Kushal Haran

12/8/16

War and Peace

Professor Nickell

Heidegger, Tolstoy, and Death

Montaigne wrote that to philosophise is to learn how to die (Montaigne 1). This is the overall

meta-thesis throughout Heideggers magnum opus Being and Time. Coming from the phenomenological

tradition, Heidegger investigates the question what is being? but, as Wrathall puts it, with an

emphasis on the is (BTC 11). And for Heidegger, he concludes that the only system by which Being

becomes intelligible is one that posits Being as always approaching death, enter Tolstoy. Tolstoy was

fascinated with death and its integral role in the conceptualization of life throughout his adulthood. This

is evidenced by works like The Death of Ivan Illych and Confession. In the former the titular Ivan suffers

through a seemingly long death considering the function of suffering in life in relation to the inevitable

fate of death. Whereas, in the latter Tolstoy, questions if there is any meaning in my life that will not be

destroyed by my inevitably approaching death? and notes that throughout human knowledge I sought

an answer to this question(Confession 35). However, Tolstoy, with some retrospective help from

Heidegger, had already formulated an answer to this question that plagued him throughout his life.

Through War and Peace, Tolstoy affirms that death is in fact the possibility of the absolute impossibility

of Being and therefore Being is then constituted by a Being-towards-death.

For sake of brevity, this essay will not get into the nitty gritty of the abstruse argument

Heidegger formulates but rather look at his conclusions with respect to War and Peace. To deal with the

impossibility of describing Being from within, Heidegger formulates two concepts, Dasein and being-
towards-death. Dasein, literally translated, is being-there and is essentially the signifier Heidegger uses

to be able to self-referentially make an argument. That is to say, Heidegger uses Dasein seemingly

interchangeably with being (the noun) only it is with the fundamental assumption that Dasein is

relational and always contingent on the place both spatial and temporal in which is located, and that all

analysis preceding and following must always be re-registered in the definition of Dasein almost

recursively like in a computer program. Essentially, the distinction between Dasein and Being is that

Dasein keeps getting redefined in any contemplation and if the contemplation ever terminates, the

final value of Dasein is what Being is.

The second, and far more important concept is being-towards-death which largely stems out of

Heidegger framing of the answer to what is Being? with respect to temporality. Specifically,

Heidegger writes that The full existential-ontological conception of death may now be defined as

follows: death, as the end of Dasein, is Daseins own most possibility non-relational, certain and as

such indefinite, not to be outstripped (BT 127). Heidegger is interested in being with respect to time

and as a result, must always consider the end of Dasein which is death. Furthermore, it is Daseins

own most possibility because it is literally the limit point, the boundary of Dasein. It is the final apex of

being that is singularly non-relational, certain, and indefinite. So, reductively summing up Heideggers

argument, Dasein must always teleologically be-towards-death for that is where/when the possibility

of a grammar for a final ontology exists. One last caveat is in order though. As stated up above,

Heidegger believes this death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Being but that is not to

say Heidegger believes that in death, or even in being-towards-death, Being suddenly makes sense or

has a definition. Rather, it provides this ephemeral, translucent glimpse of an understanding or

discovery of Being. This is why it is only a potential for the absolute impossibility of Being. It is

somewhat analogous to mathematics and its approach to infinity. There are moments in mathematics,

like in finding the convergence of an infinite series where infinity is dealt with and perhaps an answer is
obtained that makes use of the properties of infinity. But, great care is taken with respect to the

undecidable infinity, and any results are clearly not a revealing of infinity, but just a glimpse of it. That is

to say, the convergence of the series does not actually reveal the structure of infinity, but gives one a

peak at its form. For Heidegger, this mean, as Crtichley puts it Death is that limit against which my

potentiality-for- being (Seinknnen) is to be measured (Critchley 1).

Naturally, War and Peace can only ever affirm death as this aporetic potentiality-for-being

given understanding being is in fact an absolute impossibility. Hence, we first prove this is in fact how

Tolstoy portrays life, that is as an unknowable force when considered in the present. Now, this question

of whether life, or being can be understood, even just with respect to War and Peace is far too deep a

topic to rigorously consider in a subsection of an essay as it gets to the very existential heart of the book

which is what it means to live and live well. However, for the sake of brevity, this will be a cursory

treatment of the argument, restricted to two paragraphs. Tolstoy writes, in the first epilogue that If we

allow that human life can be governed by reason, the possibility of life is annihilated (WP 1131) This is

the guiding thesis for how Tolstoy portrays any understanding of life which is to say that any

systematic, rational treatment or definition of life annihilates all possibility of life or as Heidegger puts

it, any potentiality-for-being. This is, in numerous circumstances, elucidated by Tolstoy as he gives us

deeper insight into the psyches of each of his characters at different emotionally radical moments in

their lives. One such moment is Andreis positive affective perturbation when he hears Natasha sing and

he felt happy and at the same time sad. He had absolutely nothing to weep about, and yet he was

ready to weep. For what? For his past love? For the little princess? For his lost illusions? Or his hopes for

the future? Yes and no (WP 455). The moment in which Andrei feels so in touch with being and living,

he is suddenly confronted with the anxiety inducing impossibility of comprehending or expressing it.

This is reflected in the series of consecutive questions he asks himself, all culminating with a paradoxical

yes and no. When truly living with awareness of ones own ontological positioning (ontologically as
opposed to ontically in Heideggers dictionary) then there is no grammar to express this being in the

present. This is exactly what is so perplexing and thus perturbing for Andrei. This idea is reified by Pierre,

who still in emotional/existential turmoil from his duel, inquires to himself What is bad? What is good?

What should one love, what hate? Why live, and what am I? What is life, what is death? What power

rules over everything (WP 113). Here, in response to a traumatic incident, again we see a character

struck by a series of questions regarding being, here even more overtly as he literally ponders what

am I and What is life [and death] and again, he comes up empty at this point looking for an answer in

the present. Pierres flummoxed disposition to the situation is exactly this impossibility of being

Heidegger draws attention to. It is the paradoxical nature of happiness, ethics, and all these other

phenomena that Andrei and Pierre are over-saturated by that makes being so inherently elusive. That is

to say, the surplus of emotion and existential quandary render a present analysis of Being impossible.

Which is exactly why Tolstoy explains the resolution of all the possible questions of life could not satisfy

me because [it] entails a demand to explain the finite by means of the infinite and the infinite by means

of the finite (C 58). Instead, the infinite can only ever be approached, located in a future.

Now, given being is in fact an absolute impossibility we are left with how does death

represent the figure through which to formulate an alternative in War and Peace. This is largely a point

made by Tolstoy through the characters of Pierre and Andrei. Both the characters, throughout the novel,

go through their own respective existential crises, the former choosing faith early on while the latter

nihilism. Similarly, throughout, both experience death, either relationally (Pierre), or through oneself

(Andrei) and for both, this finally provides the moments of ontological apotheosis that are essentially

manifestations of the processual possibility of absolute impossibility that is Heideggers central thesis.

Pierres ontological positioning is, throughout the book, always framed in relation to death, and

it is really only when he embraces a view of life that is always already approaching death, that he finds
peace. However, until then Pierre always retreats from death, thus obscuring any hope of ontological

closure which is exactly the source of his angst. Every time Pierre encounters death,

existential/ontological crises follow. The first death Pierre encounters is that of his father, Count

Bezuhov. However, in response, Pierre does not mourn or confront the frightening reality of death but

rather his whole time was taken up with dinners and balls (WP 203). Soon enough, Pierre is set up

with Helene, and thus begins his first source of ontological anxiety. Pierre is conflicted between being

with Helene or not, due to a litany of issues including her perhaps incestuous past and his place or

rather feeling out of place in the social strata that was Pavlovnas circle. However, even more so, Helene

represents what life could be for Pierre as when he meets her he begins thinking of her worthlessness

[and] also dreaming of how she would be his wife (WP 207). This culminates to the point where a

thousand times in the course of that month and a half, all the while feeling himself drawn more and

more into that frightening abyss, Pierre had said to himself: But what is it? I need resolve. Don't I have

any? (WP 213) The use of frightening abyss makes this a particularly ontological question as it

mirrors Heideggers consideration that it is an abyss of circularity in which the whole of human Dasein

moves (BT 244). Furthermore, Pierre concludes that he is in fact left with no resolution. While not

directly in response to Count Bezuhovs death, it is no coincidence that Pierres existential crisis stems

from the situation he puts himself in (being occupied by social life) as a manifestation of his detachment

from the death.

There are a number of other instances in which Pierre yet again alienates himself from

responding to death, like when Bazdyev perishes and Pierre just takes up partying and drinking.

However, the death that makes this point the most overt is Pierre response to Karataevs death. In

response to the death of his supposed friend, Pierre falls into a sleep in which he dreams of Karataev

explaining life to him: In the center is God, and each drop strives to expand in order to reflect Him in

the greatest measure. It grows, merges, and shrinks, and is obliterated on the surface, goes into the
depths, and again floats up. Vous avez compris, mon enfant?1 said the teacher. Vous avez compris,

sacr nom?2 shouted the voice, and Pierre woke up (WP 1065). Pierres escapism from death is highly

evident here as the next sentence after Karataevs death is about Pierre dreaming, which is the epitome

of escape. Furthermore, the subsequent ontological inquiry is quite illuminating as the content of the

dream is evidence that Pierre is yet again existentially anxious in direct response to a death and he is

again denied ontological closure as a result of his detachment since he is woken up before

understanding life. This escapism followed by existential angst is exactly what Heidegger describes as

the mechanism by which one fails to engage with death as the telos of being. This is encapsulated in

Heideggers theory of Anxiety as he writes "Anxiety in the face of death is anxiety 'in the face of that

potentiality-for-Being which is Being-in-the-world" (BT 192). It is anxiety that brings one face to face

with the potentiality-for-Being or Being-in-the-world. However, Pierre, in Heideggers terminology,

flees/escapes and is thus denied any hope at being aware of this fundamental axiom of Dasein

because he evades Anxiety in the face of death. This is why he has no resolution and why he is woken

up before understanding what life is. Pierres escapism means he is ignorant of the fundamental telos

of life and thus can never position Being in the future, as something to approach i.e. he can never be-

towards-death.

Karataevs death actually provides an auxiliary argument for how death in War and Peace is

fundamentally Heideggarian. Karataevs role in the novel is not entirely clear, but it is evident that at no

point does he ever form a truly ontologically authentic connection to any other character. This is exactly

why Pierre felt that the two parting would not cause either one of them to feel perturbed. In fact,

Tolstoy writes that Karataev had no attachments, friendships, or love, as Pierre understood them; but

he loved and lived lovingly with everything that life brought his way (WP 973). This renders his place in

1 Have you understood, my child?

2 Have you understood, damn it?
the novel as quite ambiguous. That is until his death. Karataevs death is never really explicitly

mentioned at any point. Instead Tolstoy just writes A dog began to howl behind, in the place where

Karataev had been sitting (WP 1065). Karataevs death, much like his life, just blends into the

background, providing a relation for those who interact with him and nothing more. What is interesting

here is that the point at which he dies is the point at which the dog began to howl. This echoes a

Heideggarian conceptualization of death because Heidegger affirmed that ones death is always given to

others, providing a point of relationality to others that further contributes to the Dasein of each involved

in the relationality. This is exactly what happens for Karataev as his death is given to the dog and is

further embedded in the nature/background of the novel, as a point of relationality. This role that

Karataev serves in the novel is thus only clarified because of his death, and is only deducible when

reading his life as one that was always teleologically towards death. His life, and more importantly

death, is part of a panentheistic, regenerative cycle of existence and being that provides a source of

ontological investigation for those he interacts with.

The way in which death and ontology are intrinsic to one another for Pierre are further clarified

as he more explicitly problematizes both his existence and attempts to rationally understand it. That is

to say, as Pierre begins to challenge different paradigms and narratives of existence, the problem and

spectre of death become more and more salient. This is no more clear than when Pierre is confronted

by a peddler to buy something and he muses. And what does she need the money for? As if this

money can add one hair's breadth to her happiness, her peace of mind? Can anything in the world make

her or me less subject to evil and death? Death, which will end everything and which must come today

or tomorrowin a moment, anyhow, compared with eternity(WP 114 ). This is not hard to

deconstruct as a compatible passage with Heideggers notion of death. His immediate consideration of

how life is fundamentally always connected to death making it the final determinant on the sum total of

life is about as overt as it can get. However, what is particularly pertinent here is his attention to
temporality as something that is unavoidably important in the consideration of being. He mentions how

death can come today or tomorrow but it is merely a moment compared with eternity. This is an

important distinction to make because it locates being as innately finite, but located within a timeline

that is in fact eternal. The fact that temporality is important for Heideggers formulation of Dasein is not

hard to glean as the title of his book has the word Time in it. However, the way it functions for

Heidegger is that time is the only structure to locate being in, and thus death gains importance namely

because it is the boundary of Dasein with respect to time. This also is a key argument because it means

Dasein is always processual. That is, Being cannot be conceptualized as in a moment, but always

continuously defined in the future going towards something, because it is located in time which always

continues. This is reified by Tolstoy in this passage because Tolstoy actively chooses to have Pierre begin

this contemplation at a quotidian moment. Being-towards-death is necessarily processual and for Pierre,

that process is beginning here, in everyday life. The fact that this happens in such a mundane setting

establishes Pierres conceptualization of Dasein as always occurring, within time, continuously as it must

be because of its structural foundation being time. Therefore, the foundations of this Heideggarian

paradigm for Pierre are laid because we note that Pierres ontological closure is always tied up with his

relation to death, the obstacle being how he can productively relate to it.

Pierre only truly embraces a paradigm of Being-towards-death once he comes face to face

with it and embraces it, and this is exactly the moment in which Pierre truly gains ontological closure.

When considering Pierres face to face encounter with death (imprisonment/execution), there are

essentially two stages. The first is the moment in which is not executed but had accepted death to some

degree. This precedes Karataevs death; however, by that point Pierre had clearly had a new outlook

with respect to death. Granted, he still flees, but in the dream he escapes to, the view of life that he

conceptualizes of is one of fluidity and change all teleologically ending in death. The second phase is one

in which he truly does acknowledge death and the anxiety that puts him face to face with the
potentiality-of-being. As he is released from prison, he saw the corpse of Petya Rostov(WP 1102) and

on the same day learns the exact nature of Andreis death and of Helenes death. This is actually quite

an important aside by Tolstoy because it is the literal embodiment of coming face-to-face with the

potentiality-of-being when he is confronted by the corpse of Petya Rostov. Furthermore, he flees

yet again; however, this time to rethink all these strange and new things that he learned during that

time (WP 1103), those being the deaths of those he knew. This rethinking is exactly what was absent

from all other encounters with death that Pierre has. And it is in this convalescence that he suddenly

comes to peace with his ontological inquiry. Tolstoy specifically writes that formerly he had been

unable to see the great, the unfathomable and infinite, in anythingNow he had learned to see the

great, the eternal, and the infinite in everythingto enjoy contemplating it, he had naturally abandoned

the spyglass(WP 1104). While, for Pierre, he calls this God, it essentially stands in for death for that is

where the boundary of being, as had been clarified above, is for Pierre. That is to say, Pierre now lives

for/towards the eternal and the infinite abandoning the spyglass and instead contemplating the

infinite. This infinite/eternal is exactly the end of Dasein and is thus, for him the potentiality-of-being.

This is because, within the temporal framework of being, Dasein cannot traverse the entire

eternity/infinity but is rather bounded exactly by that. Therefore, when he is living to see the infinite in

everything it is to ontologically position himself in relation to that which exceeds being, which is the

infinity of death.

The precise structure by which death is an impossible possibility is clarified primarily through

Prince Andrei throughout the novel. Unlike Pierre, Andrei experiences a near-death experience and

actually finally dies in a novel and as a result, is the only character in War and Peace that allows us to

understand, at least vaguely, the structure of the translucent unveiling of the absolute impossibility of

being. During the first time in which Andrei goes to war, he is nearly mortally wounded and while he is

on the ground looking at the sky, he thinks its quite different the way the clouds creep across this lofty,
infinite sky. How is it I havent seen this lofty sky before? And how happy I am that Ive finally come to

know it. Yes! Everything is empty everything is a deception, except this infinite sky. There is nothing,

nothing except that (WP 216). For Andrei, only in death or at least in an encounter with death does

he find what appears to be the meaning of existence in the infinite sky as everything is just

deception except for the sky for which there is nothing but that. This lofty infinite sky can be read

as the analogue of Heideggers possibility of impossibility. The use of infinite is the impossibility

because it is always radically unknowable, while the lofty sky plays the role of the possibility in that

it is earthly and high, but still decidedly located spatially for Andrei. It is exactly in the possibility of death

from his wound that Andrei has finally come to know it, this it being the potentiality-for-being.

The way this passage describes Andreis experience is deliberately vague with little clarification on the

deception and lofty and infinite and this coincides exactly with Heideggers affirmation of death as

possibility of impossibility. As noted above, death does not suddenly clarify life but only given a

translucent glance at it and this is exactly Andreis experience. If it had fully clarified it, Andrei would not

be subsequently thrown into a nihilistic vortex, still lost in his existence. Rather, it guides Andrei

ontologically representing a spectre of Dasein located in the future, at the boundary of being. This is

moment Andrei begins being-towards-death.

Despite his epiphany, Andrei seems to take a step backwards when he encounters his wife Liza

dying in child birth, asking what she did to him. This moment represents the point at which Andrei is

suddenly jettisoned into an inner world of discontent and cynicism. Andrei sums up his disposition to

Pierre, claiming being is when you are journeying through life hand in hand with someone, and

suddenly your companion vanishes there, into nowhere, and you are left standing on the edge of an

abyss, and you look down into it (WP 404). One immediate point to note is Andrei describing the

journey of life. This does two things. One, it makes being processual, as opposed to just composed of a

number of moments, and two, it positions some sort of end, clearly being death as clarified further in
the passage. Andrei has essentially reformed his grammar of existence to always be conscious of its

temporal relation towards death. Also, the use of abyss comes up again which calls back to Heideggers

description of Dasein as movement within an abyss of circularity. And this is exactly the phenomena that

Andrei is describing as he is discussing the circular nature of life and death, and their inevitabilities.

However, for Andrei, this only engendered a melancholic approach to life. Nevertheless, this is not

necessarily a step backwards but rather, a necessary stepping stone in Being-towards-death. Here,

Andrei was face-to-face with death, both in the context of himself but also in the context of Liza;

however, unlike Pierre, he embraces the anxiety. While, at this point, it seems to only make him spiral

down a path of unhappiness, it is exactly what make Andrei able to comprehend the structure of Being-

towards-death earlier and more lucidly than Pierre.

This process of Being-towards-death finally culminates in Andreis death. Andrei, on his

deathbed, only moments away from his final demise suddenly understands not being, but being-

towards-death. Tolstoy writes that Prince Andrei not only knew that he would die, but felt that he was

dying He experienced an awareness of estrangement from everything earthly and a joyful and strange

lightness of being. Without haste or worry, he waited for what lay ahead of him. The dread, the eternal,

the unknown and far off, of which he had never ceased to feel the presence throughout his life, was

now close to him andby that strange lightness of being he experienced almost comprehensible and

palpable (WP 982). Andrei has a new grammar to express Being, and in fact makes this blatantly clear

as he writes that he has an awareness of [the]lightness of being and that this lightness makes the

presence [of the eternal (death)] throughout his lifealmost comprehensible and palpable. This is the

quintessence of being-towards-death as Andrei awaits what lay ahead of him and understands his

being as always already awaiting this eternal unknown that haunted his life until then. Further

parallels to Heidegger can be drawn as the use of almost comprehensible is a direct link to the

translucent unveiling discussed so many times. Moreoever, Andreis estrangement from everything
earthly positions his being in this liminal state that is ambiguous yet simultaneously clarificatory and

that is the way in which Heideggers being-towards-death handles the paradox of presence and being.

That is, the paradox of understanding being in the present is solved by Heidegger by no longer thinking

of being as in the present, but always liminal and transitioning which is what Andreis estrangement is.

Up till this point, Natasha has not been mentioned. However, Natasha actually represents a vital

part of this argument as she is an example that clarifies what is exactly meant by the frequently used

potentiality-of-being. Both Pierre and Andre fall in love with Natasha and for both, she is epiphanic

with respect to how they conceptualize of the purpose of both Dasein and living. For Pierre, only

following his final reformation of his approach to life that involved always living towards infinity or the

eternal, in other words being-towards-death is it that Pierre realizes that the whole meaning of life,

not only for him, but for all the world, seemed to him to consist only in his love and the possibility of her

love for him (WP 1123). Here, Pierre affirms that the heart of his being is his love for Natasha and the

possibility or potentiality of her love for him. This is quite literally Pierres potentiality-of-being

which only reveals itself when he directs his life towards the infinite. This is because, when projecting his

being onto the horizon where he can glance the boundary of Dasein, Pierre is able to see what can only

be called the limit of his being, and that is being with and loving Natasha. Granted, this description is

vague, and highly irrational. But this is exactly the case for Pierre as well. It is inherently irrational for

Pierre to this this is the whole meaning of lifefor all the world and this even occurs to Pierre but that

irrationality is largely why it is in fact possible to grasp the intrinsically undecidable potentiality-of-

being. A similar experience occurs for Andrey, where moments from death he thinks Love hinders

death. Love is lifeEverything is, everything exists, only because I love. Everything is connected only by

that. Love is God, and to diemeans that I, a part of love, return to the common and eternal

source(WP 984). Andrei, near death, projecting his existence fully onto the eternal in the future

concludes that Love is life and irrationally affirms that everything exists, only because I love. This
parallels Pierres experience as Andrei similarly must contemplate his potentiality-of-being irrationally.

However, in the case of Andrei, the relationship between death and his potentiality-of-being that

being love, is clarified even more overtly as he claims that to die- means that I, a part of love, return to

theeternal source. While it is a religious avowal, it nonetheless intersects with Heideggers argument

as it is in the projection towards death that Andrei affirms his being as given to love, and thus the fact

that he was always journeying towards death enabled him to give himself to love.

That Heidegger and Tolstoy are compatible is not all that interesting an argument. In fact, two

intellectuals agreeing on something is in general, little cause of investigation. So the question is what are

we left with given this analysis of death, being, and War and Peace. Despite not really being prescriptive

at any point in Being and Time, Heidegger did normatively endorse what he termed contemplation, and

this is exactly where the heart of this essay lies. For Heidegger, contemplation is the prerequisite to an

ontological as opposed to ontic or mechanical existence. To contemplate is to interrogate the structures

of being and existence constantly. Heidegger wrote Being and Time as a contemplation and, through this

essay, we can read War and Peace as another contemplation. However, this essay itself provides a

unique point by which we begin the foundation of a unique, perhaps more productive contemplation by

reading Heidegger and Tolstoy in conjunction. The old, pretentious adage we read literature to

understand more about this world resonates particularly well here. By combining both the constructed

world of Tolstoy with the theoretical analysis of Heidegger, we evade a problem that perhaps inheres in

Heideggers method which is to ontically treat the investigation of ontology. By considering the

subjectivity of both Pierre and Andrei, this paper engenders an affective mode of investigation that

makes those possibilities of impossibilities truly intelligible and not just passing remarks. The subjects

of analysis are no longer objective, but are suddenly actual humans with both rational and irrational

faculties and because of this, what is called potentiality-of-being and Dasein truly acquire meaning as

opposed to being just techniques of analysis and theory.

 Works Cited

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Media, 13 July 2009. Web. 08 Dec. 2016.

Heidegger, Martin, John Macquarrie, and Edward S. Robinson. Being and Time. New York: Harper,

1962. Print.

Montaigne, Michel De. That to Philosophise Is to Learne How to Die. Hoboken, NJ: BiblioBytes, n.d.

Print.

Wrathall, Mark A. The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger's Being and Time. Cambridge:

Cambridge UP, 2013. Print.

Tolstoy, Leo, Richard Pevear, and Larissa Volokhonsky. War and Peace. London: Vintage Classic,

2009. Print.

Tolstoy, Leo, and David Patterson. Confession. New York: W.W. Norton, 1983. Print.