1
Republic of the Philippines On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION,
represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUOZ, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila (presided by respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia,
Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773. These are: (1) the Order dated December 20,
2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muoz, private respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order
dated April 10, 2002 denying the motion to vacate the said Order of December 20,
2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition
alleges that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the
Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.
The facts are:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown
Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and
Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997.
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the Peoples Republic of China and
became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3)
counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9
(1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces
seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common
law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest
were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14)
years for each charge.
Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then
forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn,
filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of
private respondent.
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest
against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained
him.
On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory
injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest.
On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the
Order of Arrest void.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on
certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of
Appeals be reversed.
On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the
DOJ and sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The
Decision became final and executory on April 10, 2001.
Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of
private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10,
presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent filed, in the
same case,- a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying
the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition
cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk."
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil
Case No. 99-95733. It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Order denying his application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an
Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing private respondent to post bail, thus:
In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accuseds further erosion of civil
liberties. The petition for bail is granted subject to the following conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused
hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these
proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and
processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in
this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of
filing its own motion for hold departure order before this Court even in
extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this
case or if they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the
week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all
the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest,
with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets
be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding
lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order,
but it was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private
respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing
that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal
proceedings.
In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail
guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that
extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of ones liberty.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be
impaired, thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
2
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this
is not the first time that this Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether
a prospective extraditee may be granted bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding
Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan
Crespo,1 this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban,
later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to
extradition proceedings. It is "available only in criminal proceedings," thus:
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on
bail quoted above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only
when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal
laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings because extradition courts do not
render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in
favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as
thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per
Fernando, J., later CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply
to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract
from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal
proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII,
Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail
merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned
offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition
proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondents case.
However, this Court cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the
growing importance of the individual person in public international law who, in the
20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being
given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of
countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations;
and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our
fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth
of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition
that the individual person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking
root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only to

states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. For one,
the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the unprecedented
spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of the laws of
war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the
Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and
crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant
events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and
states gave recognition and importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10,
1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of
every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the
said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon the members
of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,2 this Court,
in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution, 3the
principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN
General Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental among the rights
enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to
uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every
person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which
provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of
protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process,
ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a
court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order
their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation
to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard
their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to
bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition
and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a
reexamination of this Courts ruling in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the States power to deprive an individual
of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents
in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine,4 have
likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to
our jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the
exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has
admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In
fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during
the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the
3
obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to uphold
human rights.
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing
deportation for failure to secure the necessary certificate of registration was granted
bail pending his appeal. After noting that the prospective deportee had committed no
crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has
committed the most serious crime known to law;" and that while deportation is not a
criminal proceeding, some of the machinery used "is the machinery of criminal law."
Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration,7 this
Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have been
filed may be released on bail pending the finality of an order of deportation. As
previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human
Rights in sustaining the detainees right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not
also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it
cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings
where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must
be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning
respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the
presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that
the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law)
defines "extradition" as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the
object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting
state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed
against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal
law of the requesting state or government."
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by
treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its
territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the
demanding state.8 It is not a criminal proceeding.9 Even if the potential extraditee is a
criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment
for a crime, even though such punishment may follow extradition. 10 It is sui
generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations.11 It
is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. 12 Nor
is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character.13 Its
object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to

secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or
punishment.14
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following:
(a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the
means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of
criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine
Extradition Law) which mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary detention
of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of justice." We further note that
Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional
arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that
release from provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the
accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all
earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest,
to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state
following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the
process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and
remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his
admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for over two (2) years
without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended
period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it
was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant
him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee,
however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a
right to due process under the Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in
criminal proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the
presumption of innocence of the accused. As Purganancorrectly points out, it is from
this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises.
Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the
issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight
of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a
fugitive from justice.15 Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears
the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted
bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines
honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in
our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not
4
necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should
diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where
these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international
conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an
extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is
satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting
or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases
nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While
administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in
administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is
to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate
Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing
evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him,
this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than
preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and
convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and
processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show
that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial
court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of
"clear and convincing evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court
to determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and
convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail
bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition
proceedings with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is
ultimately an incident of the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case.
The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the accuseds
propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary
objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.1
The Case
Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to
assail and annul the resolutions dated July 14, 20142 and August 8, 20143 issued by
the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238, where he has
been charged with plunder along with several others. Enrile insists that the
resolutions, which respectively denied his Motion To Fix Bail and his Motion For
Reconsideration, were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others
with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the
diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF).4 On June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively filed his
Omnibus Motion5 and Supplemental Opposition,6 praying, among others, that he be
allowed to post bail should probable cause be found against him. The motions were
heard by the Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution filed its Consolidated Opposition.7
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbaya n issued its resolution denying Enriles motion,
particularly on the matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity considering that
5
Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed under the custody of
the law.8 Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile.9
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily
surrendered to Director Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and was later on confined at
the Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital following his medical
examination.10
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital ,11 and
his Motion to Fix Bail ,12 both dated July 7, 2014, which were heard by the
Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014.13 In support of the motions, Enrile argued that he
should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established
that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder,
the penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal , not reclusion perpetua ; and
(c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must further be
seriously considered.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed resolution denying
Enriles Motion to Fix Bail, disposing thusly:
x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court
shall have made a determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against
accused Enrile can he demand bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will the
Court be duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact, accused
Enrile has not filed an application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even
commence. It is thus exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix
his bail.
Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail because while he is
charged with plunder, "the maximum penalty that may be possibly imposed on him is
reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua." He anchors this claim on Section 2 of
R.A. No. 7080, as amended, and on the allegation that he is over seventy (70) years
old and that he voluntarily surrendered. "Accordingly, it may be said that the crime
charged against Enrile is not punishable by reclusion perpetua, and thus bailable."
The argument has no merit.
x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not taken into
consideration. These circumstances will only be appreciated in the imposition of the
proper penalty after trial should the accused be found guilty of the offense charged. x
xx

Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already fix his bail because he is
not a flight risk and his physical condition must also be seriously considered by the
Court.
Admittedly, the accuseds age, physical condition and his being a flight risk are
among the factors that are considered in fixing a reasonable amount of bail. However,
as explained above, it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of bail without an
anterior showing that the evidence of guilt against accused Enrile is not strong.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan Ponce Enriles Motion to Fix Bail
dated July 7, 2014 is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.14
On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued it s second assailed resolution to deny
Enriles motion for reconsideration filed vis--vis the July 14, 2014 resolution.15
Enrile raises the following grounds in support of his petition for certiorari , namely:
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a matter of
right. Enrile may be deemed to fall within the exception only upon
concurrence of two (2) circumstances: (i) where the offense is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, and (ii) when evidence of guilt is strong.
B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile, if ever
he would be convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile is
entitled to bail as a matter of right.
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that evidence of
Enriles guilt (if ever) is strong; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of
right.
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk.16
Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as
matter of right; th at it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and
conclusively that Enrile comes under the exception and cannot be excluded from
enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if
convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the presence of
two mitigating circumstances his age and his voluntary surrender; that the
Prosecution has not come forward with proof showing that his guilt for the crime of
plunder is strong; and that he should not be considered a flight risk taking into
account that he is already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social
standing.
6
In its Comment ,17 the Ombudsman contends that Enriles right to bail is discretionary
as he is charged with a capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a
bail hearing be conducted to determine whether there is strong evidence of his guilt,
or the lack of it; and that entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty,
regardless of the attendant circumstances.
Ruling of the Court
The petition for certiorari is meritorious.
1.
Bail protects the right of the accused to
due process and to be presumed innocent
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved.18 The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process,
and is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail,19 and further
binds the court to wait until after trial to impose any punishment on the accused.20
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing
additional crimes.[[21] The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the
accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court. The amount of bail
should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but
it should be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.22 Thus, bail
acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds interest in his
provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the societys interest in assuring the
accuseds presence at trial.23
2.
Bail may be granted as a
matter of right or of discretion
The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
Constitution, viz.:
x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 11424 of the Rules of
Court , as follows:
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an

offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to
bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law
existing at the time of its commission and the application for admission to bail, may be
punished with death.25
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal
offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an
offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of
his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained
or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional
liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged
with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.26 Once it has been established
that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.27
As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court
are bailable as matter of right because these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital
offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
for any offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment, or
even prior to conviction for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or life
imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong.28
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the
RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment;29 or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding
six years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of
Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or
conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or
7
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
3.
Admission to bail in offenses punished
by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of
guilt is strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. But,
as the Court has held in Concerned Citizens v. Elma ,30 "such discretion may be
exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused
for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty." It is
axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of
discretion on the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to
the Prosecution.31The indispensability of the hearing with notice has been aptly
explained in Aguirre v. Belmonte, viz. :32
x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this Court already ruled in
People vs. Dacudao, etc., et al. that a hearing is mandatory before bail can be
granted to an accused who is charged with a capital offense, in this wise:
The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder case without any
hearing on the motion asking for it, without bothering to ask the prosecution for its
conformity or comment, as it turned out later, over its strong objections. The court
granted bail on the sole basis of the complaint and the affidavits of three policemen,
not one of whom apparently witnessed the killing. Whatever the court possessed at
the time it issued the questioned ruling was intended only for prima facie determining
whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that the
crime was committed and pinpointing the persons who probably committed it.
Whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for each individual accused still has to
be established unless the prosecution submits the issue on whatever it has already
presented. To appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the
prosecution must be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled as the accused to due
process.
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and
reasonable opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature
and circumstances of the crime, character and reputation of the accused, the weight
of the evidence against him, the probability of the accused appearing at the trial,
whether or not the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not the accused
is under bond in other cases. (Section 6, Rule 114, Rules of Court) It is highly
doubtful if the trial court can appreciate these guidelines in an ex-parte determination
where the Fiscal is neither present nor heard.

The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of the
court, should primarily determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong. For this purpose, a summary hearing means:
x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt
as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to
determine the weight of evidence for purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court
does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that
ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on
the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered or
admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may
confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters,
avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross examination.33
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is
expected to comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral,34 to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit
his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as
amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application
for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary
of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is no t strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be
denied.
3.
Enriles poor health justifies his admission to bail
We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two
mitigating circumstances that should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was
already over 70 years at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, and that
he voluntarily surrendered.35
Enriles averment has been mainly uncontested by the Prosecution, whose
Opposition to the Motion to Fix Bail has only argued that
8
8. As regards the assertion that the maximum possible penalty that might be imposed
upon Enrile is only reclusion temporal due to the presence of two mitigating
circumstances, suffice it to state that the presence or absence of mitigating
circumstances is also not consideration that the Constitution deemed worthy. The
relevant clause in Section 13 is "charged with an offense punishable by." It is,
therefore, the maximum penalty provided by the offense that has bearing and not the
possibility of mitigating circumstances being appreciated in the accuseds favor.36
Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not Enriles averment on the
presence of the two mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the
crime alleged against him being punishable with reclusion perpetua ,37 simply
because the determination, being primarily factual in context, is ideally to be made by
the trial court.
Nonetheless, in now granting Enriles petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the
earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of
the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further
mindful of the Philippines responsibility in the international community arising from
the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution
which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of
protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process,
ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a
court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order
their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation
to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard
their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to
bail.38
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value
the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to
those charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and
convincing showing: (1 ) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and (2 ) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances.39
In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered
to the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or
escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset
of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect
for the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time
many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the
legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he

was not seen as a flight risk.40 With his solid reputation in both his public and his
private lives, his long years of public service, and historys judgment of him being at
stake, he should be granted bail.
The currently fragile state of Enriles health presents another compelling justification
for his admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan,41 Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the Director of the
Philippine General Hospital (PGH), classified Enrile as a geriatric patient who was
found during the medical examinations conducted at the UP-PGH to be suffering from
the following conditions:
(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels on multiple
drug therapy; (Annexes 1.1, 1.2, 1.3);
(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the following
: coronary artery disease, because they could indicate a future risk for heart attack
a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with carotid and
vertebral artery disease ; (Annexes 1.4, 4.1)
b. Heavy coronary artery calcifications; (Annex 1.5)
c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial calcifications. (Annex
1.6)
(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat) documented by
Holter monitoring ; (Annexes 1.7.1, 1.7.2)
(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrom (ACOS) and postnasal drip syndrome;
(Annexes 2.1, 2.2)
(5) Ophthalmology:
a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p laser of the
Retina, s/p Lucentis intra-ocular injections; (Annexes 3.0, 3.1, 3.2)
b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber intraocular lens.
(Annexes 3.1, 3.2)
(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:
a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;
9
b. High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;
c. Alpha thalassemia;
d. Gait/balance disorder;
e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain) in 2014;
f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented enlarged prostate
on recent ultrasound).42
Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or collectively,
could pose significant risk s to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1) uncontrolled hypertension,
because it could lead to brain or heart complications, including recurrence of stroke;
(2) arrhythmia, because it could lead to fatal or non-fatal cardiovascular events,
especially under stressful conditions; (3) coronary calcifications associated with
under stressful conditions; and (4) exacerbations of ACOS, because they could be
triggered by certain circumstances (like excessive heat, humidity, dust or allergen
exposure) which could cause a deterioration in patients with asthma or COPD.43
Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enriles advanced age and ill
health required special medical attention. His confinement at the PNP General
Hospital, albeit at his own instance,44 was not even recommended by the officer-in-
charge (O IC) and the internist doctor of that medical facility because of the limitations
in the medical support at that hospital. Their testimonies ran as follows:
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
The question is, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator
Enrile at the Philippine National Police Hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator
Enrile at the PNP Hospital ?
PSUPT. JOCSON:
No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Why?
PSUPT. JOCSON:
Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot give him the best.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
At present, since you are the attending physician of the accused, Senator Enrile, are
you happy or have any fear in your heart of the present condition of the accused vis a
vis the facilities of the hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
That you will not be able to address in an emergency situation?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can handle it but probably if the
condition of the patient worsen, we have no facilities to do those things, Your
Honor.45
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should
be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued
incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life.
Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true
objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court has
already held in Dela Rama v. The Peoples Court:46
x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the following:
x x x [ U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the illness
of the prisoner,
10
independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the humanity of the
law makes it a consideration which should, regardless of the charge and the stage of
the proceeding, influence the court to exercise its discretion to admit the prisoner to
bail ;47
xxx
Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute to the effect that
the petitioner "is actually suffering from minimal, early, unstable type of pulmonary
tuberculosis, and chronic, granular pharyngitis," and that in said institute they "have
seen similar cases, later progressing into advance stages when the treatment and
medicine are no longer of any avail;" taking into consideration that the petitioners
previous petition for bail was denied by the Peoples Court on the ground that the
petitioner was suffering from quiescent and not active tuberculosis, and the implied
purpose of the Peoples Court in sending the petitioner to the Quezon Institute for
clinical examination and diagnosis of the actual condition of his lungs, was evidently
to verify whether the petitioner is suffering from active tuberculosis, in order to act
accordingly in deciding his petition for bail; and considering further that the said
Peoples Court has adopted and applied the well-established doctrine cited in our
above-quoted resolution, in several cases, among them, the cases against Pio Duran
(case No. 3324) and Benigno Aquino (case No. 3527), in which the said defendants
were released on bail on the ground that they were ill and their continued confinement
in New Bilibid Prison would be injurious to their health or endanger their life; it is
evident and we consequently hold that the Peoples Court acted with grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to re lease the petitioner on bail.48
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him
to have his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by
competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his
adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly , will guarantee his
appearance in court for the trial.
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a
meaningful consideration of the application for bail can be had is to defeat the
objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending the trial.
There may be circumstances decisive of the issue of bail whose existence is either
admitted by the Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial notice that the
courts can already consider in resolving the application for bail without awaiting the
trial to finish.49 The Court thus balances the scales of justice by protecting the
interest of the People through ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at
the same time realizing for him the guarantees of due process as well as to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of
bail to ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly
disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As
such, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying Enriles Motion To

Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for the issuance of the writ of
certiorari , connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
excess, or lack of jurisdiction.50 The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.51 WHEREFORE, the
Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari ; ISSUES the writ of certiorari ANNULING
and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
in Case No. SB-14 CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and August 8, 2014; ORDERS the
PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-
0238 upon posting of a cash bond of 1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and
DIRECTS the immediate release of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile from custody unless
he is being detained for some other lawful cause.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
11
G.R. No. 113517 January 19, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PAT. FLORESTAN NITCHA y DULAY, defendant-appellant.
MELO, J.:
Before the Court is the appeal interposed by accused-appellant from the decision
rendered on September 22, 1994 by the Honorable Pedro C. Cacho, Presiding Judge
of Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of the First Judicial Region, stationed in
Tayug, Pangasinan, which pronounced accused-appellant's culpability of the murder
of May Villa Rica Sibayan. In addition to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua,
accused-appellant was required to pay to the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as
indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 in the form of exemplary
damages, and P43,000.00 for actual expenses (p. 494, Record; p. 132, Rollo).
The factual background of the imputed felony, as formulated by the Office of the
Solicitor General, is supported by the record, and is accordingly adopted, thusly:
On October 1990, at around 7 o'clock in the evening, Jojo Belmonte
went out of his house located at Purok IV, Barangay Alac, San
Quintin, Pangasinan to buy some cigarettes in a nearby store. (p. 6,
TSN, December 10, 1991) Before Jojo Belmonte could buy the
cigarettes, Doro Nitcha arrived, uttered the words "You are one of
them" ("Maysa ca met") in the vernacular, then started mauling him.
(p. 7, TSN, December 10, 1991) Unable to endure the pain, Jojo
fought back. (Ibid) A few minutes had gone into the fight when May
Villarica (a.k.a. Lydia) Joselito, Agustin and Marcelina (Nenet), all
surnamed Sibayan, arrived. (p. 8, TSN, December 10, 1991; p. 6,
TSN, September 9, 1992) May and Joselito tried to pacify the two
protagonists, however, their efforts proved futile as Doro Nitcha
refused to be pacified. (Ibid.)
The fighting stopped upon the arrival of Doro's sister Victoria
Corpuz (Baby) who, upon seeing the commotion, dragged Doro
away from the fight and brought him home. (p. 7, TSN, march 30,
1993; pp. 6-7, TSN, March 1, 1993)
Likewise, Marcelina (Nenet), Agustin, May and Joselito proceeded
towards their house located in front of the store where the incident
occurred. (p. 8, TSN, March 1, 1993)

Not long thereafter and while the Sibayans were still on their way,
appellant Florestan Nitcha, brother of Doro, arrived at the sari-sari
store brandishing a gun and shouting in Tagalog, "Walanghiya
kayo, putangina ninyo, papatayin ko kayong lahat!" (p. 7, TSN,
February 2, 1993) After uttering those words, appellant fired his gun
in the direction of the Sibayans, the bullet hitting May at the back of
her head and existing through the middle of her forehead. (p. 11,
TSN, December 10, 1991; p. 8, TSN, September 9, 1992; p. 7,
TSN, February 2, 1993; p. 8, TSN, March 1, 1993; pp. 6-7, TSN
March 8, 1993) Appellant then aimed his gun at Joselito but
missed. (p. 12, TSN, December 10, 1991)
May was brought to the Eastern Pangasinan District Hospital in
Tayug, Pangasinan where she was given first aid treatment. (p. 10,
TSN, February 2, 1993) Upon the advice of a doctor, the victim was
brought to a hospital in Dagupan City. (Ibid.) May, however, expired
on the way thereto. (Ibid.)
Shortly after the shooting incident, appellant went back to his
mother's house before proceeding to the police station of San
Quintin, Pangasinan where he surrendered himself together with
his service firearm. (p. 4, TSN, April 29, 1993; p. 4, TSN, June 14,
1993; p. 7, TSN, June 14, 1993)
(pp. 2-4, Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee)
Premised on the foregoing backdrop, an indictment for murder was filed against
herein accused-appellant (p. 18, Rollo) who, after trial, was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt on account of the positive identification made by the People's
witnesses, the defense of accused-appellant anchored on denial being found
unavailing.
Jose Belmonte, Agustin Sibayan, and Joselito Sibayan collectively pointed an
accusing finger at accused-appellant whom they witnessed firing his .38 caliber
firearm towards the direction of May Villa Rica Sibayan who was then negotiating an
earthen dike about three to four meters from the position of accused-appellant. In
parrying the inculpatory thrusts of the prosecution, accused-appellant ventured to
develop the theory that it was not he but one of the companions of Jojo Belmonte who
pulled and fired the gun. According to accused-appellant, the bullet missed the head
of his brother who was then astride Jojo Belmonte while the latter and accused-
appellant's brother was engaged in a scuffle, and that unfortunately, the bullet hit the
head of May Villa Rica Sibayan.
The court a quo was understandably far from convinced by accused-appellant's thesis
by reason of the categorical statements of the People's witnesses (pp. 130-
132, Rollo).
12
The prospect of spending practically the rest of his life behind bars as a form of
retribution naturally became the source of mental concern for accused-appellant who
continues to maintain in the appeal at bench that he is not in any way responsible for
the death of the victim. To buttress the plea for reversal of the assailed discourse,
accused-appellant's counsel enumerated twelve (12) errors supposedly overlooked
by the magistrate below (pp. 87-88. Rollo) which all revolve on the principal query of
whether accused-appellant's profession of innocence is tenable.
With reference to the first, fifth, eight, and penultimate points of discussion aired by
accused-appellant, efforts were exerted to denigrate the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses first by questioning the integrity of Jojo Belmonte through capitalizing on
Belmonte's inability to convey the number of seconds in a minute, thereby suggesting
that Belmonte's testimony can not be accepted as an accurate recollection of the
crime (p. 90, Rollo). The basic faux pas from the witness can hardly diminish his
veracity of the entire narration of how the felony was perpetrated for the simple, nay,
obvious reason that an omission of this character is insignificant to merit rejection of
the whole testimony, unflawed as it has remained. Besides, it is difficult to subscribe
to the theory put forward by accused-appellant anent the imaginary companion of
Jose Belmonte who allegedly pulled and fired the gun in the light of the statements of
three witnesses of the People who declared in no uncertain terms that it was
accused-appellant who fired the gun.
Jose Belmonte testified, thus:
PROSECUTOR BINCE:
Q What happened when Forestan Nitcha arrived,
if any?
A He said "Asan ba sila? (Where are they?)
Q Is that the only statement he uttered?
A There was, Sir.
Q Please tell this court the complete statement
he stated?
A "Where are they? Come out, I'll kill you!"
xxx xxx xxx
Q What was the appearance of Florestan Nitcha
when he uttered that statement?
A He was standing, sir.
Q What else?
A He shot Lydia Sibayan.
Q What did he use in shooting Lydia Sibayan?
A A short firearm, sir.
Q How far was Lydia to Florestan when Florestan
shot Lydia Sibayan?
A More or less, four (4) meters, sir.
Q Where was Lydia Sibayan facing when he was
shot by Florestan Nitcha?
A Her back was facing Florestan Nitcha, sir.

Q You claimed that the four 94) persons, namely:
Lydia, Boy, Agustin, and Nenet were in the
process of going home. Will you please tell us
how the four (4) went home?
A They were following one after the other, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And the 4th?
A Lydia Sibayan, sir.
Q Will you please explain to this Court why they
were following each other when they went home?
A Because it is an earth dike (tambao), sir.
Q How far were you to Florestan when you saw
him fired his gun to Lydia Sibayan?
A More or less, three (3) meters, sir.
Q How many times did Florestan Nitcha shoot
Lydia Sibayan?
A Two (2) times, sir.
Q The first firing, what happened to Lydia
Sibayan?
A She was hit and fell down, sir.
Q How about the second firing, what happened to
that second firing?
A The second shot hit the wall (pader).
Q What kind of wall was that?
A Cement, sir. The wallings of the house of
Agustin Sibayan, sir.
Q You claimed that Lydia was hit by the first gun
fire. What part of his body was hit, if you know?
A The head, sir.
Q What portion of her head?
A Here, sir. (Witness pointing and touching the
back portion of his head.)" (tsn, pp. 10-13, Dec.
10, 1991) (Emphasis Supplied)
(pp. 54-56, Rollo.)
Corroborating Jose Belmonte's open-court statements was Agustin Sibayan who
narrated in part:
PROSECUTOR BINCE:
xxx xxx xxx
Q What happened, next, if any, when you heard
the accused Pat. Nitcha shouting "Putangina nila,
nasaan sila"?
A It is because my son was the last one my
daughter-in-law requested my son to go ahead
and she was left behind that it is why when
Nitcha fired his gun she was the one who was hit,
sir.
Q May Villarica Sibayan was the one who was
hit?
A Yes, sir.
13
xxx xxx xxx
Q Do you know the position of your daughter-in-
law in relation to Nitcha when the latter shot your
daughter-in-law?
A Her back was turned against Florestan Nitcha,
sir.
Q How far is your daughter-in-law to Nitcha when
she was shot by Nitcha?
A More or less three (3) meters, sir.
Q How about you how far were you to Nitcha
when you saw him shooting with the use of 38
caliber your daughter-in-law?
A Around 20 meters, sir.
Q From your place, please point to a particular
place wherein you can estimate to be a 20
meters which is your distance to that place of
Nitcha?
A (Witness is pointing from the witness stand up
to the bamboo tree guard outside the courtroom
which is 10 to 15 meters more or less)
xxx xxx xxx
Q What happened to your daughter-in-law when
she was hit by that firings of pistol by Pat.Nitcha?
A She fell down on the canal, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What did Nitcha do after that first shot and you,
your wife went to the rescue of your daughter-in-
law?
A He fired his gun once more, sir.
Q To what direction did he aim the second shot?
A. Towards us with my son, sir.
Q Were you or your son hit by the second rang of
fire?
A. With God's grace, no, sir.
Q Did you ultimately learn later on where is that
slug of the second shot found its target?
A. It hit the wall of my house which is cemented,
sir.
xx xxx xxx
Q How clear is the sky then at that time
particularly the moon and the stars so that you
can fully identify that it was Nitcha who shot your
daughter-in-law May Villarica Sibayan?
A. Because of the brightness of the moon that is
why we can identify a person, sir. (tsn., pp. 6-10,
Sept. 9, 1992) (emphasis supplied)
(pp. 56-57, Rollo.)
Joselito Sibayan also affirmed the proposition that it was accused-appellant who
caused the untimely demise of his wife:

PROSECUTOR BINCE:
xxx xxx xxx
Q When Florestan Nitcha arrived, what
happened, if any?
A. He told us in Tagalog "walanghiya kayo,
putangina ninyo, papatayin ko kayong lahat"
(God damn you vulva of your mother, I will kill all
of you).
Q After that, what happened next?
A. He shot my wife, sir.
Q Where was your wife facing in relation to
Florestan Nitcha when she was shot by the
latter?
A. The back of my wife was facing Florestan
Nitcha, sir.
Q How about you, where were you facing at that
time when you saw Florestan Nitcha shot your
wife?
A. I was facing my wife and Florestan Nitcha, sir.
Q How about your father Agustin, Jojo and Leo
where were they in relation to you and your wife
and Florestan Nitcha?
A. They went home in the house, sir.
Q Where were they when Florestan Nitcha shot
your wife?
A. They were there they were watching, sir.
Q What were they watching?
A. That shooting incident wherein Florestan
Nitcha shot my wife, sir.
Q What did the accused Florestan Nitcha used in
shooting your wife, if you know?
A. A .38 caliber, sir. (tsn, p. 7, Feb. 2, 1993)
(Emphasis supplied)
(p. 58, Rollo)
While it may be conceded that the last two witnesses for the prosecution are relatives
of the victim, still, this factor alone will not destroy their credibility inasmuch as there is
absolutely nothing in our laws that disqualifies a person from testifying in a criminal
case in which the said person's relative is involved if the former was really at the
scene of the crime and was a witness to the execution of the criminal act (People vs.
De La Cruz, 207 SCRA 632 [1992], more so, as in the case at bench, where accused-
appellant himself acknowledged that he and the Sibayans had good relations:
Q You claimed that you were born at Brgy. Alac,
San Quintin, Pangasinan. Is that right?
WITNESS
A Yes, sir.
14
Q And since the time of your birth up to the time
you graduated from high school, you stayed
there?
A Yes, sir.
Q Of course, being a resident of Brgy. Alac,
particularly Purok "4" of San Quintin, Pangasinan,
you know your neighbor Joselito Sibayan. Am I
correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q You also know Agustin Sibayan?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the rest of the family of Sibayans?
A Maybe, sir.
Q Of course, because you know them, naturally
they also know you. Is it not?
A Yes, sir.
PROSECUTOR BINCE
Q And being a neighbor of the Sibayans' at Purok
"4," Brgy. Alac, San Quintin, Pangasinan, you
have a good relation to (sic) them since the age
of reason up to the time during all those
occasions wherein you visited Brgy. Alac, San
Quintin, Pangasinan?
WITNESS
A Precisely, sir.
(pp. 20-21, tsn, may 19, 1993; pp. 12-13, Brief for Plaintiff-
Appellee)
Absent any indication of a sinister scheme to prevaricate, the affirmative statements
uttered by the People's witnesses showing accused-appellant's culpability must be
respected inasmuch as positive declarations subordinate disclaimers emanating from
the defense (People vs. Espinoza, 228 SCRA 143 [1993]). Verily, proof of motive is
not indispensable where the culprit has been positively identified (People vs.
Salveron, 228 SCRA 92 [1993]).
What militates heavily against accused-appellant's pretense is the concocted tale to
the effect that an unnamed assailant fired the gun but the bullet missed the brother of
accused-appellant as he was sitting on top of the fallen Jose Belmonte tsn, March 23,
1993, p. 22), and that instead, the bullet penetrated the back of the head of the victim
in a straight trajectory while the latter was walking on the earthen dike. Indeed, it is
absurd to suppose that a bullet fired by an assailant from a standing position directed
downwards against the so-called intended victim, such as accused-appellants brother
on the ground, would, against the law or gravity, change course from its groundward
trajectory and instead, suddenly ascend after missing the intended victim, and hit the
back of the head of the victim who was at an elevated position.

Accused-appellant argues next that procedural infirmities attended the trial below
such as (a) the hearsay character of the testimony of the People's third witness which
was heard in the absence of accused-appellant and his counsel; (b) the denial of due
process on account of the perceived bias of the trial judge; (c) the illegality of
accused-appellant's arrest and detention; and (d) the absence of preliminary
investigation. However, as correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General,
the record of the case indubitably shows that accused-appellant's counsel opted not
to cross examine Agustin Sibayan (p. 323, Record) which deliberate omission
obviously negates the so-called hearsay nature of said witness' testimony. Similarly
wanting in substance is accused-appellant's claim relative to the alleged bias of the
trial judge considering that mere apprehension that a magistrate is partial is
inefficacious to sustain a charge of breaching the tenet of "cold neutrality" normally
expected of a judge. And even on the assumption that accused-appellant's arrest was
illegal for want of preliminary investigation, such a hypothesis was nonetheless
negated by accused-appellant's act of posting a bail bond thereafter, apart from the
fact that he entered a plea of not guilty which is tantamount to foregoing the right to
question the assumed irregularity (People vs. Hubilo, 220 SCRA 389 [1993]).
Too, accused-appellant's submission that there is absence of physical evidence
showing that he fired a gun simply because the paraffin test yielded negative is
unacceptable, for as held by this Court in People vs. Manalo (219 SCRA 656 [1993]):
. . . even if he were subjected to a paraffin test and the same yields
a negative finding, it cannot be definitely concluded that he had not
fired a gun as it is possible for one to fire a gun and yet be negative
for the presence of nitrates as when the hands are washed before
the test (People vs. Talingdan, 191 SCRA 333 [1990]; People v.
Roallos, 113 SCRA 584 [1982]). The Court has even recognized
the great possibility that there will be no paraffin traces on the hand
if, as in the instant case, the bullet was fired from a .45 Caliber
pistol (People vs. Rebullar, 188 SCRA 838 [1990]).
The subsistence of a bail bond is also no legal obstacle to accused-appellant's
immediate incarceration after promulgation of a decision involving a felony punishable
by reclusion perpetua following the principle enunciated in People vs. Fortes (223
SCRA 619 [1993]) this:
It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of a s amended, that:
. . . before conviction bail is either a matter of
right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when
the offense charged is punishable by any penalty
lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the
right is absolute.
xxx xxx xxx
15
Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is
punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a
matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the
evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion
id limited to determining whether or not evidence
of guilt is strong. But once it is determined that
the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also
becomes a matter of right. . . .
The clear implication therefore, is that if an accused who is charged
with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the
trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a
matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on the
part of the court. In such a situation, the court would not have only
determined that the evidence of guilt is strong which would have
been sufficient to deny bail even before conviction it would have
likewise ruled that the accused's guilt has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Bail must not then be granted to the accused
during the pendency of his appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Construing Section 3, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, this Court, in the en banc Resolution of 15
October 1991 in People vs. Ricardo Cortez, ruled that:
Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused
who is charged with a capital offense or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall
no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right
even if he appeals the case to this Court since
his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of
his guilt of the offense charged is strong.
We are, however, not convicted that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was
attendant in the killing. It must be recalled that Doro Nitcha, the brother of accused-
appellant, was in a fight with one Jojo Belmonte and was forcibly dragged away from
the fight and brought home by his sister, Victoria Corpus. Upon seeing his injured
brother, accused-appellant became enraged and immediately dashed off to the scene
of the fight. Per testimony of Joselito Sibayan, the husband of the victim, only 4 to 5
minutes had elapsed from the time Doro was dragged away to the time that accused-
appellant arrived at the scene of the fight (pp. 6-7, t.s.n., February 2, 1993). Thus, at
such a short interval, accused-appellant did not have sufficient time consciously adopt
the mode of attack. To establish treachery, the evidence must show that the accused
made some preparation to kill the victim in such a manner as to insure the execution
of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend
himself. A killing done at the spur of the moment is not treacherous.
However, we do not agree with the trial court that the crime
committed was murder. The qualifying circumstance of treachery
can not logically be appreciated because the accused did not make
 16

any preparation to kill the deceased in such a manner as to insure
the commission of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the
person attacked to defend himself or retaliate. This circumstance
can only be applied, according to the tenor of article 13, sub-section
16 of the Revised Penal Code, when the culprit employs means,
methods or forms of execution which tend directly and specially to
insure the commission of the crime and at the same time to
eliminate or diminish the risk to his own person from a defense
which the other party might offer. In United States vs. Namit, 38
Phil. 926, it was held that the circumstance that an attack was
sudden and unexpected to the person assaulted did not constitute
the element of alevosia necessary to raise a homicide to murder,
where it did not appear that the aggressor had consciously adopted
a mode of attack intended to facilitate the preparation of the
homicide without risk to himself. In the present case, the
circumstances negative the hypothesis that the defendant reflected
on the means, method and form of killing the offended party. There
was absolutely nothing personal between the accused and Basas.
He was, so he thought, erroneously, protecting the property which
he was detailed to watch by killing the stranger. His purpose was to
kill, the decision was sudden, and the position of the stranger was
accidental and did not matter. In fact, in the nature of things, to give
the other man an opportunity to defend himself or to return the
attack would have been a contradiction.
(People vs. Tumaob, 83 Phil. 738; 742 [1949]);
The herein appellant has, no doubt, liquidated Maximo Cabuenos.
However, we do not believe that the killing was accomplished with
treachery. It does not appear that the shooting was premeditated
not that the accused had consciously chosen that method of attack
directly and specially to facilitate the perpetration of the homicide
without risk to himself. His decision to shoot Cabuenos seemed to
be sudden, in view of the latter's fight, and the position of both the
victim and the killer was entirely accidental. Therefore treachery
may not be imputed to him.
necessarily make the act treacherous. There is no showing that the
aggressors "consciously" adopted a mode of attack to directly and
specially ensure the execution of the act without any risk to
themselves. In fact, the stabbing was preceded by challenges to
fight on Nestor by Ernesto. The first was when the two had a
heated argument, and the second was less than ten minutes later,
when Ernesto came back with a "batuta", which must have placed
the deceased on guard; in any case, the latter cannot be said to
have been totally unaware of possible danger.
(People vs. Balderama, 226 SCRA 537; 550-551 [1993])
The crime committed by accused-appellant is, therefore, homicide and not murder.
The penalty for homicide, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion
temporal. There being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the penalty
imposable is reclusion temporal in its medium period; and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the penalty that should be imposed upon accused-appellant is an
indeterminate sentence within the range of prision mayor, as minimum, and reclusion
temporal medium, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED, and accused-
appellant is hereby found guilty of HOMICIDE and sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
In all other respects, he appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

(People vs. Abalos, 84 Phil. 771; 773 [1949]);

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides that murder is

committed by any person who kills another treacherously. Under
Art. 14 916) of the same Code, there is treachery "when the
offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make." It
was while Nestor was retreating from Ernesto when Oscar stabbed
Nestor at his back. An aggression from behind, however, does not

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
represented by the Philippine Department of
Justice, petitioner, vs. Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN,
Morales, and Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 42; and MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO
BATACAN CRESPO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled to notice
and hearing before warrants for their arrest can be issued? Equally
important, are they entitled to the right to bail and provisional liberty while the
extradition proceedings are pending? In general, the answer to these two
novel questions is No. The explanation of and the reasons for, as well as
the exceptions to, this rule are laid out in this Decision.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to void and set aside the Orders dated May 23, 2001 and July 3,
[1]
2001 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. The
[2] [3]
first assailed Order set for hearing petitioners application for the issuance of
a warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.
The second challenged Order, on the other hand, directed the issuance
of a warrant, but at the same time granted bail to Jimenez. The dispositive
portion of the Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the [Court] finds probable cause
against respondent Mark Jimenez. Accordingly let a Warrant for the arrest of
the respondent be issued.Consequently and taking into consideration Section
9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court fixes the
reasonable amount of bail for respondents temporary liberty at ONE
MILLION PESOS (Php 1,000,000.00), the same to be paid in cash.
Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately surrender to this Court his
passport and the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is likewise directed
to include the name of the respondent in its Hold Departure List. [4]
17
Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail Order, the
cancellation of the bond, and the taking of Jimenez into legal custody.
The Facts
This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled Secretary of
Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion.[5]
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States
[6]
Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government
Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos.
0597, 0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated documents
requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan
Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign
affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for
appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No.
1069, also known as the Extradition Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and
was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila,
Branch 25. The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing
[7]
with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was,
however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court in the said GR
No. 139465. Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the
Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a
reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. [8]
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court
issued its October 17, 2000 Resolution. By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after
[9]
three justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered and reversed its earlier
Decision. It held that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. This
Resolution has become final and executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of
America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18,
2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition which was docketed as
Extradition Case No. 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez
was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had
been issued in connection with the following charges in Indictment No. 99-
00281 CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit

certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion,
in violation of Title 26 US Code Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of
Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false statements, in violation of
Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal campaign
contributions, in violation of Title 2 US Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d)
and Title 18 US Code Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the
Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his immediate arrest pursuant
to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed
before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion, which prayed that
[10]
petitioners application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.
In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of
Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001. In that hearing,
petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial
court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the
issuance of a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative
prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the
amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15,
2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order,
directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his
temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. After he had surrendered his
[11]
passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted
provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001.[12]
Hence, this Petition. [13]
Issues
Petitioner presents the following issues for the consideration of this
Court:
I.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an
arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
18
II.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for
bail and in allowing Jimenez to go on provisional liberty because:
1. An extradition court has no power to authorize bail, in the absence of any law that
provides for such power.
2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and
Section 4, Rule 114 (Bail) of the Rules of Court, as amended, which [were] relied
upon, cannot be used as bases for allowing bail in extradition proceedings.
3. The presumption is against bail in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading
to extradition.
4. On the assumption that bail is available in extradition proceedings or proceedings
leading to extradition, bail is not a matter of right but only of discretion upon clear
showing by the applicant of the existence of special circumstances.
5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in extradition proceedings, the public
respondent received no evidence of special circumstances which may justify release
on bail.
6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no special circumstance exists that will
engender a well-founded belief that he will not flee.
7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are ineffectual and do not ensure
compliance by the Philippines with its obligations under the RP-US Extradition
Treaty.
8. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on May 10, 2001 in the case
entitled Eduardo T. Rodriguez et al. vs. The Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 17,
Manila, CA-G.R. SP No. 64589, relied upon by the public respondent in granting
bail, had been recalled before the issuance of the subject bail orders.[14]
In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will address are: (1)
whether Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his
arrest can be issued, and (2) whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional
liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending. Preliminarily, we shall
take up the alleged prematurity of the Petition for Certiorari arising from
petitioners failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration in the RTC and to seek

relief in the Court of Appeals (CA), instead of in this Court. We shall also
[15]
preliminarily discuss five extradition postulates that will guide us in disposing
of the substantive issues.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Preliminary Matters
Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition
Petitioner submits the following justifications for not filing a Motion for
Reconsideration in the Extradition Court: (1) the issues were fully considered
by such court after requiring the parties to submit their respective
memoranda and position papers on the matter and thus, the filing of a
reconsideration motion would serve no useful purpose; (2) the assailed
orders are a patent nullity, absent factual and legal basis therefor; and (3) the
need for relief is extremely urgent, as the passage of sufficient time would
give Jimenez ample opportunity to escape and avoid extradition; and (4) the
issues raised are purely of law. [16]
For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA, petitioner submits
the following reasons: (1) even if the petition is lodged with the Court of
Appeals and such appellate court takes cognizance of the issues and
decides them, the parties would still bring the matter to this Honorable Court
to have the issues resolved once and for all [and] to have a binding
precedent that all lower courts ought to follow; (2) the Honorable Court of
Appeals had in one case ruled on the issue by disallowing bail but the court
[17]
below refused to recognize the decision as a judicial guide and all other
courts might likewise adopt the same attitude of refusal; and (3) there are
pending issues on bail both in the extradition courts and the Court of
Appeals, which, unless guided by the decision that this Honorable Court will
render in this case, would resolve to grant bail in favor of the potential
extraditees and would give them opportunity to flee and thus, cause adverse
effect on the ability of the Philippines to comply with its obligations under
existing extradition treaties. [18]
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not
prosper unless the inferior court has been given, through a motion for
reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it. This rule,
though, has certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law, (2)
when public interest is involved, or (3) in case of urgency. As a fourth
[19]
exception, the Court has also ruled that the filing of a motion for
19
reconsideration before availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine qua
non, when the questions raised are the same as those that have already
been squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower
court. Aside from being of this nature, the issues in the present case also
[20]
involve pure questions of law that are of public interest. Hence, a motion for
reconsideration may be dispensed with.
Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its original
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari when there are special and important
reasons therefor. In Fortich v. Corona we stated:
[21] [22]
[T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of
the petition filed directly [before] it if compelling reasons, or the nature and
importance of the issues raised, warrant.This has been the judicial policy to
be observed and which has been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely: Uy
vs. Contreras, et. al., Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero vs. De Guzman,
and, Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al. As we have further stated in Cuaresma:
x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue
these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is
established policy. x x x.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over
the present petition in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future
litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present controversy which, as
correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the
magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed
resolution.Moreover, x x x requiring the petitioners to file their petition first
with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.
That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests
of justice is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said
in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals: [23]
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be avoided. Time and again, this Court has
suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation
whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we

forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been
taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case.
In a number of other exceptional cases, we held as follows:
[24]
This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that of Regional Trial
Courts and the Court of Appeals, over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, and we entertain
direct resort to us in cases where special and important reasons or
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the same.
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue
of bail in extradition proceedings, we deem it best to take cognizance of the
present case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first impression over
which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
Five Postulates of Extradition
The substantive issues raised in this case require an interpretation or
construction of the treaty and the law on extradition. A cardinal rule in the
interpretation of a treaty or a law is to ascertain and give effect to its
intent. Since PD 1069 is intended as a guide for the implementation of
[25]
extradition treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory, understanding
[26]
certain postulates of extradition will aid us in properly deciding the issues
raised here.
1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.
First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing
crime by facilitating the arrest and the custodial transfer of a fugitive from
[27] [28] [29]
one state to the other.
With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the
flight of affluent criminals from one country to another for the purpose of
committing crime and evading prosecution has become more
frequent. Accordingly, governments are adjusting their methods of dealing
with criminals and crimes that transcend international boundaries.
Today, a majority of nations in the world community have come to look
upon extradition as the major effective instrument of international co-
operation in the suppression of crime. It is the only regular system that has
[30]
been devised to return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent to try
them in accordance with municipal and international law. [31]
20
An important practical effect x x x of the recognition of the principle that
criminals should be restored to a jurisdiction competent to try and punish
them is that the number of criminals seeking refuge abroad will be
reduced. For to the extent that efficient means of detection and the threat of
punishment play a significant role in the deterrence of crime within the
territorial limits of a State, so the existence of effective extradition
arrangements and the consequent certainty of return to the locus delicti
commissi play a corresponding role in the deterrence of flight abroad in order
to escape the consequence of crime. x x x. From an absence of extradition
arrangements flight abroad by the ingenious criminal receives direct
encouragement and thus indirectly does the commission of crime itself. [32]
In Secretary v. Lantion we explained:
[33]
The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and
one way to do it is to facilitate the extradition of persons covered by treaties
duly entered [into] by our government.More and more, crimes are becoming
the concern of one world. Laws involving crimes and crime prevention are
undergoing universalization. One manifest purpose of this trend towards
globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminal whose activities threaten
the peace and progress of civilized countries. It is to the great interest of the
Philippines to be part of this irreversible movement in light of its
vulnerability to crimes, especially transnational crimes.
Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel,
and an expanding ring of international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford
to be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate with other states in order to
improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country.
2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused
Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have
examined, and that both accept and trust, each others legal system and
judicial process. More pointedly, our duly authorized representatives
[34]
signature on an extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and
the willingness of the other state to protect the basic rights of the person
sought to be extradited. That signature signifies our full faith that the
[35]
accused will be given, upon extradition to the requesting state, all relevant
and basic rights in the criminal proceedings that will take place therein;
otherwise, the treaty would not have been signed, or would have been
directly attacked for its unconstitutionality.
3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis

Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, extradition
[36]
proceedings are not criminal in nature. In criminal proceedings, the
constitutional rights of the accused are at fore; in extradition which is sui
generis -- in a class by itself -- they are not.
An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding
which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by
the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve
the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or
innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be
extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to
determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an
extraditee x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal
proceeding. An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal
proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In contradistinction to a criminal
proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow
admission of evidence under less stringent standards. In terms of the
quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited
upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case. Finally, unlike in a
criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final,
in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual
extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him. The
United States adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State
exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the
demands of the nations foreign relations before making the ultimate decision
to extradite.
Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called
upon to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the person sought to be
extradited. Such determination during the extradition proceedings will only
[37]
result in needless duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a measure of
international judicial assistance through which a person charged with or
convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that
person. It is not part of the function of the assisting authorities to enter into
questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction. The ultimate purpose
[38]
of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the
21
extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the
person sought is extraditable.[39]
4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the
Extradition Treaty, and our legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty
carries the presumption that its implementation will serve the national
interest.
Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes
comity with the requesting state. On the other hand, failure to fulfill our
[40]
obligations thereunder paints a bad image of our country before the world
community. Such failure would discourage other states from entering into
treaties with us, particularly an extradition treaty that hinges on reciprocity.
[41]
Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith
with our obligations under the Treaty. This principle requires that we deliver
[42]
the accused to the requesting country if the conditions precedent to
extradition, as set forth in the Treaty, are satisfied. In other words, [t]he
demanding government, when it has done all that the treaty and the law
require it to do, is entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the
proper warrant, and the other government is under obligation to make the
surrender. Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to
[43]
deliver the accused, should it be found proper.
5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This
prima facie presumption finds reinforcement in the experience of the [44]
executive branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure that the accused
will not flee the jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their
extradition to the requesting state.
The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons
sought to be extradited have a propensity to flee. Indeed, extradition
hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to
trial in the requesting country. Prior acts of herein respondent -- (1) leaving
[45]
the requesting state right before the conclusion of his indictment proceedings
there; and (2) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the
requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged with
are bailable -- eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the
requesting state, as well as his predisposition to avoid them at all cost. These
circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying high risk of flight. He has
demonstrated that he has the capacity and the will to flee. Having fled once,
what is there to stop him, given sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a second
time?

First Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing
Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?
Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC --informing
the accused, a fugitive from justice, that an Extradition Petition has been filed
against him, and that petitioner is seeking his arrest -- gives him notice to
escape and to avoid extradition. Moreover, petitioner pleads that such
procedure may set a dangerous precedent, in that those sought to be
extradited -- including terrorists, mass murderers and war criminals -- may
invoke it in future extradition cases.
On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues that he should not be
hurriedly and arbitrarily deprived of his constitutional right to liberty without
due process. He further asserts that there is as yet no specific law or rule
setting forth the procedure prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, after
the petition for extradition has been filed in court; ergo, the formulation of that
procedure is within the discretion of the presiding judge.
Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their arguments. It
states:
SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of
Notices.- (1) Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of
the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused to appear and to
answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a
warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which may be served
any where within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that
the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best
serve the ends of justice. Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused
after having received the summons fail to answer within the time fixed, the
presiding judge shall hear the case or set another date for the hearing thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued,
shall be promptly served each upon the accused and the attorney having
charge of the case. (Emphasis ours)
Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganans act of immediately
setting for hearing the issuance of a warrant of arrest? We rule in the
negative.
1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law
22
It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law,
uses the word immediate to qualify the arrest of the accused. This
qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance
of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing
parties, receiving facts and arguments from them, and giving them time
[46] [47] [48]
to prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a
hearing can no longer be considered immediate. The law could not have
intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of
imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued.
By using the phrase if it appears, the law further conveys that accuracy
is not as important as speed at such early stage. The trial court is not
expected to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and
actual situation, immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the
knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is expected merely
to get a good first impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a
speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the
accused.
Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a Certificate of
Authentication among others, were the following: (1) Annex H, the Affidavit
executed on May 26, 1999 by Mr. Michael E. Savage -- trial attorney in the
Campaign Financing Task Force of the Criminal Division of the US
Department of Justice; (2) Annexes H to G, evidentiary Appendices of
various exhibits that constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the
Indictment, with Exhibits 1 to 120 (duly authenticated exhibits that constituted
evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment); (3) Annex BB, the Exhibit I
Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of
Angela Byers and enclosed Statements in two volumes; (4) Annex GG, the
Exhibit J Table of Contents for Supplemental Evidentiary Appendix with
enclosed Exhibits 121 to 132; and (5) Annex MM, the Exhibit L Appendix of
Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Betty Steward
and enclosed Statements in two volumes. [49]
It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an
impression from these records adequate for him to make an initial
determination of whether the accused was someone who should immediately
be arrested in order to best serve the ends of justice. He could have
determined whether such facts and circumstances existed as would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that the extradition
request was prima facie meritorious. In point of fact, he actually concluded
from these supporting documents that probable cause did exist. In the
second questioned Order, he stated:

In the instant petition, the documents sent by the US Government in support
of [its] request for extradition of herein respondent are enough to convince
the Court of the existence of probable cause to proceed with the hearing
against the extraditee. [50]
We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing
the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident
from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having
already determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent
judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon
motion of Jimenez. [51]
Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of
the answer or upon failure of the accused to answer after receiving the
summons. In connection with the matter of immediate arrest, however, the
word hearing is notably absent from the provision. Evidently, had the holding
of a hearing at that stage been intended, the law could have easily so
provided. It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings
are summary in nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and the Treaty leans
[52]
to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate
with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings.
It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend something
reasonable and something not inconsistent with generally recognized
principles of International Law, nor with previous treaty obligations towards
third States. If, therefore, the meaning of a treaty is ambiguous, the
reasonable meaning is to be preferred to the unreasonable, the more
reasonable to the less reasonable x x x .[53]
Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons sought to be
extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at
some future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute
an escape. Neither the Treaty nor the Law could have intended that
consequence, for the very purpose of both would have been defeated by the
escape of the accused from the requested state.
2. On the Basis of the Constitution
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by
Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. It provides:
23
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the
Constitution itself requires only the examination -- under oath or affirmation --
of complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is no
requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants
of arrest.
In Ho v. People and in all the cases cited therein, never was a judge
[54]
required to go to the extent of conducting a hearing just for the purpose of
personally determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. All we required was that the judge must have sufficient supporting
documents upon which to make his independent judgment, or at the very
least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence
of probable cause. [55]
In Webb v. De Leon, the Court categorically stated that a judge was
[56]
not supposed to conduct a hearing before issuing a warrant of arrest:
Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely
determine personally the probability, not the certainty of guilt of an
accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine
the existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial
determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is
supported by substantial evidence.
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges
merely further examine complainants and their witnesses. In the present
[57]
case, validating the act of respondent judge and instituting the practice of
hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be
discordant with the rationale for the entire system. If the accused were
allowed to be heard and necessarily to present evidence during the prima
facie determination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, what would stop
him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage -- if he so
desires -- in his effort to negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedure
could convert the determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial of
the entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case

superfluous. This scenario is also anathema to the summary nature of
extraditions.
That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal
action is not sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of procedures more
protective of the accused. If a different procedure were called for at all, a
more restrictive one -- not the opposite -- would be justified in view of
respondents demonstrated predisposition to flee.
Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to restate the
proper procedure:
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents,
the judge must study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie
finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they show
compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought is
extraditable. At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of
further documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses
of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie
finding is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the
[58]
judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined,
then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the
extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to
appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant,
the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of
the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate
the proceedings. In our opinion, the foregoing procedure will best serve the
ends of justice in extradition cases.
Second Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?
Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:
Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance
as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required.
24
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional provision
secures the right to bail of all persons, including those sought to be
extradited. Supposedly, the only exceptions are the ones charged with
offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is
strong. He also alleges the relevance to the present case of Section 4 of [59]
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which, insofar as practicable and consistent
with the summary nature of extradition proceedings, shall also apply
according to Section 9 of PD 1069.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no provision in the
Philippine Constitution granting the right to bail to a person who is the subject
of an extradition request and arrest warrant.
Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings
We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word
conviction, the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as
Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has
been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does
not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not
render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss
of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. It follows that the constitutional provision
[60]
on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of
innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended
does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available
only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected
with invasion. Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on
[61]
bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the
aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is
available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are
bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the
present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct
from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for
bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the
extradition court.

No Violation of Due Process
Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti in arguing that,
[62]
constitutionally, [n]o one shall be deprived of x x x liberty x x x without due
process of law.
Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the
extradition proceedings does not amount to a violation of his right to due
process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is
the opportunity to be heard but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine
[63]
does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. Where the [64]
circumstances -- such as those present in an extradition case -- call for it,
a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. In the present case,
[65]
respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the
extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no
violation of his right to due process and fundamental fairness.
Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no arbitrariness, either, in
the immediate deprivation of his liberty prior to his being heard. That his
arrest and detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by (1) the
DOJs filing in court the Petition with its supporting documents after a
determination that the extradition request meets the requirements of the law
and the relevant treaty; (2) the extradition judges independent prima facie
determination that his arrest will best serve the ends of justice before the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he is under
the courts custody, to apply for bail as an exception to the no-initial-bail rule.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the
extradition of respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in that
country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before
those proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from continuing with
the due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process
now has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the
requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.
In this light, would it be proper and just for the government to increase
the risk of violating its treaty obligations in order to accord Respondent
Jimenez his personal liberty in the span of time that it takes to resolve the
Petition for Extradition? His supposed immediate deprivation of liberty
without the due process that he had previously shunned pales against the
governments interest in fulfilling its Extradition Treaty obligations and in
cooperating with the world community in the suppression of crime. Indeed,
[c]onstitutional liberties do not exist in a vacuum; the due process rights
accorded to individuals must be carefully balanced against exigent and
palpable government interests. [66]
25
Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives, cowards
and weaklings who, instead of facing the consequences of their actions,
choose to run and hide.Hence, it would not be good policy to increase the
risk of violating our treaty obligations if, through overprotection or excessively
liberal treatment, persons sought to be extradited are able to evade arrest or
escape from our custody. In the absence of any provision -- in the
Constitution, the law or the treaty -- expressly guaranteeing the right to bail in
extradition proceedings, adopting the practice of not granting them bail, as a
general rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to the
Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors.
The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into
place with and gives life to Article 14 of the Treaty, since this practice would
[67]
encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to the requesting state to cut
short their detention here. Likewise, their detention pending the resolution of
extradition proceedings would fall into place with the emphasis of the
Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need for
their speedy disposition.
Exceptions to the No Bail Rule
The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition
cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse
of discretion and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to
[68]
protect and enforce constitutional rights. Furthermore, we believe that the
[69]
right to due process is broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to
extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the life, liberty or
property of every person. It is dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every
situation calling for its application.
[70]
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so
hold that, after a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the
custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only
upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the
applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that
there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including,
[71]
as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting
state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and
since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness,
the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement
with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that

extradition is basically an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising from
the presidential power to conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it
partakes of the nature of police assistance amongst states, which is not
normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the courts into the
exercise of this power should be characterized by caution, so that the vital
international and bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably
impeded or compromised. In short, while this Court is ever protective of the
sporting idea of fair play, it also recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives
and the need to fulfill international obligations.
Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are special circumstances
that are compelling enough for the Court to grant his request for provisional
release on bail. We have carefully examined these circumstances and shall
now discuss them.
1. Alleged Disenfranchisement
While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez was elected as
a member of the House of Representatives. On that basis, he claims that his
detention will disenfranchise his Manila district of 600,000 residents. We are
not persuaded. In People v. Jalosjos, the Court has already debunked the
[72]
disenfranchisement argument when it ruled thus:
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress,
they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of
action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such
legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of
prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full
knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing
that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of
constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of laws. This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall
be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The
organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any
person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows
different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation
26
which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all
persons validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers
has never been an excuse to free a person validly [from] prison. The duties
imposed by the mandate of the people are multifarious. The accused-
appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of
government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House
of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged
with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the
physical absence of one or a few of its members.Depending on the exigency
of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court
can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a
function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse
her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique
skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An
elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer must
maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a
prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly
restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly or otherwise,
insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of
individuals.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by
public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even
if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and
duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the
class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the
law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. [73]
It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a
congressional seat in Manila, it was already of public knowledge that the
United States was requesting his extradition. Hence, his constituents were or

should have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case
against their representative, including his detention pending the final
resolution of the case. Premises considered and in line with Jalosjos, we are
constrained to rule against his claim that his election to public office is by
itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.
2. Anticipated Delay
Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the extradition
proceedings are lengthy, it would be unfair to confine him during the
pendency of the case. Again we are not convinced. We must emphasize that
extradition cases are summary in nature. They are resorted to merely to
determine whether the extradition petition and its annexes conform to the
Extradition Treaty, not to determine guilt or innocence. Neither is it, as a rule,
intended to address issues relevant to the constitutional rights available to
the accused in a criminal action.
We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner may, in bad faith,
unduly delay the proceedings. This is quite another matter that is not at issue
here. Thus, any further discussion of this point would be merely anticipatory
and academic.
However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of respondent, with all the
more reason would the grant of bail not be justified. Giving premium to delay
by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be
tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It would also
encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition
proceedings even more. This we cannot allow.
3. Not a Flight Risk?
Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To support this claim,
he stresses that he learned of the extradition request in June 1999; yet, he
has not fled the country.True, he has not actually fled during the preliminary
stages of the request for his extradition. Yet, this fact cannot be taken to
mean that he will not flee as the process moves forward to its conclusion, as
he hears the footsteps of the requesting government inching closer and
closer. That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean
that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our government if
and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.
In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for and granted by the
trial court at anytime after the applicant has been taken into custody and prior
to judgment, even after bail has been previously denied. In the present case,
the extradition court may continue hearing evidence on the application for
bail, which may be granted in accordance with the guidelines in this Decision.
27
Brief Refutation of Dissents
The proposal to remand this case to the extradition court, we believe, is
totally unnecessary; in fact, it is a cop-out. The parties -- in particular,
Respondent Jimenez -- have been given more than sufficient opportunity
both by the trial court and this Court to discuss fully and exhaustively private
respondents claim to bail. As already stated, the RTC set for hearing not only
petitioners application for an arrest warrant, but also private respondents
prayer for temporary liberty. Thereafter required by the RTC were
memoranda on the arrest, then position papers on the application for bail,
both of which were separately filed by the parties.
This Court has meticulously pored over the Petition, the Comment, the
Reply, the lengthy Memoranda and the Position Papers of both
parties. Additionally, it has patiently heard them in Oral Arguments, a
procedure not normally observed in the great majority of cases in this
Tribunal. Moreover, after the Memos had been submitted, the parties --
particularly the potential extraditee -- have bombarded this Court with
additional pleadings -- entitled Manifestations by both parties and Counter-
Manifestation by private respondent -- in which the main topic was Mr.
Jimenezs plea for bail.
A remand would mean that this long, tedious process would be repeated
in its entirety. The trial court would again hear factual and evidentiary
matters. Be it noted, however, that, in all his voluminous pleadings and
verbal propositions, private respondent has not asked for a
remand. Evidently, even he realizes that there is absolutely no need to
rehear factual matters. Indeed, the inadequacy lies not in
the factual presentation of Mr. Jimenez. Rather, it lies in
his legal arguments. Remanding the case will not solve this utter lack of
persuasion and strength in his legal reasoning.
In short, this Court -- as shown by this Decision and the spirited
Concurring, Separate and Dissenting Opinions written by the learned justices
themselves -- has exhaustively deliberated and carefully passed
upon all relevant questions in this case. Thus, a remand will not serve any
useful purpose; it will only further delay these already very delayed
proceedings, which our Extradition Law requires to be summary in
[74]
character. What we need now is prudent and deliberate speed, not
unnecessary and convoluted delay. What is needed is a firm decision on the
merits, not a circuitous cop-out.
Then, there is also the suggestion that this Court is allegedly
disregarding basic freedoms when a case is one of extradition. We believe
that this charge is not only baseless, but also unfair. Suffice it to say that, in

its length and breath, this Decision has taken special cognizance of the rights
to due process and fundamental fairness of potential extraditees.
Summation
As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize and stress these ten
points:
1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine
whether the request expressed in the petition, supported by its annexes and
the evidence that may be adduced during the hearing of the petition,
complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and whether the person sought
is extraditable. The proceedings are intended merely to assist the requesting
state in bringing the accused -- or the fugitive who has illegally escaped --
back to its territory, so that the criminal process may proceed therein.
2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to
have reposed its trust in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial
system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability and the willingness of the
latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal case
therein.
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a
criminal case in which guilt or innocence is determined. Consequently, an
extradition case is not one in which the constitutional rights of the accused
are necessarily available. It is more akin, if at all, to a courts request to police
authorities for the arrest of the accused who is at large or has escaped
detention or jumped bail. Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the
requesting state, the reasonable prima facie presumption is that the person
would escape again if given the opportunity.
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and its
supporting documents, the judge shall make a prima facie finding whether
the petition is sufficient in form and substance, whether it complies with the
Extradition Treaty and Law, and whether the person sought is
extraditable. The magistrate has discretion to require the petitioner to submit
further documentation, or to personally examine the affiants or witnesses. If
convinced that a prima facie case exists, the judge immediately issues a
warrant for the arrest of the potential extraditee and summons him or her to
answer and to appear at scheduled hearings on the petition.
5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for
bail. Since the applicants have a history of absconding, they have the burden
of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no danger to the community;
28
and (b) there exist special, humanitarian or compelling circumstances. The
grounds used by the highest court in the requesting state for the grant of bail
therein may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a special
circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right; it is subject to
judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case.
6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to
fundamental fairness. Due process does not always call for
a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity is sufficient due to
the flight risk involved. Indeed, available during the hearings on the petition
and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental
fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.
7. This Court will always remain a protector of human rights, a bastion of
liberty, a bulwark of democracy and the conscience of society. But it is also
well aware of the limitations of its authority and of the need for respect for the
prerogatives of the other co-equal and co-independent organs of
government.
8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial,
responsibility arising out of the presidential power to conduct foreign relations
and to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of government
has broad discretion in its duty and power of implementation.
9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight functions and
exercise review authority to prevent or excise grave abuse and tyranny. They
should not allow contortions, delays and over-due process every little step of
the way, lest these summary extradition proceedings become not only inutile
but also sources of international embarrassment due to our inability to
comply in good faith with a treaty partners simple request to return a
fugitive. Worse, our country should not be converted into a dubious haven
where fugitives and escapees can unreasonably delay, mummify, mock,
frustrate, checkmate and defeat the quest for bilateral justice and
international cooperation.
10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted with
all deliberate speed to determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty
and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the
legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate that pu
rpose.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Order
dated May 23, 2001 is hereby declared NULL and VOID, while the
challenged Order dated July 3, 2001 is SET ASIDE insofar as it granted bail
to Respondent Mark Jimenez. The bail bond posted by private respondent
is CANCELLED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to conduct the
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extradition proceedings before it, with all deliberate speed pursuant to the our Extradition Law. No costs.
spirit and the letter of our Extradition Treaty with the United States as well as
SO ORDERED.