less could plaintiff-appellee inherit in her own right.

"ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of
representation when it properly takes place . . ."

Applying these two (2) provisions, this Court, in Linart y Pavia vs. Ugarte y Iturralde, 5 Phil., 176 (1905), said:

". . . [I]n an intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased can not participate with a niece in the inheritance, because the
latter being a nearer relative, the more distant grandniece is excluded. In the collateral line the right of representation does
not obtain beyond sons and daughters of the brothers and sisters, which would have been the case if Pablo Linart, the father
of the plaintiff, had survived his deceased uncle."

In the present case, the relatives "nearest in degree" to Pelagia de la Cruz are her nephews and nieces, one of whom is defendant-appellant.
Necessarily, plaintiff-appellee, a grandniece, is excluded by law from the inheritance.
But what is the legal effect of plaintiff-appellee's inclusion and participation in the extrajudicial partition agreement insofar as her right to bring the
present action is concerned? They did not confer upon her the right to institute this action. The express purpose of the extrajudicial partition
agreement, as admitted by the parties in the stipulation of facts, was to divide the estate among the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz. Indeed, the said
agreement itself states that plaintiff-appellee was participating therein in representation of her deceased mother. The pertinent portion of the
agreement is herein quoted, thus:

"NOW, THEREFORE, we . . . and Diego delos Santos, married to Anastacia dela Cruz, Mariano delos Santos married to
Andrea Ramoy: Gertrudes delos Santos, married to Pascual Acuna; Alejo delos Santos, married to Leonila David; and Sotera
delos Santos, married to Narciso Ramota; all in representation of our mother, MARCIANA DELA CRUZ, . . ., do hereby by
these presents, mutually, voluntarily and amicably agree among ourselves to equitably divide the property left by the
deceased PELAGIA DELA CRUZ, and adjudicate unto ourselves definite and independent portions of the estate in the
following manner . . ."

It is quite apparent that in executing the partition agreement, the parties thereto were laboring under the erroneous belief that plaintiff-appellee
was one of the legal heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz. Plaintiff-appellee not being such an heir, the partition is void with respect to her, pursuant to
Article 1105 of the Civil Code, which reads:

"ART. 1105. A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to
such person."

Partition of property affected between a person entitled to inherit from the deceased owner thereof and another person who thought he was an
heir, when he was not really and lawfully such, to the prejudice of the rights of the true heir designated by law to succeed the deceased, is null
and void (De Torres vs. De Torres, et al., 28 Phil. 49). A fortiori, plaintiff-appellee could hardly derive from the agreement the right to have its
terms enforced.
2. The extrajudicial partition agreement being void with respect to plaintiff-appellee, she may not be heard to assert estoppel against defendant-
appellant. Estoppel cannot be predicated on a void contract (17 Am. Jur. 605), or on acts which are prohibited by law or are against public policy
(Baltazar vs. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co., et al., G.R. Nos. 16236-38, June 30, 1965 [14 SCRA 522]). In Ramiro vs. Grao, et al., 54 Phil.,
744 (1930), this Court held:

"No estoppel arises where the representation or conduct of the party sought to be estopped is due to ignorance founded upon
a mistake. And while there is authority to the contrary, the weight of authority is that the acts and declarations of a party
based upon an innocent mistake as to his legal rights will not estop him to assert the same, especially where every fact
known to the party sought to be estopped is equally well known to the party setting up the estoppel. (21 C.J., 1125, 1126.)"

And in Capili, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-18148, February 28, 1963 (7 SCRA 367), this Court said:
"Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are estopped to raise the question of ownership of the properties involved
because the widow herself, during her lifetime, not only did not object to the inclusion of these properties in the inventory of
the assets of her deceased husband, but also signed an extra-judicial partition of those inventoried properties. But the very
authorities cited by appellants require that to constitute estoppel, the actor must have knowledge of the facts and be apprised
of his rights at the time he performs the act constituting estoppel, because silence without knowledge works no estoppel . . ."

GAUDENCIO BICOMONG, et al., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. GERONIMO ALMANZA, et al., defendant.

FLORENTINO CARTENA, defendant-appellant.
FACTS: Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint on December 1, 1959, namely: (a) the Bicomongs, children of Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the
Tolentinos, children of Igmedia Bagsic; and (c) Francisca Bagsic, daughter of Ignacio Bagsic, in the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San
Pablo City against the defendants Geronimo Almanza and Engracio Menese for the recovery of their lawful shares in the properties left by Maura
Bagsic.

After the death of Maura Bagsic, the above described properties passed on to Cristela Almanza who took charge of the administration of the same.
Thereupon, the plaintiffs approached her and requested for the partition of their aunt's properties. However, they were prevailed upon by Cristeta
Almanza not to divide the properties yet as the expenses for the last illness and burial of Maura Bagsic had not yet been paid. Having agreed to
defer the partition of the same. the plaintiffs brought out the subject again sometime in 1959 only. This time Cristeta Almanza acceded to the
request as the debts, accordingly, had already been paid. Unfortunately, she died without the division of the properties having been effected,
thereby leaving the possession and administration of the same to the defendants.

After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs

COURT OF APPEALS:

On appeal, defendant-appellant Cartena contends that the provisions of Arts. 995, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code, applied by the trial court
in allowing plaintiffs-appellees to succeed to the properties left by Maura Bagsic were not the applicable provisions. He asserts that in the course of
the trial of the case in the lower court, plaintiffs requested defendants to admit that Felipa Bagsic, the sole sister of full blood of Maura Bagsic, died
on May 9, 1955. Since Maura Bagsic died on April 14, 1952, Felipa succeeded to Maura's estate. In support thereof, he cites Art. 1004 of the New
Civil Code which provides that "should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares," and he
concludes with the rule that the relatives nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones. (Art. 962, New Civil Code)

On the other hand, plaintiffs-appellees claim that the date of death of Felipa Bagsic was not raised as an issue in the trial court. It was even the
subject of stipulation of the parties as clearly shown in the transcript of the stenographic notes that Felipa Bagsic died on May 9, 1945. 3

The Court of Appeals ruled that the facts of the case have been duly established in the trial court and that the only issue left for determination is a
purely legal question involving the correct application of the law and jurisprudence on the matter, hence the appellate court certified this case to Us.

Ruling: We hold that the provisions of Art. 975, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code are applicable to the admitted facts of the case at bar. These
Articles provide: cdll

"Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by
representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions."

"Art. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together with brothers and sisters of the half blood, the
former shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter."

"Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall succeed per capita or per stirpes, in accordance with the
rules laid down for brothers and sisters of the full blood."

In the absence of descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, Article 1003 of the New Civil Code provides that collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. It appearing that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue, and her husband and all
her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded by the surviving collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of full blood and the
ten (10) children of her brother and two (2) sisters of half blood, in accordance with the provision of Art. 975 of the New Civil Code.

By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit in their own right. In Abellana-Bacayo vs. Ferraris-
Borromeo, L-19382, August 31, 1965, 14 SCRA 986, this Court held that "nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (that is
per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased."

Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification as to whether the nephews or nieces are on the maternal or paternal line and
without preference as to whether their relationship to the deceased is by whole or half blood, the sole niece of whole blood of the deceased does not
exclude the ten nephews and nieces of half blood. The only difference in their right of succession is provided in Art. 1008, N.C.C., in relation to
Article 1006 of the New Civil Code (supra), which provisions, in effect, entitle the sole niece of full blood to a share double that of the nephews
and nieces of half blood. Such distinction between whole and half blood relationships with the deceased has been recognized in Dionisia Padura, et
al. vs. Melania Baldovino, et al., No. L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065 (unreported) and in Alviar vs. Alviar, No. L-22402, June 30,
1969, 28 SCRA 610). prcd

The contention of the appellant that Maura Bagsic should be succeeded by Felipa Bagsic, her sister of full blood, to the exclusion of the nephews
and nieces of half blood citing Art. 1004, N.C.C., is unmeritorious and erroneous for it is based on an erroneous factual assumption, that is, that
Felipa Bagsic died in 1955, which as indicated here before, is not true as she died on May 9, 1945, thus she predeceased her sister Maura Bagsic.

We find the judgment of the trial court to be in consonance with law and jurisprudence.

MAURICIO RAMIREZ, administrator of the state of Moises Ramirez, deceased, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SIMEON
BAUTISTA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

FACTS:

Moises Ramirez, who died intestate, was married twice. In his first marriage, he had five (5) children, named Rosa, Carmen, Francisco, Mauricia,
and Ignacia. Under his second marriage, he had three (3) children namely Cirila, Isabel, and Serapio, of whom Isabel alone survives. His wives
predeceased him and at the time of his death he left two fish ponds.
The children of the first marriage sold the two fish ponds, to Simeon Bautista and Raymundo Duran for P1,100.00. The only surviving child of the
second marriage, Isabel, was not a party to said sale. A case was filed by the administrator of the intestate estate to have the sale declared null and
void and the fish ponds restored to the intestate estate of Moises.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sale was valid.

RULING:

Yes. It was determined by the Court that the status of the two fish ponds was of community of property. The fishponds were acquired during the
first marriage. Therefore the conjugal gains on property should have applied.

The Court laid down the following rules:

1. When two or more heirs appear at the opening of a testamentary succession, or during the progress of the settlement of an intestate estate, and
each turns out to be an owner pro indiviso of the inheritance, by reason of the share he may be entitled to receive, a community of property then
exists between the participants as long as the estate remains undivided and nothing more tangible can be imagined than this necessary community,
which arose at the moment when the coheirs assumed the entire representation of the person of the deceased with respect to all of his property,
rights, and actions, both active and passive.

2. Every co-owner shall have full ownership of his part and in the fruits and benefits derived there from, and he therefore may alienate, assign,
or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, unless personal rights are in question. But the effect of the alienation or
mortgage, with regard to the co-owners, shall be limited to the share which may be awarded him in the division on the dissolution of the
community.

Applying the said rules, the death of the mother vested in the children of the first marriage their mothers half share. The death of Moises entitled his
eight children to a share each in the fishponds. Therefore, Isabella, being the lone survivor of her siblings, was entitled to a 3/16 share of the total
property.

The Court held that Rosa, Carmen, Francisco, Mauricia, and Ignacia Ramirez could have lawfully alienated their respective shares in the joint
ownership of the two parcels of land. The sale to the defendants, Simeon Bautista and Raymundo Duran was the sale of 13/16 of the said two
properties and could not have been void. It was the sale of the 3/16 which belonged to Isabela alone which was void.

Simeon Bautista and Raymundo Duran succeed to the vendors should have been validly subrogated in the joint ownership of the two fish ponds
sold and that the shares that redounded to them were the same that were owned by the vendors, which was, 13/16 of the two properties.

6. SOLIMAN vs. ICDANG

Facts:

Defendants are the parents of Adolfo Icdang, the husband of the plaintiff. Adolfo Icbang applied for a homestead application which
was granted by the Director of Lands. Later on, war broke out and Davao was occupied by the Japanese. Adolfo Icdang was arrested
by the Japanese and soon, he was considered dead, for nothing was heard about him since then.

Petitioner later on, was able to have a patent and origiginal certificate over the land in dispute. The patent was issued in the names of
the heirs of Adolfo Icdang. Alleging that the defendants had refused, upon demand to deliver the land to her, of which she claims is
hers. The share being her share in the conjugal partnership. She filed an action for patition of the lots. During the hearing, both
parties agreed to submit the case on a single issue on who are the heirs of Adolfo Icbang. The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner.
The trial court reasoned that the propoerty belongs to the conjugal petnership of Adolfo and petitioner. Hence, the appeal.

Issue:

I. WON the property belongs to the conjugal pertnership.

II. WON petitioner is the only or sole heir of Adolfo Icbang in the property disputed.

Ruling:

I. No, the property does not belong to the conjugal property. Adolfo Icdang was married to plaintiff when he filed the
homestead application, "an applicant may be said to have acquired a vested right over a homestead only by the presentation
of the final proof and its approval by the Director of Lands." In the case at bar, the final proof appears to have been
presented to, and approved by, the Director of Lands several years after the death of Adolfo Icdang and the dissolution of his
conjugal partnership with plaintiff herein. Hence, the land in question could not have formed part of the assets of said
partnership. It belonged to the heirs of Adolfo lcdang.

It is also to be noted that the Public Land Act of 1903 (Act No. 926, section 3), "in the event of the death of an applicant prior
to the issuance of a patent, his widow shall be entitled to have a patent for the land applied for issue to her upon showing
that she has consummated the requirements of law for homesteading the lands", and that only in case the deceased
applicant leaves no widow shall his interest in the land descend and the patent issue to his legal heirs. This policy was
changed by Act No. 3517, pursuant to which the deceased shall be succeeded no longer by his widow, but "by his heirs in
law, who shall be entitled to have issued to them the patent . . . if they show that they have complied with the requirements
therefor". It is apparent from the foregoing that the present law had advisedly abolished the right of the widow of a deceased
homestead applicant to secure. Under the law now in force, the patent shall issue to the "heirs in law" of the deceased, not to
his widow, if the former "show that they have complied with the requirements therefor"; and that the issuance of the patent
and of the corresponding certificate of title, in the case at bar, in favor of the "heirs of the late Adolfo Icdang", shows that the
Director of Lands had found that the aforementioned requirements were complied with, not by plaintiff herein but by the
defendants.
 II. Defendants' claim that, since Adolfo Icdang had left no descendants, they, as his legitimate parents, are his sole heirs, to the
exclusion of his widow, relying evidently upon Article 935 of the Civil Code of Spain, the law in force at the time of the death
of the decedent, which provides:

In default of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his ascendants shall inherit from him, to the
exclusion of collaterals.

Said Article 935 should be read, however, in relation to Article 836 of the same Code, which provides that, "if the testator
leaves no descendant, but does leave ascendants, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to a third of the estate in usufruct".
Hence, defendants herein, as parents of Adolfo Icdang, inherit the land in question, share and share alike, but one-third of
the share of each (representing one-sixth of the land) shall be subject to said usufruct of plaintiff herein.

7. GONZALES vs. CA

Facts:

Isabel Gabriel died with a will. Herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago and petitioner Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales are nieces of
the deceased. Private respondent Lutgarda Santiago filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 3617, for the probate of a will alleged to have been executed by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and designating therein
petitioner as the principal beneficiary and executrix. The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales on the ground that the
will is not genuine, not executed and attested as required by law, at the time of the alleged execution of the purported wilt the
decedent lacked testamentary capacity due to old age and sickness and the purported will was procured through undue and improper
pressure and influence on the part of the principal beneficiary, and/or of some other person for her benefit. The RTC disallowed the
will. On appeal, the CA allowed the probate of the will. Hence, the petition.

Issue: WON the CA erred in holding that the document was executed and attested as required by law when there was absolutely no
proof that the three instrumental witnesses were credible witnesses.

Ruling:

Under Article 820, Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf or dumb, and able to read
and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in article 806 of this Code. While Article 821 states, The following
are disqualified from being witnesses to a will: (1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines, (2) Those who have been convicted of
falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony.

It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with, such that the soundness of his mind
can be shown by or deduced from his answers to the questions propounded to him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown from his
appearance, testimony , or competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to
read and write to the satisfaction of the Court, and that he has none of the disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil Code.

In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three instrumental witnesses, namely, Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya
and Maria Gimpaya, are competent and credible is satisfactorily supported by the evidence as found by the respondent Court of
Appeals, which findings of fact this Tribunal is bound to accept and rely upon. Moreover, petitioner has not pointed to any
disqualification of any of the said witnesses, much less has it been shown that anyone of them is below 18 years of age, of unsound
mind, deaf or dumb, or cannot read or write.

However, petitioner argued that Article 820 and 821 of the New Civil Code speak of the competency of a witness due to his
qualifications under the first Article and none of the disqualifications under the second Article, whereas Article 805 requires the
attestation of three or more credible witnesses, petitioner concludes that the term credible requires something more than just being
competent and, therefore, a witness in addition to being competent under Articles 820 and 821 must also be a credible witness under
Article 805.

The SC held, in the strict sense, the competency of a person to be an instrumental witness to a will is determined by the statute, that
is Art. 820 and 821, Civil Code, whereas his credibility depends On the appreciation of his testimony and arises from the belief and
conclusion of the Court that said witness is telling the truth. In other words, the instrumental witnesses must be competent and their
testimonies must be credible before the court allows the probate of the will they have attested.

8. CORPUS vs. CORPUS

Facts:

Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus were married, blessed with 5 children: Pablo Corpus, Jose Corpus and 3 others. When Tomas
Corpus died, Ramona wed Luis Rafael Yangco and had 4 recognized acknowledged natural children, one of then was the decedent
Teodoro Yangco. Teodoro Yangco died. His will was probated. At the time of his death, he had nof roced heirs. He only had his half
brother Luis Yangco, half sister Paz Yangco, the children of his half brother Pablo Corpus (Jose and Ramon) and daughter of his half
brother Jose Corpus (Juanita Corpus). Juanita died in 1944. (Juanitas son-Tomas Corpus)

Pursuant to the order of the probate of the court, a project of partition was submitted but it was contested by the Estate of Luis
Yangco on the ground that intestacy should be decalred because the will does not contain and institution of an heir and Juanita
Corpus, Pedro Martinez and Juliana De Castro for the propsed partition was not inconformity with the will of the testator.
Nevertheless, the project of partition was approved b the probate court. The oppositors appealed in the SC but it was dismissed
because later on they entered into a compromise agreement. Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus Signed a
receipt dated October 24, 1947 wherein he acknowledge that he received from the Yangco estate the sum of two thousand pesos
(P2,000) "as settlement in full of my share of the compromise agreement as per understanding with Judge Roman Cruz, our attorney
in this case." However, Tomas Corpus still filed an action to recover Juanitas supposed share in Yangcos estate.

Issue: WON Juanita Corpus, the mother of apt Tomas Corpus was a legal heir of Yangco. Has Tomas Corpus a cause of action to
recover his mother's supposed intestate share in Yangco's estate?

Ruling:
No, Juanita Corpus, the petitioners mother is not a legal heir of Yangco because there is no recirpocal succession between legitimate
and illegitimate relatives. Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since Juanita Corpus
was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold that appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for
the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangco's estate. Juanita Corpus was
not a legal heir of Yangco because there is no reciprocal succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. The trial court did
not err in dismissing the complaint of Tomas Corpus.

Under the Article 992 of the Civil Code which provides that "an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate
child". That rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the legitimate family while the
legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child. The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avod further grounds
of resentment.

Teodoro Yangco and the 3 other children, was acknowledge natural child and not a legitimate child of Luis Rafael Yangco and
Ramona Arguelles. Therefore, Tomas Corpus (petitioner) had no caus of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of
his mother, Juanita Corpus, as legal heir in Yangcos estate.

9. PASCUAL vs. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA

Facts:

Don Adres died intestate and was survived by his wife, children, whether legitimate or illegitimate and brother or sisters, whether full
blood or half blood. Eligio Pascual is a full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual. Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both
surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual. The surviving spouse of Don Andres Pascual
filed with the RTC for the administration of the intestate estate of her late husband. She filed a supplemetal petition to the Petition for
letters of Administration, where she expressly stated that Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of Don Andres
Pascual. Later on, she executed an affidavit, to the effect that of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger full blood brother
of her late husband Don Andres Pascual, to belie the statement made by the oppositors, that Olivia and Hermes were are not among
the known heirs of the deceased Don Andres Pascual. The parties enetered into a compromise agreement despite objections of
Olivia and Hermes. They both filed a motion to reiterate hereditary rights. However, it was denied by the court. The CA upheld the
lower courts decision. Hence, the petition.

Issue: WON Article 992 of the Civil Code, can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the
deceased.

Ruling:

Olivia and Hermes cannot inherit from Don Andres Pascual in representation of their father Eligio Pascual. Under Article 992, An
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. In Diaz v. IAC this Court ruled that:

Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a successionab
intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said
legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article
992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and
incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn
hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which
it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable
evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of
resentment.

Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.

Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in holding that petitioners herein cannot represent their
father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their
father.

Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.

Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under one category, which undoubtedly
settles the issue as to whether or not acknowledged natural children should be treated differently, in the negative.

10. MANUEL vs. FERRER

FACTS:

The petitioners in this case were the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling. During his marriage with Beatriz,
Antonio had an extra-marital affair with Ursula Bautista, from which Juan Manuel was born. Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio,
married Esperanza Gamba. In consideration of the marriage, a donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land was registered in his name.
He would later buy two parcels and register the same under his name. The couple were not blessed with a child of their own. Their desire
to have one impelled the spouses to take private respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as their own
daughter.

On 03 June 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislao Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro over a one-half (1/2) portion of his
land. Juan Manuel died intestate on 21 February 1990. Two years later, or on 04 February 1992, Esperanza Gamba also passed away.

On 05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming for herself the three
parcels of land Modesta executed in favor of her co-respondent Estanislao Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over the
unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the land that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro.
These acts of Modesta apparently did not sit well with petitioners. In a complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court, the petitioners
sought the declaration of nullity of the instruments.

ISSUE:Whether or not petitioners had the legal personality to contest the actions of Modesta.

RULING:

No. Petitioners, not being the real parties-in-interest in the case, had neither the standing nor the cause of action to initiate the complaint.

Although in her answer to the complaint, Modesta admitted that she was not an intestate heir of Juan Manuel because she was adopted
without the benefit of formal or judicial adoption and therefore was neither a compulsory nor a legal heir, the court still reiterated the
following rules:

a. where the illegitimate child had half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the formers inheritance

b. the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate child

c. a natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent

d. the natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural father

e. an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father

11. PASION vs. PASION

FACTS:

Plaintiff brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Quezon praying that the transfer certificate of title be issued in favor of
both plaintiff and defendant in the proportion of 3/4 for plaintiff and 1/4 for defendant. Plaintiff seeks also an accounting from defendant
of the fruits of her share in the property in litigation.

Defendant set up the defense that the property in question, although registered in the name of his father, was in fact his own exclusive
property, and that, even if the allegations of the complaint are true, plaintiff's action has already prescribed.

The original defendant Ramon de Pasion having died in the meantime, he was substituted by his son Florentino de Pasion, who filed an
amended answer reiterating the same defenses set up by his predecessor.

After trial, the lower court found that the right of action of both plaintiff and intervenor, being based on fraud, has already prescribed and,
consequently, dismissed their complaints. Only the intervenor has appealed.

Epifania Anca was the second wife of Bernardino de Pasion who were married on October 8, 1907. Epifania died on May 11, 1967 while
Bernardino on January 24, 1938. Ramon de Pasion was the only child of Bernardino with his first wife, while Florentino is the only child of
Ramon de Pasion. Alberto de Pasion is the only child of Epifania with an unknown father having been born on November 20, 1900. Adriana
Anca is the only surviving sister of Epifania Anca.

On January 15, 1941, Ramon de Pasion executed a deed of extrajudicial partition adjudicating to himself the land in litigation, and pursuant
thereto a transfer certificate of title was issued in his name by the register of deeds. On June 7, 1944, Ramon de Pasion sold the land to one
Benito Gaelon a new transfer certificate of title was issued in his name. Ramon de Pasion having repurchase the property from Gaelon, the
register of deeds again issued another title in his name. On November 29, 1950, Ramon de Pasion sold one-half of the land to one Manuel
Trias who died after the sale. In order to obviate the necessity of impleading the heirs of Trias, the parties agreed to limit the present
action to the remaining undivided half of the land.

For the appellant, the trial court erred in holding that her action has already prescribed. She claims that the land in question being covered
by homestead patent which has the nature of a torrens title her claim should be deemed imprescriptible. Being conjugal in nature, one-half
must be deemed to be registered also in the name of his wife Epifania Anca.

ISSUE: WON the Trial Court erred in holding that the action of the appellant has already prescribed.

HELD: No. The imprescriptibility of a torrens title can only be invoked by the person in whose name the title is registered. In other words, a
person who owns a land covered by a torrens title cannot lose its ownership by adverse possession on the part of a third person because of
the principle underlying the torrens system that the title is imprescriptible. The same rule applies to extinctive prescription in the sense
that the owner of a registered land can file an action to recover the same regardless of the period of prescription. But this rule does not
apply to a person who, not being the registered owner, claims the land in which case he should file his action within the prescriptive
period.

Further, under the principle of constructive trusteeship intervenor's right to claim the land has not prescribed because of the principle that
the right of a cestui que trust against the trustee who has committed a breach of his trust never prescribes (Sevilla, et al. v. Concordia de los
Angeles, L-7745, November 18, 1955; Gayondato v. Treasurer of the Philippine Islands, 49 Phil., 244). The evidence shows that the portion
of land that belonged to her sister Epifania Anca cannot be inherited by her because of the presence of Alberta de Pasion who, according to
the trial court, was an acknowledged natural child of Epifania. Such being the case, the right of Alberta de Pasion to the undivided portion
belonging to Epifania has the effect of excluding the intervenor who, as sister, only comes next in line of intestate succession (Articles 939
and 946, old Civil Code). The court has no other alternative than to declare that intervenor does not have any right to claim the portion of
land belonging to her sister, not because of prescription as found by the trial court, but because she is not the logical heir entitled to inherit
it. The decision appealed from is affirmed.

12. ANURAN vs. AQUINO

FACTS: Plantiff Florencia Anuran, is the widow of Ambrosio Aquino, deceased, to whose estate the property described in the complaint
belongs; Defendant, Ana Aquino, is the natural child of a sister of Ambrosio Aquino, deceased, that on the death of Ambrosio Aquino,
deceased;

Norberto Capia was appointed administrator of his intestate estate, at the instance of Ana Aquino,

At the time when these representations were made, both Ana Aquino and the administrator well knew that the plaintiff, Florencia Anuran,
was the surviving spouse of Ambrosio Aquino, deceased, and that Ana Aquino was not a legitimate but a natural daughter of the deceased
sister of Ambrosio Aquino;

Without notice to the widow, Ana Aquino, acting in collusion with the administrator appointed at her instance, fraudulently procured the
entry of an order in the administration proceedings dated March 12, 1912, authorizing and approving the delivery by the administrator of
all property of the estate to the alleged sole heir, Ana Aquino, the defendant in this suit.

The widow, who was not a party of record in the administration proceedings, did not discover that this order had been entered until about
the 14th day of February, 1914, when she promptly entered her appearance in the administration proceedings and moved that the order
be set aside, and that she be declared the sole heir of the deceased, who, as she alleged, had died without leaving either ascendants, or
descendants, or collateral relatives entitled to share in the estate.

The trial court denied the motion on the ground that the alleged fraudulent order had been entered more than six months prior to the date
of the motion, the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the motion to set it aside.

The widow instituted a separate action, wherein the trial court after declaring the order null and void, in that it had been procured by
fraudulent collusion in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant Ana Aquino for the possession of the lands and other property
turned over to the latter by the administrator, and for damages for their detention.

The facts upon which the trial judge based his judgment are fully sustained by the evidence of record, and clearly entitle the plaintiff to the
relief granted her.

ISSUE: WON Ana Aquino, is a natural and not a legitimate daughter of a deceased sister of Ambrosio Aquino.

HELD: YES. She is a natural and not a legitimate daughter of her mother.

There is not and cannot be any substantial question as to the right of the widow to take the estate of her deceased husband as his sole heir
under the provisions of articles 943 and 952 of the Civil Code. These articles are as follows:

A natural or legitimized child has no right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother
who has acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives inherit from the natural or legitimated child.

In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews, children, whether of the whole blood or not, of the same surviving spouse, if
not separated by a final decree of divorce, shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.

There can be no question as to the right of any person adversely affected by a judgment to maintain an action to enjoin its enforcement and
to have it declared a nullity on the ground of fraud and collusion practiced in the very matter of obtaining the judgment when such fraud is
extrinsic or collateral to the matters involved in the issues raised at the trial which resulted in such judgment; and fraudulent collusion
between an administrator and a third person resulting in an order or judgment whereby an interested person is unjustly deprived of his
rights in or to the estate under administration, has always been recognized as a sufficient ground for the grant of relief from the order or
judgment thus fraudulently procured. (23 Cyc., 1022, 1025, 1027, and numerous case there cited.)

As to the claim that the question of title to a part of the property described in the complaint is res adjudicata, it is only necessary to indicate
that in the present case the plaintiff bases her right to this property upon her statutory right to inherit the estate of her husband (article
952, Civil Code), whereas the judgment relied upon in support of the plea of res adjudicata, was merely judicial declaration that a part of
this property belonged to the estate of the deceased husband of the plaintiff, and that this part of the estate was not, as plaintiff then
contended, her separate property. In the present action plaintiff wholly abandons her contentions in the former proceedings, and claims
title by inheritance from her husband, accepting and relying upon the former ruling whereby the land then in question was judicially
declared to a part of his estate.

As to the contention of the appellant touching the prescription of this action, it is a sufficient answer to say that the evidence clearly
discloses that it was instituted promptly and without unreasonable delay after the discovery of the fraud perpetrated by the defendant,
acting in collusion of the fraud administrator, and within less than three years from the date of the entry of the order. Section 43 of the
Code of Civil Procedure provides that "An action for relief on the ground of fraud" must be brought within four years after the right of
action accrues, "but the right of action in such cases shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud."

Fraud has always been reckoned among the special abhorrences of equity, and fraud is one of the grounds upon which
application is most frequently made to equity for relief or redress. It is well settled that equity will enjoin a party from enforcing a
judgment which he has obtained by means of fraud. "Fraud will vitiate a judgment, and a court of equity may declare it a nullity.
Equity has so great an abhorrence of fraud that it will set aside its own decrees if founded thereupon." . . . (Par. 368, supra.)

This form of relief is expressly recognized in the Code of Civil Procedure in section 43, which provides for a prescription period of four
years for actions "for relief on the ground of fraud," the right of action in such cases "not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery
of the fraud."

From what has been said it follows that the probate court properly declined to assume jurisdiction to vacate or set aside its final order
turning over the property to the defendant in this case, on the ground of fraud in its procurement, the motion therefor not having been
submitted during the six months' period prescribed in article 113 of the Code within judgment or orders may be vacated or set aside on
motion; and it further follows, that the court having no jurisdiction to entertain such a motion, its dismissal is no bar to a separate action
for relief on the ground of fraud, and defendant's plea of res adjudicata was properly overruled.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

13. PADURA vs. BALDOVINO

*RESERVA TRONCAL: Reservees are full blood & half blood brothers/sisters

FACTS:

Agustin Padura contracted two marriages during his lifetime. With his first wife, Gervacia Landig, he had one child whom they named
Manuel Padura, and with his second, Benita Garing; he had two children named Fortunato and Candelaria. Agustin Padura died leaving a
last will and testament, duly probated in Court of First Instance of Laguna, wherein he bequeathed his properties among his children,
Manuel, Candelaria and Fortunato, and his surviving spouse, Benita Garing. Under the probate proceedings, Fortunato was adjudicated
four parcels of land covered under a Decree issued In Land Registration Case which is object of this appeal.

Fortunato died without issue and without having executed a will; the said parcels of land were inherited exclusively by her mother, Benita
Garing. She applied for and later was issued a Torrens Certificate of Title in her name, but subject to the condition that the properties
were reservable in favor of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came, in accordance with the
applicable provision of law.

1934-Candelaria Padura (sister of Fortunato) died leaving as her only heirs, her four legitimate children, the appellants herein, Cristeta,
Melania, Anicia and Pablo, all surnamed Baldovino. 1940, Manuel Padura also died. Surviving him are his legitimate children, Dionisia,
Felisa, Flora, Gornelio, Francisco, Juana, and Severino, all surnamed Padura, the appellees herein.

Upon the death of Benita Garing (the reservista) on 1952, appellants and appellees took possession of the reservable properties.

In a Resolution, the Court of First Instance of Laguna said that the legitimate children of the deceased Manuel Padura and Candelaria
Baldovino were declared to be the rightful reservees, and as such, entitled to the reservable properties (the original reserveess Candelaria
Padura and Manuel Padura, having predeceased the reservista).

APPELLANTS CONTENTION: The instant petition, dated 1956, filed by appellants Baldovino seeks to have these properties partitioned,
such that one-half of the same be adjudicated to them, and the other half to the appellees, allegedly on the basis that they inherit by right of
representation from their respective parents, the original reservees.

The appellants contend that notwithstanding the reservable character of the property under Art, 891 of the new Civil Code (Art. 811 of the
Code of 1889) the reservatarios/reservees nephews of the whole blood are entitled to a share twice as large as that of the others, in
conformity with Arts, 1006, 1008 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Arts. 949 and 951 of the Code of 1889) on intestate succession.

OPPOSITION: To this petition, appellees filed their opposition, maintaining that they should all (the eleven reservees) be deemed as
inheriting in their own right, under which, they claim, each should have an equal share.

DECISION OF THE TC: the lower court rendered judgment declaring all the reservees (without distinction) "co-owners, pro-indiviso, equal
shares of the parcels of land subject matter of the suit.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

In a case of reserva troncal, where the only reservatarios (reservees) surviving the reservista, and belonging to the line of origin, are
nephews of the descendant (prepositus), but some are nephews of the half blood and the others are nephews of the whole blood, should
the reserved properties be apportioned among them equally, or should the nephews of the whole(FULL) blood take a share twice as large
as that of the nephews of the half blood?

HELD:

"Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of
relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came. (811)"

The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once property has devolved to the specified relatives of the line of origin. But from this
time on, there is no further occasion for its application. In the relations between one reservatario and another of the same degree, there is
no call for applying Art. 891 any longer; wherefore, the respective share of each in the reversionary property should be governed by the
ordinary rules of intestate succession. In this spirit the jurisprudence of the Court, has resolved that upon the death of the
ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass, not to all the reservatorios as a class, but only to those nearest in degree to the
descendant (prepositus), excluding those reservatarios of more remote degree. And within the third degree of relationship from the
descendant (prepositus), the right of representation operates in favor of nephews.

Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood
brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews of half-blood. If in determining the rights of
the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the right of representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of double share for
immediate collaterals of the whole blood should be likewise operative.
In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives (reservatarios) to whom the property should be returned;
but within that group, the individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since
Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. This conclusion is strengthened by the circumstance that the reserva being an exceptional case, its
application should be limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of the law.

14. PAVIA VS UGARTE G.R. No. L-2599 October 27, 1905

FACTS:

Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez having died intestate, Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde asked that she be judicially declared the legitimate heir of
the deceased.

There being no legitimate heirs to the estate either in the direct ascendant or descendant line of succession, the petitioner presented
herself as a collateral descendant that is to say, as the legitimate niece of the deceased. Her mother, Maria Juana Iturralde y Gonzalez, as
well as the deceased, Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez, were children of Manual Iturralde and Josefa Gonzalez.

Carmen Linart, through her guardian, Rafaela Pavia, claimed one-half of all of the estate of the deceased, Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez, and
asked at the same time that Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, who had been declared the lawful heir of the deceased a fact which this new
relative did not deny be required to render an account of the property of the estate. What she claims is that, although she is one degree
lower in the line of succession that her aunt, Maria Juana Iturralde y Gonzalez, yet she is entitled to a share of the estate of the deceased
through her father, Pablo Linart, by representation that is to say, that even though a grandniece, she is entitled to the same share in the
estate as the direct niece, Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde.

ISSUE:

Whether or not grandniece is entitled to the same share in the estate as the direct niece.

HELD.

NO. The Court ruled that;

1) The relative nearest in degree excludes those more distant, with the exception of the right of representation in proper cases (art. 921,
par. 1 of the Civil Code); and

(2) That the right of representation in the collateral line shall take place only in favor of children of brothers or sisters whether they be of
whole or half blood (art. 925, par. 2).

We, therefore, hold that in an intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased can not participate with a niece in the inheritance, because
the latter, being a nearer relative, the more distance grandniece is excluded. In the collateral line the right of representation does not
obtain beyond sons and daughters of the brothers and sisters, which would have been the case if Pablo Linart, the father of the plaintiff,
had survived his deceased uncle.

15. DIAZ VS PAMUTI

G.R. No. L-66574 February 21, 1990

FACTS:

Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate
children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion. Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti
and another child who died during infancy. Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo
Santero. Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. Pascual Santero died
in 1970, Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976. Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona
Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.

Petitioners claim that the amendment of Articles 941 and 943 of the old Civil Code (Civil Code of Spain) by Articles 990 and 992 of the new
Civil Code (Civil Code of the Philippines) constitute a substantial and not merely a formal change, which grants illegitimate children certain
successional rights.

ISSUE: Does the term "relatives" in Article 992 include the legitimate parents of the father or mother of the illegitimate children

HELD:

"Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said illegitimate child. They may have a natural tie of
blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is
presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
family; and the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the
resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence
of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further ground of resentment.

It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother"
includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" is broad enough to comprehend all the kindred of the person spoken of. The
record reveals that from the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are
barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti
Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.