SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR.

y ASUELA, Petitioner,

vs.

HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

G.R. No. 226679 August 15, 2017

TOPIC: Section 23 of RA 9165, rule-making power of Supreme Court, equal protection clause

PONENTE: Peralta

FACTS:

Petitioner Estipona, Jr. was charged with violation of Section 11 of RA 9165.

On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement, praying to
withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12 of the same law, with a
penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug
seized in his possession.

Petitioner argues that Section 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits plea bargaining in all violations of said law violates:

1. The intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof;

2. The rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and

3. The principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the government.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it encroached upon the power of the Supreme
Court to promulgate rules of procedure.

2. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for being violative of the Constitutional right to
equal protection of the law.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: YES

The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Their exclusive
domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments.

The Court further held that the separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has
erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the
sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that
effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.
Viewed from this perspective, the Court had rejected previous attempts on the part of the Congress, in the exercise of
its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court (Rules), to wit:

1. Fabian v. Desierto -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative disciplinary
case should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules instead of appeal by
certiorari under Rule 45 as provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.

2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. The Cooperative Code
provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.

3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fees; Baguio Market
Vendors MultiPurpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes; In Re: Exemption of the
National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara,
et al. Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not exempt from the payment of
legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.

4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) The first paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770, which
prohibits courts except the Supreme Court from issuing temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it contravenes Rule
58 of the Rules.

Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its discretion to amend, repeal
or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of government. To
reiterate, the Courts authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the
safeguards of Our institutional independence.

SECOND ISSUE: UNRESOLVED

The Supreme Court did not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to the constitutional
right to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt any future discussion by the Court on the policy
considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165.

Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto or a qualified version thereof, the
Court deemed it proper to declare as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is
made part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS ABOUT PLEA BARGAINING:

Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure

Fabian v. Hon. Desierto laid down the test for determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural in nature.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts,
abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is,
the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy
and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule
creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of
implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.
In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates substantive rights. By the same token,
it is towards the provision of a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases in all courts
that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of disposing criminal charges by agreement of the parties,
plea bargaining is considered to be an important, essential, highly desirable, and legitimate component of the
administration of justice.

In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out
a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. There is give-and-take negotiation common
in plea bargaining. The essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions to
avoid potential losses. Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the
system speed, economy, and finality can benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court.

Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea bargaining neither create a right nor take
away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process
for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them.

No constitutional right to plea bargain

Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him rather than
accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial. Under the present Rules, the
acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended party and
the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in
the offense charged. The reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions;
his duty is to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand
can sustain.

Plea bargaining, when allowed

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point when the prosecution already
rested its case.

As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial courts exercise of discretion should not amount to a
grave abuse thereof.

If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the prosecution rested
its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt
of the crime charged. The only basis on which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing change in
the former plea of not guilty could be nothing more and nothing less than the evidence on record. The ruling on the
motion must disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecutions evidence. Absent any finding on the weight of the
evidence on hand, the judges acceptance of the defendants change of plea is improper and irregular.

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance - 249 SCRA 635

FACTS:
Petitioners (Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc., Philippine Airlines, Roco, and Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association)
seek reconsideration of the Courts previous ruling dismissing the petitions filed for the declaration of
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. Petitioners contend that the R.A. did not
originate exclusively in the HoR as required by Article 6, Section 24 of the Constitution. The Senate allegedly did not
pass it on second and third readings, instead passing its own version. Petitioners contend that it should have amended
the House bill by striking out the text of the bill and substituting it with the text of its own bill, so as to conform with
the Constitution.

ISSUE:
W/N the R.A. is unconstitutional for having originated from the Senate, and not the HoR.

HELD:
Petition is unmeritorious. The enactment of the Senate bill has not been the first instance where the Senate, in the
exercise of its power to propose amendments to bills (required to originate in the House), passed its own version. An
amendment by substitution (striking out the text and substituting it), as urged by petitioners, concerns a mere matter
of form, and considering the petitioner has not shown what substantial difference it would make if Senate applied
such substitution in the case, it cannot be applied to the case at bar. While the aforementioned Constitutional
provision states that bills must originate exclusively in the HoR, it also adds, but the Senate may propose or concur
with amendments. The Senate may then propose an entirely new bill as a substitute measure. Petitioners erred in
assuming the Senate version to be an independent and distinct bill. Without the House bill, Senate could not have
enacted the Senate bill, as the latter was a mere amendment of the former. As such, it did not have to pass the Senate
on second and third readings.

Petitioners question the signing of the President on both bills, to support their contention that such are separate and
distinct. The President certified the bills separately only because the certification had to be made of the version of the
same revenue bill which AT THE MOMENT was being considered.

Petitioners question the power of the Conference Committee to insert new provisions. The jurisdiction of the
conference committee is not limited to resolving differences between the Senate and the House. It may propose an
entirely new provision, given that such are germane to the subject of the conference, and that the respective houses
of Congress subsequently approve its report.

Petitioner PAL contends that the amendment of its franchise by the withdrawal of its exemption from VAT is not
expressed in the title of the law, thereby violating the Constitution. The Court believes that the title of the R.A.
satisfies the Constitutional Requirement.

Petitioners claim that the R.A. violates their press freedom and religious liberty, having removed them from the
exemption to pay VAT. Suffice it to say that since the law granted the press a privilege, the law could take back the
privilege anytime without offense to the Constitution. By granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive the
exercise of its sovereign prerogative.

Lastly, petitioners contend that the R.A. violates due process, equal protection and contract clauses and the rule on
taxation. Petitioners fail to take into consideration the fact that the VAT was already provided for in E.O. No. 273 long
before the R.A. was enacted. The latter merely EXPANDS the base of the tax. Equality and uniformity in taxation
means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class be taxed at the same rate, the taxing power
having authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation. It is enough that the statute
applies equally to all persons, forms and corporations placed in s similar situation.
Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the
rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a
violation of the Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral
conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the
bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an
interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a
quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report,
Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called
out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair
was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking
simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of
the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate
and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by
President Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House

Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern
with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to
conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to
a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person
other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity
is open to question in a case where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in
the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be
concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from
questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been
defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly
especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.