LIMITATIONS TO THE EXERCISE OF OF LGU POWERS
their principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific
1. Solicitor General vs Metropolitan Manila Authority
(204 SCRA 837)
FACTS: In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District
vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, the Court held that the
confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic
violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed
by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was
permitted only under the conditions laid dowm by LOI 43 in the
case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was
there also observed that even the confiscation of driver's
licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the
decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the
Commission. However, petitioners alleged that Traffic Enforces
continued with the confiscation of drivers licenses and removal
of license plates. Dir General Cesar P. Nazareno of the PNP
assured the Court that his office had never authorized the
removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles. Later,
the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11,
authorizing itself "to detach the license plate/tow and impound
attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally
parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila." The
Court issued a resolution requiring the Metropolitan Manila
Authority and the SolGen to submit separate comments in light
of the contradiction between the Ordinance and the SC ruling.
The MMA defended the ordinance on the ground that it was
adopted pursuant to the power conferred upon it by EO 32
(formulation of policies, promulgation of resolutions). The Sol
Gen expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void
because it represented an invalid exercise of a delegated
legislative power. The flaw in the measure was that it violated
existing law, specifically PD 1605, which does not permit, and
so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the
confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in
Metropolitan Manila. He made no mention, however, of the
alleged impropriety of examining the said ordinance in the
absence of a formal challenge to its validity.
Issue: WON Ordinance 11 is justified on the basis of the
General Welfare Clause embodied in the LGC
Held: No. The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of
legislative power to promulgate such measures, it appearing
that the requisites of such delegation are present. These
requisites are. 1) the completeness of the statute making the
delegation; and 2) the presence of a sufficient standard. The
measures in question are enactments of local governments
acting only as agents of the national legislature. Necessarily,
the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of
case now before us, we apply the particular requisites of a
valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles
governing municipal corporations. According to Elliot, a
municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
3) must not be partial ordiscriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but
may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must
be general and consistent with public policy. A careful study of
the Gonong decision will show that the measures under
consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do
not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD
1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the
confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed
in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following
provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila
Commission to impose such sanctions. In fact, the provisions
prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan
Manila. The Commission was allowed to "impose fines and
otherwise discipline" traffic violators only "in such amounts and
under such penalties as are herein prescribed," that is, by the
decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly
imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed
by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly
provides that "in case of traffic violations, the driver's license
shall not be confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to
the Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political
subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the
Municipality of Mandaluyong. `The requirement that the
municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains
itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by
virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the
national legislature. They are mere agents vested with what is
called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the
Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but
must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case
before us, the enactments in question, which are merely local
in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the
force and effect of a statute. To sustain the ordinance would be
to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so
violating national laws in the guise of implementing them.
Thus, ordinances could be passed imposing additional
requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to prevent
bigamy; the registration of vehicles, to minimize carnapping;
the execution of contracts, to forestall fraud; the validation of
parts, to deter imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech, to
reduce disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but the means,
even if the end be valid, would be ultra vires. The measures in
question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but,
worse, impose sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact
actually prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances disregard and
violate and in effect partially repeal the law. We here
emphasize the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605 applies
only to the Metropolitan Manila area. It is an exception to the
general authority conferred by R.A. No. 413 on the
Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish violations of
traffic rules elsewhere in the country with the sanction therein
prescribed, including those here questioned. The Court agrees
that the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of
motives and shares the concern of the rest of the public for the
effective reduction of traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila
through the imposition and enforcement of more deterrent
penalties upon traffic violators. At the same time, it must also
reiterate the public misgivings over the abuses that may attend
the enforcement of such sanction in eluding the illicit practices
described in detail in the Gonong decision. At any rate, the fact
is that there is no statutory authority for and indeed there is a
statutory prohibition against the imposition of such penalties in
the Metropolitan Manila area. Hence, regardless of their
merits, they cannot be impose by the challenged enactments
by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers. It is for
Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion,
whether or not to impose such sanctions, either directly
through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect
to the local governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without such
action, PD 1605 remains effective and continues prohibit the
confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except under
the conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver licenses as
well for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.
2. TATEL vs MUNICIPALITY of VIRAC
Facts: Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio
Sta. Elena, Municipality of Virac. Complaints were received by
the municipality concerning the disturbance caused by the
operation of the abaca bailing machine inside petitioners
warehouse. A committee was then appointed by the municipal
council, and it noted from its investigation on the matter that an
accidental fire within the warehouse of the petitioner created a
danger to the lives and properties of the people in the
neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was then passed by the
Municipal council declaring said warehouse as a public
nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code.
According to respondent municipal officials, petitioners
warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13,
series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near
a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without
maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said
block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by
accidental fire. On the other hand, petitioner contends that
Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Is Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 is unconstitutional
and void?
RULING: NO. Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed
by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police
power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal
corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and
maintenance of local self-government and as such are
endowed with the police powers in order to effectively
accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation.
Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under
the Administrative Code, which reads: The municipal council
shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not
repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and
such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the
health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the
municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection
of property therein.
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the municipality to enact but must also be
passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, and
must be in consonance with certain well established and basic
principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that
a municipal ordinance:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy,
(6) must not be unreasonable.
Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952, meets these criteria.
3. MAGTAJAS vs PRYCE PROPERTIES
FACTS: The Sangguniang Panlunsod enacted Ordinance No.
3353 prohibiting the operation of casino followed by Ordinance
No. 3375-93 providing penalty therefor. Petitioners also attack
gambling as intrinsically harmful and cite various provisions of
the Constitution and several decisions of this Court expressive
of the general and official disapprobation of the vice. They
invoke the State policies on the family and the proper
upbringing of the youth.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinace No. 3355 and Ordinance No.
3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlunsod of
Cagayan de Oro City are valid.
HELD: NO. Petition was denied. Decision of respondent Court
of Appeals was affirmed/ The morality of gambling is not a
justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is
generally considered inimical to the interests of the people,
there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or
penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at
all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In
the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit
gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may
prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever
reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited
jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and
horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted
its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review,
much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit
to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. The tests of a valid
ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has
held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the
following substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not
contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are
only agents of the national government. Local councils
exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them
by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate
cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher
than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local
government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which
they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by
mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
4. LIM vs PACQUING
FACTS: The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by
Congress on 18 June 1949 (R.A. No. 409). On 1 January
1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the
authority to regulate jai-alais from local government to the
Games and Amusements Board (GAB). On 07 September
1971, however, the Municipal Board of Manila nonetheless
passed Ordinance No. 7065 entitled An Ordinance
Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit The Associated
Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain And Operate
A Jai-Alai In The City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms And
Conditions And For Other Purposes. On 20 August 1975,
Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by then President
Marcos. The decree, entitled Revoking All Powers and
Authority of Local Government(s) To Grant Franchise, License
or Permit And Regulate Wagers Or Betting By The Public On
Horse And Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota, And Other
Forms Of Gambling, in Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked
all existing franchises and permits issued by local
governments. In May 1988, Associated Development
Corporation (ADC) tried to operate a Jai-Alai. The government
through Games and Amusement Board intervened and
invoked Presidential Decree No. 771 which expressly revoked
all existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of
gambling facilities (including Jai-Alai) by local governments.
ADC assails the constitutionality of P.D. No. 771.
ISSUE: Whether or not P.D. No. 771 is violative of the equal
protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution.
HELD: NO. P.D. No. 771 is valid and constitutional.
Presumption against unconstitutionality. There is nothing on
record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been
repealed, altered or amended by any subsequent law or
presidential issuance (when the executive still exercised
legislative powers). Neither can it be tenably stated that the
issue of the continued existence of ADCs franchise by reason
of the unconstitutionality of PD No. 771 was settled in G.R. No.
115044, for the decision of the Courts First Division in said
case, aside from not being final, cannot have the effect of
nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since only the Court
En Banc has that power under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the
Constitution. And on the question of whether or not the
government is estopped from contesting ADCs possession of
a valid franchise, the well-settled rule is that the State cannot
be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if any, of its
officials or agents. (Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
209 SCRA 90
5. BINAY vs DOMINGO
FACTS: Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council,
approved Resolution No. 60 which extends P500 burial
assistance to bereaved families whose gross family income
does not exceed P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to be
taken out of the unappropriated available funds in the
municipal treasury. The Metro Manila Commission approved
the resolution. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a
disbursement of P400,000.00 for the implementation of the
program. However, the Commission on Audit disapproved said
resolution and the disbursement of funds for the
implementation thereof for the following reasons: (1) the
resolution has no connection to alleged public safety, general
welfare, safety, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati; (2)
government funds must be disbursed for public purposes only;
and, (3) it violates the equal protection clause since it will only
benefit a few individuals.
Issues: 1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the
police power under the general welfare clause
2. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public purpose
RULING:
1. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent
attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized
government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo
et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex. Its
fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort
and convenience of the people. Police power is inherent in the
state but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal
corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid
delegation of such power by the legislature which is the
repository of the inherent powers of the State. Municipal
governments exercise this power under the general welfare
clause. Pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to
"enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be
necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities
conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and
proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and
convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public
morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the
municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the
protection of property therein.
2. Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has
been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all
comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the
exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it
could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and
flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus
assuring the greatest benefits. The police power of a municipal
corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate
with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs
of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience
as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all
the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all
legislation and almost every function of the municipal
government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is
especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security,
health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not
limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which
exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the
people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity,
and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of
the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed
inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall
absolutely indicate the limits of police power. Public purpose is
not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a
limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the
Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social
welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide
adequate social services, the promotion of the general welfare,
social justice as well as human dignity and respect for human
rights." The care for the poor is generally recognized as a
public duty. The support for the poor has long been an
accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the
common good.
6. VILLACORTA vs BERNARDO
7. TERRADO vs CA
FACTS:
8. MATALIN COCONUT vs MUN. COUNCIL OF
MALABANG
9. Physical Therapy Org. of the Philippines vs City
of Manila
FACTS:
10. PHIl. GAMEFOWL COMMISSION vs CA
11. DELA CRUZ vs PARAS
FACTS: The Local Government of Bocaue, Bulacan enacted
Ordinace No. 82 which sought to prohibit the operation of night
clubs and the employment of hostesses in such night clubs.
The Petitioners filed with the Court of First Instance a petition
for prohibition with preliminary injuction alleging that (1) the
ordinance is null and void as the municipality has no authority
to prohibit a lawful business, (2) it violated the petitioners right
to due process and equal protection of the law as their permits
were withdrawn without judicial hearing, and (3) that under
Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended, the power to
license and regulate tourist-oriented business including night
clubs has been transferred to the Department of Tourism. In
answer, the municipality responded that (1) it has been
authorized by law to prohibit the establishment and operation
of night clubs under Section 2238 of the Revised
Administrative Code, (2) it was not violative of their rights as
property rights are subordinate to public interests because
night clubs has been the principal cause of decadence of
morality and has adverse effects to the community, and (3)
Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended, did not deprive
municipal councils to regulate or prohibit night clubs. The Court
of First Instance upheld the constitutionality of the Ordinance.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 84 as enacted is a valid
exercise of police power by the local government unit.
RULING: The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners. According
to the Court, police power is granted to municipal corporations,
which may enact such ordinances and make regulations as
may be necessary to carry out its powers and duties to provide
for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the
morals, peace, good order and convenience of the
municipality. However, citing Justice Moreland, an ordinance is
valid unless contravenes the fundamental law of the land, an
act of national legislature, or unless it is against public policy,
or is unreasonable, oppressive, discriminating, or in derogation
of common right. Hence, an ordinance passed must be a
reasonable exercise of the power, or it will be pronounced
invalid. The general rule found in the general welfare clause
must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers of the
corporation, and not inconsistent with the law of the State.
In the present case, it is clear that municipal corporations
cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be
regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business.
All the petitioners would have to do is to apply once more for
licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses,
because no such businesses could legally open, would be
subject to judicial correction. The purpose sought to be
achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions
rather than by an absolute prohibition.
12. QC vs ERICTA
Facts: An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon city which
approved the the regulation ofestablishment of private
cemeteries in the said city. According to the ordinance, 6% of
the total area of the private memorial park shall be set aside
for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and
have been residents of QC. Himlayang Pilipino, a private
memorial park, contends that the taking or confiscation of
property restricts the use of property such that it cannot be
used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all
beneficial use of his property. It also contends that the taking is
not a valid exercise of police power, since the properties taken
in the exercise of police power are destroyed and not for the
benefit of the public.
Issue: Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon City is a
valid taking of private property
Ruling: No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid
way of taking private property. The ordinace is actually a taking
without compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead of building or maintaing a public
cemeteries. State's exercise of the power of expropriation
requires payment of just compensation. Passing the ordinance
without benefiting the owner of the property with just
compensation or due process, would amount to unjust taking
of a real property. Since the property that is needed to be
taken will be used for the public's benefit, then the power of the
state to expropriate will come forward and not the police power
of the state.
13. VELASCO vs VILLEGAS
Facts: Petitioners herein are members of the Sta. Cruz
Barbershop Association. This is an appeal from the lower
court's(LC) order dismissing their suit for declatory relief. They
are challenging the constitutionality of Ord. No. 4964. They
contend that it amounts to deprivation of properties and their
means of livelihood without due process of law. The assailed
ordinance is worded thus: "It shall be prohibited for any
operator of any barber shop to conduct the business of
massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room
or rooms of said barber shop, or in any room or rooms within
the same building where the barber shop is located as long as
the operator of the barber shop and the room where
massaging is conducted is the same person." Respondent in
its reply, said that the Ordinance No. 4964 is constitutional and
such is just an exercise of the state's inherent power (police
power).
Issue: Whether or not the assailed Ordinance violated the
petitioner's right to property and their means of livelihood.
Held: Ordinance is Constitutional. Petition is dismissed, LC
decision affirmed. Enactment of such (Ordinance) is a valid
exercise of Police Power. The objectives of the Ordinance are:
(1) To impose payment of license fees for engaging in the
business of massage clinics, and;
(2) To forestall possible immorality which might grow from the
construction of a separate room for massaging customers.
This Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances
based on the general welfare clause. And for that reason, the
petitioners rights were not violated and they are not deprived
of the due process of law.
14. ORTIGAS vs FEATI
Facts:On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of
the Highway Hills Subdivision at Mandaluyong to Augusto
Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles. The latter transferred
their rights in favour of Emma Chavez, upon completion of
payment a deed was executed with stipulations, one of which
is that the use of the lots are to be exclusive for residential
purposes only. This was annotated in the Transfer Certificate
of Titles No. 101509 and 101511. Feati then acquired Lot 5
directly from Emma Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour
Mills. On May 5, 1963, Feati started construction of a building
on both lots to be devoted for banking purposes but could also
be for residential use. Ortigas sent a written demand to stop
construction but Feati continued contending that the building
was being constructed according to the zoning regulations as
stated in Municipal Resolution 27 declaring the area along the
West part of EDSA to be a commercial and industrial zone.
Civil case No. 7706 was made and decided in favour of Feati.
Issue: Whether or not Resolution number 27 declaring Lot 5
and 6 to be part of an industrial and commercial zone is valid
considering the contract stipulation in the Transfer Certificate
of Titles.
Held: Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations.
Section 3 of RA 2264 of the Local Autonomy Act empowers a
Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances
or regulations for the Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264
states that implied power of the municipality should be
liberally construed in its favour, to give more power to the their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission
local government in promoting economic conditions, social
welfare, and material progress in the community. This is found
in the General Welfare Clause of the said act. Although non-
impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not
absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate
exercise of police power, e.g. the power to promote health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general
welfare of the people. Resolution No. 27 was obviously passed
in exercise of police power to safeguard health, safety, peace
and order and the general welfare of the people in the locality
as it would not be a conducive residential area considering the
amount of traffic, pollution, and noise which results in the
surrounding industrial and commercial establishments.
Decision dismissing the complaint of Ortigas is AFFIRMED.
15. BALACUIT vs CFI
Facts: The Municipal Board of City of Butuan passed
Oridinance No 640 on 21 April 1969, penalizing any person ,
group of persons , entity or engeged in the business of selling
admission tickets to any movie to require children between
7-12 years of age to pay full payment for ticket should only be
charged one half. Petitioners Carlos Balacuit , et al as
managers of theaters assailed the validity and constitutionality
of the said ordinance. The court adjudged in favour of the
respondents hence the petition for review. Petitioners contend
that it violates due process clause of the Constitution for being
oppressive , unfair , unjust, confiscatory and an undue restraint
of trade.
Issue: Whether or not Ordinance 640 prohibiting selling of
theatre admission tickets to children 7-12 y/o at full price is
constitutional or not?
Decision: Decision reversed. Ordinance 640 declared
unconstitutional. For the assailed ordinance be held
constitutional it must pass the test of police power. To invoke
the exercise the police power, it must be for the interest of the
public without interfering with private rights and adoptive
means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally
true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason,
that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its
provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary
interference with the business or calling subject of regulation.
The right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall
be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself
and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause.
Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage
they think most for their own advantage, and that any person
who did not approve could stay away.
16. SANGALANG vs IAC
FACTS: The residents have allegedly converted their
residences into commercial establishments (a restaurant in GR
74376, a bakery and coffee shop in GR 76394, an advertising
firm in GR 78182; and a construction company, apparently, in
GR 82281) in violation of the said restrictions. Their mother
case, GR 71169 is, on the other hand, a petition to hold the
vendor itself, Ayala Corporation (formerly Makati Development
Corporation), liable for tearing down the perimeter wall along
Jupiter Street that had theretofore closed its commercial
section from the residences of Bel-Air Village and ushering in,
as a consequence, the full commercialization of Jupiter
Street, in violation of the very restrictions it had authored. The
Court of Appeals dismissed all 5 appeals on the basis primarily
of its ruling in AC-GR 66649, Bel-Air Village, Inc. v. Hy-Land
Realty Development Corporation, et al., in which the appellate
court explicitly rejected claims under the same deed
restrictions as a result of Ordinance 81 enacted by the
Government of the Municipality of Makati, as well as
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance 8101 promulgated by the
Metropolitan Manila Commission, which two ordinances
allegedly allowed the use of Jupiter Street both for residential
and commercial purposes. It was likewise held that these twin
measures were valid as a legitimate exercise of police power.
Issue: WON Makati Resolution No. 81 and MMC Ordinance
81-01 are unconstitutional as violative of the non-impairment
clause of the Constitution.
Decision: No. Both are constitutional. All contracts are subject
to the overriding demands, needs, and interests of the greater
number as the State may determine in the legitimate exercise
of police power. The Court guarantees sanctity of contract and
is said to be the law between the contracting parties, but
while it is so, it cannot contravene law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy. Above all, it cannot be raised as
a deterrent to police power, designed precisely to promote
health, safety, peace, and enhance the common good, at the
expense of contractual rights, whenever necessary. Police
power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people. Invariably described as the
most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers and in a
sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of
government, the exercise of the power may be judicially
inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical,
unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due
process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional
guarantee. Police power is elastic and must be responsive to
various social conditions; it is not confined within narrow
circumscriptions of precedents resting on past conditions; it
must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life.
Public welfare, when clashing with the individual right to
property, should be made to prevail through the states
exercise of its police power. Herein, the MMC Ordinance
represents a legitimate exercise of police power, as the
ordinance is neither capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable;
but that it is based on compelling interests of general welfare.
The restrictive easements are similar to any other contract,
and should not deter the valid exercise of police power. The
MMC has reclassified Jupiter Street into a high density
commercial zone, pursuant to Ordinance 81-01. Sangalang,
BAVA, et. al., thus have no cause of action on the strength
alone of said deed restrictions.
17. CITY OF MANILA vs TEOTICO
Facts: At about 8:00 in the evening, private respondent Genaro
Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos
Avenue, Manila, within a loading and unloading zone, waiting
for a jeepney when one came along to stop. As he stepped
down from the curb to board the jeepney and took a few steps,
he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted manhole. The fall
caused Teoticos head to hit the rim and break his eyeglasses
and the broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid.
Respondent was then brought to PGH to be treated of his
injuries. Respondent suffered contusions in various parts of his
body and allergic eruptions caused by the anti-tetanus
injections administered to him required further medical
treatment and payment of these charges. Thus, respondent
filed a complaint for damages against the City of Manila, its
mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief
of police. The trial court dismissed the complaint. On appeal,
the City of Manila was sentenced to pay the damages.
Issue: Whether or not the City of Manila is liable for damages.
Ruling: YES. Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a
particular prescription making provinces, cities and
municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury
suffered by any person by reason specifically of the
defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings,
and other-public works under their control or supervision. In
other words, Article 2189 governs liability due to defective
streets, in particular. Since the present action is based upon
the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is
decisive thereon. In its answer to the amended complaint, the
City, in turn, alleged that the streets aforementioned were and
have been constantly kept in good condition and regularly
inspected and the storm drains and manholes thereof covered
by the defendant City and the officers concerned who have
been ever vigilant and zealous in the performance of their
respective functions and duties as imposed upon them by law.
Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue
was and is under its control and supervision. At any rate, under
Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability
therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets
belong to the province, city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the
province, city or municipality have either control or
supervision over said street or road.
18. JIMENEZ vs CITY OF MANILA
FACTS: Jimenez bought bagoong at the Santa Ana public
market at the time that it was flooded with ankle-deep water.
As he turned around to go home, he stepped on an uncovered
opening w/c could not be seen because of dirty rainwater. A
dirty and rusty 4-inch nail, stuck inside the uncovered opening,
pierced his left leg to a depth of1 inches. His left leg swelled
and he developed fever. He was confined for 20 days, walked
w/ crutches for 15 days and could not operate his school
buses. He sued City of Manila and Asiatic Integrated Corp
under whose administration the Sta. Ana had been placed by
virtue of Management and Operating Contract. TC found for
respondent. CA reversed and held Asiatec liable and absolved
City of Manila.
ISSUE: WON City of Manila should be jointly and solidarily
liable with Asiatec
HELD: YES
RATIO: In the City of Manila v Teotico case, it was held that
Art 1, Sec 4 of RA 409, which City of Manila is invoking in this
case, establishes a general rule regulating the liability of City
Of Manila while Art 2189 NCC governs the liability due to
defective streets, public buildings and other public works in
particular and is therefore decisive in this case. It was also
held that for liability under 2189 to attach, control and
supervision by the province, city or municipality over the
defective public building in question is enough. It is not
necessary that such belongs to such province, city or
municipality. In the case at bar, there is no question that Sta.
Ana public market remained under the control of the City as
evidenced by: 1.the contract bet Asiatec and City which
explicitly states that prior approval of the City is still needed in
the operations; 2.Mayor Bagatsing of Manila admitted such
control and supervision in his letter to Finance Sec. Virata
(The City retains the power of supervision and control over its
public markets); 3.City employed a market master for the
Sta. Ana public Market whose primary duty is to take direct
supervision and control of that particular public market; 4.Sec.
30 of Tax Code The treasurer shall exercise direct and
immediate supervision, administration and control over public
markets
It is thus the duty of the City to exercise reasonable care to
keep the public market reasonably safe for people frequenting
the place for their marketing needs. Ordinary precautions could
have been taken during good weather to minimize danger to
life and limb. The drainage hole could have been placed under
the stalls rather than the passageways. The City should have
seen to it that the openings were covered. It was evident that
the certain opening was already uncovered, and 5 months
after this incident it was still uncovered. There were also
findings that during floods, vendors would remove the iron
grills to hasten the flow of water. Such acts were not prohibited
nor penalized by the City. No warning sign of impending
danger was evident. Petitioner had the right to assume there
were no openings in the middle of the passageways and if any,
that they were adequately covered. Had it been covered,
petitioner would not have fallen into it. Thus the negligence of
the City is the proximate cause of the injury suffered. Asiatec
and City are joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable
19. GUILATCO vs CITY OF DAGUPAN
FACTS: Florentina Guilatco, a court interpreter, was about to
board a tricycle at a sidewalk located at Perez Boulevard when
she accidentally fell into a manhole located in said side walk,
causing her right leg to be fractured. She was hospitalized and
also as a result, suffered loss of income and moral damages.
Guilatco sued the City of Dagupan. The City replied that Perez
Boulevard, where the deadly manhole was located, is a
national road not under the control and supervision of
Dagupan. It is submitted that it is actually the Ministry of Public
Highways that has control and supervision thru the Highway
Engineer, who by mere coincidence, is also the City Engineer
of Dagupan.
ISSUE: Is the City of Dagupan liable?
HELD: Yes. 1) We again apply Art. 2189. But the bigger
question is: Does the City of Dagupan have control and
supervision over Perez Boulevard in order for it to be held
liable? The answer is yes. The City of Dagupan argued that
the supervision and control over Perez Boulevard belongs
more to his function as ex-officio Highway Engineer, thus the
Ministry of Public Highways should be held liable. However,
the court gave this arguments: Alfredo G. Tangco, in his
official capacity as City Engineer of Dagupan, as Ex-Officio
Highway Engineer, as Ex-Officio City Engineer of the Bureau
of Public Works, and, last but not the least, as Building Official
for Dagupan City, receives the following monthly
compensation: P1,810.66 from Dagupan City, P200.00 from
the Ministry of Public Highways, P100.00 from the Bureau of
Public Works and P500.00 by virtue of P.D. 1096, respectively.
This function of supervision over streets, public buildings, and
other public works pertaining to the City Engineer is coursed
through Maintenance Foreman and a Maintenance Engineer.
Although these last two officials are employees of the National
Government, they are detailed with the City of Dagupan and
hence receive instruction and supervision from the city through
the City Engineer. There is, therefore, no doubt that the City
Engineer exercises control or supervision over the public
works in question. Hence, the liability of the city to the
petitioner under article 2198 of the City Code is clear.
20. PALAFOX vs ILOCOS NORTE PROVINCE
FACTS: Torralba was employed as the driver of Ilocos Norte
and detailed to the Office of the District Engineer. While driving
his truck, Sabas ran over Proceto Palafox resulting to the
latters death. Sabas was prosecuted for homicide through
reckless imprudence to which he pleaded guilty. The heirs of
Palafox instituted a civil case against him, the Province, the
District Engineer and the Provincial Treasurer.
Issue: Whether or not the Province of Ilocos Norte can be held
liable.
Held: NO. The general rule is that local government units are
not liable for negligent acts of its employees while they are
performing governmental functions or duties. In this case, the
driver was involved in the construction or maintenance of
roads which was a governmental duty. Therefore, the province
cannot be held liable for his negligent act. However tragic and
deplorable it may be, the death of Palafox imposed on the
province no duty to pay monetary consideration. (Palafox v.
Province of Ilocos Norte, 102 Phil 1186)
21. MUN. of SAN FERNANDO vs FIRME
FACTS: A passenger jeepney, a sand truck and a dump truck
of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union collided. Due to
the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including
Laureano Bania Sr. died. The heirs of Bania filed a
complaint for damages against the owner and driver of the
jeepney, who, in turn, filed a Third Party Complaint against the
Municipality and its dump truck driver, Alfredo Bislig.
Municipality filed its answer and raised the defense of non-
suability of the State. After trial, the court ruled in favor of the
plaintiffs and ordered Municipality and Bislig to pay jointly and
severally the heirs of Bania.
ISSUES: 1. Are municipal corporations suable?
2. Is the Municipality liable for the torts committed by its
employee who was then engaged in the discharge of
governmental functions?
HELD: 1. Municipal corporations, like provinces and cities, are
agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental
functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity
from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the
performance of such functions because their charter provided
that they can sue and be sued.
2. Municipal corporations are suable because their charters
grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless,
they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the
discharge of governmental functions and can be held
answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a
proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the
State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the
defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when
the injury was committed or that the case comes under the
exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot
recover. In this case, the driver of the dump truck of the
municipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian
river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San
Fernando's municipal streets." In the absence of any evidence
to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty
is presumed. Hence, the driver of the dump truck was
performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office. Decision of
the lower court modified. Petitioner municipality was absolved
of any liability.
22. MENDOZA vs DE LEON
FACTS: The Municipal Council of Villasis Pangasinan revoked
the lease of an exclusive ferry privilege awarded to the plaintiff
under the provisions of Act No. 1634 of the Philippine
Commission. The plaintiff was forcibly ejected under and in
pursuance of a resolution adopted by the defendants in this
case, awarding a franchise for the same ferry to another
person. Mendoza filed an action for damages against the
individual members of the council.
ISSUE: WON the council members can be held personally
liable for the damages suffered by the lessee.
HELD: Yes. Under the evidence of record, that there is no
manner of doubt that this pretext was absolutely without
foundation and as there was therefore no occasion whatever
for rescinding the contract, the defendant councilors are liable
personally for the damages suffered by Mendoza.
RATIO: The Municipal Code confers both governmental and
corporate powers upon municipal corporations. For the
exercise of the former, it is not liable to private persons. Its
liability to them for the wrongful exercise of the latter is the
same as that of a private corporation or individual. Officers and
agents of MCs charged with the performance of governmental
duties which are in their nature legislative, judicial, or quasi-
judicial, are not liable for consequences of their official acts
unless it can be shown that they acted willfully and maliciously,
with the express purpose of inflicting injury upon the plaintiff.
The officers of municipalities charged with the administration of
patrimonial property are liable for mismanagement of its affairs
as are directors or managing officers of private corporations,
not for mere mistakes of judgment, but only when their acts are
so far opposed to the true interest of the municipality as to lead
to the clear inference that no one thus acting could have been
influenced by any honest desire to secure such interests. The
defendant councilors regularly leased an exclusive ferry
privilege to the plaintiff for two years. After continuous user of a
little more than one year, they forcible evicted him on the
pretext that he was not operating the ferry leased to him.
23. TORIO vs FONTANILLA
On October 21, 1978, the municipal council of Malasiqui,
Pangasinan passed 2 resolutions: one for management of the
town fiesta celebration and the other for the creation of the
Malasiqui Town Fiesta Executive Committee. The Executive
Committee, in turn, organized a sub-committee on
entertainment and stage with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman.
The council appropriated the amount of P100.00 for the
construction of 2 stages, one for the "zarzuela" and another for
the cancionan. While the zarzuela was being held, the stage
collapsed. Vicente Fontanilla was pinned underneath and died
in the afternoon of the following day. Fontanillas heirs filed a
complaint for damages with the CFI of Manila. The defendants
were the municipality, the municipal council and the municipal
council members. In its Answer, defendant municipality argued
that as a legally and duly organized public corporation it
performs sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta
was an exercise of its governmental functions from which no
liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any of its
agents. The defendant councilors, in turn, maintained that they
merely acted as agents of the municipality in carrying out the
municipal ordinance providing for the management of the town
fiesta celebration and as such they are likewise not liable for
damages as the undertaking was not one for profit;
furthermore, they had exercised due care and diligence in
implementing the municipal ordinance. CFI held that the
municipal council exercised due diligence in selecting the
person to construct the stage and dismissed the complaint.
CA reversed the decision and held all defendants solidarily
liable for damages.
Issues: 1. Is the celebration of a town fiesta authorized by a
municipal council a governmental or a corporate function of the
municipality?
2. Is the municipality liable for the death of Fontanilla?
3. Are the municipal councilors who enacted the ordinance and
created the fiesta committee liable for the death of Fontanilla?
Held: 1. The holding of the town fiesta in 1959 by the
municipality of Malsiqui Pangasinan was an exercise of a
private or proprietary function of the municipality. Section
2282 of the Chatter on Municipal Law of the Revised
Administrative Code simply gives authority to the municipality
to celebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a
duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to
commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in
essence an act for the special benefit of the community and
not for the general welfare of the public performed in
pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact that the
celebration, as claimed was not to secure profit or gain but
merely to provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a
conclusive test. For instance, the maintenance of parks is not a
source of income for the nonetheless it is private undertaking
as distinguished from the maintenance of public schools, jails,
and the like which are for public service. No governmental or
public policy of the state is involved in the celebration of a town
fiesta. Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their
functions are two fold. In one they exercise the right springing
from sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties
pertaining thereto, their acts are political and governmental
Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or
appointed by the are nevertheless public functionaries
performing a public service, and as such they are officers,
agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity, the
municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or corporate right,
arising from their existence as legal persons and not as public
agencies. Their officers and agents in the performance of such
functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or
individual capacity, and not for the state or sovereign power.
2. Under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner-
municipality is liable for damages for the death of Vicente
Fontanilla because the accident was attributable to the
negligence of the municipality's officers, employees, or agents.
Art. 2176, Civil Code: Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. . .
Art. 2180, Civil Code: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omission, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
It was found that the stage was not strong enough considering
that only P100.00 was appropriate for the construction of two
stages and while the floor of the "zarzuela" stage was of
wooden planks, the post and braces used were of bamboo
material. The collapse of the stage was also attributable to the
great number of onlookers who mounted the stage. The
municipality and/or its agents had the necessary means within
its command to prevent such an occurrence. But they failed
take the necessary steps to maintain the safety of the stage,
particularly, in preventing non-participants or spectators from
mounting and accumulating on the stage. Municipality cannot
evade ability and/or liability under the fact that it was Jose
Macaraeg who constructed the stage. The municipality acting
through its municipal council appointed Macaraeg as chairman
of the sub-committee on entertainment and in charge of the
construction of the "zarzuela" stage. Macaraeg acted merely
as an agent of the Municipality. Under the doctrine of
respondent superior mentioned earlier, petitioner is
responsible or liable for the negligence of its agent acting
within his assigned tasks.
3. The celebration of a town fiesta by the Municipality of
Malasiqui was not a governmental function. The legal
consequence thereof is that the Municipality stands on the
same footing as an ordinary private corporation with the
municipal council acting as its board of directors. It is an
elementary principle that a corporation has a personality,
separate and distinct from its officers, directors, or persons
composing it and the latter are not as a rule co-responsible in
an action for damages for tort or negligence culpa aquilla
committed by the corporation's employees or agents unless
there is a showing of bad faith or gross or wanton negligence
on their part. The records do not show that municipal
councilors directly participated in the defective construction of
the "zarzuela" stage or that they personally permitted
spectators to go up the platform. Thus, they are absolved from
liability.
24. CITY OF MANILA vs IAC
25. CEBU CITY vs PICCIO
26. ENCISO vs REMO
Facts:
The petitioner, a sergeant in the police force of Goa,
Camarines Sur applied for leave of absence on which the
respondent Deogracias Remo, then mayor of Goa, granted.
This leave of absence was later extended, with the respondent
Remo's approval. On the very day that Enciso went on leave,
Sergio Calingan, a non-eligible, was appointed "vice Angel
Enciso," to serve "until your successor shall have been duly
qualified, unless sooner discharged by proper authority." When
Enciso reported back for duty, he was told that his position had
been "abolished" by the municipal council, allegedly pursuant
to a directive of the Secretary of Finance, and that the position
of corporal had been "created." Enciso then filed a complaint,
but as no action on such, he elevated the matter to the Office
of the President wherein it ordered the reinstatement of
Enciso. But the respondent Remo refused. Hence,filed this
petition for mandamus. Meanwhile, the acting municipal mayor
of Goa reinstated Enciso.Enciso filed an amended petition in
which he asked payment for his monthly salary of P55 during
all the time that he was out of the service. On the same day he
filed a supplemental petition charging that his reinstatement
was a sham as he was not given back his badge and sidearm
nor paid his salary, and asking for P5,000 as additional moral
damages. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of
Enciso.
Remo and Municipality of Goa filed a notice of appeal bond
while the petitioner filed a motion asking that the municipality
be adjudge solidarity liable with the respondent Remo. The
court a quo granted the petitioner's motion and amended its
judgment in favor of the former.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the position of the petitioner that was
abolished was without basis.
2. Whether or not the respondents should be made liable to
the petitioner for back salaries and moral damages.
Held:
1. The respondents contend that the petitioner's position
(sergeant of police) in the police force of Goa had been
abolished on which it claim that the position occupied by
Enciso had been abolished is without basis in law and in fact.
What was plainly intended by the Act was merely an increased
adjustment of maximum rates of pay, as the change of
designation of rank had priorly been decreed by Republic Act
160 which took effect as early as June 20, 1947. Sec. 2273 of
the Revised Administrative Code, stated as follows;
SEC. 2273. Salaries of members of police force. The
salaries of the chief of police and other members of the police
force shall be fixed by the municipal council. Except as
otherwise specially provided, the annual salaries of members
of the municipal police shall not exceed the amounts
hereinbelow fixed:
In municipalities of the third class: for the chief of police, one
thousand two hundred and sixty pesos; for the corporal, nine
hundred and sixty pesos; and for other members of the police
force, eight hundred and forty pesos.
It is clear that the position occupied by Enciso, although the
given rank is that of sergeant, was actually that of corporal, in
line with the legislative policy laid down in Republic Act 160. In
fine, although Enciso erroneously called himself a sergeant of
police the fact remains that in law the item that he occupied
was that of corporal.
There was no intention to abolish existing positions and to
create new ones but only to change the designation in order to
conform to the new legislation. The department did not intend
the abolition of position of sergeant of police. It merely required
that the design of the position be changed to corporal. Neither
did it intend to place the incumbent of the old position out of
the service specially so when he is, as herein shown, a civil
service eligible. In the second place, by reinstating the
petitioner to the position of corporal, the respondents in effect
admitted that the position was the same one he formerly held
although it now bears a different name. The reinstatement
order of August 2, 1954 states: Effective upon receipt of this
letter you are hereby reinstated to your position in the police
department of this municipality, and by virtue however of
Republic Act 554 this will be a reinstatement to the position of
corporal, instead of sergeant.
2. The position of sergeant of police was in fact never
abolished by the municipal council of Goa and that the only
change effected was the name-designation of the position.
Well-settled is the rule that when a public officer goes outside
the scope of his duty, particularly when acting tortuously he is
not entitled to protection on account of his office, but is liable
for his acts like any private individual. It is a general rule that
an officer-executive, administrative, quasi-judicial, ministerial,
or otherwise who acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction and
without authorization of law may thereby render himself
amenable to personal liability in a civil suit. If he exceeds the
power conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself by
the plea that he is a public agent acting under color of his
office, and not personally. In the eye of the law, his acts then
are wholly without authority. The court stated that municipal
corporations may be held liable for the backpay or wages of
employees or laborers illegally separated from the service,
including those involving primarily governmental functions such
as policemen. 9 The unlawful exclusion of the petitioner Enciso
from his position was, to all intents and purposes, essentially
equivalent to his illegal separation from the service for the
period in question. The lower court, therefore, correctly
adjudged both respondents solidarily liable to the petitioner for
back salaries for the period specified in the judgment a quo.
27. LAGANAPAN vs ASEDILLO
Facts: Petitioner Solano Laganapan was appointed chief of
police of the municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna on 4 January
1960, with a compensation of P660.00 per annum, by the
respondent Mayor Asedillo. On 1 July 1960, his salary was
increased to P720.00 per annum, and he was extended an
appointment which was approved as provisional under Sec.
24(c) of Republic Act No. 2260 by the Commissioner of Civil
Service. On 1 April 1962, he was given another increase in
salary and a corresponding appointment was made which the
Commissioner of Civil Service "approved under Sec. 24(c) of
Republic Act No. 2260, to continue until replaced by an eligible
but not beyond thirty (30) days from receipt of certification of
eligibles by the Provincial Treasurer of Laguna." On 1 July
1963, 1 July 1964, and 1 July 1965, he was again given salary
increases, and new appointments were extended to him, which
appointments were also approved under Section 24(c) of
Republic Act No. 2260 by the Commissioner of Civil Service.
On 16 February 1967, the petitioner was summarily dismissed
from his position by respondent Mayor Elpidio Asedillo, on the
ground that his appointment was provisional and that he has
no civil service eligibility. Respondent Epifanio Ragotero was
appointed acting chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna on the
same day, in place of the petitioner. On 21 February 1967, the
Municipal Council of Kalayaan, Laguna abolished the
appropriation for the salary of the chief of police of Kalayaan,
Laguna. In view thereof, the petitioner complained to the Police
Commission which advised him to file an injunction suit against
Mayor Asedillo. Hence, on 16 March 1967, the petitioner filed a
petition for mandamus, quo warranto with preliminary
mandatory injunction against the respondents before the Court
of First Instance of Laguna, seeking his reinstatement to the
position of chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna, with back
salaries and damages. During the pendency of the case, the
respondent mayor died.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the venue has been set for the
action filed by the petitioner having not resorted to the
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
(2) Whether or not the LGU is liable after the death of the
mayor
Held: (1) YES. While there are precedents which hold that
before a litigant can bring a matter to court, it is necessary that
he first exhaust all the remedies in the administrative branch of
the government, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It has been repeatedly
held that the principle requiring previous exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not applicable where the question in
dispute is purely a legal one; where the controverted act is
patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction; where the respondent is a department
secretary, whose acts as an alter ego of the President, bear
the implied or assumed approval of the latter; where there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; or
where the respondent has acted in utter disregard of due
process. The rule does not also apply where insistence on its
observance would result in nullification of the claim being
asserted; and when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy.
In the instant case, there is no doubt that, in terminating the
services of the appellee, the appellant Mayor Elpidio Asedillo
acted summarily without any semblance of compliance or even
an attempt to comply with the elementary rules of due process.
No charges were filed; nor was a hearing conducted in order to
give the appellee an opportunity to defend himself, despite the
provisions of Sec. 14 of Republic Act No. 4864, otherwise
known as the Police Act of 1966, which took effect on 8
September 1966, that "Members of the local police agency
shall not be suspended or removed except upon written
complaint filed under oath with the Board of Investigators
herein provided for misconduct or incompetence, dishonesty,
disloyalty to the Government, serious irregularities in the
performance of their duties, and violation of law." Following the
rule, there was no need for exhaustion of administrative
remedies before appellee could come to court for the
protection of his rights. Besides, it appears that the order was
immediately executed and the appellee was immediately
removed from office and replaced by the appellant Epifanio
Ragotero on the same day, so that appeal to the
Commissioner of Civil Service, even if available to the
appellee, was not an adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. Furthermore, appeal to the Commissioner of Civil
Service is not a pre-requisite to, nor a bar to the institution of
quo warranto proceedings, so that, as pointed out by the trial
court, to require the appellee to exhaust administrative
remedies before bringing this action, could easily result in a
grave injustice of barring him forever from bringing the matter
to the courts of justice for judicial determination.
(2) YES. There is no merit in the contention of the respondent
Municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna that Mayor Elpidio Asedillo
alone should be held liable for the back salaries of the
petitioner, because the records show that the action was
instituted against Mayor Asedillo, not personally, but in his
capacity as Municipal Mayor of Kalayaan, Laguna, and he
appeared and defended the action in such capacity.
Furthermore, it is of record that, after the summary dismissal of
the petitioner by respondent Mayor Asedillo on 16 February
1967, the Municipal Council of Kalayaan instead of opposing
or at least protesting the petitioner's summary dismissal from
his position, even abolished the appropriation for the salary of
the Chief of Police of Kalayaan, Laguna, We consider this act
of the Municipal Council of Kalayaan as an approval or
confirmation of the act of respondent Mayor in summarily
dismissing the petitioner, as to make said municipality equally
liable, as held by the trial court, as respondent Mayor for the
reinstatement of petitioner and for the payment of his back
salaries.
Respondent Mayor Asedillo who was sued in his official
capacity as municipal mayor, having passed away, the liability
to pay petitioner his back salaries must now devolve upon the
respondent municipality alone.
28. de RAMA vs CA
Facts: Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of
Pagbilao, Quezon, petitoner Conrado De Rama wrote a letter
to the CSC seeking the recall of the appointments of 14
municipal employees. Petitioner justified his recall request on
the allegation that the appointments of said employees were
midnight appointments of the former mayor, done in violation
of Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution. The CSC denied
petitioners request for the recall of the appointments of the 14
employees for lack of merit. The CSC dismissed petitioners
allegation that these were midnight appointments, pointing
out that the constitutional provision relied upon by petitioner
prohibits only those appointments made by an outgoing
President and cannot be made to apply to local elective
officials. The CSC opined that the appointing authority can
validly issue appointments until his term has expired, as long
as the appointee meets the qualification standards for the
position.
Issue: 1. Whether or not the appointments made by the
outgoing Mayor are forbidden under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the
Constitution
2. Whether or not the recall made by petitioner is valid.
Held: 1. The CSC correctly ruled that the constitutional
prohibition on so-called midnight appointments, specifically
those made within 2 months immediately prior to the next
presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting
President. There is no law that prohibits local elective officials
from making appointments during the last days of his or her
tenure.
2. No. It is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment
initially approved, but only when such appointment and
approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable provisions
of the civil service law and regulations. Rule V, Section 9 of the
Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the Revised
Administrative Code specifically provides that an appointment
accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by
the appointing authority and shall remain in force and in effect
until disapproved by the Commission.
Accordingly, the appointments of the private respondents may
only be recalled on the following grounds: (a) Non-compliance
with the procedures/criteria provided in the agencys Merit
Promotion Plan; (b) Failure to pass through the agencys
Selection/Promotion Board; (c) Violation of the existing
collective agreement between management and employees
relative to promotion; or (d) Violation of other existing civil
service law, rules and regulations.
29. PILA vs SANGGUNIANG BAYAN of DASOL
30. SALCEDO vs CA
FACTS: Arsenio N. Salcedo was appointed as Chief of Police
in Candelaria, Quezon in 1955. Records show that Salcedo
then held civil service eligibility, having passed the U.S. Civil
Service Examination for Messenger and Skilled Laborers in
1928. Considering his eligibility appropriate to the position of
Chief of Police, the Commissioner of Civil Service validated the
same and attested the appointment of Salcedo as permanent.
On July 10, 1960, an administrative complaint for misconduct
and serious irregularities in the performance of his duties was
filed against Salcedo. During his suspension from the office,
the mayor terminated the services of Salcedo as Chief of
Police. The basis of the termination stated that Salcedos
appointment as permanent was erroneous and illegal, since
Salcedo didnt possess the appropriate eligibility for the
position of Chief of Police. Salcedo appealed to the
Commissioner of Civil Service. Although the Commissioner
found him guilty of conduct unbecoming a police officer, he
was ordered reinstated and was imposed a fine of one months
pay with a warning against similar offenses. The mayor
refused to pay the reinstatement and appealed the decision of
the CSC to the court of appeals. At first, the Court of Appeals
ordered as well the reinstatement of the petitioner but the
mayor moved to reconsider the decision of the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court reversed its earlier decision and
ordered the termination of the petitioner from service.
ISSUE: Whether or not certain eligibility is appropriate for a
position is within the exclusive prerogative of the
Commissioner.
HELD: The Commissioner of Civil Service had the final
authority with respect to appointments, removal, separation
and other matters relating to the conduct, discipline and
efficiency of the employees in the Civil Service.
31. SAN LUIS vs CA
32. ABELLA vs MUNICIPALITY OF NAGA
Facts: The Municipality of Naga, by a resolution, closed a road
which ran through the public market and Abellas property and
used the closed thoroughfare to expand the market.
Constructions were made along the sidewalk of Abella's
property and abutting to said property, and extending out in the
middle of the same street, hence depriving Abella's property of
access to said street. Abella sought damages from the CFI of
Camarines Sur, which ruled in her favor by ordering the
municipality to pay P300 pesos for damages. The municipality
appealed to the SC. It contended it is not liable for damages as
it acted and exercised its police power to preserve the peace
and good order of the community and promote the general
welfare.
Issue: Is the municipality liable for damages considering that it
merely exercised its police power to preserve peace and good
order of the community and promote general welfare?
Held: Yes. The municipality was not charged with any unlawful
act, or with invading Abellas property rights, it was not found
guilty of any such acts. What is in issue in this case is the
liability for damages. Sec. 2246 of the Revised Administrative
Code provides:
"No municipal road, street, etc. or any part thereof shall be
closed without indemnifying any person.
The stipulation of facts admits that Abella was economically
damaged and adversely affected by the conversion of P. Prieto
Street into a market. Hence, the municipality must be held
liable for damages.
33. VDA DE RACHO vs ILAGAN, ISABEL
FACTS: Manuel Racho was a market cleaner in the
municipality of Ilagan from 1954 to January 1960. At the time
of his retirement, he was earning P60.00 per month. He died in
October 1960. Later, his widow, Juana Racho, petitioned to
claim salary differentials because supposedly, the minimum
wage at the time when her husband was working was P120.00
a month. The municipality of Ilagan appealed that they cannot
comply with the Minimum Wage Law because it lack funds.
ISSUE: Whether or not lack of funds of a local government unit
excuses it from compliance with the Minimum Wage Law.
HELD: No. Lack of funds of a municipality does not excuse it
from paying the statutory minimum wages to its employees,
which, after all, is a mandatory statutory obligation of the
municipality. To uphold such defense of lack of available funds
would render the Minimum Wage Law futile and defeat its
purpose
34. MODAY vs CA
FACTS: Percival Moday is a landowner in Bunawan, Agusan
del Sur. In 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan passed
a resolution authorizing the mayor to initiate an expropriation
case against a 1 hectare portion of Modays land. Purpose of
which was to erect a gymnasium and other public buildings.
The mayor approved the resolution and the resolution was
transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which
disapproved the said resolution ruling that the expropriation is
not necessary because there are other lots owned by
Bunawan that can be used for such purpose. The mayor
pushed through with the expropriation nonetheless.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private
property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was
disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
HELD: Yes. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality
of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental
State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is
governments right to appropriate, in the nature of a
compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or
purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the
power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local
governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the
taking of private property by the government to be valid, the
taking must be for public use and there must be just
compensation. The only ground upon which a provincial board
may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order
invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is beyond
the powers conferred upon the council or president making the
same. This was not the case in the case at bar as the SP
merely stated that there are other available lands for the
purpose sought, the SP did not even bother to declare the SB
resolution as invalid. Hence, the expropriation case is valid.
34. PROVINCE OF CEBU vs IAC
FACTS: On 1964, while then incumbent Gov. Espina was on
official business in Manila, the Vice-Gov Almendras and 3
members of the Provincial Board enacted a Resolution
donating to the City of Cebu an area of over 380 hectares. The
deed of donation was immediately executed in behalf of the
Province of Ceby by Vice-Gov Almendras and accepted in
behalf of the City of Cebu by Mayor Osmena Jr. The document
of donation was prepared and notarized by a private lawyer.
Upon his return, Gov. Espina disagreed with the donation and
to prevent the sale of the lots, they filed a case seeking to have
the donation declared illegal, null and void. Subsequently, the
court dismissed the case on the ground that plaintiffs were not
the real parties in interest in the case. After the city announced
the sale of the lots, Gov. Espina, engaged the services of
respondent Garcia, for the annulment of the deed of donation.
For services rendered Atty. Garcia filed a Notice of Attorneys
Lien, praying that his statement of claim of attorneys lien in
said case be entered upon the records. To said notice, Prov.
Of Cebu opposed, claiming that the payment of attorneys fees
is not allowed by law.
ISSUE: Whether the Governor may validly engage the services
of a private lawyer and whether the province may be held
liable to pay the fees.
RULING: Collaboration of a private law firm with the fiscal and
the municipal attorney is not allowed. Sec. 1683 of the Revised
Administrative Code states that: The provincial fiscall shall
represent the province and any municipality. When the
provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or
other political subdivision of a province, a special attorney may
be employed by its council. The municipalitys authority to
employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations
where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it. Local
government should not be burdened with the expenses of
hiring a private lawyer and that the interests of the municipal
corporation would be best protected if a government lawyer
handles its litigation. However in the case at bar, the
controversy involved an intramural fight between the Provincial
Governor on one hand and the members of the Provincial
Board on the other hand. The Provincial Board would not
adopt a resolution authorizing the Governor to employ Atty.
Garcia to act as counsel for the Province of Cebu for the
purpose of filing and prosecuting a case against the members
to the same Provincial Board according to claimant. A strict
application of the provisions of the Revised Administrative
Code on the matter would deprive the plaintiffs in the court
below of redress for a valid grievance. Respondent counsels
representation became necessary because the Provincial
Boards failure or refusal to direct the bringing of the action to
recover the properties it had donated to Cebu City. Anent the
question of liability for respondent counsels services, the
general rule that an attorney cannot recover his fees from one
who did not employ him or authorize his employment, is
subject to its own exception. His authority to appear for and
represent petitioner in litigation, not having been questioned in
the lower court, it will be presumed on appeal that counsel was
properly authorized to file the complaint and appear for his
client. A rule in the law of municipal corporations that says: A
municipality may become obligated upon an implied contract to
pay the reasonable value of the benefits accepted or
appropriated by it as to which it has the general power to
contract. The petitioner cannot set up the plea that the contract
was ultra vires and still retain benefits thereunder. Having
regarded the contract as valid for purposes of reaping some
benefits, the petitioner is estopped to question its validity for
the purposes of denying answerability.
35. DE GUIA vs AUDITOR GENERAL
36. SAN DIEGO vs NAUJAN, ORIENTAL MINDORO
FACTS: Following a public bidding conducted by the
municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro for the lease of its
municipal waters, Resolution 46 was passed awarding the
concession of the Butas River and the Naujan Lake to
Bartolome San Diego. A contract was entered into between the
said San Diego and the municipality, for a period of lease for 5
years. The lessee then requested for a five year extension of
the original lease period, this was granted by the municipal
council. After the resolution had been approved by the
Provincial Board of Oriental Mindoro, the lessor and the
lessee, contracted for the extension of the period of the lease.
The contract was approved and confirmed on December 29,
1951 by Resolution 229 of the municipal council of Naujan
whose term was then about to expire. Pursuant to the said
contract, the lessee filed a surety bond of P52,000 and then
reconstructed his fish corrals and stocked the Naujan Lake
with bangus fingerlings. On January 2, 1952, the municipal
council of Naujan, this time composed of a new set of
members, adopted Resolution 3, series of 1952, revoking
Resolution 222, series of 1951. On the same date, the new
council also passed Resolution 11, revoking Resolution 229 of
the old council which confirmed the extension of the lease
period. The lessee requested for reconsideration and recall of
Resolution 3, on the ground, among others, that it violated the
contract executed between him and the municipality on
December 23, 1951, and, therefore, contrary to Article III,
section 1, clause 10 of the Constitution. The request, however,
was not granted. The lessee instituted proceedings to annul
the Resolution. The defendant asserted that the original lease
contract, reducing the lease rentals and renewing the lease are
null and void for not having been passed in accordance with
law. The trial court upheld the validity of the lease contract.
ISSUE: WON Resolution No. 3, series of 1952, revoking
Resolution 222, series of 1951, of the municipal council of
Naujan is valid
HELD: Yes. The law (Sec. 2323 of the Revised Administrative
Code) requires that when the exclusive privilege of fishery or
the right to conduct a fishbreeding ground is granted to a
private party, the same shall be let to the highest bidder in the
same manner as is being done in exploiting a ferry, a market
or a slaughterhouse belonging to the municipality. The
requirement of competitive bidding is for the purpose of inviting
competition and to guard against favoritism, fraud and
corruption in the letting of fishery privileges. There is no doubt
that the original lease contract in this case was awarded to the
highest bidder, but the reduction of the rental and the
extension of the term of the lease appear to have been granted
without previous public bidding. Furthermore, it has been ruled
that statutes requiring public bidding apply to amendments of
any contract already executed in compliance with the law
where such amendments alter the original contract in some
vital and essential particular. Inasmuch as the period in a lease
is a vital and essential particular to the contract, we believe
that the extension of the lease period in this case, which was
granted without the essential requisite of public bidding, is not
in accordance with law. And it follows the Resolution 222,
series of 1951, and the contract authorized thereby, extending
the original five-year lease to another five years are null and
void as contrary to law and public policy. We agree with the
defendant in that the question Resolution 3 is not an
impairment of the obligation of contract, because the
constitutional provision on impairment refers only to contract
legally executed. While, apparently, Resolution 3 tended to
abrogate the contract extending the lease, legally speaking,
there was no contract abrogated because, as we have said,
the extension contract is void and inexistent. The lower court,
in holding that the defendant-appellant municipality has been
estopped from assailing the validity of the contract into which it
entered on December 23, 1951, seems to have overlooked the
general rule that the doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied as
against a municipal corporation to validate a contract which it
has no power to make or which it is authorized to make only
under prescribed conditions, within prescribed limitations, or in
a prescribed mode or manner, although the corporation has
accepted the benefits thereof and the other party has fully
performed his part of the agreement, or has expended large
sums in preparation for performance. A reason frequently
assigned for this rule is that to apply the doctrine of estoppel
against a municipality in such case would be to enable it to do
indirectly what it cannot do directly. Also, where a contract is
violative of public policy, the municipality executing it cannot be
estopped to assert the invalidity of a contract which has ceded
away, controlled, or embarrassed its legislative or government
powers. As pointed out above, "public biddings are held for the
best protection of the public and to give the public the best
possible advantages by means of open competition between
the bidders." Thus, contracts requiring public bidding affect
public interest, and to change them without complying with that
requirement would indeed be against public policy. There is,
therefore, nothing to plaintiff-appellee's contention that the
parties in this case being in pari delicto should be left in the
situation where they are found, for "although the parties are in
pari delicto, yet the court may interfere and grant relief at the
suit of one of them, where public policy requires its
intervention, even though the result may be that a benefit will
be derived by a plaintiff who is in equal guilt with defendant.
But here the guilt of the parties is not considered as equal to
the higher right of the public, and the guilty party to whom the
relief is granted is simply the instrument by which the public is
served." In consonance with the principles enunciated above,
Resolution 59, series of 1947, reducing the rentals by 20% of
the original price, which was also passed without public
bidding, should likewise be held void, since a reduction of the
rental to be paid by the lessee is a substantial alternation in the
contract, making it a distinct and different lease contract which
requires the prescribed formality of public bidding.
37. VILLASIS vs SANDIGANBAYAN
38. RAMOS vs CA
FACTS: The municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan, availed of the
services of the law firm of Cruz Durian and Academia in a case
for land recovery against Maria C. Ramos, et. al. Provincial
Fiscal of Bulacan and Municipal Attorney of Hagonoy entered
their appearance as supervising counsel in the case for land
recovery. Ramos moved to disqualify Cruz law firm from
serving as counsel for the municipality. Trial court denied
motion to disqualify since it found that private counsel only
wanted to serve his native town. Ramos assailed said order by
a petition for certiorari with the CA, which sustained the ruling
of the trial court. Thus, the case is appealed to the SC.
ISSUE: Is the finding of CA that it is legal for a private counsel
to represent an LGU is correcy
RULING: There are 2 specific law prohibiting private counsels
representing the government. Sec. 1683 of the Revised
Administrative Code states the provincial fiscal shall represent
the province and any municipality or municipal district thereof
in any court, except in case whereof original jurisdiction is
vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the
municipality or municipal district in the same province. When
the interests of a provincial government and of any political
division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on
behalf of the province. When the provincial fiscal is disqualified
to serve any municipality or other political subdivision of a
province, a special attorney may be employed by its council.
Another is Sec. 3 of Local Autonomy Act, R.A. 2264, which
provides that the municipal attorney, as the head of the legal
division or office of a municipality, shall act as legal counsel of
the municipality and perform such duties and exercise such
powers as may be assigned to him by the council.
39. CORTES vs BARTOLOME
40. MALABANG vs BENITO
FACTS:
Municipality of Balabagan was once part of the Municipality of
Malabang before it was created into a separate municipality
thru an executive order. The Municipality Malabang filed a suit
against the Municipality of Balabagan for having been created
under an invalid EO 386 and to restrain the respondent
municipal officials from performing the functions of their
respective offices. Petitioner relied on the ruling of the Pelaez
case that Sec. 68 of the Administrative Code is
unconstitutional (a) because it constitutes an undue delegation
of legislative power and (b) because it offends against Section
10 (1) of Article VII of the Constitution, which limits the
President's power over local governments to mere supervision.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on
March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the subsequent
adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly
incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment.
The Respondents on the other hand argue that the Mun. of
Balabagan is at least a de facto corporation for having been
organized under color of a statute before this was declared
unconstitutional, its officers having been either elected or
appointed, and the municipality itself having discharged its
corporate functions for the past five years preceding the
institution of this action. It is contended that as a de facto
corporation, its existence cannot be collaterally attacked,
although it may be inquired into directly in an action for quo
warranto at the instance of the State and not of an individual
like the petitioner Balindong. The method of challenging the
existence of a municipal corporation is reserved to the State in
a proceeding for quo warranto or other direct proceeding. But
the rule disallowing collateral attacks applies only where the
municipal corporation is at least a de facto corporation. For
where it is neither a corporation de jure nor de facto, but a
nullity, the rule is that its existence may be questioned
collaterally or directly in any action or proceeding by any one
whose rights or interests are affected thereby, including the
citizens of the territory incorporated unless they are estopped
by their conduct from doing so.
ISSUE: Is the municipality of Balabagan is a de facto
corporation.
RULING: No, because there is no other valid statute to give
color of authority to its creation when EO 386 was
subsequently declared as unconstitutional.
The color of authority requisite to the organization of a de facto
municipal corporation may be:
1. A valid law enacted by the legislature.
2. An unconstitutional law, valid on its face, which has either
(a) been upheld for a time by the courts or (b) not yet been
declared void; provided that a warrant for its creation can be
found in some other valid law or in the recognition of its
potential existence by the general laws or constitution of the
state.
In the case at bar, there is no other law that could give color of
authority to the validity of the existence of the municpality of
Balabagan when EO 386 was later on invalidated. Hence,
such municipality is not a de factor corporation.
41. PELAEZ vs AUDITOR GENERAL
FACTS: FACTS:
From September 4 to October 29, 1964, the President of the
Philippines issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and
126 to 129. These orders created thirty-three (33)
municipalities pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code, insofar as it grants the President the
power to create municipalities. Thereafter, VicePresident
Pelaez instituted a special civil action for a writ of prohibition
with preliminary injunction to stop the Auditor General from
disbursing funds to said municipalities, alleging that the
executive orders are null and void on the ground that said
Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No.
2370 or the Barrio Charter Act. Since January 1, 1960, when
Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios can no
longer be created or their boundaries altered nor their names
changed except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding
provincial board upon petition of a majority of the voters in the
areas affected and the recommendation of the council of the
municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is
situated. It is argued that since the creation of barrios is a
legislative act, the creation of municipalities must also require
a legislative enactment. The Executive Orders are, likewise,
challenged for they constitute an undue delegation of
legislative power. The Auditor General argues that the present
action is premature and that not all proper parties, referring to
the officials of the new political subdivisions in question, have
been impleaded.
ISSUES: 1. Is the President empowered to create a
municipality?
2. Is Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code an undue
delegation of legislative power?
RULING: RA 2370, being a statutory denial of the presidential
authority to create a new barrio, it also implies a negation of
the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which
consists of several barrios. The authority to create municipal
corporations is essentially legislative in nature. With respect to
the issue on undue delegation of powers by the legislature, the
Supreme Court held that although Congress may delegate to
another branch of the government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a
law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself. In
other words, it must set forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate. And the law must
(b) fix a standard. The limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable to which the delegate must
conform in the performance of his functions. In the case at bar,
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet
these well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of the
power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not
enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the
President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to
avoid the evil effects above referred to. Since the creation of
municipalities is not an administrative function, it is essentially
and eminently legislative in character. The question whether or
not public interest demands the exercise of such power is not
one of fact. It is purely a legislative question. The President
cannot invoke its power of control or the right to interfere on
the acts of the officers of the executive departments, bureaus,
or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of
such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the
Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned.
Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments,
so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their
authority. What he has is a mere power of supervision over the
local government units. As a consequence, the alleged power
of the President to create municipal corporations would
necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority even
greater than that of control which he has over the executive
departments, bureaus or offices. Clearly, therefore, the
Executive Orders promulgated by him creating municipalities
are ultra vires and therefore, void
42. MUN. of JIMENEZ vs JUDGE BAZ
FACTS: The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by
President Elpidio Quirino through Executive Order No. 258,
pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of
1917. EO 258 stated that the mother Municipality of Jimenez
shall have its present territory, minus the portion thereof
included in the Municipality of Sinacaban. Based on the
technical description stated in the EO, Sinacaban laid claim to
a portion of Barrio Tabo-o and to Barrios Macabayao,
Adorable, Sinara Baja, and Sinara Alto. In response, the
Municipality of Jimenez, while conceding that the disputed
area is part of Sinacaban, nonetheless asserted jurisdiction on
the basis of an agreement it had with the Municipality of
Sinacaban. This agreement was approved by the Provincial
Board of Misamis Occidental in its Resolution No. 77, which
fixed the common boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez. On
March 20, 1990, Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus in the Regional Trial Court of
Oroquieta City. The suit was filed against Sinacaban and other
government agencies. Jimenez alleged that, in accordance
with the Pelaez ruling, the power to create municipalities is
essentially legislative. Consequently, Sinacaban, which was
created by an executive order, had no legal personality and no
right to assert a territorial claim against Jimenez, of which it
remains part. Jimenez prayed that Sinacaban be enjoined from
assuming control and supervision over the disputed barrios.
RTC, however, maintained the status quo, that is, the
municipality of Sinacaban shall continue to exist and operate
as a regular municipality, for the following reasons: Sinacaban
is a de facto corporation since it had completely organized
itself even prior to the Pelaez case and exercised corporate
powers for forty years (40) before its existence was
questioned; that Jimenez did not have the legal standing to
question the existence of Sinacaban, the same being reserved
to the State as represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General in a quo warranto proceeding; that Jimenez was
estopped from questioning the legal existence of Sinacaban by
entering into an agreement with it concerning their common
boundary; and that any question as to the legal existence of
Sinacaban had been rendered moot by Sec. 442(d) LGC.
ISSUES: 1. Whether the Municipality of Sinacaban is a legal
juridical entity, duly created in accordance with law;
2. Whether the decision of the Provincial Board regarding the
boundaries had acquired finality.
RULING: The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was
not validly created as a municipal corporation is the ruling in
Pelaez v. Auditor General that the creation of municipal
corporations is essentially a legislative matter. Therefore, the
President was without power to create by executive order the
Municipality of Sinacaban. However, the Supreme Court had
since held that where a municipality created as such by
executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are
accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be
questioned. This was the ruling in Municipality of San Narciso
v. Mendez, Sr. Here, the same factors are present so as to
confer on Sinacaban the status of at least a de facto municipal
corporation in the sense that its legal existence has been
recognized and acquiesced publicly as shown in the following
circumstances:
 1. Sinacaban had been in existence for sixteen years
(16) when Pelaez v. Auditor General was decided on
December 24, 1965. Yet the validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it
had never been questioned. Created in 1949, it was only 40
years later that its existence was questioned and only because
it had laid claim to a certain area. 2. The State and even the
Municipality of Jimenez itself have recognized Sinacaban's
corporate existence. a. Under Administrative Order No. 33
and Section 31 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.
P. Blg. 129), Sinacaban has a municipal circuit court. b. For its
part, Jimenez had earlier recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by
entering into an agreement with it regarding their common
boundary which was embodied in Resolution No. 77 of the
Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental. c. Indeed, Sinacaban
has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance
appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative
districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban
part of the Second District of Misamis Occidental. 3.
Moreover, following the ruling in Municipality of San Narciso,
Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., Sec. 442(d) of the Local Government
Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any defect in the
creation of Sinacaban.

Second, the Supreme Court held that the Provincial

Board did not have the authority to approve the agreement
declaring certain barrios part of one or the other municipality
because the effect would be to amend the technical description
stated in E.O. No. 258. Any alteration of boundaries that is not
in accordance with the law creating a municipality is not the
carrying into effect of that law but is rather considered an
amendment. Since Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board
of Misamis Occidental is contrary to the technical description of
the territory of Sinacaban, it cannot be used by Jimenez as
basis for opposing the territorial claim of Sinacaban.