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G.R. No.

Caltex Philippines, Inc., petitioner-appellee
Enrico Palomar, in his capacity as The Postmaster General, respondent-appellant
In the year 1960, Caltex Philippines conceived and laid the ground work for a
promotional scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products. The contest was
entitled Caltex Hooded Pump Contest, which calls for participants to estimate the actual
number of liters as hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specific
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing
the contest but also for the transmission of communications, representations were made by
Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing. This was
formalized in a letter sent by Caltex to the Post Master General, dated October 31, 1960, in
which Caltex, thru its counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to justify its
position that the contest does not violate the The Anti-Lottery Provisions of the Postal
Unfortunately, the Palomar, the acting Postmaster General denied Caltexs request
stating that the contest scheme falls within the purview of the Anti-Lottery Provision and
ultimately, declined Caltexs request for clearance.
Caltex sought reconsideration, stressing that there being no consideration involved in
part of the contestant, the contest was not commendable as a lottery. However, the Postmaster
General maintained his view that the contest involves consideration, or even it does not involve
any consideration it still falls as Gift Enterprise, which was equally banned by the Postal
1. Whether the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief?
2. Whether or not the scheme proposed by Caltex the appellee is within the coverage of
the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law?
By express mandate of Section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court which deals with the
applicability to invoke declaratory relief which states: Declaratory relief is available to person
whose rights are affected by a statute, to determine any question of construction or validity
arising under the statute and for a declaration of rights thereunder.
In amplification, conformably established jurisprudence on the matter, laid down certain
1. There must be a justiciable controversy.
2. The controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse.
3. The party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy.
4. The issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.
With the appellees bent to hold the contest and the appellants threat to issue a fraud order if
carried out, the contenders are confronted by an ominous shadow of imminent and inevitable
litigation unless their differences are settled and stabilized by a declaration. And, contrary to the
insinuation of the appellant, the time is long past when it can rightly be said that merely the
appellees desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of others which
admittedly does not confer a cause of action. Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a
justiciable controversy when, as in the case at bar, it was translated into a positive claim of right
which is actually contested.
Is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the
authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered
doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for
in the law.
It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have herein just reached is not
without precedent. In Liberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117 A. 2d., 487, where a
corporation engaged in promotional advertising was advised by the county prosecutor that its
proposed sales promotion plan had the characteristics of a lottery, and that if such sales
promotion were conducted, the corporation would be subject to criminal prosecution, it was held
that the corporation was entitled to maintain a declaratory relief action against the county
prosecutor to determine the legality of its sales promotion plan.
Is the Contest Scheme a Lottery?
Extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance
e.g. policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles and fairs as well as various forms of
Three Essential Elements:
1. Consideration
2. Prize
3. 3. Chance
No, according to the Supreme Court, the contest scheme is not a lottery but it appears to
be more of a gratuitous distribution since nowhere in the rules is any requirements that any fee
be paid, any merchandise be bought, any services be rendered, or any value whatsoever be
given for the privilege to participate. Since, a prospective contestant has to do is go to a Caltex
Station, request for the entry form which is available on demand and accomplish and submit the
same for the drawing of the winner. Because of this, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible
consideration which would brand it as a lottery.
Moreover, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by chance, if no
consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the party receiving the chance, but it does
condemn as criminal scheme in which a valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or
indirectly for the chance to draw a prize.
Is the scheme, as sales promotion which would benefit the sponsor in the way of
increased patronage be considered as a consideration and thus violates the Postal Law?
No, the required element of consideration does not consist of the benefit derived by the
sponsors of the contest. The true test lies on whether or not the participant pays a valuable
consideration for the chance of winning and not whether or not those conducting the enterprise
receiver something of value for the distribution of the prize.
Is the Contest Scheme a Gift Enterprise?
Even if the term Gift Enterprise is not yet defined explicitly, there appears to be a
consensus among lexicographers and standard authorities that the term is common applied to a
sporting artifice of under which goods are sold for their market value but by way of inducement
to purchase the product, the purchaser is given a chance to win a prize.
And thus, the term of gift enterprise cannot be established in the case at bar since there
is not sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the
purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified contestant irrespective of whether or not they buy
the appellees products.
The lesson that we derive from this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is that every case must
be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the applicable statutory provision. It is
only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning than that
which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith.
In the end, the Supreme Court ruled out that under the prohibitive provision of the Postal Law,
gift enterprise and similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries,
they involve the element of consideration. Finding none in the contest, it was ruled out that the
appellee may not be denied the use of the mails for the purpose thereof.
GR No. L-30061 (February 27, 1974)

People vs. Jabinal


Jabinal was found guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition.

The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the
ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed
to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment
as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent
from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the
authority to possess and carry the firearm in question.

The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as
Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the
prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Courts decision in People vs.
Macarandang(1959) and People vs. Lucero(1958) and not on the basis of the latest reversal and
abandonment in People vs. Mapa (1967).


Whether or not appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the courts rulings in Macarandang and
Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero
doctrine in Mapa.


Decisions of this Court, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code states that Judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . The settled rule
supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet
the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.

Appellant was appointed as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm
pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero under which no criminal
liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit
therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the
time it was done was held not to be punishable.

The appellant was acquitted.

G. R. No. 136921
April 17, 2001356

The case at bar is a petition for certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner and private respondent married in 1975, a union that begot four children. She contends
that respondent surprisingly showed signs of psychological incapacity to perform his marital
obligations starting 1988. His true color of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible
husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with
friends daily from 4:00 oclock in the afternoon until 1:00 oclock in the morning. When cautioned
to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one
time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the
children. The children themselves were not spared from physical violence.
Petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in
Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, she returned home
to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as expected. On
the morning of 22 March 1994, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the
presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. He was imprisoned for 11 days for
slight physical injuries.
Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. The trial court declared their marriage to be null
and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Respondent appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, which in turn reversed
the decision of the trial court. Thus, the marriage of respondent and petitioner still subsists.


Whether or not the guidelines in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina
should be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature.


The doctrine of stare decisis, ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim legis interpretado legis vim obtinet that
the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The
interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that
law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later
overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith
in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit.
Thus the term psychological incapacity, borrowed from the Canon Law, was given legal
life by the Court in the case of Santos; in the case of Molina, additional procedural guidelines to
assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on
psychological incapacity was added. Both judicial decisions in Santos and Molina have the force
and effect of law. Thus, the guidelines in the case of Molina are mandatory in nature. The petition
was denied.
Songco, et al. vs. National Labor Relations Commission
G.R. Nos. 50999-51000
(March 23, 1990)

FACTS: Zuelig filed an application for clearance to terminate the services of Songco, and
others, on the ground of retrenchment due to financial losses. During the hearing, the parties
agreed that the sole issue to be resolved was the basis of the separation pay due. The
salesmen received monthly salaries of at least P400.00 and commission for every sale they
The Collective Bargaining Agreements between Zuelig and the union of which Songco,
et al. were members contained the following provision: "Any employee who is separated from
employment due to old age, sickness, death or permanent lay-off, not due to the fault of said
employee, shall receive from the company a retirement gratuity in an amount equivalent to one
(1) month's salary per year of service."
The Labor Arbiter ordered Zuelig to pay Songco et al., separation pay equivalent to their
one month salary (exclusive of commissions, allowances, etc.) for every year of service with the
The National Labor Relations Commission sustained the Arbiter.
ISSUE: Whether or not earned sales commissions and allowances should be included in the
monthly salary of Songco, et al. for the purpose of computing their separation pay.
In the computation of backwages and separation pay, account must be taken not only of
the basic salary of the employee, but also of the transportation and emergency living
Even if the commissions were in the form of incentives or encouragement, so that the
salesman would be inspired to put a little more industry on jobs particularly assigned to them,
still these commissions are direct remunerations for services rendered which contributed to the
increase of income of the employee. Commission is the recompense compensation or reward
of an agent, salesman, executor, trustee, receiver, factor, broker or bailee, when the same is
calculated as a percentage on the amount of his transactions or on the profit to the
principal. The nature of the work of a salesman and the reason for such type of remuneration
for services rendered demonstrate that commissions are part of Songco, et al's wage or salary.
The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that some salesmen do not receive any basic
salary, but depend on commissions and allowances or commissions alone, although an
employer-employee relationship exists.
If the opposite view is adopted, i.e., that commissions do not form part of the wage or
salary, then in effect, we will be saying that this kind of salesmen do not receive any salary and,
therefore, not entitled to separation pay in the event of discharge from employment. This
narrow interpretation is not in accord with the liberal spirit of the labor laws, and considering the
purpose of separation pay which is, to alleviate the difficulties which confront a dismissed
employee thrown to the streets to face the harsh necessities of life.
In Soriano vs. NLRC (155 SCRA 124), we held that the commissions also claimed by the
employee (override commission plus net deposit incentive) are not properly includible in such
base figure since such commissions must be earned by actual market transactions attributable
to the petitioner [salesman]. Since the commissions in the present case were earned by actual
transactions attributable to Song, et al., these should be included in their separation pay. In the
computation thereof, what should be taken into account is the average commission earned
during their last year of employment.
GR 189600

5/14/2009: Petition for certiorari challenging the assumption of office of one Emmanuel Joel
Villanueva as representative of CIBAC in the HoR.
Petitioner argues:
- Villanueva was 31 at the time of filing of nomination, beyond the age limit of 30 which was
the limit imposed by RA 7941 for "youth sector".
- Villanueva's change of affiliation from Youth Sector to OFW and families not affected six
months prior to elections.
Respondent argues:
- RA 7941 requirement for "age" for youth sector representative only applicable to first three
elections after the party list act.
There was no resultant change in affiliation.

Whether the requirement for youth sector representatives apply to respondent Villanueva

Villauneva ineligible to hold office as a member of HoR representing CIBAC.
Villanueva's arguments are invalid. The law is clear. If representative of youth sector, should be
between 25to 30.
Villanueva is ineligible to also represent OFW. Sectoral representation should be changed
SIX MONTHS priorto elections.
RCBC vs. IAC G.R. No. 74851, December 9, 1999

On September 28, 1984, BF Homes filed a Petition for Rehabilitation and for Declaration of
Suspension of Payments with the SEC.

RCBC, one of the creditors listed in BF Homes inventory of creditors and liabilities, on October
26, 1984, requested the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal to extra-judicially foreclose its real estate
mortgage on some properties of BF Homes. BF Homes opposed the auction sale and the SEC
ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon petitioners filing of a bond.
Presumably unaware of the filing of the bond on the very day of the auction sale, the sheriff
proceeded with the public auction sale in which RCBC was the highest bidder for the properties
auctioned. But because of the proceedings in the SEC, the sheriff withheld the delivery to RCBC
of the certificate of sale covering the auctioned properties.

On March 13, 1985, despite the SEC case, RCBC filed with RTC an action for mandamus
against the provincial sheriff of Rizal to compel him to execute in its favor a certificate of sale of
the auctioned properties.
On March 18, 1985, the SEC appointed a Management Committee for BF Homes.

Consequently, the trial court granted RCBCs motion for judgment on the pleading ordering
respondents to execute and deliver to petitioner the Certificate of Auction Sale.

On appeal, the SC affirmed CAs decision (setting aside RTCs decision dismissing the
mandamus case and suspending issuance to RCBC of new land titles until the resolution of the
SEC case) ruling that whenever a distressed corporation asks the SEC for rehabilitation and
suspension of payments, preferred creditors may no longer assert such preference but stand on
equal footing with other creditors. Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue: When should the suspension of actions for claims against BF Homes take effect?

Held: The issue of whether or not preferred creditors of distressed corporations stand on equal
footing with all other creditors gains relevance and materiality only upon the appointment of a
management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board or body.

Upon cursory reading of Section 6, par (c) of PD 902-A, it is adequately clear that suspension of
claims against a corporation under rehabilitation is counted or figured up only upon the
appointment of a management committee or a rehabilitation takes effect as soon as the
application or a petition for rehabilitation is filed with the SEC may to some, be more logical and
wise but unfortunately, such is incongruent with the clear language of the law. To insist on such
ruling, no matter how practical and noble would be to encroach upon legislative prerogative to
define the wisdom of the law --- plainly judicial legislation.

Once a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board or body is appointed pursuant to

PD 902-A, all actions for claims against a distressed corporation pending before any court,
tribunal, board or body shall be suspended accordingly; Suspension shall not prejudice or
render ineffective the status of a secured creditor as compared to a totally unsecured creditor.
What it merely provides is that all actions for claims against the corporation, partnership or
association shall be suspended. This should give the receiver a chance to rehabilitate the
corporation if there should still be a possibility for doing so. In the event that rehabilitation is no
longer feasible and claims against the distressed corporation would eventually have to be
settled, the secured creditors shall enjoy preference over the unsecured creditors subject only to
the provisions of the Civil Code on Concurrence and Preferences of Credit.
Go Ka Toc Sons and Co., etc. v. Rice and Corn Board
G.R. No. L-23607
May 23, 1967

Go Ka Toc Sons & Co., petitioner, is a duly registered partnership not wholly owned by
Filipinos. It engaged in the "manufacturing, processing and marketing of vegetable oil extracted
from different vegetable products.
August 2, 1960, Republic Act 3018 was approved which prohibited partnerships whose
capital was not wholly owned by Filipinos from engaging directly or indirectly in the rice and/or
corn industry. The law takes effect on January 1, 1951, however such partnerships
upon registration with the Municipal treasurer are allowed to exist until 2 years after January 1,
1961, for the purpose of liquidation.
The Rice and Cord Board (RICOB) issued Resolution No. 10 defining the term by
product and General Circular No. 1 which defined the term "Capital Investment which limits the
maximum amount of capital investments of alien persons engaged in the rice and/or corn
industry in pursuant to Republic Act 3018. Petitioner has stopped in the sale of rice and/or corn
since the lapse of the two-year period from the effectivity of the law and has limited its activities
to the trade processing and manufacture of corn and rice oil from
raw materials consisting of corn germ proper or embryo (Sungo and Tahup) as well as rice
husk it secures from those who produce rice and corn. Petitioner also produces Corn Meal or
Corn Meal Germ" which it sells and trades.
Petitioners filed an action in the Court of First Instance (CFI) to declare the said law and
RICOB Resolution No. 10 and Gen. Circulation No. 1, as inapplicable to it. The lower court was
in favor of the Petitioner and thus issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for.
RICOB through the Solicitor General has taken the instant appeal to raise questions
purely of law, hence the petition to this court.

Whether or not the Petitioner, not a 100% Filipino owned corporation can engage in the trade,
processing and manufacture of corn and rice oil from raw materials.

No. The lower court erred in the construction of the in which it proclaimed that the issue
of by-products was germane to the case at hand and on the interpretation legislative intent
of the makers of the law with the remark that Filipinos do not depend for their survival by the
eating the by-products if rice and corn, hence the error in the
decision that the Petitioners were not included in the scope of Republic Act No. 3018.
According to Section 1 of the law:
No person who is not a citizen of the Philippines, or association, partnership
or Corporation, the capital or capital stock of which is now wholly owned by citizens of the
Philippines, shall directly indirectly engage in the rice and/or corn industry except as provided in
Section three of this act.
Since the law is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction or
interpretation, but only Implementation. Only 100% Filipino owned artificial persons "may
engage in the rice and/or corn industry. In regards to the validity of Resolution No. 10 and
General Circular No. 1, is rendered moot and academic.
Luzon Surety Co vs de Garcia
1) Ladislao Chavez, principal, and petitioner Luzon Surety Co Inc, executed a surety bond in
favor of PNB Victorias Branch to guaranty a crop loan granted by the latter to Chavez in the
sum of PhP9,000.
2) Vicente Garcia, together with Ladislao Chavez and Ramon Lacson, as guarantors, signed an
indemnity agreement binding themselves solidarily liable to indemnify Luzon Surety Co Inc
against any and all damages, costs and and other expenses which the petitioner may sustain or
incur in consequence of having become guarantor upon said bond, to pay interest at the rate of
12% per annum, computed and compounded quarterly until fully paid; and to pay 15% of the
amount involved in any litigation or other matters growing out of or connected therewith for
attorney's fees.
3) On April 27, 1956, PNB filed a complaint against Ladislao Chavez and Luzon Surety Co. to
recover the amount of PhP4,577.95, in interest, attorneys fees and other costs.
4) On August 8, 1957, Luzon Surety Co. instituted a third party complaint against Chavez,
Lacson and Garcia.
5) On September 17, 1958, a judgment was rendered ordering Chavez and Luzon Surety Co. to
pay PNB in solidarity. The same decision likewise ordered the third party defendants Chavez,
Garcia and Lacson to pay Luzon Surety Co. the amount to be paid to PNB.
6) On July 30, 1960, a writ of execution was issued against Garcia to satisfy the claim of the
petitioner. A writ of garnishment was soon issued levying and garnishing the sugar quedans of
the Garcia spouses from their sugar plantation.
7) Spouses Garcia filed a suit for injunction and the trial court ruled in favor of them.
WON the CPG could be liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband to
accommodate a third party in favor of a surety agreement
No. Decision appealed from was affirmed. Costs against petitioner. Ratio Decidendi: Art. 161.
The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases
where she may legally bind the partnership;
(2) Arrears or income due, during the marriage, from obligations which constitute a charge
upon property of either spouse or of the partnership;
(3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate
property of either the husband or the wife; major repairs shall not be charged to the partnership;
(4) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;
(5) The maintenance of the family and the education of the children of both husband and wife,
and of legitimate children of one of the spouses;
(6) Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a professional, vocational or
other course.(1408a)
Petitioner contends that Garcias transaction as a guarantor through which he acquires the
capacity of being trusted, adds to his reputation and enhances his standing in the community.
He can thus secure money with which to carry on the purposes of their conjugal partnership.
While not entirely without basis, such argument cannot prosper for it would negate what is
expressly provided for in Article 161.
In the most categorical language, a conjugal partnership under that provision is liable only for
such "debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." There must be the requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly
accrued to the welfare of the spouses.
There is none in this case. While Garcia by thus signing the agreement may be said to enhance
his reputation, such benefit, even if hypothetically accepted, is too remote and fanciful to come
within the express terms of the provision.
Its language is clear; it does not admit of doubt. No process of interpretation or construction
need be resorted to. It peremptorily calls for application. Where a requirement is made in explicit
and unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to the judiciary. It must see to it that its mandate is
obeyed. So it is in this case. That is how the Court of Appeals acted, and what it did cannot be
impugned for being contrary to law.
G.R. No. L-8848, November 21, 1913
The appellants, Hart, Miller, and Natividad, were found guilty on a charge of vagrancy under the
provisions of Act No. 519. All three appealed and presented evidence showing that each of the
defendants was earning a living at a lawful trade or business sufficient enough to support
themselves. However, the Attorney-General defended his clients by arguing that in Section 1
of Act No. 519, the phrase no visible means of support only applies to the clause tramping
or straying through the country and not the first clause which states that every person found
loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses, thus making the 3 appellants guilty
of vagrancy. He further argued that it been intended for without visible means of support to
qualify the first part of the clause, either the comma after gambling houses would have been
omitted, or else a comma after country would have been inserted.
WON Hart, Miller and Natividad are guilty of vagrancy under the Attorney-Generals argument
based on a mere grammatical criticism.
An argument based upon punctuation alone is not conclusive and the effect intended by theLeg
islature should be the relevant determinant of the interpretation of the law. When the meaning of
a legislative enactment is in question, it is the duty of the courts to ascertain, if possible, the true
legislative intention, and adopt that construction of the statute which will give it effect. Moreover,
ascertaining the consequences flowing from such a construction of the law is also helpful in
determining the soundness of the reasoning. Considering that the argument of the Attorney-
General would suggest a lack of logical classification on the part of the legislature of the various
classes of vagrants and since it was proven that all three of the defendants were earning a living
by legitimate means at a level of comfort higher than usual, Hart, Miller and Natividad were
acquitted, with the costs de oficio.
Perfecto Floresca vs Philex Mining Corporation
GR NO L-30642
April 30, 1985

Perfecto Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation
who, while working at its copper mines underground operations in Tuba, Benguet on June 28,
1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Theircomplaint
alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations, negligently and deliberately
failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men working
underground. Floresca et al moved to claim their benefits pursuant to the Workmens
Compensation Act before the Workmens Compensation Commission. They also filed a
separate civil case against Philex for damages.
Philex sought the dismissal of the civil case as it insisted that Floresca et al have already
claimed benefits under the Workmens Compensation Act.

Whether or not Philex is correct.

Yes. Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed for benefits under the
WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding with a civil case before the regular courts.
Conversely, if they sued before the civil courts then they would also be estopped from claiming
benefits under the WCA.

HOWEVER, the Supreme Court ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this deficiency due to
ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they may have not availed of such a
remedy. But, if in case theyll win in the lower court whatever award may be granted, the amount
given to them under the WCA should be deducted. The SC emphasized that if they would go
strictly by the book in this case then the purpose of the law may be defeated. Idolatrous
reverence for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures mans
survival and ennobles him. As Shakespeare said, the letter of the law killeth but its spirit giveth
Republic vs. CA and Molina
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel
Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The couple got
married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both
as husband and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered his
money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in
regard to their finances. In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their
relationship was estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio
City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child. Since then he abandoned

Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

No. The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes
psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction
personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet
the essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness. Reynaldos
action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise
grounds for psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she
and her husband cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem
neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison
showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered as
psychological incapacity.

The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in
this case:
burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff
root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined
such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the
essentials of marital obligations of marriage
such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the
Family Code
decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be
court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of
the state.
Airspona vs CA

GR NO. L-39419

APRIL 12, 1982


Rodolfo S. Aisporna was duly licensed by Insurance Commission as agent to Perla

Compania de Seguros, with license to expire on 30 June, 1970
Eugenio S. Isidro was issued a Personal Accident Policy by Perla thru its
author representative, Rodolfo for a period of 12 months with beneficiary
as Ana M. Isidro for P5,000
Personal Accident Policy insured died by violence during lifetime of policy
Fiscal filed against Mapalad Aisporna, wife of Rodolfo with violation of Sec. 189
of Insurance Law for having, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously acted,
"as agent in the solicitation for insurance by soliciting the application of
Eugenio S. Isidro for and in behalf of Perla Compaa de Seguros, ...
without said accused having first secured a certificate of authority to act
as such agent from the office of the Insurance Commission, Republic of
the Philippines
Defense: she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and that policy
was merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro had called by
telephone to renew, and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent
and so she left a note on top of her husband's desk to renew
RTC and CA: guilty as charged

ISSUE: W/N the agent mentioned in the 1st paragraph of Sec. 189 of the
Insurance Act is governed by the definition of an insurance agent found on
its 2nd paragraph

HELD: NO. Reversed

Section 189 of the Insurance Act
Insurance Act
Section 189
No insurance company doing business within the Philippine Islands, nor any agent
thereof, shall pay any commission or other compensation to any person for services in
obtaining new insurance, unless such person shall have first procured from the
Insurance Commissioner a certificate of authority to act as an agent of such company as
hereinafter provided. No person shall act as agent, sub-agent, or broker in the solicitation
of procurement of applications for insurance, or receive for services in obtaining new
insurance, any commission or other compensation from any insurance company doing
business in the Philippine Islands, or agent thereof, without first procuring a certificate
of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner, which must be renewed
annually on the first day of January, or within six months thereafter. Such certificate shall
be issued by the Insurance Commissioner only upon the written application of persons
desiring such authority, such application being approved and countersigned by the
company such person desires to represent, and shall be upon a form approved by the
Insurance Commissioner, giving such information as he may require. The Insurance
Commissioner shall have the right to refuse to issue or renew and to revoke any such
certificate in his discretion. No such certificate shall be valid, however, in any event after
the first day of July of the year following the issuing of such certificate. Renewal
certificates may be issued upon the application of the company.
Any person who for compensation solicits or obtains insurance on behalf of any
insurance company, or transmits for a person other than himself an application for a
policy of insurance to or from such company or offers or assumes to act in the
negotiating of such insurance, shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this
section, and shall thereby become liable to all the duties, requirements, liabilities, and
penalties to which an agent of such company is subject.

Any person or company violating the provisions of this section shall be fined in the sum
of five hundred pesos. On the conviction of any person acting as agent, sub-agent, or
broker, of the commission of any offense connected with the business of insurance, the
Insurance Commissioner shall immediately revoke the certificate of authority issued to
him and no such certificate shall thereafter be issued to such convicted person.
careful perusal of the provision shows
first paragraph - prohibits a person from acting as agent, sub-agent or broker in the
solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first procuring a
certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner (no necessity that
a person solicits an insurance for compensation in order to be called an
insurance agent)
second paragraph - defines who is an insurance agent within the intent of this section
(a person is an insurance agent if he solicits and obtains an insurance for
third paragraph - prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its violation
The appellate court has established ultimately that she did not receive any
compensation for the issuance of the insurance policy of Eugenio Isidro.
It must be noted that the information, in the case at bar, does not allege that the
negotiation of an insurance contracts by the accused with Eugenio Isidro was one for
This allegation is essential, and having been omitted, a conviction of the accused could
not be sustained.
It is well-settled in Our jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of the
crime must be alleged and proved.