Renz, Ursula - Self-Knowledge and Knowledge of Mankind in Hobbes' Leviathan PDF

DOI: 10.1111/ejop.
12227
Self-Knowledge and Knowledge of Mankind

in Hobbes Leviathan
Ursula Renz
Abstract: In the introduction to the Leviathan, Hobbes famously defends the

anthropological point of departure of his theory of the state by invoking the
Delphic injunction Know thyself! of which he presents a peculiar reading
thereafter. In this paper, I present a reading of the anthropology of the Leviathan
that takes this move seriously. In appealing to Delphic injunction, Hobbes wanted
to prompt a particular way of reading his anthropology for which it is crucial that
the reader relate the presented anthropological views to his self-conception. The
anthropology of the Leviathan is thus a kind of manual for a certain kind of self-
reection by which the readers self-knowledge is to be improved. Furthermore,
I will argue that Hobbes interpretation of the Delphic injunction illuminates
several theoretical issues relevant to the epistemology of that kind of self-knowledge
that was demanded by the Delphic injunction. While Hobbes does not solve all the
epistemological problems related with the ideal appealed to by this inscription,
he does provide some interesting insights into some general requirements that
any epistemological account of Socratic self-knowledge has to meet.
In the introduction to the Leviathan, Hobbes famously defends the anthropological

point of departure of his theory of the state by invoking the Delphic injunction
Know thyself!, of which he presents a peculiar reading thereafter. Strikingly, there
is not very much literature in Hobbes scholarship on this move.1 If addressed
explicitly, it has mostly been aligned with the remark in 7 of the chapter on
method of De Corpore, where Hobbes claims that we know the human mind not
only by the synthetic method but also by any mans experience that will but
examine his own mind.2
While this parallel places the Leviathan in the vicinity of Hobbes systematic
writing, it also exhibits how intricately the interpretation of his appeal to the
Delphic injunction relates to several long-standing controversies in Hobbes schol-
arship. Providing an instruction of how to read the Leviathan, the appeal to the
Delphic injunction is, rst, key for the hermeneutical question of how the Leviathan,
considered as a text, is related to the texts constituting the Elementa. Next, it is also
essential for the problem of what kind of psychology the alleged reliance of
Hobbes political theory on his anthropology requires, an issue that has proved
very controversial. Whereas some have assumed complete theoretical continuity
between Hobbes texts and have therefore read the Leviathan in line with the
Elementa project,3 others have posited a fundamental difference between the
Elementa and the Leviathan and have opted for a humanistic reading of Hobbes
European Journal of Philosophy : ISSN 0966-8373 pp. 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
2 Ursula Renz
anthropology.4 Finally, the interpretation of Hobbes appeal to the Delphic injunc-

tion relates to a third controversy in Hobbes scholarship over his views about, and
his usage of, rhetoric, a question that has been debated for several years now.5
A well-grounded and careful reading of Hobbes appeal to the Delphic injunc-
tion may contribute substantially to these debates, albeit only indirectly. As I am
going argue in this paper, this move is meant to indicate that the Leviathan is a
different sort of text that is distinct from the Elementa both in its addressing a
broader audience and in its pursuing a different kind of goal, which is not to
improve anthropological theory. This makes room for reconciling certain
alternative interpretive attitudes that have notoriously separated Hobbes scholar-
ship into two camps. There is no doubt, I think, that Hobbes was a naturalist,
and this certainly requires both that his political philosophy be in harmony with
his natural philosophy and that his anthropology and psychology follow the
guideline of mechanist physics.6 But this is not to preclude that Hobbes integrates
certain insights deriving from a more humanist stance as it were, insights,
moreover, the consideration of which may yield an image of Hobbes as being
concerned, in an almost existentialist manner, with human nature.7
It is against this background that I suggest a new reading of Hobbes call for
self-knowledge, the overall aim of which is to shed new light on the project
pursued in the Leviathan, or its rst part. This project, I will argue, is educational
rather than analytical in spirit. The goal is not to examine the human mind, but to
teach the reader about the properties of his own mind. The reference to the Delphic
injunction is signicant for the way in which Hobbes wishes in the anthropology of
the Leviathan to address his audience by means of it; as I shall argue, it indicates
specically how the reader is expected to take notice of, and internalize, his
anthropological insights, but it is not a matter of demonstrating their truth. This
being so, it neither reveals the theoretical basis of Hobbes anthropological views
nor reects the scientic method of the Hobbesian anthropology, and hence does
not represent a theory about the way in which human nature is to be investigated.8
Thus, I want to expose Hobbes educational ambition in the Leviathan by
proposing a new interpretation of its rst part. My hypothesis is that Hobbes
aim is to initiate a particular way of reading the rst part of the Leviathan, for which
it is crucial that the reader relate the presented views to his self-conception. Hobbes
wants us to read part one of the Leviathan in such a way that we think of the
anthropological claims it contains as describing ourselves. The anthropology of
the Leviathan is thus, as it were, a manual for a certain kind of self-reection by
which the readers self-knowledge is to be improved.
In the rst part of the paper, I defend my overall interpretive thesis. Comparing
the themes addressed in the Leviathan with the ones dealt with in the Elementa, I
will argue that in the Leviathan Hobbes is pursuing an educational project for which
he relies in many ways on the readers adopting a rst-personal perspective with
respect to what she reads. The second part examines the epistemological assump-
tions contained in the interpretation of the Delphic injunction that Hobbes
provides in the second half of the Introduction. This text raises many problems that
Hobbes does not explicitly address, not to mention solve, in a satisfying way. But
2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

Self-Knowledge and Knowledge of Mankind in Hobbes Leviathan 3
as I am going to show, Hobbes exhibits a striking awareness of the problems one

has to tackle when developing an epistemology of Socratic self-knowledge. In
the third part, I will take a closer look at the educational practice by which Hobbes
tries to persuade the reader to embrace his anthropological views on a
rst-personal level. I will end with some general remarks situating Hobbes
educational program in the larger context of his philosophy.
A nal remark before I start. One might wonder what kind of self-knowledge
Hobbes calls for when appealing to the Delphic injunction. I will address this
question in the second part of the paper. So much, however, is clear from the
outset: This imperative was certainly not concerned with what in contemporary
philosophy is called self-knowledge, i.e. the purportedly immediately accessible
knowledge of ones mental states9; for that knowledge we get for free. Instead,
what is at stake here is the kind of substantial self-knowledge that includes
anthropological knowledge and is usually considered a personal achievement. In
discussions of early modern philosophy, it is often referred to as Socratic
self-knowledge. Unfortunately, what this type of self-knowledge may be taken
to consist in is rarely examined from an epistemological point of view.10 As it will
turn out, Hobbes, while not solving all the epistemological problems related with
Socratic self-knowledge, does provide some interesting insights into some general
requirements that any epistemological account of it has to meet.
The Educational Project of Part One of the Leviathan and the Role of the First
Person
Comparing the anthropology of the Elementa with the rst part of the Leviathan,
one will soon notice that, in comparison with De Corpore and De Homine, the
anthropology of the Leviathan omits any farther-reaching physical discussion,
including all optics. In particular, the Leviathan offers no detailed causal analysis
of the psychological properties of man. This is not to say that physical causation
plays no role anymore in the latter text, for there are several passages in which
Hobbes writes about the mechanistic principles driving or even constituting our
psychological properties. In chapter one, for instance, he discusses how sensation
arises when a moving external body impinges on the sense organs.11 Similarly,
chapter two shows that imagination is due to the continuation of the internal
motion by which some former sense impression is retained.12 Furthermore,
accounts of physical causation are present implicitly in many of Hobbes
denitions of phenomena usually related to rationality, as, for instance, when
he equates the will with the last Appetite in Deliberating.13 Nonetheless, these
passages provide no complete causal explanations of mental phenomena, and it
thus seems as if Hobbes mechanistic physics is assumed as background, but is
not intended to serve or furnish a complete or systematic mechanistic account
of the human mind.
How can we account for this difference of approach between the Leviathan and
the other texts mentioned? It certainly does not indicate a fundamental change in

4 Ursula Renz
Hobbes doctrines. To be sure, there are crucial differences with respect to certain
problems and issues, such as the problem of authorization, which I am going to
address in the third section. But these are rather variations on a common theme
and do not express a fundamental change in the basic doctrine. Still, the mentioned
differences suggest that the Leviathan aspires to a different purpose.
At this point, it is worth taking a closer look at a peculiarity of the philosophical
method practiced in the Elementa. In the beginning of the second part of De Corpore,
at which point Hobbes is initiating a discussion of his natural philosophy, he
famously introduces his annihilation hypothesis, i.e. the methodological ction
that everything besides our ideas is annihilated. This ction, which requires, in
the form of a methodological proviso, that we consider all our ideas either as
internal accidents of our mind or as species of external things, not as really
existing, but appearing only to exist (DCo;1841: 93f.),14 lays the ground for the
subsequent derivation of all further claims from a causal analysis of the phantasms
provided by the senses. We can conclude that in the Elementa, Hobbes eventually
aims at giving a more-or-less complete causal account of his views on all nature,
mankind and political institutions.15
The case is different in the Leviathan. Here, by contrast, Hobbes dispenses with
farther-reaching causal analysis, and he does so quite deliberately; as he says in
the beginning of the rst chapter, [t]o know the natural cause of Sense is not very
necessary to the business in hand.16 He obviously thinks that there is no need for
detailed causal analysis in this text. Yet, as becomes clear just after the quoted
passage, he nonetheless wants to make sure that sensation, or more generally
mental states, are understood as the effect of some motion caused by external
bodies. This indicates that Hobbes wishes us to presuppose some of the details
of his mechanistic account of the mind, although his main project here is not to
provide a complete or denitive explanation of the mind in those terms. Rather, as
I shall now attempt to show, his project in the Leviathan is of a markedly pedagogical
nature: It does not seek merely to defend in an abstract manner the theoretical
validity of the causal-mechanistic account, even though, of course, he presupposes
its truth. What he is doing here is to pitch or tailor some premises and results of this
account to an audience interested in politics rather than in science.17
This does not entail that the Leviathan must be committed to a different theory
on mankind, nor does Hobbes, as some have alleged, employ another, humanist,
method of inquiry; rather, he is concerned with another kind of purpose, namely,
convincing a certain audience of his anthropological views. Note that we have to
distinguish three different levels of analysis here to get things right: The level of
theory, the level of method, and the level of purpose or the particular aim of the
text. While on the level of theory the Leviathan is consistent with the Elementa, there
is, I think, a marked difference on the level of purpose. This result, in turn, has a
negative impact on any decision of the question of method; given that there is a
difference of purpose, no conclusions can be drawn with regard to the method
employed, as only the Elementa are engaged in inquiring systematically into human
nature, whereas in the Leviathan, method is merely a matter of exposing certain
insights.

This analysis can be conrmed if we take a closer look at the contents of the rst
lesson Hobbes wishes his readers to appreciate. As he writes in the introduction to
the Leviathan, the rst part is to consider man as the Matter and the Articer of
the commonwealth. Hobbes rst lesson must thus provide the reader with a view
on mankind that allows her to understand both how man is the matter of the
commonwealth and how he can be the maker of the state.
Now, one might say that in order to acquire this understanding causal knowl-
edge is necessary. How does this t with the above observation that, unlike the
Elementa, the Leviathan is not concerned with causal analysis? It is true, some causal
knowledge is indeed required for the Leviathan, too, and this is quite obvious with
regard to the notion of mans constituting the matter of the state. Understanding
man as such requires that one conceive of the faculties and limitations of man as
causally determining his social life. This presupposes much causal knowledge. But
it is not necessary that the reader have detailed knowledge of the complete causal
history determining mans behavior. Rather than investigating all the particular
causes of mans mind and behavior, the reader has simply to acknowledge the idea
of motion as the general principle of mental causation.18
But how does causality matter to the readers notion of mans being the articer
of the state? The answer to this question is more complicated and requires rst
considering what it means to say that someone is the articer of something. For
a person to be the articer of something, it is necessary that she play a crucial role
in its causation. The thing in question must, in some sense or other, be effectuated
by the person we consider as its articer. Yet that there is a causal relation between
the person and the object is not sufcient for someones being the latters articer.
We are the causes of many things of which we are not the articer. Man is assumed
to have caused climate change, but he is not considered the articer of the climate
change. As a second requirement for a persons being the articer of a thing,
therefore, we can discern the idea that the artifact in question has to be effectuated
deliberately by the articer, rather than unintentionally. Or more precisely, to bring
about the artifact must be the very goal of some intentional action of the agent.
We can conclude that understanding man as the articer of the state is not to be
reductively accounted for by mere causal knowledge of mans behavior. The
second aspect of Hobbes programto understand man as the articer of the
statethus exhibits an additional requirement: To think of man as the articer of
the state requires that one conceive of the state as the intended product of mans
deliberate actions, and this involves conceiving of man as an agent. Clearly, given
the mechanist framework of the Hobbesian anthropology, man has no free will.
Human agency cannot therefore consist in a free and self-determined choice
among options. But Hobbes nonetheless assumes that it makes a difference
whether we think of man (i) as being some kind of agent or (ii) only passively, as
matter, and we may presume that Hobbes also wants his reader to see this
difference. Otherwise, he would not have distinguished mans being the articer
explicitly from his being the matter of the state in the rst place. It thus seems crucial
for Hobbes educational project that the reader see how man, notwithstanding his
behavior being caused by mere matter and motion, can be understood as a cause in

6 Ursula Renz
his own right, that is, in the more active and practically efcacious manner that
seems implied in the notion of man as the articer of the state.
It is against this background that I suggest interpreting the second half of the
introduction to the Leviathan. In aligning his approach with the tradition of
appealing to the Delphic injunction, Hobbes indicates, as I will argue below, that
he expects the reader to acknowledge the proposed anthropological views on
mankind from a rst-personal perspective.
But why is it necessary to adopt a rst-personal perspective, in order to get a
grasp of mans being the articer of the state? Admittedly, if Hobbes aim was only
to convey an understanding of mans being the matter of the state, our adopting a
rst-personal perspective would not be essential. It is possible to conceive of ants
as the matter of ant colonies without reecting on the ants life from a rst-personal
perspective. The situation is different, however, with regard to the second aspect of
Hobbes anthropological lesson. As I have argued above, to understand how man
is the articer of the state requires that one conceive of the state in terms of an
intended result of mans deliberate actions; yet to think of the effects of mans behavior
in these terms presupposes some knowledge of his aims and intentions. Now, as
Elizabeth Anscombe showed a few decades ago, intentions, goals, or aims belong
to the things that are known without observation, and this suggests that knowl-
edge of an agents intentions involves some irreducible rst-personal perspec-
tive.19 Now, contrary to what one might infer from the widespread image of
Hobbes as the arch-naturalist, he apparently shares this insight, for he claims that
we cannot discover the design of mans actions in a safe way without comparing
them with our own.20 This indicates that Hobbes considers it a prerequisite of the
readers understanding of mans being the articer of the state that she adopts a
rst-personal point of view.
But this is not the whole story, for this requirement also changes the way in
which the reader is to think of mans being the matter of the state. One has to
take into account here that one cannot take these two sides of Hobbes
educational program apart without changing the essence of its lesson.21 We
may and should of course distinguish features describing man as the matter from
those yielding the understanding of man being the articer of the state. These two
aspects of Hobbes anthropology can be separated for analytical purposes, but it
is by taking them together that his educational program derives its peculiar
motivation. For whereas understanding man as the articer of the state requires
the adoption of a rst-personal perspective, understanding man as matter
demands that one come to think of human desires and intentions as conditioned
by the causal principles of mechanist physics. Following Hobbes naturalism,
these are just two sides of the same coin, and this is a matter of particular urgency
for him, as we are easily led astray by our imagination to think of ourselves as
exceptional. To acquire the right understanding of man as being both the matter
and the articer of the state therefore requires that we accept the Hobbesian
anthropology as a description of our own condition and that we learn to think
of our own intentions, which we know from a rst-personal perspective, in terms
of this third-personal description.

To summarize the results of this section, we can say that the goal of the rst part
of the Leviathan is not to demonstrate the truth of Hobbes anthropology, even
though, of course, its truth is presupposed; rather, it primarily aims at educating
the reader to think of herself in terms of Hobbes views. Thus the reader is not
expected solely to afrm the truth of Hobbes anthropology, but to relate its
particular tenets to the mental properties she knows from a rst-personal perspective
and to reect on what she desires, feels, and intends in light of the third-personal
views she is presented with when reading Hobbes anthropology. Ideally, she will
thus have already improved her self-conception when she starts thinking about the
need for a social contract and tries to understand how man can also be the articer
of the state.
Reading Mankind in Oneself: Hobbes Model for the Epistemology of

Improvable Self-knowledge
I argued in the last section that Hobbes pursues an educational program that is
grounded in the expectation that the reader relate the Hobbesian anthropology
to her rst-personal knowledge of her mental life, so that she both improves her
self-conception and gets into the position to see how man can be the articer of
the state. The question arises how this expectation is defended epistemologically.
How do we have to think of this process of improving ones self-conception by
reading the Leviathan? What conceptions, in other words, of self-reection and
self-knowledge underlie Hobbes educational program?
Hobbes neither addresses this question at length nor proposes a theory of self-
knowledge elsewhere. But right after the exposition of the organization of the
book, he makes a few remarks on his understanding of the Delphic injunction that
contain a couple of interesting insights that illuminate the nature of the kind of self-
knowledge he appears to have in mind. Unfortunately, these insights are extremely
under-theorized, and are thus easily missed. Before addressing them, therefore, let
us consider the underlying structure of the passage.
Roughly, the text can be divided into four steps:
(a) Voicing his anthropological account. In a rst step, Hobbes justies the anthropo-
logical point of departure by reminding the reader of two sayings on human
nature, both current in early modern philosophy. The rst consists in the
commonplace that Wisedome is acquired, not by reading of Books, but of
Men, which is likely a reference to Galileo Galileis famous metaphor of the
book of nature22; the second is the Latin version of the Delphic inscription,
Nosce teipsum, which is translated, remarkably, by Read thy self and not,
as one might expect, by Know thy self.
(b) Specication of the target of self-knowledge. In the next step, Hobbes opposes his
interpretation of the Delphic injunction to other interpretations current at the
time. In particular he emphasizes the following two points: (1) Self-knowledge,
as conceived by the ancients, aims at the acknowledgment of universal truths

8 Ursula Renz
about mankind. It is hence neither about the particular contents or qualities of

our mental states, nor about our individual dispositions or character traits.23
What we ought to nd by looking into ourselves are, Hobbes says, the
thoughts, and Passions of all other men, upon the like occasions. (2) By adding
the phrase upon the like occasions, he further accentuates that self-knowledge,
as he conceives of it, is not so much concerned with a specication of the
essential properties of humanity, but with the understanding of how our actions
and feelings are conditioned in a mechanistic universe. One could say that
Hobbes anthropology aims at knowledge of mankind in terms of the human
condition, rather than the nature of man.
At rst, this might seem puzzling. Why does Hobbes call for a process of self-
reading or looking into oneself, if he is primarily interested in particular
aspects of the human condition? Usually, we do not engage in introspection
when we want to know more about humanity as a whole. This suggests that
Hobbes notion of self-reading is more complex than what contemporary
epistemologists refer to when talking about introspection. Still, it remains an
open question how any kind of self-cognition may contribute to our knowing
the conditions of human life. Hobbes does not provide a direct answer to this
question, but, as I am going to argue in a moment, he does indicate a
preliminary solution to it through his usage of the metaphor of reading.
(c) Raising a problem. Hobbes next step consists in a diagnosis of a fundamental
problem. His point is this: We all are subject to the same kinds of passions,
such as desires, hopes, and fears, but we do not desire, hope, or fear the same
objects. To say that mens passions and thoughts are similar is thus not to say
that they are directed toward the same things.
At rst, this insight might seem trivial. Surely, we do not love the very same
things. I love cats, whereas you love dogs. But this does not preclude the
possibility that I may compare the feeling I am experiencing when observing
cats with the emotion you are undergoing when thinking of your dog. So,
one might ask, where is the problem?
I think that this passage needs to be read in the light of the Hobbesian
anthropology as it is discussed later in the book. Given his mechanist views
on the human mind, we have to give up any ambition to specify types of
passions by pointing out various types of intentional objects. But, as already
mentioned in the previous section, Hobbes also admits that observation of
the actions or movements of men without knowing their intentions, or
design, does not provide the kind of understanding he wants us to get either.
He obviously thinks that the intentional objects our thoughts are concerned
with or the goals our actions aim at are an essential part of our mental
reactions on certain occasions. Hobbes is thus in a real dilemma here: He can
neither simply rely on our rst-personal knowledge of our intentions or of
the targets of our desires, nor can he dismiss it.
It is important to see that Hobbes is not adopting some kind of other-mind
skepticism here; his point is not that we can never be sure about the objects
and intentions of other people. On the contrary, he explicitly admits that we

may know the intentions of at least those people with which we are already
well acquainted. Nor does he doubt the possibility of introspection or address
the question of the special authority of the rst person with regard to ones
own mental properties. None of these issues discussed in contemporary
debates about self-knowledge is addressed here. The problem Hobbes is
struggling with is rather this: If the knowledge we gain by looking into
ourselves or by the acquaintance with others mental lives is so restricted, as
he seems to think, how, then, can we ever afrm universal claims about
mankind on the basis of it? The problem is clear: Unless Hobbes nds a way
to negotiate this difculty, he will have to give up the ambition to provide
us with universal truths about mankind, rather than a restricted account of
the goings-on in a given individuals mind.
(d) Addressing the reader. It is against this background that in the fourth and nal
passage of the introduction, Hobbes addresses the sovereign as the ideal
reader of his tract. This move contains several steps. First, Hobbes explains
that the ambition to seek universal truths about mankind is particularly
important for future governors. He that is to govern a whole Nation, he
writes, must read in himself, not this, or that particular man; but mankind.24
Hobbes then afrms how difcult it is to accomplish this task, for knowledge
of mankind is harder [to achieve] than to learn any language. Yet, he adds,
when I shall have set down my own reading orderly, and perspicuously, the
pains left another, will be only to consider, if he also nd not the same in
himself. In sum, Hobbes suggests tackling the problem raised before by
advising the reader to compare what she is reading in the Leviathan with what
she is reading in herself.
In which sense does this move indicate a way out of Hobbes problem?
Clearly, one might still wonder how Hobbes, as the author whose task it is to
expose the results of his own self-reading, has got the knowledge in question.
However, for that reader who follows Hobbes advice, the problem becomes
manageable, for she is in a position from which she can compare the contents
of the reading proposed by Hobbes with the results of her self-scrutiny. And
that is also how she can read mankind in herself. This might appear
unsatisfying, and indeed I think that this is a less-than-ideal solution. But there
is no other solution according to Hobbes, since, as he explicitly says in the
closing sentence, this kind of Doctrine, admitteth no other Demonstration.25
What is achieved by these considerations? What insights into the epistemology

of Socratic self-knowledge does this interpretation of the Delphic injunction
provide?
To begin with let me recall my comments on the third step. As I mentioned
there, Hobbes seems to assume that our rst-personal knowledge of our intentions
is both a problematic and, in a sense, indispensable source of anthropological
knowledge. On the one hand, he explicitly says that we cannot make sense of other
mens actions unless we compare them with our own aims. We have therefore to
think about the targets of our own actions and thoughts from a rst-personal point

10 Ursula Renz
of view, even if this is not the very goal of the inquiry; but otherwise we never get
any knowledge of mankind at all. To observe the actions of others, without
comparing them with our own is, Hobbes contends, nothing but a vain attempt
to decipher [them] without a key.
On the other hand, Hobbes is also emphasizing the inuence of individual
constitution and education on the things desired, feared, hoped, &c., and it is
hard to see how one could account for these inuences unless we rely on some
external knowledge. Against this background, we can assume that by calling for
a process of self-reading, Hobbes is not simply appealing to the readers
introspective self-reection. To understand ourselves as subject to the inuence
of some condition, introspective knowledge of our intentions or of the objects of
our desires is necessary, but not sufcient; it does not provide us with any further
insight into the causes that shape our mental states. What Hobbes requires, then, is
that the reader engages in a process of self-scrutiny that involves introspection,
while it relates it to external knowledge.
But how is such a relating of introspection to external knowledge to be
conceived? I have already indicated how Hobbes thinks of solving this problem
in my exposition of the fourth step: He addresses the reader and advises her
how to relate his views to herself. Hobbes thus introduces the idea of a systematic
cooperation between the author and the readers of the Leviathan, a cooperation that
presupposes some special kind of division of labor. While his task as the author
consists in the explication of his own reading of mankind, it is the readers duty
to compare the results of the authors self-scrutinizing reading with the things
she sees in introspection. What Hobbes calls for is sort of a guided self-reading,
where the reader deciphers her introspective self-awareness by means of the
description of man proposed by the text.
At rst, this might look like a cheap rhetorical trick simply employed to prevent
further discussion. It has to be admitted that Hobbes does not get rid of any of the
difculties connected to the issue of rst-person authority, for which he has not
provided a solution yet. But this is not what this passage is about. The problem
at stake here is that it is not clear how one can get universal knowledge of
mankind, given that introspection is fundamentally limited in its reach. Yet if it
is this problem that Hobbes is concerned with, his calling for the readers
cooperation is a pretty clever move. To see why, one has to be clear on the
requirement that any account seeking to solve this problem has to meet: It has to
show what a cognitive process might look like that systematically mediates
between external and internal perspectives on human mental life. I think that, even
though Hobbes account is unsatisfying in many respects, his suggestion that the
reader should take the anthropological tenets maintained in the Leviathan and
consider if he nd not the same in himself does meet this requirement.
One might object here that the mentioned hermeneutical division of labor does
not answer the basic epistemological question of how universal claims about
mankind can be justied by ones looking into oneself. He has only shown how
some universal claim about mankind can be comprehended and afrmed by the
reader as holding for her, too.

At this point, it is important to see that Hobbes does not really face this problem,
for given his methodological nominalism there is no principled distinction
between the validity of universal claims and individual statements. As he is going
to develop his view in chapter four of the Leviathan, it is possible for him to reason
about the properties of a type of thing by considering the property of an individual
belonging to this type. Nothing prevents him from making a case for some
anthropological view by examining himself, as long as he avoids appealing to
those very features that distinguish him from other men.26 Furthermore, one has
to be aware that, if the ambition of the rst book of the Leviathan is educational
in spirit, Hobbes has not to worry as much about the scientic validity of his
approach as about the way in which the reader takes his views in.
The epistemological problem to be addressed here is, therefore, this: How is it
possible for someone to afrm certain existing claims about human nature by
looking into her own mind? This problem is indeed tackled by the mentioned
hermeneutic division of labor. Yet, to see why, it is important to explicate a
theoretical commitment involved in Hobbes usage of the notion of reading. This
notion is not only employed as a metaphor to describe the process of introspective
self-scrutiny, nor is it, as Skinner has suggested, an indication of the difculties
involved in the process of acquiring anthropological knowledge through
self-scrutiny.27 Rather, I think, it points to a structural peculiarity underlying the
concept of reading, the understanding of which also allows us to get a better grasp
of the kind of process Hobbes has in mind here.
As is well known, it is constitutive for any process of reading that the signs to be
looked at are distinct from the contents read. The act of reading implies, in other
words, the supposition of the semiotic distinction between sign and designated
thing. This distinction is crucial for Hobbes metaphorical use of the word
reading, as can be proven by the fact that in his description of the process of
self-reection he draws on an analogous distinction.28 There he says:
[W]hosoever looketh into himself, and considereth what he does, when he
does think, opine, reason, hope, feare, [and so on he] shall thereby read
and know what are the thoughts, and Passions of all other men, upon the
like occasions.29
Note that, just as we distinguish the signs looked at from the contents read,
Hobbes wants us to distinguish between the activity of looking into ourselves
and the very act of knowing or reading. And that is indeed crucial if the rst is
to become an instrument for the second, as is indicated by the adverb thereby.
One might think that this is trivial, but it is not, as can be seen from a
comparison with contemporary discussion. Self-knowledge as it is conceived
today is typically denied such a distinction. To acquire self-knowledge, it is often
assumed, no special activity such as observation or drawing inferences is required.
Further, many deny that self-knowledge consists in a kind of higher-order
knowledge. This is considered problematic for two reasons. First, it is taken to be
hard to account for the very special role of the rst-person in self-knowledge, if
it is conceived in terms of some higher-order knowledge; second, it is notoriously

12 Ursula Renz
difcult for higher-order accounts of self-knowledge to avoid innite regress. Now,

it seems to me that while these reasons should convince us to avoid using higher-
order models when accounting for the phenomenon of self-consciousness,30 it is no
problem to employ them to conceive of Socratic self-knowledge.
It is not clear whether Hobbes is thinking of self-knowledge in terms of some
kind of higher-order knowledge; he does not make explicit what conception of
self-knowledge the usage of the metaphor of self-reading relies on. What we can
say, however, is this: If the ambition of part one of the Leviathan is educational rather
than analytical in spirit, then Hobbes must think of self-knowledge as improvable.
This requires that he conceive of it in terms of some kind of empirical knowledge, of
some knowledge, in other words, that is to be learnt, and not just to be had. We
can thus presume that there is a clear stance behind Hobbes use of the metaphor of
reading the crucial point of which is this: The self-scrutiny called for by the Delphic
injunction is a process by which we learn about our mental states and not just
consciously have them. If there is such a thing as Socratic self-knowledge, therefore,
it must be the result of a process of self-reading (and hence self-discovery), and is
not to be reduced to an epistemic relation we have to our mental states simply in
virtue of our being in them.
But why, one might ask, would Hobbes pay attention to this distinction?
There are several reasons for this. First, note that it is in virtue of this distinction
that we may conceive of introspection as providing us with knowledge about
mankind and not just about ourselves. On the other hand, Hobbes obviously wants
to conceive of self-knowledge as something that can be improved by the acquisition
of some knowledge about mankind. Were he to conceive of self-knowledge as
something we just have, this would not seem possible. More specically, it is due
to the distinction between the activity of self-scrutiny or looking into ourselves
and the act of knowing ourselves that the idea of an epistemic division of labor
between author and reader is a plausible option. This is not at all surprising, since
Hobbes has actually derived this distinction by exploiting the analogous
distinction between sign and designated thing underlying the semantics of the
word reading. Still, the distinction between the activity of self-scrutiny and the
act of knowing oneself is absolutely crucial for Hobbes intention of educating
the reader to think of herself in terms of his views. This reveals an important
generalizable insight: That we can separate the act of knowing ourselves from
the activity by which we arrive at the point where we can perform this act is a
necessary condition for the assumption that other persons may be involved in
the whole process.
To sum up, we can thus say that the views on self-knowledge contained in the
Introduction to the Leviathan are richer and more reective than one might think
at rst glance. Although Hobbes points remain implicit, and although his account
is far from giving conclusive epistemological answers to the major problems, it is
strikingly consistent with the overall educational program of the Leviathan.
Besides, our discussion has yielded important insights into the following
requirement that any epistemology of Socratic self-knowledge has to meet: In
order to conceive of self-knowledge as something that can be improved, be that

by education or by some other empirical processes, it must be shown how external

and internal perspectives on the human mind can be mediated. Hobbes provides
no answer to the question of how this requirement is to be met. But his use of
the metaphor of self-reading makes it clear that it exists.
Hobbes Educational Practice, or the Art of Enhancing Others Self-knowledge
I have argued that in the rst part of the Leviathan, Hobbes aims at improving the
readers self-conception rather than demonstrating the truth of his anthropological
views. The previous section has shown, moreover, that he is quite aware of the
difculties that an epistemological defense of this educational approach raises. I
will now examine some instances of Hobbes educational practice. What do his
views on mankind tell us about the art of enhancing others self-knowledge?
Before getting to the details, we have to appreciate the psychological difculty
that Hobbes educational project faces. Besides the fact that his mechanistic
account of mankind was quite novel at the time and was therefore, presumably,
not easily accepted, the account poses also an enormous challenge to the reader.
Famously, the Hobbesian outlook on human nature is, to say the least, rather
negative. It is difcult or unappealing to identify with such an unattering picture.
Indeed, many of Hobbes anthropological views are such as to pose a serious
obstacle to the realization of his educational project. For whereas his tenets may
appear acceptable, if considered abstractly as general anthropological truths, they
are not easily applied at the personal level as providing insight into ones own
psychological dispositions.
Yet, as we have seen, it is the latter kind of insight with which Hobbes is
concerned. According to my interpretation, his intention is not just to provide
the reader with anthropological knowledge; rather, he primarily expects her to
consider, if [s]he nds not the same in [her]self.31 As a reader, I am supposed to
check whether I can nd what I am reading in the Leviathan in my own mind,
and I am not simply to deliberate whether I generally agree with Hobbes views.
In the end, I should acknowledge that certain truths about mankind describe
appropriately my condition. Hence, what I acquire, as the ideal reader, is knowledge
of mankind as applied to my mind, or knowledge of myself as being subject to the
conditions described in part one of the book. Taken seriously, Hobbes aim is that
the third-personal views he expounds will shape our rst-personal self-conception.
Keeping this in mind, it becomes clear that the accomplishment of Hobbes
educational task depends largely on how precisely certain views on mankind are
presented to the reader. They must be introduced to her such that she can embrace
them as describing her own condition. It is against this background that I now
suggest examining some particular instances of Hobbes educational practice.
(a) Knowing our real interests. As a rst example, I would like to take a closer look
at the educational relevance of Hobbes naturalism. As mentioned in section
one, the Leviathan only briey sketches the mechanistic principles at the

14 Ursula Renz
bottom of the anthropology expounded. But why, if the ambition of this part of
the text is educational rather than analytical, does he at all refer to this
background? Why should the reader know the physical basis of the Hobbesian
views on mankind, if the ultimate educational goal is to become a better citizen
or sovereign?
I have already pointed out the general idea of why knowledge of the
mechanistic basis is crucial for Hobbes educational program: If the reader is
to understand how man is the matter of the state, then she must know the
causal mechanisms determining her social life. Having a rudimentary
understanding of mechanist physics is, I have further argued, a necessary
prerequisite for her getting the right conception of her being the articer of
the state. Still, one might wonder what precisely the reader learns about herself
when she reads those passages of book one of the Leviathan in which Hobbes
digresses into physics. We must thus be able to specify what outcome this
digression is supposed to have for the reader.
Fortunately, there is a very concrete result. It is well known that Hobbes was
worried by the fact that we do not always act according to our own interests,
but instead make decisions on the ground of either superstitious beliefs or
fancies of glory.32 We are living, he alleges, in the shadows of self-deceptive
images of ourselves, even if this means that we act against our real interests.
That is why, according to Hobbes, we tend to adhere to false understandings
of our own good, and he is afraid, therefore, that this may eventually prevent
us from accepting a conception of state that, he thinks, provides us with the
best conditions for pursuing our true interests. It is thus a vital concern of
his that we get rid of these self-deceiving images that prevent us from under-
standing our own true interests. But how is this possible, if we already adhere
to these false views?
It is to meet this challenge, I think, that the rst chapter of the Leviathan
contains a short exposition of Hobbes mechanistic principles. The idea seems
to be that by taking this as a point of departure, the reader may learn from
scratch to think of her mind in a new way. Thereby, hopefully, she naturally
grows into the position from which she can conceive of her desires and
endeavors as the effects of some contingent motion in the organs and interiour
parts of mans body, caused [originally] by the action of things we See, Heare,
&c. and retained in our imagination.33 This might ultimately allow her to get a
better understanding of her true interests.34
We can thus conclude that it is an essential application of Hobbes
educational practice that he provides the reader with an alternative theoretical
description of her psychological dispositions. The didactic aim of this is that
the reader learns to think of her interests in terms of naturally determined
needs.
The question might arise whether this is a successful strategy. Does not
Hobbes miss a crucial point here? After all, given that the reader already has
a self-deceptive image of herself, she may just resist the Hobbesian account
and deny that it appropriately describes her mind.

This is of course a real problem. Hobbes mechanistic approach is not very

appealing to readers already indulging in superstitious belief or fancies of
glory. But Hobbes seems to be deeply concerned with the motivations driving
obstinate readers, and he is looking for some remedy against them.35 As I am
going to show in the next paragraph, Hobbes presents his views on glory in a
way that is also meant to provide some such remedy. In parts three and four of
the Leviathan, moreover, he is offering a therapeutic solution to the maladies of
superstition. We can presume that, where Hobbes mechanist picture on
mankind is not immediately convincing, he is willing to employ other means
to persuade his audience.
(b) The treatment of glory. As just indicated, the success of Hobbes educational
project essentially depends on whether or not the reader comes to recognize
her susceptibility to the charms of glory.
To some, this might be surprising. It has recently been argued that, in
contrast to what has often been claimed in the wake of Leo Strauss
interpretation,36 glory does not play as important a role in the Leviathan as it
does in his previous works, De Cive and The Elements of Law.37 It is true: Glory
is less present in the Leviathan. But it is wrong to conclude that Hobbes no
longer considered glory as playing a very dangerous role in human society.38
After all, glory is still considered as one of the principal causes of the war of
every man against every man in the Leviathan.39 Remarkably, it is with respect
to the passion of pride or glory that the title of the book is explained. We can
presume that Hobbes still regarded it as crucial that the reader come to see
the dangers of peoples seeking glory.
But why, one might wonder, did Hobbes no longer point out these dangers
as vividly as he did in the earlier texts?
I think there is a deep psychological insight behind his restrained depiction.
Given how ridiculous most of mans behavior is when undertaken in the
search for glory, it is rather difcult to bring others to acknowledge in a more
than general and noncommittal way that they themselves are seducible by
the promises of glory. It is hard to bear explicit confrontation with the
ridiculous effects of ones own vanity and glory-seeking, and the more a
person is susceptible to the temptations of glory the harder it is. Glory-seekers
tend not to see that they are vain and behave ridiculously, while others will
easily see it.
Yet it is not the ridiculousness of others glory-seeking that Hobbes wants
the reader to see in the Leviathan.40 Instead, he wants her to learn that behind
these outwardly ludicrous phenomena is a passion which, considered as such,
is not at all outrageous, but an instance of a natural disposition, a disposition
that the reader may also recognize in herself. So rather than a changed opinion
concerning the potential harm caused by the passion of glory, it is tact and the
desire not to alienate the reader which is behind Hobbes milder treatment of
glory in the Leviathan: He tries to present glory such that it can be excused,
even if it can never be justied.41 This is why he denes glory as a species of

16 Ursula Renz
joy,42 and neither of opinion nor of desire.43 This is also why glory appears as
an occurrent state rather than an inclination.44 A person occurrently
experiencing glory cannot be faulted for her being in this transient emotional
state, whereas harboring an inclination to seek glory may be regarded as more
problematic. Finally, this is also why, in chapter 13 of the Leviathan, the danger
of glory is explained by describing it as a disposition to overreact to small but
real mortications.45
Hobbes thus painstakingly avoids any satirizing of the readers vanity, and
it is in virtue of this that the Leviathan is sharply contrasted from the moralist
treatments of some of his contemporaries.46 This, I think, has to do with the
danger of glory-seeking. The mere afrmation that striving for glory is a
widespread human property does not make the world a safer place, whereas
any exposure of others vanity may even cause violent overreactions on their
side. Merely third-personal knowledge of mans susceptibility to glory can be
harmful; it may undermine any serious concern with securing peace. If,
however, the reader comes to acknowledge her own susceptibility for the
charms of glory, she will not simply have a less ambivalent attitude toward
herself, but will also be more successful in not provoking others overreactions.
As a second instance of Hobbes educational practice, we may thus discern
his attempt to point out to the reader how an instance of her felt experience is
related to a property of mankind she typically observes in others. One might
again wonder whether this strategy is likely to succeed in improving the
readers self-conception. Unfortunately, I cannot answer this question here, for
in order to decide it, I would rst have to examine how precisely the
rst-personal acquaintance with the feeling of glory is recognized by the reader
as an aspect belonging to the psychological disposition of glory-seeking she is
attributing to others. This requires much more epistemological work than can
be done in this paper. It is, however, fascinating that one can nd such nuanced
phenomenological insight in the Leviathan. Considering the importance the
problem of glory has for Hobbes political theory, this cannot be a pure
coincidence.
(c) Rationalizing mutual fear. As a third instance of Hobbes educational practice, I

would like to discuss a peculiarity of his presentation of mutual fear, which is
to ground his description of the natural condition of mankind in terms of a war
of every man against every man.47
To begin with, let me emphasize that this is a decisive moment in Hobbes
educational program. The doctrine of war of all against all is probably the
point where he most depends on the readers improved self-conception. To
see this, we have to remind ourselves that, ideally, the covenant requires
everybodys commitment to authorize the actions of the sovereign by assigning
him the right to act in ones place. Thus the very establishment of the covenant
presupposes that the truth of Hobbes anthropological views is acknowledged
without any exemption, and without, in particular, the exemption of the readers
self. Moreover, that the reader accepts the Hobbesian account as a description

of her own condition is also crucial, if the sovereign is installed by natural force
rather than by agreement48; otherwise, she is always tempted to deny the
legitimacy of the actual government. Any lack of personal acknowledgment
of the sovereign on the part of the reader may thus undermine the strength
of the state.49 Given, therefore, that the features of stability and of providing
security are most essential to Hobbes conception of the ideal state, we may
say that the readers rst-personal commitment is vital to the whole project.50It
hence turns out to be necessary for Hobbes account that the natural condition
of mankind is without any exemption taken to be a condition of being in war
against each other. This involves the readers coming to see the doctrine of
the war of all as it indirectly describes her own social passions too.51 Unless
she is willing to afrm that her relations to others are such as to give as much
reason for distrusting others as for trusting them, she cannot grasp the practical
necessity of the covenant, not to mention the necessity of accepting a sovereign
installed by natural force as the legitimate ruler of the state she inhabits.
As in the case of glory, this poses an enormous psychological challenge. For
why should one, rather than just disclaiming Hobbes disenchanting outlook
on interpersonal relationships as wrong and outrageous, accept it as
describing ones own social ties? As in the case of glory, moreover, Hobbes
seems to be aware of the problem. To conclude from his presentation, he tries
his best to persuade the reader to afrm his tenets on a rst-personal level. Yet
the strategy he now chooses differs essentially from the one employed with
respect to the phenomenon of glory. This time, Hobbes seeks to convince the
reader by a fairly rationalized analysis of the phenomenon of mutual fear. To
show this, let us compare how the idea of a war of all against all is argued
for in different texts of his.
In all versions, mutual fear or difdence plays the central role; there is thus no
substantial difference in the doctrine itself. The texts differ, however, in how
they account for the origin of peoples mutual fear of others. In the Elements of
Laws, fear or difdence is the result of the tensions arising from mans
glory-seeking nature and everybodys right to everything.52 In De Cive, it results
partly from the natural equality of man, partly from mans will of hurting,
which is in turn explained partly by competition,53 and partly by mans merely
egoistic reasons for socializing.54 In the Leviathan, while natural competition and
glory-seeking are still considered as belonging to the three principall causes of
quarrel, difdence or mutual fear is considered mainly as the effect of natural
equality.55 Given that men are not just equal in their faculties of body, but also
in their mental abilities, they are equals in their hope for attaining what they
want. Once they want the same thing, therefore, they naturally generate enemies.
Comparing these accounts, one can observe that Hobbes makes an

increasing effort to render intelligible the motivations driving humans
into difdence. As a result, in the Leviathan, mutual fear is no longer
presented as the result of the irrational tendencies of human nature.
Moreover, by referring to the equality of hope, Hobbes is not merely

18 Ursula Renz
providing a cause, but also an ex post facto justication for difdence. So

just as we have noticed in the case of glory, Hobbes seeks to avoid
blaming the reader. Given, on the one hand, natural equality of hopes,
and given, on the other, the fact that certain goods cannot be shared, it
is quite rational to perceive other people as rivals, even though this
attitude is in fact fatal for human society.
Considering its effect, the strategy of rationalization employed in the case of

mutual fear thus looks quite similar to the previously discussed treatment of
glory. In both cases, the point is to downplay peoples culpability in having
the psychological disposition in question, without, however, trivializing these
dispositions noxious effects. Yet there is a clear difference. Peoples need for
glory is explained in purely psychological terms. Mutual fear and difdence,
in contrast, are accounted for by rationalizing them, whereas purely
psychological explanations take a back seat. This difference implies a
statement, I think: While difdence or mutual fear can be rationalized, glory-
seeking may be excused, but hardly justied.As a third instance of Hobbes ed-
ucational practice, we may thus point to the attempt to present mans fear of his
peers as intelligible and thereby to rationalize it. Again, the question might arise
whether this is a successful strategy. At rst glance, rationalization seems to re-
sult in a more appealing account than the rather moralizing attitude we nd in
Hobbes previous works. One the one hand, even seemingly nasty human dis-
positions such as the tendency to anticipate hostility become more acceptable
if they are presented as quasi-rational tendencies in the human psyche. On the
other hand, as Richard Moran has recently shown, there is a way of acquiring
self-knowledge by deliberating upon the grounds for ones mental states.56
Following Morans approach, when provided with a reason for some of our
emotions, we are also led to endorse the reason, which means that we can more
easily embrace the emotion in question as ours. Read as an instance of his edu-
cational practice, therefore, Hobbes intellectualist account of mutual fear is thus
an effective invitation to accept it for our own case too.Yet this kind of rational-
ization has its limits. Let us assume that the reader of the Leviathan says: O.
K., I can see why people would have mutual fear, and it is indeed conceiv-
able that many do distrust each other. But I dont believe that I have ever felt
something like this toward other people. I just cannot nd this fear in me.
Hobbes rationalized account of mutual fear cannot prevent the reader from
resisting his views in the sketched manner. It is instructive to see, however,
how he tries to undermine the readers resistance. Shortly after the introduc-
tion, he actually addresses his reader and invites her to survey her behavior.
He writes:
Let him consider with himself, when taking a journey, he armes himself,
and seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his
dores; when even in his house he locks his chests; and this when he
knows there bee Lawes, and publike Ofcers, armed to revenge all

injuries shall be done him; what opinion he has of his fellow subjects,
when he rides armed; of his fellow Citizens, when he locks his dores;
and of his children, and servants, when he looks his chests. Does he
not there as much accuse mankind by his actions, as I do by my
words?57
It is pretty clear how this is meant to persuade the reader: If she admits that
she sometimes behaves in this way, she will have to afrm that she, too, is sub-
ject to what is regarded as the very cause of such a behavior: fear.58 By drawing
the inference from the observed effects to the assumed cause, Hobbes seeks to
guide the reader to the passion constituting the origin of her attitude.
The reader may of course still disagree with Hobbes description. It has to
be emphasized, however, that the costs of such a disagreement are pretty high.
For if she wants to justify her continuing resistance, she would either have to
deny that fear is a good candidate for the cause of the invoked behavior; or
she would have to adopt a Humean stance that denies all necessary correla-
tions between types of effects and the causes leading to them. So denial of fear
is possible, but it would either call for another account of the described
phenomena, or require that one adopt skepticism toward to the explanatory
force of psychology and, ultimately, even of mechanist physics.
To conclude, we can thus say that the anthropology of the rst part of the Levi-
athan is in many ways shaped by Hobbes educational ambition. He tries whatever
he can to convince the reader not simply of the truth of his views on mankind, but
also of her being subject to it, and he does so in a pretty artful way. If he fails in
supporting the reader to embrace the presented views on a rst-personal level, this
need not automatically be a problem either for his views or for his strategies. It is
rather symptomatic of a restriction inherent in the kind of educational project
Hobbes pursues. When philosophers seek to enhance another persons self-knowl-
edge, they are always in a weak position, for they necessarily depend on the coop-
eration of the other.
Concluding Remarks
I have argued in this paper that in the rst part of the Leviathan, Hobbes pursues an
educational, rather than an analytical, project. His aim there is not to demonstrate
the theoretical validity of his anthropological views, but to teach them to the reader
interested in politics, in a way that invites her to acknowledge them from a rst-
personal perspective. I have discussed this reading in three steps. After having
defended it on a very general interpretive level, I have examined, in the second
section, how the reading is supported by the epistemological implications
harbored in the metaphor of self-reading Hobbes employs in the introduction to
the book. In the third section, nally, my view was corroborated by several striking
observations related to Hobbes way of presenting certain of his anthropological
tenets. I have argued in detail that many of the peculiarities of the text, as well

20 Ursula Renz
as many of the differences between the rst part of the Leviathan and other texts of
Hobbes, can be accounted for if we consider them as instances of Hobbes
educational practice.
Some might think that the proposed reading is still not very convincing, for at
least two reasons. One might question, on the one hand, whether the emphasis I
have put on the readers improving self-conception does not amount to some kind
of individualist perfectionism that is in strong tension with the rather instrumental
spirit of Hobbes political science. I agree that one has to abstain from taking the
concern with self-knowledge as constituting a main and self-standing motive of
Hobbes philosophy. His appeal to the Delphic injunction is meant to specify the
means by which he seeks to realize his project in the Leviathan; it surely does not
exhibit a particular interest of Hobbes in problems related to the rst person. This
is, however, not to preclude that self-knowledge is indeed crucial for Hobbes. On
the contrary, if considered as an argumentative means or strategy, the improve-
ment of the readers self-knowledge is crucial to Hobbes educational program
and his concern with it in the Leviathan is quite consistent with the overall intention
of his philosophy.
On the other hand, one may object that the educational practice described in
section three is hardly supported by Hobbes philosophy of mind and cognitive
psychology as expounded in part one. In answering this objection, I cannot but
concede it. There is indeed a puzzling gap between Hobbes mechanist views on
the human mind and his educational ambition pursued in the Leviathan. His
philosophy of mind neither offers an explanation of how the adoption of a
rst-personal perspective is possible, nor accounts for the cognitive processes by
which we may improve our rst-personal self-conception. However, this need
not be a loss. For the rst part of the Leviathan is arguably a more interesting and
rich text, if not all its insights can be derived from mechanist physics.59
Ursula Renz
Alpen-Adria-Universitt Klagenfurt
Austria
ursula.renz@aau.at
ENDNOTES
1
Missner 1977: 607 writes that this passage has received a great deal of critical
scrutiny. I do not share this opinion. The appeal to the Delphic inscription is strikingly
little-mentioned in the literature. With the exception of the analysis developed by Missner
himself, I cannot see any thorough scrutiny of the passage following this appeal.
2
EW I: 74.
3
Gauthier 1969: 3, and Esfeld 1995: 284, read this passage thus. Mc Neilly 1968:
151155 does not cite this passage, but reads the method of the Leviathan in a similar way.
4
Strauss 1952: 7 and 9 famously mentions Hobbes reference to the Delphic
inscription in order to reject the dependence of Hobbes political philosophy on his natural
philosophy and to refute the inuence of the naturalism suggested by De Corpore. See also
Missner 1977 and Nerney 1985 for readings along these lines. Independently of the concern

with the Straussian reading, Ludwig 1998 posits a great difference between the Elementa and
the Leviathan.
5
For the discussion of the role of rhetoric in the Leviathan, cf. Johnston 1986, Barnouw
1988, Sorell 1990, and Skinner 1996. It has been argued that in the Leviathan Hobbes is both
considering rhetoric in a better light (cf. Skinner 1996: 32775), and also employing rhetoric
to a higher degree (Johnston 1986: 69; Skinner 1996: 376425). For a critique of Skinners
approach, see Slomp 2000: 24 and Martel 2007: 26. I agree with the idea that rhetoric is
quite important for Hobbes. By calling Hobbes project educational, I additionally want to
accentuate the role he is assigning to the readers acquiring self-knowledge. This has not
yet been examined.
6
This has recently been emphasized by Apeldoorn 2015.
7
See also Gert 1996, 165, for a similar point. He emphasizes how little Hobbes
materialism restricts his views about human nature. Although he does not question that
Hobbes was a naturalist, or, in his terms, a materialist, he does challenge the view that
Hobbes was a psychological egoist.
8
I hence do not follow those who take the appeal to the Delphic injunction as an
indication that Hobbes is following another scientic method in the Leviathan; my point is
that Hobbes primarily applies another mode of argumentation. For the claim that Hobbes
is employing a double method, see Ludwig 1996, Leijenhorst 2007, and in particular, Strauss
1952: x; for a critique of this view see van Apeldoorn 2015.
9
See Gertler 2011 for the usage of this term in contemporary philosophy, and Garrett
2012: 234, for the ideal of Socratic self-knowledge in early modern philosophy.
10
A signicant exemption is Quassim Cassams recent book Self-knowledge for
Humans, see Cassam 2014.
11
L: 13.
12
L: 15.
13
L: 45.
14
As Malcolm 1996: 31 and 41, n. 70 has argued, there is good evidence that Hobbes
originally wanted to place this hypothesis at the very beginning of De Corpore.
15
Missner 1977: 61316 and Nerney 1985: 405 draw on a similar contrast, but provide
different interpretations of it. Missner compares the method of the Leviathan with Hobbes
notion of prudence (1977: 61316), thus relying on the controversial presumption that
science and prudence can be used for the same topics (614). I do not think that this
corresponds Hobbes views; see also Jesseph 2010: 124, who argues that science has a
restricted scope and can only be applied to the disciplines of geometry and politics. Nerney
1985: 406 interprets it in light of the alleged distinction between esoteric and exoteric
aims. To my mind, the terminology of esoteric aims is just misplaced with respect to the
Elementa.
16
Ludwig 1998: 218 refers to this passage in his argument that the anthropological
part need not be taken as a consequence of, but only as methodologically coherent with, the
materialist approach of his physics. I think this claim is too weak; the reader must at the very
least assume some substantial coherence too.
17
See Johnston 1986: 7077 and Skinner 1996: 426f. for the question of the audience of
Hobbes works.
18
This acknowledgment is important; otherwise, the omission of detailed causal
analysis would leave us in a state of credulity, which Hobbes denes as ignorance of natural
causes (L: 74); surely, to enable credulity is the last thing Hobbes would have wanted.
19
Anscombe 1957: 13 and in particular 49f.
20
L: 10.

22 Ursula Renz
21
Unfortunately, the tendency to take these two aspects apart and to reconstruct
Hobbes views from one side only is widespread in Hobbes scholarship and perhaps one
of the causes for its division into two camps, a reductive naturalist and a humanist camp.
See also Rutherford 2003: 376 for a similar point.
22
As Jesseph 2004: 192 and 199f. has argued, the major point in which Hobbes was
indebted to Galilei was not the resolutive-compositive method, but the idea of nature as
constituting a system determined completely by mechanist principles.
23
To some, it might seem strange that Hobbes is talking of self-knowledge here at all.
I think, however, that Hobbes comes quite close to the original meaning of the Delphic
injunction here. On this point, see Burkert 2011: 30.
24
Sam Rickless has raised the question whether this does not undermine the idea that
Hobbes calls for the readers adopting a rst-personal stance: Why should I, who am not a
king, or a member of the assembly constituting the sovereign, apply Hobbes views to
myself? The answer is this: Hobbes does address here the future sovereign of the ideal state
to be constituted only later. He thus addresses man as he is in the state of nature. In the state
of nature, however, all human beings are more or less equal, and this is quite crucial to
Hobbes non-essentialist political theory. In principle, any human being can become
sovereign. Hence the sovereign addressed could be me.
25
L: 11.
26
I am very grateful to Douglas Jesseph for pointing this out to me.
27
See Skinner 1996: 384.
28
Martel 2007: 1 calls reading the operative metaphor for knowing, and he further
argues that since we read not only books, but also, as Hobbes tells us, ourselves, other
people and the world around us, it becomes a basic metaphor for politics (1f.).
29
L: 10.
30
According to Thiel 2011, these worries can be tracked back to pre-Lockean debates.
I think that, as far as the debate about consciousness and not (Socratic) self-knowledge is
concerned, this is certainly right.
31
L: 11.
32
This inuence of superstition is mentioned also by Rutherford 2003: 385; the effects
of glory are pointed out by Johnston 1986: 35 and 108.
33
L: 38.
34
Rutherford 2003 has convincingly argued that Hobbes denition of felicity
contains an idea of a happy life that allows for moral considerations that go beyond the pure
need for safety (37880). This, he argues, allows for a science of ethics that is compatible with
Hobbes naturalism (cf. also 374). His view thus makes room for a reading of Hobbes not
simply as a political theorist, but also as a moral philosopher. This view nicely complements
my point that by teaching physical principles to the reader, Hobbes provides her with the
theoretical background that allows her to think about moral issues in the right way.
35
Here, again, I am indebted to Doug Jesseph.
36
Strauss ascribed to Hobbes the view that mans natural appetite is vanity and
considered vanity as the basis of his political philosophy. Strauss also stated that Hobbes
did not afrm this view unequivocally, but he explained this by saying that such a concep-
tion of natural appetite would unavoidably lead to the conclusion that man is by nature
evil. This view, according to Strauss, Hobbes did not dare to uphold (see Strauss 1952: 13).
37
Cf. McNeilly 1968: 13655, Tricaud 1988: 12023, and recently Eggers 2008: 61f. and
95. McNeilly pointedly remarks: It would be hardly an exaggeration to say that in
Leviathan Hobbes does not miss an opportunity of diminishing the importance of glory in
his psychological and political arguments (1968, 146).

38
This is also denied by Slomp 2000 and 2007, albeit on different grounds. First, she
claims that the denition of glory given in the Leviathan only appears different, but is not in
fact different (2007: 181). Second, she assumes that in later works nurture rather than nature
is singled out by Hobbes as the major source of human actions (2000: 108f.). I am a little
skeptical about this point. It seems right that Hobbes later works are more focused on the
conditions of mankind than on human nature. But this does not entail a distinction similar
to the one between nature and nurture. On the contrary, it is just in virtue of Hobbes taking
motion as the sole explanatory principle that he can account for the impact of social
inuences such education and manners. But see also Strauss 1952: 8 for the opposite view.
39
L: 88.
40
See also Mc Neilly 1968: 146, who rightly states that In Leviathan there is nothing
corresponding to the cynical description of social intercourse in De Cive or the simile of race
in The Elements.
41
See below p. 16
42
Cf. L: 42: Joy, arising from imagination of a mans own power and ability, is that
exultation of the mind that is called GLORYING: which if grounded upon the experience of
his own former actions, is the same with Condence: but if grounded on the attery of
others; on only supposed by himself, for delight in the consequences, is called
VAINE-GLORY
43
But see, in contrast, the denition in The Human Nature, (EW IV: 40).
44
This is also what distinguishes glory as dened in chapter vi from the frequent
description of pride in terms of an attitudinal rather than an occurrent property.
45
Thus he says in chapter xiii that glory uses violence or tries, as a word, a smile, a
different opinion, and any other signe of undervalue, either direct in their Persons, or
by reexion in their Kindred, their Friends, their Nation, their Profession, or their
Name (L: 88).
46
See in particular the maxims of La Rochefoucauld 2012 (rst ed. 1665), the target of
which is often vanity. There is thus a clear difference between the way in which Hobbes
treats his readers and the way in which he treats his philosophical opponents. See Skinner
1996: 395412 for a discussion of the latter.
47
L: 88.
48
See L 121 for this distinction.
49
I owe this insight to an objection by Richard Arneson against a previous version of
this paper.
50
It has been objected by several interlocutors that to convince the reader of the
covenant no self-knowledge on her part is required. I agree that one can argue in favor of
the social contract without presupposing rst-personal acknowledgement of the underlying
anthropology. Yet the view I am ascribing to Hobbes is more limited. The crucial point is
this: A contract motivated by third-personal knowledge on mankind is denitely weaker
than one established on the basis of all parties self-knowledge. Yet if Hobbes major interest
was to provide a view that grants the highest possible degree of stability, this must have
been important to him. Even if self-knowledge is not necessary to see the utility of the social
contract, a certain amount of self-knowledge seems necessary to afrm a covenant that
primarily aims at granting the highest possible degree of stability.
51
Note that Hobbes only claims in the Leviathan that the covenant must be backed up
by some act of authorization. This act is described as a performative speech act relying on
the following formula: I Authorize and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this
Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him,
and Autorise all his Actions in the like manner (L: 122). As Gauthier (1969, 124) emphasizes,

24 Ursula Renz
given the relation between author and agent, this should not be taken as a renouncement of
ones right, but rather as an allowance that the sovereign may make use of ones right.
52
EL: 80.
53
EW II: 8.
54
EW II: 4f.
55
L: 88.
56
See Moran 2001: 58f.
57
This passage is quite unusual for Hobbes. First, he is discussing exemplary cases,
which contrast sharply with the abstract way in which he deals with the passions in chapter
vi. Second, he is drawing on remembered behavior of the reader, not on his passions,
thereby reversing the direction of inference. I disagree therefore with Missner 1977: 617,
who takes it as exemplary for what he calls the method of qualied introspection. I think
this passage serves only to back up Hobbes more general argument against remaining
doubts of the kind sketched above, but it is by no means exemplary.
58
In this context, it is illuminating to see how Hobbes explains the passion of fear in
chapter six of the Leviathan. There, fear is not dened in terms of a particular feeling, but in
terms of an aversion, or motion of retiring (L: 38), which is combined with some opinion of
being hurt by the object (L: 41).
59
This paper is part of the research project A-Posteriori Self-Knowledge and Wisdom
in 17th century Philosophy, funded by the Alexander-von-Humboldt-Stiftung. I have
greatly beneted greatly from conversations I had during my stay at Harvard with
Catherine Elgin, Richard Moran, Amelie Rorty, and Alison Simmons, and from correspon-
dence with Douglas Jesseph. I thank to audiences at Mainz, Yale, Groningen, and UCSD,
particularly Richard Arneson, Stephen Darwall, Michael Della Rocca, Martin Lenz, Samuel
Rickless, Donald Rutherford, Andrea Sangiacomo, Eric Schlieer, Udo Thiel, Eric Watkins,
Kenneth Winkler and Falk Wunderlich.
LITERATURE
WORKS BY HOBBES
DCo Thomas Hobbes (1841), Elements of Philosophy, in W. Molesworth (ed.) The English
Works of Thomas Hobbes, Vol. I. London.
EL Thomas Hobbes (1989), in J. C. A. Gaskin (ed.) The Elements of Law: Natural and Politic.
Oxford.
EW Thomas Hobbes (1839 ff), in W. Molesworth (ed.) The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of
Malmesbury, Vol. 11. London.
L Thomas Hobbes (1991), Leviathan. Cambridge: Ed. R. Tuck.
SECONDARY LITERATURE
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1957), Intention. Oxford: Blackwell.

Barnouw, J. (1988), Persuasion in Hobbess Leviathan, Hobbes Studies, 1: 325.
Burkert, W. (2011), Griechische Religion der archaischen und klassischen Epoche. Stuttgart:
Kohlammer.
Cassam, Q. (2014), Self-Knowledge for Humans. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Eggers, D. (2008), Die Naturzustandstheorie des Thomas Hobbes: eine vergleichende Analyse von
The Elements of Law, De Cive und den englischen und lateinischen Fassungen des Leviathan.
Berlin/New York: De Gruyter.
Esfeld, M. (1995), Mechanismus und Subjektivitt in der Philosophie von Thomas Hobbes,
Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog.
Garrett, A. (2012), Seventeenth-Century Moral Philosophy: Self-Help, Self-Knowledge, and
the Devils Mountain, in R. Crisp (ed.) The Oxford Handbook on the History of Ethics. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press.
Gauthier, D. P. (1969), The Logic of Leviathan: The Moral and Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes.
Oxford: Clarendon.
Gert, B. (1996), Hobbes Psychology, in T. Sorell (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Thomas
Hobbes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gertler, B. (2011), Self-Knowledge, in E.N. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Spring Edition) URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/self-
knowledge/>.
Jesseph, D. (2004), Galileo, Hobbes, and the Book of Nature, Perspectives on Science, 12: 191211.
(2010), Scientia in Hobbes, in T. Sorell, G. A. J. Rogers and J. Kraye (eds) Scientia in
Early Modern Philosophy. Heidelberg/New York: Springer.
Johnston, D. (1986), The Rhetoric of the Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes and the Politics of Cultural
Transformation. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Leijenhorst, C. (2007), Sense and Nonsense About Sense: Hobbes and the Aristotelians on
Sense Perception and Imagination, in P. Springborg (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to
Hobbess Leviathan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
La Rochefoucauld, F. de. (2012), Maximes et rexions morales. Maximen und Reexionen,
trans. and ed. Jrgen von Stackelberg. Stuttgart.
Ludwig, B. (1996), Womit mu der Anfang der Staatsphilosophie gemacht werden? Zur
Einleitung des Leviathan, in W. Kersting (ed.) Leviathan oder Stoff, Form und Gewalt eines
brgerlichen und kirchlichen Staates. Klassiker Auslegen 5. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag.
(1998), Die Wiederentdeckung des epikureischen Naturrechts: zu Thomas Hobbes
philosophischer Entwicklung von De Cive zum Leviathan im Pariser Exil 16401651.
Frankfurt: Klostermann.
Malcolm, N. (1996), A Summary Biography of Hobbes, in T. Sorell (ed.) The Cambridge
Companion to Thomas Hobbes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Martel, J. R. (2007), Subverting the Leviathan: Reading Thomas Hobbes as a Radical Democrat.
New York: Columbia University Press.
Mc Neilly, F. S. (1968), The Anatomy of Leviathan. London: Macmillan.
Missner, M. (1977), Hobbess Method in Leviathan, Journal of the History of Ideas, 38:
607621.
Moran, R. (2001), Authority and Estrangement. An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Nerney, G. (1985), Hobbes: The Twofold Grounding of Civil Philosophy, History of
Philosophy Quarterly, 4: 395409.
Rutherford, D. (2003), In Pursuit of Happiness: Hobbess New Science of Ethics,
Philosophical Topics, 31: 369393.
Skinner, Q. (1996), Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes. Cambridge/New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Slomp, G. (2000), Thomas Hobbes and the Political Philosophy of Glory. New York: Macmillan.
(2007), Hobbes on Glory and Civil Strife, in P. Springborg (ed.) The Cambridge
Companion to Hobbess Leviathan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

26 Ursula Renz
Sorell, T. (1990), Hobbess Persuasive Civil Science, The Philosophical Quarterly, 40: 342351.
Strauss, L. (1952), The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Its basis and Its Genesis. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Thiel, U. (2011), The Early Modern Subject: Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity from
Descartes to Hume. New York: Oxford University Press.
Tricaud, F. (1988), Lviathan: trait de la matire, de la forme et du pouvoir de la rpublique
ecclsiastique et civile. Paris: Dalloz.
van Apeldoorn, L. (2015), Hobbes on the Scientic Study of the Human Mind, Archiv fr
Geschichte der Philosophie, 308333.

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DOI: 10.1111/ejop.

Self-Knowledge and Knowledge of Mankind

Abstract: In the introduction to the Leviathan, Hobbes famously defends the

In the introduction to the Leviathan, Hobbes famously defends the anthropological

anthropology.4 Finally, the interpretation of Hobbes appeal to the Delphic injunc-

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as I am going to show, Hobbes exhibits a striking awareness of the problems one

2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

Reading Mankind in Oneself: Hobbes Model for the Epistemology of

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about mankind. It is hence neither about the particular contents or qualities of

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What is achieved by these considerations? What insights into the epistemology

2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

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difcult for higher-order accounts of self-knowledge to avoid innite regress. Now,

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by education or by some other empirical processes, it must be shown how external

Hobbes Educational Practice, or the Art of Enhancing Others Self-knowledge

2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

This is of course a real problem. Hobbes mechanistic approach is not very

2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

(c) Rationalizing mutual fear. As a third instance of Hobbes educational practice, I

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Comparing these accounts, one can observe that Hobbes makes an

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providing a cause, but also an ex post facto justication for difdence. So

Considering its effect, the strategy of rationalization employed in the case of

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2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

Anscombe, G. E. M. (1957), Intention. Oxford: Blackwell.

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2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

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