Petitioner (Ktac)

JUSTICE T.
RAMACHANDRAN MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION - 2016
BEFORE THE HONBLE
HIGH COURT OF KARMASTHAN
ORIGINAL WRIT JURISDICTION
[UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF INDIAN CONSTITUTION]
In the matter of Article 14, 19, 20 and 21
of Constitution of India
W.P. NO. _______ OF 2016
KARMASTHAN TELEVISION ACTORS ASSOCIATION (KTAC)
......PETITIONER
versus.
STATE OF KARMASTHAN
...RESPONDENT
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HONBLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS COMPANION

JUSTICES OF THE HIGH COURT OF KARMASTHAN
WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

JUSTICE T. RAMACHANDRAN MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION -2016
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents....i
Table of Abbreviations.....iii
Authorities Cited...vi
Statement of Facts..x
Statements of Jurisdiction..1
Questions Raised2
Summary of Pleadings...3
Pleadings5
1. Whether Karmasthan the writ petition filed against the State of Karmasthan is
maintainable...5
1.1 That the Petitioner has Locus Standi....5
1.2 State has violated Fundamental Rights enshrined under Constitution.5
1.2 a) Violation of Art. 14
1.2 b) Violation of Art. 19
1.2 c) Violation of Art. 20
1.2 d) Violation of Art. 21
1.3 Alternative Remedy not a bar...7
2. Whether Karmasthan Dramatic Performances (Amendment) Act, 2016 and Indecent

Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986 Violate Art.14 of the Constitution8
2.1 That KDP(A)A, 2016 does not satisfy the Tests of Valid Classification....8
2.2 KDP(A), 2106 is Unreasonable And Arbitrary..10
2.3 That the said Act IRW(P), 1986 gives the Discretionary Powers to the State12

Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986 Violate Art.19 of the Constitution.13
Written Submission on behalf of Petitioner

i
3.1 That KDP(A)A, 2016 Violates Article 19(1)(a)..14
3.2 That IRW(P)A, 1986 Violates Article 19 (1)(g)..16

Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986 Violate Art.20 (1) & Art.21 of the
Constitution..18
4.1 Violation of Art 20 of Indian Constitution..19
4.2 That the said acts are Violative of Art 21.22
Conclusion24
Prayer...25

ii
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
& And
(P) Private
A.P. Andhra Pradesh
ABCL Amitabh Bachchan Corporation Limited
AIHC All India High Court
AIR All India Reporter
Anr. Another
Art. Article
Co., Company
Corpn., Corporation
Del Delhi
edn., Edition
Etc., Etcetera
Govt. Government
Guj. Gujarat
HC High Court
Honble Honourable
i.e., That is
IRWPA Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act
ITO Income Tax Officer
ITR Income Tax Return
J&K Jammu and Kashmir

iii
J. Justice
KDP(A)A Karmasthan Dramatic Performances (Amendment) Act
KDPA Karmasthan Dramatic Performances Act
KTAC Karmasthan Television Actors Association
Ltd., Limited
M.P. Madhya Pradesh
NCT National Capital Territory
ONGC Oil and Natural Gas Corporation limited
Ori. Orissa
Ors. Others
p. Page
para Paragraph
Pat Patna
Punj. Punjab
s. Section
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
Supp. Supplement
T.N. Tamil Nadu
u/a Under article
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UOI Union of India
UT Union Territory
v. Versus

iv
V.P. Vindhya Pradesh
Vol. Volume
W. B. West Bengal

v
AUTHORITIES CITED
1. A.L. Kalra v. P&E Corpn. of India Ltd., (1984) 3 SCC 316.8

2. A.P. Agarwal v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi , AIR 2000 SC 2059
3. A.P. Dairy Development Corporation Federation v. B Narsimha Reddy, (2011) 9 SCC
286....8
4. Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi AIR 1981 SC 487.....9
5. Ameeroonisa v. Mahboob AIR 1953 SC 91...10
6. Amitabh Bachchan Corporation Ltd., v. Mahila Jagaran Manch And Ors, (1997) 7 SCC
91.....14,17,18,24
7. B.E.M.L. Employees House Building Co-operative Society Ltd., v. State of Karnataka,
(2005) 9 SCC 248....8,11
8. Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab 1982 AIR 132522
9. Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 1325...8
10. Bal Thackeray v. Prabhakar Kashinath Kunte, AIR 1996 SC 1113....15
11. Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd., v. CTO,(2005) 1 SCC 625..11
12. Basheshar Nath vs The Commissioner of Income Tax Delhi & Rajasthan and Anr1959 AIR
149..10
13. Bhau ram v. Baij Nth Singh, AIR 1962 SC 147615
14. Bidi Supply Co. v. UOI, AIR 1956 SC 479..9
15. Central Inland Water Transport Corporation v. Brojo Nath Ganguly AIR 1986 SC
1571....10
16. Chandra Rajkumari v. Commissioner of Police AIR 1998 AP 302.......15
17. Chandrajit Lal v. UOI, AIR 1951 SC 41......5
18. Chandrakant Kalyandas Kakodkar v State of Maharastra AIR 1970 SC 1390.......15
19. Charan singh v. UOI, AIR 1961 Punj 272......14
20. Chief Inspector of Mines v. K.C. Thapar AIR 1961 SC 838..........19
21. Chintaman rao v. State of M.P., AIR 1951 SC 118,120.15
22. Chintamanrao v. State of M. P, AIR 1951 SC 118,120...18
23. Coffee Board V. Jt. Commercial Tax Officer......7
24. Collector of Customs v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty, AIR 1962 SC 316............16
25. D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A Industries Ltd. (1993) 3 SCC 259....10
26. Dharanidhare Patre v. State , 1995 AIHC 1733 (Ori)..21

vi
27. Dinesh Kumar v. State of MP (2004) 8 SCC 770........20

28. Directorate of Film Festivals v. Gaurav Ashwin Jain, AIR 1971 SC 481......14
29. District Registrar and Collector, Hyderabad v. Canara Bank, (2005) 1 SCC 496..12
30. Dr. Ramesh Yeshwant Prabhoo v.Prabhakar Kashinath Kunte, AIR 1996 SC 1113.15
31. DTC v. Mazdoor Congress AIR 1991 SC 101...10
32. Dwaraka Prasad v. State of U.P, 1954 SC 224 (227).....18
33. E.P. Royappa v. state of T.N., (1974)4 SCC 3.8,11
34. Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, U T of Delhi and Ors. (1981) 1 SCC
608..22
35. G. Gurunadha Reddy v. A.P Road Transport Corporation AIR 1999 AP 17922
36. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643.8
37. Govind Pillai v Padmanabha Pillai, AIR 1965 Ker 123.................19
38. Harbansal Sahnia V. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. AIR 2003 SC 2120....7
39. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (2000) 1 SCC 1688
40. Indra Sawhney v. UOI, (1992) 3 SCC 217..........8
41. Jaila Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1975 SC 1436.9
42. K. A. Abbas v. UOI, AIR 1971 SC 481.14
43. K. Nagraj v. State of A.P., (1985) 1 SCC 523....11
44. K.K. Kouchunni v. State of Madras AIR 1959 SC 725....7
45. Kanubhai Brahmbhatt v. State of Guj, AIR 1987 SC 1159...6
46. Kedarnath Bhal v. State of Punjab AIR 1972 SC 873.20
47. Kehar Singh v. UOI, AIR 1988 SC 1883..24
48. Keshavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 2258
49. Kishan Lal Lakshmi Chand v. State of Haryana,1993 Supp. (4) SCC 461....11
50. Krishna Kumar Narula v. State of J&K, AIR 1967 SC 1368,1371.....17
51. M.R.F. Ltd. v. Inspector Kerala Government, (1998) 8 SCC 227.18
52. Maganbhai Ishwaribhai v. UOI, AIR 1965 SC 745.........5
53. Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 5976,10,11,16,18,22,23
54. Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 620.6
55. Minerva Mills Ltd., and Ors., v. UOI, (1980) 2 SCC 591.......8
56. Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731..15
57. Municipal Corporation v. Jan Mohd. Usmanbhai, (1986) 4 SCC 656....17
58. N.B. Khare v. State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 211....11

vii
59. Naraindas Indurkhya v. State of M.P.,(1974) 4 SCC 788..........11

60. Navinchandra Majithia v.State of Maharastra (2000) 7 SCC 640..7
61. Olga Tellis & Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corpn AIR 1986 SC 18.22
62. ONGC v. Utpal Kumar Basu (1994) 4 SCC 711..7
63. Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002) 9 SCC 111..8
64. Pyare Lal Sharma v. MD Jammu and Kashmir Industries Ltd, AIR 1989 SC 1854...20
65. R.D. Shetty v. Airport Authority AIR 1979 SC 1628.............11
66. R.L.Bansal v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 978...12
67. Rama Ranjan Prasad Singh v. UOI, AIR 1995.......11
68. Randhira v. State AIR 1954 MB 83.21
69. Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 881....14
70. S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal AIR 2010 SC 3196..15
71. S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram (1989) 2 SCC 574..15
72. Sardar Inder Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1957 SC 510.....11
73. Sathyanarayana Sinha v. S. Lal & Co, AIR 1973 SC 2720.....5
74. Satywati Sharma v. Union of India 2002 AIHC 4643(Del)....10
75. Sheo Nandan Paswan v. State of Bihar, (1987) 1 SCC 288...11
76. Shiv Bhadur Sigh Rao v. State of Vindhya Pradesh AIR 1953 SC 394.....20,21
77. Shrinivasa Rao v. J.Veeraiah , AIR 1993 SC 929..12
78. Sodan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, AIR 1989 SC 1988.....16
79. Soni v. State of Guj AIR 1991 SC 2173.....22
80. State of Bombay v. R.M.D.C. Chamarbaugwalla & Ors, AIR 1956 Bom 1..13
81. State of Bombay v. United motors Ltd. AIR 1953 SC 252..7
82. State of Mysore v. Bhat AIR 1975 SC 596.....13
83. State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal, AIR 1952 SC 12...............5
84. State of Orissa v. Ram Chandra, AIR 1964 SC 41.......5
85. State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75...9
86. State of W.B. v. Subodh Gopal Bose, AIR 1954 SC 92.13
87. Sudhir Chandra Sarkar v. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd, AIR 1984 SC 1064 .10,11
88. Suman Gupta v. State of J&K, (1983) 4 SCC 339..12
89. Techspan India (P.) Ltd. v. ITO [2006] 283 ITR 212 (Del)......7
90. West Ramnad Electric Distribution Co.Ltd v. State of Madras AIR 1962 SC 17521

viii
Statutes Referred
1. Constitution of India, 1950

2. Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986
3. Indian Penal Code, 1860
Books Referred
1. M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (6TH EDITION, 2011)
2. V.N. SHUKLA, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (12TH EDITION, 2013)
3. DURGA DAS BASU, SHORTER CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (14TH EDITION,

2011)
4. DURGA DAS BASU , COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

(8TH EDITION, 2012) & (9TH EDITION, 2014)
5. RATANA LAL & DHIRAJLAL, INDIAN PENAL CODE (34TH EDITION, 2014)
Legal Database
1. Manupatra Online Resources, http://www.manupatra.com
2. Lexis Nexis Legal, http://www.lexisnexis.com/in/legal
3. Complete Digital Judgements, http://www.cdjlawjournal.com

ix
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Karmasthan is a State in the India Union and Punayaswar is the capital of the State.
KTAC [Karmasthan Television Actor Association] is a registered charitable society.
On 5 July 2016 KTAC published an advertisement in the leading cinema magazine
about the Beauty Pageant Miss India 17 for selecting Miss. India proposed to be held
on 7th and 8th January 2017.
An Advertisement was put up by the organisers regarding the venue and ticket costs
and there was picture of 7 girls wearing modern outfit.
Some organisers and religious leaders submitted a memorandum to the Chief Minister
of the State requesting to ban Miss India 17 pointing out few wrong allegations
(which arent true) against KTAC.
On 1 Aug 2016, the Karmasthan State Legislative Assembly enacted Karmasthan
Dramatic Performances (Amendment) Act, 2016 amending s.2 and 3 of Karmasthan
Dramatic Performances Act, 1962.This amendment came into force on 8 Aug 2016
The Amendment added the word beauty contests in s. 2 and 4 of the 1962 Act, which
brings beauty contests into the definition of objectionable performance.
On 15 Aug 2016, the District Collector, who is the Executive Magistrate, issued a notice
to KTAC under s.4 to show cause why Miss India 17 should not be prohibited since
its objectionable performance under s.2 (1) (vi) of Karmasthan Dramatic Performance
(Amendment) Act.
On 9 Sep 2016 Miss India 17 was prohibited by Executive Magistrate.
On 14 Sep 2016 Deputy Commissioner of Police raided the Office of KTAC and seized
the advertisements of Miss India 17 in exercise of his powers as the Authorised
Officer of the State Govt. under s. 5 of Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition)
Act, 1986. 2989 items consisting of posters and big hoardings containing the same
picture included the earlier advertisement have been seized by the Deputy
Commissioner.
On 22 Sep 2016 filed a petition before the High Court Karmasthan Challenging the
action of the Deputy Commissioner stating that beauty contests could not be treated as
indecent, scurrilous or obscene. It is also contended that Karmasthan Dramatic
Performance (Amendment) Act, 2016 and Indecent Representation of Women
(Prohibition) Act, 1986 are in violation of Art 14, 19 and 20 of the Constitution.

x
JUSTICE T. RAMACHANDRAN MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION - 2016
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Petitioner has approached the Honble High Court of Karmasthan under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
Article 226 of the Constitution confers a power on all the High Courts of India to issue
directions, orders or writs to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any
government within those territories for the enforcement of the Fundamental Rights.
The Petitioner have filed writ petition against the State of Karmasthan for infringing the
petitioners rights enshrined by Constitution of India.

1
QUESTIONS RAISED
1. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION FILED AGAINST THE STATE OF

KARMASTHAN IS MAINTAINABLE.
2. WHETHER KARMASTHAN DRAMATIC PERFORMANCES (AMENDMENT) ACT,

2016 AND INDECENT REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN (PROHIBITION) ACT,
1986 ARE VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14 OF CONSTITUTION OF INDIA.

1986 ARE VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 19 OF CONSTITUTION OF INDIA.

1986 ARE VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 20(1) AND ARTICLE 21 OF CONSTITUTION
OF INDIA.

2
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
1. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION FILED AGAINST STATE OF KARMASTHAN IS

MAINTAINABLE.
It is humbly submitted that the writ petition filed before the Honble High Court is maintainable
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as there is violation of fundamental rights under
Art.14,19,20 and 21. Therefore, the petitioner has locus standi to approach the High court
directly as there is no equal and efficacious alternative remedy available.
2. WHETHER KARMASTHAN DRAMATIC PERFORMANCES (AMENDMENT)

ACT,2016 AND INDECENT REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN (PROHIBITION)
ACT,1986 ARE VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14 OF CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
It is humbly submitted before this Honble High Court that the said Acts are violative of Art.14
of the Constitution of India as they lay down the restrictions which are arbitrary. These
restrictions are also unreasonable. Karmasthan Dramatic Performances (Amendment) Act,2016
has provided unreasonable classification by including various performances under one head and
declares the beauty contests as objectionable performances. The impugned Act also prohibits
such performances. This action violates Art.14 as the classification does not satisfy the tests of
intelligible differentia and rational nexus.
It is also submitted that Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act,1986 also violates
Art.14 as this Act considers beauty contests as indecent and obscene and provides for the seizure
of the advertisements which as promoting the beauty contest. Therefore, the said Act considers
arbitrary definition which violates Art. 14 of the petitioner.

3

ACT,1986 ARE VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 19 OF CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
It is humbly submitted before this Honble High Court that the said Acts violate Art. 19 of
Constitution of India as the Acts provides for prohibition of beauty contests which is a form of
expression and it also seizes the advertisements and hampers the Petitioners right in carrying
their business. Therefore, the said Acts are violative of Art. 19(1)(a) and Art. 19(1)(g).
Karmasthan Dramatic Performances (Amendment) Act,2016 violates Art.19(1)(a) as it prohibits
beauty contest by considering it as an objectionable performance under the grounds of decency
and morality, which is unreasonable and ambiguous grounds.
It is also submitted that Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act,1986 violates

Art.19(1)(g) as the said Act seizes the advertisements published by the Petitioner for promoting
their business. Therefore, the said Act restricts the right of the Petitioner to carry on its business.

ACT,1986 ARE VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLES 20 AND 21 OF CONSTITUTION OF
INDIA
It is humbly submitted before this Honble High Court that the said Acts violate Art. 20(1) of
Constitution of India as the Act to hold the Petitioner guilty when it is actually innocent as later
amended Act cannot hold anyone guilty of the offence wherein at the time of commission there
was not penal legislation for it.
It is also submitted KDP(A)A is in violation with Art. 20 of the constitution as it infringes the
right of organisers i.e., the Petitioner and the participates who are participating as not allowing
them to exercise their personal liberty enshrined.
It is also submitted that Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act,1986 section 5 is

in violation with Art.21 as it gives power to the state authority to enter and seize hindering the
personal liberty of the individuals and organisers i.e. Petitioner.

4
PLEADINGS
1. WRIT PETITION FILED IS MAINTAINABLE
It is humbly submitted before this Honble court that in the wide ambit of Art.226, a writ petition
can be filed in the High Court for the violation of Fundamental Rights enumerated in Part III of
the Constitution of India as there is violation of Fundamental rights u/a 14, 19, 20(1) and 21 by
the Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986[Herein after referred to as
IRWPA,1986] and Karmasthan Dramatic Performances (Amendment) Act, 2016[Herein after
referred to as KDP(A)A,2016], the present writ petition filed by KTAC [ Herein after referred
to as Petitioner] against the State of Karmasthan [Herein after referred to as Respondent] is
maintainable.
1.1 THAT THE PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI
The existence of the right is the foundation of the exercise of jurisdiction under article 226.1 The
legal right that can be enforced under this article must ordinarily be the right of the petitioner
himself.2 In Maganbhai Ishwaribhai v. UOI3 the SC held that, only those persons, whose rights
are directly and substantially invaded or are imminent danger of being so invaded, can approach
the court. The petitioner for writ should normally be a person aggrieved.4 In the present case it is
Petitioner whose rights are directly infringed by the state authority.
In a special reference case, Under Article 143(1) of Constitution of India v. Unknown5 the apex
court of justice held that the power conferred on the High Court u/a 226(1) can, in a case, be
exercised even against the legislature.
1.2VIOLATES FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ENSHRINED UNDER CONSTITUTION
The action of the Deputy Commissioner and the two statutes that are in question in the present
case has violated petitioners Fundamental Rights, hence petitioner has approached the Honble
1
State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal, AIR 1952 SC 12; State of Orissa v. Ram Chandra, AIR 1964 SC 41.
2
Chandrajit Lal v. UOI, AIR 1951 SC 41.
3
AIR 1969 SC 783.
4
Sathyanarayana Sinha v. S. Lal & Co., AIR 1973 SC 2720
5
AIR 1965 SC 745

5
HC.In Kanubhai Brahmbhatt v. State of Guj6 SC held that a petitioner complain of infraction of
his Fundamental Rights should approach the High Court.
1.2 a)Violation of Art 14
Art. 14 guarantees equality before law. Equality can be assured when there is no arbitrariness
and unreasonableness in the classification that is made. A valid classification should fulfil the
requirements of the two tests namely, i) intelligible differentia and ii) rational nexus. In the
present case both the tests are not satisfied by the two above mentioned statutes. Therefore, there
is violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India.
1.2 b)Violation of Art 19
Art. 19 of the Constitution enshrines six basic rights. The said Acts violate Art. 19(1)(a) and Art.
19(1)(g), which envisage, freedom of speech and expression and right to carry on any business or
trade, etc., respectively. The above mentioned impugned statutes prohibits beauty contest which
is a form of expression and they also provide for seizure of the advertisements which are
essential in the prosperity of the business on unreasonable grounds. Hence, the mentioned Acts
are violating Art. 19.
1.2 c)Violation of Art.20(1)
No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not
constitute a penal offence, at the time when it was committed. But in the instance case Petitioner
is held guilty though there was no prevailing legislation which includes beauty contests in the
ambit of objectionable performances, at the date when Petitioner announced beauty contest.
1.2 d)Violation of Art.21
The action of Deputy Commissioner of Police to enter and seize the material violates personal
liberty of the organisers. KDP(A)A,2016 violates the personal liberty of the organisers to
organise and participants right to compete in the contest.In Menaka Gandhi7 case it was held that
this protection of Art.21 extends this protection against legislative action too.
6
AIR 1987 SC 1159: (1989) Supp.2 SCC 310
7
Bhagwati, J. in Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248, AIR 1978 SC 597,620

6
1.3ALTERNATIVE REMEDY IS NOT A BAR
It is humbly submitted before the Honble Court that the remedy under Article 226 of the
Constitution is discretionary remedy.8 The Court is vested with power to entertain the petition
where there occurs gross miscarriage of justice and effective remedy is not available. Supreme
Court in ONGC v. Utpal Kumar Basu9 and in Navinchandra Majithia v.State of Maharastra10 it
was held that a government or an authority can be directed by the High Court within whose
jurisdiction it is located and also by the High Court within whose jurisdiction whole or part of
the cause of arises. The cause arouses in the state of Karmasthan and not anywhere else in any
part of India.
Where there is well-founded allegation that fundamental right has been infringed alternative
remedy is no bar for entertaining writ petition and granting relief.11 The Apex in Coffee Board V.
Jt. Commercial Tax Officer12 held that when a breach of fundamental right is made in the
petition there the provisions of other remedies do not stand in the way of exercising power under
Art. 32 of the Constitution of India.The mere existence of an adequate alternative legal remedy
cannot be per se be a good and sufficient ground for throwing out a petition under Art. 32 if the
existence of a fundamental right and a breach, actual or threatened, of such right and is alleged is
prima facie established on the petition.13 In spite of availability of the alternative remedy, the
court may exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least petitions where the petitioner seeks
enforcement of any of the fundamental rights14. Thus, the petitioner humbly submits that writ
petition is maintainable as existence of alternative remedy is not a bar.
8
Techspan India (P.) Ltd. v. ITO [2006] 283 ITR 212 (Del); D.D BASU, INTRODUCTION TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 448 (21st Ed. 2013)
9
(1994) 4 SCC 711
10
(2000) 7 SCC 640
11
State of Bombay v. United motors Ltd. AIR 1953 SC 252
12
AIR 1971 SC 870 at p. 877, para 16
13
K.K. Kouchunni v. State of Madras AIR 1959 SC 725
14
HarbansalSahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. AIR 2003 SC 2120

7
2.KARMASTHAN DRAMATIC PERFORMANCES (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2016 AND

INDECENT REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN (PROHIBITION) ACT, 1986 ARE
VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
It is humbly submitted before this Honble court that the said Acts violate Art. 14 of the
Constitution of India. Both the UDHR15 and the law of land16 provide that, all are equal before
the law and are entitled without discrimination to the equal protection of the laws. Incorporating
this principle in The Constitution of India enshrines this right and was interpreted that the
parliament and state legislature cannot transgress the principle of equality enshrined in Art. 1417
by the SC. It has to be noted that the principle of reasonableness which is an essential element of
equality or non-arbitrariness18pervades Art. 14. The right to equality not only means the right not
to be discriminated against but also the right against any arbitrary or irrational action of the
state.19 Statutory discretion must be based on reasonable grounds.20 Arbitrariness and
unreasonableness are denial of rule of law21 and arbitrary state action is negation of
equality.22The right to equality is also recognized as one of the basic features of the
constitution.23
2.1 THAT KDP(A)A, 2016 DOES NOT SATISFY THE TESTS OF VALID
CLASSIFICATION
In the present case the above said right enshrined u/a 14 of the Constitution of India is violated as
there exists arbitrariness and unreasonableness in considering beauty contests as objectionable
performances. The KDP(A)A, 201624 under s.2(1) defines objectionable performances and it
adds beauty contests into its ambit through the amendment made to the said Act. 25In classifying
15
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art.7.
16
His Holiness Keshavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225; Indra Sawhney v.
UOI, (1992) 3 SCC 217; Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643; Minerva Mills Ltd., and Ors., v. UOI,
(1980) 2 SCC 591.
17
Indra Sawhney v. UOI, (1992) 3 SCC 217.
18
E.P. Royappa v. state of T.N., (1974)4 SCC 3.
19
Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002) 9 SCC 111; A.P. Dairy Development
Corporation Federation v. B Narsimha Reddy, (2011) 9 SCC 286.
20
B.E.M.L. Employees House Building Co-operative Society Ltd., v. State of Karnataka, (2005) 9 SCC 248.
21
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 1325.
22
A.L. Kalra v. P&E Corpn. of India Ltd., (1984) 3 SCC 316.
23
Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (2000) 1 SCC 168 : AIR 2000 SC 498.
24
Karmasthan Dramatic Performances (Amendment) Act, 2016.
25
Moot proposition.

8
beauty contests as an objectionable performance only under the grounds of decency and
morality would not substantiate the legislations constitutionality. The made classification
should satisfy the tests for valid classification u/a 14 of the Constitution of India, namely, 1) the
classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things
that are grouped together from others left out of the group; and 2) the differentia must have a
rational relation (rational nexus) to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. 26
In the present case KDP(A)A, 2016 has erred in adding beauty contests along with play,
pantomime and other drama, where the mentioned forms are not contests as they are performed
to showcase their talents and to earn economic benefits, whereas, beauty contest is a form of
performance which is conducted to select one of the participants as winner27 by judging all the
participants on certain grounds.
The object of classification should also be lawful and it should not only aim towards attaining
desired ends.28The object of the KDP(A)A, 2016 does not satisfy rational nexus as the said Act
considers beauty contests which is arbitrarily classified in a wrong group. This classification will
not fulfil the requirements of the intelligible differentia and hence it is not correlating with
reasonable nexus. Therefore, the said Act violates Art.14. In Jaila Singh v. State of Rajasthan29,
the SC held that the differentia which is a basis for classification should not amount to
discrimination and the selection of this differentia should not be unreasonable and arbitrary. But
here in the said Act the selection of differentia itself is arbitrary and hence it violates Art.14.
In Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi30 the SC held that, the doctrine of classification which
is evolved by the courts is not paraphrase of Art. 14 nor it is the objective and the end of that Art.
It is merely a judicial formula for determining whether the legislative or executive action in
question is arbitrary and therefore constituting denial of equality. If the classification is not
reasonable and does not satisfy the two conditions that are intelligible differentia and rational
nexus, the impugned legislation is arbitrary and the grantee enshrined u/a 14 is infringed. Art.14
out-laws arbitrary administrative action. When there is arbitrariness in the state action Art.14
26
The test was clearly expressed by Das J in State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75.
27
Supra note 24.
28
Bidi Supply Co. v. UOI, AIR 1956 SC 479
29
AIR 1975 SC 1436.
30
AIR 1981 SC 487, (1981) 1 SCC 722

9
springs into action and the courts strike down such action. Arbitrary state action infringes
Art.14.31
Therefore, it is humbly submitted that KDP(A)A, 2016 does not satisfy the tests of valid
classification and hence it is in violation with Art.14.
2.2 THAT THE SAID ACT IS UNREASONABLE AND ARBITRARY
The very language of Art. 14 of the Constitution expressly directs that the State, by
which Art. 12 includes the executive organ, shall not deny to any person equality before the law
or the equal protection of the law. Thus Art. 14 protects us from both legislation, and executive
tyranny by way of discrimination.32The above remarks are based on the view that the words
"the State" in Art. 12 comprehend only the Executive and the Legislature. Article 14, therefore,
is an injunction to both the legislative as well as the executive organs of the State and the other
subordinate authorities.33
A legislature has to deal with diverse problems arising out of an infinite variety of human
relations must, of necessity, have the power of making special laws to attain particular objects;
and for that purpose it must have large powers of selection or classification of persons and things
upon which such laws are to operate.34In the present case karmasthan legislative assembly has
classified a competition into the ambit of performance which proves the classification made is
invalid u/a Art. 14.
Expanding the horizons of equality, the SC has held that Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in
State action and ensure fairness and equality in treatment. The principle of reasonableness, which
legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality and non-arbitrariness
pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence.35 Arbitrary or unreasonable actions, according
to the Court, are per se discriminatory. There exist several instances where subordinate
31
A.P. Agarwal v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi , AIR 2000 SC 205
32
Infra n.33
33
Basheshar Nath vs The Commissioner of Income Tax Delhi & Rajasthan and Anr1959 AIR 149
34
Ameeroonisa v. Mahboob AIR 1953 SC 91; Satywati Sharma v. Union of India 2002 AIHC 4643(Del)
35
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of IndiaAIR 1978 SC 597

10
legislation has been declared invalid under Article 14 on grounds of unreasonableness.36It is

humbly submitted in the present case Karmasthan Legislative Assembly amended the Act which
is unreasonable.
Every state action must be informed by reason and an Act not informed by reason is per se
arbitrary37 and an arbitrary Act is unequal both according to political logic as well as
constitutional law and hence infringes Art.14.38 The policy must be fair and must not be
arbitrary.39 If legislature over reaches the object with which the Act was enacted, then it is
unreasonable.40 The provision of equality u/a 14 and the absolute discretionary powers to grant
or deny the benefits of a particular legislation have been said to be diametrically opposite to each
other.41 If there is change in policy decisions by the authorities, without justifiable reasons that
would be arbitrary.42 Every state action must be non-arbitrary and reasonable. Otherwise the
court would strike it down as invalid.43
Justice P.N. Bhagwati laid down a new concept of equality in the case of E.P. Royappa v. State
of Tamil Nadu44and reiterated the same in future judgements.45Justice Bhagwati inthe above
mentioned case of Royappa46,elucidated on the concept of equality as follows,
Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be cribbed,
cabined, and confined within traditional and doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point of
view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact, equality and arbitrariness are sworn
enemies; one belong to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of
an absolute monarchy. Where an Act is arbitrary, it is implicit that it is unequal both according
to political logic and constitutional law and therefore violative of Article 14.
36
Sudhir Chandra Sarkar v. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. AIR 1984 SC 1064 ; Central Inland Water Transport
Corporation v. Brojo Nath Ganguly AIR 1986 SC 1571 ; DTC v. Mazdoor Congress AIR 1991 SC 101 ; D.K.
Yadav v. J.M.A Industries Ltd. (1993) 3 SCC 259
37
Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd., v. CTO,(2005) 1 SCC 625
38
K. Nagraj v. State of A.P., (1985) 1 SCC 523; Sardar Inder Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1957 SC 510.
39
Supra n.37
40
N.B. Khare v. State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 211.
41
Sudhir Chandra v. Tata Iron and Steel corpn. Ltd., (1984) 3 SCC 369; Naraindas Indurkhya v. State of
M.P.,(1974) 4 SCC 788; Kishan Lal Lakshmi Chand v. State of Haryana,1993 Supp. (4) SCC 461; Sheo Nandan
Paswan v. State of Bihar, (1987) 1 SCC 288.
42
Rama Ranjan Prasad Singh v. UOI, AIR 1995 Para 85.
43
Supra note 20.
44
AIR 1974 SC 555
45
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597; R.D. Shetty v. Airport Authority AIR 1979 SC 1628
46
AIR 1974 SC 555

11
In the light of the above, it is humbly submitted by the petitioner that the said Act is arbitrary and
unreasonable as it violates Art.14 of the Constitution of India.
2.3 THAT THE SAID ACT IRWP, 1986 GIVES THE DISCRETIONARY POWERS TO THE
STATE
A common tendency in modern democracies is to confer discriminatory power on the

government or administrative officer. In order to ensure that discretion is properly exercised, it is
necessary that the statute in question lays down some norms or principles according to which the
administer has to exercise the discretion. Many at time the statutes do not do this and leave the
administrator free to exercise his power according to his judgement. This creates the danger of
official arbitrariness which is subversive of the doctrine of equality. To mitigate this danger, the
corts have invoked Art.14. In course of time Art.14 has evolved into a very meaningful guarantee
against any action of the administration which may be arbitrary, discriminatory or unequal. 47 The
discretionary powers given to the State which is excessive, vague and undefined. In order to
ensure that the power given to the government is properly exercised there has to be some norms,
principles or guidelines properly laid down according to which authority will exercise
discretion.48 The power delegated to the state authority derived by the state government cannot
be unlimited,49 uninhibited and untraced discretionary power is irreconcilable with Art. 14.50
Art.14 is a check against any action of the administration which may be arbitrary, discriminatory
or unequal.51 This principle manifests itself in the form of following the propositions:
(1) A law conferring unguided and unrestricted power on an authority is bad for arbitrary power
is discriminatory.
(2) Art. 14 illegalises discrimination in the actual exercise of any discretionary power.
(3) Art. 14 strikes at arbitrariness in administrative action and ensures fair less and equality of
treatment.
47
Shrinivasa Rao v. J.Veeraiah , AIR 1993 SC 929; R.L.Bansal v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 978
48
District Registrar and Collector, Hyderabad v. Canara Bank, (2005) 1 SCC 496
49
Arvind P Datar, Commentary on the Constitution of India, Vol.1, 102 (2 nd edn. 2007)
50
Suman Gupta v. State of J&K, (1983) 4 SCC 339.
51
Supra n. 47

12
The Apex Court stated in State of Mysore v. Bhat52 that to consider the constitutionality of the
impugned provisions, the provisions should provide a reasonable opportunity for the affected
parties to be heard.
In the present case the discretionary powers are given to the State Government and through
which they have amended the KDP(A)A,2016 and have added beauty contests under
objectionable performances without any reasonable nexus towards the said Acts object.
Therefore, it is humbly submitted before this Honble court that the discretionary powers given
to the State authority violate Art. 14.
3. KARMASTHAN DRAMATIC PERFORMANCES (AMENDMENT) ACT,2016 AND

VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 19 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
It is humbly submitted before the Honble High Court that the said Acts violate Art 19 (1) (a)
and 19(1) (g). Article 19 entitles Fundamental Rights to citizens. 53The rights enumerated in Art.
19 are those great and basic rights which are recognised as the natural rights inherent in the
status of a citizen.54 Citizens under this Article not only mean natural citizens but also
registered companies and societies in India.55 A Society has no legal entity apart from its own
members, so it has no separate existence apart from its members. The members of the Society
being citizens of the country, the citizenship status are automatically bestowed on the Society.
The entities having status of citizenship are guaranteed with the fundamental rights. 56 Therefore,
it is humbly submitted that the Petitioner57 consists of members who are citizens of the nation,
and so Petitionerper se becomes a citizen and can challenge the said Act which is violative of
Art. 19(1)(a) and Art. 19(1)(g).
52
AIR 1975 SC 596; (1975) 1 SCC 110
53
M. P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, p.1128(6th edn. 2010)
54
State of W.B. v. Subodh Gopal Bose, AIR 1954 SC 92.
55
State of Bombay v. R.M.D.C. Chamarbaugwalla & ors. , AIR 1956 Bom 1.
56
Mahendra Pal Singh, V.N.Shuklas Constitution of India, p.128(12 th edn. 2013)
57
Karmasthan Television Actors Association.

13
3.1 THAT KDP(A)A, 2016 VIOLATES ARTICLE 19(1)(a)

Art. 19(1)(a) entitles Freedom of speech and expression to all the citizens.58 The freedom of
speech and expression means the right to express ones convictions and opinions freely by word
of mouth, printing, pictures or any other mode. Any other mode includes Performances 59 into its
ambit and here it is to be noted that beauty contests are a form of performances as it promotes
public entertainment. Though the said right is enshrined under constitution there are reasonable
restrictions laid u/a 19(2) , the impugned Act infringes the fundamental right of the petitioner to
free speech and expression guaranteed u/a 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
The beauty contests cannot be prohibited on the grounds of decency and public morality as it is
held by the Supreme Court in Amitabh Bachchan Corporation Ltd., v. Mahila Jagaran Manch
And Ors.60 If this beauty contest i.e. Miss India 17 is considered as an objectionable
performance as defined under section 2(1) of the said Act and is prohibited under S. 4 of the
same Act will infringe the fundamental right of the petitioner as this contest will be considered as
grossly indecent, or is scurrilous or obscene.61Therefore, this Act has erred in defining the
objectionable performances. Here, beauty contests are judged on the basis of sex and are
considered as obscene and indecent which is ambiguous.
The above mentioned basis clearly means that the Act is treating sex and obscenity as
synonymous. In Directorate of Film Festivals v. Gaurav Ashwin Jain62, while the Supreme Court
was laying down certain guidelines for the censors the Court held that sex and obscenity are not
always synonymous, and it is wrong to classify sex as essentially obscene or even indecent and
indecent or immoral.
In Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra63, the Supreme Court has lay down the test to
determine obscenity. While testing, the reasonableness of the restrictions, public morals and the
intention of the performance were considered. Beauty contests as it was held in ABCL case 64, are
58
Infra n. 59
59
Charan singh v. UOI, AIR 1961 Punj 272 & K. A. Abbas v. UOI, AIR 1971 SC 481.
60
(1997) 7 SCC 91.
61
Moot Proposition; Karmasthan Dramatic Perfoormance (Amendment) Act, 2016 s. (2) (1) (vi)
62
AIR 1971 SC 481.
63
AIR 1965 SC 881.
64
Amitabh Bachchan Corpn Ltd., v. Mahila Jagaran Manch And Ors, (1997) 7 SCC 91

14
not against public morality, here the intention of the contest is not corrupt and it is conducted for
providing an opportunity for those women who are interested in showcasing their talents through
this contest and the restrictions are imposed through abstract considerations65, which shows the
unreasonableness of the restrictions. Therefore, it is clear that the said Act has completely erred
in defining beauty contests as objectionable performances based on obscenity.
In S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal66, the Supreme Court observed that obscenity should be gauged
with respect to contemporary community standards that reflect the sensibilities as well as the
tolerance levels of an average reasonable person. Therefore, it is clear that old traditions should
not be held as a bar because Indian Society is developing as a contemporary modern world.
Article 19(2), which states the reasonable restriction for Art. 19(1)(a), has used the expression
decency and morality.67 The scope of the word morality is not very clear. The conception of
morality differs from time to time. In Ramesh Prabhoo68, the SC has given somewhat wider
meaning to the term decency and morality. The court has maintained that decency or
morality is not confined for sexual morality alone. In the modern era conception of morality
will be backed by contemporary and liberal thoughts and hence, it becomes ambiguous if
morality is judged based on the customs and traditions which are not applicable. Therefore,
prohibition of the contest as objectionable performance by considering decency and morality is
unreasonable. Even the determination by the legislature of what constitutes a reasonable
restriction is not final or conclusive69, it is subject to the supervision of courts. Therefore, it is
humbly submitted that the Honble Court should consider these restrictions imposed through the
said Act as unreasonable and hence declare the Act as unconstitutional as this unreasonableness
and arbitrariness are violative of Art. 19(1)(a) of Constitution of India.
65
Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731.
66
AIR 2010 SC 3196
67
Bal Thackeray v. Prabhakar Kashinath Kunte, AIR 1996 SC 1113.Chandrakant Kalyandas Kakodkar v State of
Maharastra AIR 1970 SC 1390; Chandra Rajkumari v. Commissioner of Police AIR 1998 AP 302
68
Dr. Ramesh Yeshwant Prabhoo v. Prabhakar Kashinath Kunte, AIR 1996 SC 1113;(1969) 2 SCC 687.
69
Bhau ram v. Baij Nth Singh, AIR 1962 SC 1476; Chintaman rao v. State of M.P., AIR 1951 SC 118,120.

15
In S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram70 the Court held that the restrictions under Art. 19(2)
cannot supress the performances on account of threat for violence or threat of influence that can
be created by the performance.The Supreme Court also held that along with the reasonableness
of the restriction, the Law that uses these restrictions must also be reasonable.71 But the said Act
considered incitement for violence72 as a ground for holding the beauty contest which is a
performance as objectionable performance. Therefore, the said Act is imposing unreasonable
restriction and hence can be declared as unconstitutional.
3.2 THAT IRWPA73,1986 IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 19(1)(g)

Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution reads as, All citizens shall have the right to practice any
profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.74 Along with this right there are
certain restrictions. The restriction imposed should be reasonable.75 If the restriction is based on
grounds which are arbitrary or unguided the vesting of such power would also amount to an
unreasonable restriction on rights guaranteed u/a 19(1)(g).76 This amounts to the violation of Art.
19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. In the present case the State Authority, authorized by the
said Act, has seized the commercial advertisements of the Petitioner which helps in the progress
of their business and therefore, violate Art.19(1)(g). KTCA77 as a registered charitable society is
considered a citizen because the members of the Petitioner have the status of citizenship.
Therefore, the Petitioner satisfies the requirement of a citizen.78 In the present case organising
beauty contest falls within the ambit of business in Art.19(1)(g). The term Business is a very
wide term and would include anything which occupies the time, attention and labour of a man
for the purpose of profit as held by the Apex Court in Sodan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal
Committee79 Beauty contest has the purpose of profit that is the reason it has fixed ticket rates.
Another important feature of business is its promotion. The promotion of business will be
achieved through publishing advertisements using communication media. The Petitioner has also
70
(1989) 2 SCC 574.
71
Maneka Gandhi v. UOI, AIR 1978 SC 597; M.P. Singh, The Constitutional Principle of Reasonableness
72
Section 2(1)(i) of Karmasthan Dramatic Performances (Amendment) Act,2016.
73
Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986
74
Mahendra Pal Singh, V.N.Shuklas Constitution of India, p.128(12 th edn. 2013)
75
Arvind P Datar, Commentary on the Constitution of India, vol. 1, 291(2 nd edn. 2007)
76
Collector of Customs v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty, AIR 1962 SC 316.
77
Karmasthan Television Actors Association.
78
Constitution of India, Art. 5
79
AIR 1989 SC 1988.

16
published advertisement in the leading cinema magazines80 as a part of promotional aspect of the
business.Commercial Advertisements are considered as a part of business activity as they
possess an element of trade and commerce.81 The advertisements published by the petitioner are
commercial advertisements as the objective of publishing was to promote a function of their
business activity i.e. beauty pageant Miss India 17. The said Act, under s. 5, provides authority
to the State Government to search and seize the advertisements, etc., on the grounds of
obscenity, morality and decency. The Standards of Morality can afford a guidance to impose
restrictions, but cannot limit the scope of the right itself 82and while the scope of the right is not
determined by the morality of the business, only for those business activities which are extremist
and destructive in nature could be regulated through restrictions in the Laws which are derived
from Art.19(2). This action of the State Government is infringing the Fundamental right of the
organisers u/a 19(1)(g) as it hampers the business of them by seizing the advertisements, which
are essential for the progress of the business i.e. achieved through the success of the beauty
contest which is being organised by them.
In Municipal Corporation v. Jan Mohd. Usmanbhai,83 the Supreme Court held that discretion
vested in an administrative authority which is not properly controlled, would be unreasonable.
Such discretion vested with the State Government through the impugned Act, without laying
down any policy or standard which is to guide the authority in the exercise of its power would
inevitably lead to violation of fundamental rights. It is humbly submitted in present case the state
authority i.e., Deputy Commissioner of Police, a Gazetted State Officers action infringes
19(1)(g) of the petitioner through seizing the advertisements.
Treating Beauty contests as obscene, scurrilous and indecent by considering the word beauty
which is directly related to feminine gender becomes arbitrary. The Act of considering beauty
contest is arbitrary, it clearly implies that the said Act has erred in judging beauty contests in a
positive way. Therefore, the said Act not only infringes the fundamental rights of the organizers
but also infringes that of the women who are participating of their Right to occupation.84 The
80
Moot Proposition
81
V.N. Shukla, Constitution of India, p.137(12 th edn.)
82
Krishna Kumar Narula v. State of J&K, AIR 1967 SC 1368,1371.
83
(1986) 4 SCC 656.
84
Infra n. 85

17
beauty contests will always create an avenue for the participants to get employed in modelling,
dramatic performances, etc., as they will get an opportunity to showcase their talents. In ABCL
case85, the Supreme Court held that imposing restrictions through the said Act not only violates
the rights of the organisers in carrying their business but also violates the rights of the women
who are taking part in the contest.
In Chintamanrao v. State of M. P86, the Apex Court while examining the constitutionality of an
enactment held that the impugned Act void for it was much in excess of the purpose 87 of the Act.
Also in Dwaraka Prasad v. State of U.P.88 the SC held that Legislation which arbitrarily or
excessively invades the right cannot be said to contain the quality of reasonableness.In this case
the said Act is holding excessive authorities which is violative of fundamental rights of the
Constitution and hence can be declared unconstitutional.
It is humbly submitted that as the petitioner is a citizen who is guaranteed with the fundamental
rights by the Constitution of India should not be infringed of those rights through imposition of
unreasonable restrictions under this impugned Act.89
4. KARMASTHAN DRAMATIC PERFORMANCES (AMENDMENT) ACT,2016 AND

VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 20 AND 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
It is humbly submitted before this Honble High Court that KDP(A)A, 2016 violates Art.20 and
Art.21 of the Constitution of India and IRWPA, 1986 violate Art.21 of Constitution of India. The
expression personal liberty used in Art.21 has also been given a liberal interpretation, it doesnt
mean merely the liberty of the body i.e., freedom from physical restraint.90
85
Amitabh Bachchan Corporation Ltd., v. Mahila Jagaran Manch And Ors., (1997) 7 SCC 91.
86
AIR 1951 SC 118,120
87
M.R.F. Ltd. v. Inspector Kerala Government, (1998) 8 SCC 227.
88
1954 SC 224 (227).
89
Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986.
90
Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597

18
4.1 VIOLATES ART 20 OF INDIAN CONSTITUTION
It is humbly submitted before this Honble HC that the said Acts violate Art 20 (1) as it holds the
Petitioner guilty when it is innocent as later amended Act cannot hold anyone guilty in of the
offence wherein at the time of commission there was not penal legislation for it.
Art 20 of the Constitution reads as, No person shall be convicted of any offence except for
violation of the law in force at the time of the commission of the Act charged as an offence.
Similarly, in the present case, on 5 -7-2016 Petitioner published advertisement regarding the
Beauty Pageant Miss India17 whereas KDP (A)A, 2016 later added on 8-8-2016 beauty
contests in the definition of objectionable performance.91 A person can only be convicted of any
offence if the Act charged against him was an offence under the law in force at the date of the
commission of the Act. If the at the date of the commission of an Act, such commission was not
prohibited by a law then in force, no future legislation prohibiting that Act with retrospective
effect will justify a conviction for such commission. In other words, if an Act is not an offence,
at the date of commission, no future law can make it an offence.92 Where the rule made
applicable from 1-7-1961 was published in the Gazette of 7-7-1961, it was held that the rule
could not be applicable in respects of Acts committed before 7-7-1961.93 This Article is
confined to penal legislation94 no one can be held liable under any statute which did not prevail
at the time of commission of the the said offensive Act in the statute hence the Petitioner cannot
be charged under this impugned Act.
Nullam crimen nulla poena sine lege which means that there can be no crime or punishment
unless it is an accordance with law that is certain, and ambiguous and not retroactive. This Latin
maxim further says, that there should be no crime except according to predetermined fixed law.95
It is essential in a free and democratic society that citizens are able, as far as possible, to foresee
the consequences of their conduct in order that persons be given fair notice of what to avoid and
that desecration of those entrusted with law enforcement is limited by clear and explicit
legislative standards. In the present case, it is humbly submitted before the Honble court that
91
Moot Proposition
92
Chief Inspector of Mines v. K.C. Thapar AIR 1961 SC 838
93
Govind Pillai v Padmanabha Pillai, AIR 1965 Ker 123
94
Karmasthan Dramatic Performance (Amendment) Act, 2016
95
D.D. Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India, Vol 4, 8th edn

19
there was no prevailing legislation when the Petitioner announced Beauty Contest and the later
amended legislation i.e., KDPA(A) cannot have a retrospective action against the Petitioner. The
sovereign legislature has the power to enact prospective and retrospective law but the present
Article sets two limitations upon the law making power of every legislative authority in India.
(a)No person shall be convicted of any offence under any law not in force at the time of the
commission of the offence.96 (b) The penalty for an offence shall not be greater than that which
might be inflicted for the offence under the law which was in force when the offence was
committed.97
It is most humbly submitted before the Honble HC that the Act of Karmasthan Legislative
Assembly amending the KDPA violates Art 14, 19 (1) and 21, and holding the Petitioner guilty
of the later amended Act violates 20 (1) as the Petitioner is considered to be innocent in the time
of announcement of beauty contest on 5-07-2016.
In Pyare Lal Sharma v. MD Jammu and Kashmir Industries Ltd98 service regulation was
amended which added some more grounds for terminating the service of the employee. In
construing amendment, it was held that the period of authorized absence prior to the date of
amendment could not be taken into consideration for terminating the service of the employee. It
was observed that, it is the basic principle of natural justice that no one can be penalised on the
ground of a conduct which was not penal on the day when it was committed. In the present case,
Petitioner cannot be penalised on the ground of conduct which was not penal on the when it was
committed
The expression Law in Force in Art. 20 (1) refers to the law factually in operation at the time
when the offence was committed and doesnt relate to a law deemed to be in force by the
retrospective operation of a law subsequently made.99
The Law in Force must be the law which was factually in operation on the date of the
commission of the offence not the law which by legal fiction is made operative by virtue of the
power of the legislature to pass retrospective laws. Thus, in case Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v.
96
Shiv Bhadur Sigh Rao v. State of Vindhya Pradesh AIR 1953 SC 394:(1953) SCR 1188; Dinesh Kumar v. State
of MP (2004) 8 SCC 770
97
Kedarnath Bhal v. State of Punjab AIR 1972 SC 873:(1974) 3 SCC 21
98
AIR 1989 SC 1854:(1989) 3 SCC 448
99
Shiv Bhadur Sigh Rao v. State of Vindhya Pradesh AIR 1953 SC 394..(1953) SCR 1188

20
State of Vindhya Pradesh100, the accused had been tried for certain offences alleged to have been
committed in February, March and April 1949, under the provisions of the V.P Ordinance No 48
of 1949, which was enacted on September 11, 1949. It was however, provided in s.2 of
Ordinance that should be deemed to have been in force in Vindhya Pradesh from August 9, 1948.
In other words, it was a retrospective criminal legislation and the effect of making an offence out
of an Act which was not an offence at the time it was committed. The court held that s. 2 violated
Art. 20 (1) and observed as A law in force referred to therein must be taken to relate not to a
law deemed to be in force and thus brought into force but the law factually in operation at the
time or what may be called the then existing law.. The phrase law in force, as used in Art. 20
muse be understood in its natural sense as being the law in fact in existence and in operation at
the time of the commission of the offence as distinct from the law deemed to have become
operative by virtue of power of the legislature to pass retrospective laws
When court interprets a law it relates back to the date of legislation and cannot be prospective
from the date of judgement since court doesnt legislate it gives only an interpretation to an
existing law. By using the expression Law in Force in both parts Art. 20 (1), and the
constitution has clearly indicated that even if the criminal law was enacted by any legislature
retrospectively, its retrospective operation would be controlled by Art. 20 (1). A law in force at
the time postulates actual factual existence of law at the relevant time that excludes retrospective
application of any subsequent law.101
The law for the violation of which a person is sought to be convicted must have been in force at
the time when the Act with which he is charged was committed. It follows, therefore, that a
person cannot be convicted for an Act which was not an offence under the law which was in
force when the Act was committed.102
The right guaranteed in Art. 20(1), a law which creates a new offence cannot be so interpreted as
to punish a person for an Act done by him prior to the creation of the new offence.103
100
AIR 1953 SC 394:(1953) SCR 1188
101
West Ramnad Electric Distribution Co.Ltd v. State of Madras AIR 1962 SC 1753.. (1963) 2 SCR 747;
Dharanidhare Patre v. State , 1995 AIHC 1733 (Ori)
102
Randhira v. State AIR 1954 MB 83
103
Soni v. State of Guj AIR 1991 SC 2173,(paras.9 to 10)..(1991) 4 SCC 298

21
4.2 THAT THE SAID ACTS ARE VIOLATIVE OF ART 21

Article 21 of Constitution of India reads as No person shall be deprived of his life or personal
liberty except procedure established by law.104Article 21, confers on every person the
fundamental right to life and personal liberty which has become an inexhaustible source of many
other rights.105 The Spirit of Man is at the root of Art.21. Absent liberty, other freedoms are
frozen.106 Article 21 extends the protection of life and personal liberty to all persons citizens and
non-citizens alike107, a society has no legal entity but the members of the society being citizens
of the country, the citizenship status are automatically bestowed on the society.
The object of Art.21 is to prevent encroachment upon personal liberty by the executive, save in
accordance with the law,108 but KDP(A)A 2016 violates Art 21 of the Constitution infringing the
personal liberty of the Petitioner to organize the contest and of the women who want to
participate in the beauty pageant Miss India 17.The key to this judicial activism is the ruling in
Menaka Gandhi109 that the phrase procedure established by law in Art.21 doesnt mean any
procedure laid down in a statute but just, fair and reasonable procedure, and that the term
law in Art.21 envisages not any law but a law which is right, just and fair, and not arbitrary,
fanciful or oppressive. An arbitrary law violates Art 14. Arbitrary procedure would be no
procedure at all and the requirements of Art 21 would not be compiled with. A procedure which
is unreasonable, harsh and prejudicial to the accused cannot be in consonance with Art 21110.
Article 21 requires that no one shall be deprived of life and personal liberty except procedure
established by law and this procedure must be reasonable, fair and not arbitrary, whimsical or
fanciful.111Maneka Gandhis case is not only a landmark case for interpretation of Art.21 but it
also gave entirely new point to look at the Chapter III of the Constitution. Prior to Menaka
Gandhi112s decision Art.21 guaranteed the right to life and personal liberty only against the
104
D.D. Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India, Vol 3, 8 th edn.
105
Supra n. 7
106
Ibid
107
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab 1982 AIR 1325, 1983 SCR (1) 145
108
G. Gurunadha Reddy v. A.P Road Transport Corporation AIR 1999 AP 179
109
Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597
110
M.P Jain, Indian Constitution Law, p.1279 (5 th edn. 2003)
111
Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, U T of Delhi and ors. (1981) 1 SCC 608
112

22
arbitrary action of executive and not from the legislative action. In Menaka Gandhi113 case it was
held that this protection of Art.21 extends this protection against legislative action too.
Karmasthan Legislative Assembly enacted KDP(A)A for amending s.2 and 4 KDPA which
clearly violates the womens right to personal liberty as liberty is liberty of thought, expression,
belief, faith and worship114. But in the amended Act s.2 brings beauty contests in the ambit of
objectionable performances which violates rights of the participants who are participating arent
given freedom of thought and expression as guaranteed by the preamble of the Indian
constitution.
The above mentioned amended Act defines beauty contests as against public morality, decency
and obscenity, in ABCL115 case it was held that beauty pageant cannot be held as offensive to the
sense of morality and decency nor it could be seen as obscene in the eyes of law, hence
KDP(A)A ,2016 cannot include beauty contests u/s 2 stating it as an objectionable performance,
there is a dearth of explanation and clarity and the Act infringes the constitutional right enshrined
u/a 21 of the Constitution.
In Olga Telis116 case it was further observed that unreasonableness vitiates law and procedure
alike. It is therefore essential that the procedure established by law for depriving a person of his
fundamental right must conform the norms of justice and fair play. Procedure, which is just or
unfair in the circumstances of a case, attracts the vice of unreasonableness, thereby vitiating the
law which prescribes that procedure and consequently the action taken under it. The Petitioners
right to hold beauty contest has been infringed in the above mentioned Act as it considered it as
objectionable performances in its s.2 and also states that it be prohibited undoubtedly stating in
s.4 what are the criterias to satisfy beauty contests performed in a public place is not an
objectionable performance and prohibiting the performance.
Kehar Singh v. UOI.117case it was held that fundamental right of life and personal liberty should
be given paramount importance by the courts, the expanded meaning of personal liberty included
113
114
Preamble of Indian Constitution, 1950
115
Supra n.11
116
Olga Tellis & Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corpn AIR 1986 SC 18
117
AIR 1988 SC 1883

23
the right to hold up particular opinion, to sustain and to nurture that opinion here the petitioner
has the right to opine his expression where beauty contests are considered as expressions u/a 19
(1) (a) which has direct correlation with u/a 21. State of Karmasthan not only infringes the rights
of the organisers who are conducting and the participants but it also infringes the right of the
viewers as right to life provides them right to entertainment.118
IRWPA, 1986 under s. 5 gives immense authority to the Gazetted officer to seize anything that
the Authority feels is obsence this right given to the Authority leads to violation of Art. 21. As
the Gazetted officer can seize anything he/she considers to be obscene this leads the aggrieved
persons rights being violated, in the present Deputy Commissioner seized the articles that
belonged to the Petitioner infringing their personal liberty.119
CONCLUSION
In the light of the aforementioned contentions it is firmly established that the impugned Acts are
unconstitutional and are clearly violative of Art. 14, 19, 20(1) and 21of the Indian constitution.
The pleadings submitted before the court clearly established that the above mentioned Acts
violates Art 14, 19, 20(1), 21. Thus the impugned Acts as proved by the petitioner are
unconstitutional.
118
Supra n.64
119
Supra n.117

24
PRAYER
Wherefore, in the light of issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is most
humbly and respectfully prayed before this Honble High Court that it may be pleased to adjudge
and declare that:
1. The present writ petition is maintainable as there is violation of Fundamental Rights

2. Karmasthan Dramatic Performances (Amendment) Act, 2016 and Indecent
Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986 should be held unconstitutional
AND/OR
Pass any other order that deems fit in the interest of justice, equity and good conscience
and for this act of kindness, counsels for the Petitioner as in duty bound, shall humbly
pray.
COUNSELS FOR PETITIONER

25

Petitioner (Ktac)

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JUSTICE T.

RAMACHANDRAN MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION - 2016

BEFORE THE HONBLE

HIGH COURT OF KARMASTHAN

ORIGINAL WRIT JURISDICTION

[UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF INDIAN CONSTITUTION]

In the matter of Article 14, 19, 20 and 21

W.P. NO. _______ OF 2016

KARMASTHAN TELEVISION ACTORS ASSOCIATION (KTAC)

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HONBLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS COMPANION

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

1.1 That the Petitioner has Locus Standi....5

1.2 State has violated Fundamental Rights enshrined under Constitution.5

1.2 a) Violation of Art. 14

1.2 b) Violation of Art. 19

1.2 c) Violation of Art. 20

1.2 d) Violation of Art. 21

1.3 Alternative Remedy not a bar...7

2. Whether Karmasthan Dramatic Performances (Amendment) Act, 2016 and Indecent

2.2 KDP(A), 2106 is Unreasonable And Arbitrary..10

3. Whether Karmasthan Dramatic Performances (Amendment) Act, 2016 and Indecent

Written Submission on behalf of Petitioner

3.1 That KDP(A)A, 2016 Violates Article 19(1)(a)..14

3.2 That IRW(P)A, 1986 Violates Article 19 (1)(g)..16

4. Whether Karmasthan Dramatic Performances (Amendment) Act, 2016 and Indecent

4.1 Violation of Art 20 of Indian Constitution..19

4.2 That the said acts are Violative of Art 21.22

Written Submission on behalf of Petitioner

A.P. Andhra Pradesh

ABCL Amitabh Bachchan Corporation Limited

AIHC All India High Court

AIR All India Reporter

IRWPA Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act

ITO Income Tax Officer

ITR Income Tax Return

J&K Jammu and Kashmir

Written Submission on behalf of Petitioner

KDP(A)A Karmasthan Dramatic Performances (Amendment) Act

KDPA Karmasthan Dramatic Performances Act

KTAC Karmasthan Television Actors Association

M.P. Madhya Pradesh

NCT National Capital Territory

ONGC Oil and Natural Gas Corporation limited

SCC Supreme Court Cases

T.N. Tamil Nadu

u/a Under article

UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights

UOI Union of India

Written Submission on behalf of Petitioner

V.P. Vindhya Pradesh

Written Submission on behalf of Petitioner

1. A.L. Kalra v. P&E Corpn. of India Ltd., (1984) 3 SCC 316.8

Written Submission on behalf of Petitioner

27. Dinesh Kumar v. State of MP (2004) 8 SCC 770........20

Written Submission on behalf of Petitioner

59. Naraindas Indurkhya v. State of M.P.,(1974) 4 SCC 788..........11

Written Submission on behalf of Petitioner

1. Constitution of India, 1950

1. M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (6TH EDITION, 2011)

2. V.N. SHUKLA, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (12TH EDITION, 2013)

3. DURGA DAS BASU, SHORTER CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (14TH EDITION,

4. DURGA DAS BASU , COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

Written Submission on behalf of Petitioner

Written Submission on behalf of Petitioner